Life of John C. Calhoun, presenting a condensed history of political events from 1811 to 1843. Together with a selection from his speeches, reports, and other writings subsequent to his election as vice-president of the United States, including his leading speech on the late war delivered in 1811

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Irora a Muiial.;ire by Bla.:,ehard

LIFE

OP

JOHN C. CALHOM,

PRESENTING A CONDENSED

HISTORY OP POLITICAL EVENTS

FROM 1811 TO 1843.

TOGETHER WITH A SELECTION

SPEECHES, REPORTS, AND OTHER WRITINGS

SUBSEQUENT TO HIS ELECTION AS

VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, INCLUDING HIS LEAD
ING SPEECH ON THE LATE WAR DELIVERED IN 1811.

NEW-YORK:
HARPER & BROTHERS, 82 CLIFF-STREE.T.

1843.

Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1843,

By HARPER & BROTHERS,
In the Clerk's Office of the Southern District of New- York.

ADVERTISEMENT.

SINCE Mr. CALHOUN first took a leading part in the politics of the coun
try and the administration of its government, a new generation of men
has risen into life, who cannot appeal to their memories for the his
tory of his public services. It was thought necessary, therefore, by his
political friends, who desire to see his great abilities and high virtues
placed in the widest sphere of usefulness, that a biographical sketch
should be published to furnish information to the young, and to revive
the recollections of those of more mature age ; and to attain their object
most effectually, it was deemed expedient that the sketch should be ac
companied with a selection from his speeches, reports, and other writings,
which would furnish the most authentic evidence of his opinions as well
on subjects of high constitutional law as on the great measures of policy
which divide and distinguish the two great parties of the country. Such
a selection, to be practically useful to the public, must necessarily be very
limited when taken in comparison with the whole body of Mr. CALHOUN'S
very numerous speeches, reports, and other writings, as a complete col
lection of them would be too bulky and expensive for general circulation.
This selection, therefore, contains one speech only delivered prior to his
becoming Vice-president, and, while many delivered subsequently have,
in order to prevent the volume from being too large, been unavoidably
excluded, it is particularly full on the subject of Banks, Independent Treas
ury, Currency, Tariff, Distribution of the Proceeds of the Public Lands,
State Rights, and the principles and policy which should control in the
administration of the government, those being the subjects which for some
years past have agitated, and still continue to agitate, the public mind,
and on which the people of the United States are interested in having
exact and authentic information respecting Mr. CALHOUN'S settled and
matured opinions after the long experience of thirty-two years uninter
ruptedly devoted to their service.

LIFE

OF

JOHN C. CALHOUN.

CHAPTER I.

Including the Period from his Infancy until he entered Congress.

THE object of the present memoir of JOHN CALDWELL CALHOUN is not to
present a biography of the man, but to describe him as a statesman j to
draw and to develop his character in that capacity, and to trace his emi
nent public services during a long career in one of the most eventful pe
riods of human history. To dwell on a character like his, distinguished
by every trait that should win esteem and commn^d admiration, would be
to the biographer a most attractive labour ; bui the pleasure of depicting
a private life elevated by spotless purity and integrity, and a severe sim
plicity of tastes and habits, must be relinquished — except so far as occa
sional reference to his early history may become necessary — for the high
er duty of portraying his intellectual features, and of explaining his mo
tives and conduct as a public man- It is not our aim to commend him to
public affection, or to enlist popular sympathy in his behalf, but rather to
show to the world, not for hi-* sake, but for its own instruction, the deep
influence of this master-nv'nd upon the great political events of his age.
A fair and impartial review of the career of this eminent statesman in
connexion with public affairs, is necessary*to a thorough understanding
of the course of our own government for nearly two thirds of its existence.
Such a review, it is believed, would be no unacceptable offering at the
present time. Throughout the whole period from 1811 up to the pres
ent time he has served the Union in the various capacities of Represent
ative, Secretary of War, Vice-president, and Senator. He has taken
a prominent and influential part in all the great questions which have
arisen during that long interval; and, although he has asked a release
from farther public service, it is not impossible that he may be destined
to close his career as a statesman in another and a higher station. With
faculties unclouded, with physical powers unimpaired, with a judgment
matured by observation and experience, with an intrepidity untamed by
the many trying vicissitudes of his extraordinary life, and with an activity
whose energies are unabated by time, it is probable that the American
people will not dispense with such services as he might render in the
highest sphere open to American statesmen.

Mr. Calhoun is a native of South Carolina, and was born in Abbeville
District on the 18th of March, 1782. His family is Irish on both sides.
His father, Patrick Callioun, was born in Donegal, in Ireland, but the fam
ily emigrated when Patrick was a child, first to Pennsylvania, where they
remained some years, and then to the western part of Virginia, from
whence they were driven by the Indians after Braddock's defeat. They

4 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

removed finally to South Carolina in 1756, when Patrick settled on the
place where the subject of this sketch was born, and which still continues
in the family of his younger brother. His mother, whose maiden name
was Caldwell, was born in Charlotte County, Virginia. They had five
children, one daughter and four sons, of whom John was the youngest but
one. He was called after his maternal uncle, Major John Caldwell, whom
the Tories had murdered in cold blood, and in his own yard, after destroy
ing his house by fire. If time permitted, it might be interesting here to
trace the effect which the traditions of the stirring scenes of a pioneer's
life might have had upon the mind and character of young Calhoun. His
paternal and maternal family both being Whig, they were exposed not
only to hostile Indian incursions, but also to Tory outrages. They main
tained their foothold on the soil despite the conflicts of an almost con
stant border warfare, and adhered to their country amid the horrors of
civil strife and in the face of foreign invaders. But they had need both
of courage and constancy to bear them through the severe trials to which
they were exposed. Of three maternal uncles able to bear arms, one per
ished as we have before described, another fell at the battle of Cowpens
with thirty sabre wounds, and a third, taken prisoner by the English, was
immured for nine months in the dungeons of St. Augustine. Nor was
Patrick Calhoun, the father, indebted to anything less than a strong arm
and a stout heart for his escape from the perils which surrounded him.
Upon one occasion, with thirteen other whites, he maintained a desperate
conflict for hours with the Cherokee Indians, until, overwhelmed by su
perior numbers, he was forced to retreat, leaving seven of his companions
dead upon the field. Three days after, they returned to bury their dead,
and found the bodies of twenty-three Indian warriors, who had perished
in the same conflict. At another time, he was singled out by an Indian
distinguished for his prowess as & chief and for his skill with the rifle.
The Indian taking to a tree, Calhoun secured himself behind a log, from
whence he drew the Indian's fire four ti^es by holding his hat on a stick
a little above his hiding-place. The Indi^i at length exhibited a portion
of his person in an effort to ascertain the effect of his shot, when he re
ceived a ball from his enemy in the shoulder, which forced him to fly.
But the hat exhibited the traces of four balls by *rhich it had been perfo
rated. The effect of this mode of life upon a min& naturally strong and
inquisitive was to create a certain degree of contempt for the forms of
civilized life, and for all that was merely conventional in society. He
claimed all the rights which nature and reason seemed to establish, and
he acknowledged no obligation which was not supported by the like sanc
tions. It was under this conviction that, upon one occasion, be and his
neighbours went down within twenty-three miles of Charleston, armed
with rifles, to exercise a right of suffrage which had been disputed: a
contest which ended in electing him to the Legislature of the state, in
which body he served for thirty years. Relying upon virtue, reason,
and courage as all that constituted the true moral strength of man, he at
tached too little importance to mere information, and never feared to en
counter an adversary who, in that respect, had the advantage over him : a
confidence which many of the events of his life seemed to justify. In
deed, he once appeared as his own advocate in a case in Virginia, in
which he recovered a tract of land in despite of the regularly-trained dispu
tants who sought to embarrass and defeat him. He opposed the Federal
Constitution, because, as he said, it permitted other people than those of
South Carolina to tax the people of South Carolina, and thus allowed tax
ation without representation, which was a violation of the fundamental
principle of the Revolutionary struggle.

LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 5

We have heard his son say that among his earliest recollections was
one of a conversation when he was nine, years of age, in which his father
maintained that government to be best which allowed the largest amount
of individual liberty compatible with social order and tranquillity, and in
sisted that the improvements in political science would be found to consist
in throwing off many of the restraints then imposed by law, and deemed
necessary to an organized society. It may well be supposed that his son
John was an attentive and eager auditor, and such lessons as these must
doubtless have served to encourage that free spirit of inquiry, and that
intrepid zeal for truth for which he has been since so much distinguished.
The mode of thinking which was thus encouraged may, perhaps, have
compensated in some degree the want of those early advantages which
are generally deemed indispensable to great intellectual progress. Of
these he had comparatively few. But this was compensated by those
natural gifts which give great minds the mastery over difficulties which
the timid regard as insuperable. Indeed, we have here another of those
rare instances in which the hardiness of natural genius is seen to defy all
obstacles, and develops its flower and matures its fruit under circum
stances apparently the most unpropitious.

The section of the country in which his family resided was then newly
settled, and in a rude frontier state. There was not an academy in all the
upper part of the state, and none within fifty miles, except one at about
that distance in Columbia county, Georgia, which was kept by his broth
er-in-law, Mr. Waddell, a Presbyterian clergyman. There were but a few
scattered schools in the whole of that region, and these were such as are
usually found on the frontier, in which reading, writing, and arithmetic
were imperfectly taught. At the age of thirteen he was placed under the
charge of his brother-in-law to receive his education. Shortly after, his
father died ; this was followed by the death of his sister, Mrs. Waddell,
within a few weeks, and the academy was then discontinued, which sus
pended his education before it had fairly commenced. His brother-in-
law, with whom he was still left, was absent the greater part of the time,
attending to his clerical duties, and his pupil thus found himself on a se
cluded plantation, without any white companion during the greater por
tion of the time. A situation apparently so unfavourable to improvement
turned out, in his case, to be the reverse. Fortunately for him, there was a
small circulating library in the house, of which his brother-in-law was libra
rian, and, in the absence of all company and amusements, that attracted
his attention. His taste, although undirected, led him to history, to the
neglect of novels and other lighter reading ; and so deeply was he inter
ested, that in a short time he read the whole of the small stock of his
torical works contained in the library, consisting of Rollin's Ancient His
tory, Robertson's Charles V., his South America, and Voltaire's Charles
XII. After despatching these, he turned with like eagerness to Cook's
Voyages (the large edition), a small volume of Essays by Brown, and
Locke on the Understanding, which he read as far as the chapter on In
finity. All this was the work of but fourteen weeks. So intense was his
application that his eyes became seriously affected, his countenance pal
lid, and his frame emaciated. His mother, alarmed at the intelligence of
his health, sent for him home, where exercise and amusement soon re
stored his strength, and he acquired a fondness for hunting, fishing, and
other country sports. Four years passed away in these pursuits, and in
attention to the business of the farm while his elder brothers were absent,
to the entire neglect of his education. But the time was not lost. Exer
cise and rural sports invigorated his frame, while his labours on the farm
gave him a taste for agriculture, which he has always retained, and in the

6 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN

pursuit of which he finds delightful occupation for his intervals of leisure from
public duties.

About this time an incident occurred upon which turned his after life. His
second brother, James, who had been placed at a counting-house in Charles
ton, returned to spend the summer of 1800 at home. John had determined
to become a planter ; but James, objecting to this, strongly urged him to ac
quire a good education, and pursue one of the learned professions. He re
plied that he was not averse to the course advised, but there were two difficul
ties in the way : one was to obtain the assent of his mother, without which lie
could not think of leaving her, and the other was the want of means. He said
his property was small and his resolution fixed : he would far rather be a
planter than a half-informed physician or lawyer. With this determination, he
could not bring his mind to select either without ample preparation ; but if the
consent of their mother should be freely given, and he (James) thought he
could so manage his property as to keep him in funds for seven years of study
preparatory to entering his profession, he would leave home and commence his
education the next week. His mother and brother agreeing to his conditions, he
accordingly left home the next week for Dr. Waddell's, who had married again,
and resumed his academy in Columbia county, Georgia. This was in June,
1800, in the beginning of his 19th year, at which time it may be said he com
menced his education, his tuition having been previously very imperfect, and
confined to reading, writing, and arithmetic in an ordinary country school. His
progress here was so rapid that in two years he entered the junior class of Yale
College, and graduated with distinction in 1804, just four years from the time
he commenced his Latin grammar. He was highly esteemed by Dr. Dwight,
then the president of the college, although they differed widely in politics, and
at a time when political feelings were intensely bitter. The doctor was an
ardent Federalist, and Mr. Calhoun was one of a very few, in a class of more
than seventy, who had the firmness openly to avow and maintain the opinions
of the Republican party, and, among others, that the people were the only le
gitimate source of political power. Dr. Dwight entertained a different opinion.
In a recitation during the senior year, on the chapter on Politics in Paley's
Moral Philosophy, the doctor, with the intention of eliciting his opinion, pro
pounded to Mr. Calhoun the question, as to the legitimate source of power. He
did not decline an open and direct avowal of his opinion. A discussion ensued
between them, which exhausted the time allotted for the recitation, and in which
the pupil maintained his opinions with such vigour of argument and success as
to elicit from his distinguished teacher the declaration, in speaking of him to a
friend, that " the young man had talent enough to be President of the United
States," which he accompanied by a prediction that he would one day attain
that station.

An English oration was assigned to Mr. Calhoun at the Commencement.
He selected for his thesis, " The qualifications necessary to constitute a perfect
statesman," and prepared his oration, but was prevented from delivering it by a
severe indisposition. After graduating, he commenced the study of the law, and
devoted three years to that and miscellaneous reading, eighteen months of which
were spent at Litchfield, Connecticut, where a celebrated law-school was kept
at that time by Judge Reeves and Mr. Gould. He acquired great distinction at
the school. It was there that he successfully cultivated, in a debating society,
his talents for extemporary speaking. The residue of the time was spent in the
offices of Mr. De Saussure, of Charleston (afterward chancellor), and of Mr.
George Bowie, of Abbeville. Having spent seven years in preparation, accord
ing to his determination when he commenced his education, and having passed
his examination for admission to the bar, he began the practice of law in his na
tive district. He rose at once into full practice, taking a stand with the oldest
and ablest lawyers on the circuit

LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 7

He continued but a short time at the bar. While he was yet a student, after
iris return from Litchfield to Abbeville, an incident occurred which agitated the
whole Union, and contributed to give to Mr. Calhoun's life, at that early period,
the political direction which it has ever since kept — the attack of the English
frigate Leopard on the American frigate Chesapeake. It led to public meetings all
over the Union, in which resolutions were passed expressive of the indignation
of the people, and their firm resolve to stand by the government in whatever
measure it might think proper to adopt to redress the outrage. At that called
in his native district, he was appointed one of the committee to prepare a report
and resolutions to be presented to a meeting to be convened to receive them on
an appointed day. Mr. Calhoun was requested by the committee to prepare
them, which he did so much to their satisfaction, that he was appointed to ad
dress the meeting on the occasion before the vote was taken on the resolutions.
The meeting was large, and it was the first time he had ever appeared before
the public. He acquitted himself with such success that his name was pre
sented as a candidate for the state Legislature at the next election. He was
elected at the head of the ticket, and at a time when the prejudice against law
yers was so strong in the district that no one of the profession who had offered
for many years previously had ever succeeded. This was the commencement
of his political life, and the first evidence he ever received of the confidence of
the people of the state — a confidence which has continued ever since constantly
increasing, without interruption or reaction, for the third of a century ; and which,
for its duration, universality, and strength, may be said to be without a parallel
in any other state, or in the case of any other public man.

He served tw.o sessions in the state Legislature. It was not long after he
took his seat before he distinguished himself. Early in the session an informal
meeting of the Republican portion of the members was called to nominate can
didates for the places of President and Vice-president of the United States.
Mr. Madison was nominated for the presidency without opposition. When,
the nomination for the vice-presidency was presented, Mr. Calhoun embraced
the occasion to present his opinion in reference to coming events, as bearing
on the nomination. He reviewed the state of the relations between the United
States and Great Britain and France, the two great belligerents which were
then struggling for mastery, and in their struggle trampling on the rights of neu
trals, and especially ours ; he touched on the restrictive system which had been
resorted to by the government to protect our rights, and expressed his doubt of
its efficacy, and the conviction that a war with Great Britain would be una
voidable. " It was," he said, " in this state of things, of the utmost importance
that the ranks of the Republican party should be preserved undisturbed and un
broken by faction or discord." He then adverted to the fact, that a discontent
ed portion of the party had given unequivocal evidence of rallying round the
name of the venerable vice-president, George Clinton (whose re-nomination was
proposed), and of whom he spoke highly ; but he gave it as his opinion, that should
he be nominated and re-elected, he would become the nucleus of all the dis
contented portion of the party, and thus make a formidable division in its ranks
should the country be forced into war. These persons, he predicted, would ulti
mately rally under De Witt Clinton, the nephew, whom he described as a man
of distinguished talents and aspiring disposition. To avoid the danger, he sug
gested for nomination the name of John Langdon, of New-Hampshire, of whom
he spoke highly both as to talents and patriotism.

It was Mr. Calhoun's first effort in a public capacity. The manner and mat
ter excited great applause ; and when it is recollected that these remarks pre
ceded the declaration of war more than three years, and how events happened
according to his anticipations, it affords a striking proof of that sagacity, at so
early a period, for which he has since been so much distinguished. It at once
gave him a stand among the most distinguished members of the Legislature.

LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

During the short period he remained a member, he originated and carried
through several measures, which proved in practice to be salutary, and have
become a permanent portion of the legislation of the state.

CHAPTER II.

Including the period from his entering Congress until his appointment as Secretary of War.

IN the mean time, the growing difficulties in our foreign relations, especially
with Great Britain, impressed the community at large with the belief that war
with that formidable power was approaching. The impression naturally turned
the attention of the people, in selecting candidates for Congress, to those whom
they believed to be the most competent to serve them at so trying a period.
The eyes of the congressional district in which Mr. Calhoun resided were
turned towards him, and he was elected by an overwhelming majority over his
opponent. This was in the fall of 1810, and he took his seat in the councils
of the nation, a year afterward, in the first session of the twelfth Congress,
known as the war session, with his two distinguished colleagues, Mr. Cheves
and Mr. Lowndes, who, like himself, had been elected in reference to the critical
condition of the country. His reputation had preceded him, and he was placed
second on the Committee of Foreign Relations, which, in the existing state of our
relations with the two great belligerents, was regarded as the most important of
the committees, and was, accordingly, filled by members selected in reference
to the magnitude of its duties. The other distinguished individuals who com
posed it were Peter B. Porter, the chairman, and Felix Grundy, of Tennessee,
on the Republican side, and John Randolph and Philip Barton Key on the other.
It was, indeed, an eventful period of our history, and the duties which it imposed
on the committee were of the most difficult and responsible character.

It is not easy, at this day, to estimate the magnitude of the crisis. Our pres
ent government had its origin just preceding the commencement of the great
Revolution in France, which, in its progress, involved her in a war without ex
ample or parallel in the history of the world, taking into estimate its cause, ex
tent, duration, the immensity of force brought into conflict, the skill which di
rected it, the variety and magnitude of its incidents, and the importance of the
stake at issue. England was the great antagonist power to France in this
mighty struggle, whose shocks reached even our distant shores. From the be
ginning, our mutual rights were invaded by both sides, and our peace endan
gered ; but so recently had our government been established, so hazardous was
it to jput it to the test of war, and especially in such a struggle, and so advan
tageous to our commerce and prosperity was our position as a neutral power,
while all Europe was at war, that it became the fixed policy of the government
to preserve peace and bear wrongs, so long as the one could be preserved and
the other endured without sacrificing the honour and independence of the coun
try. This pacific and wise policy was, with some slight exceptions, steadily
pursued for more than fifteen years. At length came the Berlin and Milan
Decrees on the part of France, and the hostile orders in council on the part of
England, which forced on our government the embargo and other restrictive
measures, adopted from an anxious desire of preserving peace, and in the hope
of obtaining respect for our rights from one or other of the two belligerents.
Experience soon proved how impotent these measures were, and how fallacious
was our hope. The encroachments on our rights and independence continued
to advance, till England at length pushed her aggressions so far that our com
merce was reduced to a state of dependance as complete as when we were her
colonies, and our ships were converted, at the same time, into a recruiting-ground

LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 9 .

to man her navy. Not a vessel of ours was permitted to reach Europe but
through her ports, and more than 3000 of our hardy seamen were impressed
into her service, to fight battles in which they had no interest. Our independ
ence, as far as the ocean was concerned, had become an empty name ; but so
hazardous was it to take up arms in the unprepared state of the country, and to
be drawn into a struggle apparently so fearful and interminable between the two
first powers on earth, that the stoutest and boldest might well have paused at
taking the step.

It was in such a crisis of our affairs that Mr. Calhoun took his seat in Con
gress. To him it was not unexpected. He had little confidence from the be
ginning in the peaceful measures resorted to for the redress of our wrongs, and
saw beforehand that the final alternatives would be war or submission, and had
deliberately made up his mind, that to lose independence, and to sink down into
a state of acknowledged inferiority, depending for security on forbearance, and
Dot on our capacity and disposition to defend ourselves, would be the worst
calamity which could befall the country. According to his opinion, the ability
of the government to defend the country against external danger, and to cause
its rights to be respected from without, was as essential as protection against
violence within, and that, if i*. should prove incompetent to meet successfully the
hazard of a just and necessary war, it would fail in one of the two great objects
for which it was instituted, and that the sooner it was known the better. With*
these fixed opinions, his voice, on taking his seat, was for the most decisive
course.

The President's Message, at the opening of the session, was, in its general
features, warlike, and yet there were expressions of an ambiguous character,
which led many to doubt what course of policy was really intended by the ad
ministration. The portion which related to our affairs with other powers was
referred to the Committee of Foreign Relations. The excitement in the coun
try was intense, and party spirit never ran higher. All eyes were turned on
the proceedings of the committee. They reported, at an early period of the
session, resolutions strongly recommending immediate and extensive prepara
tions to defend our rights and redress our wrongs by an appeal to arms. The
debate was opened by the chairman, Mr. Porter, and he was followed on the
same side by Mr. Grundy. It was allotted to Mr. Calhoun to follow Mr. Ran
dolph, who, on the opposite side, succeeded Mr. Grundy in an able and elo
quent speech. The discussion from the beginning excited profound interest,
both in the body and the crowded audience daily assembled in the lobby and
galleries, and this interest had increased as the discussion advanced. It was
Mr. Calhoun's first speech in Congress, except a few brief remarks on the Ap
portionment Bill. The trial was a severe one ; expectation was high. The
question was of the greatest magnitude, and he to whom he had to reply, a vet
eran statesman of unsurpassed eloquence. How he acquitted himself, the pa
pers of the day will best attest. The remarks of the Richmond Enquirer, then,
as now, a leading journal on the Republican side, may be taken as an example.
Mr. Ritchie, in his remarks on the speeches, after characterizing Mr. Randolph's,
said : " Mr. Calhoun is clear and precise in his reasoning, marching up directly
to the object of his attack, arid felling down the errors of his opponent with the
club of Hercules ; not eloquent in his tropes and figures, but, like Fox, in the
moral elevation of his sentiments ; free from personality, yet full of those fine
touches of indignation, which are the severest cut to the man of feeling. His
speech, like a fine drawing, abounds in those lights and shades which set off
each other : the cause of his country is robed in light, while her opponents are_^-
wrapped in darkness. It were a contracted wish that Mr. Calhoun were a Vir
ginian ; though, after the quota she has furnished with opposition talents, such,
a wish might be forgiven us. We beg leave to participate, as Americans and
friends of our country, in the honours of South Carolina. We hail this young

B

10 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

•Carolinian as one of the master-spirits who stamp their names upon the age in
which they live."

When Mr. Calhoun sat down, he was greeted by the great body of the
party for his successful effort, and thenceforward took rank with the ablest
and most influential members of the body. But, as clear as it appeared to him
that the period had arrived when a resort to arms could no longer be avoided
without sacrificing the honour and interest of the country, such was far from
being the feeling of many, even of the Republican members of the body. Many,
who saw the necessity, hesitated ; some from the great hazard of war, others
from the want of preparation, or the difficulty of selecting between the belliger
ents, when both had so grossly violated our rights ; arid not a few from a linger
ing confidence in the Non-importation Act, and other restrictive measures, as the
means of redressing our wrongs. Mr. Calhoun, although he approved of the
motive which had led to a resort to those measures in the first instance, and
regarded them as wise temporary expedients, never had any confidence in
them as instruments of avenging or redressing the wrongs of the country. • Be
lieving that they had accomplished all they ever could, and that a latent attach
ment to them was one of the principal impediments to a resort to arms, he did
not hesitate to attack the whole system.

To realize the boldness and hazard of such a step, it must be borne in mind
at the support or opposition to the system had been for many years the main
jtest of party fidelity, and that party spirit was never higher than at the time.
But as strongly as he was attached to the administration, to the Republican
party, and their general policy, and opposed as he was to the Federalists, he
did not hesitate, young as he was, when he believed duty and the interest of
the country required it, to place himself above all party considerations, and to
expose manfully the defects of a system which had been so long cherished and
defended by the party to which he belonged. The following extracts from a
speech delivered against it will give in his own language some of the most
prominent objections which he urged against the system, and afford, at the
same time, a fair specimen of his powers of reasoning and eloquence at that
early period, and of the lofty and patriotic sentiments which actuated him in the
line of policy that he advocated.

" The restrictive system," he said, " as a mode of resistance, or as a means
of obtaining redress, has never been a favourite one with me. I wish not to
censure the motives which dictated it, or attribute weakness to those who first
resorted to it for a restoration of our rights. But, sir, I object to the restrictive
system because it does not suit the genius of the people, or that of our govern
ment, or the geographical character of our country. We are a people essen
tially active ; I may say we are pre-eminently so. No passive system can
suit such a people ; in action superior to all others, in patient endurance inferior
to none. Nor does it suit the genius of our government. Our government is
founded on freedom, and hates coercion. To make the restrictive system ef
fective, requires the most arbitrary laws. England, with the severest penal
statutes, has not been able to exclude prohibited articles ; and Napoleon, with
all his power and vigilance, was obliged to resort to the most barbarous laws to
enforce his Continental system."

After showing how the whole mercantile community must become corrupt by
the temptations and facilities for smuggling, and how the public opinion of the
commercial community (upon which the system must depend for its enforce
ment) becomes opposed to it, and gives sanction to its violation, he proceeds

" But there are other objections to the system. It renders government odi
ous. The farmer inquires why he gets no more for his produce, and he is told
it is owing to the embargo, or commercial restrictions. In this he sees only
the hand of his own government, and not the acts of violence and injustice
•which this system is intended to counteract. His censures fall on the govern-

LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 11

ment. This is an unhappy state of the public mind ; and even, I might say, in.
a government resting essentially on public opinion, a dangerous one. In war
it is different. Its privation, it is true, may be equal or greater ; but the public
mind, under the strong impulses of that state of things, becomes steeled against
sufferings. The difference is almost infinite between the passive and active
state of the mind. Tie down a hero, and he feels the puncture of a pin : throw
him into battle, and he is almost insensible to vital gashes. So in war. Im
pelled alternately by hope and fear, stimulated by revenge, depressed by shame,
or elevated by victory, the people become invincible. No privation can shake
their fortitude ; no calamity break their spirit. Even when equally successful,
the contrast between the two systems is striking. War and restriction may
leave the country equally exhausted ; but the latter not only leaves you poor,
but, even when successful, dispirited, divided, discontented, with diminished
patriotism, and the morals of a considerable portion of your people corrupted.
Not so in war. . In that state, the common danger unites all, strengthens the
bonds of society, and feeds the flame of patriotism. The national character
mounts to energy. In exchange for the expenses and privations of war, you
obtain military and naval skill, and a more perfect organization of such parts of
your administration as are connected with the science of national defence. Sir,
are these advantages to be counted as trifles in the present state of the world ?
Can they be measured by moneyed valuation ? I would prefer a single victory
over the enemy, by sea or land, to all the good we shall ever derive from the
continuation of the Non-importation Act. I know not that a victory would pro
duce an equal pressure on the enemy ; but I am certain of what is of greater
consequence, it would be accompanied by more salutary effects on ourselves.
The memory of Saratoga, Princeton, and Eutaw is immortal. It is there you
will find the country's boast and pride — the inexhaustible source of great and
heroic sentiments. But what will history say of restriction ? What examples
worthy of imitation will it furnish to posterity 1 What pride, what pleasure,
will our children find in the events of such times ? Let me not be considered
romantic. This nation ought to be taught to rely on its courage, its fortitude,
its skill and virtue, for protection. These are the only safeguards in the hour
of danger. Man was endued with these great qualities for his defence.
There is nothing about him that indicates that he is to conquer by endurance.
He is not incrusted in a shell ; he is not taught to rely upon his insensibility,
his passive suffering, for defence. No, sir ; it is on the invincible mind, on a
magnanimous nature, he ought to rely. Here is the superiority of our kind ; it
is these that render man the lord of the world. It is the destiny of his condi
tion that nations rise above nations, as they are endued in a greater degree
with these brilliant qualities."

But this is not the only instance in which Mr. Calhoun, at this early stage
of his public life, manifested a spirit above party influence or control, that
spirit which he has so often since exhibited, when duty and patriotism demand
ed it. No one appreciates more highly the value of party ties within proper
limits, or adheres more firmly to his party within them, than he does. He never
permits them to influence him beyond those necessary limits. Acting accord
ingly, he did not hesitate to give his cordial and warm support to a bill for the
increase of the navy, reported by his able and distinguished colleague, who
was then chairman of the Naval Committee, although, at and previous to that
time, the great body of the Republican party was and had been opposed to it.
It was owing to the decided support which it received from Mr. Cheeves, Mr.
Calhoun, Mr. Lowndes, and Mr. Clay, and its brilliant achievements afterward
(even then confidently anticipated by them), that it has since become with the
whole Union the favourite arm of defence.

As prominent as was the situation of Mr. Calhoun at the commencement of
this eventful session, as the second on the most important committee, it became

12 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

still more so in its progress. The chairman, Mr. Porter, withdrew from Con
gress, and Mr. C. found himself at the head of the committee, which, in addition
to its peculiar duties, was charged, by a vote of the House, with a large portion
of those properly belonging to the Committee on Military Affairs. Few indi
viduals with so little parliamentary experience have ever been placed in so re
sponsible a situation. He had never before served in a deliberative body except
for two short sessions in the Legislature of his own state, making together but
nine weeks. With such limited experience, it is difficult to conceive a situ
ation of the kind more arduous than that in which he was placed at the head of
such a committee at such a period, when party spirit was at its height and the
opposition under the guidance of leaders distinguished for their talents and ex
perience ; and yet, so ample were his resources, and so great his aptitude for
business, that he not only sustained himself, but acquired honour and distinc
tion for the ability with which he discharged the duties of his station.

It will not be attempted to trace Mr. Calhoun's course through this laborious
and long-to-be-remembered session. It is sufficient to say that he exhibited
throughout the same zeal and ability with which he commenced it. Near its
close he reported and carried through the bill declaring war against Great
Britain — a war under all circumstances fairly entitled to its appellation as the-
second war of independence. The proceedings were in secret session, con
trary to his opinion and wishes.

Such was the brilliant career of Mr. Calhoun during his first session, and
that under the most responsible and trying circumstances. Much of his suc
cess is to be attributed to his early and wise determination not to come forward
till he had laid the foundation in a solid education, and fully prepared himself
to act his part in life. Without them, the mere force of natural talents could
not have carried him successfully through the difficulties he had to encounter
at the outset of his congressional career.

The declaration of war fixed the policy of the government for the time, and
the discussions in Congress during its continuance turned, for the most part, on
questions relating to the finances, the army, the navy, the mode of conducting
the war, and its success and disasters. These gave rise to many warm and
animated debates of deep interest and excitement at the time, and in most of
which Mr. Calhoun took a prominent part, and fully sustained the reputation he
had acquired for ability and eloquence ; but as the subjects were generally of a
temporary character, and have long since lost much of their interest, the object
of this sketch does not require that they should be particularly noticed. They
will, accordingly, be passed in silence, and the notice of the events of the pe
riod confined to those that may be regarded as exceptions to the ordinary party
discussions of the day. This course is the more readily adopted, because it is
believed that the whole country is disposed to do ample justice to the patriot
ism, the intelligence, and ability with which he performed his part during this
eventful period of our history.

The first incident that will be noticed took place at the commencement of
the session immediately succeeding the declaration of war. South Carolina
had in that Congress an unusual number of men of talents : General D. R. Wil
liams, Langdon Cheves, William Lowndes, and the subject of this sketch, all
of whom were entitled to prominent positions in the arrangement of commit
tees. Mr. Calhoun was the youngest. The speaker was embarrassed. There
was a difficulty in placing so many from one state, and that a small one, at tho
head of prominent committees, and Mr. Calhoun, with his characteristic disin
terestedness, cheerfully assented to be placed second on that at the head of
which he had served with so much distinction at the preceding session. Mr.
Smilie, an old and highly-respectable member from Pennsylvania, was placed
at the head of the committee. At its first meeting the chairman, without pre
viously intimating his intention, moved that Mr. Calhoun should be elected

LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 13

chairman. He objected, and insisted that Mr. Smilie should act as chairman,
and declared his perfect willingness to serve under him ; but he was, notwith
standing, unanimously elected, and the strongest proof that could be given of the
highly satisfactory manner in which he had previously discharged his duty was
thus afforded. In this conviction, and as illustrative of the same disinterested
character, when the speaker's chair became vacant by the appointment of Mr.
Clay as one of the commissioners to negotiate for peace, Mr. Calhoun was so
licited by many of the most influential members of the party to become a £an-
didate for it; but he peremptorily refused to oppose his distinguished colleague,
Mr. Cheves, who was elected.

At an early period of the same session, a question out of the ordinary course,
and which excited much interest at the time, became the subject of discussion,
that of the merchants' bonds. The Nori -importation Act (one of the restrictive
measures) was in force when war was declared. Under its operation a large
amount of capital had been accumulated abroad, and especially in England, the
proceeds of exports that could not be returned in consequence of the prohibition
of imports. The owners, when they saw war was inevitable, became alarmed,
and gave orders for the return of their property. It came back, for the most
part, in merchandise, which was subject to forfeiture under the act. The own
ers petitioned for the remission of the forfeiture, and permission to enter the
goods on paying the war duties. The secretary of the treasury, on the other
hand, proposed to remit the forfeiture on condition that the amount of the value
of the goods should be loaned to the government by the owners. Mr. Cheves,
who was at the head of the Committee of Ways and Means, reported in favour of
the petition, and supported his report by an able speech. The question had
assumed much of a party character, but it did not deter Mr. Calhoun from an
independent exercise of his judgment. He believed that the act never con
templated a case of the kind, and that to enforce, under such circumstances, a
forfeiture amounting to millions, which would embrace a large class of citizens,
would be against the spirit of the criminal code of a free and enlightened peo
ple. But waving these more general views, he thought the only alternative
was to remit the forfeiture, as prayed for by the owners, or to enforce it accord
ing to the provisions of the act : that, if the importation was such a violation
as justly and properly incurred the forfeiture, then the act ought to be enforced ;
but if not, the forfeiture ought to be remitted ; and that the government had no
light, and if it had, it was unbecoming its dignity to convert a penal act into
the means of making a forced loan. Thus thinking, he seconded the effort
of his distinguished colleague, and enforced his views in a very able speech.
The result was, that the forfeiture was remitted, and the goods admitted on
paying duties in conformity to the course recommended by the committee.

There was another case in which, at this period, he evinced his firmness and
independence. The administration still adhered to the restrictive policy, and
even after the war was declared the President recommended the renewal of
the Embargo. Mr. Calhoun, as has been shown, opposed, on principle, the
whole system as a substitute for war, and he was still more opposed to it as an
auxiliary to it. He held it, in that light, not only as inefficient and delusive,
but as calculated to impair the means of the country, and to divert a greater
share of its capital and industry to manufactures than could be, on the return
of peace, sustained by the government on any sound principles of justice or
policy. He thought war itself, without restrictions, would give so great a stim
ulus, that no small embarrassment aiad loss would result on its termination, in.
despite of all that could be done for them, while, at the same time, he expressed
his willingness, when peace came, to protect the establishments that might
grow up during its continuance, as far as it could be fairly done.

The Embargo failed on the first recommendation : but, at the next session,
oeing recommended again, it succeeded. Mr. Calhoun, at the earnest entreaties

14 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

of friends, and to prevent division in the party when their union was so neces
sary to the success of the war, gave it a reluctant vote.

But the time was approaching when an opportunity would be afforded him
to carry out successfully his views in reference to the restrictive system, and
that with the concurrence of the party. The disasters of Bonaparte in the Rus
sian campaign, his consequent fall and dethronement in the early part of 1814,
and the triumph of Great Britain, after one of the longest, and, altogether, the
most remarkable contests on record, offered that opportunity, which he promptly
seized. This great event, which terminated the war in Europe, left Great Brit
ain, flushed with victory, in full possession of all the vast resources, in men,
money, and materials, by which she had brought that mighty conflict to a suc
cessful termination, to be turned against us. It was a fearful state of things ;
but, as fearful as it was of itself, it was made doubly so by the internal condi
tion of the country, and the course of the opposition. Blinded by party zeal,
they beheld with joy or indifference what was calculated to appal the patriotic.
Forgetting the country, and intent only on a party triumph, they seized the op
portunity to embarrass the government. Their great effort was made against
the Loan Bill — a measure necessary to carry on the war. Instead of support
ing it, they denounced the war itself as unjust and inexpedient ; and they pro
claimed its farther prosecution, in so unequal a contest, as hopeless, now that
the whole power of the British Empire would be brought to bear against us.
Mr. Calhoun replied in a manner highly characteristic of the man, undaunted,
able, and eloquent. None can read this speech, even at this distance of time,
•without kindling under that elevated tone of feeling, which wisdom, emanating
from a spirit lofty and self-possessed under the most trying circumstances, only
can inspire. In order to show the justice and expediency of the war, he took
an historical view of the maritime usurpations of Great Britain, from the cele
brated order in council of 1756, to the time of the discussion, and demon
strated that her aggressions were not accidental, or dependant on peculiar cir
cumstances, but were the result of a fixed system of policy, intended to estab
lish her supremacy on the ocean. After giving a luminous view of the origin
and character of the wrongs we had suffered from her, he clearly showed the
flimsiness of the pretext by which she sought to justify her conduct, as well as
that of the opposition to excuse her, and dwelt upon the folly of hoping to ob
tain redress by sheathing the sword or throwing ourselves on her justice. The
following extract, taken from the conclusion, will afford an example of his lofty
and animating eloquence :

" This country is left alone to support the rights of neutrals. Perilous is the
condition, and arduous the task. We are not intimidated. We stand opposed
to British usurpation, and, by our spirit and efforts, have done all in our power
to save the last vestiges of neutral rights. Yes, our embargoes, non-inter
course, non-importation, and. finally, war, are all manly exertions to preserve
the rights of this and other nations from the deadly grasp of British mari
time policy. But (say our opponents) these efforts are lost, and our condi
tion hopeless. If so, it only remains for us to assume the garb of our condition.
We must submit, humbly submit, crave pardon, and hug our chains. It is not
wise to provoke where we cannot resist. But first let us be well assured of the
hopelessness of our state before we sink into submission. On what do our op
ponents rest their despondent and slavish belief.7 On the recent events in Eu
rope ? I admit they are great, and well calculated to impose on the imagina
tion. Our enemy never presented a more imposing exterior. His fortune is at
the flood. But I am admonished by universal experience, that such prosperity
is the most precarious of human conditions. From the flood the tide dates its
ebb. From the meridian the sun commences his decline. Depend upon it,
there is more of sound philosophy than of fiction in the fickleness which poels
attribute to fortune. Prosperity has its weakness, adversity its strength. In

LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 15

many respects our enemy has lost by those very changes which seem so very
much in his favour. He can no more claim to be struggling for existence ; no more
to be fighting the battles of the world in defence of the liberties of mankind.
The magic cry of ' French influence' is lost. In this very hall we are not
strangers to that sound. Here, even here, the cry of ' French influence,' that
baseless fiction, that phantom of faction now banished, often resounded. I re
joice that the spell is broken by which it was attempted to bind the spirit of
this youthful nation. The minority can no longer act under cover, but must
come out and defend their opposition on its own intrinsic merits. Our example
can scarcely fail to produce its effects on other nations interested in the main-*
tenance of maritime rights. But if, unfortunately, we should be left alone to
maintain the contest, and if, which may God forbid, necessity should compel
us to yield for the present, yet our generous efforts will not have been lost. A
mode of thinking and a tone of sentiment have gone abroad which must stimu
late to future and more successful struggles. What could not be effected with
eight millions of people will be done with twenty. The great cause will never
be yielded — no, never, never ! Sir, I hear the future audibly announced in the
past — in the splendid victories over the Guerriere, Java, and Macedonian. We,
and all nations, by thes^ victories, are taught a lesson never to be forgotten.
Opinion is power. The charm of British naval invincibility is gone."

Such was the animated strain by which Mr. Calhoun roused the spirit of the
government and country under a complication of adverse circumstances cal
culated to overwhelm the feeble and appal the stoutest. Never faltering, never
doubting, never despairing of the Republic, he was at once the hope of the party
and the beacon light to the country.

But he did not limit his efforts to repelling the attacks of the opposition, and
animating the hopes of the government and country. He saw that the very
events \vhich exposed us to so much danger, made a mighty change in the po
litical and commercial relations of Continental Europe, which had been so long
closed against foreign commerce, in consequence of the long war that grew out
of the French Revolution, and of those hostile orders and decrees of the two
great belligerents, which had for many years almost annihilated all lawful com
merce between the Continent of Europe and the rest of the world. The events
that dethroned Bonaparte put an end to that state of things, and left all the pow
ers of Europe free to resume their former commercial pursuits. He saw in all
this that the time had come to free the government entirely from the shackles of
the restrictive system, to which he had been so long opposed ; and he, according
ly, followed up his speech by a bill to repeal the Embargo and the Non-importa
tion Act. He rested their repeal on the ground that they were a portion of the
restrictive policy, and showed that the ground on which it had been heretofore
sustained was, that it was a pacific policy, growing out of the extraordinary
state of the world at the time it was adopted, and, of course, dependant on the
continuance of that state. "It was a time," he said, "when every power on
the Continent was arrayed against Great Britain, under the overwhelming influ •
ence of Bonaparte, and no country but ours interested in maintaining neutral
rights. The fact of all the Continental ports being closed against her, gave to
our restrictive measures an efficacy which they no longer had, now that they
were open to her." He admitted that the system had been continued too long,
and been too far extended, and that he was opposed to it as a substitute for
war, but contended that there would be no inconsistency on the part of the
government in abandoning a policy founded on a state of things which no
longer existed. " But now," said he, " the Continental powers are neutrals, as
between us and Great Britain. We are contending for the freedom of trade,
and ought to use every exertion to attach to our cause Russia, Sweden, Hol
land, Denmark, and all other nations which have an interest in the freedom of
the seas. The maritime rights assumed by Great Britain infringe on the

16 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

rights of all neutral powers, and if we should now open our ports and trade to
the nations of the Continent, it would involve Great Britain in a very awkward
and perplexing dilemma. She must either permit us to enjoy a very lucrative
commerce with them, or, by attempting to exclude them from our ports by her
system of paper blockades, she would force them to espouse our cause. The
option which would thus be tendered her would so embarrass her as to produce
a stronger desire for peace than ten years' continuance of the present system,
inoperative as it is now rendered by a change of circumstances." These views
had the desired effect, and the bill passed.

The subsequent session (that of 1814-15) was the last of the war sessions.
It was short, terminating on the 4th of March. It was one of much excite
ment, but was principally distinguished for the project of a bank, submitted by
the administration, and intended for the relief of the financial difficulties of the
government. Upon this measure Mr. Calhoun differed from the administration
and a large portion of the party.

It so happened that he was detained at home by sickness, and did not take
his seat for several weeks after the commencement of the session, and his place
as chairman of the Committee of Foreign Relations was filled by the late secre
tary of state, Mr. Forsyth. He found, on his arrival, the plan of a bank agreed
on, and he was especially requested by the secretary of the treasury, with whom
he had the kindest relations, and several members of the Committee of Ways
and Means, to give it his particular attention, which he promised to do. His
predisposition was strongly in favour of a bank of some kind. It was then
generally thought to be indispensable to the prosecution of the war. With this
disposition, and a strong desire to meet what were the views of the secretary
and the administration, and of his friends on the Ways and Means, he took up
the plan for examination. The whole subject of banking, theoretically and
practically, was, in a great measure, new to him. He had never given it a
serious and careful examination, and his mind, though favourably disposed to
the plan, was open to the reception of truth.

The leading features of the plan were a bank of $50,000,000 of capital, to
consist, with the exception of a few millions of specie, entirely of the stock is
sued by the government for loans made to carry on the war. It was not to pay
specie during the war, nor till three years after its termination, and was to lend
the government, whenever required, $30,000,000, at six per cent., to carry on
the war. With all his prepossessions in its favour, he was soon struck by the
fact, that the great leading object was to create a machine for lending money,
not on the means or credit of the bank, or the individuals to be incorporated,
but of the government itself ; for the bank would not be bound to pay its notes,
and would have little or nothing on which to lend but the stock of the govern
ment. The whole contrivance was, virtually, under the specious show of a
loan, for the government to borrow back its own credit at six per cent., for
•which it had already stipulated to pay a high interest — not less, on an average,
than eight per cent. Those who had lent the government, alleging that they
had loaned all they had, modestly proposed to lend it, on its own credit, as
much as it might need to carry on the war, if it would incorporate them under
the magic name of " a bank," exempt them from the payment of their debts as
a corporation, give them the use of the public money, and not only endorse
their notes by receiving them for its dues, but also pay them away as money in
their disbursements.

It was impossible for a mind constituted as Mr. Calhoun's not to see the
whole effects of the scheme, or to give its assent to it, by whomsoever contri
ved, or by whatever name called. To him, no alternative was left but to sac
rifice his judgment, or to differ from the administration and many of his friends
who were anxious to have his snpport ; but, as responsible and painful as was
the alternative, he did not hesitate.

LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUJN. 17

When the bill came up he opposed it in a speech, in which he briefly stated
his objections ; and such was its effect that, though the measure had the support
of the administration, and the whole of the Committee of Ways .and Means
but one, it was struck out, and the amendment he proposed was substituted by
an overwhelming majority. His substitute was, that the government should
use its own credit directly in the shape of treasury notes, to be issued to meet
ts wants, and to be funded in the bank in the form of stock at six per cent. ;
that the bank should be bound to pay its' notes at all times, and should make
the government no loans but short ones, in anticipation of its current revenue.
By the issue of treasury notes, to be funded in the bank, he proposed to obtain
the immediate supplies to carry on the government ; and, by establishing a
specie-paying bank, under proper restrictions, he hoped to sustain a strong po
sition, from which the currency, then consisting, south of New-England, exclu
sively of the notes of suspended banks, might be restored to the specie standard
on the return of peace. His substitute was, in its turn, defeated. Two other
bills, differently modified, were successively introduced, and were both defeat
ed — one by the casting vote of the speaker, Mr. Cheeves, and the other by the
"President, who vetoed it on the ground that, as modified, it would not afford the
^relief required by the treasury. .

The greater part of the session had been spent in these various attempts
to pass a bill, and many who entirely agreed with Mr. Calhoun in his view
of the subject, and had stood fast by him at first, now yielded to the
pressure. Finally, a rally was made, a short time before the close of the
session, to pass a bill, and it was again introduced in the Senate much im
proved in some of its objectionable features, but still defective enough to
prevent him and the friends who stood by him from giving it their sup
port. It speedily passed that body, and was sent to the House, where it
was pressed through to its passage with all possible despatch. On the
question of ordering it to the third reading, Mr. Calhoun made a few re
marks, in which he warned the House against adopting a measure which
a great majority decidedly disapproved, but for which they were prepared
to vote under a supposed necessity, which did not exist. He concluded
by saying that the bill was so objectionable that, were it not for the sup
posed necessity, if, for instance, the news of peace should arrive before its
passage, it would not receive fifteen votes, and concluded by saying that
he would reserve a full statement of his objections to the bill for the ques
tion on the passage to be taken the next day, when he intended to make
a final stand against it, and appeal to the public for the vindication of his
course. At the time there was not the slightest rumour or indication of
peace, and no one expected it. On the contrary, every indication was,
that the war would be pushed with vigour in the approaching campaign.
. The attack had been made on New-Orleans, and by every mail it was ex
pected to hear of its fate ; and yet, strange as it may seem, that very day.
subsequent to the adjournment of the House, a despatch, sent on by a mer
cantile house in New-York, to be forwarded by the mail to the South to
its agents, arrived in the city, with the intelligence that a vessel had come
in after the departure of the mail, bringing the treaty of peace. The
member to whom it was sent was so struck with the coincidence, that he
•. informed Mr. Calhoun of the fact in confidence. By some means, a rumour
got out that there was a late arrival at New- York bringing important in
telligence. Next day the friends of the bill made an effort to push it
through before the arrival of the mail in the Afternoon. Mr. Calhoun
moved to lay the bill on the table, saying- that there was a hope that the
mail from New-York, which would arrive in a few hours, might bring in
telligence that would have an important bearing on the bill. The vote on
his motion verified his prediction. The mail arrived with the treaty of

C

18 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

peace. It was then proposed to him to modify the hill in conformity
with his views, if he would withdraw his opposition. He refused, and
demanded other and severer restrictions than those which he had hereto
fore proposed. An attempt was then made to take up the bill and pass it,
which failed by a large majority.

It was thus his sagacity and firmness, under the most trying circum
stances, against the whole weight of the administration, defeated a meas
ure, which, if it had been adopted as first proposed, would have been fol
lowed by consequences more disastrous than could well be anticipated.
He had the satisfaction to receive the thanks of many of the members for
its defeat, who but a short time before were ready to denounce him for
his resistance to it. It is now to be regretted that none of Mr. Calhoun's
speeches against the measure were published. He declined publishing at
the time on the ground that his object was to defeat the bill, but to do so
without distracting the party or impairing confidence in the administra
tion, on which the success of the war so much depended. For that rea
son, he not only avoided publishing, but bore patiently the denunciations
daily levelled against him for his opposition to the bill. On all other,
measures of the session he gave the administration an active and hearty
support. It was, indeed, a rule with him, when compelled to differ from
his party on an important measure, to limit his opposition strictly to the
measure itself, and to avoid, both in manner and matter, all that could by
possibility give offence. By a rigid observance, too, of this rule, he suc
ceeded in maintaining his individual opinion in reference to all important
questions on which he differed from his party without weakening his
standing with them.

The transition from a state of war to that of peace gave rise to many
important questions, the most prominent of which grew out of the finances
and the currency. At the succeeding session, Mr. Lowndes and Mr. Cal-
houn were placed at the head of the committees which had charge of these
important subjects; Mr. Lowndes was made chairman of the Ways and
Means, and Mr. Calhoun, from the prominence he had acquired at the pre
ceding session on the Bank Question, was appointed chairman of that on
currency. The most prominent question connected with the finances was
that of the readjustment of the duties on the imposts. The duties had been,
doubled at the commencement of the war, and the question now presented
was, how much they should be reduced. It was one that took in the whole
range of the future policy of the government, and involved the considera
tion of many important subjects ; the military and naval establishments,
the debt, and the new direction given to a large amount of the capital and
industry of the country in consequence of the war, the Embargo, the Non
importation, and Non-intercourse Acts, which preceded it. These, in turn,
involved the question of our foreign relations in all their bearings. After
a survey of the whole ground, the Committee of Ways and Means reported
the bill, \vith the full concurrence of the administration, which passed
with but fe\* changes, and has since been called the Tariff of 1816.

Few measuies have been less understood or more misrepresented. It
has been the general impression that the duties were adjusted by the bill
mainly in reference to the protection of manufactures. Such is far from
being the fact. With the exception of a few items, such as the minimum
duty on coarse cottons, the duties on rolled iron, and, perhaps, one or two
more, the duties would have been arranged substantially as they were if
there had not been a manufacturing establishment in the whole country.
It was in other respects a revenue bill, proposed and reported by the
committee to whom the subject of revenue properly belonged, and regu
lated in its details, with the few exceptions referred to, by revenue con
siderations.

LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 19

The first great question in the adjusting of the duties was, what amount
of revenue would the future policy of the country require ] And, in de
ciding that, the leading question was, whether the public debt should be
rapidly or slowly paid! In this decision were involved, not only the ques
tion of the policy of freeing the government as soon as possible from debt,
but also the collateral effects of such a process on the country under the
particular circumstances of the case. In that view, the effects which
raising the duties, with a view to the speedy discharge of the debt, would
have in sustaining the manufacturing establishments which had grown up
under the war, and the restrictive system preceding it, served to create a
strong motive for adopting that policy, and for fixing the duties as high
as they stand in the act. In conformity with this policy, an efficient sink
ing fund of $10,000,000 annually was provided for the payment of the
principal and interest of the debt, with the proviso that all moneys re
maining in the treasury at the end of each year exceeding $2,000,000
should be carried to its aid. It was in reference to these views, and the
necessity of providing for the military and naval establishments on a scale
sufficiently extended for the public service, that the details of the bill and
the rates of the duties were mainly adjusted, and not solely or principally
for the protection of manufactures, as has been erroneously supposed. If
proof is required, conclusive evidence will be found in the bill itself, which
imposes a much lower average rate of duties on what are now called the
protected articles, that is, articles similar to those made at home, or which
may come into competition with them, than upon the other descriptions.

Nor has the course of Mr. Calhoun in reference to it been less misun
derstood or misrepresented than the measure itself. He has frequently
oeen called the author of the protective system. Nothing is more untrue.
He was not on the committee, and took no part in the discussion, except
to make a short off-hand speech at the request of a friend, at a particular
stage of the debate. He was engrossed with the duties of his own com
mittee, and had bestowed but little attention to the details of the bill. He
concurred in the general views and policy in which it originated, and the
more readily because it would sustain the manufacturing establishments
that had grown up under the war-measures of the government. Shortly
after he came into Congress, he had anticipated, as has been stated, the dif
ficulty that would be occasioned by the new direction which so consider
able a portion of the capital and labour of the country had taken ; and,
while he professed a disposition at the time to do what could be legiti
mately done to support them on the return of peace, yet he used his best
efforts to diminish the necessity, as far as practicable, by removing every
remnant of the restrictive system during the war. He did not then, nor
do we believe that he has since doubted that, in deciding whether the debt
should be more speedily or more tardily discharged, the favourable effects
which the former mode would have in sustaining the manufacturing estab
lishments was, under the circumstances of the case, a legitimate and prop
er consideration. But truth and candour require us to say, that, as far as
the details of the bill went beyond, and raised the duties above the rev
enue point, with the view to protection, as on our coarse cottons and
rolled iron, he has long believed it to be unconstitutional, unjust, and un
wise. The subject was new, and his attention was drawn to other sub
jects, and he did not take the proper distinction between duties for revenue
and for protection, nor was it, as it is believed, taken at the time by any
one. He who will examine Mr. Calhoun's remarks on the occasion will
not fail to perceive that the support he gave the bill looked, not to what
has since been called the protective policy, but almost wholly to consid
erations of a public character connected y°'th the foreign relations of the

20 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

country, and the danger resulting from war to a country, as ours was then,
in a great measure, dependant on agriculture and commerce with foreign
nations, without the requisite naval power to keep open in war the chan
nels of trade with the rest of the world. In fact, it is difficult at this time,
in the changed condition of the country and the world, to realize the
circumstances under which the public men of that day acted, and the mo
tives which guided them.

To do so, we must go back to the history of that period. A just and
necessary war had been honourably terminated with the greatest power
in the world, after a short but perilous struggle. The violent and unpat
riotic course of the opposition during the war had so discredited it, that
the name and doctrines of the Federal party, once so respectable, had be
come odious. After the war, they ceased to use their old name, or to
avow their doctrines as a party ; and the long struggle between them and
their principles and policy, and the Republican party and their principles
and policy, was supposed to have finally terminated in the ascendency of
the latter. The impression was almost universal, that the danger to our
popular system of government from the Federal consolidation doctrines
was ended. The only cause of danger to the country and its institutions
was then supposed to be from abroad. The overthrow of Bonaparte was
followed throughout Europe by a powerful reaction against the popular
principles on which our government rests, and to which, through the in
fluence of our example, the French Revolution was traced. To counter
act their influence, and to put down effectually their revival in Europe, a
league of all the great Continental monarchs was formed, called the Holy
Alliance. Great Britain did not expressly accede to it, but countenanced
and supported it. Our country of all the world stood alone in opposi
tion, and became an object of the deepest jealousy. The Spanish prov
inces of South America, it is true, were in a revolutionary state, and
struggling to form governments similar to ours. It was known that
this formidable combination of crowned heads meditated hostile move
ments against them on political grounds, which could not be made with
out involving us. In such a state of the world, well might the patriots
of that day be roused to the dangers from without, almost to the neg
lect of those from within. Had events taken the course which then seem
ed so probable, much that was then said and done, which now seems to
require explanation, would have been regarded as profoundly wise. This
is pre-eminently true of Mr. Calhoun's course. Always vigilant and soli
citous for the safety and prosperity of the country, he kept his eyes
steadily directed, at that critical period, to the point from which he and
all then thought the country was menaced, and was active and zealous in.
giving such a direction to the policy of the government, for the time, as
was best calculated to meet it. During this period, he spoke at large on
the subject of defence against external danger, in a speech delivered on
the subject of the repeal of the direct taxes, and which, for its eloquence,
ability, and lofty and patriotic sentiments, gained him great applause. To
the same cause may be traced his course, and that of the great body of the
party at the time, on most of the subjects in reference to which different
views are now entertained by them, and, among others, on that of internal
improvements. On that subject, as well as upon the tariff, his views have
been much misunderstood as well as misrepresented. Of these views a
brief explanation may here be important.

During the war, while the coasting trade was interrupted, the whole in
ternal commercial intercourse, and the military transportations and move-
ments over our widely-extended country, had to pass through internal
routes, then in a state far less perfect than at present, and the difficulties

LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 21

were immense. Great delay, uncertainty, and expense attended the con
centration of any considerable force or supply on a point where the de
fence of the country or an attack on the enemy made it necessary. This
greatly enfeebled our military operations, and contributed much to ex
haust the means of the government. So great were the expense and dif
ficulties, that it is estimated, for example, that much of the flour delivered
at Detroit during the war cost $60 per barrel, and most of the cannon
and ball transported to the lakes not less than 50 cents per pound.

At the commencement of the first session after the war, while the rec
ollection of these things was fresh, Mr. Madison, in Ms opening message,
among other things, invited the attention of Congress to the subject of
internal improvements, and recommended Congress to call into exercise
whatever constitutional power it might possess over the subject, and if
that should not prove adequate, to apply for an amendment to the Con
stitution granting such additional powers as would be sufficient. Mr.
Calhoun, acting, as he supposed, in strict conformity to this recommenda
tion, reported a bill at the next session, to set apart and pledge the bonus
of the United States Bank and their share of its dividends as a fund for
internal improvement. It made no appropriation, nor did it intend to af
firm that Congress had any power, much less to fix the limits of its power,
over the subject ; but to leave both, as well as the appropriations thereaf
ter to be made, to abide the decision of Congress, in conformity with the
President's views. Nor did Mr. C. undertake to establish either in his
speech. He declined both, and confined his remarks to the general ben
efit of a good system of internal improvements. When urged to assert
the power of Congress, he refused, saying that, although he believed it
possessed the power to a certain extent, he was not prepared to say to
what limits it extended. He had not the least suspicion, in reporting and
supporting the bill, that he went beyond the President's recommendation,
or that he would have any difficulty in approving it, till the bill had pass
ed both Houses, and was sent to him for his signature.

It was Mr. Madison's last session, and only a few days before its termi
nation, when the bill was sent to him ; and while it was still before him,
Mr. Calhoun called to take his leave of him. After congratulating him on
the success of his administration, and expressing the happiness he felt in
having had the opportunity of co-operating with him in its most difficult
period, that of the war, he took his leave. When he reached the door,
Mr. Madison requested him to return. He did so, and took his seat ; and
for the first time Mr. M. disclosed to him his constitutional objections to
the bill. Mr. Calhoun expressed his deep regret, first, that he should en
tertain them, and, next, that he had not intimated them to him in time,
saying that, if he had, he (Mr. Calhoun) would certainly not have subject
ed him to the unpleasant duty, at the very close of his administration, of
vetoing a bill passed by the votes of his friends, nor himself to having the
weight of his name and authority brought against him on such a subject.
He then stated that he had introduced the bill, as he believed, in strict con
formity to his recommendation, and if he had gone beyond, it was not in
tentional, and entreated him to reconsider the subject ; but it was too late.

In this connexion, it is due to candour to state, that although Mr. Cal
houn has never committed himself, in any speech or report, as to the ex
tent of the constitutional powers of Congress over internal improvements,
yet his impression, like that of most of the young men of the party at the
time, was, that it was comprehended under the money-power of the gov
ernment. Experience and reflection soon taught him this was an error —
one, in all probability, originating with him, and others of his own age, in
the precedent of the Cumberland Road, which may be regarded as the first

22 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

departure by the Republican party from the true construction of the Con
stitution in reference to that dangerous power. Thus much it has been
thought proper to state by way of explanation, and as due to that por
tion of our political history, and the part which Mr. Calhoun acted in re-
laion to it.

The subject of the currency, as has been stated, was particularly in
trusted to Mr. Calhoun. It was regarded as the most difficult and impor
tant question of the session. All the banks of the states south of New-
England had, at an early period of the war, stopped payment, and gold and
silver had entirely disappeared, leaving within their limits no other cur
rency than the notes of banks that either would not or could not redeem
them. G overmnent was forced to submit, and not only to collect its taxes
and dues, and make its disbursements, and negotiate its loans in their dis
credited and depreciated paper, but also to use them, at the same time, as
the agents of the treasury and depositories of its funds. At first the de
preciation was inconsiderable, but it continued to increase, though une
qually, in the different portions of the Union to the end of the war. It
was then hoped it would stop ; but the fact proved far otherwise ; for the
progress of depreciation became more rapid and unequal than ever. It
was greatest at the centre (the District of Columbia and the adjacent re
gion), where it had reached 20 per cent., as compared with Boston ; nor
was there the least prospect that it would terminate of itself. It became
absolutely necessary, in this state of things, for the government to adopt
the rule of collecting its taxes and dues in the local currency of the place,
to prevent that which was most depreciated from flooding the whole
Union 5 for the public debtors, if they had the option, would be sure to
pay in the most depreciated. But the necessary effect of this was to turn
the whole import trade of the country towards the Chesapeake Bay, the
region where the depreciation was the greatest. By making entry there,
the duties could be paid in the local depreciated currency, and the goods
then shipped where they were wanted. The result of the rule, though
unavoidable, was to act as a premium for depreciation. It was impossible
to tolerate such a state of things. It was in direct hostility to the Con
stitution, which provides that " all duties, imposts, and excises shall be
uniform throughout the United States," and that " no preference shall be
given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one state
over another." Thus the only question was, What shall be done 1

The administration was in* favour of a bank, and the President (Mr.
Madison) recommended one in his Message at the commencement of the
session. The great body of the Republican party in Congress concurred
in the views of the administration, but there were many of them who had,
on constitutional grounds, insuperable objections to the measure. These,
added to the Federal party, who had been against the war, and were, in
consequence, against a bank, constituted a formidable opposition.

Mr. Calhoun, whose first lesson on the subject of banks, taken at the
preceding session, was not calculated to incline him to such an institution,
was averse, in the abstract, to the whole system ; but perceiving then no
other way of relieving government from its difficulties, he yielded to the
opinion that a bank was indispensable. The separation of the govern
ment and the banks was at that time out of the question. A proposition
of the kind would have been rejected on all sides. Nor was it possible
then to collect the taxes and dues of the government in specie. It had
been almost entirely expelled the country j there appeared to be no alter
native but to yield to a state of things to which no radical remedy could
at that time be applied, and to resort to a bank to mitigate the evils of a
system which in its then state \vas intolerable. This, at least, was the

LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 23

view which Mr. Calhoun took, and which he expressed in his speech on
taking up the bill for discussion. It is said to have been one of the most
elaborate and powerful he ever delivered. Unfortunately, it is lost. That
published at the time is a meager sketch of what took three hours in the
delivery, and such as it is, never passed under his review and correction,
and omits almost entirely all that does not immediately refer to the bank.

The passage of the Bank Bill was followed by the joint resolution of
1816, which prohibited, after a certain day, the reception of the notes of
any bank which did not pay specie. It received the decided support of
Mr. Calhoun, and was the first step towards the separation of the govern
ment from the banking system. Through the joint agency of the two
measures, the currency was brought to the specie standard, and the evil
remedied.

During the same session a bill was passed changing the per diem pay
of members of Congress into an annual compensation of $1500. It proved
to be exceedingly unpopular ; so much so, that the greater part of the
members who voted for it declined offering for re-election, and those who
were again candidates, with few exceptions, were defeated at the polls.
Mr. Calhoun voted for the bill, though he took but little part or interest in
its passage. When he returned to his constituents, he found, for the first
time, the tide of popular favour against him. So strong was the current,
that his two predecessors, who had retired in his favour, General Butler
and Colonel Calhoun, the latter a near relative, were both violently opposed
to him, and the former came out as a candidate against him. They were
Loth men of great influence, the one residing at Edgefield, the other in Ab
beville, and these two formed the Congressional district. Only a few faith
ful friends ventured openly to vindicate his vote. He was advised to ap
peal to the kind feelings of his constituents, and apologize for his course.
This he peremptorily declined, declaring that he had voted for the meas
ure because he believed it was right, and could not, as his opinion remain
ed unchanged, apologize for that which his judgment approved. He ad
ded, at the same time, that all he asked was, that his constituents should
give him a hearing in explanation of his vote. A day was appointed in
each of the districts for him to address them at the courthouses. He
met and addressed them accordingly. In his two speeches he confined
himself to the merits of the question, without apology or appeal to sym
pathy, but with such force, candour, and manliness, that the tide was com
pletely turned, and he was triumphantly re-elected.

At the next session of Congress a bill was introduced to repeal the
act. It gave rise to an animated and interesting debate, in which Mr.
Calhoun took part, and entered fully into the merits of the measure, and
the reasons which governed him in voting for it. An estimate may be
formed of the ability of the speech from the following compliment bestow
ed upon it by Mr. Grosvenor, of New-York, one of the ablest and most dis
tinguished members of the House, on the opposite side in politics. To
understand the allusion which he made, and to appreciate the full force
of the compliment, it is proper to premise that there had been a personal
difference between him and Mr. Calhoun in one of the secret sessions
during the war, since which they had not been on speaking terms.
Mr. Grosvenor said, " He had heard, with peculiar satisfaction, the able,
manly, and constitutional speech of the gentleman from South Carolina."
[Here Mr. Grosvenor, recurring in his own mind to their personal difference
with Mr. Calhoun, which arose out of the warm party discussions during
the war, paused for a moment, and then proceeded] : " Mr. Speaker, I will
not be restrained. No barrier shall exist which I will not leap over for
the purpose of offering to that gentleman my thanks for tbe judicious, in-

24 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

dependent, and national course which he has pursued in this House for the
last two years, and particularly upon the subject now before us. Let the
honourable gentleman continue with the same manly independence, aloof
from party views and local prejudices, to pursue the great interests of his
country, and fulfil the high destiny for which it is manifest he was born.
The buzz of popular applause may not cheer him on his way, but he will
inevitably arrive at a high and happy elevation in the view of his country
and the world."

He made another effort about the same time on the treaty-making pow
er, of which William Pinckney, the distinguished advocate, at that time a
member of the House from Maryland, and who followed in the debate
said, " The strong power of genius, from a higher region than that of ar
gument, had thrown on the subject all the light with which it is the pre
rogative of genius to invest and illustrate everything 5" and still more
directly, "The gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Calhoun) has exhaust
ed the correct constitutional grounds of the question, and left me nothing
but to recapitulate his arguments."

After taking an active and influential part in all the great questions
which grew out of the transition from a state of war to that of peace,
both at this and the preceding session, he began to turn his attention to
wards correcting the abuses which existed in the administrative branches
of the government, and more especially towards the disbursements, in
which great looseness and profusion had prevailed during the war. He
had ever been the advocate of rigid economy and accountability in the
use of the public money, and had resolved thenceforward to devote him
self to their enforcement while he remained in Congress. The first thing
that he struck at was the dangerous power which had been given to the
President, of transferring appropriations, at his discretion, from one branch
of service to another, in the war and navy departments ; thereby con
verting, in effect, specific into general appropriations, and subjecting them,
in a great measure, to his control. The evil had become so inveterate
that it could not all at once be extirpated. The chairman of the Commit
tee of Ways and Means, and the Secretary of the Treasury, both opposed
(he repeal of the act which authorized such transfers, but he neverthe
less succeeded, against their opposition, in imposing important limitations
on the power. This was among his last Congressional acts.

CHAPTER III.

Including the Period during his Administration of the War Department.

SHORTLY before the meeting of Congress at the next session, he re
ceived an invitation from Mr. Monroe to take a place in his cabinet as
Secretary of War. It was unsolicited and unexpected His friends, with
some exceptions, advised against his acceptance, on the ground that Con
gress was the proper theatre for his talents ; Mr. Lowndes concurred in
this advice, and, among other reasons, urged that his improvement in
speaking had been such that he was desirous to see the degree of emi»
nence he would reach by practice. Indeed, the prevailing opinion at the
time was, that his talent lay more in the power of thought than aetloa.
His great powers of analysis and generalization were calculated to snake
the impression, which was not uncommon at the time, that his miad wss
more metaphysical than practical, and that he would lose reputation
taking charge of a department, especially one in a state of such

LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 25

and confusion as the war department was then. The reasons assigned'
by his friends served hut to confirm Mr. Calhoun in the opinion that
he ought to accept. He believed the impression of his friends was
erroneous as to the character of his mind ; but if not, if his powers lay
rather in thinking and speaking than in execution, it was but the more
necessary he should exercise them in the latter, and thereby strengthen
them where they were naturally the weakest. He also believed that he
could render more service to the country in reforming the great disbur
sing department of government, admitted to be in a state of much disor
der, than he could possibly do by continuing in Congress, where most of
the great questions growing out of a return to a state of peace had been
discussed and settled. Under the influence of these motives, he accept
ed the proffered appointment, and entered on the duties of the depart
ment early in December, 1817.

Thus, after six years of distinguished services in Congress, during which
Mr. Calhoun bore a prominent and efficient part in originating and sup
porting all the measures necessary to carry the country through one of
the most trying and difficult periods of its existence, and had displayed
throughout great ability as a legislator and a speaker, we find him in a
new scene, where his talents for business and administration for the first
time are to be tried. He took possession of his department at the most
unfavourable period. Congress was in session, when much of the time
of the secretary is necessarily occupied in meeting the various calls for
information from the two Houses, and attending to the personal applica
tion of the members on the business of their constituents. Mr. Graham,
the chief clerk, an able and experienced officer, retired shortly afterward,
and a new and totally inexperienced successor had to be appointed in his
place. The department was almost literally without organization, and
everything in a state of confusion. Mr. Calhoun had paid but little at
tention to military subjects in any of their various branches. He had
never read a treatise on the subject, except a small volume on the Staff.

In this absence of information, he determined at once to do as little as
possible at first, and to be a good listener and a close observer till he
could form a just conception of the actual state of the department and
what was necessary to be done. Acting on this prudent rule, he heard
all and observed everything, and reflected on and digested all that he
heard and saw. In less than three months he became so well acquainted
with the state of the department, and what was required to be done, that
he drew up himself, without consultation, the bill for organizing it on the
bureau principle, and succeeded in getting it through Congress against a
formidable opposition, who denounced it as wild and impracticable. But,
on the contrary, this organization has been proved to be so perfect, that
it has remained unchanged through all the vicissitudes and numerous
changes of parties till this time, a period of twenty-five years.

But that was only the first step. The most perfect system is of little-
value without able and faithful officers to carry it into execution. The
President, under his advice, selected to fill the several bureaus such offi
cers as had the confidence of the army for ability and integrity, and pos
sessing an aptitude of talent for the service of the bureau for which they
were respectively selected. With each of these Mr. Calhoun associated
a junior officer, having like qualifications, for his assistant. But, to give
effect to the system, one thing was still wanting — a code of rules for the
department and each of its bureaus, in order to give uniformity, consist
ency, efficacy, and stability to the whole. These he prepared, with the
assistance of the heads of the respective bureaus, under the provision of
the bill for the organization of the department, which gave the secretary

D

26 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

the power to establish rules not inconsistent with existing laws. They
form a volume of considerable size, which, like the act itself, remains sub
stantially the same, though, it is to be feared, too often neglected in prac
tice by some of his successors. All this was completed in the course of
a few months after the passage of the act, and the system put into active
operation. It worked without a jar.

In a short time its fruits began to show themselves in the increased ef
ficiency of the department and the correction of abuses, many of which
were of long standing. To trace his acts through the period of more than
seven years, during which Mr. Calhoun remained in the war-office, would
be tedious, and occupy more space than the object of this sketch would
justify. The results, which, after all, are the best tests of the system and
the efficiency of an administration, must be taken as a substitute. Suffice
it, then, to say, that when he came into office, he found it in a state of
chaos, and left it, even in the opinion of opponents, in complete organiza
tion and order. An officer of high standing and a competent judge pro
nounced it the most perfectly organized and efficient military establish
ment for its size in the world. He found it with upward of $40,000,000 of
unsettled accounts, many of them of long standing, going back almost to
the origin of the government, and he reduced them to less than three
millions, which consisted, for the most part, of losses, and accounts that
never can be settled. He prevented all current accumulation, by a prompt
and rigid enforcement of accountability ; so much so, that he was enabled
to report to Congress in 1823, that " of the entire amount of money drawn
from the treasury in 1822 for military service, including pensions amount
ing to $4,571,961 94, although it passed through the hands of 291 dis
bursing officers, there has not been a single defalcation, nor the loss of a
single cent to the government." He found the army proper, including the
Military Academy, costing annually more than $451 per man, including of
ficers, professors, and cadets, and he left the cost less than $287 ; or, to do
more exact justice to his economy, he diminished such parts of the cost
per man as were susceptible of reduction by an efficient administration,
excluding pay and such parts as were fixed in moneyed compensation by
law, from $299 to $150. All this was effected by wise reforms, and not
by parsimony (for he was liberal, as many supposed, to a fault) in the qual
ity and quantity of the supplies, and not by a fall of prices ; for in making
the calculation, allowance is made for the fall or rise of prices on every
article of supply. The gross saving on the army was $1,300,000 annu
ally, in an expenditure which reached $4,000,000 when he came into the
department. This does not include the other branches of service, the ord
nance, the engineer and Indian bureaus, in all of which a like rigid econ
omy and accountability were introduced, with similar results in saving to
the government.

These great improvements were made under adverse circumstances.
Party excitement ran high during the period, and Mr. Calhoun came in for
his full share of opposition and misrepresentation, which maybe explained
by the fact that his name had been presented as a candidate for the pres
idency. He was often thwarted in his views and defeated in his meas
ures, and was made for years the subject of almost incessant attacks in
Congress, against which he had to defend himself, but with such com
plete success, finally, as to silence his assailants. They had been kept
constantly informed of every movement in his department susceptible of
misconstruction or of being turned against him. One of the representa
tives, who boarded in the same house with his principal assailant, offered
to disclose to Mr. Calhoun the channel through which his opponents in
Congress derived the information on which they based their attacks. Mr.

LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 27

Calhoun declined to receive it. He said he did not object that any act of
the department should be known to his bitterest enemies : that he thought
well of all about him, and did not desire to change his opinion ; and all
that he regretted was, that if there was any one near him who desired to
communicate anything to any member, he did not ask for his permission,
which he would freely have given. He felt conscious he was doing his
duty, and dreaded no attack. In fact, he felt no wish that these attacks
should be discontinued. He knew how difficult it was to reform long
standing and inveterate abuses, and he used the assaults on the department
and the army as the means of reconciling the officers, who might be profit
ing by them, to the measures he had adopted for their correction, and to
enlist them heartily in co-operating with him in their correction, as the most
certain means of saving the establishment and themselves. To this cause,
and to the strong sense of justice which he exhibited on all occasions, by
the decided support he gave to all who did their duty, and his no less de
cided discharge of his duty against all who neglected or omitted it, is to
be attributed the fact that he carried through so thorough a reform, where
there was so much disorder and abuse, with a popularity constantly in
creasing with the army. Never did a secretary leave a department with
more popularity or a greater degree of attachment and devotion on the
part of those connected with it than he did.

In addition to the ordinary duties of the department, he made many and
able reports on the subject of our Indian affairs, on the reduction of the
army, on internal improvements, and others. He revived the Military
Academy, which he found in a very disordered state, and left it in great
perfection 5 he caused a minute and accurate survey to be made of the
military frontier, inland and maritime, and projected, through an able board
of engineers, a plan for their defence. In conformity with this plan, he
commenced a system of fortification, and made great progress in its exe
cution, and he established a cordon of military posts from the lakes
around our northwestern and southwestern frontiers to the Gulf of Mexico.

Another measure remains to be noticed, which will be regarded in after-
times as one of the most striking and useful, although it has heretofore
attracted much less attention than it deserves. In organizing the medical
department, Mr. Calhoun, with those enlarged views and devotion to sci
ence which have ever characterized him, directed the surgeons at all the
military posts extending over our vast country, to report accurately to the
surgeon-general at Washington every case of disease, its character, its
treatment, and the result, and also to keep a minute register of the
weather, the temperature, the moisture, and the winds, to be reported in
like manner to the surgeon-general. To enable them to comply with the
order, he directed the surgeons at the various posts to be furnished with
thermometers, barometers, and hygrometers, and the surgeon-general
from time to time to publish the result of their observations in condensed
reports, which were continued during the time he remained in the war de
partment. The result has been, a vast mass of valuable facts, connected
'with the diseases and the climate of our widely-extended country, collected
through the long period of nearly a quarter of a century. They have been
recently collected and published in two volumes by Dr. Samuel Forney, of
the United States army. The one is entitled " Medical Statistics," and the
other " The Climate of the United States," in which many interesting facts
are disclosed relative to the diseases and climate of the different portion?
of our country. This example has been already followed by England, on a
still more enlarged scale, and will doubtless be imitated by all civilized na
tions, and will in time lead to most interesting discoveries in the sciences
Qf medicine and meteorology generally. The honour of taking the first

28 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

step in this important matter, and the discoveries to which it will lead,
will, under the enlightened policy of Mr. Calhoun, belong to our country.

During the second term of Mr. Monroe's administration, the names of'
six candidates were presented to the people of the United States for the
presidential office, Mr. Adams, Mr. Crawford, General Jackson, Mr. Clay,
Mr. Lowndes, and Mr. Calhoun. The names of the two latter had beer,
brought forward, the former by South Carolina, and the latter by Penn
sylvania, and both nearly at the same time, without its being known tc
either that it was intended. They were warm and intimate friends, and
had been so almost from their first acquaintance. They had both entered
Congress at the same time, and had rarely ever differed in opinion on any
political subject. Mr. Lowndes was a few years the oldest, and the first
nominated. Mr. Calhoun's nomination followed almost immediately after.
As soon as he heard of it. he called on Mr L., and stated that it had been
made without his knowledge or solicitation, and that he called to say that
he hoped the position in which they had been placed by their friends to
wards each other would not affect their private and friendly relations.
That he would regard it as a great misfortune should such be the effect,
and was determined on his part to do everything to avoid it. Mr. Lowndes
heartily reciprocated the same sentiment. It is unnecessary to state that
they faithfully adhered to their resolution ; and these two distinguished
citizens of the same state, and nearly of the same age, set the noble and
rare example of being placed by friends as rivals for the highest office in
the gift of a great people, without permitting their mutual esteem and
friendship to be impaired.

But, unfortunately for themselves, and, it may be said, for the country,
the same harmony of feeling was not preserved between Mr. Calhoun and
another of the candidates, Mr. Crawford. They had been long acquaint
ed, and although residing in different states, they lived but a short dis
tance apart, and had been long on friendly terms. It is difficult to trace
the chain of causes by which they and their friends were brought into
collision. Mr. Calhoun supported decidedly Mr. Monroe in his first
election, when Mr. Crawford's name had been brought forward in opposi
tion to him. He had acted as chairman of the Committee of Foreign Re
lations, while Mr. Monroe was Secretary of State, during Mr. Madison's
time, and had, from his frequent and intimate intercourse with him, form
ed a high estimate of his character for honesty, fidelity, and patriotism,
to which, adding his sound judgment, long public service and experience,
his age, and revolutionary claims, it was natural, without disparaging the
high qualifications of Mr. Crawford, he should give him the preference.
Mr. Crawford's friends relied on a Congressional caucus for a nomination,
to which Mr. Calhoun was opposed, and against which he long stood out
with the leading friends of Mr. Monroe in Congress. They finally assent
ed reluctantly to go into one, to avoid a split in the party. Mr. Monroe
was nominated by a small majority, when, in the opinion of his friends, the
majority of the people was overwhelming in his favour. It is not extraor
dinary that he and many of his other friends, with this impression, should
have been confirmed in their objections to a caucus nomination, as calcu
lated to be influenced by improper considerations, and thus, instead cf
concentrating the will of the people, as it was originally intended to do,
becoming capable of being made the instrument of defeating it, and of
imposing on the country a President not of its choice.

When Mr. Crawford's friends brought forward his name the second
time, they again relied on a caucus; while the friends of all the 6ther
candidates were in favour of leaving the election to a direct appeal to the
sense of the people, as they all belonged to one party, and professed the-

LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 29

same political creed. With his decided impression against a caucus,
strengthened, as has been stated, by what occurred at the first election of
.Mr. Monroe, it is not at all surprising that Mr. Calhoun's friends should
take a prominent stand against another appeal to a Congressional caucus :
that, together with the latent feelings on both sides (of which both were
perhaps unconscious), growing out of the stand he made in favour of Mr.
Monroe and against Mr. Crawford, probably led to the regretted division
between their friends, which continued, as usual, long after the cause
had ceased, with such mischievous influence on the politics of the country
and the party to which both belonged.

Time and experience have decided against a Congressional caucus ; but
it must be admitted, looking back to the scenes of that day, that much
might be said for and against it. It is certainly highly desirable that the
people should act directly in voting for a President, uninfluenced by the
address and management of powerful combinations of individuals acting
through a small body, and who, in making a nomination, may respect their
own interest and feelings much more than the voice of the people, or
even the party they represent. But, on the other hand, without the inter
mediate agency of some such body in so large a country, and with so
many prominent citizens from which to make a selection, the danger of
discord in the ranks of the majority, and, through it, of the triumph of a
minority in the election, is great. The chance is between discord with
all its consequences, and the dictation of party leaders with all its effects.
Each is pregnant with mischief. It is the weak point of the government,
and unless it be guarded with the utmost vigilance, must end, on the one
hand, in interminable confusion, or, on the other, in rendering the election
by the people merely nominal. Without such vigilance, the real election
would degenerate into the dictation of caucus. It was on this difficult
point that the friends of these two distinguished citizens split, and it is
left to time and experience yet to decide which were right.

In the progress of the canvass the talented and lamented Lowndes died,
in the prime of life, and Mr. Calhoun's friends in Pennsylvania, with his
acquiescence, withdrew his name, rather than subject the state to a violent
contest between them and the friends of General Jackson. They had
maintained throughout the canvass the most friendly relations, and were
both decidedly opposed to the caucus. On his withdrawal, he was taken
up by the friends both of General Jackson and Mr. Adams for the Vice-
presidency.

This memorable canvass terminated in returning General Jackson, Mr.
Adams, and Mr. Crawford to the House of Representatives, from which
three, by the provisions of the Constitution, one was to be elected. The
electoral votes received by each stood in the order in which their names-
are placed. Mr. Calhoun was elected by the people Vice-president by a
large majority. The House, voting by states, on the first ballot elected
Mr. Adams. Mr. Clay, who was then a member of the body, voted for
him, against, as it was believed, the sense of a majority of his constitu
ents. That impression, connected with his previous relations, personal
and political, with Mr. Adams, caused much excitement, and a strong de
termination on the part of many to organize forthwith an opposition to the
new administration. Mr. Calhoun discountenanced an immediate move,
on the ground that, although, in his opinion, the vote belonged to the
state, and should be given to the candidate the state would elect if left to
its choice, yet he was not prepared to say whether there might not be
circumstances under which a member might assume the high responsibil
ity of voting otherwise, and, for the justification of his conduct, throw
himself on the state j but he thought it indispensable that the member as-

30 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

suming it should make out a strong case, and that he would owe it to
himself and the country to place his relations and conduct towards the ad
ministration of him whom he had elected above all suspicion. His advice
induced his friends to wait the development of events ; but when Mr. Clay
afterward took office, and Mr. Adams adopted, in its full extent, Mr. Clay's
American System, opposition to the administration from himself and his
friends followed as a matter of course.

CHAPTER IV.

Including the Period during which he was Vice-president.

MR. CALHOUN took his seat in the Senate as Vice-president on the 4th of
March, 1825, having remained irv the war department a few months more
than seven years. There never was a department left in more perfect or
der. It literally almost moved of itself. When he took charge of the
department, it was difficult to discharge its duties with less than fourteen
or fifteen hours of severe daily labour ; but when he left it, the secretary
had little to do beyond signing his name and deciding on such cases as
were brought up by the subordinate officers, and were not embraced in the
numerous and comprehensive rules provided for their government. He
had not, indeed, been long in office before those who doubted his execu
tive talents were disposed to place them even above his parliamentary,
great as they were acknowledged to be. He united, in a remarkable de
gree, quickness with precision, firmness with patience and courtesy, and
industry with the higher capacity for arrangement and organization j and
to these he added exemption from favouritism, a high sense of justice and
inflexible devotion to duty. Taken together, they formed a combination
so fortunate, that General Bernard, who had been a favourite aid-de-camp
of the Emperor Napoleon, and saw and knew much of him, and who was
chief of the board of engineers while Mr. Calhoun was secretary, and had
an equal opportunity of observing him, not unfrequently, it is said, com
pared his administrative talents to those of that extraordinary man.

The duties of the office of Vice-president, though it is one of high dig
nity, are limited, except giving a casting vote when the body is equally
divided, to presiding in the Senate, which, in a body so small and cour
teous, and having so few and simple rules, affords but little opportunity
for the display even of the peculiar talents necessary for Presidency in a
deliberative body. The most eminent in filling such an office cannot
leave much behind worth remembering. It is sufficient to say of him,
that, as a presiding officer, he was impartial, prompt, methodical, and at
tentive to his duties. He always appeared and took his seat early in the
session, and continued to preside till within a short time of its close ;
contrary to the practice of some of his immediate predecessors, who, by
their long and frequent absence from their seat, had permitted the office
to fall into some discredit. He was careful in preserving the dignity of
the Senate, and raising its influence and weight in the action of the gov
ernment. In putting questions, he changed the form of address from
•' Gentlemen" to the more simple and dignified address of " Senators,"
which has since been preserved, and adopted by the senators themselves
in alluding to each other in debate. But the most important and mem
orable incident connected with the discharge of his duty as the presiding
officer, and the most characteristic of the man, was the stand he took in
favour of the rights of the body itself, and against his own power. He

LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 31

decided, during a period of great excitement on the Panama Question,
when party spirit ran high, and the debate was very warm and personal,
that he had no right to call a senator to order for words spoken in debate,
He rested his decision on the broad ground that, as the presiding officer,
he had no power but to carry into effect the rules adopted by the body,
either expressly or by usage, and that there was neither rule nor usage
to authorize him ta exercise the power in question. On the contrary,
the rules of the Senate, by strong implication, limited the power of call
ing to order for words spoken in debate to the members themselves, to the
exclusion of the presiding officer. And yet this decision, resting on so
solid a foundation, subjected Mr. Calhoun to the fiercest attacks and the
grossest abuse ; and, what is more extraordinary, he was opposed by the
members themselves, whose rights he maintained, with the exception of
Mr. Macon, Mr. Tazewell, and a few others of the elder and more expe
rienced, and his immediate personal friends. To understand how this
should happen, it is necessary to advert to the existing state of the parties,
and the circumstances under which the decision was made.

The circumstances under which Mr. Adams was elected, the part which
Mr. Clay took in his election, and the prominent position to which he was
appointed in his cabinet, laid the foundation of the opposition which
finally overthrew his administration. This opposition was greatly strength
ened by the bold Federal and consolidation doctrines avowed by Mr.
Adams in his inaugural address, and by the wild measures of policy which
he recommended. Among these was the project of sending commission
ers to the Congress proposed to be convened at Panama of all the states
that had grown up on the overthrow of the Spanish dominions on this
Continent. This was a favourite measure of the administration. Mr.
Calhoun was understood to be decidedly opposed to it, both on the ground
of unconstitutionality and inexpediency ; and it was on that question that
the first attack was made on the administration. It commenced in the
Senate ; and, as he had not disguised his disapprobation, he was regarded
in a great measure as the adviser and author of the attack, which, of
course, subjected him to the fierce and united assaults of the administra
tion and its friends. At the same time, the opposition in the Senate,
though united against the administration, and its doctrines and policy, con
sisted of individuals who had but a short time before held political rela
tions with men far from being friendly. They consisted of the friends of
Mr. Crawford, General Jackson, Mr. Calhoun, and such portion of Mr.
Clay's as disapproved of his connexion with Mr. Adams. With the ex
ception of his own friends, and those of General Jackson, there was no
indisposition, on the part of a large portion of the rest of the opposition,
to see him sacrificed by the party in power. But as difficult and critical
as was his position, it could not prevent him from a manly avowal of his
opinion on a novel, and what he believed to be an important question, or
from exposing himself to hazard when principle and duty required him to
assert the rights of the body, though against his own power. But what
added greatly to the excitement and abuse was the particular occasion
upon which the decision was made. Mr. Randolph was then a mem-
"her of the Senate, and gave full vent to his inimitably sarcastic poAver
against the administration, and especially against the President and the
3eci«tary of State, and their supporters in the body. It was too keenly
felt by the last to permit them to do justice to the grounds on which Mr.
Calhoun placed his decision, and the occasion was too favourable to be
permitted to pass without a formal attack on him. A writer of great power
(supposed to be the President himself) attacked his decision with much
acrimony, under the signature of Patrick Henry. Finding it impossible

.32 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUJN.

to assail the decision with effect, or through the rules of the Senate or
its usage, he was forced to assume the position that the Vice-president,
in virtue of his office, derived the power of calling a senator to order for
words spoken in debate, not from the body itself, but directly from the Con
stitution, and that, in exercising the power, he was wholly independent of
its will. This gave the whole subject a new and highly important aspect ;
for if it could be successfully maintained, it would give the Vice-president
supreme control over the freedom of debate in the Senate. To this a re-
ply followed (supposed to be from Mr. Calhoun), in two numbers, under
the signature of Onslow, that so completely demolished the argument of
Patrick Henry as to turn the tide in his favour. The Senate itself be
came so well satisfied of the injustice done him, that on the revisal of the
rules a year or two afterward, they gave him the power in question, with
an almost unanimous approval of his decision. It was thus, by his fair
ness under these trying circumstances, that he preserved a right of the
"body, which he might have usurped, not only with safety, but with in
creased popularity for the time ; but of which the Senate could not be di
vested without a surrender of the freedom of debate, and the right of
making their own rules, secured to them by the Constitution itself.

So vigorous was this first onset of the opposition, that the administra
tion reeled under the force of the blow, and it became apparent that no
thing but some bold step could save them from defeat, by the election of
General Jackson, under whom the opposition, with the hearty concurrence
of Mr. Calhoun and his friends, had unanimously rallied. The great
strength of the administration lay in the various powerful interests rallied
under the plausible name of Home Industry and the American System, of
which the Secretary of State was the acknowledged head, and to which
.the President had given his adhesion. Their hope of holding power rested
on a unanimous and zealous rally of that powerful combination in favour
of the administration. The tariff was the great central interest, around
which all the others revolved. The whole party, without schism, were
united in its favour, while the opposition was greatly divided in reference
to it ; a great portion of the party, North and West, being in its favour,
while the South and Southwest were united almost to a man against it.
In fact, the portion of the Union at that time most attached to a high pro
tective tariff was the Middle and Western States, and yet its union with
the South and Southwestern portion was indispensable to the election of
General Jackson. The advantage this state of things afforded was per
ceived by those in power, and was not permitted to remain without an
attempt to turn it to account.

For that purpose, a general convention was called to meet at Harris-
burg, the seat of government in Pennsylvania, and the friends of the
tariff everywhere were invited to take into consideration the state of the
manufacturing interest, and to devise measures for its farther promotion.
The place was well chosen. Pennsylvania, though a thorough tariff state,
was favourable to General Jackson's election, and its support was regard,
ed as indispensable to his success. It met, and attempted to rally the
•whole interest by an elaborate report in favour of the protective system,
accompanied by a scheme of high duties, to be presented to Congress at
the next session for its action. It was thought, if the friends of General
Jackson in the tariff states should oppose it, his defeat in those states
would be certain ; but if, on the contrary, they should support it, a schism,
"between his Northern and Southern supporters would be equally certain,
and with not less certainty would be followed by his defeat. But, as
plausible as the calculation was, the tariff friends of General Jackson in
New-York, Pennsylvania, New-Jersey, and the West, succeeded, as far as
politics were concerned, in turning it against its projectors.

LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 33

They succeeded in electing- the speaker, and in obtaining the majority
of the Committee of Manufactures in the House. Instead of adopting the
Harrisburg scheme, this committee reported a thorough protective tariff,
such as suited the states they represented, imposing duties even higher
and more indiscriminately than those of the Harrisburg plan. They laid
their duties without the slightest regard to the navigating and commercial
interests of New-England, and so managed it as to induce the Southern
members to resist all the amendments offered to render it acceptable to
those who represented that interest, in the expectation of defeating the
bill, either on its passage through the House or tn the Senate, by the uni
ted votes of the members from those states and the South and Southwest.
The expectation proved fallacious. The bill passed the House by a small
majority, a large portion of the New-England members voting against it ;
but when it came to the Senate, where the relative united strength of the
Southern and New-England States is much greater than in the House, it
was ascertained that the bill could not pass unless it was modified so as
to be acceptable to the senators from New-England favourable to the ad
ministration. It was so modified by the votes of the senators opposed to
the administration from the Middle and Western States, contrary to the
expectation of the South ; for the bill, as modified, received the votes of
the New-England senators in favour of the administration, which, added
to those in favour of General Jackson from New- York, New-Jersey, Penn
sylvania, and the Northwest, made a majority. It passed, accordingly,
and became a law ; but under such circumstances as not only to deprive
the administration of the advantage they anticipated from the scheme, but
to turn it directly against them.

Unfortunately, however, in this political manoeuvring in the presidential con
test, equity, justice, the Constitution, and the public welfare were overlooked.
The interests of the great body of the consumers and of nine tenths of the pro
ducing interests, including especially the growers of the great agricultural sta
ples, rice, cotton, and tobacco, with those engaged in commerce, ship-building,
arid navigation, and all their connected interests, were sacrificed to promote the
prosperity of a single interest, and that constituting but a small portion of the
community. But the evil ended not with their sacrifice, as immense as it was.
As bad as was the effect in its pecuniary bearing, it was far worse in its finan
cial, political, and moral operation. Never, in that Aspect, was a measure of
the kind passed under more ad verse %ircumstan^s- Viewed in its financial
aspect, it was worse than folly — it was madnp^ itself. The public debt was
nearly extinguished, under the wise policr adopted after the war. After its
final discharge, one half nearly of the annual revenue applied to the payment of
its principal and interest would be liberated, which, if a wise and just policy
had been adopted, would have enab^d the government to reduce the duties one
half, and still leave a sufficient revenue to provide amply for all the public
wants. Instead of that, and i* the face of these consequences, the duties were
greatly increased, so much -=!O as to be, on an average, nearly fifty per cent, on
the value of the imports. This led to a corresponding increase of the revenue,
which, in turn, hastened proportionally the final discharge of the debt, when,
by necessity, one of three consequences must follow : a vast increase of expend
itures ; a sudden reduction of the duties, to the ruin of the manufacturers ; or
else an immense surplus in the treasury, with all its corrupting influence.
These obvious results were either not seen or disregarded by those who were
governed by cupidity, or too intensely engaged in the presidential contest to
look to consequences.

It is regarded as necessary to understand the history of the origin and pas
sage of that disastrous measure, in order to have a just conception of the events
which have since occurred, and the motives which governed Mr. Calhoim's

E

34 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

•course in reference to them. To it may be traced almost every important inci
dent in our political history since that time, as far as our internal affairs are
concerned. To it, too, may be ascribed the division in the Republican party,
which separated Mr. Calhoun and the States' Rights portion from the other, and
the disasters which have impaired the credit and standing of the country, and
deranged and interrupted its currency, finances, commerce, and industrial oper
ations. Mr. Calhoun, although not an actor at the time, was not an inattentive
observer of what passed. His position as President of the Senate afforded
great advantages for observation and reflection, of which he did not fail to avail
himself from the time he first took his seat. Questions relating to the protect-
ivft policy were constantly occurring in one form or another, and especially at
tracted his attention and excited reflection. He was not long in making him
self master of that policy in all its bearings, economical and political, and in
becoming thoroughly satisfied that it was unconstitutional, unjust, unequal, and
oppressive in its character and tendency, and that it must, in the end, if it be
came the established and permanent policy, lead to the overthrow of our free
and popular system of government. With this impression of the system, he
watched with vigilance the progress of the tariff of 1828, from its incipient state
at Harrisburg to the passage of the bill through the Senate. The results of his
observation confirmed him in all his previous objections to the system, and
strengthened his conviction of the dangers to which it exposed our institutions.
For the first time he began to fear, from the part taken in the passage of the
bill in the Senate by a considerable and influential portion of the party, that the
leading object which he and his friends had in view in the presidential contest
(a gradual and cautious reduction of the duties to the revenue standard prepar
atory to the discharge of the debt) might not be realized by a change of admin
istration. He saw that the passage of the bill opposed great and almost insu
perable difficulties to effecting what they desired ; but neither he nor they
permitted these misgivings to abate their zeal in support of General Jackson's
election. They still hoped for the best from him ; and how strongly Mr. C.
desired his election, an occurrence at the time will best illustrate.

The Senate was so nearly equally divided at one time, that it was believed
that the friends of the administration would intentionally so arrange it as to
make a tie, and throw the casting vote on the Vice-president, in order to defeat
General Jackson's election. His friends became alarmed, and some of them
intimated a desire that Mi Calhoun should leave his seat to avoid the effect,
stating as an inducement tha\ m the ev«nt of a tie, the bill would be defeated
without his vote. He promptly lofused, and replied that no consideration could
prevent him from remaining and doW his duty by voting against it ; but added,
it should not hurt General Jackson's eVction, for in that event his name should
be withdrawn from the ticket as Vice-present. Such was the interest he took
in his success, and so strong, and, at the sa^e time, so patriotic, was his oppo
sition to the bill of abominations ; and yet m^iy have been so unjust as to at
tribute his after opposition to the bill to disappointed ambition. On the con
trary, he was ready to sacrifice every object of ambition, at a time when not a
cloud darkened his prospects, to defeat a measure he believed to be so fraught
with mischief. He was then the second officer in the government, and stood,
without opposition, for re-election to the same place, on the ticket of General
Jackson, whose success was then certain ; nor was there any other man in the
party of equal prominence and popularity, except the general himself. Nothing
was wanting on his part but to accommodate himself to the course of events,
v/ithout regard to their effects on the country, to have attained the highest office,
which lay within a single step from the place where he then stood. This he
could not but plainly see ; but his resisting temptation on this occasion is but
one instance of self-sacrifice among many in a long life, the whole course of
which abundantly proves that office, even the highest, has ever been with him
subordinate to his sense of duty and the public welfare.

LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 35

The entire South was justly indignant at the passage of so unjust and oppress
ive a measure, especially under the circumstances which attended it, and the
question universally asked was, What is to be done ? On his return home this
question was often and emphatically asked him. He was not the man to evade
it. He frankly replied that there was no hope from Congress ; that in both
houses there were fixed majorities in favour of the system, and that there was
no hope of any speedy change for the better ; but, on the contrary, things must
grow worse, if no efficient remedy should be applied. He said that he could
see but two possible remedies within the limits of the Constitution ; one, the
election of General Jackson, who, by bringing to bear systematically and steadily
the patronage which the protective system placed in his hands, might reduce
the duties down to the revenue standard ; and the other, State Interposition or
Veto, the high remedy pointed out in the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions as
the proper one, after all others had failed, against oppressive and dangerous
acts of the general government, in palpable violation of the Constitution. He
gave it as his opinion that there was no hope from the judiciary, and, as the
act stood, the constitutional question could not be brought before the courts, the
majority having refused to amend the title of the bill so as to make it appear on
the face of it that the duties were laid for protection and not for revenue, ex
pressly with the view of preventing the courts from talcing jurisdiction, and de
ciding on its constitutionality. He also stated that, although he regarded Gen
eral Jackson's election as certain, yet he was constrained to say that the cir
cumstances under which the act passed, and the part which many of his influ
ential supporters took in its passage, mado it doubtful whether the hopes enter
tained from his election would, as it regarded the protective system, be realized,
and expressed his belief that South Carolina would in the end be obliged to re
sort to its ultimate constitutional remedy by state interposition, and the ruinous
consequences which must inevitably result from the act to itself, to the South,
and finally to the whole Unio*-

Many of the leading citizens of the state visited Mr. Calhoun at his residence,
near the mountains in S^uth Carolina, during the summer and autumn after his
return from Washington, with all of whom he conversed freely, and expressed
the same sentiments. But while he stated his conviction of the necessity of
preparing in time for the worst, he always advised that there should be no pre
cipitation, nor anything done to endanger the election of General Jackson, nor,
indeed, afterward, till it was ascertained whether his administration would cor
rect the evil before the public debt was finally discharged. He fixed on that as
the period for invoking the high authority of the state, as one of the sovereign
parties to the constitutional compact, to arrest the evil, not only because he
thought that ample time ought to be allowed to see if anything would be done,
but because he believed that so long as the money, however unjustly and uncon
stitutionally extorted from the people by the act of '28, was applied to the pay
ment of the debt, it should be borne. But he thought, if the operation of the act
should not then be arrested promptly, the vast surplus revenue which it would
afterward pour into the treasury would be converted into the means of perpetu
ating it, and fixing the system on the country permanently and beyond the reach
of any constitutional remedy.

He was the more deeply impressed with the danger from >vhat had already
occurred. A leading advocate of the measure in the Senate, Mr. Dickerson, of
New- Jersey, the chairman of the Committee on Manufactures, and since Sec
retary of the Navy, had already moved in anticipation of the payment of the
debt, and with the view of strengthening the protective system, that five mill
ions of dollars should annually be taken from the treasury and divided among
the states. Such a proposition could not fail to arouse the attention and appre
hension of one so sagacious and vigilant as Mr. Calhoun. He saw at once the
full extent of the danger. No measure could be devised more insidious, cor-

36 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

rupting, or better calculated to effect the object contemplated. The money
proposed to be so divided would never return to the pockets of the tax-paying
people from whom it was first taken. It would go to the State Legislatures, to
be disposed of as they should think proper, and would constitute a fund, in the
management of which there would be no responsibility, under the control of
the majority of the Legislature, or, rather, of the few leaders of the majority for the
time, to be converted by them into means of power and emolument for themselves,
through their partisans and friends. The necessary effect would be, that the
leaders for the time in all the State Legislatures, even of those most injured
by the system, would be interested in its favour ; as they, and their friends and
partisans, would derive more from the administration and application of the fund
than they had contributed to it, as tax-payers, under the duties from which it
was derived. Seeing these consequences, he could not doubt that, if the meas
ure was once adopted, it would absorb in its vortex the whole surplus revenue
after the discharge of the debt, and unite the General and State Governments
in support of a universal system of plunder. Under that state of things, he be
lieved the evil would become remediless, and our free and popular institutions
would sink into a mass of corruption. With this impression, he used his ut
most influence against this incipient move. It was defeated for the time, but
not without deep apprehension, on his part, that it would revive and finally pre
vail, unless the protective policy, from which this monstrous measure derived
its origin as a legitimate offspring, was effectually and forever destroyed. It
was this view of the subject that so strongly impressed him with the necessity
of decisive action, should the comia^ administration fail to put it down, and
confirmed him in the belief that the tin** for action should by no means be de
layed beyond the final discharge of the public debt.

So deep was his conviction of the danger, that when he was requested by
one of the members elected to the Legislatu^ Of South Carolina, with whom
lie had conversed freely when on a visit to him, *pd who expected to be on the
Committee of Federal Relations, to give him his vie>rs on the subject, he did not
hesitate to draw them up in the shape of a report, in Which he fully expressed
himself as to the disease, the danger, and remedy ; and, regardless of popularity,
he gave him authority to state who was its author, should he. think it would be
of any service. The paper was reported by the committee wiib some, though
not material alterations. Five thousand copies were ordered by the Legisla
ture to be printed, under the title of " The South Carolina Exposition and Pro
test on the subject of the Tariff."

But while the Legislature were thus preparing to arrest, in the last resort, the
obnoxious act, if it should become necessary, they showed, at the same time,
their continued confidence in General Jackson. The presidential election came
on at the same session, and the electors who were appointed by the Legislature
gave their votes to General Jackson and Mr. Calhoun, who were elected by a
large majority of the whole electoral college.

His inaugural address was received with enthusiasm by the people of the
state, and atrong hopes were entertained that their expectations upon his elec
tion would 'he fully realized, and the necessity of resorting to the ultimate
remedy of the Constitution avoided ; but his first message, at the commence
ment of the next session, went far to extinguish their hopes.

Here we reach a. period of history of which it will be difficult to treat with
out reviving some recollection of the unfortunate difference which, for a time,
divided the Republican party, now so happily united in the defence of their
common principles and of constitutional liberty. But, referring to the past, as
we shall for its facts, and not for its feelings, we shall endeavour to give so
much of this history as is indispensable to an explanation of Mr. Calhoun's con
nexion with political affairs, as it will hereafter be written by some impartial
hand — an effort which, we trust, may not be unacceptable to the great actors

LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 37

of that day, if they should find it but a calm and dispassionate review of those
trying and eventful scenes in which they bore so prominent a part. To sup
pose that any man would recoil from the truth of history is to attribute to him
the meanest and most unmanly of fears — an injustice which no motives of false
delicacy would make us even seem to offer to those whom we respect as friends.
In discharging our duty as chroniclers, we shall noUpresume to decide upor.
the merits of past disputes, as our immediate object may be accomplished with
out entering upon that delicate ground. In stating the opinions and course of
Mr. Calhoun, it is not always with a view of justifying them, and we may dis
approve some features in the policy of President Jackson without doubting his >
motives, or disparaging his great abilities and eminent public services. Each
of these great men is too deservedly proud of the past to wish to disguise or
conceal any portion of that history upon which he rests his pretensions for fame ;
and the highest evidence of a noble nature is that candour which receives truth
without offence whenever it is truthfully told. Now that the fires of old feuds
have burned out, and the excitement of the time has passed away, we doubt not
but that each will look upon the past without passion and with impartiality.

But to resume the thread of our narrative. The first message of the Presi
dent, in December, 1829, did not remove the apprehensions which heretofore
had weighed so heavily upon Mr. Calhoun's mind — apprehensions which then
seemed the more exaggerated as he, perhaps, was the only man of the time
who measured, in their full extent, the consequences of a system against which
he was destined soon to peril his all in deadly strife. One of the paragraphs
in this message declares that, " After the .extinction of the public debt, it is not
probable that any adjustment of the tariff, upon principles satisfactory to the
people of the Union, will, until a remote period, if ever, leave the government
•without a considerable surplus in the treasury beyond what may be required
for its current service." After discussing various modes of applying this sur
plus, the message thus again proceeds : " To avoid these evils, it appears to me
that the most safe, just, and federal disposition which could be made of this sur
plus revenue would be its apportionment among the several states, according
to their ratio of representation ; and, should this measure not be found warrant
ed by the Constitution, that it would be expedient to propose to the states an
amendment authorizing it." These recommendations were not calculated to
relieve the apprehensions of Mr. Calhoun as to the danger of a long continuance
of the protective system and its union with distribution; a conjunction which,
of all others, he regarded as the most formidable to the liberties of our people
and the permanence of their free institutions ; and, at the same time, they con
tributed to make a deep and lasting impression upon the people of South Caro
lina, and greatly increased their efforts to disseminate correct information as to
the nature of the evil, and the absolute necessity of averting it by the separate
action of the state, if not done by the General Government, all hope of which
was now wellnigh gone. The next annual message recurred to the same topics.
" In my first message," said President Jackson, " I stated it to be my opinion
that ' it is not probable that any adjustment of the tariff, upon principles satis
factory to the people of the Union, will, until a remote period, if ever, leave the
government without a considerable surplus in the treasury beyond what may be
required for its current service.' I have had no cause to change that opinion,
but much to confirm it." In another part of the same message he said, " Thus
viewing the subject, I have heretofore felt it my duty to recommend the adop
tion of some plan for the distribution of the surplus funds, which may at any
time remain in the treasury after the national debt shall have been paid, among
the states, in proportion to the number of their representatives, to be applied by
them to objects of internal improvement. Although this plan has met with fa
vour in some portions of the Union, it has also elicited objections, which merit
deliberate consideration."* These he proceeded to state and answer at great

38 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

length. It soon became apparent that systematic movements were making in
the leading tariff states to enforce this policy by the weight of their influence.
The governors of New-York and Pennsylvania followed with similar recom
mendations, and their respective legislatures adopted strong resolutions in fa
vour of the scheme. The door of hope from without seemed to be wellnigh
closed, j Unless the state should interpose to avert this system by her separate
action, it appeared inevitable that the tariff of 1828, that " bill of abominations,"
•would be perpetuated in connexion with a distribution of the surplus revenue
after the payment of the debt, with all of its dangerous and corrupting conse
quences. | South Carolina did not hesitate in her choice between these alterna
tives. Everywhere the subject of state remedies was agitated, and the elec
tions throughout the state turned upon that deeply-exciting and important ques
tion.

In the mean time, the personal relations between Mr. Calhoun and the Presi
dent had been impaired by various causes, and in the spring of 1830 the differ
ence became serious and the rupture complete. Separated as they now were
upon great public questions, and alienated also by private differences, it is
not surprising that the President should have directed the whole weight of
his immense popularity against Mr. Calhoun ; nor had the latter any resource
in the opposition, who, separated from him in principle and policy, bore down
upon him with their whole strength and influence. These things, of them
selves, seemed to constitute difficulties of sufficient magnitude to overpower
him. On the whole expanse of the wide American Continent, there were,
perhaps, but two spirits that could have encountered them ; and these, strangely
enough, were the two individuals who were destined to conduct the two parties
in the tremendous contest that was approaching. But, undaunted at the pros
pect, and strong not only in the consciousness of his intellectual resources, but
also in that high resolve which springs from a deep sense of wrong, Mr. Cal
houn fearlessly assumed the responsibility of the movement in the great issue
which South Carolina was preparing to make with the General Government ;
and, in obedience to the calls on him from various quarters, he unhesitatingly
avowed his opinions on the complex and difficult questions arising out of it. It
would be difficult to imagine a situation of more peril, or a greater example of
self-abandonment and moral intrepidity. He andvthe state now stood alone in
open, bold, and undaunted resistance against the scheme of a permanent distri*
bution of the surplus revenue, sustained by a perpetual protective tariff. They
were assailed with equal fierceness by the administration and opposition parties,
and they were deserted by all the Southern states, though most of them had
adopted the strongest resolutions, declaring the tariff of '28 to be oppressive, un
just, unequal, and unconstitutional, and pledging themselves in the most posi
tive manner to oppose it. Nothing but the deepest conviction of the truth and
justice of their cause, and of the magnitude of the questions, could have sus
tained him under such difficulties, and in the face of so imposing a force.

He commenced the address containing the avowal of his opinion with a state
ment of his views on the question of the relation which the states* bear to the
General Government. After referring to the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions,
the Virginia report and the decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
the case of Cobbett, as containing a summary of his opinion, he said, " As many
might not have an opportunity to refer to them, and as different opinions might
be entertained as to their meaning, he would, to avoid all ambiguity, and that
his sentiments might be fully known, state his opinions of the doctrine which
he believed they embraced." With these preliminary remarks, he proceeded
to give, in the first place, a concise summary of the doctrines they embraced,
3nd in the next, his impression of the character and tendency of these doctrines,
followed up by a calm, lucid, and able array of reasons in support of his opin
ion ; and, finally, brought the whole to bear on the protective system, and the

LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 39

dangers to which it exposed our political institutions. He then showed that
the period of the final payment of the debt was fast approaching, and that, if the
threatened danger was not promptly met, the most disastrous consequences
would follow ; and, finally, if the government itself should fail to meet it, state
interposition was the only adequate and constitutional remedy which could ar
rest it. The following extract from this manly and able document contains the
doctrines of state interposition or nullification, with his impression of its char
acter and tendency :

" The great and leading principle is, that the General Government emanated
from the people of the several states, forming distinct political communities, and
acting in their separate and sovereign capacity, and not from all of the people
forming one aggregate political community ; that the Constitution of the United
States is, in fact, a compact, to which each state is a party, in the character al
ready described ; and that the several states or parties have a right to judge
of its infractions, and, in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise
of power not delegated, they have the right, in the last resort, to use the lan
guage of the Virginia resolutions, ''to interpose for arresting the progress of the
evil, and for maintaining, within their respective limits, the authorities, rights, and
liberties appertaining to them? This right of interposition, thus solemnly as
serted by the State of Virginia, be it called what it may, state-right, veto, nulli
fication, or by any other name, I conceive to be the fundamental principle of
our system, resting on facts historically as certain as our Revolution itself, and
deductions as simple and demonstrative as that of any political or moral truth
whatever ; and I firmly believe that on its recognition depends the stability and
safety of our political institutions.

" I am not ignorant that those opposed to the doctrine have always, now and
formerly, regarded it in a very different light, as anarchical and revolutionary.
Could I believe such in fact to be its tendency, to me it would be no recom
mendation. I yield to none, I trust, in a deep and sincere attachment to our
political institutions, and the union of these states. I never breathed an oppo
site sentiment ; but, on the contrary, I have ever considered them the great in
strument of preserving our liberty, and promoting the happiness of ourselves and
our posterity ; and, next to these, I have ever held them most dear. Nearly
half my life has passed in the service of the Union, and whatever public reputa
tion I have acquired is indissolubly identified with it. To be too national has,
indeed, been considered by many, even of my friends, to be my greatest political
fault. With these strong feelings of attachment, I have examined, with the ut
most care, the bearing of the doctrine in question ; and so far from anarchical
or revolutionary, I solemnly believe it to be the only solid foundation of our sys
tem and of the Union itself, and that the opposite doctrine, which denies to the
states the right of protecting their several powers, .and which would vest in the
General Government (it matters not through what department) the right of de
termining, exclusively and finally, the powers delegated to it, is incompatible
with the sovereignty of the states and of the Constitution itself, considered as
the basis of a Federal Union. As strong as this language is, it is not stronger
than that used by the illustrious Jefferson, who said, to give to the General Gov
ernment the final and exclusive right to judge of its powers, is to make ' its dis
cretion, and not the Constitution, the measure of its powers ;' and that ' in all
cases of compact between parties having no common judge, each party has an equal
right to judge for itself, as well of the infraction as of the mode and measure of
redress? Language cannot be more explicit, nor can higher authority be ad
duced.

" That different opinions are entertained on this subject, I consider but as an
additional evidence of the great diversity of the human intellect. Had not able,
experienced, and patriotic individuals, for whom I have the highest respect, taken
different views, I should have thought the right too clear to admit of doubt ; but

40 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

I am taught by this, as well as by many similar instances, to treat with deference
opinions differing from my own. The error may possibly be with me ; but, if
so, I can only say, that after the most mature and conscientious examination, I
have not been able to detect it. But with all proper deference, I must think
that theirs is the error who deny what seems to be an essential attribute of the
conceded sovereignty of the states, and who attribute to the General Govern
ment a right utterly incompatible with what all acknowledge to be its limited
and restricted character ; an error originating principally, as I think, in not duly
reflecting on the nature of our institutions, and oa what constitutes the only ra
tional object of all political constitutions."

The following are the three concluding paragraphs, which will exhibit the
tone and feeling with which the address was written.

" In forming the opinions I have expressed, I have not been actuated by an
unkind feeling to our manufacturing interest. I now am, and ever have been,
decidedly friendly to them, though I cannot concur in all the measures which
have been adopted to advance them. I believe considerations higher than any
question of mere pecuniary interest forbid their use. But, subordinate to the
higher views of policy, I regard the advancement of mechanical and chemical
improvements in the arts with feelings little short of enthusiasm, not only as the
prolific source of national and individual wealth, but as the grea, mear^ of en
larging the domain of man over the material world, and thereby of laying the
solid foundation of a highly-improved condition of society, morally and politi
cally. I fear not that we shall extend our power too far over the great agents
of nature ; but, on the contrary, I consider such enlargement of our power as
tending more certainly and powerfully to better the condition of our race, than.
any one of the many powerful causes now operating to that result. With these
impressions, I not only rejoice at the general progress of the arts in the world,
but on their advancement in our own country ; and, as far as protection may be
incidentally afforded in the fair and honest exercise of our constitutional powers,
I think now, as I have always done, that sound policy, connected with the
security, independence, and peace of the country, requires it should be ; but we
cannot go a single step beyond without jeopardizing our peace, our harmony,
and our liberty — considerations of infinitely more importance to us than any
measure of mere policy can possibly be.

" In thus placing my opinion before the public, I have not been actuated
by the expectation of changing the public sentiment. Such a motive on a ques
tion so long agitated, and so beset with feelings of prejudice and interest,
"would argue, on my part, an insufferable vanity, and a profound ignorance of the
human heart. To avoid, as far as possible, the imputation of either, I have
confined my statement on the many and important points on which I have been
compelled to touch, to a simple declaration of my opinion, without advancing
any other reasons to sustain them than what appeared to me to be indispen
sable to the full understanding of my views ; and if they should, on any point, be
thought to be not clearly and explicitly developed, it will, I trust, be attributed
to my solicitude to avoid the imputations to which I have alluded, and not from
an^ desire to disguise my sentiments, nor the want of arguments and illustra
tions to maintain positions which so abound in both, that it would require a
volume to do them anything like justice. I can only hope that truths which,
I feel assured are essentially connected with all we ought to hold most dear,
may not be weakened in the public estimation by the imperfect manner in which
I have been, by the object in view, compelled to present them.

" With every caution on my part, I dare not hope, in taking the step I have,
to escape the imputation of improper motives, though I have, without reserve,
freely expressed my opinions, not regarding whether they might or might not
be popular. I have no reason to believe that they are such as will conciliate
public favour,' but the opposite, which I greatly regret, as I have ever planed a

LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 41

high estimate on the good opinion of my fellow-citizens. But, be that as it may,
I shall, at least, be sustained by feelings of conscious rectitude. I have formed
my opinions after the most careful and deliberate examinations, with all the aids
which my reason and experience could furnish ; I have expressed these honestly
and fearlessly, regardless of their effects personally, which, however interesting
to me individually, are of too little importance to be taken into the estimate,
where the liberty and happiness of our country are so vitally involved."

He followed up, the next year, this statement of his opinion by a letter* ad
dressed to General Hamilton, then governor of the state, at his request, in
which he went into the same subjects more fully, and with additional force of
argument and illustration. They both did much to enlighten the state on the
subject discussed, and to sustain her in the arduous struggle into which she
was preparing to enter.

In the mean time, the period selected for final and decisive action was rapidly
approaching, and the excitement in the state became deeper and deeper. A
strong party, under able leaders, had risen in the state against the course pro
posed to be taken. They admitted the tariff to be unconstitutional and oppress
ive, but disagreed as to the remedy, which they regarded as revolutionary, and
not warranted by the Constitution. They assumed the popular name of the
Union party. The whole weight of the General Government was thrown in
their favour. The two parties were drawn up in fierce array against each
other, and every nerve was strained on each side to gain the ascendency. The
whole energy and talents of the state were aroused, and the people were inces
santly addressed on both sides, through speeches, pamphlets, and newspapers,
by the ablest men, in manly and eloquent arguments, making direct appeal to
their understandings and patriotism, on all the questions involved in the issue.

At this stage, a gleam of light inspired the hope that the necessity of resort
ing to the extreme remedy of the Constitution would be unnecessary. President
Jackson, in his message to Congress at the opening of the session in Decem
ber, 1831, omitting for the first time all allusion to the scheme of distribution,
announced the near approach of the period when the public debt would be
finally paid, and recommended that provision should be made for the reduction,
of the duties and the relief of the people from unnecessary taxation, after the
extinguishment of the debt. The message diffused general joy throughout the
state. It was believed that the scheme of distribution was abandoned, and
was hoped, ?ate as it was, that most of the mischief anticipated from the surplus
revenue, by a prompt and judicious reduction of the duties, might be still avoid
ed. The delegation in Congress prepared to co-operate zealously with the
friends of the administration in making such a reduction as would relieve the
people from unnecessary taxation, and save the country and government from
the worst of all evils, an accumulating and corrupting surplus, collected in bank
notes, or, what was the same thing, bank credit.

But this gleam of sunshine proved transient and illusory. It soon became
apparent that neither side, administration or opposition, contemplated anything
like an adequate reduction. In spite of every effort made by the delegation, and
after spending the greater portion of the session on the subject, an inconsidera
ble reduction of some three or four millions of dollars only was effected. This
still left a revenue more than twice as large as the usual and necessary expendi
ture of the government would require after the payment of the debt, and the du
ties at high protective rates, on what were called the protected articles ; and as
if, too, to extinguish all hope, this trifling reduction was announced by Mr. Clay
on the part of the opposition, and the Secretary of the Treasury on that of the
administration, as the final adjustment of the tariff, and the permanent system
of revenue, after the payment of the debt. In a striking particular, the act
making the reduction was even more unequal and worse than the tariff of '28.
* See " Speeches," &c., No. 4.

F

32 • LIFE OF JOHft C. CALHOUN.

It exempted the manufacturing portion of the community almost literally from
all taxes. It gave them a bounty on all they made by imposing duties on all
similar articles imported, and all such as could come in competition with what
they made, while it exempted them, as consumers, from paying taxes on almost
all others, by admitting them duty free ; so that, instead of abandoning the prin
ciple of protection, or guarding against the danger of a surplus, the act but per
petuated the protective policy, and left the country and the government exposed
to all the evils of a large annual surplus.

Such an arrangement could not induce South Carolina to surrender the stand
she had taken. On the contrary, it only aroused her to more active resistance,
and energetic preparation to meet an issue, which now seemed almost inevi
table. At this stage an incident occurred that tended greatly to confirm and
animate her in her course.

From the commencement, the State Rights party had claimed the authority of
the Virginia Resolutions, Mr. Madison's Report, and the Kentucky Resolutions,
which they attributed to Mr. Jefferson, as sanctioning the doctrine of nullification
and the course they proposed to take, while those who opposed denied that they
authorized the interpretation put on them, or that Mr. Jefferson was the author
of the Kentucky Resolutions. It became a point of great importance to estab
lish which of the two were right. Both sides admitted the high authority of
Mr. Jefferson, and that the report and resolutions contained the true political
creed of the party. Mr. Ritchie, the experienced editor of the Enquirer and
the associate of Mr. Jefferson, and most of the distinguished men who were his
contemporaries in Virginia, was among the most influential of those who denied
that these documents, or the opinions of Mr. Jefferson, authorized the doctrine
of nullification. But, fortunately, the original manuscript of Mr. Jefferson, from
which the Kentucky Resolutions were taken, was brought to light at this criti
cal juncture, and left no doubt that Mr. Jefferson was their real author, and
that he entertained the doctrines of nullification to the full extent, as interpreted
by the State Rights party, which Mr. Ritchie had the candour to acknowledge,
as the following extract from the Enquirer of March, 1832, shows.

From the Richmond Enquirer, March 13th.

MR. JEFFERSON THE AUTHOR OF THE KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS.

" Nullification — An Error corrected. — We come before the public to correct
an error into which we have betrayed them. Some of the politicians of South
Carolina had maintained the opinion, that Mr. Jefferson was not only the friend,
but the father of nullification ; and their principal argument was, that he was
the author of the Kentucky Resolutions of 1799, as well as those of 1798 ; and
that in those of 1799 is to be found the memorable passage, * The several
states which formed that instrument, being sovereign and independent, have the
unquestionable right to judge of its infraction ; and that a nullification by these
sovereignties of all unauthorized acts, done under colour of that instrument, is the
rightful remedy.'

" We had a great curiosity to ascertain the truth of this opinion. We hunted
up all the facts that were within our reach, weighed them as impartially as we
could, and we arrived at a different conclusion from that of the State Rights
politicians of South Carolina. We expressed our opinions in the ' Enquirer' of
the 13th of September last.

" We have now to state our conviction that we were wrong, and the South
Carolinians were right as to Mr. Jefferson's opinions. A small MS. book has
been found among his papers, which, with other articles, contains two copies, in
his own handwriting, that appear to have been the original of the Kentucky Reso
lutions. The first of these is blurred and much corrected, with passages struck
out and others interlined. The other is a fair and later copy, judging from the

LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 43

^colour of the paper and of the ink, of Mr. J.'s draught. We are indebted to his
grandson for the permission to examine these MSS., and compare them with the
printed copies of the Kentucky Resolutions, and for the opportunity of correct
ing our own mistake, and of laying the following result before our readers."

Here follows Mr. Jefferson's original draught of the Kentucky Resolutions.

Never was a document more clear and explicit on any point than this in fa
vour of the principles on which Carolina had placed her right to interpose.
Words could not make it more so. It says expressly, " That in all cases of an
abuse of delegated powers, the members of the General Government being
chosen by the people, a change by the people would be the constitutional rem
edy ; but where powers are assumed which have not been delegated, a NULLIFICATION
of the act is the RIGHTFUL REMEDY that every state has a natural right to, in cases
not in the compact (casus non foederis), to nullify, of their own authority, all as
sumptions of powers within their limits ; that without this right, they would be
under the absolute and unlimited dominion of whoever might exercise this right
of judgment for them; that, nevertheless, this Commonwealth (Kentucky), from
motives of regard and respect for its co-states, has wished to communicate with
them on the subject ; that with them alone it proposes to communicate, they
alone being parties to the compact, and solely authorized to judge, in the last
resort, of the powers exercised under it — Congress being not a party, but merely
the creature of the compact, and subject, as to its assumption of its powers, to
the final judgment of those by whom, and for whose use, itself and its powers
were created."

So fully does the above extract, and the whole draught, in fact, accord with
the views taken by Mr. Calhoun in the statement of his opinion, and letter to
General Hamilton, that, had it been possible for him to have had access to the
manuscript, he might well have been suspected of plagiarism.

Supported by this high and explicit authority, the State Rights party moved
-forward with renovated energy and confidence in preparing for the great issue ;
but the difficulties were great. The Union party, thoroughly organized under
able leaders, and animated by the greatest zeal, were supported not only by the
whole influence of the General Government, but sustained and cheered by the
concurring voice of both parties, and, it may almost be literally said, of the
whole Union. Against this immense resistance, the State Rights party had to
obtain a majority of two thirds of both houses of the Legislature to carry out its
views, as, according to their opinion, the right of a state to declare an act of
Congress unconstitutional, and therefore null and void, is derived from the fact
that the Constitution is a compact to which the people of the states, in their sover
eign capacity, are direct parties ; and, of course, the right appertains to them in this
capacity only, and can only be exercised by them, through a convention, in the
same mode that the instrument was adopted, and not by the State Government.
They regard the General and State Governments as co-ordinate governments, and
the people of the states, severally, as the paramount sovereign authority. Accord
ing to these views, in order to take the final step it would be necessary to call
a convention of the people of the state ; and for this purpose, by a provision of
the Constitution of the state, two thirds of the Legislature were necessary ; with
out that nothing could be done, and the cause would have to be abandoned.
The election was pending, and the great struggle between the parties was, on
one side, to carry two thirds of both houses, and on the other to defeat it. The
magnitude of the issue was felt by both, and never was a political struggle more
ardent ; and, let it be added for the honour of both parties and the state, never
before, in such a struggle, was the appeal more direct and solemn to the intel
ligence and patriotism of the people, and so free from all false issues, cant, or
appeal to pas«ion or prejudice.

It resulted in the triumph of the State Rights party. They returned more
.than tl^p constitutional number to both houses. The Legislature met and called

44 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

a Convention, which assembled and passed the Ordinance of Nullification, the
24th of November, 1832, accompanied by two addresses ; one to the people of
South Carolina, and the other to the people of their co-states of the Union, set
ting forth fully an explanation of the motives and principles which governed
them as one of the parties to the constitutional compact, in the high and solemn
act of sovereignty, which duty to themselves and to the Union compelled them
to perform. They adjourned to meet in March, subsequent to the period at
•which, by the Constitution, the approaching session of Congress would ter
minate.

Congress met at the usual period, in December, and the President, in his Mes
sage, announced the final payment of the public debt, and recommended a re
duction of the duties to the standard required for the revenue of the government
economically and efficiently administered, to take place as soon as the faith of
the government, and the preservation of the large capital invested in manufac
turing establishments, would permit.

The time of Governor Hamilton having expired, General Hayne, then a sen
ator in Congress, was elected his successor, and placed at the head of the gov
ernment of the state at this momentous period. The proceedings of the Con
vention were reported to the Legislature, which met shortly after its adjournment,
and an act introduced and passed to carry into effect the ordinance, to go into
operation in February. That was followed by the proclamation of the President,
which asserted that the ordinance was subversive of the Constitution, and that
the object of South Carolina was the destruction of the Union ; and after giving
his views of the Constitution, and the provisions of the existing laws applicable
to the case, and declaring the course he would pursue, he warned all the peo
ple of the state against obedience to the ordinance, under the high penalty for
treason against the United States. Governor Hayne issued his counter procla
mation, repelling the charges of the President, and maintaining the grounds taken,
by the Convention, and replying to the reasons assigned for the grounds taken
in the President's proclamation.

CHAPTER V.

j • '.< °i •

Including the Period from his Resignation of the Vice-presidency till the Admission of
Michigan into the Union.

AT this critical juncture, the Legislature elected Mr. Calhoun to fill the vacancy
in the Senate occasioned by the election of General Hayne as governor. As
trying as was the situation under such circumstances, he resigned without hesita
tion his place as Vice-president, and proceeded to Washington to take his seat
in the Senate. Never was there, since the commencement of the government,
a moment of more intense interest and anxiety throughout the whole Union, and
never before was any public man placed in a situation more difficult and re
sponsible. The expectation was general that he would be arrested as soon as
he arrived in Washington ; and on his way thither, wherever he stopped,
crowds collected to see him. Nor was the excitement less when he arrived at
the seat of government, where he had been so long and familiarly known.
When he appeared in the Senate to take his seat as a member in a body over
which he had so long and recently presided, the gallery and chamber were
thronged with spectators. He repeated the constitutional oath in a firm and
audible voice, and took his seat on the side and in the midst of his old political
friends, of whom a large majority were now placed in hostile array to him.
But as trying and responsible as was the occasion, he stood erect and unap-
palled, conscious of the purity of his motives, and strong in the depth of his
conviction of the truth, justice, constitutionality, and magnitude of tke

LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 45

which South Carolina, in her confidence, had selected him as her chosen repre
sentative to defend.

Mr. Calhoun, a few days after he took his seat, in order to bring the whole
subject under the early consideration of the Senate, offered a resolution, calling
ttpon the President to lay before the body the ordinance and other documents
connected with it, which had been transmitted to him by the executive of the
state ; but he forbore to press its adoption, on the statement of Mr. Grundy,
that there was reason to believe the President was preparing a message on the
subject, which would be accompanied by the documents requested, and that the
message would probably be sent the day after the next. Not expecting any
thing of importance the next day, Mr. Calhoun delayed some time after the
usual meeting of the body to take his seat. When he entered the chamber, he
was surprised to find it crowded, and the Secretary of the Senate in the midst
of reading the message, which he did not expect until the next day. It took
strong ground against South Carolina, and recommended the adoption of the
most decisive measures to coerce her obedience.

It was a trying moment. He had not the slightest anticipation that he would
be called on to say anything when he entered the chamber, and was wholly
unprepared ; and, to add to his embarrassment, he had, for the long period of
fifteen years (while he filled the war department and the place of Vice-presi
dent), been, entirely out of the habit of public speaking. Nor could he avoid
speaking, as it would look like shrinking not to give an immediate reply to the
message. • Under all these trying circumstances, he rose as soon as the reading
was over, and replied, in a manly and effective speech, to the ground taken in
the message. After he concluded, the message and documents were referred
to the Committee on the Judiciary, of which Mr. Grundy was chairman and Mr.
Webster a prominent member. They reported a bill, extending the jurisdiction
of the courts of the United States greatly and beyond all former acts, and cloth
ing the President with almost unlimited powers, both as to men and money.

In order to have a preliminary discussion, and to take the sense of the Sen
ate on the principles involved in the issue, before the bill was called up, Mr.
Calhoun prepared and moved the three following resolutions, which affirmed
the grounds on which South Carolina placed her right, on the one side, and
negatived, on the other, those assumed in the proclamation and message.

" Resolved, That the people of the several states composing these United
States are united as parties to a constitutional compact, to which the people of
each state acceded as a separate and sovereign community, each binding itself,
by its own particular ratification ; and that the Union, of which the said com
pact is the bond, is a Union between the states ratifying the same.

" Resolved, That the people of the several states, thus united by a constitu
tional compact, in forming that instrument, in creating a General Government
to carry into effect the objects for which it was formed, delegated to that gov
ernment, for that purpose, certain definite powers, to be exercised jointly, re
serving, at the same time, each state to itself, the residuary mass of powers, to
be exercised by its own separate government ; and that, whenever the General
Government assumes the exercise of powers not delegated by the compact, its
acts are unauthorized, void, and of no effect ; and that the said government is
not made the final judge of the powers delegated to it, since that would make
its discretion, and not the Constitution, the measure of its powers ; but that, as
in all other cases of compact among sovereign parties, without any common
judge, each has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of the infraction as of
the mode and measure of redress.

" Resolved, That the assertions, that the people of these United States, taken
collectively as individuals, are now, or ever have been, united on the principle
of the social compact, and, as such, are now formed into one nation or people ,
or that they have ever been so united in any one stage of their political exist-

46 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

ence ; or that the people of the several states comprising the Union have not,
as members thereof, retained their sovereignty ; or that the allegiance of their
citizens has been transferred to the General Government ; or that they have
parted with the right of punishing treason through their respective state gov
ernments ; or that they have not the right of judging, in the last resort, as to the
extent of the powers reserved, and, of consequence, of those delegated, are not
only without foundation in truth, but are contrary to the most certain and plain
historical facts, and the clearest deductions of reason ; and that all exercise of
power on the part of the General Government, or any of its departments, de
riving authority from such erroneous assumptions, must of necessity be uncon
stitutional ; must tend directly and inevitably to subvert the sovereignty of the
states, to destroy the federal character of the Union, and to rear on its ruins a
consolidated government, without constitutional check or limitation, and which
must necessarily terminate in the loss of liberty itself."

It is obvious, on the perusal, that if the principles offered by the resolutions
be true, South Carolina would stand justified ; and if those negatived be false,
the bill could not be rightfully sustained ; and such being the case, it was but
fair that the principles should be settled prior to the discussion and action on
the bill. But as reasonable as was the request of Mr. Calhoun, the Senate,
under the influence of the committee, laid his resolutions on the table, and took
up the bill for discussion. The debate was very able on both sides. Many of
the old and sound Republicans, refusing to yield their long-cherished principles
to party feelings or considerations, opposed the bill with great ability and vigour.
Mr. Grundy, as chairman, claimed the right of closing the debate, and Mr. Cal
houn reserved himself to reply to Mr. Webster, who was the great champion of
the bill ; but he was informed, through one of Mr. Webster's friends, that he
would not speak before him. This left him no option, as he could not avoid
speaking, and had therefore to submit. He spoke late,* and conjecturing that Mr.
Webster intended to speak to the principles involved, and not to the provisions
of the bill, he spoke at large on a variety of points, which he thought required
explanation in connexion with the course of South Carolina, and but slightly
touched on the principles which he had affirmed or negatived in his resolutions,
in order to deprive Mr. Webster of the advantages he aimed at in reserving
himself for the reply. He was right in his conjecture. The moment he sat
down, Mr. Webster rose to reply, but spoke, as he anticipated, not on the bill,
but to the resolutions, without assailing or controverting any of the positions
taken by Mr. C. in his speech. This gave him a claim to be heard on his
resolutions ; and the Senate accordingly permitted him to call them up, and as
signed a day in order to give him an opportunity of replying to Mr. Webster in
their support.

When the day came the senate-chamber and gallery were crowded, and Mr.
Calhoun replied in a speechf which, for precision and force of argument, has
rarely, if ever, been equalled. The great point at issue was, whether the Con
stitution is or is not a compact between the States. Mr. Webster, with that
strength of understanding which belongs to him, saw clearly where the real
issue lay, and had the fairness and candour to concede that if, in fact, the Con
stitution is a compact between the States, then the doctrines contended for by
South Carolina necessarily followed, nullification, secession, and all. Mr. Cal
houn, accordingly, mainly directed his efforts to establishing the fact, and with
such success, that even the North American Quarterly Review, published in
Boston, and at all times the champion of the principles supported by Mr. Web
ster, in an article reviewing the debate, admitted that Mr. Calhoun had success
fully maintained his ground on that point. Mr. Randolph, then in a feeble state
of health, on his way to Philadelphia, was present in the senate-chamber, it is
believed for the last time, when Mr. Calhoun spoke. He sat near the desk
* See " Speeches," &c., No. 5, t See " Speeches," &c,; No, 6.

LIFE OF J.OHN C. CALHOUN. 47

where Mr. C. stood while addressing the Senate, and at the close openly and
highly complimented him for the ability and success of his reply, which he re
garded as unanswerable.

The bill passed, but while it was in progress, efforts were made in both Houses
so to modify the duties as to terminate the controversy peaceably. Upon
faith in these efforts, South Carolina postponed the time for carrying into effect
her ordinance, from the first of February till after the adjournment of Congress
on the fourth of March. Mr. Verplanck, in the early part of the session, had
reported a bill in conformity with the message of the President at the opening
of the session, proposing a very great reduction of the duties, but without sur
rendering the principle of protection, or, in many instances, reducing the duties
to the revenue standard. Its progress was slow. It was detained a long time
in committee of the whole, where many amendments, increasing the duties,
were made. After it was reported to the House, it continued to drag along with
difficulty. Many of the objectionable amendments made in the committee of
the whole were concurred in, and the fate of the bill still continued doubtful,
notwithstanding the steady and united support which it received from the State
Rights party, objectionable as it was in many particulars. Their support was
more than counterbalanced by the division in the ranks of the administration
party.

In the mean time, Mr. Clay introduced a bill in the Senate, which received
the sanction of that body, and was sent to the House, where Mr. Verplanck's
bill still lingered near the end of the session. It was moved as a substitute to
his bill, and carried by a large majority ; Mr. Verplanck himself, and the lead
ing friends of the administration who supported his bill, voting for it in despair,
as it is believed, of the passage of his own. It received the sanction of the
President, and has since been called the Compromise Act ; and thus terminated
this controversy, the most agitating and memorable that ever occurred under the
government.

It is not deemed necessary to go into the origin or history of the act, or mi
nutely into its provisions. The former have been given several times by Mr,
Clay and Mr. Calhoun in their places in the Senate, and are generally known.
It is sufficient to say that Mr. Calhoun, from the commencement, refused to go
into any arrangement which did not explicitly surrender the principle of pro
tection, but was willing to allow ample time for the gradual reduction of the
duties on the protected articles, in order to save the manufacturers from ruin ;
but he insisted on a tota] repeal at once on all unprotected articles, in order to
prevent, if possible, the great object of his dread from the first, a surplus rev
enue. Mr. Clay was, of course, on his part, solicitous, in making the changes
necessary to a compromise, to give as slight a shock as possible to his long-
cherished system. The result was the surrender of the protective principle
and the establishment of the ad valorem, and a gradual reduction of duties on
all protected articles, to terminate on the thirtieth of June, 1842, when no duty
above 20 per cent, ad valorem should be laid ; the immediate repeal of all du
ties on articles not similar to those manufactured in the country, and a moderate
list of articles to be made permanently free of duty after the thirtieth of June,
1842, with provisions for cash duties and home valuation. Such are the gen
eral outlines of the provisions of the act which peaceably closed the controver
sy ; and if faith and pledges had been observed with as much fidelity on the
side of the tariff interest as it has been on the part of the opposite side, the pos
sibility of its renewal would have forever been prevented.

Whatever opinion may have been entertained at one time of the views and
motives of Mr. Calhoun, and the small but gallant party with which* he acted,
none now, not even the most prejudiced, doubts the purity and patriotism of his
and their motives, however much they may differ from them as to principles and
policy. So far from hostility to the Union, one of the leading objects was its

$8 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

preservation. The Union may be destroyed as well by consolidation as by dis
solution — by the centripetal as well as the centrifugal tendency of the bodies of
which it is composed. It is the duty of the patriot to resist both, and hold the
government firmly to its allotted sphere. Against the former, state interposition
is an all-sufficient remedy, and it remains to be seen whether experience will
not prove that it is an indispensable one. It was, at least, so considered by the
State of South Carolina, and that was one of the principal motives for resorting to
it. Nor does it admit of a doubt but that her action did much to counteract the
consolidating tendency of the Government. Had she not taken the stand she
did, in all probability the distribution of the surplus revenue among the states
and the protective policy would have become the established system of the Gov
ernment. The scheme of distribution is almost a necessary consequence of that
policy. They are most intimately connected, as the experience of the last few
years shows, even with an- empty treasury. With one full to overflowing, as was
the case when the debt was paid and the state interposed, it was almost, if not al
together unavoidable, without state interposition. That the protective tariff would
not have been overthrown without it, the inconsiderable reduction of 1832, and
the fate of Mr. Verplanck's bill, notwithstanding all the pressing circumstances
under which it was introduced and attempted to be passed, conclusively prove ;
and that it could not have been overthrown if the two, distribution and protec
tion, had become united, may be fairly inferred. They would then have been
beyond the reach of all ordinary and constitutional remedies, when either con
solidation or despotism would have been the end of our political system.

But how different now is the situation of the government and the country in
consequence of the course pursued. When the state first took its stand, the
very existence of states' rights was almost forgotten in the Union. The party
had greatly departed from the old standard of its faith both in theory and prac
tice, and had imperceptibly embraced, to a great extent, the doctrines and policy
of its opponents. If proof be required, the proclamation, the message recom
mending the Force Bill, the bill itself, and the arguments by which it was sup
ported, afford conclusive evidence. That a great and cheering change has
since taken place, all must admit ; and that it may be attributed, in a great
measure, to say the least, to the stand taken by South Carolina, cannot well
be doubted.

It was expected that, among its other benefits, it had put an end forever to
the protective policy, but the act of the last session has proved to the contrary.
It is, however, to be hoped that the wound it has received will yet prove to be
its death-blow, and that the act of the last session will be but a last spasmodic
struggle preceding its final dissolution. Great has been the progress of truth
in reference to this policy, both as to its character and operation, since the stand
taken by South Carolina. That it is unjust, unequal, oppressive, and unconstitu
tional, the great body of the Democratic party are now agreed, and, being agreed,
they can never cease their determined resistance to it until it is finally overthrown,
without (what cannot be anticipated) an abandonment of their political faith.

Such is a sketch of this important part of Mr. Calhoun's public life. As long
as it is, not a word has been added which was not regarded as necessary to a
just understanding of his motives and conduct, in the most trying scene through
which it has been his fortune to pass.

Congress adjourned on the third of March, and he proceeded by public con
veyance to Columbia to meet the Convention, which was to reassemble in a
few days. The spring was unusually cold and backward. The snow lay sev
eral inches deep on the ground, and the Potomac was frozen. He took the
stage at Alexandria, but the roads were so broken up in consequence of the
frost that he had to take open mail-carts, in which he rode night and day with
out stopping, for a considerable portion of the way, in order to reach Columbia
in time. He found the members of the Convention assembled. Knowing how

LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 49

firm and resolved the state was to maintain its rights, lie anticipated some dis
satisfaction at the compromise, which had induced him to proceed with the
speed which he used. He was not mistaken ; but, on explaining fully what
had been done, and the reasons on which he and his colleague had acted, the
Convention readily acquiesced in the adjustment. Let it be added, in conclu
sion, that the earliest opportunity was seized by both parties in the state, at the
next session of the Legislature, after the closing of the controversy with the
General Government, to meet like friends, and agree to disband their party or
ganization, and forget their past differences, which both sides, to their lasting
honour, have faithfully and honestly observed. The consequence of so patri
otic and magnanimous a course has been a degree of harmony and unanimity in
the state ever since, without example in any other member of the Confederacy.

This great subject of controversy was thus happily closed in the Union and the
State of South Carolina ; but the recess between the last and the next session
was not permitted to pass without giving birth to another question of deep and
abiding excitement : the withholding of the deposites of the public money from
the Bank of the United States, and their transfer, by the authority of the President,
to certain state banks, selected for the purpose. To effect his object, he had re
moved Mr. Duane for declining to comply with 2iis order, and appointed Mr.
Taney Secretary of the Treasury in his pla^e, in order to have it executed.
The bank was made by its charter the fiscal agent of the government for the
collection, distribution, and safe keeping °f tne public funds, unless otherwise
ordered by the Secretary of the Treasury, and in that case it was provided he
should report to Congress, if in session, immediately, and if not, at the com
mencement of the next session, his reasons for so doing. For that and other
privileges, the bank paid a bonus for the charter of one million five hundred
thousand dollars. The President communicated the fact of the removal of the
deposites in his message at the opening of the next session, with his reasons,
which were repeated and enlarged on by ,the Secretary of the Treasury in his
Annual Report.

The subject gave rise to a long and animated discussion between the two
great parties, both as to the right and expediency of the measure. Mr. Cal-
houn was not regarded as attached to either, and much interest was felt in the
course he might take. He spoke first, and in a speech* distinguished for its
ability, admitted the right of the President to remove his secretary, though he
regarded it, under the circumstances, an abuse of power ; but denied not only
the right of the secretary to withhold the deposites so long as the funds, were
safe and the bank performed faithfully its duties as a fiscal agent, but also the
expediency of the act. But he did not confine himself to these points. He
saw, at that early period, the radical defects of the banking system, and he re
solved, though he disapproved of the act of the executive, that his position
should not hereafter be mistaken as that of a partisan of the bank or the bank
ing system. With that view, after discussing the questions immediately con
nected with the withholding of the deposites, and some other intermediate ones,
he added :

" Nor is it more true that the real question is ' Bank or no Bank.' Taking
the deposite question in the broadest sense ; suppose, as it is contended by the
friends of the administration, that it involves the question of the renewal of the
charter, and, consequently, the existence of the bank itself, still the banking
system would stand almost untouched and unimpaired. Four hundred banks
would still remain scattered over this wide Republic, and on the ruins of the
United States Bank many would rise to be added to the present list. Under
this aspect of the subject, the only possible question that would be presented
for consideration would be, Whether the banking system was more safe, more
beneficial, or more constitutional with or without the United States Bank ?'
* See " Speeches," &c., No. 7.

G

50 LIFE OF JOHN C. CA.LHOUN.

" If," said Mr. C., " this was a question of ' Bank or no Bank' — if it involved
the existence of the banking system, it would, indeed, be a great question — one *
of the first magnitude ; and, with my -present impression, long entertained and
daily increasing, I would hesitate — long hesitate — before I would be found un
der the banner of the system. I have great doubts, if doubts they may be call
ed, as to the soundness and tendency of the whole system, in all its modifica
tions. I have great fears that it will be found hostile to liberty and the advance
of civilization — fatally hostile to liberty in our country, where the system exists
in its worst and most dangerous form. Of all institutions affecting the great
question of the distribution of wealth — a question least explored, and the most
important of any in the whole range of political economy — the banking institu
tion has, if not the greatest, one of the greatest, and, I fear, most pernicious in
fluence on the mode of distribution. Were the question really before us, I
would not shun the responsibility, as great as it might be, of freely and fully
offering my sentiments on these deeply-important points ; but as it is, I must
content myself with the few remarks which I have thrown out."

u What, then, is ^ real question which now agitates the country ? I an
swer, it is a struggle between the executive and legislative departments of the
government ; a struggle, not «» relation to the existence of the Bank, but wheth
er Congress or the President bVould have the power to create a bank, and,
through it, the consequent control over the currency of the country. This is
the real question. Let us not deceive, ourselves. This league, this association,
vivified and sustained by receiving the tioposites of the public money, and hav
ing their notes converted, by being received everywhere by the treasury, into
the common currency of the country, is, to all intents and purposes, a bank of
the United States — the executive bank of the United States, as distinguished
from that of Congress. However it might fail to perform satisfactorily the use
ful functions of the Bank of the United States, as incorporated by law, it would
outstrip it — far outstrip it — in all its dangerous qualities, in extending the pow
er, the influence, and the corruption of the government. It was impossible to
conceive any institution more admirably calculated to advance these objects.
Not only the selected banks, but the whole banking institutions of the country,
and with it the entire money power, for the purpose of speculation, peculation,
and corruption, would be placed under the control of the executive. A system
of menaces and promises will be established : of menace to the banks in pos
session of the deposites, but which might not be entirely subservient to execu
tive views, and of promise of future favours to those who may not as yet enjoy
its favours. Between the two, the banks would be left without honour or hon
esty, and a system of speculation and stock-jobbing would commence, unequal
led in the annals of our country."

Again : " So long as the question is one between a bank of the United States
incorporated by Congress, and that system of banks which has been created by
the will of the executive, it is an insult to the understanding to discourse on the
pernicious tendency and unconstitutionality of the Bank of the United States.
To bring up that question fairly and legitimately, you must go one step farther :
you must divorce the government and the bank. You must refuse all connexion
with banks. You must neither receive, nor pay away bank-notes ; you must go
back to the old system of the strong box, and of gold and silver. If you have a
right to receive bank-notes at all — to treat them as money by receiving them in
your dues, or paying them away to creditors, you have a right to create a bank.
Whatever the government receives and treats as money, is money in effect ; and
if it be money, then they have the right, under the Constitution, to regulate it.
Nay, they are bound by high obligation to adopt the most efficient means, ac
cording to the nature of that which they have recognised as money, to give it
the utmost stability and uniformity of value. And if it be in the shape of bank
notes, the most efficient means ol giving those qualities is a Bank of the United
States, incorporated by Congress. Unless you give the highest practical uni-

LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 51

formity to the value of bank-notes — so long as you receive them in your dues,
and treat them as money, you violate that provision of the Constitution which
provides that taxation shall be uniform throughout the United States. There is
no other alternative, I repeat; you must divorce the government entirely from the
banking system, or, if not, you are bound to incorporate a bank, as the only safe
and efficient means of giving stability and uniformity to the currency. And
should the deposites not be restored, and the present illegal and unconstitutional
connexion between the executive and the league of banks continue, I shall feel
it my duty, if no one else moves, to introduce a measure to prohibit government
from receiving or touching bank-notes in any shape whatever, as the only
means left of giving- safety and stability to the currency, and saving the country
from corruption and ruin."

Again: "Were I," said Mr. C., "to select the case best calculated to illus
trate the necessity of resisting usurpation at the very commencement, and to
prove how difficult it is to resist it in any subsequent stage if not met at first, ]
would select this very case. What, he asked, is the cause of the present usur
pation of power on the part of the executive ? what the motive ? the temptation
which has induced it to seize on the deposites ? What, but the large surplup
revenue 1 the eight or ten millions in the public treasury beyond the wants of
the government? And what has put so large an amount of money in the treas
ury when not needed ? I answer, the protective system : that system which
graduated the duties, not in reference to the wants of the government, but ir
reference to the importunities and demands of the manufacturers, and which
poured millions of dollars into the treasury beyond the most profuse demands,
and even the extravagance of the government — taken — unlawfully taken — from
the pockets of those who honestly made it. I hold that those who make are
entitled to what they make against all the world except the government, and
against it except to the extent of its legitimate and constitutional wants ; and
that for the government to take one cent more is robbery. In violation of this
sacred principle, Congress first removed the money by high duties, unjustly and
unconstitutionally imposed, from the pockets of those who made it, where it
was rightfully placed by all laws, human and divine, into the treasury. The
executive, in his turn, following the example, has taken them from that depos-
ite, and distributed them among favourite and partisan banks. The means
used have been the same in both cases. The Constitution gives to Congress
the power to lay duties, with a view to revenue. This power, without re
garding the object for which it was intended, forgetting that it was a great
trust power, necessarily limited, by the very nature of such powers, to the
subject and the object of the trust, was perverted to a use never intended,
that of protecting the industry of one portion of the country at the expense of
another ; and, under this false interpretation, the money was transferred from
its natural and just deposite, the pockets of those who made it, into the public
treasury, as I have stated. In this, too, the executive followed the example
of Congress. By the magic construction of a few simple words — * unless other
wise ordered' — intended to confer on the Secretary of the Treasury a limited
power — to give additional security to the public deposites, he has, in like
manner, perverted this power, and made it the instrument, by similar sophistry,
of drawing the money from the treasury, and bestowing it, as I have stated, on
favourite and partisan banks. Would to God, said Mr. C., would to God I
could reverse the whole of this nefarious operation, and terminate the contro
versy by returning the money to the pockets of the honest and industrious citi
zens, by the sweat of whose brows it was made, with whom only it can be
rightfully deposited. But as this cannot be done, I must content myself by
giving a vote to return it to the public treasury, where it was ordered to be
deposited by an act of the Legislature."

These extracts contain an explanation, not only of Mr. Calhoun's views of
the banking system at the time, but also of those which have governed his after

<52 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

course in reference to the banks, and most of the prominent questions since
agitated. He believed that there was, at the time, a strong tendency in all the
departments of the government to usurp power, and that it originated with Con
gress. It is, indeed, a settled opinion with him, which he has long entertained,
and the reasons for which he recently explained in his speech on the veto, that
usurpations in the Federal Government almost necessarily originate with Con
gress ; but that the powers which it gains by usurping those of the states or
people, adds, not to its strength, but to that of the other departments, and es
pecially of the executive, in whose hands it becomes the means of usurping in
turij the powers of Congress, and controlling its proceedings. He accordingly
attributed the great power and influence of the executive at this time, and its
tendency to encroachment, to the previous encroachments of Congress, espe
cially in passing the tariff of '28. That having been prostrated by the inter
position of the State of South Carolina and the Compromise Act at the last ses
sion, he next turned his efforts to arresting, what he believed to be its natural
consequence, the encroachments of the executive ; and was thus, and to that
extent, brought for the time to act with the opposition party, then called National
Republicans. But he occupied throughout his own independent State Rights
ground and principles, from which he in no instance departed. Wherever they
led, he followed, without regarding whether they brought him to co-operate with
the opposition or administration, or left him alone in the Senate to maintain and
defend his own separate and peculiar position.

His course in the very case under consideration strikingly illustrates these
remarks. He essentially differed on this important occasion from both of the
great parties, administration and opposition. The former was in favour of the
league of state banks as the fiscal agents and depositaries of the Government,
and opposed both to a national bank and the 'divorce of government from the
banks. The latter, on the contrary, were in favour of a national bank, and op
posed to the league of banks and the divorce ; while Mr. Calhoun and the State
Rights party were in favour of the divorce, or what has since been called the
Independent Treasury, and opposed to a national bank, and any connexion with
the banking system in any way. It was in conformity to these views, and after
consulting Mr. Calhoun and the prominent members of the party, that General
Gordon, then a distinguished representative from Virginia, introduced at the
time a bill to establish the Independent Treasury. It failed. The public mind
was not then prepared ; but to him will belong the lasting honour of introducing
one of the most important measures of modern times.

The removal of the deposites was not the only question of importance which
was agitated during the session. Among others, the motion of Mr. Webster,
who was then chairman of the Committee on Finance, for leave to bring in a
bill to recharter the Bank of the United States for six years, gave rise to an in
teresting discussion. Mr. Calhoun seized the opportunity, not to discuss the
question of renewal, but that of the currency generally, which he showed, even
then, to be deeply diseased, and to warn the Government and country of the ap
proach of the catastrophe which has since befallen them. He pointed out the
cause and character of the disease, and the remedy that should be adopted to
prevent, if possible, the approaching shock, or at least to lessen its violence.
His speech* on the occasion is one of the ablest and most remarkable for its
forecast he ever made. It is prophetic throughout, and was pronounced by one
of the senators, himself a speaker of distinguished abilities and long experience,
the ablest he ever heard. To appreciate its merits, it must be read.

Upon this occasion he exhibited, in a remarkable degree, that statesmanlike
faculty which has enabled him to do so much to direct events, by always taking
the nearest practicable step towards his object, instead of refusing to do anything
unless he could effect what was the best in the abstract. The great ends in his sys
tem of life, whether public or private, he has ever held to be fixed by reason and
* See " Speeches," &c., No. 8.

LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 53

general rules ; but the time and mode of attaining them he regarded as questions
of expediency, to be determined by the circumstances under which he is called to
act. If things are now wrong, he who refuses to make any change for the better
because he cannot obtain at once what he believes to be best in the abstract,
is responsible for them as they exist, and should be classed rather with those
•who sustain the present wrongs than with those who pursue the right ; for in prac
tice, the effects of their action are the same ; and yet he who makes the nearest
attainable approach to the right is too often confounded with those who main
tain the wrong, and postponed for others who, content to think correctly, are
yet too timid to act if there be danger of misconstruction, and really contribute
to the continuance of that which they condemn. This is a species of fear
which Mr. Calhoun has never known. Seeing cleariy his own ends, which
have been long fixed by observation and reflection, he judges, with a rare saga
city, of the nearest practicable approach which can be made to them under the
circumstances, and advances forward to the boundaries assigned by prudence
without fear of the enemy, and halts when he has taken as much ground as he
can occupy, without regard to the remonstrances of his followers, who take their
counsels merely from zeal, and do not properly ascertain the limits upon human
power, and the controlling force of events. It is thus that he is ever in prog
ress ; and although generally in advance of his party and the world, in a long
life he has never been forced to abandon any forward movement, or recede from
his end. He uses time to control circumstances, and directs them both to his
great object, which he is ever on the march sooner or later to attain. This
it is which makes him the master-statesman of his age, and thus he has been
able to accomplish so much with such inconsiderable means.

Upon the occasion to which we now refer, he exhibited this statesmanlike
mode of thinking and acting in a remarkable degree. He sought no trial of skill in
oratory where victories were to be barren of results to the country. He avoided
all those topics of personal or party excitement, whose fleeting interest belonged to
the time and not to the case ; but, looking to the exigencies of the country, and
not to the mere feelings of the day, he surveyed the whole ground with military
precision, and made a masterly reconnoisance of the field. As abstract ques
tions, he did not enter into the nature of the banking system, or its constitutional
propriety. In discussing the disease, it was necessary to touch slightly upon the
tendencies of the banking system ; and these touches, like the line of Apelles,
showed the master's hand, and his thorough acquaintance, with the" subject.
He traced clearly the deep seat of the malady, and developed its probable
progress and consequences unless corrected. He then addressed himself to
the discovery of some remedy, which should be both safe and efficient. With
the propriety and constitutionality of the banking system as abstract questions
he had nothing to do, and upon them he only touched so far as they bore upon
the remedy which he had in view. Banks were in existence, and through them
the currency was indisputably deeply diseased. There was not the least proba
bility of any successful effort to force the Government to abandon the use of pa
per. He contented himself, therefore, with showing that, if the Government
could use paper, it could also regulate its value ; and the question was to ascer
tain the best means of reaching that object. He proposed a continuance of the
bank for twelve years, under severe restrictions, and upon conditions which
would gradually diminish the volume of paper currency, so as to enable the
Government, at the end of that period, to dispense with its use altogether, if
it should choose to do so, without any shock to the community. In this point
of view, it was of no importance whether the original charter was constitutional
or not. Suppose it to be unconstitutional, it was a question whether we would
rid ourselves of the evil gradually, and without injury to the community, or
whether we should repeal it at once, at the sacrifice of all of its immense con
nected interests, and send the whole toppling down the abyss together. He
thought there was a great difference between doing and undoing ; and while he

54 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

would never originate what he believed to be unauthorized by the Constitution,
he would take his own time for repairing the breaches already made in it, and
so conduct the process as to produce the least possible amount of suffering in
the country. It was thus that he agreed to compromise an unconstitutional
lariffby allowing time, so as to save vast and meritorious interests which were
connected with it ; and thus, too, he now sought (to use his own words) to
" unbank the banks." Here, too, he exhibited an instance of that cautious pro
cess by which all real statesmen conduct their reforms, and proved his aversion
to hazarding the vast interests of a community by any sudden change which
was not justified by experience, but suggested only by theoretic opinions. It
was clearly seen, both in this and his preceding speeches, that he disapproved
the banking system, and *saw, as far as mere reason without experience could
point, that its tendencies were evil ; and yet he forbore to strike at it until there
was time to verify his reflection by experience, and the period should arrive
when an effectual blow might be given. If the system were good, it was clear
to him that it required severe restrictions and judicious regulation ; if evil, he
was equally decided that it ought to be removed gradually, so as to produce the
least shock to the community. In either point of view, his course of conduct
would be the same up to a certain period, to which he limited his prescription.
The question of his future action he reserved for the time itself, to be deter
mined by the lights of a more matured experience. It was not his object to
amuse theorists or gratify a mere taste for speculation, but he sought a practical
remedy for a disease under which the community was likely to suffer most in
tensely. As his suggestions were not taken, we can come to no certain con
clusion as to what they would have led, but posterity will form its opinion as to
their probable result. Of this, however, we feel assured, that the speech will
always be considered as most remarkable for its political forecast.

So deeply was he impressed with the approaching danger, that when he un
derstood Mr. Webster contemplated making the motion he afterward made, to
renew the charter, he sent word through a friend of his, who had called on
him, that he feared he was about to make a false move, and said that, although
he and Mr. Webster were scarcely on speaking terms, in consequence of the
occurrences of the last session, he would be glad to have a full conversation
with him before he made his motion, if he would give him an opportunity by
calling on him. The next morning he called. Mr. Calhoun stated his objection
to the course he proposed, and what he thought ought to be done. Mr. Webster
took time before he gave an answer, but informed Mr. Calhoun, when he called
next day to learn his decision, that he concluded not to change his course. Mr.
Calhoun expressed his regret, and on being asked by Mr. Webster whether he
would oppose his motion, he replied no ; but added that he believed the govern
ment and country were approaching a period of great peril, and that he felt that
it would be due both to the public and himself to embrace the occasion to state
at large the opinions and views he had expressed to him. He, in fact, regarded
it as the critical moment ; and when he saw that it was permitted to pass with
out doing anything to prevent the disorder into which the currency was falling,
he made up his mind that what has since followed was inevitable.

In this connexion, and governed by the same views, he gave a decided sup
port to what is called the Gold Bill,, which raised the relative value of gold
compared to silver, and the establishment of the branch mints, both of which he
regarded as intimately connected with a return to a permanent and sound cur
rency. The administration favoured both measures, and Mr. Clay opposed them.
The discussion on both was conducted principally by him and Mr. Calhoun.

The proceedings of the Senate on the removal of the deposites was followed
by the President's protest, which gave rise to a full and animated discussion in
the Senate. Mr. Calhoun took decided ground against its reception. In the
course of his argument, he maintained the position that the Constitution vests all

LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 55

discretionary powers in Congress, to the exclusion of the executive and judici
ary departments ; and that neither of them, nor any office under the government,
can exercise any power not authorized by law, but such as is expressly granted
by the Constitution. To sustain this important position, he cited the provision
in the Constitution which gives to Congress the power "to pass all laws ne
cessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing" (that is, the pow
ers granted to Congress), " and all other powers vested by this Constitution in
the government of the United States, or in any department or office thereof." The
provision is express, and the position incontrovertible ; and yet, strange as it
may seem, it had been theretofore entirely overlooked, although it is one of the
most important provisions in the whole instrument. It is the provision, in fact,
which binds up all the parts in one, making of them one government, instead of
consisting, as they would without it, of three hostile departments, each with the
authority to assume whatever right it might think proper to carry into execution
its share of the granted powers. One of the important consequences of this
provision of the Constitution is to subject the removing power to the regulation
of law. The mere fact that the power of removing from office is not granted
by the Constitution to the President, is conclusive proof that it can only be ex
ercised by the authority of law, and, of course, subject to such limitation as it
may impose. It was, indeed, an investigation into the origin of that power
which led Mr. Calhoun to the examination of the Constitution, which ended in
making this important disclosure, as it may fairly be termed.

At the next session a special committee of nine members was, on motion of
Mr. Calhoun, raised, in order to inquire into the extent of the executive patron
age, the cause of its great increase of late, and the expediency and practicabil
ity of reducing the same, and the means of doing it. After a minute and labo
rious investigation, he made a full and able report* on all the points, of which
10,000 copies were ordered to be printed by the Senate.

One of the leading objects which he had in view was to strike at the surplus
revenue. He anticipated it would be large, although the Compromise Act had
repealed the duties on more than one half of the imports. But even that, aided
by the gradual reduction on all the residue, could not prevent the accumulation.
He dreaded it, not only because it would add greatly to the patronage of the
executive by extending its control over the banks, and, through them, over the
whole community, but still more because it would be the source of boundless
speculation and corruption. To ascertain its probable extent, he entered into
a minute examination of the finances, and after exploring the whole ground, he
estimated the surplus at an average of not less than nine millions of dollars an
nually for the whole period the Compromise Act had to run. As moderate as
bis estimate proved to be, it was violently assailed, at the time, for its supposed
extravagance.

But time rolled on, and at the opening of the next session, his estimate, in
stead of proving extravagant, fell short of the actual amount by millions, and
that with a surplus daily increasing with an accelerated velocity, under a new
impulse, which was swelling it beyond ail assignable limits. Here a brief ex
planation is necessary, in order to have a just conception of the danger to which
the government and country were exposed at this period.

The tariff of 1828 gave the first impulse to that great expansion of the cur
rency, which, under the influence of different causes, both foreign and domestic,
was still on the increase, and continued so till just before the final explosion ia
1837. So powerful was the first impulse, from the high duties imposed in 1828,
that the currency was doubled, in the manufacturing portions of the Union, in
eighteen months from the passage of the act. On the accumulation of the surplus
revenue from the same cause, after the payment of the public debt, a new im
pulse was given to the expansion. The surplus was deposited with the banksT
and became, in fact, so much additional bank capital, in the least responsible and
* Se» "Speeches." &c.. No. 10.

56 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

most dangerous form. This, with other causes, and especially the withdrawal
of the deposites from the United States Bank, and the approaching termination
of its charter, gave a great additional impulse to the whole system. State
banks were multiplied in all directions, with but little capital, and charters less
guarded than ever. All these concurring causes tended greatly to increase the
expansion, and, by necessary consequence, to produce a corresponding augmen
tation of prices, to which, however, there was an important exception. The
price of all public lands which had been offered at public sales and not sold,
was fixed by law at $1 25 per acre, and could not, of course, partake of the
general rise. The quantity of such lands- was great, not less, probably, than
two hundred millions of acres, and thus a universal spirit of speculation, engen
dered by an inflated currency and high duties, was turned in that direction.

The facility of purchasing was not less than the quantity to be purchased.
The deposites of the government in the state banks selected as its fiscal agents
was upward of forty millions of dollars, consisting almost exclusively of bank
notes. From this vast source speculators and political partisans drew their
funds,- in the form of discount or loan, in exchange for which they gave their
own promissory notes, and received the notes deposited by the government, or,
what was the same, a credit in bank founded on them. These, in turn, were
exchanged for the public lands, when they passed into the hands of the receiv
ers, and were by them returned to the banks as new deposites, to take the same
rapid round again and again, and sweeping away from the people, by means
of their own funds, a corresponding amount of their land, and swelling, in the
same proportion, the amount brought to the credit of the government by the
banks, under the fallacious name of public money in the treasury, but which, in
reality, was nothing more than the notes in bank given by speculators and par
tisans in exchange for the public lands.

In this operation every revolution but increased the force of the next, which,
if left to operate unchecked, must end,' as was manifest, in the entire absorp
tion of the public domain and the universal explosion of the banking system,
with the ultimate loss of what was due to the Government. It was about the
time when these powerful causes began to operate with such effect as to be
seen and felt by all, that the administration obtained a majority in the Senate,
where it had for some time been in a minority ; on which Mr. Calhoun, who
had moved, as has been stated, at the preceding session, in anticipation of the
danger, rose in his place and said, that, as the friends of the administration were
now in a majority, he left it to them to take the lead in providing a remedy for
this alarming state of things.

All now felt that something must be done, and that promptly, to regulate and
control the deposite banks, and to save the public funds and the national do
main. Three remedies were proposed. The first was, to absorb the current
revenue and the vast surplus already accumulated by the increase of the pub
lic expenditures ; and, with that view, a resolution was actually introduced in
the Senate and passed, calling on the executive to know how much could pos
sibly be spent on military defences. The next was to vest what was not need
ed to meet the current expenses of the government in state stocks ; and tho
other, to pass an act regulating and controlling the deposite banks, and to place
the surplus in deposite in the treasury of the several states. The first two
came from the friends of the administration, and the last was proposed by Mr.
Calhoun as an amendment to the second.

It was the choice of evils. Something must be done. Anything was better
than the continuance of the actual state of things. This all acknowledged.
The objection to the first was great. So sudden and great an increase of ex
penditures when prices were so extravagant, and when, without a vast enlarge
ment of the disbursing departments, there could be no efficient accountability,
could not but end in much waste, loss, extravagance, and corruption, to say no

LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 57

thing of the great increase of patronage. But the great and decisive objection
was, that expenditures sufficiently large to absorb the surplus would necessarily
destroy, in their effects, the Compromise Act, and restore the protective system.
It is easy to raise the expenditures, but very difficult to reduce them, of which
the experience of the last five or six years affords abundant proof. The revenue
at the time, though far beyond the wants of the government, was in the regular
course of reduction under the compromise, which would, in the course of six
years, bring it down to a sum only sufficient for the support of the Government
with rigid economy. To have raised the expenditures sufficiently high to ab
sorb the surplus, under such circumstances, would have required an unusual
disbursement of between thirty and forty millions of dollars for the whole pe
riod, as experience has shown ; and, of course, a sudden reduction of nearly
twenty millions, to bring down the expenditures to what, with proper manage
ment, would be necessary. So great and sudden a reduction would prove im
practicable, and the certain result would be loans, debts, the violation of the com
promise, and a renewal of the protective system. All this was urged against
the scheme by Mr. Calhoun at the time. It was defeated, at least in a great
degree ; and it may well be asked, after the experience of the last two years,
what would have been the consequences if it had not been, when even its par
tial effects have brought on the Government and country, to the extent they have,
the very evils then anticipated by him.

The objection to vesting the surplus in state stocks was not less serious.
Among so many other mischievous consequences, it would have been grossly
partial; but the insurmountable objection was the danger of entangling the
Government with the state stocks.

This scheme was in substance as much a deposite of the surplus revenue with,
the states as that proposed by Mr. Calhoun as an amendment to it. The latter
placed the money with the states upon their promise to return it, if the General
Government should require it, while the former exchanged the surplus for the
obligations, by which the states, in another form, were bound to repay it ; so that
each scheme proposed to exchange the surplus for state credit in some form.
With state stocks depreciating as they have since done, it would have been as
unpopular and impossible to have used any means to recover the money by
selling them, as it would have been to have recalled it directly from the states
themselves. The difference was, that Mr. Calhoun's scheme bestowed upon the
states all the patronage resulting from the use of the money, while the other
gave it to the Secretary of the Treasury, in whom it vested an almost unlimited
discretion, and to whom it gave the dangerous power of dealing in those stocks
to large amounts. That this plan would have resulted in the entire loss of the
money, with little or no benefit to the states, we may see from our past experi
ence. The immense increase of executive patronage to which it would have led
may also be estimated. But the endless train of mischiefs which would have
followed in some of its remote consequences it would be difficult to measure, as
we may readily perceive, when we come to consider the use which might have
been made of such a power in the federal executive by those who have con
ceived the monstrous scheme of assuming the state debts. Indeed, the exist
ence of such a power would naturally seem to suggest such a use of it, with the
ideas now prevalent in the minds of many of our public men on the subject of
state-indebtedness.

Nor was the last of the alternatives free from serious objections ; but, under
all circumstances, it was thought to be the least so by Congress, and it accord
ingly passed through both houses by a large majority. Mr. Calhoun made a
very comprehensive and able speech against the first two, and explained his
views of the substitute he offered.

This was not the only important measure that claimed his attention during
the session. In the preceding recess the Abolitionists had for the first time

H

68 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

regularly organized as a party, with a powerful press, and attempted, by sys
tematic operations, to force its publications on the South, with a view of acting
on its slave population. It carried deep excitement throughout that entire sec
tion. Everywhere meetings were held and the attempt denounced, and the
other sections called upon to adopt measures to stay the evil. The President,
in his message at the opening of the session, called the attention of Congress
to the subject, and recommended the adoption of efficient measures to prevent
the circulation of their incendiary publications through the mail. Mr. Cal-
lioun, although he appreciated and highly approved the patriotic motives of the
President, could not agree with him to the full extent of his recommendation.
He saw the danger of permitting Congress to assume the right of judging of
what constituted an incendiary publication ; for if it be conceded that it has the
right of determining what is incendiary, and to prevent its circulation, it would,
by necessary consequence, carry with it the right of determining what was not,
and to enforce its circulation against the laws of such states as might prohibit
them. With this impression, and in order to prevent the adoption of erroneous
views, at the outset, on a subject so vitally important to the slave-holding states,
lie moved the reference of the portion of the message containing the recom
mendation to a special committee, of which he was appointed chairman.

The report* he made took a very original and able survey of the whole ground,
and conclusively proved, both by arguments drawn from the Constitution and
the practice of the Government, that it belonged to the states separately to de
termine what is or is not calculated to affect or disturb its internal police, in
cluding its peace and safety, and to adopt the measures necessary for their
security ; and that it was the duty of the General Government not only to con
form its acts, in reference to the mail or for the regulation of commerce, to the
legislation of the states in such cases, but to aid in the execution of the laws
of the states, as far as its power would permit, when it became necessary.
The report was accompanied by a bill, drawn up in conformity with these
views, and was ordered to the third reading by the casting vote Oi iLe Vice-
president, but finally failed.

This bill gave rise in the Senate to a very animated and interesting debate,
principally between Mr. Calhoun and Mr. Davis of Massachusetts, in which
the arguments for and against are strongly presented on both sides. For ori
ginal views of the Constitution and strength of argument, Mr. Calhoun *s speechf
on the occasion ranks with his ablest, and is worthy of the study of all who de-
eire to understand some of the most important provisions of that instrument.

During the same session he made another speechj on the same subject, dis
tinguished for its foresight and knowledge of the Constitution. For the first
time there began to pour in that flood of petitions on the subject of abolition
which has since deluged Congress. The members from the non-slave-holding
states on both sides, though adverse to the petitions, were opposed to taking
strong and decided grounds against them ; and their respective political friends
in the South were naturally indisposed to force them to take higher grounds
iiian they were inclined to do. The result was a sort of compromise, to re-
eeive the petitions, but not to refer or act upon them. Mr. Calhoun, whose
£ule has ever been to meet danger " on the frontier," to use his own expres
sion, saw the peril of receiving the petitions, and determined to take a decided
stand against it. He expected to stand alone ; but with such force did he
-maintain his objections^ to receiving, that he was supported by a large portion
-of the Southern senators, and the motion to receive was laid on the table.
-Since then, no petition of the kind has been received by the Senate.

The prominent question at the next session was the Specie Circular. The
President had issued an order in the recess prohibiting the receipt of bank
notes, or anything but specie in payment of the public lands. The opposition

* See « Speeches," &c., No. 1 1. f Ibid, No. 12. } Ibid, No. 13. $ Ibid, No. 14.

LIFE OF JOHN C* CALHOUN. 59

was unanimously opposed to it, both on the ground of expediency, and the want
of authority on his part to issue such an order, while his friends and supporters
were greatly divided, some sustaining, but the greater part opposing the meas
ure. Mr. Calhoun agreed with those who denied the right of the President
to issue the order, on the broad principle that neither the Constitution nor the
laws conferred it, and that the executive had no power but what was conferred
by the one or the other. Nevertheless, he declined voting for the bill to super
sede the order, which was passed by a great majority, a large portion of the
administration party voting for it. His reasons were, that the diseased state of
the currency was beyond remedy, and whether the circular was repealed or
not, the result would be the same. He regarded the catastrophe as inevitable,
and that the only question was, at whose door the responsibility should be laid.
He saw that if the circular should be rescinded, it would be charged on those
by whose vote it was done ; and as he felt conscious that he had done all that
he could to arrest the approaching calamity, he was determined to avoid all
responsibility, and therefore declined voting for the bill. He -was entitled to
the floor, and intended to offer his reasons at large ; but when it came up on its
passage, was accidentally prevented from speaking. On his return home in
March, several of his friends in Charleston, interested in trade and the banks,
asked his opinion of the prospect ahead. His reply was, that the storm was ap
proaching, and was just at hand, and his advice was to reef — reef — reef — quickly
and closely, to avoid being wrecked. In tvfo months the banks suspended pay
ments, and the commerce and business of the country were prostrated.

During the same session an important question arose in reference to the ad
mission of Michigan. She had been admitted at the preceding session on the
condition of agreeing to the boundary between her and Ohio, as presented by
the act for her admission. The Legislature of the state, in compliance with
the act of Congress, called a convention of the people of the state, in order to
determine whether the conditions should be accepted or not. The convention
rejected the condition. Subsequently, an informal meeting or caucus was called
by the party in favour of accepting it, without legal authority, or any other cere
mony than is used for convening such meetings for ordinary political objects. It
met, and agreed to the condition, which had been in due form considered and
rejected by the convention legally and regularly called. The Committee on
the Judiciary, to whom the subject was referred, reported in favour of admitting
the state on the authority of the informal meeting or caucus, for it was, in fact,
nothing more. . Mr. Calhoun opposed the report in two speeches* on the ground
of the unconstitutionality and the danger of the precedent, in which he displayed,
with great force of argument, that thorough knowledge of the Constitution for
which he is remarkable. But, as powerful as was his resistance, it proved vain.
The bill passed, and has made a precedent, the danger of which time only can
disclose.

CHAPTER VI.

in which the Narrative is continued until the Termination of the Second Session of the

27th Congress.

THE suspension of the banks in the spring of '37 marks an important period
in the life of Mr. Calhoun and the political history of the country. Fortunately,
under the operation of the joint resolution of 1816, and the Deposite Act of the
preceding year, in the passage of both of which he took a decided part, the act
of suspension of itself entirely separated the Government and the banks. The
former prohibited the Government from receiving the notes of suspended banks
* See " Speeches," &c., Nos. 16 and 17.

60 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN,

in the public dues ; and the latter prohibited it from using such banks as the
depositaries of the public money, or as the fiscal agents of the Government.
Without these, the union of the Government with the banks would still have
continued, and the former would have found* itself reduced to the same condi
tion that it was at the end of the war in 1815, of receiving and paying away
the notes of discredited banks, and using them as its depositaries and agents in
the management of its revenue.

The suspension, as has been stated, was not unexpected to Mr. Calhoun ;
and he was not long in making up his mind as to the course he would pursue.
He resolved to resist the reunion of the Government and the banks in any
form, and to oppose the establishment of a national bank. Indeed, he regarded
it as the first occasion that ever occurred which offered an opportunity for car
lying into execution what he had long believed to be the true policy of the
country, the divorce of the Government from all connexion with banks ; an
opinion which he had first publicly and plainly indicated in 1834, in his speech
on the removal of the deposites, already cited. He made known his determi
nation to a few confidential friends long before the call of the extraordinary ses
sion, and resisted decidedly all attempts to influence him to support a national
bank.

With his course thus fixed, he went to Washington at the commencement of
the extra session, resolved to await the development of the views of the two
great parties before he should publicly make known his own, and to act with
or against them, according as their course might agree or disagree with his
own. He listened attentively to the reading of the President's Message at the
opening of the session, which explicitly opposed the establishment of a United
States Bank, and the renewal of the union of the Government and the banks,
and made up his mind, as soon as the reading was finished, that he would give
it his support.

The impression got out that Mr. Calhoun would support the message. It
caused much excitement ; but as it was only a rumour, the development of his
course in his place in the Senate was looked to with deep solicitude. It was
not long before an occasion offered. The Committee on Finances reported,
shortly after the message was received, a bill for the establishment of what
•was called a Sub-treasury, but without any provision for collecting the Govern
ment dues in specie.

Mr. Calhoun rose in his place, and declared himself in favour of the entire
separation of the Government from the banks, but denounced in strong Jerms
the report of the committee for .omitting what he regarded as essential to a
separation; a provision for collecting the public dues in the constitutional
currency, without which the measure they had reported would prove a perfect
abortion. He declared that if that was what was meant by a sub-treasury, he
washed his hands of all concern with it. His remarks made a deep sensation,
and he was solicited by many of the friends of the administration to bring for
ward, in the shape of an amendment, a proposition to collect the public dues in
specie. He replied that he had not intended to offer any proposition of his
own ; but, as they requested it, he would comply with their wishes. When,
the bill for the issue of treasury notes came up a few days after, he stated his
opinion at large on the subject of the separation of the Government and the
banks; in a speech, which made a permanent impression on the public mind,
in reference to the whole banking system. He gave notice in his speech* of
his intention of moving an amendment, at the proper time, to the bill, for the
gradual but permanent separation of the Government from the banks, but finally
agreed to postpone his motion till the bill for the establishment of the Sub-
treasury should come under consideration. When that came up, he moved his
amendment, and made a second speech,! *n which he traced the rise and progress
of the banking system, and marked the several stages through which it had
* See « Speeches," &c., No. 18. t See " Speeches," &c.. No. 19.

LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 61

passed ; he showed that it contained within itself the princi£te_tf J
struction ; and finally exposed the mischievous character and tendency of the
system, .economically, politically, and morally. His amendment prevailed, and
the bill passed the Senate as amended, but failed in the House.

Such was Mr. Calhoun's course on this memorable occasion. All things
considered, it has seldom been equalled for patriotism, magnanimity, sagacity, V
and boldness. We have seen him, in obedience to his principles, and what
seemed to be his duty, separate himself from General Jackson and the party
when in the plenitude of their power, and when he held the second office in
the Government, with every prospect of reaching the highest. We have seen
him, after his separation, instead of courting the opposition in order to maintain
himself against the power and influence of the executive, again pursue a course
in obedience to principle and duty, which brought him into direct conflict with
both, and left him with his state alone to maintain the unequal struggle against
a course of policy which, he believed, if not arrested, would prove ruinous to the
Government and country. We have seen him, when the state, in pursuance of
his course, had effected its object, availing himself of the aid of the opposition
to bring down the power and influence of the executive department (origina
ting in the encroachments of the Congress) within proper constitutional, legal
limits. That done, we next see him, when the reaction of the very system to
oppose which he separated from the party had prostrated them, and when the
opposition with which he had for a time acted were preparing to rush on and
overwhelm them in their weakness, and to re-establish their old doctrines and
principles, rising up promptly, overcoming all personal feelings, forgetting all
past differences, boldly repelling the assaults of his recent allies, and de
fending and protecting those from whom he had been so long separated, and by
whom he had been much wronged, in stern obedience to his principles and to
what he believed to be his duty : thus clearly showing, by his whole course
throughout this eventful period, that when they were at stake, neither ambition.
fear, enmity, friendship, nor popularity could bend him from his course.

The stand which he took drew down on him, as might be expected, the bitter
denunciation and vengeance of the opposition, who had now" assumed the name
of Whigs. Among other things, they charged him with desertion, as if he had
ever been of their party, and when, in fact, he had kept himself distinct from
both the great parties from the time of his separation from General Jackson.
That there might be no mistake on that point, he took the earliest opportunity
in the Senate to avow what his position was. In his speech on Mr. Webster's
motion, in 1834, to renew the charter of the United States Bank for six years,
he said, " I am the partisan of no class, nor, let me add, of either political party.
I am neither of the opposition nor administration. If I act with the former in
any instance, it is because I approve of their course on the particular occasion,
and I shall always be happy to act with them when I do approve. If I oppose
the administration, if I desire to see power change hands, it is because I disap
prove of the general course of those in authority."

To which he added : " But mine has not been, nor will it be, a systematic
opposition. Whatever measure of theirs I deem right I shall cheerfully sup
port, and I only desire that they will afford me more frequent occasions for
support and fewer for opposition than they have heretofore done." He often
avowed the same sentiments, and acted throughout in strict conformity to the
principles here laid down ; and when Mr. Clay, for the first time in the Senate,
assumed the name of Whig for himself and the party, intending to comprehend
under it all that did not support the administration, the State Rights as well
as the national parties, Mr. Calhoun rose in his place and disavowed the name,
as applied to himself, and expressed himself contented with the name he bore.
If to this it is added, he never, on any occasion, joined in their political meet
ings or party consultations, and always kept himself free on every question to

62 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

follow the dictates of his own judgment, it must be obvious that the charge of
desertion is wholly groundless. In truth, he never from the first permitted his
party obligations to overrule his attachment to principles or duty, and through
out this trying period he availed himself of the aid of whatever party fell in
with his course for the time, to effect the important objects he had in view,
but without permitting them, in any instance, to divert him from his end.

At the next session, the Sub-treasury, or the reorganization of the treasury,
with the view of collecting, safe keeping, and disbursing the public moneys
through its own officers, without the agency of banks, again became the prom
inent question. The subject was again referred in the Senate to the Commit
tee of Finance, which reported a bill much fuller in its details, and containing
"what is called the specie feature, that is, a provision for the gradual, but entire
separation of the government from the banks, similar to that moved at the extra
session by Mr. Calhoun. Mr. Rives moved, as a substitute, to strike out the
whole bill after the enacting clause, and to insert in lieu the use of the state
banks as the depositaries and fiscal agents of the government, as formerly used,
but with some additional modifications. The discussion took place on the
amendment, and the argument principally turned on the respective merits of
the two systems. Both sides put out their strength. The debate was ani
mated and able. Mr. Calhoun took a prominent part, and greatly distinguished
himself in the speech he delivered on the occasion.* This drew down on
him pointed personal attacks from the two great leaders of the opposition, Mr.
Clay and Mr. Webster, with whom he had to contend single handed. The
conflict excited deep and universal interest.! It was called in the journals
of the day the war of the giants ; and it is no more than justice to him to say,
that he repelled their charges with signal success, and turned back the war
with effect. J

After the defeat of the amendment offered by Mr. Rives, and just before the
question was put on the engrossment, a motion was made to strike out the spe
cie feature, which succeeded by the united vote of the opposition and a consid
erable portion of the friends of the administration. The effect of the amend
ment would be for the government to collect the dues in the notes of the banks,
and deposite them for safe keeping in its own safes and vaults, to which Mr.
Calhoun had from the first avowed his hostility. He reserved his opposition
until the bill had been perfected, according to the views of those who had made
the amendment, and the question put on the engrossment, when he stated his
objections in a short, but strong and decisive speech, showing that it was liable
to all the dangers and objections for which the pet-bank system was obnoxious,
attended by additional dangers and objections peculiar to itself. The bill, nev
ertheless, passed the Senate, but the argument was not without its effects. The
views of Mr. Calhoun were almost unanimously sustained by the party in the
House and the country. The bill failed, and the session terminated in leaving
things as they were.

It was during this session that Mr. Calhoun introduced his resolutions on the
subject of abolition. He had always regarded this as the most mischievous
species of political fanaticism, and the only question which could really en
danger the Union. He saw the non-slave-holding states closely divided be
tween two great parties, and a third growing up and organizing upon a principle
which they believed of a higher importance than any involved in the political
issues of the day. Should this sect continue to increase without opposition
from either of the great parties, its influence might become strong enough to de
cide the political contests, and so formidable that it would be courted. As their
ends could only be attained through consolidation, it was likely that they would
join the party whose principles had that tendency. The best interests of the
tlnion, and the integrity of the Republican party, seemed to require the line to
* See " Speeches," &c., Nos. 20, 21, and 22.

LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 63

be drawn at once between that party and the Abolitionists. He accordingly
moved the following resolutions, which present so strongly his views of the re
lations of the General Government and of the states to this subject, that we
shall extract them.

" Mr. Calhoun then submitted the following resolutions :

" Resolved, That, in the adoption of the Federal Constitution, the states
adopting the same acted severally as free, independent, and sovereign states ;
and that each, for itself, by its own voluntary assent, entered the Union with the
view to its increased security against all dangers, domestic as well as foreign,
and the more perfect and secure enjoyment of its advantages, natural, political,
and social.

" Resolved, That, in delegating a portion of their powers to be exercised by
the Federal Government, the states retained severally the exclusive and sole
right over their own domestic institutions and police, and are alone responsible
for them ; and that any intermeddling of any one or more states, or a combina
tion of their citizens, with the domestic institutions and police of the others, on
any ground or under any pretext whatever, political, moral, or religious, with a
view to their alteration or subversion, is an assumption of superiority not war
ranted by the Constitution, insulting to the states interfered with, tending to en
danger their domestic peace and tranquillity, subversive of the objects for which
the Constitution was formed, and, by necessary consequence, tending to weaken
and destroy the Union itself.

" Resolved, That this Government was instituted and adopted by the several
states of this Union as a common agent, in order to carry into effect the powers
which they had delegated by the Constitution for their mutual security and pros
perity ; and that, in fulfilment of this high and sacred trust, this Government is
bound so to exercise its powers as to give, as far as may be practicable, in
creased stability and security to the domestic institutions of the states that com
pose the Union ; and that it is the solemn duty of the Government to resist all
attempts by one portion of the Union to use it as an instrument to attack the
domestic institutions of another, or to weaken or destroy such institutions, in
stead of strengthening and upholding them, as it is in duty bound to do.

" Resolved, That domestic slavery, as it exists in the Southern and Western
States of this Union, composes an important part of their domestic institutions,
inherited from their ancestors, and existing at the adoption of the Constitution.,
by which it is recognised as constituting an essential element in the distribu
tion of its powers among the states ; and that no change of opinion or feeling
on the part of the other states of the Union in relation to it can justify them or
their citizens «i open and systematic attacks thereon, with the view to its over
throw ; and that all such attacks are in manifest violation of the mutual and
solemn pledge to protect and defend each other, given by the states respectively
on entering into the Constitutional compact which formed the Union, and, as
such, is a manifest breuch of faith, and a violation of the most solemn obliga
tions, moral and religious,

" Resolved, That the intermeddling of any state or states, or' their citizens, to
abolish slavery in this district, or any of the territories, on the ground or under
the pretext that it is immoral or sinful, or the passage of any act or measure
of Congress with that view, would be a direct and dangerous attack on the in
stitutions of all the slave-holding states.

" Resolved, That the union of these states rests on an equality of rights and
advantages among its members ; and that whatever destroys that equality tends
to destroy the Union itself; and that it is the solemn duty of all, and more es
pecially of this body, which represents the states in their corporate capacity, to
resist all attempts to discriminate between the states in extending the benefits
of the Government to the several portions of the Union ; and that to refuse to
extend to the Southern and Western States any advantage which would tend to

64 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

strengthen or render them more secure, or increase their limits or population by
trie annexation of new territory or states, on the assumption or under the pre
text that the institution of slavery, as it exists among them, is immoral or sinful,
or otherwise obnoxious, would be contrary to that equality of rights and advan
tages which the Constitution was intended to secure alike to all the members
of the Union, and would, in effect, disfranchise the slave-holding states, with
holding from them the advantages, while it subjected them to the burdens of the
Government."

These, with the exception of the last, passed the Senate with some slight
modifications. In the course of a long and running debate on these resolutions,
he examined the relations of our government to this subject. He showed those
•who viewed slavery only in the abstract, that they could never thus form a true
conception of their duty in the existing state of things. It was not a question
to be considered in the abstract, but in the concrete, and with a full view of all
the circumstances connected with it. In a large portion of our country, two
races had been thrown together in nearly equal numbers, and separated into
castes by a natural line too strongly drawn ever to be effaced. The question
was not as to what different state of things could be conceived as more desira
ble, but what was the best relation to establish between two such races thrown to
gether under such circumstances. Under the institution of slavery, both races
had prospered, and the black especially had made a more rapid advance in
civilization than it had ever done before in the same space of time and under
other circumstances. These were facts to induce those to pause who were
tempted, by considerations of abstract philanthropy, to overstep the bounds which
were imposed on their action not only by the Constitution, but also by an enlighten
ed spirit of benevolence itself. If other considerations were wanting, he pointed
to the incidental political benefits arising from an institution which harmonized
the relations between capital and labour, and thus introduced a spirit conserva
tive of both interests, so far as Southern influence could be felt in the action of
the General Government. The passage of these resolutions placed the Aboli
tionists in direct hostility to the Republican party, and led to a state of things
which was far safer to the party and the Union than to have permitted so dan
gerous a sect to grow up unopposed. The Republicans, from all sections of
the Union, found in these propositions a common ground where they could stand,
without danger of schism upon the question which threatened most to divide them.

At the next session the prominent subject of debate was Mr. Crittenden's
bill to prevent the interference of certain Federal officers in elections. Mr.
Calhoun spoke with much power and effect on the occasion.* Aftsr discussing
the subject fully against the bill on its merits, both as to its constitutionality
and expediency, and showing that its effects would be the opposite of what was
intended — that it would increase instead of diminishing the influence of the ex
ecutive — he declared himself the fixed and strenuous friend of reducing the
influence and patronage of that branch of the government within the narrowest
limits consistent with the Constitution and the object for which it was created.
He then proceeded to show that the legitimate means of effecting that was to
restrict the revenue and expenditure to the legitimate and constitutional wants
of the Government, and to hold the executive power strictly to its appropriate
sphere. This led him into a very interesting account of the two hostile sys
tems of policy, which had divided the country from the formation of the Gov
ernment, of one of which Mr. Jefferson was the head and General Hamilton of
the other. After tracing their rise and progress, he showed that the present
struggle was but a continuation of the original conflict between them, and that
an opportunity was now afforded for the first time since the Government went
into operation, to put down eilectually that of which Hamilton was the head —
the old Federal and consolidation party; and to give the opposite — that of
* See " Speeches," &c., No. 23.

LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 65

which Jefferson was the head, the old State Rights Republican party — a per
manent ascendency. In conclusion he said, " It would be presumptuous in me,
Mr. President, to advise those who are charged with the administration of the
Government what course to adopt ; but if they would hear the voice of one who
desires nothing for himself, and whose only wish is to see the country prosper
ous, free, and happy, I would say to them, You are placed in the most remark
able juncture that has ever occurred since the establishment of the Federal
Government, and, by seizing the opportunity, you may bring the vessel of state
to a position where she may take a new tack, and thereby escape all the shoals
and breakers into the midst of which a false steerage has run her, and bring her
triumphantly into her destined port, with honour to yourselves and safety to
those on board. Take your stand boldly ; avow your object ; disclose your
measures, and let the people see clearly that you intend to do what Jefferson
designed, but, from adverse circumstances, could not accomplish : to reverse the
measures originating in principles and policy not congenial with our political
system ; to divest the Government of all undue patronage and influence ; to re
strict it to the few great objects intended by the Constitution ; in a word, to
give a complete ascendency to the good old Virginia school over -Jts antagonist,
which time and experience have proved to be foreign and dana--rous to our sys
tem of Government, and you may count with confidence on *w# support, with
out looking to other means of success. Should the Government take such a
course at this favourable moment, our free and happy institutions may be perpet
uated for generations, but, if a different, short wa be their duration." Had
the course advised been early and openly avrvVed and vigorously pursued in
time, very different might have been the termination of the last presidential
election ; and it may be added, that the af>'lce *s not IGSS applicable to the com
ing than to the past election, arid, if fie Federal consolidation party is ever to
be permanently put down, and the State Rights Republican party to gain the
permanent ascendency, it ca/i only oe effected by its adhering steadily and in
good faith to the course advised

The next session, ths* of i 839-40, which immediately preceded the late
presidential election, was distinguished for the number and importance of the
subjects that were agitated and discussed, and, it may be added, the ability and
animation of the discussions. Among the more prominent of these may be in
cluded the public lands ; the assumption of state debts ; Mr. Calhoun's resolu
tions in reference to the case of the Enterprise ; the Bankrupt Bill, and the re
peal of the salt-tax ; in all of which Mr. Calhoun took a prominent part.* His
speeches on his resolutions and on the assumption of state debts arc among the
ablest he ever delivered, and are worthy of the attention of all who desire to
understand the subjects which they discuss.

The presidential election having terminated in favour of the Whigs, the next
session was principally occupied in the discussions connected with the public
lands, preparatory to one of the leading objects of policy contemplated under
the new administration. Mr. Calhoun made three speeches on the subject:!
one on the prospective Pre-emption Bill ; another on an amendment to it pro
posed by Mr. Crittenden, as a substitute, to distribute the revenue from the pub
lic lands among the states ; and, finally, one in reply to Mr. Webster and Mr.
Clay. In these the whole policy of the public lands, and the various plans
which were proposed in reference to them, were discussed. It is a subject
which early attracted Mr. Calhoun's attention, and has engrossed much of his
reflection.

As far back as February, 1837, he offered a substitute, in the form of an

amendment to the bill, to suspend the sales of the public lands, in which he

proposed to cede to the new states the portion of the public lands lying within

their respective limits, on certain conditions, which he accompanied by a speech

* See " Speeches," &c., Nos. 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29.

66 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

explanatory of his views and reasons. He followed up the subject in a speech
delivered in January, 1839, on the Graduation Bill ; and in May, 1840, an
elaborate and full report was made from the Committee on Public Lands, and a
bill introduced by him, containing substantially the same provisions Avith his
original proposition. These, with his three speeches already referred to, con
tain a full view of his objects and reasons for the proposed cession.

There have been few measures ever presented for consideration so grossly
misrepresented, or so much misconceived, as the one in question. It has been,
represented as a gift — a surrender — an abandonment of the public domain to
the new states ; and having assumed that to be its true character, the most un
worthy motives have been attributed to the author for introducing it. Nothing
is more untrue. The cession is neither more nor less than a conditional sale,
not extended to the whole of the public domain, as represented, but to that por
tion in the new states respectively within whose limits they lie ; the greater
part of which are mere remnants, which have long since been offered for sale,
without being sold.

The conditions on which they are proposed to be ceded or sold are drawn up
with the greyest care, and with the strictest provisions to ensure their fulfil
ment ; one of w\icn js> that the state should pay 65 per cent, of the gross pro
ceeds of the sale v> the General Government, and retain only 35 per cent,
for the trouble, experi^ and responsibility attending their administration. An
other is, that the existing iaws? as tney stands except so far as they may be mod
ified or authorized to be moe^ed by t^e act of cession, shall remain unchanged,
unless altered by the joint consvQt of the General Government and the several
states. They are respectively auti^nzed, if they should think proper, to adopt
a system of graduation and pre-empti^ within well-defined and safe limits pre
scribed in the conditions ; and the Gene^l Government is authorized to appoint
officers in the several states, to whom its share, of the proceeds of the sale shall
be directly paid, without going into the stau treasury ; and these conditions are
put under the guardianship of the courts, by providing, if they shall be violated,
that all after rules by the state shall be null and void. So far from this being a
gift, or an abandonment of the public lands to the i\ew states he has clearly
proved, if there be truth in figures, that the Governmem would receive a o-reat-
er amount of revenue from the lands in the new states, under the system he
proposes, than under the present. These demonstrations are based on calcula
tions which neither have nor can be impugned.

But his views extended far beyond dollars and cents in bringiag forward the
measure. He proposed to effect by it the high political objects of placing the
new states on the same footing of equality and independence with the old, in
reference to their domain ; to cut off the vast amount of patronage which the
public lands place in the hand of the executive ; to withdraw them, as one
of the stakes, from the presidential game ; to diminish by one fourth the busi
ness of Congress, and with it the length and expense of its session ; to enlist
the Government of the new states on the side of the General Government ; to
aid in a more careful administration of the rest of the public domain, and
thereby prevent the whole of it from becoming the property of the occupants
from possession ; and, finally, to prevent the too rapid extinction of Indian
titles in proportion to the demand for lands from the increase of population,
which he shows to be pregnant with great embarrassment and danger. These
are great objects, of high political import ; and if they could be effected by the
measure proposed, it is justly entitled to be ranked among the wisest and most
politic ever brought forward. That they can be effected, it is almost impossi
ble for any well-informed and dispassionate mind deliberately to read the
speeches and documents referred to, and to doubt.

LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. w

CHAPTER VII.
Conclusion.

ONE of the first acts of the new administration was to call an extra session
in the spring of 1841. Flushed with success, and confident in their power to
consummate their entire system of policy, the Whigs assembled at the commence
ment of this session with overwhelming majorities in each House of Congress.
The Republicans came, under circumstances well calculated to dispirit them,
and too weak in point of numbers to have made an efficient opposition except
under the most skilful management. It soon became manifest, as the pian of
the campaign was developed, that the majority were determined to sweep every
thing by " coups-de-main," and would not depend upon address at <he expense
of time to take any post which could possibly be carried by storre- They com
menced in the House of Representatives by wresting from t*e minority some
of the most inestimable of the privileges of debate : privilegepwhich the minority-
had enjoyed from the institution of the House of Repres endives up to that time,
and even during the war, when the opposition, by its &ctirus course, seemed
to have justly forfeited all respect, if it had not bee* deemed the sacred right
of the tax-payer to be fully heard before new burd^s «ere imposed upon him.
But the minority were no longer allowed to deb^6 Questions in the Committee
of the Whole until they were satisfied with tly hearing.

The majority seized the power of arresting tne debate whenever they chose,
.and thus, under the pretence of preventijg factious delays, they acquired the
means of terminating the discussion viienever it searched their purposes too
deeply, or developed too strongly tb' consequences of their measures. Under
this state of things, there was little *eft to tne opposition but the mere vote ; and
the majority so completely acqu*ed tb<J whole sway in the lower House that it
was by their grace only that ^eir opponents could even remonstrate against
their measures. In that bor1/ one overruling influence seemed to prevail, which
did not emanate from with-*1, DlJt cast *ts shadow from without. Nor could even
the fascinations of the fplendid genius that controlled, relieve the dull, dreary,
and depressing sensr of dependance under which that House seemed to think
and move. In the Senate, however, this tendency to the absolute power of a
majority met wit* a severe and effective resistance. Determined never to yield
tip the arms w^ich were necessary for the contest, they repelled every attempt
to introduce ' the gag v Foremost among the opposition stood Mr. Calhoun, and
the parliamentary annals of the world hardly afford an instance of a more formi
dable a* ay of intellectual force than that opposition then presented. Nothing
could oe more brilliant than its career through the whole of this short but event
ful session

The majority boldly assumed the old Federal positions upon the bank, the
tariff, and the distribution of the proceeds of the public lands. Confident in
their strength to carry it, they openly avowed their system. Profusion in pub
lic expenditure and special legislation seemed to be the order of the day. To
the shattered victims of the war so long waged by the stock interests, a deliver
ance from all obligation for the past was declared in the Bankrupt Law ; and
the affiliated system of the bank, the tariff, and the distribution tempted them
with an almost boundless prospect for future indulgence. The prodigal, the
idle, the desperate, the visionary speculator, and even the cunning usurer, were
each invited, by some appropriate hope, to join in the general foray, when
the whole field of productive industry was to be given up to plunder. There
seemed to be at last a prospect that Hamilton's system would prevail. With

68 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

revenue decreasing daily, the Secretary of the Treasury proposed an annual ex
penditure of about $27,000,000, and recommended a distribution among the states
of the proceeds of the public lands. This lavish expenditure was to be main
tained from customs alone ; and through the influence of another bank expansion,
our people were to be tempted to buy freely under the ruinous rates of duties
which were proposed. Entreaty and remonstrance were alike unavailing with
the majority, which for a while ^pursued its course without regard to the rights
of the states or the freedom of individual pursuits, which were overwhelmed in
their way. The whole hope of an efficient resistance to these measures in
Congress now rested on the Senate, where the necessary privileges of debate
were still retained. Our history does not present us an instance of an opposi
tion mdre distinguished for its ability, or more untiring, in its energy. Its
searching gaze seemed to read the hidden purpose with almost as much cer
tainty as it followed the open movements of its adversary. The purposes and
principles of the system proposed by the majority were so clearly exposed by
skilful amendments or in vigorous debate, that the public attention was fully
aroused and directed to the consequences : consequences which were so pow
erfully and accurately depicted, that even the authors of the measures would
have been appall^ had they been less reckless of the future. The natural af
finity between the uriff and distribution, which Mr. Calhoun had proclaimed so
long before, was :apw clearly proved by the course of the majority during this
session. So essential i^ j^ey deem the distribution in order to secure the
permanence of the tariff, v!iat they ventured upon the former measure at every
hazard, and at a time, too, wh^ the revenue was deficient, and there was scarcely
a hope that the customs would .ffor(i money enough for the current expenses of
the Government, This ominous ^mbination, which Mr. Calhoun had sacrificed
so much to avert, was now at hand, cn(J he met it in a speech,* which is one of.
the finest specimens of his power and >tyie> There are portions of that speech
in which he traces the consequents v distribution with a spirit of inquiry so
eager, so searching, so keen, that he Sorgeu himself and the personal feelings of
the contest in the contemplation of the visio, of ruin before him, and seems to
seek relief from his forebodings by unbosomingMmself to the country. The ma
jority now faltered, for the first time, under the i^peals of the opposition, and
incorporated a provision for suspending the dibtribttion when the duties upon
imports exceeded a certain rate — a provision to whici. we have since owed the
suspension of that dangerous act. The condition of the ".nances, which seemed
not to have been fully appreciated by the majority, togetht* with the proviso of
which we have spoken, rendered the distribution law practically inefficient.
Their bank bills had been vetoed by the President, from whon. they were soon
alienated ; the Bankrupt Law was generally odious, anl it seeded to require.
nothing more than the absurd and extravagant Tariff Act oC the suc*eeding ses
sion to consummate their ruin. Thus did the opposition come out of he contest
with flying colours at the close of that eventful session. The part which Mr.
Calhoun bore in this crisis is so justly and so thoroughly appreciated U- the
country, that no particular comment upon it is necessary.

Suffice it to say, that the discussions of the extra session and of that which
succeeded it were important and exciting. The most prominent of the extra
session were upon the M'Leod case, the Report of the Secretary of the Treas
ury, and the Bankrupt Law.f The debate on the bank bills turned almost ex
clusively upon the details. At the succeeding session the principal subjects
were the Treasury Note Bill, the Veto power, Mr. Clay's resolutions in refer
ence to the revenue and expenditures, the Loan Bill, and the Tariff Bill. To
Mr. Calhoun's speeches upon these subjects we simply refer, because they are
so recent as to be familiar to all, and not because they are less worthy of study
than some others of a more distant date, from which we have extracted freely.
Indeed, we have so often found occasion to recommend the perusal of the par-
* See " Speeches," &c., No. 31. t Ibid., No. 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36.

LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. <&

ticular speech to which we were referring, that we were almost afraid of exci
ting the suspicion that our object was more to eulogize the statesman than to
instruct the reader ; and yet we are sure that all who study these speeches will
acquit us of such a motive. We have recommended their perusal because we
believed that they gave the best view of the state of public affairs, and of the
mode in which a statesman would deal with such events, which has yet been
furnished ; nor did we know of any other models, either of statesmanship or
oratory, in our own parliamentary annals, to which we could better invite the
attention of the student. Indeed, we could scarcely direct him amiss among
these speeches for specimens of luminous conceptions, or of that simple and
natural order of propositions which constitutes a peculiar charm in style, and
enables the orator to fascinate his audience, and carry them along with him.
The English language affords no finer examples than are to be found in these
speeches of the power of analysis in eliminating the truth of a case from cir
cumstances which obscure and embarrass it. Nor are there any more attract
ive for novel and profound speculation, in which he sometimes deals when such,
lights and shadows are necessary to complete the picture which he is drawing.

In how many of the unexplored regions of human thought will the attentive
reader be startled to find the trace of his footstep, and yet so rapid is he in his
flight over his subject, that he scarcely takes time to set up his flag on the lands
which he has found, or to perpetuate the evidences of his title to the honours
of discovery.

Here, perhaps, we ought to leave the reader to draw his own conclusions as
to the nature of the man and of his public services from the narrative which
we have given ; and yet we feel that it will be impossible for him to understand
either fully, even with the aids which we have offered him, without a careful study
of his speeches, reports, and other public addresses, in connexion with the his
tory of the times ; a study to which we again commend him, as well worthy of
the time and labour which it may cost. For ourselves, we can truly say, that
our estimate of his public services has increased with our opportunities for stud
ying them, and that our admiration of his character has grown as his private
and political history became more familiar to us. Indeed, it would almost seem
to us, at times, that it belonged to the destiny of the American people to have
reared up such a man, and that one of its necessities required him to pursue
that long and stormy career, through which he has watched and helped to steer
the ship of state with an eye that never winked and an energy that never tired.
It required his indomitable will, and a nature thus rarely constituted, to have
maintained this eager and incessant labour for the happiness of the American
people, and to have led, for so long a period, the triumphal march of our glori
ous institutions. With a turn of mind naturally philosophical, his great power
of analysis and his faculty of attentive observation early enabled him to form a
system for the conduct of life, both in his private and public relations, and to
determine within his own mind upon the true ends of human action ; ends
which he has pursued with a matchless constancy, while a knowledge of bis
ultimate destination and of the high objects of his journey has cheered him
along through the thorny paths of public life. Of all the men whom we have
ever seen, he seems to us to have surveyed most completely the whole ground
of human action. To these advantages he adds another, which constitutes,
perhaps, his highest quality as a statesman. It is the faculty of considering
circumstances in their combinations, and of determining their relative power in
propelling events. To analyze this combination, or "juncture" (as he some
times calls it), and to determine the resultant of all these forces, is, in his opin
ion, the highest and rarest faculty of a statesman. If he values this power
more than most others, it is because he has derived more benefit from its use,
and well may he estimate highly that quality which, by affording him an insight
into futurity far beyond the usual range of human vision, has given him such

70 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

control over events. These were the gifts in whose strength he presented him
self on the stage of the world in the very commencement of his public life, as
one fully grown and armed for the trials which belonged to the time and the
place. True to those noble instincts which spring more from a Divine source
than from human reason, he ever leaned to liberty as against power, and early
learned to resist those temptations which so often lead man to increase the
power of the mass, which he is content to share as a member, at the expense
of those separate and individual rights of which nature constituted him the pe
culiar guardian, and which were only given as the means of self-culture, and &.s
indispensable to the moral elevation of his being.

His public life may be divided into two grand epochs : the first, in which he
put forth his whole energies to enable his countrymen to maintain their inde
pendence against foreign aggression ; and the second, in which he undertook the
more difficult task. of freeing their domestic legislation from those devices by
which one was enabled to prey upon another. In each of these periods he has
been emphatically " the man of his time," and he has ever regarded the tenets
of the Republican party as indicating the best means of attaining these ends
under our form of government. Of all men now living, he, perhaps, has con
tributed most to illustrate and establish that political creed. We are aware that
we expose ourselves here to the sneers of some of those literal expositors of the
law, who believe that man was made for the Sabbath and not the Sabbath for
man. But we repeat the assertion, that in all the public exigencies in which
he was called to act, he made the nearest practical approach to the great ends
of the Republican party which human wisdom or foresight could then devise.
In all the great measures of our government since he first entered Congress,
his influence has been felt either in their origination or modification, and to this
influence more than any other the Republican party is indebted for its present
proud position before the world.

Morally considered, the great objects of the Republican party are simple and
few. Its first is to preserve, as far as possible, the independence of individual
action and pursuit ; and it rejects all limitations upon this independence which
are not essential to the great ends of social organization. It regards all of those
powers which man wields in his aggregate or corporate capacity as so many
limitations upon his individual rights, and it yields those which are indispensa
ble to the institution of society as so many concessions which necessity has ex
torted from liberty. These are the terms upon which they would grant Govern
ment its powers ; and they would administer the power thus limited with an
equal regard for all who are entitled to share the benefits of the trust. Tried by
these tests, Mr. Calhoun has nothing to fear, when the circumstances are con
sidered under which he was called to act.

In the first epoch of his public life, we were forced to defend ourselves in a
war with the most formidable nation of the globe, and with the only power
whose arm was long enough to reach us in our distant position, and within the
defences of so many natural barriers. In its commencement it was a war of
independence, and it might become a contest for existence. In this state of
things, it was in our aggregate power alone that we were to find the strength to
resist foreign assaults, and every American patriot sought the means of increas
ing it as far as the limitations of the Constitution would permit. The war was
a measure of the Republican party, and the unpatriotic course of the opposition
devolved upon them alone the duty of devising the means to prosecute it. Un
der these circumstances, the Republican party deflected from the natural line of
their direction, and sought to concentrate as much power in the Government as
they then believed indispensable for the successful conduct of the war. How
far they were right or wrong, it is not our province here to determine ; but cer
tain it is, that there was much in the overruling power of circumstances to jus
tify their course and excuse their errors, if errors they may be called. With

LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 71

how much more justice may the same apology be made for Mr. Calhoun him
self. The leading advocate of hostilities and the chairman of the committee
which reported the declaration of war, with a deep responsibility to the country
for the success of that contest, which he was accused of precipitating ; young,
ardent, and indignant at the course of foreign and domestic enemies, it is sur
prising that he was not less scrupulous of the Constitution in calling forth the
means of defending it, and our people against foreign expositions of law and
justice, which ultimately might have overturned all, unless arrested by our
successful resistance. And yet, upon how many great occasions did he re
strain the Republican party from aberrations from their principles.

It was he who opposed the restrictive system against the majority of the party.
It was he, too, who took a prominent part in resisting the system of forced
loans in the case of the merchants' bonds, and who defeated Mr. Dallas's vast
scheme of a national bank to issue irredeemable paper, which was recommend
ed by a Republican President and supported by the party. Session after ses
sion did he combat it, until he succeeded in restoring to the country a specie-
paying paper, and something like uniformity in the medium in which its taxes
were collected. And although the opinions of that day, growing out of the exi
gencies of the war, exaggerated the necessity for roads and canals as military
defences, and called for the general use of a power which was given by the
Constitution within the narrowest limits, it is remarkable that he has nowhere
expressly affirmed the existence of such a power in the Federal Government.

His views of the proper use to be made of this power, if it existed, or
could be obtained, when given in obedience to a call of the House of Repre-
resentatives, were perhaps the ablest ever taken of the relation of this subject to
our military defences, yet he cautiously abstained from deciding the constitu
tional question. This was before the Republican party had paused in that ca
reer in which they were concentrating power within to defend themselves against
attacks from without. In a review of this period of his life, it may with truth
be said, that all those acts for which he has been reproached as departures from
the State Rights creed, were substitutes for much worse measures, which, but
for him, his party would have adopted ; and, although some of them were nei
ther the wisest nor best, according to the present standard of information, they
were each the nearest approach to the true Republican line of action which
was permitted by the state of public knowledge and feeling at the time. But,
whatever may have been the errors of the early part of his public life, he nobly
redeemed them in the second period, which commenced from his election to
the vice-presidency. It was during the interval then allowed for reflection
that he first examined thoroughly the working of the machinery of the Govern
ment in its internal as well as its external relations. He was among the first
of the Republican party to pause in that career by which power had been con
solidated in the Federal Government, without due reflection upon its conse
quences to the states and the people. He saw that the distribution of the polit
ical powers of our system, as contemplated by the Constitution, had been de
ranged, and that vast affiliated stock interests had been. permitted to grow up
almost unconsciously, which threatened to absorb the whole power and influ
ence of the Confederacy, and to substitute a government of the few for that of the
many ; and, worse than all, he saw many of the Republican party so deeply
entangled in the consequences of past action, and so little aware of the mis
chiefs which threatened them, that it was impossible to receive their co-oper
ation in the efforts which were necessary to save the Government from deep
organic derangement, and the party itself from utter annihilation. His position
gave him a deep interest in the unity of the party, if he had looked to himself
alone ; the road to office was open and easy ; but the higher and more alluring
path to fame lay along a steeper route and over rugged and difficult precipices.
Between these alternatives he did not hesitate, but determined at once to strike

72 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

the blows he believed to be necessary to save the country and restore the party
to its pristine purity of faith and practice. We have given the history of the
memorable contest in which, with unexampled odds against him, he maintained
his foothold and accomplished his grand design.

We have seen the series of skilful movements and masterly combina
tions by which, with comparatively few forces, he occupied and manfully
contested every inch of disputed territory, until he finally struck down the
protective system with blows from which it never can entirely recover
in the face of the formidable array against him, wielding the battle-axa
of Richard or the cimeter of Saladin, as strength or skill might best
serve his turn. Ever ready, cheerful, and confident, he sometimes obtain
ed concessions from mere respect to his gallantry and prowess, which no
force at his disposal could then have extorted. Experience now proved
that he had not been a moment too soon in striking at the protective sys
tem. The Republican party had been gradually wasting under the as
saults of their open enemies, and the moral influences of the stock in
terests. The banks, deprived for the time of their natural ally the tariff
were forced to take the field alone, and the difficulty which the Republi
cans experienced in coping with this single interest, proved how impossi
ble it would ha've been for them to have resisted the whole affiliated sys
tem if its strength had been unimpaired, and its united forces directed
against them. They now saw that Mr. Calhoun had been warring all along,
not against them, but a common enemy, which, but for him, might have
overwhelmed all together. Mr. Calhoun, who had left his ancient friends
in their strength to reform, but not to destroy, now returned to them in
their weakness to cheer, to animate, to rally, and defend them, and was
prouder of their alliance upon principle in their period of adversity than
he would have been of all the honours which they could have heaped
upon him in their prosperity. It was not in his nature to regard the exe
crations which these stock interests poured out upon him. They had
too often tried the temper of his steel not to know the force of the arm
which wielded it, and it was perhaps with as much of despair as rage
that privilege saw its ancient and well-trained adversary take the field with
additional strength against it. Mr. Calhoun did not now direct his atten
tion so much to mere affairs of outposts as to placing the party upon that
solid platform of principle, in which he well knew that the whole batter
ing train of the Federal hosts could never effect a breach. With a true
military eye, he readily seized all the advantages of position, and under
his advice mainly, they have, at every sacrifice, directed column after col
umn upon this elevated post, where they now command the field, and from
which, if not abandoned or lost by want of vigilance, they must ultimately
recover the country.

He is now about to retire from the theatre of public life, neither weari
ed nor worn, but because his work is done, so far, at least, as senatorial
life can afford him any useful part to play. If there be any new field of
action worthy of his powers, and as yet untrodden by him, it is in that
highest executive sphere, for which the character of his mind and the ex
perience of his life have so eminently fitted him. It is, perhaps, only upon
this theatre that his countrymen would not now exclaim, " Superfluous
lags the veteran on the stage," and it is there that they will probably re
quire him to consummate, as perhaps he alone can do, those great Repub
lican reforms so cherished by the party, as destined to commend it to the
grateful regards of posterity. We cannot better close this sketch than by
extracting a portrait of Mr. Calhoun as a man and an orator, which was
drawn by a friendly hand, it is true, but which we recognise as being so
just and well executed that we gladly adopt it as our own.

LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 73

In his person Mr. Calhoun is slender and tall. His countenance, at
rest, is strikingly marked with decision and firmness. In conversation it
is highly animated, expressive, and indicative of genius. His eyes are
large, dark, brilliant, and penetrating, and leave no doubt, at first view, of
a high order of intellect. His manners are easy, natural, and unassu
ming, and as frank as they are cordial and kind. In all his domestic rela
tions his life is without a blemish. He has none of the cautious reserve
and mystery of common politicians j for he has nothing to conceal or
disguise. He is accessible to all, agreeable, animated, instructive, and
eloquent in conversation, and communicates his opinions with the utmost
freedom. Some politicians seek popularity by carefully avoiding re
sponsibility. Whatever popularity Mr. Calhoun possesses has, on the
contrary, been acquired by bold and fearless assumption of responsibility
on all critical and trying occasions. His judgment is so clear and dis
criminating, that he seems to possess a sort of prophetic vision of future
events, and on occasions when most men doubt and hesitate, he decides
with confidence, follows up his decision with undoubting firmness, and
has never failed in the end to be justified by time, the arbiter of all things.
Few men have been called upon to pass through scenes of higher polit
ical excitement, and to encounter more vigorous and unrelenting opposi
tion than Mr. Calhoun ; yet, amid all the prejudices which party feeling
engenders, and all the jealousy of political rivals, and all the animosity*
of political opponents, no one has yet ventured to hazard his own repu
tation for judgment or sincerity so far as to doubt one moment his great
and commanding talents.

'As an orator, Mr. Calhoun stands in the foremost rank of parliamentary
speakers. On first rising in debate, he always felt the anxiety of diffi
dence, arising from a sensibility which is almost always the companion
of true genius. His manner of speaking is energetic, ardent, rapid, and
marked by a solemn. earnestness, which leaves no doubt of his sincerity
and deep conviction. His style is pure, forcible, logical, and condensed ;
often figurative for illustration, never for ornament. His mind is well
stored with the fruits of learning, but still better with those of observa
tion and reflection. Hence depth, originality, and force characterize all
his speeches. He lays his premises on a foundation too broad, solid, and
deep to be shaken ; his deductions are clear and irresistible; "the strong
power of genius," to adopt the language of the eloquent Pinkney, in re
ferring to Mr. Calhoun's splendid speech on the treaty-making power,
" from a higher region than that of argument, throws on his subjects all
the light with which it is the prerogative of genius to invest and illus
trate everything." And his speeches, full of the most elevated and pa
triotic sentiments, after conquering the understanding, take the heart
entirely captive, and carry along his hearers, often unconsciously, and
sometimes against their will, to the point he desires.

Mr. Calhoun had attained so high a reputation as a member of Con
gress, that it was thought by many that he was leaving his appropriate
field when he accepted the appointment of Secretary of War. On the
contrary, his new situation only presented another theatre for the exer
cise of his great and diversified talents. The distinguishing feature of
his mind, the power of analysis, was now to be exercised in the practical
business of Government, and at once, as by enchantment, order, efficiency,
and perfect accountability sprang from the chaos in which he found the
department, and demonstrated that his energy in execution was equal to his
wisdom in organizing, and left it doubtful whether his legislative talents
were not surpassed by his practical ability in administration.

As a statesman, in the most enlarged and elevated sense of the term,

K

74 LIFE OF JOHN C. CALHOUN

Mr. Calhoun has no superior. A philosophical observer of men and of
their affairs, he analyzes and reduces all things to their original elements,
and draws thence those general principles, which, with inconceivable
rapidity and unerring certainty, he applies on all occasions, and banishes
the perplexity and doubt by which ordinary minds are overwhelmed and
confounded. By this wonderful faculty, he is enabled to decide at once,
not only what measures are at present necessary for a government novel
in its principles, and placed in circumstances of which there is no pre
cedent in the history of mankind, but, by discerning results through their
causes, to look into futurity, and to devise means for carrying on our be
loved country in a direct path to the high and glorious destiny which,
under the guidance of wisdom and virtue, awaits her.

To the highest powers of mind Mr. Calhoun unites those elevated
moral qualities, which are equally essential with ability to complete the
character of a perfect statesman: inflexible integrity, honour without a
stain, disinterestedness, temperance, and industry ; a firmness of purpose
which disdains to calculate the consequences of doing his duty ; pru
dence and energy in action, devotion to his country, and inextinguishable
love of liberty and justice. To these great qualities, perhaps, we ought
to add a lofty ambition ; but it is an ambition that prefers glory to office
and power, which looks upon the latter only as a means for acquiring the
former, and which, by the performance of great and virtuous actions for
the accomplishment of noble ends, aims at the establishment of a widely-
extended and ever-during fame. This ingredient, which enters into the
composition of all great and powerful minds, seems intended by Provi
dence to stimulate them to the highest pitch of exertion in the service
of mankind j and if it be a defect, it is one which Mr. Calhoun shares, as
well as all their high qualities, with the most perfect models of Greek
and Roman excellence.

To those who have not been attentive observers of the life, character,
and conduct of Mr. Calhoun, or who may have been alienated by political
conflicts, the above portraiture may seem to derive some of its colour
ing from the partial pencil of friendship. If an intimate connexion of
that kind for more than a quarter of a century may be supposed to
tincture the writer's mind with partiality, it will be allowed, at the same
time, that it affords the best possible opportunity of forming an accurate
estimate of the moral and political character of the subject of this me
moir. His statements of fact and opinion he knows to be entirely authentic ;
and after a deliberate review of every sentence and word he has written,
he finds nothing which a reverence for justice and truth will allow him
to alter.

-:

FROM THE

SPEECHES, REPORTS,

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

JOHN C. CALHOUN,

SUBSEQUENT TO HIS

ELECTION AS VICE-PRESIDENT,

(INCLUDING ALSO HIS FIRST SPEECH IN CONGRESS IN 1811), AND
REFERRED TO IN HIS "LIFE."

-

VJ i-.'.'AVP

CONTENTS.

Page

I. Delivered in the House of Representatives, December 19, 1811, in the De
bate on the Second Resolution reported by the Committee of Foreign

Relations . . ' . . . .9

II. Onslow in Reply to Patrick Henry — No. 1 . \ ... .14

« « " No. 2 22

x III. Mr. Calhoun's Address, stating his Opinion of the Relation which the

States and General Government bear to each other . . . .27
IV. Mr. Calhoun's Letter to General Hamilton on the Subject of State Inter
position . . . . * *'*.' . ' ". ": •'..'.'". . 43
V. Speech against the Force Bill 67

VI. Speech on his Resolutions, and Reply to Mr. Webster, February 26, 1833 98

VII. Speech on the Subject of the Removal of the Deposites from the Bank of

the United States, January 13, 1834 122

s VIII. Speech on Mr. Webster's Proposition to Recharter the United States

Bank, March 26, 1834 .138

IX.. Speech delivered in the Senate of the United States, April 9, 1834, on the

Bill to Repeal the Force Act 154

"X.. A Report on the Extent of Executive Patronage, February 9, 1835 . . 168
-— , — XI. A Report on that Portion of the President's Message which related to the
Adoption of efficient Measures to prevent the Circulation of incendiary
Abolition Petitions through the Mail, February 4, 1836 . . . 189

— XII. Speech on the Abolition Petitions, March 9, 1836 197

XIII. Speech on the Bill' to prohibit Deputy Postmasters from receiving and
transmitting through the Mail certain Papers therein mentioned, April

12, 1836 210

""""XIV. Speech on the Reception of Abolition Petitions, February, 1837 . . 222

XV. Speech on the Public Deposites, May 28, 1836 226

XVI. Speech on the Bill for the Admission of Michigan, January 2, 1837 . . 243
XVII. On the same Subject, January 5, 1837 . . . . . . .249

XVIII. Speech on the Bill authorizing an Issue of Treasury Notes, September 19,

1837 . . .'. . • ii'--- .' . •••'•„' V 259

\/XIX. Speech on his Amendment to Separate the Government from the Banks,

October 3, 1837 275

XX. Speech on the Sub-treasury Bill, February 15, 1838 . . . ' . 290

XXI. Speech in Reply to Mr. Clay, on the Sub-treasury Bill, March 10, 1838 . 309

XXII. Speech in Reply to Mr. Webster on the Sub-treasury Bill, March 22, 1838 329

XXIII. Speech on the Bill to Prevent the Interference of certain Federal Officers

in Elections, February 22, 1839 352

XXIV. Speech on the Report of Mr. Grundy, of Tennessee, in relation to the As

sumption of the Debts of the States by the Federal Government, Febru
ary 5, 1840 . 363

XXV. Speech on his Resolutions in reference to the Case of the Enterprise,

March 13, 1840 '-.-.>. -^ . .378

XXVI. Speech on the Bankrupt Bill, June 2, 1840 390

i XXVII. Speech on the Prospective Pre-emption Bill, January 12, 1841 . . 403
^XXVIII. Speech on the Bill to Distribute the Proceeds of the Public Lands, Janu
ary 23, 1841 417

XXIX. Speech in Reply to the Speeches of Mr. Webster and Mr. Clay, on Mr.

Crittenden's Amendment to the Pre-emption Bill, January 30^ 1841 . 429
XXX. Speech on the Case of M'Leod, June 11, 1841 . ... 442

XXXI. Speech on the Distribution Bill, August 24, 1841 . ... .447

XXXII. Speech on the Treasury Note Bill, January 25, 1842 . V . .462

XXXIII. Speech in Support of the Veto Power, February 28, 1842 . . . .477

XXXIV. Speech on Mr. Clay's Resolutions in Relation to the Revenues and Expen

ditures of the Government, March 16, 1842 489

XXXV. Speech on the Loan Bill, April 12, 1842 . .'.... . .509

XXXVI. Speech on the Passage of the Tariff Bill, August 5, 1842 . . . .518

XXXVII. Speech on the Treaty of Washington, August, 1842 532

XXXVIII. Speech on the Oregon Bill, January 24, 1843 544

SPEECHES OP JOHN C. CALHOUN.

DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DECEMBER 19, 1811, IN THE
DEBATE ON THE SECOND RESOLUTION REPORTED BY THE COMMITTEE OF FOR
EIGN RELATIONS.

MR. SPEAKER — I understood the opinion of the Committee of Foreign Rela
tions differently from what the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Randolph) has
stated to be his impression. I certainly understood that the committee recom
mended the measures now before the house as a preparation for war ; and
such, in fact, was its express resolve, agreed to, I believe, by every member
except that gentleman. I do not attribute any wilful misstatement to him, but
consider it the effect of inadvertency or mistake. Indeed, the report could mean
nothing but war or empty menace. I hope no member is in favour of the lat
ter. A bullying, menacing system has everything to condemn and nothing to
recommend.it — in expense it almost rivals war. It excites contempt abroad
and destroys confidence at home. Menaces are serious things, which ought to
be resorted to with as much caution and seriousness as war itself; and should,
if not successful, be invariably followed by war. It was not the gentleman
from Tennessee (Mr. Grundy) that made this a war question. The resolve
contemplates an additional regular force ; a measure confessedly improper but
as a preparation for war, but undoubtedly necessary in that event. Sir, 1 am
not insensible to the weighty importance of this question, for the first time sub
mitted to this house, to compel a redress of our long list of complaints against
one of the belligerants. According to my mode of thinking, the more serious
the question, my conviction to support it must be the stronger and more unal
terable. War, in our country, ought never to be resorted to but when it is
clearly justifiable and necessary ; so much so as not to require the aid of logic
to convince our understanding, nor the ardour of eloquence to inflame our pas
sions. There are many reasons why this country should never resort fc> it but
for causes the most urgent and necessary. It is sufficient that, under a govern
ment like ours, none but such will justify it in the eyes of the people ,• and were
I not satisfied that such is the present case, I certainly would be no advocate
of the proposition now before the house.

Sir, I might prove the war, should it follow, to be justifiable, by the express
admission of the gentleman from Virginia ; and necessary, by /acts undoubted
and universally admitted, such as he did not attempt to controvert. The ex
tent, duration, and character of the injuries received ; the failure of those peace
ful means heretofore resorted to for the redress of oar wrongs, are my proofs
* that it is necessary. Why should I mention the impressment of our seamen —
depredation on every branch of our commerce, including the direct export trade,
continued for years, and made under laws which professedly undertake to reg
ulate our trade with other nations ? negotiation, resorted to again and again,
till it became hopeless, and the restrictive system persisted in to avoid war, and
in the vain expectation of returning justice ? The e.vil still continued to grow,
so that each succeeding year exceeded in enormity the preceding. The ques
tion, even in the opinion and admission of our opponents, is reduced to this sin-

B

10 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

gle point : Which shall we do, abandon or defend our own commercial and mar
itime rights, and the personal liberties of our citizens employed in exercising
them ? These rights are vitally attacked, and war is the only means of re
dress. The gentleman from Virginia has suggested none, unless we consider
the whole of his speech as recommending patient and resigned submission as
the best remedy. It is for the house to decide which of the alternatives ought
to be embraced. I hope the decision is made already, by a higher authority
than the voice of any man. It is not in the power of speech to infuse the sense
of independence and honour. To resist wrong is the instinct of nature ; a gen
erous nature, that disdains tame submission.

This part of the subject is so imposing as to enforce silence even on the gen
tleman from Virginia. He dared not to deny his country's wrongs, or vindi
cate the conduct of her enemy. But one part only of his argument had any,
the most remote relation to this point. He would not say that we had not a
good cause for war, but insisted that it was our duty to define that cause. If
he means that this house ought, at this stage of its proceedings, or any other,
to specify any particular violation of our rights to the exclusion of all others,
he prescribes a course which neither good sense nor the usage of nations war
rants. When we contend, let us contend for all our rights — the doubtful and
the certain, the unimportant and essential. It is as easy to contend, or even
more so, for the whole as for a part. At the termination of the contest, secure
all that our wisdom, and valour, and the fortune of war will permit. This is
the dictate of common sense, and such, also, is the usage of nations. The sin
gle instance alluded to, the endeavour of Mr. Fox to compel Mr. Pitt to define
the object of the war against France, will not support the gentleman from Vir
ginia in his position. That was an extraordinary war for an extraordinary pur
pose, and was not governed by the usual rules. It was not for conquest or for
redress of injury, but to impose a government on France which she refused to
receive — an object so detestable that an avowal dare not be made.

I might here rest the question. The affirmative of the proposition is estab
lished. I cannot but advert, however, to the complaint of the gentleman from
Virginia when he was first up on this question. He said he found himself re
duced to the necessity of supporting the negative side of the question before the
affirmative was established. Let me tell that gentleman that there is no hard
ship in his case. It is not every affirmative that ought to be proved. Were I
to affirm that the house is now in session, would it be reasonable to ask for
proof? He who would deny its truth, on him would be the proof of so extra
ordinary a negative. How, then, could the gentleman, after his admissions, and
with tine facts before him and the nation, complain ? The causes are such as
to warrant, or, rather, to make it indispensable in any nation not absolutely de
pendant to defend its rights by arms. Let him, then, show the reasons why we
ought not so to defend ourselves. On him, then, is the burden of proof. This
he has attempted. He has endeavoured to support his negative. Before I pro
ceed to answer him particularly, let me call the attention of the house to one
circumstance, that almost the whole of his arguments consisted of an enumer
ation of evils always incident to war, however just and necessary ; and that, if
they have any force, h is calculated to produce unqualified submission to every
species of insult and injury. I do not feel myself bound to answer arguments
of that description, and if 1 should allude to them, it will be only incidentally,
and not for the purpose of serious refutation.

The first, argument which I shall notice is the unprepared state of the coun
try. Whatever weight this argument might have in a question of immediate
war, it surely has little in that of preparation for it. If our country is unpre
pared, let us prepare as soon as possible. Let the gentleman submit his plan,
and if a reasonable one, I doubt not it will be supported by the house. But,
sir, let us admit the fact with the whole force of the argument ; I ask, whose is

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALIIOUN. 11

the fault? Who has been a member for many years past, and has seen the
defenceless state of his country, even near home, under his own eyes, without
a single endeavour to remedy so serious an evil ? Let him not say " 1 have
acted in a minority." It is no less the duty of the minority than a majority to
endeavour to defend the country. I7ui tiia^ puipooe principally we are sent
here, and not for that of opposition. .

We are next told of the expenses of the war, and that the people will not
pay taxes. W^hy not ? Is it a want of means ? What, with 1,000,000 tons of
shipping; a commerce of $100,000,000 annually; manufactures yielding a
yearly product of $150,000,000, and agriculture thrice that amount; shall we,
with such great resources, be told that the country wants ability to raise and
support 10,000 or 15,000 additional regulars? No : it has the ability, that is
admitted ; but will it not have the disposition ? Is not our course just and ne
cessary ? Shall we, then, utter this libel on the people ? Where will proof be
found of a fact so disgraceful ? It is said, in the history of the country twelve
or fifteen years ago. The case is not parallel. The ability of the country is
greatly increased since. The whiskey tax was unpopular. But, as well as my
memory serves me, the objection was not so much to the tax or its amount as
the mode of collecting it. The people were startled by the host of officers, and
their love of liberty shocked with the multiplicity of regulations. We, in the
spirit of imitation, copied from the most oppressive part of the European laws
on the subject of taxes, and imposed on a young and virtuous people the se
vere provisions made necessary by corruption and the long practice of evasion.
If taxes should become necessary, I do not hesitate to say the people will pay
cheerfully. It is for their government and their cause, and it would be their
interest and duty to pay. But it may be, and I believe was said, that the peo
ple will not pay taxes, because the rights violated are not worth defending, or
that the defence will cost more than the gain. Sir, I here enter my solemn
protest against this low and " calculating avarice" entering this hall of legisla
tion. It is only fit for shops and counting-houses, and ought not to disgrace the
seat of power by its squalid aspect. Whenever it touches sovereign power, the
nation is ruined. It is too short-sighted to defend itself. It is a compromising
spirit, always ready to yield a part to save the residue. It is too timid to have
in itself the laws of self-preservation. Sovereign power is never safe but under
the shield of honour. There is, sir, one principle necessary to make us a great
people — to produce, not the form, but real spirit of union, and that is to protect
every citizen in the lawful pursuit of his business. He will then feel that he
is backed by the government — that its arm is his arm. He then will rejoice in
its increased strength and prosperity. Protection and patriotism are reciprocal.
This is the way which has led nations to greatness. Sir, I am not versed in
this calculating policy, and will not, therefore, pretend to estimate in dollars
and cents the value of national independence. I cannot measure in shillings
and pence the misery, the stripes, and the slavery of our impressed seamen ;
nor even the value of our shipping, commercial and agricultural losses, under
the orders in council and the British system of blockade. In thus expressing
myself, I do not intend to condemn any prudent estimate of the means of a
country before it enters on a war. That is wisdom, the other folly. The
gentleman from Virginia has not failed to touch on the calamity of war, that
fruitful source of declamation, by which humanity is made the advocate of sub
mission. If he desires to repress the gallant ardour of our countrymen by such
topics, let me inform him that true courage regards only the cause; that it is
just and necessary, and that it contemns the sufferings and dangers of war. If
he really wishes well to the cause of humanity, let his eloquence be addressed
to the British ministry, and not the American Congress. Tell them that, if
they persist in such daring insult and outrages to a neutral nation, however in
clined to peace, it will be bound by honour and safety to resist ; that their pa-

12 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALIIOUN.

tience and endurance, however great, will be exhausted ; that the calamity of
war will ensue, and that they, and not we, in the opinion of the world, will be
answerable for all its devastation and misery. Let a regard to the interest of
humanity stay the hand of injustice, and my life on it, the gentleman will not
find it difficult to dissuade his countrymen from rushing into the bloody scenes
of war.

We are next told of the danger of war. We are ready to acknowledge its
hazard and misfortune, but I cannot think that we have any extraordinary dan
ger to apprehend, at least none to warrant an acquiescence in the injuries we
have received. On the contrary, I believe no war would be less dangerous to
internal peace or the safety of the country. But we are told of the black pop
ulation of the Southern States. As far as the gentleman from Virginia speaks
of his own personal knowledge, I shall not question the correctness of his
statement. I only regret that such is the state of apprehension in his part of
the country. Of the southern section, I too have some personal knowledge,
and can say that in South Carolina no such fears, in any part, are felt. But,
sir, admit the gentleman's statement : will a war with Great Britain increase
the danger ? Will the country be less able to suppress insurrections ? Had we
anything to fear from that quarter — which. I do not believe — in my opinion, the
period of the greatest safety is during a war, unless, indeed, the enemy should
make a lodgment in the country. It is in war that the country would be most on
its guard, our militia the best prepared, and the standing army the greatest. Even
in our Revolution, no attempts were made at insurrection by that portion of our pop
ulation ; and, however the gentleman may alarm himself with the disorganizing
effects of French principles, I cannot think our ignorant blacks have felt much
of their baneful influence. I dare say more than one half of them never heard
of the French Revolution.

But as great as he regards the danger from our slaves, the gentleman's fears
end not there — the standing army is not less terrible to him. Sir, I think a
regular force, raised for a period of actual hostilities, cannot properly be called
a standing army. There is a just distinction between such a force and one
raised as a permanent peace establishment. Whatever would be the composi
tion of the latter, I hope the former will consist of some of the best materials of
the country. The ardent patriotism of our young men, and the liberal bounty
in land proposed to be given, will impel them to join their country's stand
ard, and to fight her battles. They will not forget the citizen in the soldier,
and, in obeying their officers, learn to contemn their government and Con
stitution. In our officers and soldiers we will find patriotism no less pure and
ardent than in the private citizen ; but if they should be as depraved as has
been represented, what have we to fear from 25,000 or 30,000 regulars ?
Where will be the boasted militia of the gentleman ? Can 1,000,000 of militia
be overpowered by 30,000 regulars ? If so, how can we rely on them against
a foe invading our country? Sir, I. have no such contemptuous idea of our
militia : their untaught bravery is sufficient to crush all foreign and internal at
tempts on their country's liberties.

But we have not yet come to the end of the chapter of dangers. The gen
tleman's imagination, so fruitful on this subject, conceives that our Constitution
is not calculated for war, and that it cannot stand its rude shock. Can that be
so? If so, we must then depend upon the commiseration or contempt of other
nations for our existence. The Constitution, then, it seems, has failed in an
essential object: "to provide for the common defence." No, says the gentle
man, it is competent to a defensive, but not an offensive war. It is not neces
sary for me to expose the fallacy of this argument. Why make the distinction
in this case ? Will he pretend to say that this is an offensive war — a war of
conquest? Yes, the gentleman has ventured to make this assertion, and for
reasons no less extraordinary than the assertion itself. He says, our rights are

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 13

violated on the ocean, and that these violations affect our shipping and commer
cial rights, to which the Canadas have no relation. The doctrine of retaliation
has been much abused of late, by an unreasonable extension of its meaning.
We have now to witness a new abuse : the gentleman from Virginia has limited
it down to a point. By his rule, if you receive a blow on the breast, you dare
not return it on the head ; you are obliged to measure and return it on the pre
cise point on which it was received. If you dp not proceed with this mathe
matical accuracy, it ceases to be self-defence — it becomes an unprovoked attack.

In speaking of Canada, the gentleman from Virginia introduced the name of
Montgomery with much feeling and interest. Sir, there is danger in that name
to the gentleman's argument. It is sacred to heroism ! it is indignant of sub
mission ! It calls our memory back to the time of our Revolution — to the Con
gress of 1774 and 1775. Suppose a member of that day had rose and urged
all the arguments which we have heard on this occasion — had told that Con
gress your contest is about the right of laying a tax — that the attempt on Cana
da had nothing to do with it — that the war would be expensive — that danger
and devastation would overspread our country — and that the power of Great
Britain was irresistible. With what sentiment, think you, would such doctrines
have been then received 1 Happy for us, they had no force at that period of our
country's glory. Had such been acted on, this hall would never have witnessed
a great people convened to deliberate for the general good ; a mighty empire,
with prouder prospects than any nation the sun ever shone on, would not have
risen in the West. No ! we would have been base, subjected colonies, gov
erned by that imperious rod which Britain holds over her distant provinces.

The gentleman attributes the preparation for war to everything but its true
cause. He endeavoured to find it in the probable rise in the price of hemp.
He represents the people of the Western States as willing to plunge our coun
try into war for such interested and base motives. I will not reason this point.
I see the cause of their ardour, not in such unworthy motives, but in their known
patriotism and disinterestedness.

No less mercenary is the reason which he attributes to the Southern States.
He says that the Non-importation Act has reduced cotton to nothing, which has
produced a feverish impatience. Sir, I acknowledge the cotton of our planta
tions is worth but little, but not for the cause assigned by the gentleman. The
people of that section do not reason as he does ; they do not attribute it to the
efforts of their government to maintain the peace and independence of their
country : they see in the low price of their produce the hand of foreign injustice ;
they know well, without the market of the Continent, the deep and steady cur
rent of our supply will glut that of Great Britain. They are not prepared for
the colonial state, to which again that power is endeavouring to reduce us.
The manly spirit of that section will not submit to be regulated by any foreign
power.

The love of France and the hatred of England have also been assigned as
the cause of the present measure. France has not done us justice, says the
gentleman from Virginia, and how can we, without partiality, resist the aggres
sions of England ? I know, sir, we have still cause of complaint against
France, but it is of a different character from that against England. She
professes now to respect our rights ; and there cannot be a reasonable doubt
but that the most objectionable parts of her decrees, as far as they respect us,
are repealed. We have already formally acknowledged this to be a fact. But
I protest against the principle from which his conclusion is drawn. It is a
novel doctrine, and nowhere avowed out of this house, that you cannot select
your antagonist without being guilty of partiality. Sir, when two invade your
rights, you may resist both, or either, at your pleasure. The selection is regu
lated by prudence, and not by right. The stale imputation of partiality for
France is better calculated for the columns of a newspaper than for the walls
of this house.

14 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

The gentleman from Virginia is at a loss to account for what he calls our
hatred to England. He asks, how can we hate the country of Locke, of New
ton, Hampden, and Chatham ; a country having the same language and customs
with ourselves, and descended from a common ancestry ? Sir, the laws of hu
man affections are steady and uniform. If we have so much to attach us to
that country, powerful indeed must be the cause which has overpowered it.
Yes, there is a cause strong enough ; not that occult, courtly affection, which
he has supposed to be entertained for France, but continued and unprovoked
insult and injury : a cause so manifest that he had to exert much ingenuity
to overlook it. But the gentleman, in his eager admiration of England, has not
been sufficiently guarded in his argument. Has he reflected on the cause of
that admiration ? Has he examined the reasons for our high regard for her Chat
ham ? It is his ardent patriotism — his heroic courage, which could not brook
the least insult or injury offered to his country, but thought that her interest and
her honour ought to be vindicated, be the hazard and expense what they might.
I hope, when we are called on to admire, we shall also be asked to imitate. I
hope the gentleman does not wish a monopoly of those great virtues for England.

The balance of power has also been introduced as an argument for submis
sion. England is said to be a barrier against the military despotism of France.
There is, sir, one great error in our legislation; we are ready, it would seem
from this argument, to watch over the interests of foreign nations, while we
grossly neglect our own immediate concerns. This argument, drawn from the
balance of power, is well calculated for the British Parliament, but is not at
all suited to the American Congress. Tell the former that they have to con
tend with a mighty power, and if they persist in insult and injury to the Ameri
can people, they will compel them to throw their weight into the scale of their
enemy. Paint the danger to them, and if they will desist from injuring us, I
answer for it, we will not disturb the balance of power. But it is absurd for
us to talk about it, while they, by their conduct, smile with contempt at what
they regard as our simple, good-natured vanity. If, however, in the contest, it
should be found that they underrate us, which I hope and believe, and that we
can affect the balance of power, it will not be difficult for us to obtain such terms
as our rights demand.

I, sir, will now conclude, by adverting to an argument of the gentleman used
in debate on a preceding day. He asked, why not declare war immediately ?
The answer is obvious — because we are not yet prepared. But, says the gen
tleman, such language as is held here will provoke Great Britain to commence
hostilities. I have no such fears. She knows well that such a course would
unite all parties here — a thing which, above all others, she most dreads. Be
sides, such has been our past conduct, that she will still calculate on our pa
tience and submission till war is actually commenced.

ii.

ONSLOW IN REPLY TO PATRICK HENRY.
No. 1.

IF rumour may be credited, I may be proud in having you as an antagonist
[Mr. A., the President of the United States] ; and if I were actuated by a senti
ment of vanity, much of my reply would be devoted to tracing the strong, but,
perhaps, accidental analogy between the style of your numbers and some of
our public documents. But truth, and not the gratification of vanity, is my ob
ject ; and though the pride of victory would be swelled in proportion to the high

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 15

standing of an opponent, I shall, witj^but stopping to inquire into the question
of authorship, proceed directly to the point at issue.

If you have failed in your argument, you have, at least, succeeded in giving
the question a new and interesting aspect. You have abandoned the rules and
usages of the Senate, as the source of the Vice-president's authority as the
presiding officer of the Senate. You contend that the disputed right is derived
directly from the Constitution, and that the Vice-president's authority is wholly
independent of the will of the Senate, which can neither give nor take it away.
It is not my wish to misstate your arguments in the slightest degree, and, to
avoid the possibility of misrepresentation, you shall speak for yourself. Spurn
ing the authority of the Senate, you scornfully observe, " With the easy assu
rance of a man stating a conceded postulate, he (Onslow) says, ' After all, the
power of the Vice-president must depend upon, the rules and usages of the Sen
ate :' a postulate not only false in its principle, but which, if true, would not
sustain the cause to whose aid it is invoked. Unless the Constitution of the
United States was subjected to some military construction, the power of the
Vice-president, in presiding over the Senate, rests on deeper, holier founda
tions than any rules or usages which that body may adopt. What says the
Constitution ? ' The Vice-president of the United States shall be President of
the Senate, but shall have no vote unless they be equally divided.' ' The Sen
ate shall choose their own officers, and also a president pro tempore, in the
absence of the Vice-president, or when he shall exercise the office of Presi
dent of the United States.' — (Const. U. S., Art. 1, Sec. 3.) It is here made
the duty of the Vice-president to preside over the Senate, under the sole re
striction of having no vote except in a given case ; the right of the Senate to
choose their president is confined to two contingencies ; his powers, after be
ing so chosen, are identical with those of the president set over them by the
Constitution, and any abridgment of those powers by the Senate would be a pal
pable infraction of that Constitution. Now, sir, what is the import of the term
' to preside,' in relation to a deliberative assembly ? Can any sophistry devise
a plausible definition of it, which would exclude the power of preserving or
der ? In appointing an officer to preside over the Senate, the people surely in
tended not to erect an empty pageant, but to accomplish some useful object :
and when, in another part of the Constitution, they authorize each house ' to
determine the rules of its proceedings,' they do not authorize it to adopt rules
depriving any office created by the Constitution of powers belonging, ex m ter
mini, to that office. If the plainest or most profound man in the community
were asked what powers he 'supposed to be inherent in the presiding officer of
either house of Congress, he would instantly enumerate, first, the power of
preserving order in its deliberations ; next, that of collecting the sense of its
members on any question submitted to their decision ; and, thirdly, that of au
thenticating, by his signature, their legislative acts. I have before said, and I
regret that I am obliged to repeat a truism, that ' the right to call to order is a
necessary consequence of the power of preserving order ;' and that, ' unless a
deliberative body, acting within the sphere of its competence, expressly restrict
this power and this right, no restriction on them can then be supposed.' In di
vesting the president set over them by the people, of any power which he had
received, either expressly or impliedly, from the people, the Senate, instead of
' acting within the sphere of their competence,' would act usurpingly and un
constitutionally — they would nullify the connexion which the people had es
tablished between themselves and their president; they would reduce them
selves to the monstrous spectacle of a body without a head, and their president
to the equally monstrous spectacle of a head without a body ; and their violent
act, while it would be disobeyed as illegal, would be contemned as ridiculous.
But, in truth, the Senate have never thus forgotten their allegiance to the Con
stitution."

16 SPEECHES OF JOHN C, CALHOTJN.

There can be no mistake as to the source or the nature of the power, ac
cording to your conception. You tell us plainly that it rests " on a deeper,
holier foundation" than the rules of the Senate — that it is " inherent in the "Vice-
president, and that, as presiding officer, he possesses it ex vi termini ; that an
attempt to divest, and, of course, to modify the power ' by the Senate, would be
to act' usurpingiy and unconstitutionally," and that " such violent act would be
disobeyed as illegal, and contemned as ridiculous."

These are, at least, lofty grounds, and if they can be maintained, there is an
end of the controversy. It would be absurd to go farther. An inquiry into the
rules and usages of the Senate, after such grounds are occupied, becomes ri
diculous, and much more so an inquiry into those of the houses of Parliament :
for surely, if it is beyond the power of the Senate to give or withhold the right,
it must stand on an elevation far above parliamentary rules or usages ; and I
was therefore not a little surprised to find that, after so bold an assertion, more
than four fifths of your long and elaborate essay was devoted to a learned and
critical inquiry into these very rules and usages. There can be but one expla
nation of so strange an inconsistency, but that a very satisfactory one. You
lack confidence in your own position ; and well might you : for, surely, power
so despotic and dangerous, so inconsistent with the first principles of liberty,
and every sound view of the Constitution, was never attempted to be establish
ed on arguments so imbecile and absurd, to which no intellect, however badly
organized, could yield assent, unless associated with feelings leaning strongly
to the side of power. That such are your feelings, no one who reads your es
say can doubt. None of your sympathies are on the Democratic side of our in
stitutions. If a question can be made as to where power is lodged, it requires
but little sagacity to perceive that you will be found on the side which will
place it in the fewest and least responsible hands. You perceive perfection
only in the political arrangement, which, with simplicity and energy, gives pow
er to a single will. It is not, then, at all surprising, that you should seize on
that portion of the Constitution which appoints the Vice-president to be Presi
dent of the Senate ; and that you should quote it at large, and dwell on it at
length, as the source of high and uncontrollable power in that officer ; while you
have but slightly and casually adverted to another section in the same article,
which clothes the Senate with the power " of determining the rules of their pro
ceedings, punishing its members for disorderly conduct, and, with the concur
rence of two thirds, of expelling a member." — (See Art. 1, Sec. 5.) Had your
predilections for the unity and irresponsibility of power been less strong, you
could not have failed to see that the point of view in which you have thought
proper to place the question made it one of relative power between the Senate
and its presiding officer. You place the Vice-president on one side and the Sen
ate on the other ; and the more you augment the constitutional power of the for
mer as the presiding officer, just in the same proportion you diminish the pow
er of the latter. What is gained to the one is lost to the other ; and in this com
petition of power you were bound to present fully and fairly both sides. This
you have not done, and, consequently, you have fallen not only into gross, but
dangerous errors. You set out by asserting that the very object of the appoint
ment of the Vice-president as President of the Senate was to preserve order,
and that he has all the powers, ex vi termini, necessary to the attainment of the
end for which he was appointed. Having gained this point, you make your
next step, that the right of enforcing order involves that of calling to order, and
that again involves the very power in question, which the Vice-president de
clined to exercise. You then draw two corollaries : that the power held by
the Vice-president being derived direct from the Constitution, is held independ
ently of the Senate, and is, consequently, beyond their control or participation ;
and that, as the Vice-president alone possesses it, he, and he alone, is respon
sible for order and decorum. Such is your summary logic, which you accom

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 17

pany with so much abuse of Mr. Calhoun for not calling the power, which you
have, as you suppose, clearly proven that he possesses by the Constitution, into
active energy, by correcting and controlling, at his sole will and pleasure, the
licentious and impertinent debates of the Senators.

Let us now turn the same mode of reasoning on the side of the Senate, and
you will perceive that it applies with infinite more force, though you have not
thought it deserving of notice.

The Constitution has vested the Senate with the right of determining the
rules of its proceedings, and of punishing members for disorderly conduct, which
may extend even to expulsion. The great object of giving the power to estab
lish rules is to preserve order. The only effectual means of preserving order
is to prescribe by rules what shall be a violation of order, and to enforce the
same by adequate punishment. The Senate alone has these powers by the
Constitution : consequently, the Senate alone has the right of enforcing order ;
and, consequently, whatever right the Vice-president possesses over order,
must be derived from the Senate ; and, therefore, he can exercise no power in
adopting rules or enforcing them, but what has been delegated to him by the
Senate, and only to the extent, both in manner and matter, to which the power
has been delegated. The particular power in question no* having been dele
gated, cannot be exercised by the Vice-president, and, consequently, he is not
responsible. Do you not perceive the irresistible force with which your own
mode of reasoning applies to the substantial constitutional powers of the Senate,
and how partial and absurd your arguments in favour of the inferred constitu
tional power of its presiding officer must appear in contrast with it ? As absurd
as it now appears, it shall be, if possi^e, infinitely more so before I have closed
this part of the investigation.

With the same predilection, your assumptions are all on the side of uncon
trolled and unlimited power. Without proof, or even an attempt at it, you as
sume that the power in controversy is inherent in the Vice-president, and that
he possesses it ex m termini, & presiding officer of the Senate. Now I, who
have certainly as much rigfa to assume as yourself, deny that he possesses any
such power ; and what mzy, perhaps, startle a mind organized like yours, I af
firm that, as a presiding officer, he has no inherent power whatever, unless that
of doing what t-'ie Senate may prescribe by its rules be such a power. There
are, indeed, inherent powers, but they are in the body, and not in the officer.
He is a mere agent to execute the will of the former. He can exercise no
power wiiich he does not hold by delegation, either express or implied. He
stands in the same relation to the body, or assembly over which he presides,
that a magistrate in a republic does to the state, and it would be as absurd to at
tribute to the latter inherent powers as to the former. This, in fact, was once
a fashionable doctrine. There was a time when minions of power thought it
monstrous that all of the powers of rulers should be derived from so low and
filthy a source as the people whom they govern. " A deeper and holier found
ation" of power was sought, and that was proclaimed to be in the " inherent,"
divine "right of rulers;" and, as their powers were thus shown to be inde
pendent of the will of the people, it followed that any attempt on their part to
divest rulers of power would be an act of " such violence as would be disobey
ed as illegal and contemned as ridiculous." I might trace the analogy between
your language and principles and those of the advocate of despotic power in all
ages and countries much farther, but I deem it not necessary either to weaken
or refute your arguments. A more direct and decisive reply may be given.

An inherent power is one that belongs essentially to the office, and is, in its
nature, inseparable from it. To divest the office of it would be to change its
nature. It would be no longer the same office. It is, then, a power wholly
independent of the circumstances how the office may be created or filled, or in
what particular manner its functions may be exercised. If. then, the power be-

18 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALUOUN.

longs to the Vice-president inherently, as presiding officer of the- Senate, it is
because it is essentially attached to the mere function of presiding in a deliber
ative assembly, and, consequently, belongs to all presiding officers over such as
semblies ; for it would be absurd to assert that it is inherent in him as President
of the Senate, and then make it depend on the circumstance that he holds his
appointment to preside in the Senate by the Constitution. The high power,
then, which you attribute to the Vice-president, must belong, if your argument
be correct, to the Speaker of the House of Commons, to the lord-chancellor,
as preskling officer of the House of Lords, to the Speaker of the House of Rep
resentatives, and those of our State Legislatures. They must not only possess
the power, but must hold it independently of the will of the bodies over which
they preside ; which can neither give nor take it away, nor modify the mode
of exercising it, nor control its operation. These consequences, absurd as
they appear to be, are legitimately drawn from your premises.

Now " out of thine own mouth I will condemn thee ;" by your own authori
ties you shall be refuted. To prove that the Vice-president possesses this
power, you have laboured to establish the fact that the Speaker of the House
of Commons holds and exercises it, and in proof of which you have cited many
cases from Jefferson's Manual.

It is true that he has, at least to a certain extent, but how has he acquired it ?
This is the important inquiry in the point of view in which we are now con
sidering the question. Is it inherent, or is it delegated ? If the former, 1 ac
knowledge that your argument, from analogy, in. favour of the inherent power
of the Vice-president, would have much force ; but, if the latter, it must utterly
fail ; for, if delegated, it clearly establishes the fact that the power is in the
body, and not in the presiding officer, and, consequently, not inherent in the Vice-
president, as you affirm. The instances that you have cited shall decide the
point. What say the cases'? "On thb 14th of April, 1604, rule conceived,
that if any man speak impertinently, or betide the question in hand, it stands
with the orders of the house for the speaker u» interrupt him, and to show the
pleasure of the house, whether they will farther hp,ar km." " On the 17th of
April, 1604, agreed for a general rule, if any superfluous motion or tedious
speech be offered in the house, the party is to be dn^cted and ordered by Mr.
Speaker." " On the 19th of May, 1604, Sir William Paddy ei^ering into a long
speech, a rule agreed, that, if any man speak not to the matter In question, the
speaker is to moderate." So it is said, on the 2d of May, 1610, vhen a mem
ber made what seemed an impertinent speech, and there was much iiissin" and
spitting, " that it was conceived for a rule, that Mr. Speaker n*ay stay imperti
nent speeches." " On the 10th of November, 1640, it was declared that, when
a business is begun and in debate, if any man rise to speak to a new business,
any member may, but Mr. Speaker ought to, interrupt him." — See Hat-sell's
Precedents, vol. ii., 3d edition. .

Do you not notice, that in every case the power was delegated by the house-
that the language is, " rule conceived," " it was agreed to as a general rule,'"
"rule agreed," &c., &c. ; and this, too, in relation to the very power in question^
according to your own showing? Thus it is established, beyond controversy,
that in the House of Commons the power is really in the body, and not in the
presiding officer.

If, to this decisive proof that the power has been delegated to the Speaker
of the House of Commons, and is, consequently, not inherent, we add that it is
conferred on the Speaker of the House of Representatives (see 19th rule) by
an express rule of the house, and that the lord-chancellor, as presiding officer
in the House of Lords, possesses it not, either ex-officio or by delegation, as
shall be shown hereafter, your monstrous and slavish doctrine, that it is an in
herent power, will be completely overthrown, and you are left without the pos
sibility of escape.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 19

Should you attempt to extricate yourself by endeavouring to show that, un
der our Constitution, the relative powers of the Vice-president and the Senate
are different from those of the speaker and the House of Commons ; and that,
though the latter may hold the power by delegation from the body, that the
Vice-president may possess it by a different and higher tenure, it would, at least,
prove that you cede the point that it is not inherent, and, also, that it cannot be
deduced from analogy between the powers of the two presiding officers, which
you have so much relied on in another part of your essay. But this shall not
avail you. The door is already closed in that direction. It has been, I trust,
conclusively proved that the Constitution, so far from countenancing the idea
of the power being inherent in the Vice-president, gives it to the Senate, by the
strongest implication, in conferring the express right of establishing its own
rules, and punishing for disorderly conduct. If you are not yet convinced, ad
ditional arguments are not wanting, which, though they may not extort an ac
knowledgment of your error, will thoroughly convince you of it.

You have overlooked the most obvious and best-established rules of construc
tion. What are the facts ? The Constitution has designated the Vice-president
as President of the Senate, and has also clothed that body with the right of de
termining the rules of its proceedings. It is obvious that the simple intention of
the framers of that instrument was to annex to the office of Vice-president that
of President of the Senate, without intending to define the extent or the limit
of his power in that character ; and, in like manner, it was the intention to con
fer on the Senate simply the power of enacting its own rules of proceeding,
without reference to the powers, such as they may be, that had been conferred on
their presiding officer. The extent of power, as between the two, becomes a
question of construction. Now the first rule of construction, in such cases, is
the known usage and practice of parliamentary bodies ; and. as those of the
British Parliament were the best known to the framers of the Constitution, it
cannot be doubted that, in determining what are the relative powers of the Vice-
president and the Senate, they ought to prevail. Under this view, as between
the Vice-president and Senate, the latter possesses the same power in determin
ing its rules that is possessed by the houses of Parliament, without being re
stricted in the slightest degree by the fact that the Vice-president, under the
Constitution, is president of the body, saving only the right of adopting such
rules as apply to the appointment or election of a presiding officer, which the
Senate would have possessed, if the Constitution had not provided a president
of the body ; and, as I have proved, from your own cases, that the particular
power in question incontrovertibly belongs to the house, it follow? necessarily,
according to established rules of construction, that the Senate also possesses it.

You have overlooked these obvious truths by affixing too hi^n an idea to the
powers of the presiding officer in preserving order. According to your concep
tion, the house is nothing, and the officer everything, on points of order. No
thing can be more erroneous. The power you attribute to him has tiever been
possessed by the president, or speaker, in any deliberative assembly ; no, noi
even by delegation from the body itself.

The right of preserving order must depend on the power of enforcing it, or
of punishing for a breach of order— a right inherent in the house alone, and nev
er, in any instance, delegated to the chair. Our Constitution confines this right
to each house of Congress, by providing- •' that they may punish for disorderly
conduct :" a power which they neither nave delegated, nor can delegate, to the
presiding officer. What, then, is the right of preserving order, belonging to the
Vice-president, which you have so pompously announced, and for not enfor
cing which, according to your conception, you and. your associates have de
nounced Mr. Calhoun almost as a traitor to his country ?

It is simply the right of calling to order, tn the, strict, literal meaning ; and, so
far from being derived from the right of preserving order, as you absurdly sup-

20 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

pose, it is not even connected with it. The right of preserving order depends
on the right of enforcing it, or the right of punishment for breaches of order, al
ways possessed by the body, but never, either by delegation or otherwise, by
the chair. It is notorious that the chair cannot enforce its calls to order. The
body alone can, and that only o-n its decisions, and not on tfyat of the presiding
officer. It is thus manifest, the high right of preserving order, to which you
make the right of calling to order incidental, belongs especially to the Senate,
and not to the Vice-president ; and, if your argument be correct, the incident
must follow the right ; and, consequently, it is the right and duty of a senator
to call to order for disorderly conduct. So clear is the proposition, that, if the
member called to order by the chair for disorderly conduct chooses to persist,
the presiding officer has no other remedy but to repeat his call, or throw himself,
for the enforcement of it, on the Senate. This feebleness of the chair, in ques
tions of order, explains why there has always been such indisposition to call
to order, even when it is made the express duty by rule, as in the House of
Representatives, and the House of Commons in England. Thousands of in
stances might be cited to establish the truth of this remark, both there and here :
instances in which all that has been said and uttered by Mr. Randolph is no
thing, but in which the speaker waited for the interference of some of the mem
bers, in order to preserve order. Such was the case in the recent occurrence
in the House of Commons, when Mr. Hume made an attack on the Bishop of
London and the lord-chancellor, both of whom, as members of the House of
Lords, were under the protection of positive rules ; yet no one, even there, had
the assurance to throw the responsibility on the presiding officer. The parti
sans of power in our country have the honour of leading in these new and dan
gerous attacks on the freedom of debate.

Some men, of honest intention, have fallen into the error about the right of
the Vice-president to preserve order independently of the Senate, because the
judges, or, as they express it, the presiding officer in the courts of justice pos
sess the right. A moment's reflection will show the fallacy. There is not the
least analogy between the rights and duties of a judge and those of a presiding
officer in a deliberative assembly. The analogy is altogether the other way.
It is between the court and the house. In fact, the latter is often called a
court, and there is a very strict resemblance, in the point under consideration,
between what may be called a parliamentary court and a court of justice. They
both have the right of causing their decision to be respected, and order and de
corum to be observed in their presence, by punishing those who offend. But
who ever h^ard of the speaker or Vice-president punishing for disorderly con
duct ? The utmost power they can exercise over disorderly conduct, even in
the lobby or g&Uery, is to cause it to be suppressed, for the time, by the ser-
geant-at-arms.

Enough has beeu said, though the subject is far from being exhausted, to de
monstrated that your views of the relative powers and duties of the Vice-pres
ident and the Senate, in relation to the point in question, are wholly erroneous.
It remains to be shown that your opinions (for arguments they cannot be call
ed) are dangerous to our liberty, and that they are in conflict with the first prin
ciples of our government. I do not attribute to you, or those with whom you
are associated, any deep-laid design against public liberty. Such an attempt,
as flagitious as it may be, requires a sagacity and boldness quite beyond what
we have now to apprehend from those in power. But that there exists, at the
present time, a selfish and greedy appetite to get, and to hold office, and that,
to effect their grovelling objects, doctrines slavish and dangerous are daily prop
agated, cannot be doubted by even careless observers. The freedom of de
bate is instinctively dreaded by the whole corps, high and low, of those who
make a speculation of politics; and well they may: for it is the great and
only effectual means of detecting and holding up to public scorn every machi-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 21

nation against the liberty of the country. It ranks first, even before the liberty
of the press, the trial by jury, the rights of conscience, and the writ of habeas
corpus, in the estimation of those who are capable of forming a correct estimate
of the value of freedom, and the best means of preserving it. Against this pal
ladium of liberty your blows are aimed ; and, to do you justice, it must be ac
knowledged, if the energy be not great, the direction is not destitute of skill.
If you could succeed in establishing the points which you labour, that the Vice-
president holds a power over the freedom of debate, under the right of preserv
ing order, beyond the will or control of the Senate ; and that, consequently, he
alone is responsible for what might be considered an undue exercise of the free
dom of speech in debate, a solid foundation would be laid, from which, in time,
this great barrier against despotic power would be battered down. It is easy
to see that the scheme takes the power of protecting this, the first of its rights,
•wholly out of the hands of the Senate, and places its custody in the hands of a
single individual, and he in no degree responsible to the body over which this
high power is to be exercised : thus efTectu ally destroying the keystone of free
dom, responsibility, and introducing into a vital part of our system uncontrolled,
or, what is the same thing, despotic power ; which, being derived, by your
theory, from the Constitution, and being applicable to all points of order, neces
sarily would vest in the Vice-president alone an independent and absolute
power, that would draw' into the vortex of his authority an unlimited control
over the freedom of debate.

Mark the consequences ! If the Vice-president should belong to the sfame
party or interest which brought the President into power, or if he be dependant
on him for his political standing or advancement, you will virtually place the
control over the freedom of debate in the hands of the executive. fWJ '

You thus introduce the President, as it were, into the chamber of the Senate,
and place him virtually over the deliberation of the body, with powers to restrain
discussion, and shield his conduct from investigation. Let us, for instance, sup
pose that the present chief magistrate should be re-elected, and that the party
which supports him should succeed, as, in all probability, they would in that
event, in electing also their Vice-president, can it be doubted that the rules for
the restraint of the freedom of debate in the Senate, which have been insisted
on openly by the party during the last winter, would be reduced to practice,
through a subservient Vice-president ? And what are those rules ? One of the
leading ones, to advert to no other, is, that the conduct of the executive, as a
co-ordinate branch of that government, cannot be called in question by a sen
ator in debate, at least so far as it relates to impeachable offences ; and, of
course, an attempt to discuss the conduct of the President, in such cases, would be
disorderly, and render the senator liable to be punished, even to expulsion. What
would be the consequence ? The Senate would speedily sink into a body to
register the decrees of the President and sing hosannas in his praise, and be «
as degraded as the Roman Senate under Nero.

But let us suppose the opposite state of things, in which the Vice-president
chooses to pursue a course independent of the will of the executive, and, in
stead of assuming so dangerous an exercise of power, he should indulge (for
indulgence it must be called, if allowed by his courtesy) that freedom of debate
which exists in other deliberative assemblies. What will then follow 1 Pre
cisely that which occurred last winter. Most exaggerated and false accounts
would everywhere be propagated, by hirelings of power, of the slightest occur
rence in the Senate. The public indignation would be roused at the supposed
disorder and indecorum, and the whole would be artfully directed against the
Vice-president, in order to prostrate his reputation ; and thus an officer, without
patronage or power, or even the right of defending himself, would be the target
against which the whole force arid patronage of the Government would be di
rected. Few men wbuld have the firmness to encounter danger so tremendous ;

22 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

and the practical result, in the long run, must be a subservient yielding to the
executive will.

No. 2.

Having now established, I may venture to say beyond the possibility of rea
sonable controversy, that the idea of an inherent right in the Vice-president, in
dependent of, and beyond the will of the Senate, to control the freedom of de
bate, is neither sanctioned by the Constitution, nor justified by the relation be
tween the body and its presiding officer, and that it is subversive of the right
of free discussion, and, consequently, dangerous to liberty, I might here fairly
rest the question. To you, at least, who treat with scorn the rules and usages
of the Senate, as the source of the power of the Vice-president, all farther in
quiry is fairly closed. But as many, who may agree with you in the conclu
sion, may treat with contempt your high-strained conception of the origin of the
power under investigation, it will not be improper to ascertain whether it has
been conferred on the Vice-president by any act of the Senate, express or im
plied, the only source whence the power can be fairly derived. In this view
of the subject, the simple inquiry is, Has the Senate conferred the power ?
It has been fully established that they alone possess it, and, consequently, from
the Senate only can it be derived. We, then, affirm that the Senate has not
conferred the power. The assertion of the negative, in such cases, is sufficient
to throw the burden of proof on those who hold the affirmative. I call on you,
then, or any of your associates, to point out the rule or the usage of the Senate
by which the power has been conferred. None such has, or can be designated.
If a similar question be asked as to the power of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, how easy would be the reply ? The 19th rule, which express
ly gives the power to him, would be immediately quoted ; and, if that were sup
posed to be doubtful, the journals of the house would be held up as containing
innumerable instances of the actual exercise of the power. No such answer
can be given when we turn to the power of the Vice-president. The rules are
mute, and the journals of the Senate silent. What means this striking differ
ence, but that, on this point, there is a difference, in fact, between the power of
the speaker and of the Vice-president ? a difference which has been always
understood and acted on ; and when to this we add, that the rules of the two
houses in regard to the power are strikingly different ; that, while those of the
Representatives expressly delegate the power to the speaker, those of the Sen
ate, by strong implication, withhold it from the Vice-president, little room can
be left for doubt. ' Compare, in this view, the 19th rule of the house and the
7th of the Senate. The former says, " If any member, by speaking or other-
*vise, transgress the rules of the house, the speaker shall, or any member may,
call to order : in which case the member so called to order shall immediately
sit down, unless permitted to explain ; and the house shall, if appealed to, de
cide on the case without debate ; if there be no appeal, the decision of the
chair shall be submitted to. If the decision be in favour of the member called
to order, he shall be at liberty to proceed ; if otherwise, he will not be permit
ted to proceed without leave of the house ; and if the case require it, he shall
be liable to the censure of the house." The rule of the Senate, on the contra
ry, provides, " If the member shall be called to order for words spoken, the ex
ceptionable words shall immediately be taken down in writing, that the presi
dent may be better enabled to judge of the matter." These are the corresponding-
rules of the two houses : and can any impartial mind contend that similar pow
ers are intended to be conferred by them on the speaker and Vice-president ?
Or will it be insisted on that the difference in the phraseology is accidental,
when it is known that they have often been revised on the reports of commit-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 23

tees, who would not fail to compare the rules of the two houses on correspond
ing subjects ? Under such circumstances, it is impossible that it could be in
tended to confer the same power by such difference of phraseology, or that the
withholding of the power in question from the Vice-president was unintentional.
This rational construction is greatly strengthened, when we advert to the dif
ferent relations which the two officers bear to their respective houses. The
speaker is chosen by the House of Representatives, and is, consequently, di
rectly responsible to' the body ; and his decision, by the rules, may be appealed
from to the house. The Vice-president, on the contrary, is placed in the chair
by the Constitution, is not responsible to the Senate, and his decision is with
out appeal. Need we look farther for the reason of so essential a variation in
the rules conferring power on their respective presiding officers ? It is a re
markable fact, that the same difference exists in the relation between the pre
siding officers of the two houses of the British Parliament, and the bodies over
which they respectively preside. In the Commons, the speaker is chosen as
in our House of Representatives, and is, consequently, in like manner respon
sible ; on the contrary, in the House of Lords the chancellor presides ex-officio,
in like manner as the Vice-president in the Senate, and is, in like manner, ir
responsible to the body. Now it is no less remarkable that the speaker pos
sesses the power in question, while it is perfectly certain that the lord-chancel
lor does not. Like cause, like effect ; dissimilar cause, dissimilar effect. You,
sir, have, it is true, made a puny effort to draw a distinction between the mode
in which the Vice-president and the lord-chancellor are appointed, and have
also feebly denied that the latter has not the power of calling to order. Both
of these efforts show the desperation of your cause. What does it signify by
whom an ex-officio officer is appointed, if not by the body ? There can be but
one material point, and that without reference to the mode of appointment — is
he, or is he not, responsible to the house ? If the former, there is good cause
for the delegation of the power ; for power exercised by responsible agents is
substantially exercised by the principal ; while by irresponsible agents it is the
power of him by whom it is exercised. Nor is your effort to show that the
chancellor has the power less unhappy. You have cited but one instance, and
that really renders you ridiculous. The lord-chancellor, as is well known,
has the right of speaking ; and you most absurdly cite the commencement of
a .speech of one of the chancellors, in which he states that he would call back
the attention of the Lords to the question at issue, as an instance of exercising
the power of calling to order as presiding officer, for departure from the ques
tion ! Though you have signally failed to prove your position, you have not less
completely established the fact, that your integrity is not above a resort to trick,
where argument fails. Nor is this the only instance of subterfuge. You made
a similar effort to do away the authority of the venerable Jefferson. He has
le.ft on record, that he considered his power as presiding officer of the Senate
as the power ofumpiragc, or, what is the same thing, an appellate power. In
order to break the force of this authority, you have denied the plain and inva
riable meaning of the word, and attempted to affix one to it which it never bears.
You say that its usual meaning is synonymous with " office," " authority," or
"the act of determining," and that it is only in its technical sense that it con
veys the idea of an appellate power ! Can it be unknown to you that no word in
the language more invariably has attached to it the idea of decision by appeal,
and that there is not an instance of its being used by any respectable authority
in the sense which you state to be its usual meaning ?

It only remains to consider the cases that you have cited from the Manual,
to prove that the Speaker of the House of Commons possesses the power in
question ; by which you would infer that it belongs also to the Vice-president.
A very strange deduction by one who believes that the power originates in the
Constitution, and that it neither can be given or taken away by the authority of th&

24 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

Senate itself. After asserting that it has " deeper and holier foundations than
the rules and usages of the Senate," there is something more than ridiculous,
that you at last seek for the power in the rules and usages of the House of Com
mons ! But let such inconsistency pass. You have, indeed, established the
fact that the speaker has the power, but you have overlooked the material cir
cumstance, as I have shown from your own cases, that he possesses it by posi
tive rules of the house. You might as well have shown that the Speaker of
the House of Representatives possesses it, and then inferred that the Vice-
president does also : for he, too, holds the power by positive rules of the body,
which makes the analogy as strong in the one case as the other.

But you would have it understood that the rules of Parliament have been
adopted by the Senate. No such thing. I challenge you to cite a single rule
or act of the Senate that gives countenance to it. Finally, you tell us that Mr.
Jefferson has cited these rules as being part of the rules and usages of the Sen
ate. Admitting, for a moment, that Mr. Jefferson had cited them as such, still
a very important question would arise, How came they to be the rules of the
Senate ? The Constitution provides that the Senate shall determine the rules
of its proceedings ; now, if that body has not, by any rule, adopted the rules of
the British Parliament, by what process of reason could they be construed to be
the rules of the Senate ? That the Senate has not adopted the rules of Parlia
ment, is certain ; and I confess I am not a little curious to see the process of
reasoning by which they are made the rules of the Senate, without adoption.
Is there not a striking analogy between this and the question, whether the com
mon law is a part of the laws of the Union ? We know that they have been
decided by the highest judicial authority not to be ; and, it seems to me, the ar
guments which would be applicable to the one would be equally so to the other
question. That the rules and usages of Parliament may be referred to to illus
trate the rules of either house of Congress, is quite a distinct proposition, and
may be readily admitted. Arguments may be drawn from any source calcula
ted to illustrate, but that is wholly different from giving to the rules of another
body a binding force on the Seriate, without ever having been recognised as its
rules. This is a subject of deep and grave importance ; but as it is not neces
sary to my purpose, I decline entering on it. It is sufficient, at present, to de
ny that Mr. Jefferson has cited the rules of the Parliament, referred to by you,
as those of the Senate. On the contrary, they are expressly cited as the rules
of the British House of Commons, without stating them to be obligatory on the
Senate. He has notoriously cited many of the rules of that body which are
wholly dissimilar from the usages of the Senate. But you cite Mr. Jefferson's
opinion, in which he says, " The Senate have, accordingly, formed some rules
for its government" (they have been much enlarged since) ; " but these going
only to a few cases, they have referred to the decision of the president, without
debate or appeal, all questions of order arising under their own rules, or where,
there is none. This places under the discretion of the president a very exten
sive field of decision." If your object in quoting the above passage was to show
that, where the Senate has adopted no rules of its own, the rules of Parliament
are those of the Senate, it completely fails. Not the slightest countenance
is given to such an idea. Mr. Jefferson, on the contrary, says that, in cases of
omission, the sound discretion of the president is the rule ;* and such has been
the practice, and from which it has followed that usages of the Senate are very
different from the Parliament, which could not be, if the latter were adopted,
where there were no positive rules by the Senate.

If this view of the subject be correct, which is certainly Mr. Jefferson's, the

* This opinion of Mr. Jefferson's is probably founded on the latter part of the 6th rule, which
strongly supports it. The rule is as follows : " When a member shall be called to order, he shall sit
down until the president shall have determined whether he is in order or not ; and every question
of order shall be decided by the president, without debate ; but if there be a doubt in his mind, he
may call for the sense of the Senate."

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 25

Vice-president had the right to make the rule by exercising a sound discretion ;
and the only question that could arise in this view is, whether he has acted on
correct principles in referring the power to the house, instead of exercising it
by the chair. So long as doubtful and irresponsible power ought not to be as
sumed — so long as the freedom of debate is essential to liberty — and so long as
it is an axiom in politics that no power can be safe but what is in the final con
trol and custody of the body over which it is exercised — so long the rule (to
view it in that light) adopted by the Vice-president will be considered in con
formity to sound political principles. But, suppose it to be conceived that the
rules of Parliament are those of the Senate, when not overruled by its own posi
tive acts, still, two questions would remain : first, whether the 7th rule of the
Senate, by a sound construction, does not restrain the Vice-president from exer
cising the power, by limiting it to the members of the Senate ? and, secondly,
whether the practice of the House of Lords, or that of the Commons, ought, in
this particular, to prevail ? Both of these points have already been incidental
ly considered, and a single remark will now suffice. Whether we regard the
nature of the power, or the principles of our system of government, there can,
be no doubt that the decision ought to be against the practice of the House of
Commons, and in favour of that of the House of Lords.

It may not be improper to notice an opinion which, if I mistake not, has, in.
no small degree, contributed to the error which exists as to the decision of the
Vice-president. There are many who are far from agreeing with your absurd
and dangerous positions as to the inherent powers of the Vice-president over
the freedom of debate, but who have, I think, a vague conception that he has
the right in dispute, as presiding officer, but a right subordinate to, and depend
ant on, the Senate. They concede to the Senate the right of determining their
rules, and thflt this right comprehends that of determining what is, or what is
not, disorderly conduct, and how the same shall be noticed or inhibited ; but
they have an idea that the ex-officio duty of the Vice-president to regulate the
proceedings of the Senate according to their own rules, extends to cases of the
freedom of debate. The amount of the argument, as far as I can understand it,
is, that, where there is a rule of the Senate, the Vice-president has, ex~officio,
the power of regulating the proceedings of the Senate by it, without any express
authority in the rule to that effect. All this may be fairly conceded, but it decides
nothing. It brings back the question to the inquiry, Is there, or is there not, such
a rule ? which has been fully considered, and, I trust, satisfactorily determined
in the negative. I will not again repeat the arguments on this point : I do not
deem it necessary. It is sufficient to remark, if there be a rule, let it be shown,
and the question is at an end. There is none.

As connected with this part of the subject, I do not think it necessary to
meet the ridiculous charge of inconsistency which you make against the Vice-
president in the exercise of his power, and which you endeavour to support by
reference to the stale and false accounts of his conduct in the case of Mr. Dick-
erson. It is sufficient that Mr. D. has repelled the charge of injustice, and you
exhibit but a sorry and factious appearance in defending a senator from oppres
sion, who is not conscious of any injustice having been inflicted.

Having demonstrated that the powers which you claim for the Vice-presi
dent do not belong to him as presiding officer of the Senate, and that they are
not conferred on him by the rules or usage of the Senate, or those of Parlia
ment, I may safely affirm that it does not exist, and that, so far from censure,
Mr. Calhoun deserves praise for declining to exercise it. He has acted in the
spirit that ought to actuate every virtuous public functionary — not to assume
doubtful powers — a spirit, under our systems of delegated authority, essential to
the preservation of liberty, and for being guided by which, he will receive the
thanks of the country when the excitement of the day has passed away.

I have now completed what may be considered the investigation of the sub-

D

28 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

ject ; but there are still several of your remarks that require notice. You have
not only attacked the decision of Mr. Calhoun, but you have impugned his mo
tives with licentious severity. The corrupt are the most disposed to attribute
corruption, and your unprovoked and unjustifiable attack on Mr. C.'s motives
speak as little in favour of your heart as your arguments do of your head. For
tunately for the Vice-president, his general character for virtue and patriotism
shields him from the imputation of such gross abuse of power, from such impure
motives as you attribute to him. He could not decide differently from what he
did without being at war with the principles which have ever governed him. It
is well known to all acquainted with him, publically or privately, that the maxim
which he holds in the highest veneration, and which he regards as the founda
tion of our whole system of government, is, that power should be controlled by
the body over which it is exercised, and that, without such responsibility, all
delegated power would speedily become corrupt. Whether he is wrong in giv
ing too high an estimate to this favourite maxim is immaterial. It is, and long
has been, his, and could not fail in having great influence in the decision which
you have so seriously assaulted. Had his principles been like yours, as illus
trated in your essay, it is possible he might have taken a different view of the
subject ; but, as he has decided in conformity to principles long fixed in his
mind, there is something malignant in the extreme to attribute his decision to
motives of personal enmity. You not only attack Mr. C.'s motives for this de
cision, but also his motive for the constitution of the Committee of Foreign Re
lations. You think it a crime in him that the venerable and patriotic Macon
should be placed at the head of the committee. I will neither defend him nor
the other members of the committee. They need no defence ; but I cannot
but remark, that the election of Mr. Macon president pro tern, of the Senate is
a singular comment on your malignant attack on the Vice-president.

It would have been impossible that you should steer clear of the cant of your
party, and we accordingly have a profusion of vague charges about Mr. Cal-
houn's ambition. The lowest and most mercenary hireling can easily coin such
charges ; and while they deal in the general, without a single specification, it
is utterly impossible to meet or refute them ; but, fortunately, they go for no
thing with the wise and virtuous, saving only that, on the part of those who make
them, they evince an envious, morbid mind, which, having no real ground of
attack, indulges in vague, unmeaning abuse. It is highly honourable to Mr.
C. that, in the midst of so much political enmity, his personal and public char
acter stands free from all but one specific charge — which is, that he has incli
ned, in his present station, too much against his own power, and too much in favour
of the inestimable right of the freedom of debate.. That he has been indefatiga
ble in the discharge of his duty ; that he has been courteous to the members,
and prompt and intelligent, all acknowledge. Not a moment was he absent
from his post during a long and laborious session, and often remained in the
chair, without leaving it, from eight to twelve hours. He has, however, com
mitted one unpardonable sin which blots out all. He did not stop Mr. Ran
dolph. This is the head and front of his offending. And who is Mr. Randolph ?
Is he or his manners a stranger in our national councils ? For more than a
quarter of a century he has been a member of Congress, and during the whole
time his character has remained unchanged. Highly talented, eloquent, se
vere, and eccentric ; not unfrequently wandering from the question, but often
uttering wisdom worthy of a Bacon, and wit that would not discredit a Sheri
dan, every speaker had freely indulged him in his peculiar manner, and that
without responsibility or censure ; and none more freely than the present Sec
retary of State, while he presided in the House of Representatives. He is
elected, with a knowledge of all this, by the ancient and renowned common
wealth of Virginia, and takes his seat in'the Senate. An immediate outcry is
made against the Vice-president for permitting him, who has been so long per-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 27

jnitted by so many speakers, to exercise his usual freedom of discussion,
though in no respects were his attacks on this administration freer than what
they had been on those of Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Madison, and Mr. Monroe.
Who can doubt, if Mr. Calhoun had yielded to this clamour, that the whole
current would have turned, and that he would then have been more severely
denounced for what would have been called his tyranny and usurpation, than
he has been for refusing to interfere with the freedom of debate ? His author
ity would have been denied, and properly denied : the fact that Mr. R. had been
permitted by all other presiding officers, for so long a time, to speak without re
straint, would have been dwelt on ; and the injustice done to the senator, and
the insult offered to the state that sent him, would have been painted in the
most lively colours. These considerations, we are satisfied, had no weight
with the Vice-president. Those who know him know that no man is more re
gardless of consequences in the discharge of his duty ; but that the attack on
him is personal, in order to shake his political standing, and prostrate his char
acter, is clearly evinced by every circumstance ; and with this object, that he
would have been assaulted, act as he might, is most certain. It is for the
American people to determine whether this conspiracy against a public servant,
whose only fault is that he has chosen the side of liberty rather than that of pow
er, and whose highest crime consists in a reverential regard for the freedom of
debate, shall succeed. ONSLOW.

in.

MR. CALHOUN'S ADDRESS, STATING HIS OPINION OF THE RELATION WHICH THE

STATES AND GENERAL GOVERNMENT BEAR TO EACH OTHER.

THE question of the relation which the States and General Government bear
to each other is not one of recent origin. From the commencement of our
system, it has divided public sentiment. Even in the Convention, while the
Constitution was struggling into existence, there were two parties as to what
this relation should be, whose different sentiments constituted no small imped
iment in forming that instrument. After the General Government went into
operation, experience soon proved that the question had not terminated with the
labours of the Convention. The great struggle that preceded the political rev
olution of 1801, which brought Mr. Jefferson into power, turned essentially on
it, and the doctrines and arguments on both sides were imbodied and ably sus
tained : on the one, in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, and the Report
to the Virginia Legislature ; and on the other, in the replies of the Legislature
of Massachusetts and some of the other states. These resolutions and this
report, with the decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania about the
same time (particularly in the case of Cobbett, delivered by Chief-justice
M'Kean, and concurred in by the whole bench), contain what I believe to
be the true doctrine on this important subject. I refer to them in order to avoid
the necessity of presenting my views, with the reasons in support of them, in
detail.

As my object is simply to state my opinions, I might pause with this refer
ence to documents that so fully and ably state all the points immediately con
nected with this deeply-important subject ; but as there are many who may not
have the opportunity or leisure to refer to them, and as it is possible, however clear
they may be, that different persons may place different interpretations on their
meaning, I will, in order that my sentiments may be fully known, and to avoid
all ambiguity, proceed to state summarily the doctrines which I conceive they
embrace.

28 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

i '

j The great and leading principle is, that the General Government emanated
from the people of the several states, forming distinct political communities, and
acting in their separate and sovereign capacity, and not from all of the people
forming one aggregate political community ; that the Constitution of the United
States is, in fact,* a compact, to which each state is a party, in the character al
ready described ; and that the several states, or parties, have a right to judge of
its infractions ; and in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of
power not delegated, they have the right, in the last resort, to use the language
of the Virginia Resolutions, " to interpose for arresting the progress of the evil,
and for maintaining, within their respective limits, the authorities, rights, and lib
erties appertaining to them" This right of interposition, thus solemnly assert
ed by the State of Virginia, be it called what it may — State-right, veto, nullifi
cation, or by any other name — I conceive to be the fundamental principle of
our system, resting on facts historically as certain as our revolution itself, and
deductions as simple and demonstrative as that of any political or moral truth
whatever ; and I firmly believe that on its recognition depend the stability
and safety of our political institutions.! j

I am not ignorant that those opposed to the doctrine have always, now and
formerly, regarded it in a very different light, as anarchical and revolutionary.
Could I believe such, in fact, to be its tendency, to me it would be no recom
mendation. I yield to none, I trust, in a deep and sincere attachment to our
political institutions and the union of these states. I never breathed an oppo
site sentiment ; but, on the contrary, 'l have ever considered them the great in
struments of preserving our liberty, &nd promoting the happiness of ourselves
and our posterity ; and next to these I have ever held them most dear. VNearly
half my life has been passed in the service of the Union, and whatever public
reputation I have acquired is indissolubly identified with it. To be too national
has, indeed, been considered by many, even of my friends, to be my greatest
political fault. | With these strong feelings of attachment, I have examined, with
the utmost care, the bearing of the doctrine in question ; and, so far from anar
chical or revolutionary, I solemnly believe it to be the only solid foundation of
our system, and of the Union itself; and that the opposite doctrine, which denies
to the states the right of protecting their reserved powers, and which would
vest in the General Government (it matters not through what department) the
right of determining, exclusively and finally, the powers delegated to it, is in
compatible with the sovereignty of the states, and of the Constitution itself, con
sidered as the basis of a Federal Union. If As strong as this language is, it is
not stronger than that used by the illustrious Jefferson, who said to give to the
General Government the final and exclusive right to judge of its powers, is to
make "'-its discretion, and not the Constitution, the measure of its powers ;" and
that, " in all cases of compact between parties having no common judge, each party
has an equal right to^iudgefor itself, as well of the infraction as of the mode and
measure of re dress ^JA Language cannot be more explicit, nor can higher author
ity be adduced.

That different opinions are entertained on this subject, I consider but as an
additional evidence of the great diversity of the human intellect. Had not able,,
experienced, and patriotic individuals, for whom I have the highest respect,
taken different views, I would have thought the right too clear to admit of doubt ;
but I am taught by this, as well as by many similar instances, to treat with
deference opinions differing from my own. The error may, possibly, be with
me ; but if so, I can only say that, after the most mature and conscientious ex
amination, I have not been able to detect it. But, with all proper deference, I
must think that theirs is the error who deny what seems to be an essential at
tribute of the conceded sovereignty of the states, and who attribute to the Gen
eral Government a right utterly incompatible with what all acknowledge to be
its limited and restricted character : an error originating principally, as I must

SPEECHES OF JOHN C.. &ALHOUN. 29

think, in not duly reflecting on the nature of our institutions, and on what con
stitutes the only rational object of all political constitutions.

It has been well' said by one of the most sagacious men of antiquity, that the
object of a constitution is to restrain the government, as that of laws is to restrain
individuals. The remark is correct ; nor is it less true where the government
is vested in a majority than where it is in a^single or a few individuals — in a
republic, than a monarchy or aristocracy. j(_No one can have a higher respect
for the maxim that the majority ought to govern than I have, taken in its proper
sense, subject to the restrictions imposed by the Constitution, and confined to
subjects in which every portion of the community have similar interests ; but it
is a great error to suppose, as many do, that the right of a majority to govern is
a natural and not a conventional right, and therefore absolute and unlimited.
By nature every individual has the right to govern himself; and governments,
whether founded on majorities or minorities, must derive their right from the
assent, .expressed or implied, of the governed, and be subject to such limitations
as they may impose. Where the interests are the same, that is, where the
laws that may benefit one will benefit all, or the reverse, it is just and proper to
place them under the control of the majority ; but where they are dissimilar, so
that the law that may benefit one portion may be ruinous to another, it would
be, on the contrary, unjust and absurd to subject them to its will ; and such I
conceive to be the theory on which our Constitution restsjj

That such dissimilarity of interests may exist, it is impossible to doubt. They
ure to be fouud in every community, in a greater or less degree, however small
or homogeneous, and they constitute everywhere the great difficulty of forming
and preserving free institutions. To guard against the unequal action of the
laws, when applied to dissimilar and opposing interests, is, in fact, what mainly
renders a constitution indispensable ; to overlook which, in reasoning on our
Constitution, would be to omit the principal element by which to determine its
character. Were there no contrariety of interests, nothing would be jnore
simple and easy than to form and preserve free institutions. The right of suf
frage alone would be a sufficient guarantee. It is the conflict of opposing inter
ests which renders it the most difficult work of man.

Where the diversity of interests exists in separate and distinct classes of the
community, as is the case in England, and was formerly the case in Sparta,
Rome, and most of the free states of antiquity, the rational constitutional pro
vision is that each should be represented in the government, as a separate es
tate, with a distinct voice, and a negative on the acts of its co-estates, in order
to check their encroachments. In England the Constitution has assumed ex
pressly this form, while in the governments of Sparta and Rome the same
thing was effected under different, but not much less efficacious forms. The
perfection of their organization, in this particular, was that which gave to the
constitutions of these renowned states all their celebrity, which secured their
liberty for so many centuries, and raised them to so great a height of power
and prosperity. Indeed, a constitutional provision giving to the great and sep
arate interests of the community the right of self-protection, must appear, to
those who will duly reflect on the subject, not less essential to the preservation
of liberty than the right of suffrage itself. They, in fact, have a common object,
to effect which the one is as necessary as the other to secure responsibility :
that is, that those who make and execute the laws should be accountable to those on
whom the laws in reality operate — the only solid and durable foundation of liberty .
[If, without the right of suffrage, our rulers would oppress us, so, without the
right of self-protection, the major would equally oppress the minor interests of
the community. The absence of the former would make the governed the
slaves of the rulers, and of the latter, the feebler interests, the victim of the
stronger!!

Happily for us, we have no artificial and separate classes of society. We

30 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

have wisely exploded all such distinctions ; but we are not, on that account, ex
empt from all contrariety of interests, as the present distracted and dangerous
condition of our country, unfortunately, but too clearly proves. With us they
are almost exclusively geographical, resulting mainly from difference of climate,
soil, situation, industry, and production, but are not, therefore, less necessary to
be protected by an adequate constitutional provision than where the distinct in
terests exist in separate classes. The necessity is, in truth, greater, as such
separate and dissimilar geographical interests are more liable to come into con
flict, and more dangerous, when in that state, than those of any other descrip
tion : so much so, that ours is the first instance on record where they have not
formed, in an extensive territory, separate and independent communities, or sub
jected the whole to despotic sway. That such may not be our unhappy fate also,
must be the sincere prayer of every lover of his country.

So numerous and diversified are the interests of our country, that they could
not be fairly represented in a single government, organized so as to give to each
great and leading interest a separate and distinct voice, as in governments to
which I have referred. A plan was adopted better suited to our situation, but
perfectly novel in its character. j The powers of the government were divided,
not, as heretofore, in reference to classes, but geographically. One Gener
al Government was formed for the whole, to which was delegated all the
powers supposed to be necessary to regulate the interests common to all the
states, leaving others subject to the separate control of the states, being,
from their local and peculiar character, such that they could not be subject to
the will of a majority of the whole Union, without the certain hazard of injus
tice and oppression. It was thus that the interests of the whole were subject
ed, as they ought to be, to the will of the whole, while the peculiar and local
interests were left under the control of the states separately, to whose custody
only they could be safely confided. This distribution of power, settled solemnly
by a constitutional compact, to which all the states are^ parties, constitutes the
peculiar character and excellence of our political systemj It is truly and emphat
ically American, without example or parallel.

To realize its perfection, we must view the General Government and those
of the states as a whole, each in its proper sphere independent ; each perfectly
adapted to its respective objects ; the states acting separately, representing and
protecting the local and peculiar interests ; acting jointly through one General
Government, with the weight respectively assigned to each by the Constitu
tion, representing and protecting the interest of the whole, and thus perfecting,
by an admirable but simple arrangement, the great principle of representation
and responsibility, without which no government can be free or just. To pre
serve this sacred distribution as originally settled, by coercing each to move in
its prescribed orb, is the great and difficult problem, on the solution of which
the duration of our Constitution, of our Union, and, in all probability, our liberty
depends. How is this to be effected^

The question is new when applied to our peculiar political organization,
where the separate and conflicting interests of society are represented by dis
tinct but connected governments ; but itjs, in reality, an old question under a
new form, long since perfectly solved. ^Whenever separate and dissimilar in
terests have been separately represented in any government ; whenever the
sovereign power has been divided in its exercise, the experience and wisdom
of ages have devised but one mode by which such political organization can be
preserved — the mode adopted in England, and by all governments, ancient
and modern, blessed with constitutions deserving to be called free — to give to
each co-estate the right to judge of its powers, with a negative or veto on the
acts of the others, in order to protect against encroachments the interests it par
ticularly representsf: a principle vvhich all of our Constitutions recognise in the
distribution of power among their respective departments, as essential to main-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 31

tain the independence of each, but which, to all who will duly reflect on the
subject, must appear far more essential, for the same object, in that great and
fundamental distribution of powers between the General and State Governments.
So essential is the principle, that to withhold the right from either, where the
sovereign power is divided, is, in fact, to annul the division itself, and to con
solidate in the one left in the exclusive possession of the right all powers of
government ; for it is not possible to distinguish, practically, between a govern
ment having all power, and one having the right to take what powers it pleases.
Nor does it in the least vary the principle, whether the distribution of power be
between co-estates, as in England, or between distinctly organized but con
nected governments, as with us. The reason is the same in both cases, while
the necessity is greater in our case, as the danger of conflict is greater where
the interests of a society are divided geographically than in any other, as has
already been shown.

These truths do seem to me to be incontrovertible ; and I am at a loss to un
derstand how any one, who has maturely reflected on the nature of our institu
tions, or who has read history or studied the principles of free government to
any purpose, can call them in question. The explanation must, it appears to
me, be sought in the fact that in every free state there are those who look more
to the necessity of maintaining power than guarding against its abuses. I do
not intend reproach, but simply to state a fact apparently necessary to explain
the contrariety of opinions among the intelligent, where the abstract considera
tion of the subject would seem scarcely to admit of doubt. If such be the true
cause, I must think the fear of weakening the government too muoh in this case
to be in a great measure unfounded, or, at least, that the danger is much less
from that than the opposite side. I do not deny that a power of so high a na-
ture^may be abused by a state, but when I reflect that the states unanimously
called the General Government into existence with all its powers, which they
freely delegated on their part, under the conviction that their common peace,
safety, arid prosperity required it ; that they are bound together by a common
origin, and the recollection of common suffering and common triumph in the
great and splendid achievement of their independence ; and that the strongest
feelings of our nature, and among them the love of national power and distinc
tion, are on the side of the Union, it does seem to me 'that the fear which
would strip the states of their sovereignty, and degrade them, in fact, to mere
dependant corporations, lest they should abuse a right indispensable to the peace
able protection of those interests which they reserved under their own peculiar
guardianship when they created the General Government, is unnatural and un
reasonable. If those who voluntarily created the system cannot be trusted to
preserve it, who can ?

So far from extreme danger, I hold that there never was a free state in which
this great conservative principle, indispensable to all, was ever so safely lodged.
In others, when the co-estates representing the dissimilar and conflicting inter
ests of the community came into contac^the only alternative was compromise,
submission, or force. Not so in our^£j$hould the General Government and
a state come into conflict, we have a nigher remedy: the power which called
the General Government into existence, which gave it all its authority, arjd can
enlarge, contract, or abolish its powers at its pleasure, may be invoketfj' The
states themselves may be appealed to, three fourths of which, in fact, form a
power, whose decrees are the Constitution itself, arid whose voice can silence
all discontent. The utmost extent, then, of the power is, that a state acting in its
sovereign capacity, as one of the parties to the constitutional compact, may com
pel the government, created by that compact, to submit a question touching its
infraction to the parties who created it ; to avoid the supposed dangers of which,
it is proposed to resort to the novel, the hazardous, and, I must add, fatal proj
ect of giving to the General Government the sole and final right of interpret-

32 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

ing the Constitution, thereby reversing the whole system, making that instru
ment the creature of its will instead of a rule of action impressed on it at its
creation, and annihilating, in fact, the authority, which imposed it, and from which
the government itself derives its existence.Jf '

That such would be the, result, were the right in question vested in the le
gislative or executive branch of the government, is conceded by all. No one
has been so hardy as to assert that Congress or the President ought to have the
right, or deny that, if vested finally and exclusively in either, the consequences
which I have stated would necessarily follow ; but its advocates have been rec
onciled to the doctrine, on the supposition that there is one department of the
General Government which, from its peculiar organization, affords an independ
ent tribunal through which the government may exercise the high authority
which is the subject of consideration, with perfect safety to all.

I yield, I trust, to few in my attachment to the judiciary department. I am
fully sensible of its importance, and would maintain it to the fullest extent in
its constitutional powers and independence ; but it is impossible for me to be
lieve that it was ever intended by the Constitution that it should exercise the
power in question, or that it is competent to do so ; and, if it were, that it would
be a safe depositary of the power.

Its powers are judicial, and not political, and are expressly confined by the
Constitution " to all cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution, the
laws of the United States, and the treaties made, or which shall be made, under
its authority ;" and which I have high authority in asserting excludes political
questions, and comprehends those only where there are parties amenable to the
process of the court.* Nor is its incompetency less clear than its want of con
stitutional authority. There may be many, and the most dangerous infractions
on the part of Congress, of which, it is conceded by all, the court, as a judicial
tribunal, cannot, from its nature, take cognizance. The tariff itself is a strong-
case in point ; and the reason applies equally to all others where Congress per
verts a power from an object intended to one not intended, the most insidious and
dangerous of all the infractions ; and which may be extended to all its powers,
more especially to the taxing and appropriating. But, supposing it competent to
take cognizance of all infractions of every description, the insuperable objec
tion still remains, that it would not be a safe tribunal to exercise the power in
question.

It is a universal and fundamental political principle, that the power to pro
tect can safely be confided only to those interested in protecting, or their re
sponsible agents — a maxim not less true in private than in public affairs. The
danger in our system is, that the General Government, which represents the in
terests of the whole, may encroach on the states, which represent the peculiar
and local interests, or that the latter may encroach on the former.

In examining this point, we ought not to forget that the government, through
all its departments, judicial as well as others, is administered by delegated and
responsible agents ; and that the power which really controls, ultimately, all the
movements, is not in the agents, but those who elect or appoint them. To under
stand, then, its real character, and what would be the action of the system in
any supposable case, we must raise our view from the mere agents to this high
controlling power, which finally impels every movement of the machine. By
doing so, we shall find all under the control of the will of a majority, compound
ed of the majority of the states, taken as corporate bodies, and the majority of
the people of the states, estimated in federal numbers. These, united, constitute
the real and final power which impels and directs the movements of the Gen
eral Government. The majority of the states elect the majority of the Senate ;
of the people of the states, that of the House of Representatives ; the two uni-

* I refer to the authority of Chief-justice Marshall, in the case of Jonathan Robbins. I
Shave not been able to refer to the speech, and speak from memory.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 33

ted, the President ; and the President and a majority of the Senate appoint
the judges : a majority of whom, and a majority of the Senate and ho§se, with
the President, really exercise all the powers of the government, with the excep
tion of the cases where the Constitution requires a greater number than a ma
jority. The judges are, in fact, as truly the judicial representatives of this uni
ted majority, as the majority of Congress itself, or the President, is its legisla
tive or executive representative ; and to confide the power to the judiciary to
determine finally and conclusively what powers are delegated and what reserv
ed, would be, in reality, to confide it to the majority, whose agents they are, and
by whom they can be controlled in various ways ; and, of course, to subject
(against the fundamental principle of our system and all sound political reason
ing) the reserved powers of the states, with all the local and peculiar interests
they were intended to protect, to the will of the very majority against which the
protection was intended. Nor will the tenure by which the judges hold their
office, however valuable the provision in many other respects, materially vary
the case. Its highest possible effect would be to retard, and not finally to re
sist, the will of a dominant majority.

But it is useless to multiply arguments. Were it possible that reason could
settle a question where the passions and interests of men are concerned, this
point would have been long since settled forever by the State of Virginia. The
report of her Legislature, to which I have already referred, has really, in my
opinion, placed it beyond controversy. Speaking in reference to this subject,
it says : " It has been objected" (to the right of a state to interpose for the pro
tection of her reserved rights) " that the judicial authority is to be regarded as
the sole expositor of the Constitution. On this objection it might be observed,
first, that there may be instances of usurped powers which the forms of the
Constitution could never draw within the control of the judicial department ;
secondly, that, if the decision of the judiciary be raised above the sovereign
parties to the Constitution, the decisions of the other departments, not carried
by the forms of the Constitution before the judiciary, must be equally author
itative and final with the decision of that department. But the proper answer
to the objection is, that the resolution of the General Assembly relates to those
great and extraordinary cases in which all the forms of the Constitution may
prove ineffectual against infractions dangerous to the essential rights of the par
ties to it. The resolution supposes that dangerous powers, not delegated, may
not only be usurped and executed by the other departments, but that the judi
cial department may also exercise or sanction dangerous powers, beyond the
grant of the Constitution, and, consequently, that the ultimate right of the par
ties to the Constitution to judge whether the compact has been dangerously
violated, must extend to violations by one delegated authority, as well as by an
other — by the judiciary, as well as by the executive or legislative."

Against these conclusive arguments, as they seem to me, it is objected that,
if one of the parties has the right to judge of infractions of the Constitution, so
has the other ; and that, consequently, in cases of contested powers between a
state and the General Government, each would have a right to maintain its
opinion, as is the case wlien sovereign powers differ in the construction of
treaties or compacts, and that, of course, it would come to be a mere question
of force, frhe error is in the assumption that the General Government is a
party to the constitutional compact. The states, as has been shown, formed
the compact, acting" as sovereign and independent communities. The General
Government is but its creature ; and though, in reality, a government, with all
the rights and authority which belong to any other government, within the orbit
of its powers, it is, nevertheless, a government emanating from a compact be
tween sovereigns, and partaking, in its nature and object, of the character of a
joint commission, appointed to superintend and administer the interests in which
all are jointly concerned, but having, beyond its proper sphere, no more power

E

34 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

than if it did not exist. | To deny this would be to deny the most incontestable
facts anfl the clearest conclusions ; while to acknowledge its truth is to de
stroy utterly the objection that the appeal would be to force, in the case sup
posed. For, if each party has a right to judge, then, under our system of gov
ernment, the final cognizance of a question of contested power would be in the
states, and not in the General Government. It would be the duty of the latter,
as in all similar cases of a contest between one or more of the principals and
a joint commission or agency, to refer the contest to the principals themselves.
Such are the plain dictates of both reason and analogy. On no sound principle
can the agents have a right to final cognizance, as against the principals much
less to use force against them to maintain their construction of their powers.
Such a right would be monstrous, arid has never, heretofore, been claimed in.
similar cases.

That the doctrine is applicable to the case of a contested power between the
states and the General Government, we have the authority not only of reason
and analogy, but of the distinguished statesman already referred to. Mr. Jef
ferson, at a late period of his life, after long experience and mature reflection,
says, " With respect to our State and Federal Governments, I do not think their
relations are correctly understood by foreigners. They suppose the former
are subordinate to the latter. This is not the case. They are co-ordinate de
partments of one simple and integral whole. But you may ask, If the two de
partments should claim each the same subject of power, where is the umpire to
decide between them ? In cases of little urgency or importance, the prudence
of both parties will keep them aloof from the questionable ground ; but, if it can
neither be avoided nor compromised, a convention of the states must be called
to ascribe the doubtful power to that department which they may think best."

fit is thus that our Constitution, by authorizing amendments, and by prescribing
the authority and mode of making them, has, by a simple contrivance, with its
characteristic wisdom, provided a power which, in the last resort, supersedes
effectually the necessity, and even the pretext for force : a power to which none
can fairly object j with which the interests of all are safe ; which can definitive
ly close all controversies in the only effectual mode, by freeing the compact of
every defect and uncertainty, by an amendment of the instrument itselffj It is
impossible for human wisdom, 'in a system like ours, to devise another mode
which shall be safe and effectual, and, at the same time, consistent with what
are the relations and acknowledged powers of the two great departments of our
government. It gives a beauty and security peculiar to our system, which, if
duly appreciated, will transmit its blessings to the remotest generations ; but, if

4 not, our splendid anticipations of the future will prove but an empty dream.

JfStripped of all its covering, the naked question is, whether ours is a federal or
a consolidated government ; a constitutional or absolute one ; a government
resting ultimately on the solid basis of the sovereignty of the states or on the
unrestrained will of a majority ; a form of government, as in all other unlimited
ones, in which injustice, and violence, and force must finally prevail. Let it
never be forgotten that, where the majority rules withovJ restriction, the minority
is the subject ; and that, if we should absurdly attribute to the former the exclu
sive right of construing the Constitution, there would be, in fact, between the
sovereign and subject, under such a government, no constitution, or, at least,
nothing deserving the name, or serving the legitimate object of so sacred an
instrument.,] I

0Iow the states are to exercise this high power of interposition, which con
stitutes so essential a portion of their reserved rights that it cannot be delegated
without an entire surrender of their sovereignty, and converting our system from
a federal into a consolidated government, is a question that the states only are
competent to determine. The arguments which prove that they possess the
power, equally prove that they are, in the language of Jefferson, fl the rightful

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 35

judges of the mode and measure of redress" But the spirit of forbearance, as
well as the nature of the right itself, forbids a recourse to it, except in cases of
dangerous infractions of the Constitution ; and then only in the last resort, when
all reasonable hope of relief from the ordinary action of the government has
failed ; when, if the right to interpose did not exist, the alternative would be
submission and oppression on one side, or resistance by force on the other.
That our system should afford, in such extreme cases, an intermediate point be
tween these dire alternatives, by which the government may be brought to a
pause, and thereby an interval obtained to compromise differences, or, if im
practicable, be compelled to submit the question to a constitutional adjustment,
through an appeal to the states themselves, is an evidence of its high wisdom :
an element not, as is supposed by some, of weakness, but of strength ; not of
anarchy or revolution, but of peace and safety. Its general recognition would
of itself, in a great measure, if not altogether, supersede the necessity of its exer
cise, by impressing on the movements of the government that moderation and jus
tice so essential to harmony and peace, in a country of such vast extent and diver
sity of interests as ours ; and would, if controversy should come, turn the resent
ment of the aggrieved from the system to those who had abused its powers
(a point all-important), and cause them to seek redress, not in revolution or over
throw, but in reformation.^ It is, in fact, properly understood, a substitute, where
the alternative would be force, tending to prevent, and, if that fails, to correct peace
ably the aberrations to which all systems are liable, and which, if permitted to ac
cumulate without correction, must Jinally end in a general catastrophe^]

I have now said what I intended in reference to the abstract question of the-
relation of the states to the General Government, and would here conclude, did
I not believe that a mere general statement on an abstract question, without in
cluding that which may have caused its agitation, would be considered by many
imperfect and unsatisfactory. Feeling that such would be justly the case, I am
compelled, reluctantly, to touch on the tariff, so fait, at least, as may be neces
sary to illustrate the opinions which I have already advanced. Anxious, how
ever, to intrude as little as possible on the public attention, I will be as brief as
possibte ; and with that view will, as far as may be consistent with my object,
avoid all debateable topics.

Whatever diversity of opinion may exist in relation to the principle, or the
effect on the productive industry of the country, of the present, or any other
tariff of protection, there are certain political consequences flowing from the
present which none can doubt, and all must deplore. It Avould be in vain to
attempt to conceal, that it has divided the country into two great geographical
divisions, and arrayed them against each other, in opinion at least, if not inter
ests also, on some of the most vital of political subjects — on its finance, its com
merce, and its industry — subjects calculated, above all others, in time of peace,
to produce excitement, and in relation to which the tariff has placed the sec-,
tions in question in deep and dangerous conflict. fjf there be any point on
which the (I was going to say, southern section, but to avoid, as far as possi
ble, the painful feelings such discussions are calculated to excite, I shall say)
weaker of the two sections is unanimous, it is that its prosperity depends, in a
great measure, on free trade, light taxes, economical, and, as far as possible,,
equal disbursements of the public revenue, and unshackled industry, leaving^
them to pursue whatever may appear most advantageous to their interestsj
From the Potomac to the Mississippi, ther^ are few, indeed, however divided
on other points, who would not, if dependant on their volition, and if they re
garded the interest of their particular section only, remove from commerce and
industry every shackle, reduce the revenue to the lowest point that the wants of
the government fairly required, and restrict the appropriations to the most mod
erate scale consistent with the peace, the security, and the engagements of the
public ; and who do not believe that the opposite system is calculated to throw

36 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

on them an unequal burden, to repress their prosperity, and to encroach on their
enjoyment.

£jOn all these deeply-important measures, the opposite opinion prevails, if not
with equal unanimity, with at least a greatly preponderating majority, in the other
and stronger section ; so much so, that no two distinct nations ever entertained
more opposite views of policy than these two sections do on all the important
points to which I have referred^ Nor is it less certain that this unhappy con
flict, flowing directly from the tariff, has extended itself to the halls of legislation,
and has converted the deliberations of Congress into an annual struggle between
the two sections ; the stronger to maintain and increase the superiority it has
already acquired, and the other to throw off' or diminish its burdens : a struggle
in which all the noble arid generous feelings of patriotism are gradually subsi
ding into sectional and selfish attachments.* Nor has the effect of this danger
ous conflict ended here. It has not only divided the two sections on the im
portant point already stated, but on the deeper and more dangerous questions,
the constitutionality of a protective tariff, and the general principles and theory
of the Constitution itself : the stronger, in order to maintain their superiority,
giving a construction to the instrument which the other believes would convert
the General Government into a consolidated, irresponsible government, with
the total destruction of liberty ; and the weaker, seeing no hope of relief with
such assumption of powers, turning its eye to the reserved sovereignty of the
states, as the only refuge from oppression. I shall not extend these remarks,
as I might, by showing that, while the effect of the system of protection was
rapidly alienating one section, it was not less rapidly, by its necessary opera
tion, distracting and corrupting the other ; and, between the two, subjecting the
administration to violent and sudden changes, totally inconsistent with all sta
bility and wisdom in the management of the affairs of the nation, of which we
already see fearful symptoms. Nor do I deem it necessary to inquire whether
this unhappy conflict grows out of true or mistaken views of interest on either
or both sides. Regarded in either- light, it ought to admonish us of the extreme
danger to which our system is exposed, and the great moderation and wisdom
necessary to preserve it. If it comes from mistaken views — if the interests of
the two sections, as affected by the tariff, be really the same, and the system, in
stead of acting unequally, in reality diffuses equal blessings, and imposes equal
burdens on every part — it ought to teach us how liable those who are differently
situated, and who view their interests under different aspects, are to come to
different conclusions, even when their interests are strictly the same ; and, con
sequently, with what extreme caution any system of policy ought to be adopted,
and with what a spirit of moderation pursued, in a country of such great extent
and diversity as ours. |J3ut if, on the contrary, the conflict springs really from
contrariety of interests — if the burden be on one side and the benefit on the
other — then are we taught a lesson not less important, how little regard we
have for the interests of others while in pursuit of our own ; or, at least, how
apt we are to consider our own interest the interest of all others ; and, of
course, how great the danger, in a country of such acknowledged diversity of
interests, of the oppression of the feebler by the^ronger interest, and, in con
sequence of it, of the most fatal sectional conflicts^ But whichever may be the
cause, the real or supposed diversity of interest, it cannot be doubted that the
political consequences of the prohibitory system, be its effects in other respects
beneficial or otherwise, are really si»ch as I have stated ; nor can it be doubted
that a conflict between the great sections, on questions so vitally important, in
dicates a condition of the country so distempered and dangerous, as to demand

* The system, if continued, must end, not only in subjecting the industry and property of the
weaker section to the control of the stronger, but in proscription and political "disfranchisement. It.
must finally control elections and appointments to office*, as well as acts of legislation, to the great
increase oAhe feelings of animosity, and of the fatal tendency to a complete alienation between the
sections. '- '• .

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 37

the most serious and prompt attention. It is only when we come to consider
of the remedy, that, under the aspect I am viewing the subject, there can be,
among the informed and considerate, any diversity of opinion.

Those who have not duly reflected on its dangerous and inveterate character,
suppose that the disease will cure itself; that events ought to be left to take
their own course ; and that experience, in a short time, will prove that the in
terest of the whole community is the same in reference to the tariff, or, at least,
whatever diversity there may now be, time will assimilate. Such has been
their language from the beginning, but, unfortunately, the progress of events has
been the reverse. The country is now more divided than in 1824, and then
more than in 1816. The majority may have increased, but the opposite sides
are, beyond dispute, more determined and excited than at any preceding period.
Formerly, the system was resisted mainly as inexpedient ; but now, as uncon
stitutional, unequal, unjust, and oppressive. Then, relief was sought exclusive
ly from the General Government ; but now, many, driven to despair, are raising
their eyes to the reserved sovereignty of the states as the only refuge. If
we turn from the past and present to the future, we shall find nothing to lessen,
but much to aggravate the danger. The increasing embarrassment and distress
of the staple states, the growing conviction, from experience, that they are
caused by the prohibitory system principally, and that, under its continued oper
ation, their present pursuits must become profitless, and with a conviction that
their great and peculiar agricultural capital cannot be diverted from its ancient
and hereditary channels without ruinous losses, all concur to increase, instead
of dispelling, the gloom that hangs over the future. In fact, to those who will
duly reflect on the subject, the hope that the disease will cure itself must ap
pear perfectly illusory. The question is, in reality, one between the exporting
and non-exporting interests of the country. Were there no exports, there would
be no tariff. It would be perfectly useless. On the contrary, so long as there
are states which raise the great agricultural staples with the view of obtaining
their supplies, and which must depend on the general market of the world for
their sales, the conflict must remain if the system should continue, and the dis
ease become more and more inveterate. Their interest, and that of those who,
by high duties, would confine the purchase of their supplies to the home mar
ket, must, from the nature of things, in reference to the tariff, be in conflict.
Till, then, we cease to raise the great staples cotton, rice, and tobacco, for the
general market, and till we can find some other profitable investment for the
immense amount of capital and labour now employed in their production, the
present unhappy and dangerous conflict cannot terminate, unless with the pro
hibitory system itself.

In the mean time, while idly waiting for its termination through its own ac
tion, the progress of events in another quarter is rapidly bringing the contest to
an immediate and decisive issue. We are fast approaching a period very novel
in the history of nations, and bearing directly and powerfully on the point un
der consideration — the final payment of a long-standing funded debt — a period
that cannot be greatly retarded, or its natural consequences eluded, without pro
ving disastrous to those who attempt either, if not to the country itself. When
it arrives, the government will find itself in possession of a surplus revenue of
$10,000,000 or $12,000,000, if not previously disposed of— which presents the
important question, What previous disposition ought to be made ? a question,
which must press urgently for decision at the very next session of Congress.
It cannot be delayed longer without the most distracting and dangerous conse
quences.

Elf he honest and obvious course is, to prevent the accumulation of the surplus
in the treasury by a timely and judicious reduction of the imposts ; and there
by to leave the money in the pockets of those who made it, and from whom it
cannot be honestly nor constitutionally taken, unless required by the fair and

38 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN

legitimate wants of the government. If, neglecting a disposition so obvious
and just, the government should attempt to keep up the present high duties,
when the money is no longer wanted, or to dispose of this immense surplus by
enlarging the old, or devising new schemes of appropriations ; or, finding that
to be impossible, it should adopt the most dangerous, unconstitutional, and ab
surd project ever devised by any government, of dividing the surplus among the
states — a project which, if carried into execution, would not fail to create an an
tagonist interest between the states and General Government on all questions of
appropriations, which would certainly end in reducing the latter to a mere office
of collection and distribution — either of these modes would be considered by the
section suffering under the present high duties as a fixed determination to per
petuate forever what it considers the present unequal, unconstitutional, and op
pressive burden ; and from that moment it would cease to look to the General
Government for reliefjf This deeply-interesting period, which must prove so
disastrous should a wrong direction be given, but so fortunate and glorious,
should a right one, is just at hand. The work must commence at the next ses
sion, as I have stated, or be left undone, or, at least, be badly done. The suc
ceeding session would be too short, and too much agitated by the presidential
contest, to afford the requisite leisure and calmness ; and the one succeeding
would find the country in the midst of the crisis, when it would be too late to
prevent an accumulation of the surplus ; which I hazard nothing in saying,
judging from the nature of men and government, if once permitted to accumu
late, would create an interest strong enough to perpetuate itself, supported, as
it would be, by others so numerous and powerful ; and thus would pass away a
moment, never to be quietly recalled, so precious, if properly used, to lighten
the public burden : to equalize the action of the government ; to restore har
mony and peace ; and to present to the world the illustrious example, which,
could not fail to prove most favourable to the great cause of liberty everywhere,
of a nation the freest, and, at the same time, the best and most cheaply govern
ed ; of the highest earthly blessing at the least possible sacrifice.

As the disease will not, then, heal itself, we are brought to the question, Can
a remedy be applied ? and if so, what ought it to be ?

To answer in the negative would be to assert that our Union has utterly fail
ed ; and that the opinion, so common before the adoption of our Constitution,
that a free government could not be practically extended over a large country,
was correct ; and that ours had been destroyed by giving it limits so great as to
comprehend, not only dissimilar, but irreconcilable interests. I am not prepared
to admit a conclusion that would cast so deep a shade on the future, and that
would falsify all the glorious anticipations of our ancestors, while it would so
greatly lessen their high reputation for wisdom. Nothing but the clearest dem
onstration, founded on actual' experience, will ever force me to a conclusion
so abhorrent to all my feelings. As strongly as I am impressed with the great
dissimilarity, and, as I must add, as truth compels me to do, contrariety of inter
ests in our country, resulting from the causes already indicated, and which are
so great that they cannot be subjected to the unchecked will of a majority of
the whole without defeating the great end of government, and without which it
is a curse — justice — yet I see in the Union, as ordained by the Constitution, the
means, if wisely used, not only of reconciling all diversities, but also the means,
and the only effectual one, of securing to us justice, peace, and security, at home
and abroad, and with them that national power and renown, the love of which
Providence has implanted, for wise purposes, so deeply in the human heart : in
all of which great objects, every portion of our country, widely extended and di-
Tersilied as it is, has a common and identical interest.? |J f we have the wisdom
to place a proper relative estimate on these more elevated and durable blessings,
the present and every other conflict of like character may be readily terminated ;
but if, reversing the scale, each section should put a higher estimate on its im-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUK. 39

mediate and peculiar gains, and, acting in that spirit, should push favourite meas
ures of mere policy, without some regard to peace, harmony, or justice, our
sectional conflicts would then, indeed, without some constitutional check, become
interminable, except by the dissolution of the Union i-tselfTT-JThat we have, in
fact, so reversed the estimate, is too certain to be doubted, and the result is our
present distempered and dangerous condition. The cure must commence in
the correction of the error ; and not to admit that we have erred would be the
worst possible symptom. It would prove the disease to be incurable, through
the regular and ordinary process of legislation ; and would compel, finally, a re
sort to extraordinary, but I still trust, not only constitutional, but safe remedies.

No one would more sincerely rejoice than myself to see the remedy applied
from the quarter where it could be most easily and regularly done. It is the
only way by which those who think that it is the only quarter from which it
can constitutionally come, can possibly sustain their opinion. To omit the ap
plication by the General Government would compel even them to admit the
truth of the opposite opinion, or force them to abandon our political system in
despair ; while, on the other hand, all their enlightened and patriotic opponents
would rejoice at such evidence of moderation and wisdom, on the part of the
General Government, as would supersede a resort to what they believe to be
the higher powers of our political system, as indicating a sounder state of pub
lic sentiment than has ever heretofore existed in any country, and thus afford
ing the highest possible assurance of the perpetuation of our glorious institu
tions to the latest generation. For, as a people advance in knowledge, in the
same degree they may dispense with mere artificial restrictions in their gov
ernment ; and we may imagine (but dare not expect to see it) a state of intelli
gence so universal and high, that all the guards of liberty may be dispensed with
except an enlightened public opinion, acting through the right of suffrage ; but
it presupposes a state where every class and every section of the community
are capable of estimating the effects of every measure, not only as it may af
fect itself, but every other class and section; and of fully realizing the sub
lime truth that the highest and wisest policy consists in maintaining justice, and
promoting peace and harmony L-snd that, compared to these, schemes of mere
gain are but trash and dross. £J fear experience has already proved that we
are far removed from such a state, and that we must, consequently, rely on the
old and clumsy, but approved mode of checking power, in order to prevent or
correct abuses ; but I do trust that, though far from perfect, we are, at least, so
much so as to be capable of remedying the present disorder in the ordinary
way ; and thus to prove that with us public opinion is so enlightened, and our
political machine so perfect, as rarely to require for its preservation the inter
vention of the power that created itTf How is that to be effected ?

The application may be painful, but the remedy, I conceive, is certain and
simple. £There is but one effectual cure — an honest reduction of the duties to
a fair system of revenue, adapted to the just and constitutional wants of the
government. Nothing short of this will restore the country to peace, harmony, / /
and mutual affection, j There is already a deep and growing conviction, in a
large section of the country, that the impost, even as a revenue system, is ex
tremely unequal, and that it is mainly paid by those who furnish the means of
paying the foreign exchanges of the country on which it is laid ; and that the
case would not be varied, taking into the estimate the entire action of the sys
tem, whether the producer or consumer pays in the first instance.

I do not propose to enter formally into the discussion of a point so complex
and contested ; but, as it has necessarily a strong practical bearing on the sub
ject under consideration in all its relations, I cannot pass it without a few gen
eral and brief remarks :

If the producer in reality pays, none will doubt but the burden would mainly
fall on the section it is supposed to do. The theory that the consumer pays ia

40 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

the first instance renders the proposition more complex, and will require, in
order to understand where the burden, in reality, ultimately falls, on that sup
position, to consider the protective, or, as its friends call it, the American Sys
tem, under its threefold aspect of taxation, of protection, and of distribution, or
as performing, at the same time, the several functions of giving a revenue to the
government, of affording protection to certain branches of domestic industry, and
furnishing means to Congress of distributing large sums through its appropria
tions : all of which are so blended in their effects, that it is impossible to un
derstand its true operation without taking the whole into the estimate.

Admitting, then, as supposed, that he who consumes the article pays the tax
in the increased price, and that the burden falls wholly on the consumers, with
out affecting the producers as a class (which, by-the-by, is far from being
true, except in the single case, if there be such a one, where the producers have
a monopoly of an article so indispensable to life that the quantity consumed
cannot be affected by any increase of price), and that, considered in the light
of a tax merely, the impost duties fall equally on every section in proportion
to its population, still, when combined with its other effects, the burden it im
poses as a tax may be so transferred from one section to the other as to take
it from one and place it wholly on the other. Let us apply the remark first to
its operation as a system of protection :

The tendency of the tax or duty on the imported article is not only to
raise its price, but also, in the same proportion, that of the domestic article of
the same kind, for which purpose, when intended for protection, it is, in fact,
laid ; and, of course, in determining where the system ultimately places the
burden in reality, this effect, also, must be taken into the estimate. If one of
the sections exclusively produces such domestic articles, and the other pur
chases them from it, then it is clear that, to the amount 'of such increased pri
ces, the tax or duty on the consumption of foreign articles would be transferred
from the section producing the domestic articles to the one that purchased and
consumed them, unless the latter, in turn, be indemnified by the increased price
of the objects of its industry, which none will venture to assert to be the case
with the great staples of the country, which form the basis of our exports, the
price of which is regulated by the foreign, and not the domestic market. To
those who grow them, the increased price of the foreign and domestic articles
both, in consequence of the duty on the former, is in reality, arid in the strictest
sense, a tax, while it is clear that the increased price of the latter acts as a
bounty to the section producing them ; and that, as the amount of such increased
prices on what it sells to the other section is greater or less than the duty it
pays on the imported articles, the system will, in fact, operate as a bounty or
tax : if greater, the difference would be a bounty ; if less, a tax.

Again, the operation may be equal in every other respect, and yet the pres
sure of the system, relatively, on the two sections, be rendered very unequal by
the appropriations or distribution. If each section receives back what it paid
into the treasury, the equality, if it previously existed, will continue ; but if one
receives back less, and the other proportionably more than is paid, then the dif
ference in relation to the sections will be to the former a loss, and to the latter
a gain ; and the system, in this aspect, would operate to the amount of the differ
ence, as a contribution from the one receiving less than it paid to the other that
receives more. Such would be incontestably its general effects, taken in all its
different aspects, even on the theory supposed to be most favourable to prove
the equal action of the system, that the consumer pays in the first instance the
Avhole amount of the tax.

To show how, on this supposition, the burden and advantages of the system
would actually distribute themselves between the sections, would carry me too
far into details ; but I feel assured, after full and careful examination, that they
are such as to explain what otherwise would seem inexplicable, that one sec-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 41

tion should consider its repeal a calamity and the other a blessing ; and that
such opposite views should be taken by them as to place them in a state of de
termined conflict in relation to the great fiscal and commercial interests of the
country. Indeed, were there no satisfactory explanation, the opposite views
that prevail in the two sections, as to the effects of the system, ought to satis
fy all of its unequal action. There can be no safer, or more certain rule, than
to suppose each portion of the country equally capable of understanding its
respective interests, and that each is a much better judge of the effects of any
system or measures on its peculiar interest than the other can possibly be.
fjjut, whether the opinion of its unequal action be correct or erroneous, no
thing can be more certain than that the impression is widely extending itself,
that the system, under all its modifications, is essentially unequal ; and if to
that be added a conviction still deeper and more universal, that every duty im
posed for the purpose of protection is not only unequal, but also unconstitutional ,
it would be a fatal error to suppose that any remedy, short of that which I have
stated, can heal our political disorders^

In order to understand more fully the difficulty of adjusting this unhappy con
test on any other ground, it may not be improper to present a general view of
the constitutional objection, that it may be clearly seen how hopeless it is to
expect that it can be yielded by those who have embraced it.

frhey believe that all the powers vested by the Constitution in Congress are
not only restricted by the limitations expressly imposed, but also by the nature
and object of the powers themselves. Thus, though the power to impose du
ties on imports be granted in general terms, without any other express limita
tions but that they shall be equal, and no preference shall be given to the ports
of one state over those of another, yet, as being a portion of the taxing power
given with the view of raising revenue, it is, from its nature, restricted to that
object, as much so as if the Convention had expressly so limited it ; and that to
use it to effect any other purpose not specified in the Constitution, is an infrac
tion of the instrument in its most dangerous form — an infraction by perversions
more easily made, and more difficult to resist, than any other"7 The same view
is believed to be applicable to the power of regulating commerce, as well as all
the other powers. To surrender this important principle, it is conceived, would
be to surrender all power, and t6 render the government unlimited and despotic ;
and to yield it up, in relation to the particular power in question, would be, in.
fact, to surrender the control of the whole industry and capital of the country to
the General Government, and would end in placing the weaker section in a
colonial relation with the stronger. For nothing are more dissimilar in their
nature, or may be more unequally affected by the same laws, than different de
scriptions of labour and property; and if taxes, by increasing the amount and
changing the intent only, may be perverted, in fact, into a system of penalties
and rewards, it would give all the power that could be desired to subject the
labour and property of the minority to the will of the majority, to be regulated
without regarding the interest of the former in subserviency to the will of the
latter. Thus thinking, it would seem unreasonable to expect that any adjust
ment, based on the recognition of the correctness of a construction of the Con
stitution which would admit the exercise of such a power, would satisfy the
weaker of two sections, particularly with its peculiar industry and property,
which experience has shown may be so injuriously affected by its exercise.
Thus much for one side.

The just claim of the other ought to be equally respected. Whatever excite
ment the system has justly caused in certain portions of our country, I hope
and believe all will conceive that the change should be made with the least. pos
sible detriment to the interests of those who may be liable to be affected by it,
consistently with what is justly due to others, and the principles of the Consti
tution. To effect this will require the kindest spirit of conciliation and the ut-

F

42 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

most skill ; but, even with these, it will be impossible to make the transition
without a shock, greater or less, though I trust, if judiciously effected, it will
not be without many compensating advantages. That there will be some such
cannot be doubted. It will, at least, be followed by greater stability, and will
tend to harmonize the manufacturing with all of the other great interests of the
country, and bind the whole in mutual affection. But these are not all. Another
advantage of essential importance to the ultimate prosperity of our manufactu
ring industry will follow. It will cheapen production ; and, in that view, the loss
of any one branch will be nothing like in proportion to the reduction of duty on
that particular branch. Every reduction will, in fact, operate as a bounty to
every other branch except the one reduced ; and thus the effect of a general re
duction will be to cheapen, universally, the price of production, by cheapening
living, wages, and materials, so as to give, if not equal profits after the reduc
tion — profits by no means reduced proportionally to the duties — an effect which,
as it regards the foreign markets, is of the utmost importance. It must be ap
parent, on reflection, that the means adopted to secure the home market for our
manufactures are precisely the opposite of those necessary to obtain the for
eign. In the former, the increased expense of production, in consequence of a
system of protection, may be more than compensated by the increased price at
home of the article protected ; but in the latter, this advantage is lost ; and, as
there is no other corresponding compensation, the increased cost of production
must be a dead loss in the foreign market. But whether these advantages, and
many others that might be mentioned, will ultimately compensate to the full ex
tent or not the loss to the manufacturers, on the reduction of the duties, certain
it is, that we have approached a point at which a great change cannot be much
longer delayed ; and that the more promptly it may be met, the less excitement
there will be, and the greater leisure and calmness for a cautious and skilful
operation in making the transition ; and which it becomes those more immedi
ately interested duly to consider. £&or ought they to overlook, in considering
the question, the different character of the claims of the two sides. The one
asks from government no advantage, but simply to be let alone in the undis
turbed possession of their natural advantages, and to secure which, as far as was
consistent with the other objects of the Constitution, was one of their leading
motives in entering into the Union ; while the other side claims, for the advance
ment of their prosperity, the positive interference of the government. In such
cases, on every principle of fairness and justice, such interference ought to be
restrained within limits strictly compatible with the natural advantages of the
other. He who looks to all of the causes in operation, the near approach of
the final payment of the public debt, the growing disaffection and resistance to
the system in so large a section of the country, the deeper principles on which
opposition to it is gradually turning, must be, indeed, infatuated not to see a
great change is unavoidable ; and that the attempt to elude or much longer delay
it must finally but increase the shock and disastrous consequences which may
follovAT.f

In forming the opinions I have expressed, I have not been actuated by an un
kind feeling towards our manufacturing interests. I now am, and ever have been,
decidedly friendly to them, though I cannot concur in all the measures which
have been adopted to advance them. I believe considerations higher than any
question of mere pecuniary interest forbade their use. But subordinate to these
higher views of policy, I regard the advancement of mechanical and chemical
improvements in the arts with feelings little short of enthusiasm ; not only as
the prolific source of national and individual wealth, but as the great means of
enlarging the domain of man over the material world, and thereby of laying the
solid foundation of a highly-improved condition of society, morally and politi
cally. I fear not that we shall extend our power too far over the great agents
of nature ; but, on the contrary, I consider such enlargement of our power as

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 43

tending more certainly and powerfully to better the condition of our race than
any one of the many powerful causes now operating to that result. With these
impressions, I not only rejoice at the general progress of the arts in the world,
but in their advancement in our own country ; and as far as protection may be
incidentally afforded, in the fair and honest exercise of our constitutional
powers, I think now, as I have always thought, that sound policy, connected
with the security, independence, and peace of the country, requires it should be
done, but that we cannot go a single step beyond without jeopardizing our peace,
our harmony, and our liberty — considerations of infinitely more importance to us
than any measure of mere policy can possibly be.

In thus placing my opinions before the public, I have not been actuated by
the expectation of changing the public sentiment. Such a motive, on a ques
tion so long agitated, and so beset with feelings of prejudice and interest, would
argue, on my part, an insufferable vanity, and a profound ignorance of the
human heart. To avoid as far as possible the imputation of either, I have con
fined my statement, on the many and important points on which I have been
compelled to touch, to a simple declaration of my opinion, without advancing
any other reasons to sustain them than what appeared to me to be indispensa
ble to the full understanding of my views ; and if they should, on any point, be
thought to be not clearly and explicitly developed, it will, I trust, be attributed
to my solicitude to avoid the imputations to which I have alluded, and not from
any desire to disguise my sentiments, nor the want of arguments and illustra
tions to maintain positions, which so abound in both, that it would require a
volume to do them anything like justice. I can only hope that truths which, I
feel assured, are essentially connected with all that we ought to hold most dear,
may not be weakened in the public estimation by the imperfect manner in
which I have been, by the object in view, compelled to present them.

With every caution on my part, I dare not hope, in taking the step I have, to
escape the imputation of improper motives ; though I have, without reserve,
freely expressed my opinions, not regarding whether they might or might not
be popular. I have no reason to believe that they are such as will conciliate
public favour, but the opposite, which I greatly regret, as I have ever placed a
high estimate on the good opinion of my fellow-citizens. But, be that as it
may, I shall, at least, be sustained by feelings of conscious rectitude. I have
formed my opinions after the most careful and deliberate examination, with all
the aids which my reason and experience could furnish; I have expressed
them honestly and fearlessly, regardless of their effects personally, which,
however interesting to me individually, are of too little importance to be taken
into the estimate, where the liberty and happiness of our country are so vitally
involved. JOHN C. CALHOUN.

Fort Hill, July 2ft/t, 1831.

IV.

• MR. CALHOUN'S LETTER TO GENERAL HAMILTON ON THE SUBJECT OF STATE

INTERPOSITION.

*

FORT HILL, August 28th, 1832,

MY DEAR SIR — I have received your note of the 31st July, requesting me
to give you a fuller development of my views than that, contained in my ad
dress last summer, on the right of a state to defend her reserved powers against
the encroachments of the General Government.

As fully occupied as my time is, were it doubly so, the quarter from which
the request comes, with my deep conviction of the vital importance of the sub
ject, would exact a compliance.

44 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

No one can be more sensible than I am that the address of last summer fell
far short of exhausting the subject. It was, in fact, intended as a simple state
ment of my views. 1 felt that the independence and candour which ought to
distinguish one occupying a high public station, imposed a duty on me to meet
the call for my opinion by a frank and full avowal of my sentiments, regardless
of consequences. To fulfil this duty, and not to discuss the subject, was the
object of the address. But, in making these preliminary remarks, I do not in
tend to prepare you to expect a full discussion on the present occasion. What
I propose is, to touch some of the more prominent points that have received less
of the public attention than their importance seems to me to demand.
. Strange as the assertion may appear, it is, nevertheless, true, that the great
difficulty in determining whether a state has the right to defend her reserved
powers against the General Government, or, in fact, any right at all beyond
those of a mere corporation, is to bring the public mind to realize plain histor
ical facts connected with the origin and formation of the government. Till
they are fully understood, it is impossible that a correct and just view can be
taken of the subject. In this connexion, the first and most important point is
to ascertain distinctly who are the real authors of the Constitution of the Uni
ted States — whose powers created it — whose voice clothed it with authority;
and whose agent the government it formed in reality is. At this point, I com
mence the execution of the task which your request has imposed.

The formation and adoption of the Constitution are events so recent, and all
the connected facts so fully attested, that it would seem impossible that there
should be the least uncertainty in relation to them ; and yet, judging by what is
constantly heard and seen, there are few subjects on which the public opinion
is more confused. The most indefinite expressions are habitually used in speak
ing of them. Sometimes it is said that the Constitution was made by the
states, and at others, as if in contradistinction, by the people, without distin
guishing between the two very different meanings which may be attached to
those general expressions ; and this, not in ordinary conversation, but in grave
discussions before deliberative bodies, and in judicial investigations, where the
greatest accuracy on so important a point might be expected ; particularly as
one or the other meaning is intended, conclusions the most opposite must fol
low, not only in reference to the subject of this communication, but as to the
nature and character of our political system. By a state may be meant either
the government of a state or the people, as forming a separate and independent
community ; and by the people, either the American people taken collectively,
as forming one great community, or as the people of the several states, forming,
as above stated, separate and independent communities. These distinctions
are essential in the inquiry. If by the people be meant the people collective
ly, and not the people of the several states taken separately ; and if it be true,
Indeed, that the Constitution is the work of the American people collectively ;
if it originated with them, and derives its authority from their will, then there
is an end of the argument. The right claimed for a state of defending her re
served powers against the General Government would be an absurdity. View
ing the American people collectively as the source of political power, the rights
of the states would be mere concessions — concessions from the common major
ity, and to be revoked by them with the same facility that they were granted.
The states would, on this supposition, bear to the Union the same relation that
counties do to the states ; and it would, in that case, be just as preposterous to
discuss the right of interposition, on the part of a state, against the General
Government, as that of the counties against the states themselves. That a
large portion of the people of the United States thus regard the relation between
the state and the General Government,, including many who call themselves
the friends of State-rights and opponents of consolidation, can scarcely be doubt
ed, as it is only on that supposition it can be explained that so many of that

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CA.LHOUN. 45

description should denounce the doctrine for which the state contends as so
absurd. But, fortunately, the supposition is entirely destitute of truth. So far
from the Constitution being the work of the American people collectively, no
such political body either now, or ever did. exist. In that character the people
of this country never performed a single political act, nor, indeed, can, without
an entire revolution in all our political relations.

I challenge an instance. From the beginning, and in all the changes of po
litical existence through which we have passed, the people of the United
States have been united as forming political communities, and not as individ
uals. Even in the first stage of existence, they formed distinct colonies, inde
pendent of each other, and politically united only through the British crown.
In their first imperfect union, for the purpose of resisting the encroachments of
the mother-country, they united as distinct political communities ; and, passing
from their colonial condition, in the act announcing their independence to the
world, they declared themselves, by name and enumeration, free and inde
pendent states. In that character, they formed the old confederation ; and, when
it was proposed to supersede the articles of the confederation by the present
Constitution, they met in convention as states, acted and voted as states ; and
the Constitution, when formed, was submitted for ratification to the people of
the several states : it was ratified by them as states, each state for itself ; each
by its ratification binding its own citizens ; the parts thus separately binding
themselves, and not the whole the parts ; to which, if it be added, that it is de
clared in the preamble of the Constitution to be ordained by the people of the
United States, and in the article of ratification, when ratified, it is declared " to
be binding between the states so .ratifying" The conclusion is inevitable, that
the Constitution is the work of the people of the states, considered as separate
and independent political communities ; that they are its authors — their power
created it, their voice clothed it with authority — that the government formed is,
in reality, their agent ; arid that the Union, of which the Constitution is the
bond, is a union of states, and not of individuals. No one, who regards his
character for intelligence and truth, has ever ventured directly to deny facts so
certain ; but while they are too certain for denial, they are also too conclusive
in favour of the rights of the states for admission. The usual course has been
adopted — to elude what can neither be denied nor admitted ; and never has the
device been more successfully practised. By confounding states with state
governments, and the people of the states with the American people collective
ly — things, as it regards the subject of this communication, totally dissimilar,
as much so as a triangle and a square — facts of themselves perfectly certain and
plain, and which, when well understood, must lead to a correct conception of
the subject, have been involved in obscurity and mystery.

I will next proceed to state some of the results which necessarily follow
from the facts which have been established.

(The first, and, in reference to the subject of this communication, the most im
portant, is, that there is no direct and immediate connexion between the indi
vidual citizens of a state and the General Government. The relation between
them is through the state. The Union is a union of states as commtmities,
and not a union of individualsTj As members of a state, her citizens were
originally subject to no control but that of the state, and could be subject to
no other, except by the act of the state itself. The Constitution was, accord
ingly, submitted to the states for their separate ratification ; and it was only by
the ratification of the state that its citizens became subject to the control of the
General Government. The ratification of any other, or all the other states,
without its own, could create no connexion between them and the General
Government, nor impose on them the slightest obligation. Without the ratifi
cation of their own state, they would stand in the same relation to the General
Government as do tke citizens or subjects of any foreign state ; and we find the

46 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

citizens of North Carolina and Rhode Island actually bearing that relation ta
the government for some time after it went into operation ; these states having,
in the first instance, declined to ratify. Nor had the act of any individual the.
least influence in subjecting him to the control of the General Government, ex
cept as it might influence the ratification of the Constitution by his own state.
Whether subject to its control or not, depended wholly on the act of the state.
His dissent had not the least weight against the assent of his state, nor his as
sent against its dissent. It follows, as a necessary consequence, that the act
of ratification bound the state as a community, as is expressly declared in the
article of the Constitution above quoted, and not the citizens of the state as in
dividuals : the latter being bound through their state, and in consequence of the
ratification of the former. Another, and a highly important consequence, as it
regards the subject under investigation, follows with equal certainty : that, on a
question whether a particular power exercised by the General Government be
granted by the Constitution, it belongs to the state as a member of the Union,
in her sovereign capacity in convention, to determine definitively, as far as her
citizens are concerned, the extent of the obligation which she contracted ; and
if. in her opinion, the act exercising the power be unconstitutional, to declare it
null and void, which declaration would be obligatory on her citizens. In coming'
to this conclusion, it may be proper to remark, to prevent misrepresentation,
that I do not claim for a state the right to abrogate an act of the General Gov
ernment. It is the Constitution that annuls an unconstitutional act. Such an
act is of itself void and of no effect. What I claim is, the right of the state,
as Jar as its citizens are concerned, to declare the extent of the obligation, and
that such declaration is binding on them — a right, when limited to its citizens,
flowing directly from the relation of the state to the General Government on the
one side, and its citizens on the other, as already explained, and resting on
the most plain and solid reasons.

Passing over, what of itself might be considered conclusive, the obvious prin
ciple, that it belongs to the authority which imposed the obligation to declare
its extent, as far as those are concerned on whom the obligation is placed, I
shall present a single argument, which of itself is decisive. I have already
shown that there is no immediate connexion between the citizens of a state
and the General Government, and that the relation between them is through the
state. I have also shown that, whatever obligations were imposed on the cit
izens, were imposed by the act of the state ratifying the Constitution. A sim
ilar act by the same authority, made with equal solemnity, declaring the extent
of the obligation, must, as far as they are concerned, be of equal authority. I
speak, of course, on the supposition that the right has not been transferred, as
it will hereafter be shown that it has not. A citizen would have no more right
to question the one than he would have the other declaration. They rest on
the same authority ; and as he was bound by the declaration of his state as
senting to the Constitution, whether he assented or dissented, so would he be
equally bound by a declaration declaring the extent of that assent, whether'op-
posed to, or in favour of, such declaration. In this conclusion I am supported
by analogy. The case of a treaty between sovereigns is strictly analogous.
There, as in this case, the state contracts for the citizen or subject : there, as
in this, the obligation is imposed by the state, and is independent of his will ;
and there, as in this, the declaration of the state, determining the extent of
the obligation contracted, is obligatory on him, as much so as the treaty itself.

Having now, I trust, established the very important point, that the declara
tion of a state, as to the extent of the power granted, is obligatory on its citi
zens, I shall next proceed to consider the effects of such declarations in refer
ence to the General Government: a question which necessarily involves the
consideration of the relation between it and the states. It has been shown that
the people of the states, acting as distinct and independent Communities, are the

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 47

authors of the Constitution, and that the General Government was organized
and ordained by them to execute its powers. The government, then, with all
its departments, is, in fact, the agent of the states, constituted to execute their
joint will, as expressed in the Constitution.

In using the term agent, I do not intend to derogate in any degree from its
character as a government. It is as truly and properly a government as are
the state governments themselves. I have applied it simply because it strictly
belongs to the relation between the General Government and the states, as, in
fact, it does also to that between a state and its own government. Indeed, ac
cording to our theory, governments are in their nature but trusts, and those ap
pointed to administer them trustees or agents to execute the trust powers.
The sovereignty resides elsewhere — in the people, not in the government ; and
with us, the people mean the people of the several states originally formed into
thirteen distinct and independent communities, and now into twenty-four. Po
litically speaking, in reference to our own system, there are no other people,
The General Government, as well as those of the states, is but the organ of
their power: the latter, that of their respective states, through which are exer
cised separately that portion of power not delegated by the Constitution, and in
the exercise of which each state has a local and peculiar interest ; the former,
the joint organ of all the states confederated into one general community, and
through which they jpintly and concurringly exercise the delegated powers, in
which all have a common interest. Thus viewed, the Constitution of the Uni
ted States, with the government it created, is truly and strictly the Constitution
of each state, as much so as its own particular Constitution and government,
ratified by the same authority, in the same mode, and having, as far as its citi
zens are concerned, its powers and obligations from the same source, differing
only in the aspect, under which I am considering the subject, in the plighted
faith of the state to its co-states, and of which, as far as its citizens are con
sidered, the state, in the last resort, is the exclusive judge.

Such, then, is the relation "between the state and General Government, in
whatever light we may consider the Constitution, whether as a compact be
tween the states, or of the nature of the legislative enactment by the joint and
concurring authority of the states in their high sovereignty. In whatever light
it may be viewed, I hold it as necessarily resulting, that, in the case of a power
disputed between them, the government, as the agent, has no right to enforce
its construction against the construction of the state as one of the sovereign
parties to the Constitution, any more than the state government would have
agaiivst the people of the state in their sovereign capacity, the relation being
the same between them. That such would be the case between agent and
principal in the ordinary transactions of life, no one will doubt, nor will it be
possible to assign a reason why it is not as applicable to the case of gov
ernment as -to that of individuals. The principle, in fact, springs from the re
lation itself, and is applicable to it in all its forms and characters. It may, how
ever/ be proper to notice a distinction between the case of a single principal
and his agent, and that of several principals and their joint agent, which might
otherwise cause some confusion. In both cases, as between the agent and a
principal, the construction of the principal, whether he be a single principal or
one of several, is equally conclusive ; but. in the latter case, both the principal
and the agent bear relation to the other principals, which must be taken into
the estimate, in order to understand fully all the results which may grow out of
the contest for power between them. Though the construction of the principal
is conclusive against the joint agent, as between them, such is not the case be
tween him and his associates. They both have an equal right of construction,
and it would be the duty of the agent to bring the subject before the principal
to be adjusted, according to the terms of the instrument of association, and of
the principal to submit to such adjustment. In such cases the contract itself

48 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

is the law, which must determine the relative rights and powers of the parties
to it. The General Government is a case of joint agency — the joint agent of
the twenty-four sovereign states. It would be its duty, according to the prin
ciples established in such cases, instead of attempting to enforce its construc
tion of its powers against that of the states, to bring the subject before the states
themselves, in the only form which, according to the provision of the Constitu
tion, it can be — by a proposition to amend, in the manner prescribed in the in
strument, to be acted on by them in the only mode they can, by expressly grant
ing or withholding the contested power. Against this conclusion there can be
raised but one objection, that the states have surrendered or transferred the
right in question. If such be the fact, there ought to be no difficulty in estab
lishing it. The grant of the powers delegated is contained in a written instru
ment, drawn up with great care, and adopted with the utmost deliberation. It
provides that the powers not granted are reserved to the states and the people.
If it be surrendered, let the grant be shown, and the controversy will be ter
minated ; and, surely, it ought to be shown, plainly and clearly shown, before
the states are asked to admit what, if true, would not only divest them of a right
which, under all its forms, belongs to the principal over his agent, unless surren
dered, but which cannot be surrendered without in effect, and for all practical
purposes, reversing the relation between them ; putting the agent in the place
of the principal, and the principal in that of the agent ; and which would de
grade the states from the high and sovereign condition which they have ever
held, under every form of their existence, to be mere subordinate and dependant
corporations of the government of its own creation. But, instead of showing
any such grant, not a provision can be found in the Constitution authorizing the
General Government to exercise any control whatever over a state by force, by
veto, by judicial process, or in any other form — a most important omission, de
signed, and not accidental, and, as will be shown in the course of these remarks,
omitted by the dictates of the profoundest wisdom.

The journal and proceedings of the Convention which formed the Constitu
tion afford abundant proof that there was in the body a powerful party, distin
guished for talents and influence, intent on obtaining for the General Govern
ment a grant of the very power in question, and that they attempted to effect
this object in all possible ways, but, fortunately, without success. The first
project of a Constitution submitted to the Convention (Governor Randolph's)
embraced a proposition to grant power " to negative all laws contrary, in the opin
ion of the National Legislature, to the articles of the Union, or any treaty sub
sisting under the authority of the Union ; and to call forth the force of the Union
against any member of the Union failing to fulfil his duty under the articles
thereof." The next project submitted (Charles Pinckriey's) contained a simi
lar provision. It proposed, " that the Legislature of the United States should
have the power to revise the laws of the several states that may be supposed
to infringe the powers exclusively delegated by this Constitution to Congress,
and to negative and annul such as do." The next was submitted by Mr. Pat-
erson, of New-Jersey, which provided, " if any state, or body of men in any
state, shall oppose or prevent the carrying into execution such acts or treaties"
(of the Union), " the federal executive shall be authorized to call forth the pow
ers of the confederated states, or so much thereof as shall be necessary to en
force, or compel the obedience to such acts, or observance of such treaties."
General Hamilton's next succeeded, which declared " all laws of the particu- .
lar states contrary to the Constitution or laws of the United States, to be ut
terly void ; and, the better to prevent such laws being passed, the governor or
president of each state shall be appointed by the General Government, and
shall have a negative on the laws about to be passed in the state of which he
is governor or president."

At a subsequent period, a proposition was moved and referred to a committee

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 49

to provide that " the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to all con
troversies between the United States and any individual state ;" and, at a still
later period, it was moved to grant power " to negative all laws passed by the
several states interfering, in the opinion of the Legislature, with the general
harmony arid interest of the Union, provided that two thirds of the members of
«ach house assent to the same," which, after an ineffectual attempt to commit,
was withdrawn.

I do not deem it necessary to trace through the journals of the Convention
the fate of these various propositions. It is sufficient that they were moved
and failed, to prove conclusively, in a manner never to be reversed, that the
Convention which framed the Constitution was opposed to granting the power
to the General Government in any form, through any of its departments, legis
lative, executive, or judicial, to coerce or control a state, though proposed in all
conceivable modes, and sustained by the most talented and influential members
of the body. This, one would suppose, ought to settle forever the question of
the surrender or transfer of the power under consideration ; and such, in fact,
would be the case, were the opinion of a large portion of the community not bi
ased, as, in fact, it is, by interest. A majority have almost always a direct in
terest in enlarging the power of the government, and the interested adhere to
power with a pertinacity which bids defiance to truth, though sustained by evi
dence as conclusive as mathematical demonstration ; and, accordingly, the ad
vocates of the' powers of the General Government, notwithstanding the impreg
nable strength of the proof to the contrary, have boldly claimed, on construc
tion, a power, the grant of which was so perseveringly sought and so sternly
resisted by the Convention. They rest the claim on the provisions in the
Constitution which declare " that this Constitution, and the laws made in pur
suance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land," and that " the judicial
power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this Corfstitu-
tion, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their authority."

I do not propose to go into a minute examination of these provisions. They
have been so frequently and so ably investigated, and it has been so clearly
shown that they do not warrant the assumption of the power claimed for the
government, that I do not deem it necessary. I shall, therefore, confine myself-
to a few detached remarks.

I have already stated that a distinct proposition was made to confer the very
power in controversy on the Supreme Court, which failed ; which of itself
ought to overrule the assumption of the power by construction, unless sustained
by the most conclusive arguments ; but when it is added that this proposition
was moved (20th August) subsequent to the period of adopting the provisions,
above cited, vesting the court with its present powers (18th July), and that an
effort was made, at a still later period (23d August), to invest Congress with a
negative on all state laws which, in its 'Opinion, might interfere with the gen
eral interest and harmony of the Union, the argument would seem too conclu
sive against the powers of the court to be overruled by construction, however
strong.

Passing by, however, this, and also the objection that the terms cases in law
and equity are technical, embracing only questions between parties amenable to
the process of the court, and, of course, excluding questions between the states
and the General Government — an argument which has never been answered —
there remains another objection perfectly conclusive.

The construction which would confer on the Supreme Court the power in
question, rests on the ground that the Constitution has conferred on that tribu
nal the high and important right of deciding on the constitutionality of laws.
That it possesses this power I do not deny, but I do utterly deny that it is confer
red by the Constitution, either by the provisions above cited, or any other. It is a

G

50 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

power derived from the necessity of the case ; and, so far from being possessed
by the Supreme Court exclusively or peculiarly, it not only belongs to every
court of the country, high or low, civil or criminal, but to all foreign courts, be
fore which a case may be brought involving the construction of a law which may-
conflict with the provisions of the Constitution. The reason is plain. Where
there are two sets of rules prescribed in reference to the same subject, one by
a higher and the other by an inferior authority, the judicial tribunal called in
to decide on the case must unavoidably determine, should they conflict, which is
the law ; and that necessity compels it to decide that the rule prescribed by the
inferior power, if in its opinion inconsistent with that of the higher, is void, be it a
conflict between the Constitution and a law, or between a charter and the by-laws
of a corporation, or any other higher and inferior authority. The principle and
source of authority are the same in all such cases. Being derived from neces
sity, it is restricted within its limits, and cannot pass an inch beyond the nar
row confines of deciding in a case before the court, and, of course, between par
ties amenable to its process, excluding thereby political questions, which of the
two is, in reality, the law, the act of Congress or the Constitution, when on
their face they are inconsistent ; and yet, from this resulting limited power, de
rived from necessity, and held in common with every court in the world which,
by possibility, may take cognizance of a case involving the interpretation of our
Constitution and laws, it is attempted to confer on the Supreme Court a power
which would work a thorough and radical change in our system, and which,
moreover, was positively refused by the Convention.

The opinion that the General Government has the right to enforce its con
struction of its powers against a state, in any mode whatever, is, in truth, found
ed on a fundamental misconception of our system. At the bottom of this, and,
in fact, almost every other misconception as to the relation between the states
and the General Government, lurks the radical error, that the latter is a national,
and not, as in reality it is, a confederated government ; and that it derives its
powers from a higher source than the states. There are thousands influenced
by these impressions without being conscious of it, and who, while they believe
themselves to be opposed to consolidation, Have infused into their conception
of our Constitution almost all the ingredients which enter into that form of
government. The striking difference between the present government and that
under the old confederation (I speak of governments as distinct from constitu
tions) has mainly contributed to this dangerous impression. But, however dis
similar their governments, the present Constitution is as far removed from con
solidation, and is as strictly and as purely a confederation, as the one which it su
perseded.

Like the old confederation, it was formed and ratified by state authority. The
only difference in this particular is, that one was ratified by the people of the
states, and the other by the state governments ; one forming strictly a union of
the state governments, the other of the states themselves ; one, of the agents ex
ercising the powers of sovereignt)r, and the other, of the sovereigns themselves ;
but both were unions of political bodies, as distinct from a union of the people
individually. They are, indeed, both confederations, but the present in a higher
and purer sense than that which it succeeded, just as the act of a sovereign
is higher and more perfect than that of his agent ; and it was, doubtless, in ref
erence to this difference that the preamble of the Constitution, and the address
of the Convention laying the Constitution before Congress, speak of consolida
ting and perfecting the Union ; yet this difference, which, while it elevated the
General Government in relation to the state governments, placed it more imme
diately in the relation of the creature and agent of the states themselves, by a
natural misconception, has been the principal cause of the impression so preva
lent of the inferiority of the states to the General Government, and of the con
sequent right of the latter to coerce the former. Raised from below to the same

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 51

level with the state governments, it was conceived to be placed above the states
themselves.

I have now, I trust, conclusively shown that a state has a right, in her sov
ereign capacity, in convention, to declare an unconstitutional act of Congress to
be null and void, and that such declarations would be obligatory on her citizens,
as highly so as the Constitution itself, and conclusive against the General Gov
ernment, which would have no right to enforce its construction of its powers
against that of the state.

I next propose to consider the practical effect of the exercise of this high and
important right — which, as the great conservative principle of our system, is
known under the various names of nullification, interposition, and state veto — in
reference to its operation viewed under different aspects : nullification, as de
claring null an unconstitutional act of the General Government, as far as the
state is concerned ; interposition, as throwing the shield of protection between
the citizens of a state and the encroachments of the Government ; and veto, as
arresting or inhibiting its unauthorized acts within the limits of the state.

The practical effect, if the right was fully recognised, would be plain and
simple, and has already, in a great measure, been anticipated. If the state has
a right, there must, of necessity, be a corresponding obligation on the part of
the General Government to acquiesce in its exercise ; and, of course, it would
be its duty to abandon the power, at least as far as the state is concerned, to
compromise the difficulty, or apply to the states themselves, according to the
form prescribed in the Constitution, to obtain the power by a grant. If granted,
acquiescence, then, would be a duty on the part of the state ; and, in that event,
the contest would terminate in converting a doubtful constructive power into one
positively granted ; but. should it not be granted, no alternative would remain for
the General Government but a compromise or its permanent abandonment. In
either event, the controversy would be closed and the Constitution fixed : a re
sult of the utmost importance to the steady operation of the government and the
stability of the system, and which can never be attained, under its present opera
tion, Avithout the recognition of the right, as experience has sliown.

From the adoption of the Constitution, we have had but one continued agita
tion of constitutional questions embracing some of the most important powers
exercised by the government ; and yet, in spite of all the ability and force of
argument displayed in the various discussions, backed by the high authority
claimed for the Supreme Court to adjust such controversies, not a single con
stitutional question, of a political character, which has ever been agitated during
this long period, has been settled in the public opinion, except that of the un-
constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition Law ; and, what is remarkable, that
was settled against the decision of the Supreme Court. The tendency is to in
crease, and not diminish, this conflict for power. New questions are yearly
added without diminishing the old ; while the contest becomes more obstinate
as the list increases, and, what is highly ominous, more sectional. It is im
possible that the government can last under this increasing diversity of opinion,
and growing uncertainty as to its power in relation to the most important sub
jects of legislation ; and equally so, that this dangerous state can terminate
without a power somewhere to compel, in effect, the government to abandon
doubtful constructive powers, or to convert them into positive grants by an
amendment of the Constitution ; in a word, to substitute the positive grants of
the parties themselves for the constructive powers interpolated by the agents.
Nothing short of this, in a system constructed as ours is, with a double set of
agents, one for local and the other for general purposes, can ever terminate the
conflict for power, or give uniformity and stability to its action.

Such would be the practical and happy operation were the right recognised ;
but the case is far otherwise ; and as the right is not only denied, but violently
opposed, the General Government, so far from acquiescing in its exercise, and

52 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

abandoning the power, as it ought, may endeavour, by all the means within its
command, to enforce its construction against that of the state. It is under this
aspect of the question that I now propose to consider the practical effect of the
exercise of the right, with the view to determine which of the two, the state or
the General Government, must prevail in the conflict ; which compels me to
revert to some of the grounds already established.

I have already shown that the declaration of nullification would be obligatory
on the citizens of the state, as much so, in fact, as its declaration ratifying the
Constitution, resting, as it does, on the same basis. It would to them be the
highest possible evidence that the power contested was not granted, and, of
course, that the act of the General Government was unconstitutional. They
would be bound, in all the relations of life, private and political, to respect and
obey it ; and, when called upon as jurymen, to render their verdict according
ly, or. as judges, to pronounce judgment in conformity to it. The right of jury
trial is secured by the Constitution (thanks to the jealous spirit of liberty,
doubly secured and fortified) ; and, with this inestimable right — inestimable, not
only as an essential portion of the judicial tribunals of the country, but infinitely
more so, considered as a popular, and still more, a local representation, in that
department of the government which, without it, would be the farthest removed
from the control of the people, and a fit instrument to sap the foundation of the
system — with, I repeat, this inestimable right, it would be impossible for the Gen
eral Government, within the limits of the state, to execute, legally, the act nulli
fied, or any other passed with a view to enforce it ; while, on the other hand, the
state would be able to enforce, legally and peaceably, its declaration of nullification.
Sustained by its court and juries, it would calmly and quietly, but successfully,
meet every effort of the General Government to enforce its claim of power.
The result would be inevitable. Before the judicial tribunal of the country, the
state must prevail, unless, indeed, jury trial could be eluded by the refinement
of the court, or by some other device ; which, however, guarded as it is by the
ramparts of the Constitution, would, I hold, be impossible. The attempt to
elude, should it be made, would itself be unconstitutional ; and, in turn, would
be annulled by the sovereign voice of the state. Nor would the right of appeal
to the Supreme Court, under the judiciary act, avail the General Government.
If taken, it would but end in a new trial, and that in another verdict against the
government ; but whether it may be taken, would be optional with the state.
The court itself has decided that a copy of the record is requisite to review a
judgment of a state court, and, if necessary, the state would take the precaution
to prevent, by proper enactments, any means of obtaining a copy. But if ob
tained, what would it avail against the execution of the penal enactments of the
state, intended to enforce the declaration of nullification ? The judgment of
the state court would be pronounced and executed before the possibility of a
reversal, and executed, too, without responsibility incurred by any one.

Beaten before the courts, the General Government would be compelled to
abandon its unconstitutional pretensions, or resort to force : a resort, the diffi
culty (I was about to say, the impossibility) of which would very soon fully
manifest itself, should folly or madness ever make the attempt.

In considering this aspect of the controversy, I pass over the fact that the
General Government has no right to resort to force against a state — to coerce a
sovereign member of the Union — which, I trust, I have established beyond all
possible doubt. Let it, however, be determined to use force, and the difficulty
would be insurmountable, unless, indeed, it be also determined to set aside the
Constitution, and to subvert the system to its foundations.

Against whom would it be applied ? Congress has, it is true, the right to
call forth the militia " to execute the laws and suppress insurrection ;" but
there would be no law resisted, unless, indeed, it be called resistance for the
juries to refuse to find, and the courts to render judgment, in conformity to the

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 53

wishes of the General Government ; no insurrection to suppress ; no armed
force to reduce ; not a sword unsheathed ; not a bayonet raised ; none, absolute
ly none, on whom force could be used, except it be on the unarmed citizens en
gaged peaceably and quietly in their daily occupations.

No one would be guilty of treason (" levying war against the United States,
adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort"), or any other crime
made penal by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

To suppose that force could be called in, implies, indeed, a great mistake,
both as to the nature of our government and that of the controversy. It would
be a legal and constitutional contest — a conflict of moral, and not physical force —
a trial of constitutional, not military power, to be decided before the judicial
tribunals of the country, and not on the field of battle. In such contest, there
would be no object for force, but those peaceful tribunals — nothing on which it
could be employed, but in putting down courts and juries, and preventing the
execution of judicial process. Leave these untouched, and all the militia that
could be called forth, backed by a regular force of ten times the number of our
small, but gallant and patriotic army, could have not the slightest effect on the
result of the controversy ; but subvert these by an armed body, and you subvert
the very foundation of this our free, constitutional, and legal system of govern
ment, and rear in its place a military despotism.

Feeling the force of these difficulties, it is proposed, with the view, I suppose,
of disembarrassing the operation, as much as possible, of the troublesome inter
ference of courts and juries, to change the scene of coercion from land to water ;
as if the government could have one particle more right to coerce a state by
water than by land ; but, unless I am greatly deceived, the difficulty on that
element will not be much less than on the other. The jury trial, at least the
local jury trial (the trial by the vicinage), may, indeed, be evaded there, but
in its place other, and not much less formidable, obstacles must be encoun
tered.

There can be but two modes of coercion resorted to by water — blockade and
abolition of the ports of entry of the state, accompanied by penal enactments,
authorizing seizures for entering the waters of the state. If the former be at
tempted, there will be other parties besides the General Government and the
state. Blockade is a belligerent right : it presupposes a state of war, and,
unless there be war (war in due form, as prescribed by the Constitution), the
order for blockade would not be respected by other nations or their subjects.
Their vessels would proceed directly for the blockaded port, with certain pros
pects of gain ; if seized under the order of blockade, through the claim of in
demnity against the General Government ; arid, if not, by a profitable market,
without the exaction of duties.

The other mode, the abolition of the ports of entry of the state, would also
have its difficulties. The Constitution provides that "no preference shall be
given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one state over
those of another ; nor shall vessels bound to or from one state be obliged to
enter, clear, or pay duties in another :" provisions too clear to be eluded even
by the force of construction. There will be another difficulty. If seizures be
made in port, or within the distance assigned by the laws of nations as the limits
of a state, the trial must be in the state, with all the embarrassments of its courts
and juries ; while beyond the ports and the distance to which I have referred,
it would be difficult to point out any principle by which a foreign vessel, at
least, could be seized, except as an incident to the right of blockade, and, of
course, with all the difficulties belonging to that mode of coercion.

But there yet remains another, and, I doubt not, insuperable barrier, to be
found in the judicial tribunals of the Union, against all the schemes of introdu
cing force, whether by land or water. Though I cannot concur in the opinion
of those who regard the Supreme Court as the mediator appointed by the Con-

54 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

stitution between the states and the .General Government ; and though I cannot
doubt there is a natural bias on its part towards the powers of the latter, yet I
must greatly lower my opinion of that high and important tribunal for intelli
gence, justice, and attachment to the Constitution, and particularly of that pure
and upright magistrate who has so long, and with such distinguished honour to
himself and the Union, presided over its deliberations, with all the weight that
belongs to an intellect of the first order, united with the most spotless integrity,
to believe, for a moment, that an attempt so plainly and manifestly unconstitu
tional as a resort to force would be in such a contest, could be sustained by the
sanction of its authority. In whatever form force may be used, it must present
questions for legal adjudication. If in the shape of blockade, the vessels seized
under it must be condemned, and thus would be presented the question of prize
or no prize, and, with it, the legality of the blockade ; if in that of a repeal of
the acts establishing ports of entries in the state, the legality of the seizure
must be determined, and that would bring up the question of the constitutional
ity of giving a preference to the ports of one state over those of another ; and
so, if we pass from water to land, we will find every attempt there to substitute.
force for law must, in like manner, come under the review of the courts of the
Union ; and the unconstitutionally would be so glaring, that the executive and
legislative departments, in their attempt to coerce, should either make an attempt
so lawless and desperate, would be without the support of the judicial depart
ment. I will not pursue the question farther, as I hold it perfectly clear that,
so long as a state retains its federal relations ; so long, in a word, as it continues
a member of the Union, the contest between it and the General Government
must be before the courts and juries ; and every attempt, in whatever form,
whether by land or water, to substitute force as the arbiter in their place, must
fail. The unconstitutionality of the attempt would be so open and palpable,
that it would be impossible to sustain it.

There is, indeed, one view, and one only, of the contest in which force could
be employed ; but that view, as between the parties, would supersede the Con
stitution itself: that nullification is secession, and would, consequently, place
the state, as to the others, in the relation of a foreign state. Such, clearly,
would be the effect of secession ; but it is equally clear that it would place the
state beyond the pale of all her federal relations, and, thereby, all control on the
part of the other states over her. She would stand to them simply in the rela
tion of a foreign state, divested of all federal connexion, arid having none other
between them but those belonging to the laws of nations. Standing thus to
wards one another, force might, indeed, be employed against a state, but it.
must be a belligerent force, preceded by a declaration of war, and carried on
with all its formalities. Such would be the certain effect of secession ; and if
nullification be secession — if it be but a different name for the same thing — such,
too, must be its effect ; which presents the highly important question, Are they,
in fact, the same ? on the decision of which depends the question whether it
be a peaceable and constitutional remedy, that may be exercised without termi
nating the federal relations of the state or not.

1 am aware that there is a considerable and respectable portion of our state,
with a very large portion of the Union, constituting, in fact, a great majority,
who are of the opinion that they are the same thing, differing only in name,
and who, under that impression, denounce it as the most dangerous of all doc
trines ; and yet, so far from being the same, they are, unless, indeed, I am
greatly deceived, not only perfectly distinguishable, but totally dissimilar in
their nature, their object, and effect ; and that, so far from deserving the de
nunciation, so properly belonging to the act with which it is confounded, it is,
in truth, the highest and most precious of all the rights of the states, and es
sential to preserve that very Union, for the supposed effect of destroying which
it is so bitterly anathematized.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 55

I shall now proceed to make good my assertion of their total dissimilarity.

First, they are wholly dissimilar in their nature. One has reference to the
parties themselves, and the other to their agents. Secession is a withdrawal from
the Union : a separation from partners, and, as far as depends on the member
withdrawing, a dissolution of the partnership. It presupposes an association :
a union of several states or individuals for a common object. Wherever these
exist, secession may ; and where they do not, it cannot. Nullification, on the
contrary, presupposes the relation of principal and agent : the one granting a
power to be executed, the other, appointed by him with authority to execute it ;
and is simply a declaration on the part of the principal, made in due form, that
an act of the agent transcending his power is null and void. It is a right belong
ing exclusively to the relation between principal and agent, to be found wher
ever it exists, and in all its forms, between several, or an association of princi
pals, and their joint agents, as well as between a single principal and his agent.

The difference in their object is no less striking than in their nature. The
object of secession is to free the withdrawing member from the obligation of
the association or union, and is applicable to cases where the object of the
association or union has failed, either by an abuse of power on the part of its
members, or other causes. Its direct and immediate object, as it concerns the with
drawing member, is the dissolution of the association or union, as far as it is con
cerned. On the contrary, the object of nullification is to confine the agent with
in the limits of his powers, by arresting his acts transcending them, not with the
view of destroying the delegated or trust power, but to preserve it, by compelling
the agent to fulfil the object for which the agency or trust was created; and is ap
plicable only to cases where the trust or delegated powers are transcended on the
part of the agent. Without ihe power of secession, an association or union,
formed for the common good of all the members, might prove ruinous to some,
by the abuse of power on the part of the others ; and without nullification the
agent might, under colour of construction, assume a power never intended to
be delegated, or to convert those delegated to objects never intended to be com
prehended in the trust, to the ruin of the principal, or, in case of a joint agency,
to the ruin of some of the principals. Each has, thus, its appropriate object,
but objects in their nature very dissimilar ; so much so, that, in case of an asso
ciation or union, where the powers are delegated to be executed by an agent,
the abuse of power, on the part of the agent, to the injury of one or more of the
members, would not justify secession on their part. The rightful remedy in
that case would be nullification. There would be neither right nor pretext to
secede : not right, because secession is applicable only to the acts of the mem
bers of the association or union, and not to the act of the agent ; nor pretext,
because there is another, and equally efficient remedy, short of the dissolution
of the association or union, which can only be justified by necessity. Nullifi
cation may, indeed, be succeeded by secession. In the case stated, should the
other members undertake to grant the power nullified, and should the nature of
the power be such as to defeat the object of the association or union, at least as
far as the member nullifying is concerned, it would then become an abuse of
power on the part of the principals, and thus present a case where secession
would apply ; but in no other could it be justified, except it be for a failure of
the association or union to effect the object for which it was created, independ
ent of any abuse of power.

It now remains to show that their effect is as dissimilar as their nature or
object.

Nullification leaves the members of the association or union in the condi
tion it found them — subject to all its burdens, and entitled to all its advantages,
comprehending the member nullifying as well as the others — its object being,
not to destroy, but to preserve, as has been stated. It simply arrests the act
of the agent, as far as the principal is concerned, leaving in every other respect

56 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

the operation of the joint concern as before ; secession, on the contrary, destroys,
as far as the withdrawing member is concerned, the association or union, and
restores him to the relation he occupied towards the other members before the
existence of the association or union. He loses the benefit, but is released
from the burden and control, and can no longer be dealt with, by his former as
sociates, as one of its members.

Such are clearly the differences between them — differences so marked, that,
instead of being identical, as supposed, they form a contrast in all the aspects
in which they can be regarded. The application of these remarks to the polit
ical association or Union of these twenty-four states and the General Govern
ment, their joint agcmt, is too obvious, after what has been already said, to re
quire any additional illustration, and I will dismiss this part of the subject with
a single additional remark.

There are many who acknowledge the right of a state to secede, but deny
its right to nullify ; and yet, it seems impossible to admit the one without ad
mitting the other. They both presuppose the same structure of the govern
ment, that it is a Union of the states, as forming political communities, the
same right on the part of the states, as members of the Union, to determine for
their citizens the extent of the powers delegated and those reserved, and, of
course, to decide whether the Constitution has or has not been violated. The
simple difference, then, between those who admit secession and deny nullifica
tion, and those who admit both, is, that one acknowledges that the declara
tion of a state pronouncing that the Constitution has been violated, and is, there
fore, null and void, would be obligatory on her citizens, and would arrest all
the acts of the government within the limits of the state ; while they deny that
a similar declaration, made by the same authority, and in the same manner, that
an act of the government has transcended its powers, and that it is, therefore,
null and void, would have any obligation ; while the other acknowledges the
obligation in both cases. The one admits that the declaration of a state assent
ing to the Constitution bound her citizens, and that her declaration can unbind
them ; but denies that a similar declaration, as to the extent she has, in fact,
bound them, has any obligatory force on them ; while the other gives equal
force to the declaration in the several cases. The one denies the obligation,
where the object is to preserve the Union in the only way it can be, by confining
the government, formed to execute the trust powers, strictly within their
limits, and to the objects for which they were delegated, though they give full
force where the object is to destroy the Union itself; while the other, in giving
equal weight to both, prefers the one because it preserves, and rejects the other be
cause it destroys ; and yet the former is the Union, and the latter the disunion
party I And all this strange distinction originates, as far as I can judge, in
attributing to nullification what belongs exclusively to secession. The diffi
culty as to the former, it seems, is, that a state cannot be in and out of the
Union at the same time.

This is, indeed, true, if applied to secession — the throwing off the authority

of the Union itself. To nullify the Constitution, if I maybe pardoned the sole-

,cism, would, indeed, be tantamount to disunion; and, as applied to such an

act, it would be true that a state could not be in and out of the Union at the

same time ; but the act would be secession.

But to apply it to nullification, properly understood, the object of which, in
stead of resisting or diminishing the powers of the Union, is to preserve them
as they are, neither increased nor diminished, and thereby the Union itself
(for the Union may be as effectually destroyed by increasing as by diminish
ing its powers — by consolidation, as by disunion itself), would be, I would say,
had I not great respect for many who do thus apply it, egregious trifling with a
grave and deeply-important constitutional subject.

I might here finish the task which your request imposed, having, I trust, de*

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 57

monstrated, beyond the power of refutation, that a state has the right to defend
her reserved powers against the encroachments of the General Government ;
and I may add that the right is, in its nature, peaceable, consistent with the
federal relations of the state, and perfectly efficient, whether contested before
the courts, or attempted to be resisted by force. But there is another aspect of
the subject not yet -touched, without adverting to which, it is impossible to un
derstand the full effects of nullification, or the real character of our political in
stitutions : I allude to the power which the states, as a confederated body, have
acquired directly over each other, and on which I will now proceed to make
some remarks, though, I fear, at the hazard of fatiguing you.

Previous to the adoption of the present Constitution, no power could be ex
ercised over any state by any other, or all of the states, without its own con
sent ; and we, accordingly, find that the old confederation and the present Con
stitution were both submitted for ratification to each of the states, and that
each ratified for itself, and was bound only in consequence of its own partic
ular ratification, as has been already stated. The present Constitution has made,
in this particular, a most important modification in their condition. I allude to
the provision which gives validity to amendments of the Constitution when
ratified by three fourths of the states — a provision which has not attracted as
much attention as its importance deserves. Without it, no change could have
been made in the Constitution, unless with the unanimous consent of all the
states, in like manner as it was adopted. This provision, then, contains a high
ly-important concession by each to all of the states, of a portion of the original
and inherent right of self-government, possessed previously by each separately,
in favour of their general confederated powers, giving thereby increased energy
to the states in their united capacity, and weakening them in the same degree
in their separate. Its object was to facilitate and strengthen the action of the
amending, or (to speak a little more appropriately, as it regards the point under
consideration) the repairing power. It was foreseen that experience would,
probably, disclose errors in the Constitution itself ; that time would make great
changes in the condition of the country, which would require corresponding
changes in the Constitution ; that the irregular and conflicting movements of the
bodies composing so complex a system might cause derangements requiring
correction ; and that, to require the unanimous consent of all the states to meet
these various contingencies, would be placing the whole too much under the
control of the parts : to remedy which, this great additional power was given to
the amending or repairing power — this vis medicatrix of the system.

To understand correctly the nature of this concession, we must not confound
it with the delegated powers conferred on the General Government, and to be
exercised by it as the joint agent of the states. They are essentially different*
The former is, in fact, but a modification of the original sovereign power re
siding in the people of the several states — of the creating or Constitution-making
power itself, intended, as stated, to facilitate and strengthen its action, and not
change its character. Though modified, it is not delegated. It still resides in the
states, and is still to be exercised by them, and not by the government.

I propose next to consider this important modification of the sovereign pow
ers of the states, in connexion with the right of nullification.

It is acknowledged on all sides that the duration and stability of our system
depend on maintaining the equilibrium between the states and the General
Government — the reserved and delegated powers. We know that the Conven
tion which formed the Constitution, and the various state conventions which
adopted it, as far as we are informed of their proceedings, felt the deepest soli
citude on this point. They saw and felt there would be an incessant conflict
between them, which would menace the existence of the system itself, unless
properly guarded. The contest between the states and General Government
— the reserved and delegated rights — will, in truth, be a conflict between the

H

58 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

great predominant interests of the Union on one side, controlling and directing
the movements of the government, and seeking to enlarge the delegated pow
ers, and thereby advance their power and prosperity ; and, on the other, the
minor interests rallying on the reserved powers, as the only means of protect
ing themselves against the encroachment and oppression of the other. In such
a contest, without the most effectual check, the stronger will absorb the weak
er interests ; while, on the other hand, without an adequate provision of some
description or other, the efforts of the weaker to guard against the encroach
ments and oppression of the stronger might permanently derange the system.

On the side of the reserved powers, no check more effectual can be found or
desired than nullification, or the right of arresting, within the limits of a state,
the exercise, by the General Government, of any powers but the delegated — a
right which, if the states be true to themselves and faithful to the Constitution,
will ever prove, on the side of the reserved powers, an effectual protection to
both.

Nor is the check on the side of the delegated less perfect. Though less
strong, it is ample to guard against encroachments ; and is as strong as the na
ture of the system would bear, as will appear in the sequal. It is to be found
in the amending power. Without the modification which it contains of the
rights of self-government on the part of the states, as already explained, the
consent of each state would have been requisite to any additional grant of power,
or other amendment of the Constitution. While, then, nullification would ena
ble a state to arrest the exercise of a power not delegated, the right of self-gov
ernment, if unmodified, would enable her to prevent the grant of a power not
delegated ; and thus her conception of what power ought to be granted would
be as conclusive against the co-states, as her construction of the powers grant
ed is against the General Government. In that case, the danger would be on
the side of the states or reserved powers. The amending power, in effect,
prevents this danger. In virtue of the provisions which it contains, the re
sistance of a state to a power cannot finally prevail, unless she be sustain
ed by one fourth of the co-states ; and in the same degree that her resistance
is weakened, the power of the General Government, or the side of the delega
ted powers, is strengthened. It is true that the right of a state to arrest an un
constitutional act is of itself complete against the government ; but it is equally
so that the controversy may, in effect, be terminated against her by a grant of
the contested powers by three fourths of the states. It is thus by this simple,
and, apparently, incidental contrivance, that the right of a state to nullify an uncon
stitutional act, so essential to the protection of the reserved rights, but which,
unchecked, might too much debilitate the government, is counterpoised : not
by weakening the energy of a state in her direct resistance to the encroach
ment of the government, or by giving to the latter a direct control over the
states, as proposed in the Convention, but in a manner infinitely more safe, and,
if I may be permitted so to express myself, scientific, by strengthening the
amending or repairing power — the power of correcting all abuses or derange
ments, by whatever cause, or from whatever quarter.

To sum all in a few words. The General Government has the right, in the
first instance, of construing its own powers, which, if final and conclusive, as
is supposed by many, would have placed the reserved powers at the mercy of
the delegated, and thus destroy the equilibrium of the system. Against that, a
state has the right of nullification. This right, on the part of the state, if not
counterpoised, might tend too strongly to weaken the General Government and
derange the system. To correct this, the amending or repairing power is
strengthened. The former cannot be made too strong if the latter be propor
tionally so. The increase of the latter is, in effect, the decrease of the former.
Give to a majority of the states the right of amendment, and the arresting power,
on the part of the state, would, in fact, be annulled. The amending power and

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 59

the powers of the government would, in that case, be, in reality, in the same
hands. The same majority that controlled the one would the other, and the power
arrested, as not granted, would be immediately restored in the shape of a grant.
This modification of the right of self-government, on the part of the states, is, in
fact, the pivot of the system. By shifting its position as the preponderance is
on the one side or the other, or, to drop the simile, by increasing or diminish
ing the energy of the repairing power, effected by diminishing or increasing
the number of states necessary to amend the Constitution, the equilibrium be
tween the reserved and the delegated rights may be preserved or destroyed at
pleasure.

I am aware it is objected that, according to this view, one fourth of the
states may, in reality, change the Constitution, and thus take away powers
which have been unanimously granted by all the states. The objection is more
specious than solid. The right of a state is not to resume delegated powers,
but to prevent the reserved from being assumed by the government. It is, how
ever, certain the right may be abused, and, thereby, powers be resumed which
were, in fact, delegated ; and it is also true, if sustained by one fourth of the co-
states, such resumption may be successfully and permanently made by the
state. This is the danger, and the utmost extent of the danger from the side of
the reserved powers. It would, I acknowledge, be desirable to avoid or
lessen it ; but neither can be effected without increasing a greater and opposing
danger. .

If the right be denied to the state to defend her reserved powers, for fear she
might resume the delegated, that denial would, in effect, yield to the General
Government the power, under the colour of construction, to assume at pleasure
all the reserved powers. It is, in fact, a question between the danger of the
states resuming the delegated powers on one side, and the General Government
assuming the reserved on the other. Passing over the far greater probability
of the latter than the former, which I endeavoured to illustrate in the address
of last summer, I shall confine my remarks to the striking difference between
them, viewed in connexion with the genius and theory of our government.

The right of a state originally to complete self-government is a fundamental
principle in our system, in virtue of which the grant of power required the con
sent of all the states, while to withhold power the dissent of a single state was suf
ficient. It is true, that this original and absolute power of self-government has
been modified by the Constitution, as already stated, so that three fourths of the
states may now grant power ; and, consequently, it requires more than one fourth
to withhold. The boundary between the reserved and the delegated powers
marks the limits of the Union. The states are united to the extent of the latter,
and separated beyond that limit. It is, then, clear that it was not intended that
the states should be more united than the will of one fourth of them, or, rather,
one more than a fourth, would permit. It is worthy of remark, that it was pro
posed in the Convention to increase the corifederative power, as it may be call
ed, by vesting two thirds of the states with the right of amendment, so as to
require more than a third, instead of a fourth, to withhold power. The propo
sition was rejected, and three fourths unanimously adopted. It is, then, more
hostile to the nature and genius of our system to assume powers not delegated,
than to resume those that are ; and less hostile that a state, sustained by one fourth
of her co-states, should prevent the exercise of power really intended to be granted,
than that the General Government should assume the exercise of powers not in
tended to be delegated. In the latter case, the usurpation of power would be
against the fundamental principle of our system, the original right of the states
to self-government ; while in the former, if it be usurpation at all, it would be,
if so bold an expression may be used, a usurpation in the spirit of the Consti
tution itself — the spirit ordaining that the utmost extent of our Union should be
limited by the will of any number of states exceeding a fourth, and that most

60 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

wisely. In a country having so great a diversity of geographical and political
interest, with so vast a territory, to be filled, in a short time, with almost count
less millions — a country of which the parts will equal empires, a union more
intimate than that ordained in the Constitution, and so intimate, of course, that it
might be permanently hostile to the feelings of more than a fourth of the states,
instead of strengthening, would have exposed the system to certain destruction.
There is a deep and profound philosophy, which he who best knows our nature
will the most highly appreciate, that would make the intensity of the Union, if
I may so express myself, inversely to the extent of territory and the population
of a country, and the diversity of its interests, geographical and political ; and,
which would hold in deeper dread the assumption of reserved rights by the
agent appointed to execute the delegated, than the resumption of the delegated
by the authority which granted the powers and ordained the agent to adminis
ter them. There appears, indeed, to be a great and prevailing principle that
tends to place the delegated power in opposition to the delegating — the created
to the creating power — reaching far beyond man and his works, up to the uni
versal source of all power. The earliest pages of Sacred History record the re
bellion of the archangels against the high authority of Heaven itself, and ancient
mythology, the war of the Titans against Jupiter, which, according to its nar
rative, menaced the universe with destruction. This all-pervading principle is
at work in our system — the created warring against the creating power; and
unless the government be bolted and chained down with links of adamant by the
hand of the states which created it, the creature will usurp the place of the
creator, and universal political idolatry overspread the land.

If the views presented be correct, it follows that, on the interposition of a
state in favour of the reserved rights, it would be the duty of the General Gov
ernment to abandon the contested power, or to apply to the states themselves,
the source of all political authority, for the power, in one of the two modes pre
scribed in the Constitution. If the case be a simple one, embracing a single
power, and that in its nature easily adjusted, the more ready and appropriate
mode would be an amendment in the ordinary form, on a proposition of two
thirds of both houses of Congress, to be ratified by three fourths of the states ;
but, on the contrary, should the derangement of the system be great, embracing
many points difficult to adjust, the states ought to be convened in a general Con
vention, the most august of all assemblies, representing the united sovereignty
of the confederated states, and having power and authority to correct every er
ror, and to repair every dilapidation or injury, whether caused by time or acci
dent, or the conflicting movements of the bodies which compose the system..
With institutions every way so fortunate, possessed of means so well calculated
to prevent disorders, and so admirable to correct them when they cannot be pre
vented, he who would prescribe for our political disease disunion on the one
side, or coercion of a state in the assertion of its rights on the other, would de
serve, and will receive, the execrations of this and all future generations.

I have now finished what I had to say on the subject of this communication;,
in its immediate connexion with the Constitution. In the discussion, I have
advanced nothing but on the authority of the Constitution itself, or that of re
corded and unquestionable facts connected with the history of its origin and
formation ; and have made no deduction but such as rested on principles which
I believe to be unquestionable ; but it would be idle to expect, in the present state
of the public mind, a favourable reception of the conclusions to which I have
been carried. There are too many misconceptions to encounter, too many prej
udices to combat, and, above all, too great a weight of interest to resist. I do
not propose to investigate these great impediments to the reception of the truth,
though it would be an interesting subject of inquiry to trace them to their cause,
and to measure the force of their impeding power ; but there is one among
them of so marked a character, and which operates so extensively, that I can-r

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 61

not conclude without making it the subject of a few remarks, particularly as they
will be calculated to throw much light on what has already been said.

Of all the impediments opposed to a just conception of the nature of our po
litical system, the impression that the right of a state to arrest an unconstitu
tional act of the General Government is inconsistent with the great and funda
mental principle of all free states — that a majority has the right to govern — is the
greatest. Thus regarded, nullification is, without farther reflection, denounced
as the most dangerous and monstrous of all political heresies, as, in truth, it
would be, were the objection as well-founded as, in fact, it is destitute of all
foundation, as I shall now proceed to show.

Those who make the objection seem to suppose that the right of a majority
to govern is a principle too simple to admit of any distinction ; and yet, if I do not
mistake, it is susceptible of the most important distinction — entering deeply into
the construction of our system, and, I may add, into that of all free states in
proportion to the perfection of their institutions, and is essential to the very ex
istence of liberty.

When, then, it is said that a majority has the right to govern, there are two
modes of estimating the majority, to either of which the expression is applica
ble. The one, in which the whole community is regarded in the aggregate,
and the majority is estimated in reference to the entire mass. This may be
called the majority of the whole, or the absolute majority. The other, in which
it is regarded in reference to its different political interests, whether composed
of different classes, of different communities, formed into one general confeder
ated community, and in which the majority is estimated, not in reference to the.
whole, but to each class or community of which it is composed, the assent of
each taken separately, and the concurrence of all constituting the majority.
A majority thus estimated may be called the concurring majority.

When it is objected to nullification, that it is opposed to the principle that a
majority ought to govern, he who makes the objection must mean the absolute,
as distinguished from the concurring. It is only in the sense of the former the
objection can be applied. In that of the concurring, it would be absurd, as the
concurring assent of all the parts (with us, all the states) is of the very essence
of such majority. Again, it is manifest, that in the sense it would be good
against nullification, it would be equally so against the Constitution itself; for,
in whatever light that instrument may be regarded, it is clearly not the work
of the absolute, but of the concurring majority. It was formed and ratified by
the concurring assent of all the states, and not by the majority of the whole ta
ken in the aggregate, as has been already stated. Thus, the acknowledged
right of each state in reference to the Constitution, is unquestionably the same
right which nullification attributes to each in reference to the unconstitutional
acts of the government; and, if the latter be opposed to the i^ht of a majority
to govern, the former is equally so. I go farther. The objection might, with
equal truth, be applied to all free states that have ever existed : I mean states
deserving the name, and excluding, of course, those which, after a factious and
anarchical existence of a few years, have sunk under the yoke of tyranny or
the dominion of some foreign power. * There is not, with this exception, a sin
gle free state whose institutions were not based on the principle of the con
curring majority : not one in which the community was not regarded in refer
ence to its different political interests, and which did not, in some form or oth£r,
take the assent of each in the operation of the government.

In support of this assertion, I might begin with our own government and go
back to that of Sparta, and show conclusively that there is not one on the list
whose institutions were not organized on the principle of the concurring ma
jority, and in the operation of which the sense of each great interest was not
separately consulted. The various devices which have been contrived for this
purpose, with the peculiar operation of each, would be a curious and highly im-

62 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

portant subject of investigation. I can only allude to some of the most promi
nent.

The principle of the concurring majority has sometimes been incorporated
in the regular and ordinary operation of the government, each interest having a
distinct organization, and a combination of the whole forming the government ;
but still requiring the consent of each, within its proper sphere, to give validity
to the measures of government. Of this modification the British and Spartan
governments are by far the most memorable and perfect examples. In others,
the right of acting — of making and executing the laws — was vested in one in
terest, and the right of arresting or nullifying in another. Of this description,
the Roman government is much the most striking instance. In others, the
right of originating or introducing projects of laws was in one, and of enacting
them in another : as at Athens before its government degenerated, where the
Senate proposed, and the General Assembly of the people enacted, laws.

These devices were a]l resorted to with the intention of consulting the separ
ate interests of which the several communities were composed, and against
all of which the objection to nullification, that it is opposed to the will of a ma
jority, could be raised with equal force — as strongly, and I may say much more
so, against the unlimited, unqualified, and uncontrollable veto of a single tribune
out of ten at Rome on all laws and the execution of laws, as against the same
right of a sovereign state (one of the twenty-four tribunes of this Union), limit
ed, as the right is, to the unconstitutional acts of the General Government, and
liable, as in effect it is, to be controlled by three fourths of the co-states ; and
yet the Roman Republic, and the other states to which I have referred, are the
renowned among free states, whose examples have diffused the spirit of liberty
over the world, and which, if struck from the list, would leave behind but little
to be admired or imitated. There, indeed, would remain one class deserving
from us particular notice, as ours belongs to it — I mean confederacies ; but, as
a class, heretofore far less distinguished for power and prosperity than those
already alluded to ; though I trust, with the improvements we have made, des
tined to be placed at the very head of the illustrious list of states which have
blessed the world with examples of well-regulated liberty ; and which stand
as so many oases in the midst of the desert of oppression and despotism, which
occupies so vast a space in the chart of governments. That such will be the
great and glorious destiny of our system, I feel assured, provided we do not
permit our government to degenerate into the worst of all possible forms, a con
solidated government, swayed by the will of an absolute majority. But to pro
ceed.

Viewing a confederated community as composed of as many distinct politi
cal interests as there are states, and as requiring the consent of each to its meas
ures, no government can be conceived in which the sense of the whole com
munity can be more perfectly taken, and all its interests be more fully represent
ed and protected. But, with this great advantage, united with the means of
the most just and perfect local administration through the agency of the states,
and combined with the capacity of embracing within its limits the greatest ex
tent of territory and variety of interests, ft is liable to one almost fatal objection,
the tardiness and feebleness of its movements — a defect difficult to be reme
died, and when not, so great as to render a form of government, in other re
spects so admirable, almost worthless. To overcome this difficulty was the
great desideratum in political science, and the most difficult problem within its
circle. To us belongs the glory of its solution, if, indeed, our experiment (for
such it must yet be called) shall prove that we have overcome it, as I sincerely
believe and hope it will, on account of our own, as well as the liberty and happi
ness of our race.

Our first experiment in government was on the old form of a simple confed
eracy, unmodified, and extending the principle of the concurring majority alike

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 63

to the Constitution (the articles of union) and to the government which it con
stituted. It failed, and the present structure was reared in its place, combining,
for the first time in a confederation, the absolute with the concurring majority ;
and thus uniting the justice of the one with the energy of the other.

The new government was reared on the foundation of the old, strengthened,
but not changed. It stands on the same solid basis of the concurring majority,
perfected by the sanction of the people of the states directly given, and not in
directly through the state governments, as their representatives, as in the old
confederation. With that difference, the authority which made the two Consti
tutions — which granted their powers, and ordained and organized their respect
ive governments to execute them — is the same. But, in passing from the Con
stitution to the government (the law-making and the law-administering powers),
the difference between the two becomes radical and essential. There, in the
present, the concurring majority is dropped, and the absolute substituted. In
determining, then, what powers ought to be granted, and how the government
appointed for their execution ought to be organized, the separate and concur
ring voice of the states was required — the union being regarded, for this pur
pose, in reference to its various and distinct interests ; but in the execution of
these powers (delegated only because all the states had a common interest in
their exercise), the union is no longer regarded in reference to its parts, but as
forming, to the extent of its delegated powers, one great community, to be gov
erned by a common will, just as the states are in reference to their separate in
terests, and by a government organized on principles similar to theirs. By this
simple but fortunate arrangement, we have ingrafted the absolute on the con
curring majority, thereby giving to the administration of the powers of the gov
ernment, where they were required, all the energy and promptness belonging
to the former, while we have retained in the power granting and organizing
authority (if I may so express myself) the principle of the concurring majori
ty, and with it that justice, moderation, and full and perfect representation of
all the interests of the community which belong exclusively to it.

Such is the solidity and beauty of our admirable system, but which, it is per
fectly obvious, can only be preserved by maintaining the ascendency of the

CONSTITUTION-MAKING AUTHORITY OVER THE LA'W-MAKING THE CONCURRING

OVER THE ABSOLUTE MAJORITY. Nor is it less clear that this can only be ef
fected by the right of a state to annul the unconstitutional acts of the govern
ment — a right confounded with the idea of a minority governing a majority, but
which, so far from being the case, is indispensable to prevent the more ener
getic but imperfect majority which controls the movements of the government,
from usurping the place of that more perfect and just majority which formed
the Constitution and ordained government to execute its powers.

Nor need we apprehend that this check, as powerful as it is, will prove ex
cessive. The distinction between the Constitution and the law making pow
ers, so strongly marked in our institutions, may yet be considered as a new and
untried experiment. It can scarcely be said to have existed at all before our
system of government. We have yet much to learn as to its practical opera
tion ; and, among other things, if I do not mistake, we are far from realizing
the many and great difficulties of holding the latter subordinate to the former,
and without which, it is obvious, the entire scheme of constitutional govern
ment, at least in our sense, must prove abortive. Short as has been our expe
rience, some of these, of a very formidable character, have begun to disclose
themselves, particularly between the Constitution and the government of the
Union. The two powers there represent very different interests : the one,
that of all the states taken separately ; and the other, that of a majority of the
states as forming a confederated community. Each acting under the impulse
of these respective and very different interests, must necessarily strongly tend
to come into collision, and, in the conflict, the advantage will be found almost

.64 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

exclusively on the side of the government or law-making power. A few re
marks will be sufficient to illustrate these positions.

The Constitution, while it grants powers to the government, at the same time im
poses restrictions on its action, with the intention of confining it within a limited
range of powers, and of the means of executing them. The object.of the powers is
to protect the rights and promote the interests of all ; and of the restrictions, to pre
vent the majority, or the dominant interests of the government, from perverting
powers intended for the common good into the means of oppressing the minor inter
ests of the community. Thus circumstanced, the dominant interest in possession
of the powers of the government, and the minor interest on whom they are exer
cised, must regard these restrictions in a very different light : the latter, as a
protection, and the former, as a restraint, and, of course, accompanied with all
the impatient feelings with which restrictions on cupidity and ambition are
ever regarded by those unruly passions. Under their influence, the Constitu
tion will be viewed by the majority, not as the source of their authority, as it
should be, but as shackles on their power. To them it will have no value as
the means of protection. As a majority they require none. Their number and
strength, and not the Constitution, are their protection ; and, of course, if I may
so speak, their instinct will be to weaken and destroy the restrictions, in order
to enlarge the powers. He must have a very imperfect knowledge of the hu
man heart who does not see, in this state of things, an incessant conflict between
the government or the law-making power and the Constitution-making power.
Nor is it less certain that, in the contest, the advantage will be exclusively with
the former.

The law-making power is organized and in constant action, having the con
trol of the honours and emoluments of the country, and armed with the power
to punish and reward ; the other, on the contrary, is unorganized, lying dormant
in the great inert mass of the community, till called into action on extraordinary
occasions and at distant intervals ; and then bestowing no honours, exercising
no patronage, having neither the faculty to reward nor to punish, but endowed
simply with the attribute to grant powers and ordain the authority to execute
them. The result is inevitable. With so strong an instinct on the part of the
government to throw off the restrictions of the Constitution and to enlarge its
powers, and with such powerful faculties to gratify this instinctive impulse, the
law-making must necessarily encroach on the Constitution-making power, un
less restrained by the most efficient check — at least as strong as that for which
we contend. It is worthy of remark, that, all other circumstances being equal,
the more dissimilar the interests represented by the two, the more powerful will
be this tendency to encroach ; and it is from this, among other causes, that it is
so much stronger between the government and the Constitution-making powers
of the Union, where the interests are so very dissimilar, than between the two
in the several states.

That the framers of the Constitution were aware of the danger which I have
described, we have conclusive proof in the provision to which I have so fre
quently alluded — I mean that which provides for amendments to the Constitu
tion.

I have already remarked on that portion of this provision which, with the
view of strengthening the confederated power, conceded to three fourths of the
states a right to amend, which otherwise could only have been exercised by
the unanimous consent of all. It is remarkable, that, while this provision thus
strengthened the amending power as it regards the states, it imposed imped
iments on it as far as the government was concerned. The power of acting,
as a general rule, is invested in the majority of Congress ; but, instead of per
mitting a majority to propose amendments, the provision requires for that pur
pose two thirds of both houses, clearly with a view of interposing a barrier
against this strong instinctive appetite of the government for the acquisition of

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 65

power. But it would have been folly in the extreme thus carefully to guard
the passage to the direct acquisition, had the wide door of construction been
left open to its indirect ; and hence, in the same spirit in which two thirds of
both houses were required to propose amendments, the Convention that fnftned
the Constitution rejected the many propositions which were moved in the body
with the intention of divesting the states of the right of interposing, and, there
by, of the only effectual means of preventing the enlargement of the powers of
the government by construction.

It is thus that the Constitution-making power has fortified itself against the
law-making ; and that so effectually, that, however strong the disposition and
capacity pf the latter to encroach, the means of resistance on the part of the
former are not less powerful. If, indeed, encroachments have been made, the
fault is not in the system, but in the inattention and neglect of those whose in
terest and duty it was to interpose the ample means of protection afforded by
the Constitution.

To sum up in few words, in conclusion, what appears to me to be the entire
philosophy of government, in reference to the subject of this communication.

Two powers are necessary to the existence and preservation of free states :
a power on the part of the ruled to prevent rulers from abusing their authority,
by compelling them to be faithful to their constituents, and which is effected
through the right of suffrage ; and a power TO COMPEL THE PARTS OF SOCIETY

TO BE JUST TO ONE ANOTHER, BY COMPELLING THEM TO CONSULT THE INTER
EST OF EACH OTHER, which can only be effected, whatever may be the device
for the purpose, by requiring the concurring assent of all the great and distinct
interests of the community to the measures of the government. This result is
the sum-total of all the contrivances adopted by free states to preserve their
liberty, by preventing the conflicts between the several classes or parts of
the community. Both powers are indispensable. The one as much so as the
other. The rulers are not more disposed to encroach on the ruled than the dif
ferent interests of the community on one another ; nor would they more cer
tainly convert their power from the just and legitimate objects for which gov
ernments are instituted into an instrument of aggrandizement, at the expense
of the ruled, unless made responsible to their constituents, than would the
stronger interests theirs, at the expense of the weaker, unless compelled to con
sult them in the measures of the government, by taking their separate and con
curring assent. The same cause operates in both cases. The constitution of
our nature, which would impel the rulers to oppress the ruled, unless prevented,
would in like manner, and with equal force, impel the stronger to oppress the
weaker interest. To vest the right of government in the absolute majority,
would be, in fact, BUT TO IMBODY THE WILL OF THE STRONGER INTEREST IN

THE OPERATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT, AND NOT THE WILL OF THE WHOLE
COMMUNITY, AND TO LEAVE THE OTHERS UNPROTECTED, A PREY TO ITS AMBI
TION AND CUPIDITY, just as would be the case between rulers and ruled, if the
right to govern was vested exclusively in the hands of the former. They
would both be, in reality, absolute and despotic governments : the one as much
so as the other.

They would both become mere instruments of cupidity and ambition in the
hands of those who wielded them. No one doubts that such would be the case
were the government placed under the control of irresponsible rulers ; but, un
fortunately for the cause of liberty, it is not seen with equal clearness that it
must as necessarily be so when controlled by an absolute majority ; and yet,
the former is not more certain than the latter. To this we may attribute the
mistake so often and so fatally repeated, that TO EXPEL A DESPOT is TO ESTAB
LISH LIBERTY — a mistake to which we may trace the failure of many noble
and generous efforts in favour of liberty. The error consists in considering
communities as formed of interests strictly identical throughout, instead of be-

66 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

ing composed, as they in reality are, of as many distinct interests as there are
individuals. The interests of no two persons are the same, regarded in refer
ence to each other, though they may be, viewed in relation to the rest of the
community. It is this diversity which the several portions of the community
bear to each other, in reference to the whole, that renders the principle of the
concurring majority necessary to preserve liberty. Place the power in the
hands of the absolute majority, and the strongest of these -would certainly per
vert the government from the object for which it was instituted, the equal pro
tection of the rights of all, into an instrument of advancing itself at the expense*
of the rest of the community. Against this abuse of power no remedy can be
devised but that of the concurring majority. Neither the righf,: of suffrage nor
public opinion can possibly check it. They, in fact, but tend to aggravate the
disease. It seems really surprising that truths so obvious should be so imper
fectly understood. There would appear, indeed, a feebleness in our intellect
ual powers on political subjects when directed to large masses. We readily
see why a single individual, as a ruler, would, if not prevented, oppress the
rest of the community ; but are at a loss to understand why seven millions
would, if not also prevented, oppress six millions, as if the relative numbers on.
either side could in the least degree vary the principle.

In stating what I have, I have but repeated the experience of ages, compre
hending all free governments preceding ours, and ours as far as it has advan
ced. The PRACTICAL operation of ours has been substantially on the principle
of the absolute majority. We have acted, with some exceptions, as if the Gen
eral Government had the right to interpret its own powers, without limitation or
check ; and though many circumstances have favoured us, and greatly impeded
the natural progress of events, under such an operation of the system, yet we
already see, in whatever direction we turn our eyes, the growing symptoms of
disorder and decay — the growth of faction, cupidity, and corruption ; and the
decay of patriotism, integrity, and disinterestedness. In the midst of youth, we
see the flushed cheek, and the short and feverish breath, that mark the approach
of the fatal hour ; and come it will, unless there be a speedy and radical change
— a return to the great conservative principle which brought the Republican
party into authority, but which, with the possession of power and prosperity, it
has long ceased to remember.

I have now finished the task which your request imposed. If I have been
so fortunate as to add to your fund a single new illustration of this great con
servative principle of our government, or to furnish an additional argument cal
culated to sustain the state in her noble and patriotic struggle to revive and
maintain it, and in which you have acted a part long to be remembered by the
friends of freedom, I shall feel amply compensated for the time occupied in so
long a communication. I believe the cause to be the cause of truth and justice,
of union, liberty, and the Constitution, before which the ordinary party strug
gles of the day sink into perfect insignificance ; and that it will be so regarded
by the most distant posterity, I have not the slightest doubt.

With great and sincere regard,

I am yours, &c., &c.,

JOHN C. CALHOUN.

His Excellency JAMES HAMILTON, Jun.,
Governor of South Carolina.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 67

V.

SPEECH AGAINST THE FORCE BILL.

MR. PRESIDENT — I know not which is most objectionable, the provision of
the bill, or the temper in which its adoption has been urged. If the extraordi
nary powers with which the bill proposes to clothe the executive, to the utter
prostration of the Constitution and the rights of the states, be calculated to im
press our minds with alarm at the rapid progress of despotism in our country ;
the zeal with which every circumstance calculated to misrepresent or exagger
ate the conduct of Carolina in the controversy, is seized on with a view to ex
cite hostility against her, but too plainly indicates the deep decay of that broth
erly feeling which once existed between these states, and to which we are
indebted for our beautiful federal system, and by the continuance of which
alone it can be preserved. It is not my intention to advert to all these mis
representations, but there are some so well calculated to mislead the mind as
to the real character of the controversy, and hold up the state in a light so
odious, that I do not feel myself justified in permitting them to pass unnoticed.

Among them, one of the most prominent is the false statement that the ob
ject of South Carolina is to exempt herself from her share of the public burdens,
while she participates in the advantages of the government. If the charge were
true — if the state were capable of being actuated by such low and unworthy
motives, mother as I consider her, I would not stand up on this floor to vindi
cate her conduct. Among her faults, and faults I will not deny she has, no one
has ever yet charged her with that low and most sordid of vices — avarice. Her
conduct, on all occasions, has been marked with the very opposite quality.
From the commencement of the Revolution — from its first breaking out at Bos
ton till this hour, no state has been more profuse of its blood in the cause of
the country, nor has any contributed so largely to the common treasury in
proportion to wealth and population. She has in that proportion contributed
more to the exports of the Union, on the exchange of which with the rest of
the world the greater portion of the public burden has been levied, than any
other state. No : the controversy is not such as has been stated ; the state does
not seek to participate in the advantages of the government without contributing
her full share to the public treasury. Her object is far different. A deep con
stitutional question lies at the bottom of the controversy. The real question at
issue is, Has the government a right to impose burdens on the capital ancf indus
try of one portion of the country, not with a view to revenue, but to benefit
another ? and I must be permitted to say that, after the long and deep agitation
of this controversy, it is with surprise that I perceive so strong a disposition to
misrepresent its real character. To correct the impression which those misrep
resentations are calculated to make, I will dwell on the point under consider
ation for a few moments longer.

The Federal Government has, by an express provision of the Constitution,
the right to lay duties on imports. The state has never denied or resisted this
right, nor even thought of so doing. The government has, however, not been
contented with exercising this power as she had a right to do, but has gone a
-step beyond it, by laying imposts, not for revenue, but for protection. This the
state considers as an unconstitutional exercise of power — highly injurious and
oppressive to her and the other staple states, and hss, accordingly, met it with
the most determined resistance. I do not intend to enter, at this time, into the
argument as to the unconstitutionally of the protective system. It is not ne
cessary. It is sufficient that the power is nowhere granted ; and that, from the
journals of the Convention which formed the Constitution, it would seem that
it was refused. In support of the journals, I might cite the statement of Luther

68 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

Martin, which has already been referred to, to show that the Convention, so far
from conferring the power on the Federal Government, left to the state the right to
impose duties on imports, with the express view of enabling the several states to
protect their own manufactures. Notwithstanding this, Congress has assumed,
without any warrant from the Constitution, the right of exercising this most im
portant power, and has so exercised it as to impose a ruinous burden on the labour
and capital of the State of South Carolina, by which her resources are exhaust
ed — the enjoyments of her citizens curtailed — the means of education contracted
— and all her interests essentially and injuriously affected. We have been,
sneeringly told that she is a small state ; that her population does not much ex
ceed half a million of souls ; and that more than one half are not of the Euro
pean race. The facts are so. I know she never can be a great state, and
that the only distinction to which she can aspire must be based on the moral
and intellectual acquirements of her sons. To the development of these much
of her attention has been directed ; but this restrictive system, which has so un
justly exacted the proceeds of her labour, to be bestowed on other sections, has
so impaired the resources of the state, that, if not speedily arrested, it will dry
up the means of education, and with it deprive her of the only source through
which she can aspire to distinction.

There is another inisstatement, as to the nature of the controversy, so fre
quently made in debate, and so well calculated to mislead, that I feel bound to
notice it. It has been said that South Carolina claims the right to annul the
Constitution and laws of the United States ; and to rebut this supposed claim,
the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Rives) has gravely quoted the Constitution,
to prove that the Constitution, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, are the
supreme laws of the land — as if the state claimed the right to act contrary to
this provision of the Constitution. Nothing can be more erroneous : her object
is not to resist laws made in pursuance of the Constitution, but those made
without its authority, and which encroach on her reserved powers. She claims
not even the right of judging of the delegated powers ; but of those that are re
served, and to resist the former, when they encroach upon the latter. I will
pause to illustrate this important point.

All must admit that there are delegated and reserved powers, and that the
powers reserved are reserved to the states respectively. The powers, then, of
the system are divided between the general and the state government ; and
the point immediately under consideration is, whether a state has any right
to judge as to the extent of its reserved powers, and to defend them against the
encroachments of the General Government. Without going deeply into this
point at this stage of the argument, or looking into the nature and origin of the
government, there is a simple view of the subject which I consider as conclu
sive. The very idea of a divided power implies the right on the part of the
state for which I contend. The expression is metaphorical when applied to
power. Every one readily understands that the division of matter consists in
the separation of the parts. But in this sense it is not applicable to power.
What, then, is meant by a division of power 1 I cannot conceive of a division,
without giving an equal right to each to judge of the extent of the power allotted
to each.. Such right I hold to be essential to the existence of a division;
and that, to give to either party the conclusive right of judging, not only of the
share allotted to it, but of that allotted to the other, is to annul the division, and
would confer the whole power on the party vested with such right.

But it is contended that, the Constitution has conferred on the Supreme Court,
the right of judging between the states and the General Government. Those
who make this objection overlook, I conceive, an important provision of the
Constitution. By turning to the 10th amended article, it will be seen that the
reservation of power to the states is not only against the powers delegated to
Congress, but against the United States themselves ; and extends, of course, as

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 69

well to the judiciary as to the other departments of the government. The ar
ticle provides, that all powers not delegated to the United States, or prohibited
by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.
This presents the inquiry, What powers are delegated to the United States ?
They may be classed under four divisions : first, those that are delegated by the
states to each other, by virtue of which the Constitution may be altered or
amended by three fourths of the states, when, without which, it would have re
quired the unanimous vote of all ; next, the powers conferred on Congress ;
then those on the President ; and, finally, those on the judicial department — all
of which are particularly enumerated in the parts of the Constitution which or
ganize the respective departments. The reservation of powers to the states is,
as I have said, against the whole, and is as full against the judicial as it is
against the executive and legislative departments of the government. It cannot
be claimed for the one without claiming it for the whole, and without, in fact,
annulling this important provision of the Constitution.

Against this, as it appears to me, conclusive view of the subject, it has been
urged that this power is expressly conferred on the Supreme Court by that
portion of the Constitution which provides that the judicial power shall extend
to all cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution, the laws of the
United States, and treaties made under their authority. I believe the assertion
to be utterly destitute of any foundation. It obviously is the intention of the
Constitution simply to make the judicial power commensurate with the law-
making and treaty-making powers ; and to vest it with the right of applying the
Constitution, the laws, and the treaties, to the cases which might arise under
them ; and not to make it the judge of the Constitution, the laws, and the trea
ties themselves. In fact, the power of applying the laws to the facts of the
case, and deciding upon such application, constitutes, in truth, the judicial pow
er. The distinction between such power, and that of judging of the laws, will
be perfectly apparent when we advert to what is the acknowledged power of
the court in reference to treaties or compacts between sovereigns. It is per
fectly established, that the courts have no right to judge of the violation of
treaties ; and that, in reference to them, their power is limited to the right of
judging simply of the violation of rights under them ; and that the right of
judging of infractions belongs exclusively to the parties themselves, and not to
the courts : of which we have an example in the French treaty, which was de
clared by Congress null and void, in consequence of its violation by the gov
ernment of France. Without such declaration, had a French citizen sued a
citizen of this country under the treaty, the court could have taken no cogni
zance of its infraction ; nor, after such a declaration, would it have heard any
argument or proof going to show that the treaty had not been violated.

The declaration of itself is conclusive on the court. But it will be asked
how the court obtained the powers to pronounce a law or treaty unconstitution
al, when they come in conflict with that instrument. I do not deny that it
possesses the right, but I can by no means concede that it was derived from
the Constitution. It had its origin in the necessity of the case. Where there
are two or more rules established, one from a higher, the other from a lower
authority, which may come into conflict in applying them to a particular case, the
judge cannot avoid pronouncing in favour of the superior against the inferior.
It is from this necessity, and this alone, that the power which is now set up to
overrule the rights of the states against an express provision of the Constitution
was derived. It had no other origin. That I have traced it to its true source,
will be manifest from the fact that it is a power which, so far from being con
ferred exclusively on the Supreme Court, as is insisted, belongs to every
court — inferior and superior — state and general — and even to foreign courts.

But the senator from Delaware (Mr. Clayton) relies on the journals of the
Convention to prove that it was the intention of that body to confer on the Su-

70 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

preme Court the right of deciding in the last resort between a state and the
General Government. I will not follow him through the journals, as I do not
deem that to be necessary to refute his argument. It is sufficient for this pur
pose to state, that Mr. Rutledge reported a resolution, providing expressly that
the United States and the states might be parties before the Supreme Court.
If this proposition had been adopted, I would ask the senator whether this very
controversy between the United States and South Carolina might not have been
brought before the court ? I would also ask him whether it can be brought be
fore the court as the Constitution now stands 1 If he answers the former in the
affirmative, and the latter in the negative, as he must, then it is clear, his elabo
rate argument to the contrary notwithstanding, that the report of Mr. Rutledge
was not, in substance, adopted as he contended ; and that the journals, so far
from supporting, are in direct opposition to the position which he attempts to
maintain. I might push the argument much farther against the power of the
court, but I do not deem it necessary, at least in this stage of the discussion.
If the views which have already been presented be correct, and I do not see
how they can be resisted, the conclusion is inevitable, that the reserved powers
were reserved equally against every department of the government, and as
strongly against the judicial as against the other departments, and, of course,
were left under the exclusive will of the states.

There still remains another misrepresentation of the conduct of the state
which has been made with the view of exciting odium. I allude to the charge,
that South Carolina supported the tariff of 1816, and is, therefore, responsible
for the protective system. To determine the truth of this charge, it becomes
necessary to ascertain the real character of that law — whether it was a tariff
for revenue or for protection — which presents the inquiry, What was the condi
tion of the country at that period ? The late war with Great Britain had just
terminated, which, with the restrictive system that preceded it, had diverted a
large amount of capital and industry from commerce to manufactures, particu
larly to the cotton and woollen branches. There was a debt, at the same time,
of one hundred and thirty millions of dollars hanging over the country, and the
heavy war duties were still in existence. Under these circumstances, the ques
tion was presented, to what point the duties ought to be reduced. That ques
tion involved another — at what time the debt ought to be paid ; which was a
question of policy involving in its consideration all the circumstances connected
with the then condition of the country. Among the most prominent arguments
in favour of an early discharge of the debt was, that the high duties which it
would require to effect it would have, at the same time, the effect of sustaining
the infant manufactures, which had been forced up under the circumstances to
which I have adverted. This view of the subject had a decided influence in,
determining in favour of an early payment of the debt. The sinking fund was,
accordingly, raised from seven to ten millions of dollars, with the provision to
apply the surplus which might remain in the treasury as a contingent appro
priation to that fund ; and the duties were graduated to meet this increased
expenditure. It was thus that the policy and justice of protecting the large
amount of capital and industry which had been diverted by the measures of the
government into new channels, as I have stated, was combined with the fiscal
action of the government, and which, while it secured a prompt payment of the
debt, prevented the immense losses to the manufacturers which would have fol
lowed a sudden and great reduction. Still, revenue was the main object, and
protection but the incidental. The bill to reduce the duties was reported by
the Committee of Ways and Means, and not of Manufactures, and it proposed
a heavy reduction on the then existing rate of duties. But what of itself, with
out other evidence, was decisive as to the character of the bill, is the fact that
it fixed a much higher rate of duties on the unprotected than on the protected
articles. I will enumerate a few leading articles only: woollen and cotton

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 71

above the value of 25 cents on the square yard, though they were the leading
objects of protection, were subject to a permanent duty of only 20 per cent.
Iron, another leading article among the protected, had a protection of not more
than 9 per cent, as fixed by the act, and of but fifteen as reported in the bill.
These rates were all below the average duties as fixed in the act, including
the protected, the unprotected, and even the free articles. I have entered into
some calculation, in order to ascertain the average rate of duties under the act.
There is some uncertainty in the data, but I feel assured that it is not less than
thirty per cent, ad valorem : showing an excess of the average duties above that
imposed on the protected articles enumerated of more than 10 per cent., and
thus clearly establishing the character of the measure — that it was for revenue,
and not protection.

Looking back, even at this distant period, with all our experience, I perceive
but two errors in the act : the one in reference to iron, and the other the mini
mum duty on coarse cottons. As to the former, I conceive that the bill, as re
ported, proposed a duty relatively too low, which was still farther reduced in
its passage through Congress. The duty, at first, was fixed at seventy-five
cents the hundred weight ; but, in the last stage of its passage, it was reduced,
by a sort of caprice, occasioned by an unfortunate motion, to forty-five cents.
This injustice was severely felt in Pennsylvania, the state, above all others,
most productive of iron ; and was the principal cause of that great reaction
which has since thrown her so decidedly on the side of the protective policy.
The other error was that as to coarse cottons, on which the duty was as much
too high as that on iron was too low. It introduced, besides, the obnoxious
minimum principle, which has since been so mischievously extended ; and to
that extent, I am constrained, in candour, to acknowledge, as I wish to disguise
nothing, the protective principle was recognised by the act of 1816. How this
was overlooked at the time, it is not in my power to say. It escaped my ob- '
servation, which I can account for only on the ground that the principle was
then new, and that my attention was engaged by another important subject
— the question of the currency, then so urgent, and with which, as chairman
of the committee, I was particularly charged. With these exceptions, I again,
repeat, I see nothing in the bill to condemn ; yet it is on the ground that the
members from the state voted for the bill, that the attempt is now made to hold
up Carolina as responsible for the whole system of protection which has since
followed, though she has resisted its progress in every stage. Was there ever
greater injustice ? And how is it to be accounted for, but as forming a part of
that systematic misrepresentation and calumny which has been directed for so
many years, without interruption, against that gallant and generous state ? And
why has she thus been assailed ? Merely because she abstained from taking
any part in the Presidential canvass — believing that it had degenerated into a
mere system of imposition on the people — controlled, almost exclusively, by
those whose object it is to obtain the patronage of the government, and that
without regard to principle or policy. Standing apart from what she considered
a contest in which the public had no interest, she has been assailed by both
parties with a fury altogether unparalleled ; but which, pursuing the course
which she believed liberty and duty required, she has met with a firmness equal
to the fierceness of the assault. In the midst of this attack, I have not escaped.
With a view of inflicting a wound on the state through me, I have been held
up as the author of the protective system, and one of its most strenuous advo
cates. It is with pain that I allude to myself on so deep and grave a subject
as that now under discussion, and which, I sincerely believe, involves the lib
erty of the country. I now regret that, under the sense of injustice whiclj the
remarks of a senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Wilkins) excited for the moment,
I hastily gave my pledge to defend myself against the charge which has been
made in reference to my course in 1816 : not that there will be any difficulty

72 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

in repelling the charge, but because I feel a deep reluctance in turning the dis~
ciission, in any degree, from a subject of so much magnitude to one of so little
importance as the consistency or inconsistency of myself, or any other indi
vidual, particularly in connexion with an event so long since passed. But for
this hasty pledge, I would have remained silent, as to my own course, on this
occasion, and would have borne with patience and calmness this, with the
many other misrepresentations with which I have been so incessantly assailed
for so many years.

The charge that I was the author of the protective system has no other
foundation but that I, in common with the almost entire South, gave my support
to the tariff of 1816. It is true that I advocated that measure, for which I may
rest my defence, without taking any other, on the ground that it was a tariff for
revenue, and not for protection, -which I have established beyond the power of
controversy. But my speech on the occasion has been brought in judgment
against me by the senator from Pennsylvania. I have since cast my eyes over
the speech; and I will surprise, I have no doubt, the senator, by telling him
that, with the exception of some hasty and unguarded expressions, I retract
nothing I uttered on that occasion. I only ask that I may be judged, in refer
ence to it, in that spirit of fairness and justice which is due to the occasion:
taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was delivered, and
bearing in mind that the subject was a tariff for revenue, and not for protection ;
for reducing, and not raising the revenue. But, before I explain the then con
dition of the country, from which my main arguments in favour of the measure
were drawn, it is nothing but an act of justice to myself that I should state a
fact in connexion with my speech, that is necessary to explain what 1 have call
ed hasty and unguarded expressions. My speech was an impromptu ; and, as
such, I apologized to the house, as appears from the speech as printed, for of
fering my sentiments on the question without having duly reflected on the sub
ject. It was delivered at the request of a friend, when I had not previously
the least intention of addressing the house. I allude to Samuel D. Ingham,
then and now, as I am proud to say, a personal and political friend — a man of
talents and integrity — with a clear head, and firm and patriotic heart ; then,
among the leading members of the house : in the palmy state of his political
glory, though now for a moment depressed — depressed, did I say 1 no ! it is
his state which is depressed — Pennsylvania, and not Samuel D. Ingham !
Pennsylvania, which has deserted him under circumstances which, instead of
depressing, ought to have elevated him in her estimation. He came to me,
when sitting at my desk writing, and said that the house was falling into some
confusion, accompanying it with a remark, that I knew how difficult it was to
rally so large a body when once broken on a tax bill, as had been experienced
during the late war. Having a higher opinion of my influence than it deserved,
he requested me to say something to prevent the confusion. I replied that I
was at a loss what to say ; that I had been busily engaged on the currency,
which was then in great confusion, and which, as I have stated, had been pla
ced particularly under my charge, as the chairman of the committee on that
subject. He repeated his request, and the speech which the senator from Penn
sylvania has complimented so highly was the result.

I will ask whether the facts stated ought not, in justice, to be borne in mind,
by those who would hold me accountable, not only for the general scope of the
speech, but for every word and sentence which it contains ? But, in asking this
question, it is not my intention to repudiate the speech. All I ask is, that I
may be judged by the rules which, in justice, belong to the case. Let it be
recollected that the bill was a revenue bill, and, of course, that it was constitu
tional. I need not remind the Senate that, when the measure is constitutional,
all arguments calculated to show its beneficial operation may be legitimately
pressed into service, without taking into consideration whether the subject to

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 73

which the arguments refer be within the sphere of the Constitution or not. If,
for instance, a question were before this body to lay a duty on Bibles, arid a
motion were made to reduce the duty, or admit Bibles duty free, who could doubt
that the argument in favour of the motion, that the increased circulation of the
Bible would be in favour of the morality and religion of the country, would be
strictly proper ? Or who would suppose that he who adduced it had committed
himself on the constitutionality of taking the religion or morals of the country
under the charge of the Federal Government ? Again : .suppose the question,
to be to raise the duty on silk, or any other article of luxury, and that it should
be supported on the ground that it was an article mainly consumed by the rich
and extravagant, could it be fairly inferred that, in the opinion of the speaker,
Congress had a right to pass sumptuary laws ? I only ask that these plain
rules may be applied to my argument on the tariff of 1816. They turn almost
entirely on the benefits which manufactures conferred on the country in time
war, and which no one could doubt. The country had recently passed through
such a state. The world was at that time deeply agitated by the effects of the
great conflict which had so long raged in Europe, and which no one could tell
how soon again might return. Bonaparte had but recently been overthrown ;
the whole southern part of this Continent was in a state of revolution, and was
threatened with the interference of the Holy Alliance, which, had it occurred,
must almost necessarily have involved this country in a most dangerous conflict,
It was under these circumstances that I delivered the speech, in which I urged
the house that, in the adjustment of the tariff, reference ought to be had to a
state of war as well as peace, and that its provisions ought to be fixed on the
compound views of the two periods — making some sacrifice in peace, in order
that less might be made in war. Was this principle false ? and, in urging it, did I
commit myself to that system of oppression since grown up, and which has for
its object the enriching of one portion of the country at the expense of the other ?

The plain rule in all such cases is, that when a measure is proposed, the first
thing is to ascertain its constitutionality ; and, that being ascertained, the next is
its expediency ; which last opens the whole field of argument for and against.
Every topic may be urged calculated to prove it wise or unwise : so in a bill
to raise imposts. It must first be ascertained that the bill is based on the prin
ciples of revenue, and that the money raised is necessary for the wants of
the country. These being ascertained, every argument, direct and indirect, may
be fairly offered, which may go to show that, under all the circumstances, the
provisions of the bill are proper or improper. Had this plain and simple rule
been adhered to, we should never have heard of the complaint against Carolina.
Her objection is not against the improper modification of a bill acknowledged to
be for revenue, but that, under the name of imposts, a power essentially differ
ent from the taxing power is exercised — partaking much more of the character
of a penalty than a tax. Nothing is more common than that things closely re
sembling in appearance should widely and essentially differ in their character.
Arsenic, for instance, resembles flour, yet one is a deadly poison, and the other
that which constitutes the staff of life. So duties imposed, whether for reve
nue or protection, may be called imposts ; though nominally and apparently the
same, yet they differ essentially in their real character.

I shall now return to my speech on the tariff of 1816. To determine what
my opinions really were on the subject of protection at that time, it will be
proper to advert to my sentiments before and after that period. My sentiments
preceding 1816, on this subject, are* matter of record. I came into Congress,
in 1812, a devoted friend and supporter of the then administration ; yet one of
my first efforts was to brave the administration, by opposing its favourite meas
ure, the restrictive system— embargo, non-intercourse, and all — and that upon
the principle of free trade. The system remained in fashion for a time ; but,
after the overthrow of Bonaparte, I reported a bill from the Committee on For-

K

74 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

eign Relations, to repeal the whole system of restrictive measures. While the
bill was under consideration, a worthy man, then a member of the house (Mr.
M'Kim, of Baltimore), moved to except the non-importation act, which he sup
ported on the ground of encouragement to manufactures. I resisted the motion
on the very grounds on which Mr. M'Kim supported it. I maintained that the
manufacturers were then receiving too much protection, and warned its friends
that the withdrawal of the protection which the war and the high duties then
afforded would cause great embarrassment ; and that the true policy, in the
mean time, was to admit foreign goods as freely as possible, in order to dimin
ish the anticipated embarrassment on the return of peace ; intimating, at the
same time, my desire to see the tariff revised, with a view of affording a moder
ate and permanent protection.*

Such was my conduct before 1816. Shortly after that period I left Congress,
and had no opportunity of making known my sentiments in reference to the pro
tective system, which shortly after began to be agitated. But I have the most
conclusive evidence that I considered the arrangement of the revenue, in 1816,
as growing out of the necessity of the case, and due to the consideration of jus
tice ; but that, even at that early period, I was not without my fears that even,
that arrangement would lead to abuse and future difficulties. I regret that I
have been compelled to dwell so long on myself; but trust that, whatever cen
sure may be incurred, will not be directed against me, but against those who
have drawn my conduct into the controversy ; and who may hope, by assailing
my motives, to wound the cause with which I am proud to be identified.

I may add, that all the Southern States voted with South Carolina in support of
the bill : not that they had any interest in manufactures, but on the ground that
they had supported the war, and, of course, felt a corresponding obligation to
sustain those establishments which had grown up under the encouragement it
had incidentally afforded ; while most of the New-England members were op
posed to the measure principally, as I believe, on opposite principles.

I have now, I trust, satisfactorily repelled the charge against the state, and
myself personally, in reference to the tariff of 1816. Whatever support the
state has given the bill, originated in the most disinterested motives.

There was not within the limits of the state, so far as my memory serves me,
a single cotton or wollen establishment. Her whole dependance was on agri
culture, and the cultivation of two great staples, rice and cotton. Her obvious
policy was to keep open the market of the world unchecked and unrestricted :
to buy cheap, and to sell high ; but from a feeling of kindness, combined with a
sense of justice, she added her support to the bill. We had been told by the
agents of the manufacturers that the protection which the measure afforded
would be sufficient ; to which we the more readily conceded, as it was consid
ered a final adjustment of the question.

Let us now turn our eyes forward, and see what has been the conduct of the
parties to this arrangement. Have Carolina and the South disturbed this ad
justment ? No : they have never raised their voice in a single instance against
it, even though this measure, moderate, comparatively, as it is, was felt with
no inconsiderable pressure on their interests. Was this example imitated on
the opposite side? Far otherwise. Scarcely had the president signed his
name, before application was made for an increase of duties, which was repeat
ed, with demands continually growing, till the passage of the act of 1828. What
course now, I would ask, did it become Carolina to pursue in reference to these
demands ? Instead of acquiescing in them, because she had acted generously
in adjusting the tariff of 1816, she saw, in her generosity on that occasion, ad
ditional motives for that firm and decided resistance which she has since made
against the system of protection. She accordingly commenced a systematic
opposition to all farther encroachments, which continued from 1818 till 1828 :
* See Mr. C.'s Speech in the National Intelligencer, April, 1814.

SPEECHES OF JOHN 'C. CALHOUN. 75

by discussions and by resolutions, by remonstrances and by protests through
her Legislature. These all proved insufficient to stem the current of encroach
ment ; but, notwithstanding the heavy pressure on her industry, she never de
spaired of relief till the passage of the act of 1828 — that bill of abominations —
engendered by avarice and political intrigue. Its adoption opened the eyes
of the state, and gave a new character to the controversy. Till then, the ques
tion had been, whether the protective system was constitutional and expedient ;
but, after that, she no longer considered the question whether the right of regu
lating the industry of the states was a reserved or delegated power, but what
right a state possesses to defend her reserved powers against the encroach
ments of the Federal Government : a question on the decision of which the
value of all the reserved powers depends. The passage of the act of 1828, with
all its objectionable features, and under the odious circumstances under which
it was adopted, almost, if not entirely, closed the door of hope through the Gen
eral Government. It afforded conclusive evidence that no reasonable prospect
of relief from Congress could be entertained ; yet, the near approach of the pe
riod of the payment of the public debt, and the elevation of General Jackson to
the presidency, still afforded a ray of hope — not so strong, however, as to pre
vent the state from turning her eyes for final relief to her reserved powers.

Under these circumstances commenced that inquiry into the nature and extent
of the reserved powers of a state, and the means which they afford of resist
ance against the encroachments of the General Government, which has been
pursued with so much zeal and energy, and, I may add, intelligence. Never
was there a political discussion carried on with greater activity, and which
appealed more directly to the intelligence of a community. Throughout the
whole, no address has been made to the low and vulgar passions ; but, on the
contrary, the discussion has turned upon thq higher principles of political econ
omy, connected with the operations of the tariff system, calculated to show its
real bearing on the interests of the state, and on the structure of our political
system ; and to show the true character of the relations between the state and
the General Government, and the means which the states possess of defending
those powers which they reserved in forming the Federal Government.

In this great canvass, men of the most commanding talents and acquirements
have engaged with the greatest ardour ; and the people have been addressed
through every channel — by essays in the public press, and by speeches in their
public assemblies — until they have become thoroughly instructed on the nature
of the oppression, and on the rights which they possess, under the Constitution,
to throw it off.

If gentlemen suppose that the stand taken by the people of Carolina rests on
passion and delusion, they are wholly mistaken. The case is far otherwise.
No community, from the legislator to the ploughman, were ever better instruct
ed in their rights ; and the resistance on which the state has resolved is the
result of mature reflection, accompanied with a deep conviction that their rights
have been violated, and that the means of redress which they have adopted are
consistent with the principles of the Constitution.

But while this active canvass was carried on, which looked to the reserved
powers as the final means of redress if all others failed, the state at the same
time cherished a hope, as I have already stated, that the election of General
Jackson to the presidency would prevent the necessity of a resort to extrem
ities. He was identified with the interests of the staple states ; and, having the
same interest, it was believed that his great popularity — a popularity of the
strongest character, as it rested on military services — would enable him, as they
hoped, gradually to bring down the system of protection, without shock or inju
ry to any interest. Under these views, the canvass in favour of General Jack
son's election to the presidency was carried on with great zeal, in conjunction
with that active inquiry into the reserved powers of the states on which final

76 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

reliance was placed. But little did the people of Carolina dream that the man
•whom they were thus striving to elevate to the highest seat of power would
disappoint all their hopes. Man is, indeed, ignorant of the future ; nor was
there ever a stronger illustration of the observation than is afforded by the re
sult of that election ! The very event on which they had built their hopes has
been turned against them, and the very individual to whom they looked as a de
liverer, and whom, under that impression, they strove for so many years to ele
vate to power, is now the most powerful instrument in the hands of his and
their bitterest opponents to put down them and their cause !

Scarcely had he been elected, when it became apparant, from the organization
of his cabinet, and other indications, that all their expectations of relief through
him were blasted. The admission of a single individual into the cabinet, under
the circumstances which accompanied that admission, threw all into confusion.
The mischievous influence over the President, through which this individual
was admitted into the cabinet, soon became apparent. Instead of turning his
eyes forward to the period of the payment of the public debt, which was then
near at hand, and to the present dangerous political crisis, which was inevita
ble unless averted by a timely and wise system of measures, the attention of
the President was absorbed by mere party arrangements, and circumstances too
disreputable to be mentioned here, except by the most distant allusion.

Here I must pause for a moment to repel a charge which has been so often
made, and which even the President has reiterated in his proclamation — the
charge that I have been actuated, in the part which I have taken, by feelings of
disappointed ambition. I again repeat, that I deeply regret the necessity of
noticing myself in so important a discussion ; and that nothing can induce me
to advert to my own course but the conviction that it is due to the cause, at
which a blow is aimed through me.* It is only in this view that I notice it.

It illy became the chief magistrate to make this charge. The course which
the state took, and which led to the present controversy between her and the
General Government, was taken as far back as 1828 — in the very midst of that
severe canvass which placed him in power — and in that very canvass Carolina
openly avowed and zealously maintained those very principles which he, the
chief magistrate, now officially pronounces to be treason and rebellion. That was
the period at which he ought to have spoken. Having remained silent then, and
having, under his approval, implied by that silence, received the support and the
vote of the state,.!, if a sense of decorum did not prevent it, might recriminate
with the double charge of deception and ingratitude. My object, however, is not
to assail the President, but to defend myself against a most unfounded charge.
The time alone at which the course upon which this charge of disappointed am
bition is founded, will of itself repel it, in the eye of every unprejudiced and
honest man. The doctrine which I now sustain, under the present difficulties,
I openly avowed and maintained immediately after the act of 1828, that " bill
of abominations," as it has been so often and properly termed. AVas I at that
period disappointed in any views of ambition which I might be supposed to en
tertain? I was Vice-president of the United States, elected by an overwhelm
ing majority. I was a candidate for re-election on the ticket with General
Jackson himself, with a certain prospect of a triumphant success of that tick
et, and with a fair prospect of the highest office to which an American citizen
can aspire. What was my course under these prospects ? Did I look to my
own advancement, or to an honest and faithful discharge of my duty ? Let facts
speak for themselves. When the bill to which I have referred came from the
other house to the Senate, the almost universal impression was, that its fate
would depend upon my casting vote. It was known that, as the bill then stood,
the Senate was nearly equally divided ; and as it was a combined measure, ori
ginating with the politicians and manufacturers, and intended as much to bear
upon the Presidential election as to protect manufactures, it was believed that»

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 77

as a stroke of political policy, its fate would be made to depend on my vote, in
order to defeat General Jackson's election, as well as my own. The friends
of General Jackson were alarmed, and I was earnestly entreated to leave the
chair in order to avoid the responsibility, under the plausible argument that, if
the Senate should be equally divided, the bill would be lost without the aid of
my casting vote. The reply to this entreaty was, that no consideration person
al to myself could induce me to take such a course ; that I considered the
measure as of the most dangerous character, and calculated to produce the most
fearful crisis ; that the payment of the public debt was just at hand ; and that the
great increase of revenue which it would pour into the treasury would acceler
ate the approach of that period, and that the country would be placed, in the
most trying of situations — with an immense revenue without the means of ab
sorption upon any legitimate or constitutional object of appropriation, and would
be compelled to submit to all the corrupting consequences of a large surplus, or
to make a sudden reduction of the rates of duties, which would prove ruinous to
the very interests which were then forcing the passage of the bill. Under these
views I determined to remain in the chair, and if the bill came to me, to give
my casting vote against it, and in doing so, to give my reasons at large ; but at
the same time I informed my friends that I would retire from the ticket, so that
the election of General Jackson might not be embarrassed by any act of mine.
Sir, I was amazed at the folly and infatuation of that period. So completely
absorbed was Congress in the gajne of ambition and avarice, from the double
impulse of the manufacturers and politicians, that none but a few appeared to
anticipate the present crisis, at which now all are alarmed, but which is the in
evitable result of what was then done. . As to myself, I clearly foresaw what
has since followed. The road of ambition lay open before me — I had but to
follow the corrupt tendency of the times — but I chose to tread the rugged path
of duty.

It was thus that the reasonable hope of relief through the election of Gen
eral Jackson was blasted ; but still one other hope remained, that the final dis
charge of the public debt — an event near at hand — would remove our burden.
That event would leave in the treasury a large surplus : a surplus that could
not be expended under the most extravagant schemes of appropriation, having
the least colour of decency or constitutionality. That event at last arrived.
At the last session of Congress, it was avowed on all sides that the public debt,
for all practical purposes, was in fact paid, the small surplus remaining being
nearly covered by the money in the treasury and the bonds for duties, which
had already accrued ; but with the arrival of this event our last hope was doom
ed to be disappointed. After a long session of many months, and the most ear
nest effort on the part of South Carolina and the other Southern States to obtain
relief, all that could be effected was a small reduction in the amount of the du
ties ; but a reduction of such a character, that, while it diminished the amount
of burden, distributed that burden more unequally than even the obnoxious act
of 1828 : reversing the principle adopted by the bill of 1816, of laying higher
duties on the unprotected than the protected articles, by repealing almost en
tirely the duties laid upon the former, and imposing the burden almost entirely
on the latter. It was thus that, instead of relief — instead of an equal distribu
tion of the burdens and benefits of the government, on the payment of the debt,
as had been fondly anticipated — the duties were so arranged as to be, in fact,
bounties on one side and taxation on the other : thus placing the two great sec
tions of the country in direct conflict in reference to its fiscal action, and there
by letting in that flood of political corruption which threatens to sweep away
our Constitution and our liberty.

This unequal'and unjust arrangement was pronounced, both by the adminis
tration, through its proper organ, the secretary of the treasury, arid by the op
position, to be a permanent adjustment; and it was thus that all hope of relief

78 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOTIN.

through the action of the General Government terminated, and the crisis so long
apprehended at length arrived, at which the state was compelled to choose be
tween absolute acquiescence in a ruinous system of oppression, or a resort to
her reserved powers — powers of which she alone was the rightful judge, and
which only, in this momentous juncture, can save her. She determined on the
latter.

The consent of two thirds of her Legislature was necessary for the call of a
convention, which was considered the only legitimate organ through which the
people, in their sovereignty, could speak. After an arduous struggle, the State
Rights party succeeded : more than two thirds of both branches of the Legisla
ture favourable to a convention were elected ; a convention was called — the
ordinance adopted. The convention was succeeded by a meeting of the Legis
lature, when the laws to carry the ordinance into execution were enacted : all
of which have been communicated by the President, have been referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary, and this bill is the result of their labour.

Having now corrected some of the prominent misrepresentations as to the na
ture of this controversy, and given a rapid sketch of the movement of the state
in reference to it, I will next proceed to notice some objections connected with
the ordinance and the proceedings under it.

The first and most prominent of these is directed against what is called the
test oath, which an effort has been made to render odious. So far from de
serving the denunciation which has been levelled against it, I view this provis
ion of the ordinance as but the natural result of the doctrines entertained by
the state, and the position which she occupies. The people of that state be
lieve that the Union is a union of states, and not of individuals ; that it was
formed by the states, and that the citizens of the several states were bound to it
through the acts of their several states ; that each state ratified the Constitution
for itself, and that it was only by such ratification of a state that any obligation
was imposed upon the citizens : thus believing, it is the opinion of the people
of Carolina that it belongs to the state which has imposed the obligation to de
clare, in the last resort, the extent of this obligation, as far as her citizens are
concerned ; and this upon the plain principles which exist in all analogous
cases of compact between sovereign bodies. On this principle, the people of
the state, acting in their sovereign capacity in convention, precisely as they
adopted their own and the federal Constitution, haved eclared by the ordi
nance, that the acts of Congress which imposed duties under the authority to
lay imposts, are acts, not for revenue, as intended by the Constitution, but for
protection, and therefore null and void. The ordinance thus enacted by the
people of the state themselves, acting as a sovereign community, is as obliga
tory on the citizens of the state as any portion of the Constitution. In pre
scribing, then, the oath to obey the ordinance, no more was done than to pre
scribe an oath to obey the Constitution. It is, in fact, but a particular oath of
allegiance, and in every respect similar to that which is prescribed under the
Constitution of the United States, to be administered to all the officers of the
State and Federal Governments ; and is no more deserving the harsh and bit
ter epithets which have been heaped upon it than that, or any similar oath. It
ought to be borne in mind, that, according to the opinion which prevails in Caro
lina, the right of resistance to the unconstitutional laws of Congress belongs to
the state, and not to her individual citizens ; and that, though the latter may, in
a mere' question of meum and tuum, resist, through the courts, an unconstitu
tional encroachment upon their rights, yet the final stand against usurpation
rests not with them, but with the state of which they are members ; and such
act of resistance by a state birds the conscience and allegiance of the citizen.
But there appears to be a general misapprehension as to- the extent to which
the state has acted under this part of the ordinance. Instead of sweeping every
officer by a general proscription of the minority, as has been represented in de-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 79

bate, as far as my knowledge extends, not a single individual has been remo
ved. The state has, in fact, acted with the greatest tenderness, all circumstan-
.ces considered, towards citizens who differed from the majority ; and, in that,
spirit, has directed the oath to be administered only in cases of some official
act directed to be performed in which obedience to the ordinance is involved.

It has been farther objected that the state has acted precipitately. What !
precipitately ! after making a strenuous resistance for twelve years — by discus
sion here and in the other house of Congress — by essays in all forms — by res
olutions, remonstrances, and protests on the part of her Legislature — and, final
ly, by attempting an appeal to the judicial power of the United States ? I say
attempting, for they have been prevented from bringing the question fairly be
fore the court, and that by an act of that very majority in Congress who now
upbraid them for not making that appeal : of that majority who, on a motion of
one of the members in the other house from South Carolina, refused to give to
the act of 1828 its true title — that it was a protective, and not a revenue act.
The state has never, it is true, relied upon that tribunal, the Supreme Court, to
vindicate its reserved rights ; yet they have always considered it as an auxili
ary means of defence, of which they would gladly have availed themselves to
test the constitutionality of protection, had they not been deprived of the means
of doing so by the act of the majority.

Notwithstanding this long delay of more than ten years, under this continued
encroachment of the government, we now hear it on all sides, by friends and foes,
gravely pronounced that the state has acted precipitately — that her conduct has
been rash ! That such should be the language of an interested majority, who,
by means of this unconstitutional and oppressive system, are annually extorting
millions from the South to be bestowed upon other sections, is not at all sur
prising. Whatever impedes the course of avarice and ambition will ever be de
nounced as rash and precipitate ; and had South Carolina delayed her resist
ance fifty instead of twelve years, she would have heard from the same quarter
the same language ; but it is really surprising that those who are suffering in
common with herself, and who have complained equally loud of their grievan
ces, who have pronounced the very acts which she has asserted within her
limits to be oppressive, unconstitutional, and ruinous, after so long a struggle — a
struggle longer than that which preceded the separation of these states from the
mother-country — longer than the period of the Trojan war — should now com
plain of precipitancy ! No, it is not Carolina which has acted precipitately ; but
her sister states, who have suffered in common with her, have acted tardily.
Had they acted as she has done, had they performed their duty with equal en
ergy and promptness, our situation this day would be very different from what
we now find it. Delays are said to be dangerous ; and never was the maxim
more true than in the present case, a case of monopoly. It is the very nature
of monopolies to grow. If we take from one side a large portion of the pro
ceeds of its labour and give it to the other,, the side from which we take must
constantly decay, and that to which we give must prosper and increase. Such
is the action of the protective system. It exacts from the South a large portion
of the proceeds of its industry, which it bestows upon the other sections, in the
shape of bounties to manufactures, and appropriations in a thousand forms ;
pensions, improvement of rivers and harbours, roads and canals, and in every
shape that wit or ingenuity can devise. Can we, then, be surprised that the
principle of monopoly grows, when it is so amply remunerated at the expense
of those who support it ? And this is the real reason of the fact which we wit
ness, that all acts for protection pass with small minorities, but soon come to be
sustained by great and overwhelming majorities. Those who seek the monop
oly endeavour to obtain it in the most exclusive shape ; and they take care,
accordingly, to associate only a sufficient number of interests barely to pass it
through the two hoiftes of Congress, on the plain principle that the greater the

80 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

number from whom the monopoly takes, and the fewer on whom it bestows, the
greater is the advantage to the monopolists. Acting in this spirit, we have
often seen with what exact precision they count : adding wool to woollens, as
sociating lead and iron, feeling their way, until a bare majority is obtained,
when the bill passes, connecting just as many interests as are sufficient to ensure
its success, and no more. In a short time, however, we have invariably found
that this lean becomes a decided majority, under the certain operation which
compels individuals to desert the pursuits which the monopoly has rendered
unprofitable, that they may participate in those pursuits which it has rendered
profitable. It is against this dangerous and growing disease which South Car
olina has acted : a disease whose cancerous action would soon have spread to
every part of the system, if not arrested.

There is another powerful reason why the action of the state could not have
been safely delayed. The public debt, as I have already stated, for all practi
cal purposes, has already been' paid; and, under the existing duties, a large
annual surplus of many millions must come into the treasury. It is impossi
ble to look at this state of things without seeing the most mischievous conse
quences : and, among others, if not speedily corrected, it would interpose pow
erful and almost insuperable obstacles to throwing off the burden under which
the South has been so long labouring. The disposition of the surplus would
become a subject of violent and corrupt struggle, and could not fail to rear up
new and powerful interests in support of the existing system, not only in those
sections which have been heretofore benefited by it, but even in the South itself.
I cannot but trace to the anticipation of this state of the treasury the sudden
and extraordinary movements which took place at the last session in the Vir
ginia Legislature, in which the whole South is vitally interested.* It is im
possible for any rational man to believe that that state could seriously have
thought of effecting the scheme to which I allude by her own resources, with
out powerful aid from the General Government.

It is next objected, that the enforcing acts have legislated the United States
out of South Carolina. I have already replied to this objection on another oc
casion, and will now but repeat what I then said : that they have been legisla
ted out only to the extent that they had no right to enter. The Constitution
has admitted the jurisdiction of the United States within the limits of the sev
eral states only so far as the delegated powers authorize ; beyond that they are
intruders, and may rightfully be expelled ; and that they have been efficiently
expelled by the legislation of tjie state through her civil process, as has bseji
acknowledged on all sides in the debate, is only a confirmation of the truth of
the doctrine for which the majority in Carolina have contended.

The very point at issue between the two parties there is, whether nullifica
tion is a peaceable and an efficient remedy against an unconstitutional act of the
General Government, and which may be asserted as such through the state tri
bunals. Both parties agree that the acts against which it is directed are un
constitutional and oppressive. The controversy is only as to the means by
which our citizens may be protected against the acknowledged encroachments
on their rights. This being the point at issue between the parties, and the
very object of the majority being an efficient protection of the citizens through
the state tribunals, the measures adopted to enforce the ordinance of course
received the most decisive character. We were not children, to act by halves.
Yet for acting thus efficiently the state is denounced, and this bill reported, to
overrule, by military force, the civil tribunals and civil process of the state !
Sir, I consider this bill, and the arguments which have been urged on this floor
in its support, as the most triumphant acknowledgment that nullification is
peaceful and efficient, and so deeply intrenched in the principles of our system,

* Having for their object the emancipation and colonization of slaves.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 81

that it cannot be assailed but by prostrating the Constitution, and substituting
the supremacy of military force in lieu of the supremacy of the laws. In fact,
the advocates of this bill refute their own argument. They tell us that the or
dinance is unconstitutional ; that they infract the Constitution of South Carolina,
although, to me, the objection appears absurd, as it was adopted by the very
authority which adopted the Constitution itself. They also tell us that the Su
preme Court is the appointed arbiter of all controversies between a state and
the General Government. Why, then, do they not leave this controversy to
that tribunal ? Why do they not confide to them the abrogation of the ordi
nance, and the laws made in pursuance of it, and the assertion of that suprema
cy which they claim for the laws of Congress ? The state stands pledged to
resist no process of the court. Why, then, confer on the President the exten
sive and unlimited powers provided in this bill ? Why authorize him to use
military force ta arrest the civil process of the state ? But one answer can be
given : That, in a contest between the state and the General Government, if
the resistance be limited on both sides to the civil process, the state, by its in
herent sovereignty, standing upon its reserved powers, will prove too powerful
in such a controversy, arid must triumph over the Federal Government, sustain
ed by its delegated and limited authority ; and in this answer we have an ac
knowledgment of the truth of those great principles for which the state has so
fomly and nobly contended.

Having made these remarks, the .great question is now presented, Has Con
gress the right to pass this bill ? which I will next proceed to consider. The
decision of this question involves the inquiry into the provisions of the bill.
What are they ? It puts at the disposal of the President the army and navy, and
the entire militia of the country ; it enables him, at his pleasure, to subject every
man in the United States, not exempt from militia duty, to martial law : to call
fcim from his ordinary occupation to the field, and under the penalty of fine and im
prisonment, inflicted by a court-martial, to compel him to imbrue his hand in his
brothers' blood. There is no limitation on the power of the sword, and that
over the purse is equally without restraint; for, among the extraordinary fea
tures of the bill, it contains no appropriation, which, under existing circumstan
ces, is tantamount to an unlimited appropriation. The President may, under its
authority, incur any expenditure, and pledge the national faith to meet it. He
may create a new national debt, at the very moment of the termination of the
former — a debt of millions, to be paid out of the proceeds of the labour of that
section of the country whose dearest constitutional rights this bill prostrates !
Thus exhibiting the extraordinary spectacle, that the very section of the coun
try which is urging this measure, and carrying the sword of devastation against
us, are, at the same time, incurring a new debt, to be paid by those whose rights
are violated ; while those who violate them are to receive the benefits, in the
shape of bounties and expenditures.

And for what purpose is the unlimited control of the purse and of the sword
thus placed at the disposition of the executive ? To make war against one of
the free and sovereign members of this confederation, which the bill proposes
to deal with, not as a state, but as a collection of banditti or outlaws. Thus ex
hibiting the impious spectacle of this government, the creature of the states,
making war against the power to which it owes its existence.

The bill violates the Constitution, plainly and palpably, in many of its pro
visions, by authorizing the President, at his pleasure, to place the different
ports of this Union on an unequal footing, contrary to that provision of the Con
stitution which declares that no preference shall be given to one port over
another. It also violates the Constitution by authorizing him, at his discretion.
to impose cash duties on one port, while credit is allowed in others ; by enabling
the President to regulate commerce, a power vested in Congress alone ; and by
drawing within the jurisdiction of the United States courts powers never in-

L *

82 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

tended to be conferred on them. As great as these objections are, they become
insignificant in the provisions of a bill which, by a single blow — by treating the
states as a mere lawless mass of individuals — prostrates all the barriers of the
Constitution. I will pass over the minor considerations, and proceed directly'
to the great point. This bill proceeds on the ground that the entire sovereignty
of this country belongs to the American people, as forming one great community,
and regards the states as mere fractions or counties, and not as an integral part
of the Union : having no more right to resist the encroachments of the govern
ment than a county has to resist the authority of a state ; and treating such re
sistance as the lawless acts of so many individuals, without possessing sover
eignty or political rights. It has been said that the bill declares war against
South Carolina. No. It decrees a massacre of her citizens ! War has some
thing ennobling about it, and, with all its horrors, brings into action the highest
qualities, intellectual and moral. It was, perhaps, in the order of Providence
that it should be permitted for that very purpose. But this bill declares no war,
except, indeed, it be that which savages wage — a war, not against the commu
nity, but the citizens of whom that community is composed. But I regard it as
worse than savage warfare — as an attempt to take away life under the colour of
law, without the trial by jury, or any other safeguard which the Constitution has
thrown around the life of the citizen ! It authorizes the President, or even his
deputies, when they may suppose the law to be violated, without the interven
tion of a court or jury, to kill without mercyuor discrimination !

It has been said by the senator from Tennessee (Mr. Grundy) to be a meas
ure of peace ! Yes, such peace as the wolf gives to the lamb — the kite to the
dove ! Such peace as Russia gives to Poland, or death to its victim ! A peace,
by extinguishing the political existence of the state, by awing her into an aban
donment of the exercise of every power which constitutes her a sovereign com-
munity. It is to South Carolina a question of self-preservation ; and I proclaim
it, that, should this bill pass, and an attempt be made to enforce it, it will be
resisted, at every hazard — even that of death itself. Death is not the greatest
calamity : there are others still more terrible to the free and brave, and among
them may be placed the loss of liberty and honour. There are thousands of
her brave sons who, if need be, are prepared cheerfully to lay down their lives in
defence of the state, and the great principles of constitutional liberty for which
she is contending. God forbid that this should become necessary ! It never
can be, unless this government is resolved to bring the question to extremity, when
her gallant sons will stand prepared to perform the last duty — to die nobly.

I go on the ground that this Constitution was made by the states ; that it is a
federal union of the states, in which the several states still retain their sover
eignty. If these views be correct, I have not characterized the bill too strongly,
which presents the question whether they be or be not. I will riot enter into
the discussion of that question now. I will rest it, for the present, on what I
have said on the introduction of the resolutions now on the table, under a hope
that another opportunity will be afforded for more ample discussion. I will, for
the present, confine my remarks to the objections which have been raised to
the views which I presented when I introduced them. The authority of Luther
Martin has~been adduced by the senator from Delaware, to prove that the citi
zens of a state, acting under the authority of a state, are liable to be punished
as traitors by this government. As eminent as Mr. Martin was as a lawyer,
and as high as his authority may be considered on a legal point, I cannot ac
cept it in determining the point at issue. The attitude which he occupied, if
taken into view, would lessen, if not destroy, the weight of his authority. He
had been violently opposed in Convention to the Constitution, and the very let
ter from which the senator has quoted was intended to dissuade Maryland from
its adoption. With this view, it was to be expected that every consideration
calculated to effect that object should be urged ; that real objections should be

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALIIOUN. 83

exaggerated ; and that those having no foundation, except mere plausible deduc
tions, should be presented. It is to this spirit that I attribute the opinion of
Mr. Martin in reference to the point under consideration. But if his authority
be good on one point, it must be admitted to be equally so on another. If his
opinion be sufficient to prove that a citizen of the state may be punished as a
traitor when acting under allegiance to the state, it is also sufficient to show
that no authority was intended to be given in the Constitution for the protection
of manufactures by the General Government, and that the provision in the Con
stitution permitting a state to lay an impost duty, with the consent of Congress,
was intended to reserve the right of protection to the states themselves, arid
that each state should protect its own industry. Assuming his opinion to be
of equal authority on both points, how embarrassing would be the attitude in
which it would place the senator from Delaware, and those with whom he is
acting — that of using the sword and the bayonet to enforce the execution of an
unconstitutional act of Congress. I must express my surprise that the slightest
authority in favour of power should be received as the most conclusive evidence,
while that which is, at least, equally strong in favour of right and liberty, is
wholly overlooked or rejected.

Notwithstanding all that has been said, I must say that neither the senator
from Delaware (Mr. Clayton), nor any other who has spoken on the same side,
has directly and fairly met the great questions at issue : Is this a federal union ?
a union of states, as distinct from that of individuals ? Is the sovereignty in the
several states, or in -the American people in the aggregate ? The very language
which we are compelled to use, when speaking of our political institutions, af
fords proof conclusive as to its real character. The terms union, federal, uni
ted, all imply a combination of sovereignties, a confederation of states. They
are never applied to an association of individuals. Who ever heard of the Uni
ted State of New- York, of Massachusetts, or of Virginia ? Who ever heard
the term federal or union applied to the aggregation of individuals into one
community ? Nor is the other point less clear — that the sovereignty is in the
several states, and that our system is a union of twenty-four sovereign powers,
under a constitutional compact, and not of a divided sovereignty between the
states severally and the United States. In spite of all that has been said, I
maintain that sovereignty is in its nature indivisible. It is the supreme power
in a state, and we might just as well speak of half a square, or half of a trian
gle, as of half a sovereignty. It is a gross error to confound the exercise of
sovereign powers with sovereingty itself, or the delegation of such powers with
a. surrender of them. A sovereign may delegate his powers to be exercised by
as many agents as he may think proper, under such conditions and with such
limitations as he may impose ; but to surrender any portion of his sovereignty
to another is to annihilate the whole. The senator from Delaware (Mr. Clay
ton) calls this metaphysical reasoning, which, he says, he cannot comprehend.
If by metaphysics he means that scholastic refinement which makes distinc
tions without difference, no one can hold it in more utter contempt than I do ;
but if, on the contrary, he means the power of analysis and combination — that
power which reduces the most complex idea into its elements, which traces
causes to their first principle, and, by the power of generalization and combi
nation, unites the whole in one harmonious system — then, so far from deserv
ing contempt, it is the highest attribute of the human mind. It is the power
which raises man above the brute — which distinguishes his faculties from mere
sagacity, which he holds in common with inferior animals. It is this power
which has raised the astronomer from being a mere gazer at the stars to the
high intellectual eminence of a Newton or Laplace, and astronomy itself from
a mere observation of insulated facts into that noble science which displays to
our admiration the system of the universe. And shall this high power of the
mind, which has effected such wonders when directed to the laws which con-

84 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

trol the material world, be forever prohibited, under a senseless cry of metaphys
ics, from being applied to the high purpose of political science and legislation ?
I hold them to be subject to laws as fixed as matter itself, and to be as fit a
subject for the application of the highest intellectual power. Denunciation may,
indeed, fall upon the philosophical inquirer into these first principles, as it did
upon Galileo and Bacon when they first unfolded the great discoveries which
have immortalized their names ; but the time will come when truth will pre
vail in spite of prejudice and denunciation, and when politics aud legislation
will be considered as much a science as astronomy and chemistry.

In connexion with this part of the subject, I understood the senator from Vir
ginia (Mr. Rives) to say that sovereignty was divided, and that a portion re
mained with the states severally, and that the residue was vested in the Union.
By Union, I suppose the senator meant the United States. If such be his
meaning — if he intended to affirm that the sovereignty was in the twenty-four
states, in whatever light he may view them, our opinions will not disagree ; but,
according to my conception, the whole sovereignty is in the several states, while
the exercise of sovereign powers is divided — a part being exercised under com
pact, through this General Government, and the residue through the separate
state governments. But if the senator from Virginia (Mr. Rives) means to as
sert that the twenty-four states form but one community, with a single sovereign
power as to the objects of the Union, it will be but the revival of the old ques
tion, of whether the Union is a union between states, as distinct communities,
or a mere aggregate of the American people, as a mass of individuals ; and in
this light his opinions would lead directly to consolidation.

But to return to the bill. It is said that the bill ought to pass, because the
law must be enforced. The law must be enforced. The imperial edict must
be executed. It is under such sophistry, couched in general terms, without
looking to the limitations which must ever exist in the practical exercise of
power, that the most cruel and despotic acts ever have been covered. It was
such sophistry as this that cast Daniel into the lion's den, and the three Inno
cents into the fiery furnace. Under the same sophistry the bloody edicts of
Nero and Caligula were executed. The law must be enforced. Yes, the act
imposing the " tea-tax must be executed." This was the very argument which
impelled Lord North and his administration in that mad career which forever
separated us from the British crown. Under a similar sophistry, " that religion
must be protected," how many massacres have been perpetrated ? and how many
martyrs have been tied to the stake ? What ! acting on this vague abstraction,
are you prepared to enforce a law without considering whether it be just or un
just, constitutional or unconstitutional ? Will you collect money when it is ac
knowledged that it is not wanted ? He who earns the money, who digs it from
the earth with the sweat of his brow, has a just title to it against the universe.
No one has a right to touch it without his consent except his government, and
it only to the extent of its legitimate wants ; to take more is robbery, and you
propose by this bill to enforce robbery by murder. Yes : to this result you
must come, by this miserable sophistry, this vague abstraction of enforcing the
law, without a regard to the fact whether the law be just or unjust, constitution
al or unconstitutional.

In the same spirit, we are told that the Union must be preserved, without re
gard to the means. And how is it proposed to preserve the Union? By
force ! Does any man in his senses believe that this beautiful structure — this
harmonious aggregate of states, produced by the joint consent of all — can be
preserved by force ? Its very introduction will be certain destruction of this
Federal Union. No, no. You cannot keep the states united in their consti
tutional and federal bonds by force. Force may, indeed, hold the parts togeth
er, but such union Avould be the bond between master and slave : a union of
exaction on one side, and of unqualified obedience on the other. That obedience

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 55

which, we are told by the senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Wilkins), is the
Union ! Yes, exaction on the side of the master ; for this very bill is intend
ed to collect what can be no longer called taxes — the voluntary contribution of
a free people — but tribute — tribute to be collected under the mouths of the can
non ! Your custom-house is already transferred to a garrison, and that garri
son with its batteries turned, not against the enemy of your country, but on sub
jects (I will not say citizens), on whom you propose to levy contributions. Has
reason fled from our borders ? Have we ceased to reflect ? It is madness
to suppose that the Union can be preserved by force. I tell you plainly, that
the bill, should it pass, cannot be enforced. It will prove only a blot upon your
statute-book, a reproach to the year, and a disgrace to the American Senate.
I repeat that it will not be executed : it will rouse the dormant spirit of the
people, and open their eyes to the approach of despotism. The country has
sunk into avarice and political corruption, from which nothing can arouse it but
some measure, on the part of the government, of folly and madness, such as
that now under consideration.

Disguise it as you may, the controversy is one between power and liberty ;
and I will tell the gentlemen who are opposed to me, that, as strong as may be
the love of power on their side, the love of liberty is still stronger on ours.
History furnishes many instances of similar struggles where the love of liberty
has prevailed against power under every disadvantage, and among them few
more striking than that of our own Revolution ; where, as strong as was the pa
rent country, and feeble as were the colonies, yet, under the impulse of liberty,
and the blessing of God, they gloriously triumphed in the contest. There are,
indeed, many and striking analogies between that and the present controversy :
they both originated substantially in the same cause, with this difference, that,
in the present case, the power of taxation is converted into that of regulating
industry ; in that, the power of regulating industry, by the regulation of com
merce, was attempted to be converted into the power of taxation. Were I to
trace the analogy farther, we should find that the perversion of the taxing pow
er, in one case, has given precisely the same control to the Northern section
over the industry of the Southern section of the Union, which the power to reg
ulate commerce gave to Great Britain over the industry of the colonies ; and
that the very articles in which the colonies were permitted to have a free trade,
and those in which the mother-country had a monopoly, are almost identically
the same as those in which the Southern States are permitted to have a free
trade by the act of 1832, and in which the Northern States have, by the same
act, secured a monopoly : the only difference is in the means. In the former,
the colonies were permitted to have a free trade with all countries south of
Cape Finisterre. a cape in the" northern part of Spain ; while north of that
the trade of the colonies was prohibited, except through the mother-country, by
means of her commercial regulations. If we compare the products of the coun
try north and south of Cape Finisterre, we shall find them almost identical with
the list of the protected and unprotected articles contained in the act of last
year. Nor does the analogy terminate here. The very arguments resorted
to at the commencement of the American Revolution, and the measures adopt
ed, and the motives assigned to bring on that contest (to enforce the law), are
almost identically the same.

But to return from this digression to the consideration of the bill. Whatever
difference of opinion may exist upon other points, there is one on which I should
suppose there can be none : that this bill rests on principles which, if carried
out, will ride over state sovereignties, and that it will be idle for any of its ad
vocates hereafter to talk of state rights. The senator from Virginia (Mr. Rives)
says that he is the advocate of state rights ; but he must permit me to tell him
that, although he may differ in premises from the other gentlemen with whom
he acts on this occasion, yet in supporting this bill he obliterates every vestige

86 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

of distinction between him and them, saving only that, professing the principles
of '98, his example will be more pernicious than that of the most open and bit
ter opponents of the rights of the states. I will also add, what I am compelled
to say, that I must consider him (Mr. Rives) as less consistent than our old
opponents, whose conclusions were fairly drawn from their premises, while
his premises ought to have led him to opposite conclusions. The gentleman
has told us that the new-fangled doctrines, as he chooses to call them, have
brought state rights into disrepute. I must tell him, in reply, that what he calls
new-fangled are but the doctrines of '98 ; and that it is he (Mr. Rives), and
others with him, who, professing these doctrines, have degraded them by ex
plaining away their meaning and efficacy. He (Mr. R.)has disclaimed, in be
half of Virginia, the authorship of nullification. I will not dispute that point.
If Virginia chooses to throw away one of her brightest ornaments, she must
not hereafter complain that it has become the property of another. But while
I have, as a representative of Carolina, no right to complain of the disavowal
of the senator from Virginia, I must believe that he (Mr. R.) has done his na
tive state great injustice by declaring on this floor that, when she gravely re-
solved, in '98, that, " in cases of deliberate and dangerous infractions of the Con
stitution, the states, as parties to the compact, have the right, and are in 'duty
bound, to interpose to arrest the progress of the evil, and to maintain within their
respective limits the authorities, rights, and liberties appertaining to them," she
meant no more than to ordain the right to protest and to remonstrate. To sup
pose that, in putting forth so solemn a declaration, which she afterward sustain
ed by so able arid elaborate an argument, she meant no more than to assert what
no one had ever denied, would be to suppose that the state had been guilty of
the most egregious trifling that ever was exhibited on so solemn an occasion.

In reviewing the ground over which I have passed, it will be apparent that
the question in controversy involves that most deeply important of all political
questions, whether ours is a federal or a consolidated government : a question,
on the decision of which depend, as I solemnly believe, the liberty of the peo
ple, their happiness, and the place which we are destined to hold in the moral
and intellectual scale of nations. Never was there a controversy in which
'more important consequences were involved : not excepting that between Per
sia and Greece, decided by the battles of Marathon, Platea, and Salamis ;
which gave ascendency to the genius of Europe over that of Asia ; and which,
in its consequences, has continued to affect the destiny of so large a portion of
the world even to this day. There is often close analogies between events ap
parently very remote, which are strikingly illustrated in this case. In the great
contest between Greece and Persia, between European and Asiatic polity and
civilization, the very question between the federal and consolidated form of gov
ernment was involved. The Asiatic governments, from the remotest time, with
some exceptions on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean, have been based
on the principle of consolidation, which considers the whole community as but
a unit, and consolidates its powers in a central point. The opposite principle
has prevailed in Europe — Greece, throughout all her states, was based on a
federal system. All were united in one common, but loose bond, and the gov
ernments of the several states partook, for the most part, of a complex organi
zation, which distributed political power among different members of the com
munity. The same principles prevailed in ancient Italy ; and, if we turn to the
Teutonic race, our great ancestors — the race which occupies the first place in
power, civilization, and science, and which possesses the largest and the fairest
part of Europe — we shall find that their governments were based on the federal
organization, as has been clearly illustrated by a recent and able writer on the
British Constitution (Mr. Palgrave). from whose writings I introduce the follow
ing extract :

" In this manner the first establishment of the Teutonic States was effected.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 87

They were assemblages of septs, clans, and tribes ; they were confederated
hosts and armies, led on by princes, magistrates, and chieftains ; each of whom
was originally independent, and each of whom lost a portion of his pristine in
dependence in proportion as he and his compeers became united under the su
premacy of a sovereign, who was superinduced upon the state, first as a milita
ry commander, and afterward as a king. Yet, notwithstanding this political con
nexion, each member of the state continued to retain a considerable portion of
the rights of sovereignty. Every ancient Teutonic monarchy must be consid
ered as a federation : it is not a unit, of which the smaller bodies politic there
in contained are the fractions, but they are the integers, and the state is the
multiple which results from them. Dukedoms and counties, burghs and baron
ies, towns and townships, and shires, form the kingdom ; all, in a certain de
gree, strangers to each other, and separate in jurisdiction, though all obedient
to the supreme executive authority. This general description, though not al
ways strictly applicable in terms, is always so substantially and in effect ; and
hence it becomes necessary to discard the language which has been very gen
erally employed in treating on the English Constitution. It has been supposed
that the kingdom was reduced into a regular and gradual subordination of gov
ernment, and that the various legal districts of which it is composed arose from
the divisions and subdivisions of the country. But this hypothesis, which tends
greatly to perplex our history, cannot be supported by fact ; and instead of view
ing the Constitution as a whole, and then proceeding to its parts, we must ex
amine it synthetically, and assume that the supreme authorities of the state
were created by the concentration of the powers originally belonging to the
members and corporations of which it is composed." [Here Mr. C. gave way
for a motion to adjourn.]

On the next day Mr. Calhoun said, I have omitted at the proper place, in the
course of my observations yesterday, two or three points, to which I will now
advert, before I resume the discussion where I left off. I have stated that the
ordinance and acts of South Carolina were directed, not against the revenue,
but against the system of protection. But it may be asked, If such was her
object, how happens it that she has declared the whole system void — revenue
as well as protection, without discrimination ? It is this question which I pro
pose to answer. Her justification will be found in the necessity of the case ;
and if there be any blame, it cannot attach to her. The two are so blended,
throuo-hout the whole, as to make the entire revenue system subordinate to the
protective, so as to constitute a complete system of protection, in which it is
impossible to discriminate the two elements of which it is composed. South
Carolina, at least, could not make the discrimination, and she was reduced to the
alternative of acquiescing in a system which she believed to be unconstitution
al, and which she felt to be oppressive and ruinous, or to consider the whole
as one, equally contaminated through all its parts, by the unconstitutionally of
the protective portion, and, as such, to be resisted by the act of the siate. I
maintain that the state has a right to regard it in the latter character, and that,
if a loss of revenue follow, the fault is not hers, but of this government, which
has improperly blended together, in a manner not to be separated by the state,
two systems wholly dissimilar. If the sincerity of the state be doubted ; if it
be supposed that her action is against revenue as well as protection, let the two
be separated : let so much of the duties as are intended for revenue be put in
one bill, and the residue intended for protection be put in another, and I pledge
myself that the ordinance and the acts of the state will cease as to the former,
and be directed exclusively against the latter.

I also stated, in the course of my remarks yesterday, and I trust I have con
clusively shown, that the act of 1816, with the exception of a single item, to
which I have alluded, was, in reality, a revenue measure, and that Carolina and
the other states, in supporting it, have not incurred the slighted responsibility

88 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALIIOUN.

in relation to the system of protection which has since grown up, and which
now so deeply distracts the country. Sir, I am willing, as one of the repre
sentatives of Carolina, and I believe I speak the sentiment of the state, to take
1<hat act as the basis of a permanent adjustment of the tariff, simply reducing the
duties, in an average proportion, on all the items to the revenue point. I make
that offer now to the advocates of the protective system ; but I must, in candour,
inform them that such an adjustment would distribute the revenue between the
protected and unprotected articles more favourably to the state, and to the South,
and less so to the manufacturing interest, than an average uniform ad valorem,
and, accordingly, more so than that now proposed by Carolina through her con
vention. After such an offer, no man who values his candour will dare accuse
the state, or those who have represented her here, with inconsistency in refer
ence to the point under consideration.

. I omitted, also, on yesterday, to notice a remark of the senator from Virginia
(Mr. Rives), that the only difficulty in adjusting the tariff grew out of the ordi
nance and the acts of South Carolina. I must attribute an assertion so incon
sistent with the facts to an ignorance of the occurrences of the last few years
in reference to this subject, occasioned by the absence of the gentleman from
the United States, to which he himself has alluded in his remarks. If the sen
ator will take pains to inform himself, he will find that this protective system
advanced with a continued and rapid step, in spite of petitions, remonstrances,
and protests, of not only Carolina, but also of Virginia and of all the Southern
States, until 1828, when Carolina, for the first time, changed the character of
her resistance, by holding up her reserved rights as the shield of her defence
against farther encroachment. This attitude alone, unaided by a single state,
arrested the farther progress of the system, so that the question from that pe
riod to this, on the part of the manufacturers, has been, not how to acquire
more, but to retain that which they have acquired. I will inform the gentle
man that, if this attitude had not been taken on the part of the state, the ques
tion would not now be how duties ought to be repealed, but a question, as to
the protected articles, between prohibition on one side and the duties establish
ed by the act of 1828 on the other. But a single remark will be sufficient ia
reply to what I must consider the invidious remark of the senator from Virgin
ia (Mr. Rives). The act of 1832, which has not yet gone into operation, and
which was passed but a few months since, was declared by the supporters of
the system to be a permanent adjustment, and the bill proposed by the Treasury
Department, not essentially different from the act itself, was in like manner de
clared to be intended by the administration as a permanent arrangement.
What has occurred since, except this ordinance, and these abused acts of the
calumniated state, to produce this mighty revolution in reference to this odious
system ? Unless the senator from Virginia can assign some other cause, he is
bound, upon every principle of fairness, to retract this unjust aspersion upon the
acts of South Carolina.

The senator from Delaware (Mr. Clayton), as well as others, has relied with
great emphasis on the fact that we are citizens of the United States. 1 do not
object to the expression, nor shall I detract from the proud and elevated feel
ings with which it is associated ; but I trust that I may be permitted to raise the
inquiry, In what manner are we citizens of the United States ? without weak
ening the patriotic feeling with which, I trust, it will ever be uttered. If by cit
izen of the United States he means a citizen at large, one whose citizenship
extends to the entire geographical limits of the country, without having a local
citizenship in some state or territory, a sort of citizen of the world, all I have
to say is, that such a citizen would be a perfect nondescript ; that not a single
individual of this description can be found in the entire mass of our population.
Notwithstanding all the pomp and display of eloquence on the occasion, every
citizen is a citizen of some state or territory, and, as such, under an express pro-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 89

vision of the Constitution, is entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens
in the several states ; and it is in this, and in no other sense, that we are citizens
of the United States. The senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Dallas), indeed, re
lies upon that provision in the Constitution which gives Congress the power
to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and the operation of the rule actu
ally established under this authority, to prove that naturalized citizens are citi
zens at large, without being citizens of any of the states. I do not deem it ne
cessary to examine the law of Congress upon this subject, or to reply to the ar
gument of the senator, though I cannot doubt that he (Mr. D.) has taken an en
tirely erroneous view of the subject. It is sufficient that the power of Congress
extends simply to the establishment of a uniform rule by which foreigners may
be naturalized in the several states or territories, without infringing in any other
respect, in reference to naturalization, the rights of the states as they existed
before the adoption of the Constitution.

Having supplied the omissions of yesterday, I now resume the subject at the
point where my remarks then terminated. The Senate will remember that
I stated, at their close, that the great question at issue is, whether ours is a
federal or a consolidated system of government ; a system in which the parts,
to use the emphatic language of Mr. Palgrave, are the integers, and the whole
the multiple, or in which the whole is a unit and the parts the fractions ; that I
stated, that on the decision of this question, I believe, depend not only the lib
erty and prosperity of this country, but the place which we are destined to hold
in the intellectual and moral scale of nations. I stated, also, in my remarks on
this point, that there is a striking analogy between this and the great struggle
between Persia and Greece, which was decided by the battles of Marathon,
Platea, and Salamis, and which immortalized the names of Miltiades and The-
mistocles. I illustrated this analogy by showing that centralism or consolida
tion, with the exception of a few nations along the eastern border of the Medi
terranean, has been the pervading principle in the Asiatic governments, while
the federal system, or, what is the same in principle, that system which organ
izes a community in reference to its parts, has prevailed in Europe.

Among the few exceptions in the Asiatic nations, the government of the
twelve tribes of Israel, in its early period, is the most striking. Their govern
ment, at first, was a mere confederation without any central power, till a mil
itary chieftain, with the title of king, was placed at its head, without, however,
merging the original organization of the twelve distinct tribes. This was the
commencement of that central action among that peculiar people which, in
three generations, terminated in a permanent division of their tribes. It is im
possible even for a careless reader to peruse the history of that event without
being forcibly struck with the analogy in the causes which led to their separa
tion, and those which now threaten us with a similar calamity. With the es
tablishment of the central power in the king commenced a system of taxation,
which, under King Solomon, was greatly increased to defray the expense of
rearing the temple, of enlarging and embellishing Jerusalem, the seat of the
central government, and the other profuse expenditures of his magnificent reign.
Increased taxation was followed by its natural consequences — discontent and
complaint; which before his death began to excite resistance. On the succes
sion of his son, Rehoboam, the ten tribes, headed by Jeroboam, demanded a re
duction of the taxes ; the temple being finished, and the embellishment of Jeru
salem completed, and the money which had been raised for that purpose being
no longer required, or, in other words, the debt being paid, they demanded a
reduction of the duties— a repeal of the tariff. The demand was taken under
consideration, and after consulting the old men, the counsellors of '98, who ad
vised a reduction, he then took the opinion of the younger politicians, who had
since grown up, and knew not the doctrines of their fathers ; he hearkened unto
their counsel, and refused to make the reduction, and the secession of the ten

M

90 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

tribes under Jeroboam followed. The tribes of Judah and Benjamin, which
had received the disbursements, alone remained to the house of David.

But to return to the point immediately under consideration. I know that it
is not only the opinion of a large majority of our country, but it may be said to '
be the opinion of the age, that the very beau ideal of a perfect government is
the government of a majority, acting through a representative body, without
check or limitation in its power ; yet, if we may test this theory by experience
and reason, we shall find that, so far from being perfect, the necessary tenden
cy of all governments, based upon the will of an absolute majority, without con
stitutional check or limitation of power, is to faction, corruption, anarchy, and
despotism ; and this, whether the will of the majority be expressed directly
through an assembly of the people themselves, or by their representatives. 1
know that, in venturing this assertion, I utter that which is unpopular both
within and without these walls ; but where truth and liberty are concerned,^
such considerations should not be regarded. I will place the decision of this
point on the fact that no government of the kind, among the many attempts
which have been made, has ever endured for a single generation, but, on the
contrary, has invariably experienced the fate which I have assigned to it. Let
a single instance be pointed out, and I will surrender my opinion. But, if we
had not the aid of experience to direct our judgment, reason itself would be a
certain guide. The view which considers the community as a unit, and all its
parts as having a similar interest, is radically erroneous. However small the
community may be, and however homogeneous its interests, the moment that
government is put into operation, as soon as it begins to collect taxes and to
make appropriations, the different portions of the community must, of necessity,
bear different and opposing relations in reference to the action of the govern
ment. There must inevitably spring up two interests — a direction and a stock
holder interest — an interest profiting by the action of the government, and in
terested in increasing its powers and action ; and another, at whose expense
the political machine is kept in motion. I know how difficult it is to commu
nicate distinct ideas on such a subject, through the medium of general proposi
tions, without particular illustration ; and in order that I may be distinctly un
derstood, though at the hazard of being tedious, I will illustrate the important
principle which I have ventured to advance by examples.

Let us, then, suppose a small community of five persons, separated from the
rest of the world ; and, to make the example strong, let us suppose them all to be
engaged in the same pursuit, and to be of equal wealth. Let us farther sup
pose that they determine to govern the community by the will of a majority ;
and, to make the case as strong as possible, let us suppose that the majority, in
order to meet the expenses of the government, lay an equal tax, say of $100, on
each individual of this little community. Their treasury would contain five
hundred dollars. Three are a majority ; and they, by supposition, have con
tributed three hundred as their portion, and the other two (the minority),
two hundred. The three have the right to make the appropriations as they
may think proper. The question is, How would the principle of the abso
lute and unchecked majority operate, under these circumstances, in this little
community ? If the three be governed by a sense of justice — if they should
appropriate the money to the objects for which it was raised, the common and
equal benefit of the five, then the object of the association would be fairly and
"honestly effected, and each would have a common interest in the government.
But, should the majority pursue an opposite course — should they appropriate the
money in a manner to benefit their own particular interest, without regard to
the interest of the two (and that they will so act, unless there be some effi
cient check, he who best knows human nature will least doubt), who does not
see that the three and the two would have directly opposite interests in refer
ence to the action of the government ? The three who contribute to the com-

SPEECHES OF JOHfr C. CALHOUN. 91

•mon treasury but three hundred dollars, could, in fact, by appropriating the five
hundred to their own use, convert the action of the government into the means
of making money, and, of consequence, would have a direct interest in increas
ing the taxes. They put in three hundred and take out five : that is, -they take
back to themselves all that they had put in, and, in addition, that which was
put in by their associates ; or, in other words, taking taxation and appropriation
together, they have gained, and their associates have lost, two hundred dollars
by the fiscal action of the government. Opposite interests, in reference to the
action of the government, are thus created between them : the one having an
interest in favour, and the other against the taxes ; the one to increase, and the
other to decrease the taxes ; the one to retain the taxes when the money is no
longer wanted, and the other to repeal them when the objects for which they
were levied have been executed.

Let us now suppose this community of five to be raised to twenty-four indi
viduals, to be governed, in like manner, by the will of a majority : it is obvious
that the same principle would divide them into two interests — into a majority
and a minority, thirteen against eleven, or in some other proportion ; and that
all the consequences which I have shown to be applicable to the small com
munity of five would be equally applicable to the greater, the cause not de
pending upon the number, but resulting necessarily from the action of the gov
ernment itself. Let us now suppose that, instead of governing themselves di
rectly in an assembly of the whole, without the intervention of agents, they
should adopt the representative principle, and thaf, instead of being governed
by a majority of themselves, they should be governed by a majority of their
representatives. It is obvious that the operation of the system would not be
affected by the change : the representatives being responsive to those who
choose them, would conform to the will of their constituents, and would act as
they would do were they present and acting for themselves ; and the same con
flict of interest, which we have shown would exist in one case, would equally
exist in the other. In either case, the inevitable result would be a system of
hostile legislation on the part of the majority, or the stronger interest, against the
minority, or the weaker interest : the object of which, on the part of the former,
would be to exact as much as possible from the latter, which would necessarily
be resisted by all the means in their power. Warfare, by legislation, would
thus be commenced between the parties, with the same object, and not less
hostile than that which is carried on between distinct and rival nations — the
only distinction would be in the instruments and the mode. Enactments, in the
one case, would supply what could only be effected by arms in the other ; and
the inevitable operation would be to engender the most hostile feelings between
the parties, which would merge every feeling of patriotism — that feeling which
embraces the whole, and substitute in its place the most violent party attach
ment ; and, instead of having one common centre of attachment, around which
the affections of the community might rally, there would, in fact, be two — the
interests of the majority, to which those who constitute that majority would be
more attached than they would be to the whole, and that of the minority, to
which they, in like manner, would also be more attached than to the interests of
the whole. Faction would thus take the place of patriotism ; and, with the loss
of patriotism, corruption must necessarily follow, and in its train, anarchy, and,
finally, despotism, or the establishment of absolute power in a single individual,
as a means of arresting the conflict of hostile interests : on the principle that
it is better to submit to the will of a single individual, who, by being made lord
and master of the whole community, would have an equal interest in the pro
tection of all the parts.

Let us next suppose that, in order to avert the calamitous train of consequen
ces, this little community should adopt a written constitution, with limitations
restricting the will of the majority, in order to protect the minority against the

92 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

oppression which I have shown would necessarily result without such restric
tions. It is obvious that the case would not be in the slightest degree varied,
if the majority be left in possession of the right of judging exclusively of the
extent of its powers, without any right on the part of the minority to enforce
the restrictions imposed by the Constitution on the will of the majority. The
point is almost too clear for illustration. Nothing can be more certain than
that, when a constitution grants power, and imposes limitations on the exercise
of that power, whatever interests may obtain possession of the government, will
be in favour of extending the power at the expense of the limitation ; and that,
unless those in whose behalf the limitations were imposed have, in some form
or mode, the right of enforcing them, the power will ultimately supersede the
limitation, and the government must operate precisely in the same manner as
if the will of the majority governed without constitution or limitation of power.

I have thus presented all possible modes in which a government founded
upon the will of an absolute majority will be modified, and have demonstrated
that, in all its forms, whether in a majority of the people, as in a mere Democ
racy, or in a majority of their representatives, without a constitution or with a
constitution, to be interpreted as the will of the majority, the result will be the
same : two hostile interests will inevitably be created by the action of the gov
ernment, to be followed by hostile legislation, and that by faction, corruption,
anarchy, and despotism.

The great and solemn question here presents itself, Is there any remedy for'
these evils ? on the decision of which depends the question, whether the people
can govern themselves, which has been so often asked with so much skepticism
and doubt. There is a remedy, and but one, the effects of which, whatever
may be the form, is to organize society in reference to this conflict of interests,
which springs out of the action of government ; and which can only be done by
giving to each part the right of self-protection ; which, in a word, instead of con
sidering the community of twenty-four a single community, having a common
interest, and to be governed by the single will of an entire majority, shall, upon,
all questions tending to bring the parts into conflict, the thirteen against the
eleven, take the will, not of the twenty-four as a unit, but that of the thirteen
and that of the eleven separately, the majority of each governing the parts, and
where they concur, governing the whole, and where they disagree, arresting
the action of the government. This I will call the concurring, as distinct from,
the absolute majority. It would not be, as was generally supposed, a minority
governing a majority. In either way the number would be the same, whether
taken as the absolute or as the concurring majority. Thus, the majority of the
thirteen is seven, and of the eleven six ; and the two together make thirteen, which.
is the majority of twenty-four. But, though the number is the same, the mode of
counting is essentially different : the one representing the strongest interest,
and the other, the entire interests of the community. The first mistake is, in
supposing that the government of the absolute majority is the government of this
people — that beau ideal of a perfect government which has been so enthusias
tically entertained in every age by the generous and patriotic, where civiliza
tion and liberty have made the smallest progress. There can be no greater er
ror : the government of the people is the government of the whole community
— of the twenty-four — the self-government of all the parts — too perfect to be re
duced to practice in the present, or any past stage of human society. The gov
ernment of the absolute majority, instead of the government of the people, is
but the government of the strongest interests, and, when not efficiently checked,
is the most tyrannical and oppressive that can be devised. Between this ideal
perfection on one side and despotism on the other, none other can be devised
but that which considers society in reference to its parts, as differently affected
by the action of the government, and which takes the sense of each part sepa
rately, and thereby the sense of the whole, in the manner already illustrated.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALIIOUN. 93

These principles, as I have already stated, are not affected by the number
of which the community may be composed, and are just as applicable to one
of thirteen millions, the number which composes ours, as of the small commu
nity of twenty-four, which I have supposed for the purpose of illustration ; and
are not less applicable to the twenty-four states united in one community, than
to the case of the twenty-four individuals. There is, indeed, a distinction be
tween a large and a small community, not affecting the principle, but the vio
lence of the action. In the former, the similarity of the interests of all the
parts will limit the oppression from the hostile action of the parts, in a great
degree, to the fiscal action of the government merely ; but in the large commu
nity, spreading over a country of great extent, and having a great diversity of
interests, with different kinds of labour, capital, and production, the conflict and
oppression will extend, not only to a monopoly of the appropriations on the
part of the stronger interests, but will end in unequal taxes, and a general con
flict between the entire interests of conflicting sections, which, if not arrested
by the most powerful checks, will terminate in the most oppressive tyranny
that can be conceived, or in the destruction of the community itself.

If we turn our attention from these supposed cases, and direct it to our gov
ernment and its actual operation, we shall find a practical confirmation of the
truth of what has been stated, not only of the oppressive operation of the sys
tem of an absolute majority, but also a striking and beautiful illustration, in the
formation of our system, of the principle of the concurring majority, as distinct
from the absolute, which I have asserted to be the only means of efficiently
checking the abuse of power, and, of course, the only solid foundation of con
stitutional liberty. That our government, for many years, has been gradually
verging to consolidation ; that the Constitution has gradually become a dead let
ter ; and that all restrictions upon the power of government have been virtually
removed, so as practically to convert the General Government into a govern
ment of an absolute majority, without check or limitation, cannot be denied by
any one who has impartially observed its operation.

It is not necessary to trace the commencement and gradual progress of the
causes which have produced this change in our system : it is sufficient to state
that the change has taken place within the last few years. What has been the
result ? Precisely that which might have been anticipated : the growth of fac
tion, corruption, anarchy, and, if not despotism itself, its near approach, as wit
nessed in the provisions of this bill. And from what have these consequences
sprung ? We have been involved in no war ! We have been at peace with
all the world. We have been visited with no national calamity. Our people
have been advancing in general intelligence, and, I will add, as great and
alarming as has been the advance of political corruption among the mercenary
corps who look to government for support, the morals and virtue of the commu
nity at large have been advancing in improvement. What, I will again repeat,
is the cause ? No other can be assigned but a departure from the fundamental
principles of the Constitution, which has converted the government into the will
of an absolute and irresponsible majority, and which, by the laws that must in
evitably govern in all such majorities, has placed in conflict the great inter
ests of the country : by a system of hostile legislation, by an oppressive and
unequal imposition of taxes, by unequal and profuse appropriations, and by ren
dering the entire labour and capital of the weaker interest subordinate to the
stronger.

This is the cause, and these the fruits, which have converted the government
into a mere instrument of taking money from one portion of the community to
be given to another, and which has rallied around it a great, a powerful, and
mercenary%orps of office-holders, office-seekers, and expectants, destitute of
principle and patriotism, and who have no standard of morals or politics but the
•will of the executive — the will of him who has the distribution of the loaves

94 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

and the fishes. I hold it impossible for any one to look at the theoretical illus
tration of the principle of the absolute majority in the cases which I have sup
posed, and not be struck with the practical illustration in the actual operation
of our government. Under every circumstance, the absolute majority will ever
have its American system (I mean nothing offensive to any senator) ; but the
real meaning of the American system is, that system of plunder which the
strongest interest has ever waged, and will ever wage, against the weaker,
where the latter is not armed with some efficient and constitutional check to
arrest its action. Nothing but such check on the part of the weaker interest
can arrest it : mere constitutional limitations are wholly insufficient. Whatever
interest obtains possession of the government will, from the nature of things, be
in favour of the powers, and against the limitations imposed by the Constitution,
and will resort to every device that can be imagined to remove those restraints.
On the contrary, the opposite interest, that which I have designated as the
stockholding interest, the tax-payers, those on whom the system operates, will
resist the abuse of powers, and contend for the limitations. And it is on this
point, then, that the contest between the delegated and the reserved powers will
be waged ; but in this contest,, as the interests in possession of the govern
ment are organized and armed by all its powers and patronage, the opposite in
terest, if not in like manner organized and possessed of a power to protect them-
selves under the provisions of the Constitution, will be as inevitably crushed as
would be a band of unorganized militia when opposed by a veteran and train
ed corps of regulars. Let it never be forgotten that power can only be oppo
sed by power, organization by organization ; and on this theory stands our beau
tiful federal system of government. No free system was ever farther removed
from the principle that the absolute majority, without check or limitation, ought
to govern. To understand what our government is, we must look to the Con
stitution, which is the basis of the system. I do not intend to enter into any
minute examination of the origin and the source of its powers : it is sufficient
for my purpose to state, what I do fearlessly, that it derived its power from the
people of the separate states, each ratifying by itself, each binding itself by its
own separate majority, through its separate convention, the concurrence of the
majorities of the several states forming the Constitution, thus taking the sense
of the whole by that of the several parts, representing the various interests of
the entire community. It was this concurring and perfect majority which form
ed the Constitution, and not that, majority which would consider the American,
people as a single community, and which, instead of representing fairly and
fully the interests of the whole, would but represent, as has been stated, the in
terest of the stronger section. No candid man can dispute that I have given a
correct description of the constitution-making power : that power which created
and organized the government, which delegated to it, as a common agent, cer
tain powers, in trust for the common good of all the states, and which imposed
strict limitation and checks against abuses and usurpations. In administer
ing the delegated powers, the Constitution provides, very properly, in order to
give promptitude and efficiency, that the government shall be organized upon
the principle of the absolute majority, or, rather, of two absolute majorities com
bined : a majority of the states considered as bodies politic, which prevails in
this body ; and a majority of the people of the states, estimated in federal num
bers, in the other house of Congress. A combination of the two prevails in
the choice of the President, and, of course, in the appointment of judges, they be
ing nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. It is thus that the
concurring and the absolute majorities are combined in one complex system :
the one in forming the Constitution, and the other in making and ey cuting the
laws ; thus beautifully blending the moderation, justice, and equity of the former,
and more perfect majority, with the promptness and energy of the latter, but
less perfect.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALIIOUN. 95

To maintain the ascendency of the Constitution over the law-making majori
ty is the great and essential point, on which the success of the system must
depend : unless that ascendency can be preserved, the necessary consequence
must be, that the laws will supersede the Constitution, and, finally, the will of
the executive, by the influence of his patronage, will supersede the laws, indi
cations of which are already perceptible. This ascendency can only be pre
served through the action of the states as organized bodies, having their own
separate governments, and possessed of the right, under the structure of our
system, of judging of the extent of their separate powers, and of interposing
their authority to arrest the enactments of the General Government within their
respective limits. I will not enter at this time into the discussion of this im
portant point, as it has been ably and fully presented by the senator from Ken
tucky (Mr. Bibb), and others who preceded him in this debate on the same
side, whose arguments riot only remain unanswered, but are unanswerable. It
is only by this power of interposition that the reserved rights of the states can
be peacefully and efficiently protected against the encroachments of the Gener
al Government, that the limitations imposed upon its authority will be enforced,
and its movements confined to the orbit allotted to it by the Constitution.

It has, indeed, been said in debate, that this can be effected by the or
ganization of the General Government itself, particularly by the action of this
body, which represents the states, and that the states themselves must look to
the General Government for the preservation of many of the most important of
their reserved rights. I do not underrate the value to be attached to the organ
ic arrangement of the General Government, and the wise distribution of its pow
ers between the several departments, and, in particular, the structure and the
important functions of this body ; but to suppose that the Senate, or any depart
ment of this government, was intended to be the only guardian of the reserved
rights, is a great and fundamental mistake. The government, through all its
departments, represents the delegated, and not the reserved powers ; and it is a
violation of the fundamental principle of free institutions to suppose that any
but the responsible representative of any interest can be its guardian. The
distribution of the powers of the General Government, and its organization,
were arranged to prevent the abuse of power in fulfilling the important trusts
confided to it, and not, as preposterously supposed, to protect the reserved pow
ers, which are confided wholly to the guardianship of the several states.

Against the view of our system which I have presented, and the right of the
state to interpose, it is objected that it would lead to anarchy and dissolution.
I consider the objection as without the slightest foundation, and that, so far from
tending to weakness or disunion, it is the source of the highest power and of
the strongest cement. Nor is its tendency in this respect difficult of explana
tion. The government of an absolute majority, unchecked by efficient consti
tutional restraint, though apparently strong, is, in reality, an exceedingly feeble
government. That tendency to conflict between the parts, which I have shown
to be inevitable in such governments, wastes the powers of the state in the
hostile action of contending factions, which leaves very little more power than
the excess of the strength of the majority over the minority. But a government
based upon the principle of the concurring majority, where each great interest
possesses within itself the means of self-protection, which ultimately requires
the mutual consent of all the parts, necessarily causes that unanimity in coun
cil, and ardent attachment of all the parts to the whole, which give an irresist
ible energy to a government so constituted. I might appeal to history for the
truth of these remarks, of which the Roman furnishes the most familiar and
striking. It is a well-known fact, that, from the expulsion of the Tarquins to
the time of the establishment of the tribunitian power, the government fell into
a state of the greatest disorder and distraction, and, I may add, corruption.
How did this happen ? The explanation will throw important light on the sub-

96 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

ject under consideration. The community was divided into two parts — the
Patricians and the Plebeians : with the power of the state principally in the
hands of the former, without adequate check to protect the rights of the latter.
The result was as might be expected. The patricians converted the powers of
the government into the means of making money, to enrich themselves and their
dependants. They, in a word, had their American system, growing out of the
peculiar character of the government and condition of the country. This re
quires explanation. At that period, according to the laws of nations, when one
nation conquered another, the lands of the vanquished belonged to the victors ;
and, according to the Roman law, the lands thus acquired were divided into two
parts, one allotted to the poorer class of the people, and the other assigned to
the use of the treasury, of which the patricians had the distribution and admin
istration. The patricians abused their power by withholding from the plebeians
that which ought to have been allotted to them, and by converting to their own
use that which ought to have gone to the treasury. In a word, they took to
themselves the entire spoils of victory, and they had thus the most powerful
motive to keep the state perpetually involved in war, to the utter impoverish
ment and oppression of the plebeians. After resisting the abuse of power by
all peaceable means, and the oppression becoming intolerable, the plebeians, at
last, withdrew from the city — they, in a word, seceded ; arid, to induce them to
reunite, the patricians conceded to the plebeians, as the means of protecting
their separate interests, the very power which I contend is necessary to protect
the rights of the states, but which is now represented as necessarily leading to
disunion. They granted to them the right of choosing three tribunes from
among themselves, whose persons should be sacred, and who should have the
right of interposing their veto, not only against the passage of laws, but even
against their execution : a power which those who take a shallow insight into
human nature would pronounce inconsistent with the strength and unity of the
state, if not utterly impracticable ; yet, so far from that being the effect, from
that day the genius of Rome became ascendant, and victory followed her steps
till she had established an almost universal dominion. How can a result so
contrary to all anticipation be explained 1 The explanation appears to me to
be simple. No measure or movement could be adopted without the concurring
assent of both the patricians and plebeians, and each thus became dependant
on the other ; and, of consequence, the desire and objects of neither could be
effected without the concurrence of the other. To obtain this concurrence,
each was compelled to consult the good-will of the other, and to elevate to
office, not simply those who might have the confidence of the order to which
he belonged, but also that of the other. The result was, that men possessing
those qualities which would naturally command confidence — moderation, wis
dom, justice, and patriotism — were elevated to office ; and these, by the weight
of their authority and the prudence of their counsel, together with that spirit of
unanimity necessarily resulting from the concurring assent of the two orders,
furnishes the real explanation of the power of the Roman State, and of that ex
traordinary wisdom, moderation, and firmness which in so remarkable a degree
characterized her public men. I might illustrate the truth of the position which
I have laid down by a reference to the history of all free states, ancient and
modern, distinguished for their power and patriotism, and conclusively show,
not only that there was riot one which had not some contrivance, under some
form, by which the concurring assent of the different portions of the community
was made necessary in the action of government, but also that the virtue,
patriotism, and strength of the state were in direct proportion to the perfection
of the means of securing such assent. In estimating the operation of this prin
ciple in our system, which depends, as I have stated, on the right of interposi
tion on the part of the state, we must not omit to take into consideration the
amending power, by which new powers may be granted, or any derangement

SPEECHES OF JOHN C, CALHOUN. 97

of the system be corrected, by the concurring assent of three fourths of the
states, and thus, in the same degree, strengthening the power of repairing any
derangement occasioned by the eccentric action of a state. In fact, the power
of interposition, fairly understood, may be considered in the light of an appeal
against the usurpations of the General Government, the joint agent of all the
states, to the states themselves, to be decided under the amending power,
affirmatively in favour of the government, by the voice of three fourths of the
states, as the highest power known under the system. I know the difficulty,
in our country, of establishing the truth of the principle for which I contend,
though resting upon the clearest reason, and tested by the universal experience
of free nations. I know that the governments of the several states will be cited
as an argument against the conclusion to which I have arrived, and which, for
the most pare, are constructed on the principle of the absolute majority ; but, in
my opinion, a satisfactory answer can be given : that the objects of expenditure
which fall within the sphere of a state government are few and inconsiderable,
so that, be their action ever so irregular, it can occasion but little derangement.
If, instead of being members of this great confederacy, they formed distinct
communities, and were compelled to raise armies, and incur other expenses
necessary to their defence, the laws which I have laid down as necessarily
controlling the action of a state where the will of an absolute and unchecked
majority prevailed, would speedily disclose themselves in faction, anarchy, and
corruption. Even as the case is, the operation of the causes to which I have
referred are perceptible in some of the larger and more populous members of
the Union, whose governments have a powerful central action, and which al
ready show a strong tendency to that moneyed action which is the invariable
forerunner of corruption and convulsions.

But, to return to the General Government, we have now sufficient experi
ence to ascertain that the tendency to conflict in its action is between southern
and other sections. The latter having a decided majority, must habitually be
possessed of the powers of the government, both in this and in the other house ;
and, being governed by that instinctive love of power so natural to the human
breast, they must become the advocates of the power of government, and in the
same degree opposed to the limitations ; while the other and weaker section is
as necessarily thrown on the side of the limitations. One section is the natural
guardian of the delegated powers, and the other of the reserved ; and the strug
gle on the side of the former will be to enlarge the powers, while that on the
opposite side will be to restrain them within their constitutional limits. The
Contest will, in fact, be a contest between power and liberty, and such I con
sider the present — a contest in which the weaker section, with its peculiar
labour, productions, and institutions, has at stake all that can be dear to free
men. Should we be able to maintain in their full vigour our reserved rights,
liberty and prosperity will be our portion ; but if we yield, and permit the
stronger interest to concentrate within itself all the powers of the government,
then will our fate be more wretched than that of the aborigines whom we have
expelled. In this great struggle between the delegated and reserved powers,
so far from repining that my lot, and that of those whom I represent, is cast on
the side of the latter, I rejoice that such is the fact ; for, though we participate
in but few of the advantages of the government, we are compensated, and more
than compensated, in not being so much exposed to its corruption. Nor do I
repine that the duty, so difficult to be discharged, as the defence of the reserved
powers, against apparently such fearful odds, has been assigned to us. To dis
charge successfully this high duty requires the highest qualities, moral and in
tellectual ; and should we perform it with a zeal and ability in proportion to
its magnitude, instead of being mere planters, our section will become dis
tinguished for its patriots and statesmen. But, on the other hand, if we prove
unworthy of this high destiny — if we yield to the steady encroachment of

N

98 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

power, the severest calamity and most, debasing corruption will overspread the
land. Every Southern man, true to the interests of his section, and faithful to
the duties which Providence has allotted him, will be forever excluded from the
honours and emoluments of this government, which will be reserved for those
only who have qualified themselves, by political prostitution, for admission into
the Magdalen Asylum.

VI.

SPEECH ON HIS RESOLUTIONS, AND REPLY TO MR. WEBSTER, FEBRUARY 26,

/1833.

THE following resolutions, submitted by Mr. CALHOUN, came up for consider
ation, viz. :

" Resolved, That the people of the several states composing these United
States are united as parties to a .constitutional compact, to which the people of
each state acceded as a separate and sovereign community, each binding itself
by its own particular ratification ; and that the Union, of which the said com
pact is the bond, is a union between the states ratifying the same.

" Resolved, That the people of the several states thus united by the constitu
tional compact, in forming that instrument, and in creating a General Govern
ment to carry into effect the objects for which it was formed, delegated to that
government, for that purpose, certain definite powers, to be exercised jointly,
reserving, at the same time, each state to itself, the residuary mass of powers, to
be exercised by its own separate government ; and that, whenever the General
Government assumes the exercise of powers not delegated by the compact, its
acts are unauthorized, void, and of no effect ; and that the said government is
not made the final judge of the powers delegated to it, since that would make
its discretion, and not the Constitution, the measure of its powers ; but that, as
in all other cases of compact among sovereign parties, without any common
judge, each has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of the infraction, as of
the mode and measure of redress.

" Resolved, That the assertions that the people of these United States, taken
collectively as individuals, are now, or ever have been, united on the principle
of the social compact, and, as such, are now formed into one nation or people,
or that they have ever been so united, in any one stage of their political existi
ence ; that the people of the several states composing the Union have not, as
members thereof, retained their sovereignty ; that the allegiance of their citi
zens has been transferred to the General Government ; that they have parted
with the right of punishing treason through their respective state governments ;
and that they have not the right of judging, in the last resort, as to the extent of
powers reserved, and, of consequence, of those delegated, are not only without
foundation in truth, but are contrary to the most certain and plain historical
facts, and the clearest deductions of reason ; and that all exercise of power on
the part of the General Gevernment, or any of its departments, deriving author
ity from such erroneous assumptions, must of necessity be unconstitutional —
must tend directly and inevitably to subvert the sovereignty of the states — to
destroy the federal character of the Union, and to rear on its ruins a consolida
ted government, without constitutional check or limitation, and which must ne
cessarily terminate in the loss of liberty itself."
Which being read,

Mr. CALHOUN said : When the bill with which the resolutions are connected
was under discussion, the senator from Massachusetts thought proper to give
his remarks a personal bearing in reference to myself. I had said nothing to

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 99

justify this course on the part of that gentleman. I had, it is true, denounced
the bill in strong language, but not stronger than the rules which govern parlia
mentary proceedings permit ; nor stronger than the character of the bill, and its
bearing on the state which it is my honour to represent, justified. I am at a
loss to understand what motive governed the senator in giving a personal char
acter to his remarks. If he intended anything unkind — (here Mr. WEBSTER
said, audibly, Certainly not ; and Mr. C. replied, I will not, then, say what I in
tended, if such had been his motives) — but still I must be permitted to ask, If he
intended nothing unkind, what was the object of the senator ? Was his motive
to strengthen a cause which he feels to be weak, by giving the discussion a per
sonal direction ? If such was his motive, his experience as a debater ought to
have taught him that it was one of those weak devices which seldom fail to
react on those who resort to them. If his motive was to acquire popularity
by attacking one who had voluntarily, and from a s<mse of duty — from a deep
conviction that liberty and the Constitution were at ptake — had identified him
self with an unpopular question, I would say to him that a true sense of dignity
would have impelled him in an opposite direction- Among the possible motives
which might have influenced him, there is another to the imputation of which
he is exposed, but which, certainly, I wi'i i*>t attribute to him— that his motive
was to propitiate in a certain high quarter — a quarter in which he must know
that no offering could be more acceptable than the immolation of the character
of him who now addresses you. Bvi whatever may have been the motive of
the senator, I can assure him that I will not follow his example. I never had
any inclination to gladiatorial exhibitions in the halls of legislation, and if I now
had, I certainly would not indulge them on so solemn a question : a question
which, in the opinion of the senator from Massachusetts, as expressed in debate,
involves the union of these states, and in mine, the liberty and the Constitution
of the country. Before nowever, I conclude the prefatory observations, I must
allude to the remark w^ich the senator made at the termination of the argument
of my friend from Mississippi (Mr. POINDEXTER). I understood the senator
to say that, if I chose to put at issue his character for consistency, he stood pre
pared to vindicate his Bourse. I assure the senator that I have no idea of call-
ino- in question his consistency, or that of any other member of this body. It
is *a subject in which I feel no concern ; but if I am to understand the remark
of the secator as intended indirectly as a challenge to put in issue the consist
ency of my course as compared to his own, I have to say that, though I do not
accept of his challenge, yet, if he should think proper to make a trial of charac
ter on that or any other point connected with our public conduct, and will select
a suitable occasion, I stand prepared to vindicate my course, as compared with
his, or that of any other member of this body, for consistency of conduct, purity
of motive, and devoted attachment to the country and its institutions.

Having made these remarks, which have been forced upon me, I shall now
proceed directly to the subject before the Senate ; and in order that it may, with
all its bearings, be fully understood, I must go back to the period at which I in
troduced the resolutions. They were introduced in connexion with the bill
which has passed this house, and is now pending before the other. That bill
was couched in general terms, without naming South Carolina or any other
state, though it was understood, and avowed by the committee, as intended to
act directly on her.

Believing that the government had no right to use force in the controversy,
and that the attempt to introduce it rested upon principles utterly subversive of the
Constitution and the sovereignty of the states, I drew up the resolutions, and intro
duced them expressly with the view to test those principles, with a desire that
they should be discussed and voted on before the bill came up for consideration.
The majority ordered otherwise. The resolutions were laid on the table, and
the bill taken up for discussion. Under this arrangement, which it was under-

100 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

stood originated with the committee that reported the bill, I, of course, conclu
ded that its members would proceed in the discussion, and explain the princi
ples, and the necessity for the bill, before the other senators would enter into
the discussion, and particularly those from South Carolina ; understanding, how
ever, that, by the arrangement of the committee, it was allotted to the senator
from Tennessee to close the discussion on the bill. I waited to the last moment,
in expectation of hearing from the senator from Massachusetts. He is a mem
ber of the committee. But not hearing from him, I rose to speak to the bill, and
as soon as I had concluded, the senator from Massachusetts arose — I will not
say to reply to rive, and certainly not to discuss the bill, but the resolutions
which had been laid on the table, as I have stated. I do not state these facts
in the way of complaint, but in order to explain my own course. The senator
having directed his argument against my resolutions, I felt myself compelled to
seize the first opportunity to call them up from the table, and to assign a day for
their discussion, in the hbpe \iot only that the Senate would hear me in their
vindication, but would also aflfori me an opportunity of taking the sense of this
.body on the great principles OK wVjch they are based.

The senator from Massachusetts, in his argument against the resolutions,
directed his attack almost exclusively gainst the first, on the ground, I suppose,
that it was the basis of the other two, an3. that, unless the first could be demol
ished, the others would follow of course Jn this he was right. As plain and
as simple as the facts contained in the fii^t are, they cannot be admitted to be
true without admitting the doctrines for whith I, and the state I represent, con
tend. He (Mr. W.) commenced his attack w^h a verbal criticism on the res
olution, in the course of which he objected strtngly to two words, " constitu
tional," and "accede." To the former on the gr*Und that the word, as used
-(constitutional compact), was obscure — that it conveyed no definite meaning —
and that the Constitution was a noun-substantive, and not an adjective. I re
gret that I have exposed myself to the criticism of the senator. I certainly
did not intend to use any expression of a doubtful sense, a»d if I have done so,
the senator must attribute it to the poverty of my language, ^nd not to design.
I trust, however, that the senator will excuse me, when he comes to hear my
apology. In matters of criticism, authority is of the highest importance, and I
have an authority of so high a character, in this case, for using ihe expression
which he considers so obscure and so unconstitutional, as will justify me even
in his eyes. It is no less than the authority of the senator him&elf — given on
a solemn occasion (the discussion on Mr. Foote's resolution), and doubtless
with great deliberation, after having duly weighed the force of the expression.
(Here Mr. C. read from Mr. Webster's speech in reply to Mr. Hayne, in the
Senate of the United States, delivered January 26, 1830, as follows:)

" The domestic slavery of the South I leave where I find it — in the hands of
their own governments. It is their affair, not mine. Nor do I complain of
the peculiar effect which the magnitude of that population has had in the dis
tribution of power under the Federal Government. We know, sir, that the
representation of the states in the other house is not equal. We know that
great advantage, in that respect, is enjoyed by the slaveholding states ; and we
know, too, that the intended equivalent for that advantage, that is to say, the
imposition of direct taxes in the same ratio, has become merely nominal : the
habit of the government being almost invariably to collect its revenues from
other sources, and in other modes. Nevertheless, I do not complain, nor
would I countenance any movement to alter this arrangement of representation.
It is the original bargain — the compact — let it stand ; let the advantage of it be
fully enjoyed. The Union itself is too full of benefits to be hazarded in propo
sitions for changing its original basis. I go for the Constitution as it is. and
for the Union as it is. But I am resolved not to submit in silence to accusa
tions, either against myself individually, or against the North, wholly unfoimd-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 101

ed and unjust : accusations which impute to us a disposition to evade the CON
STITUTIONAL COMPACT, and to extend the power of the government over the
internal laws and domestic condition of the states."

It will be seen, by this extract, that the senator not only uses the phrase
" constitutional compact," which he now so much condemns, but, what is still
more important, he calls the Constitution itself a compact — a bargain ; which,
contains important admissions, having a direct and powerful bearing on the
main issue involved in the discussion, as will appear in the course of his re-
marks. But, as strong as his objection is to the word " constitutional," it is
still stronger to the word " accede," which, he thinks, has been introduced into
the resolution with some deep design, as I suppose, to entrap the Senate into
an admission of the doctrine of state rights. Here, again, I must shelter
myself under authority. But I suspect that the senator, by a sort of instinct
(for our instincts often strangely run before our knowledge), had a prescience,
which would account for his aversion for the word, that this authority was no less
than Thomas Jefferson himself, the great apostle of the doctrines of state rights.
The word was borrowed from him. It was taken from the Kentucky Resolu
tion, as well as the substance of the resolution itself. But I trust that I may
neutralize whatever aversion the authorship of this word may have excited in
the mind of the senator, by the introduction of another authority — that of Wash
ington himself, who, in his speech to Congress, speaking of the admission of
North Carolina into the Union, uses this very term, which was repeated by the
Senate in their reply. Yet, in order to narrow the ground between the sena
tor and myself as much as possible, I will accommodate myself to his strange
antipathy against the two unfortunate words, by striking them out of the reso
lution, and substituting in their place those very words which the senator him
self has designated as constitutional phrases. In the place of that abhorred ad
jective " constitutional," I will insert the very noun-substantive " constitution ;"
and in the place of the word " accede," I will insert the word " ratify," which
he designates as the proper term to be used.

Let us now see how the resolution stands, and how it will read after these
amendments. Here Mr. C. said the resolution, as introduced, reads :

Resolved, That the people of the several states composing these United States
are united as parties to a constitutional compact, to which the people of each
state acceded as a separate and sovereign community, each binding itself by its
own particular ratification ; and that the Union, of which the said compact is-
a bond, is a union between the states ratifying the same.
As proposed to be amended :

Resolved, That .the people of the several states composing these United States
are united as parties to a compact, under the title of the Constitution of the Uni
ted States, which the people of each state ratified as a separate and sovereign
community, each binding itself by its own particular ratification ; and that the
Union, of which the said compact is the bond, is a Union between the states
ratifying the same.

Where, sir, I ask, is that plain case of revolution ? Where that hiatus, as-
wide as the globe, between the premises and conclusion, which the senator pro
claimed would be apparent if the resolution was reduced into constitutional lan
guage ? For my part, with my poor powers of conception, I cannot perceive
the slightest difference between the resolution as first introduced, and as it is
proposed to be amended in conformity to the views of the senator. And, in
stead of that hiatus between premises and conclusion, which seems to startle
the imagination of the senator, I can perceive nothing but a continuous and sol
id surface, sufficient to sustain the magnificent superstructure of state rights.
Indeed, it seems to me that the senator's vision is distorted by the medium
through which he views everything connected with the subject ; and that the
same distortion which has presented to his imagination this hiatus, as wide as

102 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

the globe, where not even a fissure exists, also presented that beautiful and clas
sical image of a strong man struggling in a bog without the power of extricating
himself, and incapable of being aided by any friendly hand, while, instead of
struggling in a bog, he stands on the everlasting rock of truth.

Having now noticed the criticism of the senator, I shall proceed to meet and
repel the main assault on the resolution. He directed his attack against the
strong point, the very horn of the citadel of state rights. The senator clearly
perceived that, if the Constitution be a compact, it was impossible to deny the
assertions contained in the resolutions, or to resist the consequences which 1
had drawn from them, and, accordingly, directed his whole fire against that point ;
but, after so vast an expenditure of ammunition, not the slightest impression, so
far as I can perceive, has been made. But, to drop the simile, after a careful
examination of the notes which I took of what the senator said, I am now at a
loss to know whether, in the opinion of the senator, our Constitution is a com
pact or not, though almost the whole argument of the senator was directed to
that point. At one time he would seem to deny directly and positively that it
was a compact, while at another he would appear, in language not less strong,
to admit that it was.

I have collated all that the senator has said upon this point ; and, that what
I have stated may not appear exaggerated, I will read his remarks in juxtapo
sition. He said that

" The Constitution means a government, not a compact. Not a constitution
al compact, but a government. If compact, it rests on plighted faith, and the
mode of redress would be to declare the whole void. States may secede if a
league or compact."

1 thank the senator for these admissions, which I intend to use hereafter.
(Here Mr. C. proceeded to read from his notes.)

" The states agreed that each should participate in the sovereignty of the
other."

Certainly, a very correct conception of the Constitution ; but when did they
make that agreement but by the Constitution, and how could they agree but by
compact ?

" The system, not a compact between states in their sovereign capacity, but
a government proper, founded on the adoption of the people, and creating indi
vidual relations between itself and the citizens."

This the senator lays down as a leading fundamental principle to sustain his
doctrine, and, I must say, by a strange confusion and uncertainty of language ;
not, certainly, to be explained by any want of command of the most appropriate
words on his part.

" It does not call itself a compact, but a constitution. The Constitution rests
on compact, but it is no longer a compact."

I would ask, To what compact does the senator refer, as that on which the
Constitution rests ? Before the adoption of the present Constitution, the states
had formed but one compact, and that was the old confederation ; and, certain
ly, the gentleman does not intend to assert that the present Constitution rests
upon that. What, then, is his meaning ? What can it be, but that the Con
stitution itself is a compact ? and how will his language read, when fairly in
terpreted, but that the Constitution was a compact, but is no longer a compact ?
It had, by some means or another, changed its nature, or become defunct.

He next states that

" A man is almost untrue to his country who calls the Constitution a com
pact."

I fear the senator, in calling it a compact, a bargain, has called down this
heavy denunciation on his own head. He finally states that

" It is founded on compact, but not a compact results from it."

To what are we to attribute the strange confusion of words ? The senator

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 103

has a mind of high order, and perfectly trained to the most exact use of lan
guage. No man knows better the precise import of the words he uses. The
difficulty is not in him, but in his subject. He who undertakes to prove that this
Constitution is not a compact, undertakes a task which, be his strength ever
so great, must oppress him by its weight. Taking the whole of the argument
of the senator together, I would say that it is his impression that the Constitu
tion is not a compact, and will now proceed to consider the reason which he
has assigned for this opinion.

He thinks there is an incompatibility between constitution and compact. To
prove this, he adduces the words " ordain and establish," contained in the pre
amble of the Constitution. I confess I am not capable of perceiving in what
manner these words are incompatible with the idea that the Constitution is a
compact. The senator will admit that a single state may ordain a constitution ;
and where is the difficulty, where the incompatibility of two states concurring
in ordaining and establishing a constitution ? As between the states themselves,
the instrument would be a compact ; but in reference to the government, and
those on whom it operates, it would be ordained and established — ordained and
established by the joint authority of two, instead of the single authority of one.
The next argument which the senator advances to show that the language
of the Constitution is irreconcilable with the idea of its being a compact, is ta
ken from that portion of the instrument which imposes prohibitions on the au
thority of the states. He said that the language used in imposing the prohibi
tions is the language of a superior to an inferior ; and that, therefore, it was not
the language of a compact, which implies the equality of the parties. As a
proof, the senator cited the several provisions of the Constitution which provide
that no state shall enter into treaties of alliance and confederation, lay imposts,
&c., without the assent of Congress. If he had turned to the articles of the
old confederation, which he acknowledges to have been a compact, he would
have found that those very prohibitory articles of the Constitution were borrow
ed from that instrument ; that the language which he now considers as imply
ing superiority was taken verbatim from it. If he had extended his researches
still farther, he would have found that it is the habitual language used in treat
ies, whenever a stipulation is made against the performance of any act. Among
many instances which I could cite if it were necessary, I refer the senator to
the celebrated treaty negotiated by Mr. Jay with Great Britain in 1793, and in
which the very language used in the Constitution is employed.

To prove that the Constitution is not a compact, the senator next observes
that it stipulates nothing, and asks, with an air of triumph, Where are the evi
dences of the stipulations between the states ? I must express my surprise at
this interrogatory, coming from so intelligent a source. Has the senator never
seen the ratification of the Constitution by the several states ? Did he not cite
them on this very occasion ? Do they contain no evidence of this stipulation
on the part of the states ? Nor is the assertion less strange that the Constitu
tion contains no stipulation. So far from regarding it in the light in which the
senator regards it, I consider the whole instrument but a mass of stipulation :
what is that but a stipulation to which the senator refers when he states, in the
course of his argument, that each state had agreed to participate in the sover
eignty of the others ?

But the principal argument on which the senate? relied to show that the
Constitution is not a compact, rests on the provision in that instrument which
declares that " this Constitution, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, and
treaties made under their authority, are the supreme laws of the land." He
asked, with marked emphasis, Can a compact be the supreme law of the land ?
I ask, in return, whether treaties are not compacts, and whether treaties, as well
3,s the Constitution, are not declared to be the supreme law of the larrd ? His
argument, in fact, as conclusively proves that treaties are not compacts as it

104 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

does that this Constitution is not a compact. I might rest this point on this
decisive answer ; but, as I desire to leave not a shadow of doubt on this impor
tant point, I shall follow the gentleman in the course of his reasoning.

He defines a constitution to be a fundamental law, which organizes the gov
ernment, and points out the mode of its action. I will not object to the defini
tion, though, in my opinion, a more appropriate one, or, at least, one better
adapted to American ideas, could be given. My objection is not to the defini
tion, but to the attempt to prove that the fundamental laws of a state cannot be
a compact, as the senator seems to suppose. I hold the very reverse to be the
case ; and that, according to the most 'approved writers on the subject of gov
ernment, these very fundamental laws which are now stated not only not to be
compacts, but inconsistent with the very idea of compacts, are held invariably
to be compacts ; arid, in that character, as distinguished from the ordinary laws
of the country. I will cite a single authority, which is full and explicit on this-
point, from a writer of the highest repute.

Burlamaqui says, vol. ii., part 1, chap, i., sec. 35, 36, 37, 38 : " It entirely de
pends upon a free people to invest the sovereigns whom they place over their
heads with an authority either absolute, or limited by certain laws. These
regulations, by which the supreme authority is kept within bounds, are called the
fundamental laws of the state"

" The fundamental laws of a state, taken in their full extent, are not only the
decrees by which the entire body of the nation determine the form of govern
ment, and the mariner of succeeding to the crown, but are likewise covenants
between the people and the person on whom they confer the sovereignty, which
regulate the manner of governing, and by which the supreme authority is lim
ited."

" These regulations are called fundamental laws, because they are the basis,
as it were, and foundation of the state on which the structure of the government-
is raised, and because the people look upon these regulations as their principal
strength and support."

" The name of laws, however, has been given to these regulations in an im
proper and figurative sense, for, properly speaking, they are real covenants.
But as those covenants are obligatory between the contracting parties, they have
the force of laws themselves."

The same, vol. ii., part 2, ch. i., sec. 19 and 22, in part. " The whole body
of the nation, in whom the supreme power originally resides, may regulate the
government by a fundamental law in such manner as to commit the exercise
of the different parts of the supreme power to different persons or bodies, who
may act independently of each other in regard to the rights committed to thenij
but still subordinate to the laws from which those rights are derived."

" And these fundamental laws are real covenants, or what the civilians call
pacta conventa, between the different orders of the Republic, by which they
stipulate that each shall have a particular part of the sovereignty, and that this
shall establish the form of government. It is evident that, by these means, each
of the contracting parties acquires a right not only of exercising the power
granted to it, but also of preserving that original right."

A reference to the Constitution of Great Britain, with which we are better
acquainted than with that of any other European government, will show that
it is a compact. Magn* Charta may certainly be reckoned among the funda
mental laws of that kingdom. Now, although it did not assume, originally, the
form of a compact, yet, before the breaking up of the meeting of the barons
which imposed it on King John, it was reduced into the form of a covenant,
and duly signed by Robert Fitzwalter and others, on the one part, and the king
on the other.

But we have a more decisive proof that the Constitution of England is a com
pact in the resolution of the Lords and Commons in 1688, which declared that

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 105

" King James the Second, having endeavoured to subvert the Constitution of the
kingdom, by breaking the original contract between the king and people, and
having, by the advice of Jesuits and other wicked persons, violated the fun
damental law, and withdrawn himself out of the kingdom, hath abdicated the
government, and that the throne is thereby become vacant."

But why should I refer to writers upon the subject of government, or inquire
into the constitution of foreign states, when there are such decisive proofs that
our Constitution is a compact ? On this point the senator is estopped. I bor
row from the gentleman, and thank him for the word. His adopted state,
which he so ably represents on this floor, and his native state, the states of
Massachusetts and New-Hampshire, both declared, in their ratification of the
Constitution, that it was a compact. The ratification of Massachusetts is in the
following words (here Mr. C. read) :

" In Convention of the Delegates of the People of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, Feb. 6, 1788.

" The Convention having impartially discussed and fully considered the Con
stitution of the United States of America, reported to Congress by the Conven
tion of Delegates from the United States of America, and submitted to us by
a resolution of the General Court of said Commonwealth, passed the 25th day
of October last past, and acknowledging, with grateful hearts, the goodness of
the Supreme Ruler of the universe, in affording the people of the United States,
in the course of his providence, an opportunity deliberately and peaceably,
without fraud or surprise, of entering into an explicit and solemn compact with
each other, by assenting to and ratifying a new Constitution, in order to form a
more perfect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquillity, provide for the
common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of lib
erty to themselves and of Massachusetts, assent to and ratify the said Constitu
tion for the United States of America."

The ratification of New-Hampshire is taken from that of Massachusetts, and
almost in the same words. But proof, if possible, still more decisive, may be
found in the celebrated resolutions of Virginia on the alien and sedition law,
in 1798, and the responses of Massachusetts and the other states. Those
resolutions expressly assert that the Constitution is a compact between the
states, in the following language (here Mr. C. read from the resolutions of
Virginia as follows) :

" That this Assembly doth explicitly and peremptorily declare that it VIEWS

THE POWERS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, AS RESULTING FROM THE COMPACT,
TO WHICH THE STATES ARE PARTIES, AS LIMITED BY THE PLAIN SENSE AND IN
TENTION OF THE INSTRUMENT CONSTITUTING THAT COMPACT AS NO FARTHER
VALID THAN THEY ARE AUTHORIZED BY THE GRANTS ENUMERATED IN THAT COM
PACT ; AND THAT, IN CASE OF A DELIBERATE, PALPABLE, AND DANGEROUS EX
ERCISE OF OTHER POWERS NOT GRANTED BY THE SAID COMPACT, THE STATES
WHO ARE PARTIES THERETO HAVE THE RIGHT, AND ARE IN DUTY BOUND, TO
INTERPOSE FOR ARRESTING THE PROGRESS OF THE EVIL, AND FOR MAINTAINING
WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE LIMITS THE AUTHORITIES, RIGHTS, AND LIBERTIES
APPERTAINING TO THEM.

" That the General Assembly doth also express its deep regret that a spirit
has, in sundry instances, been manifested by the Federal Government to en
large its powers by forced constructions of the constitutional charter, which de
fines them ; arid that indications have appeared of a design to expound certain
general phrases (which, having been copied from the very limited grant of powers
in the former articles of confederation, were the less liable to be misconstrued),
so as to destroy the meaning and effect of the particular enumeration which
necessity explains, and limits the general phrases, and so as to CONSOLIDATE

THE STATES, BY DEGREES, INTO ONE SOVEREIGNTY, THE OBVIOUS TENDENCY

0

106 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

AND INEVITABLE RESULT OF WHICH WOULD BE TO TRANSFORM THE PRESENT
REPUBLICAN SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES INTO AN ABSOLUTE, OR, AT BEST,
A MIXED MONARCHY."

They were sent to the several states. We have the reply of Delaware,
New- York, Connecticut, New-Hampshire, Vermont, and Massachusetts, not
one of which contradicts this important assertion on the part of Virginia ; and,
by their silence, they all acquiesce in its truth. The case is still stronger
against Massachusetts, which expressly recognises the fact that the Constitu
tion is a compact.

In her answer she says (here Mr. C. read from the answer of Massachusetts
as follows) : " But they deem it their duty solemnly to declare that, while they
hold sacred the principle, that consent of the people is the only pure source of
just and legitimate power, they cannot admit the right of the state Legislatures
to denounce the administration of that government, to which the people them
selves, by a solemn compact, have exclusively committed their national concerns.
That, although a liberal and enlightened vigilance among the people is always
to be cherished, yet an unreasonable jealousy of the men of their choice, and a
recurrence to measures of extremity upon groundless or trivial pretexts, have a
strong tendency to destroy all rational liberty at home, and to deprive the Uni
ted States of the most essential advantages in their relations abroad. That this
Legislature are persuaded that the decision of all cases in law or equity, arising
under the Constitution of the United States, and the construction of all laws
made in pursuance thereof, are exclusively vested by the people in the judicial
courts of the United States."

" That the people, in that solemn compact, which is declared to be the supreme
law of the land, have not constituted the state Legislatures the judges of the acts
or measures of the Federal Government, but have confided to them the power of
proposing such amendments of the Constitution as shall appear to them neces
sary to the interests, or conformable to the wishes, of the people whom they
represent."

Now, I ask the senator himself — I put it to his candour to say, if South Car
olina be estopped on the subject of the protective system because Mr. Burke
and Mr. Smith proposed a moderate duty on hemp, or some other article, I
know not what, nor do I care, with a view of encouraging its production, of
which motion, I venture to say, not one individual in a hundred in the state
ever heard, whether he and Massachusetts, after this clear, full, and solemn
recognition that the Constitution is a compact, both on his part and that of his
state, be not forever estopped on this important point ?

There remains one more of the senator's arguments to prove that the Con
stitution is not a compact, to be considered. He says it is not a compact, be
cause it is a government ; which he defines to be an organized body, possessed
of the will and power to execute its purposes by its own proper authority ; and
which, he says, bears not the slightest resemblance to a compact. But I would
ask the senator, Who ever considered a government, when spoken of as the
agent to execute the powers of the Constitution, as distinct from the Constitu
tion itself, as a compact ?

In that light it would be a perfect absurdity. It is true that, in general and
loose language, it is often said that the government is a compact, meaning the
Constitution which created it, and vested it with authority to execute the powers
contained in the instrument ; but when the distinction is drawn between the
Constitution and the government, as the senator has done, it would be as ridic
ulous to call the government a compact as to call an individual, appointed to
execute provisions of the contract, a contract ; and not less so to suppose that
there could be the slightest resemblance between them. In connexion with
this point the senator, to prove that the Constitution is not a compact, asserts
that it is wholly independent of the state, and pointedly declares that the states

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 107

have not a right to touch a hair of its head ; and this, with that provision in the
Constitution that three fourths of the states have a right to alter, change, or
amend, or even to abolish it, staring him in the face.

I have examined all of the arguments of the senator intended to prove that
the Constitution is not a compact ; and I trust I have shown, by the clearest
demonstration, that his arguments are perfectly inconclusive, and that his as
sertion is against the clearest and most solemn evidence — evidence of record,
and of such a character that it ought to close his lips forever.

I turn now to consider the other, and, apparently, contradictory aspect in
which the senator presented this part of the subject : I mean that one in which
he states that the government is founded in compact, but is no longer a com
pact. I have already remarked, that no other interpretation could be given to
this assertion, except that the Constitution was once a compact, but is no long
er so. There is a vagueness and indistinctness in this part of the senator's
argument, which left me altogether uncertain as to its real meaning. If he
meant, as I presume he did, that the compact is an executed, and not an execu
tory one — that its object was to create a government, and to invest it with
proper authority — and that, having executed this office, it had performed its
functions, and, with it, had ceased to exist, then we have the extraordinary
avowal that the Constitution is a dead letter — that it has ceased to have any
binding effect, or any practical influence or operation.

It had, indeed, often been charged that the Constitution had become a dead
letter; that it was continually violated, and had lost all its control over the
government ; but no one had ever before been bold enough to advance a theory
on the avowed basis that it was an executed, and. therefore, an extinct instru
ment. I will not seriously attempt to refute an argument which to me appears
so extravagant. I had thought that the Constitution was to endure forever ;
and that, so far from its being an executed contract, it contained great trust
powers for the benefit of those who created it, and all future generations, which
never could be finally executed during the existence of the world, if our gov
ernment should so long endure.

I will now return to the first resolution, to see how the issue stands between
the senator from Massachusetts and myself. It contains three propositions.
First, that the Constitution is a compact ; second, that it was formed by the
states, constituting distinct communities ; and, lastly, that it is a subsisting and
binding compact between the states. How do these three propositions now
stand 1 f The first, I trust, has been satisfactorily established ; the second, the
senator has admitted, faintly, indeed, but still he has admitted it to be true.
This admission is something. It is so much gained by discussion. Three
years ago even this was a contested point. But I cannot say that I thank him
for the admission : we owe it to the force of truth. The fact that these states
were declared to be free and independent states at the time of tjieir independ
ence ; that they were acknowledged to be so by Great Britain in the treaty
which terminated the war of the Revolution, and secured their independence ;
that they were recognised in the same character in the old articles of the con
federation ; and, finally, that the present Constitution was formed by a conven
tion of the several states, afterward submitted to them for their ratification, and
was ratified by them separately, each for itself, and each, by its own act, bind
ing its citizens, formed a body of facts too clear to be denied and too strong to
be resisted.

It now remains to consider the third and last proposition contained in the
resolution — that it is a binding and a subsisting compact between the states.
The senator was not explicit on this point. I understood him, however, as as
serting that, though formed by the states, the Constitution was not binding be
tween the states as distinct communities, but between the American people in
4he aggregate, who, in consequence of the adoption of the Constitution, accord-

108 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

ing to the opinion of the senator, became one people, at least, to the extent of
the delegated powers. This would, indeed, be a great change. All acknowl
edge that, previous to the adoption of the Constitution, the states constituted
distinct and independent communities, in full possession of their sovereignty ;
and, surely, if the adoption of the Constitution was intended to effect the great
and important change in their condition which the theory of the senator sup
poses, some evidence of it ought to be found in the instrument itself. It pro
fesses to be a careful and full enumeration of all the powers which the states
delegated, and of every modification of their political condition. The senator
said that he looked to the Constitution in order to ascertain its real character ;
and, surely, he ought to look to the same instrument in order to ascertain what
changes were, in fact, made in the political condition of the states and the coun
try. But with the exception of " we, the people of the United States," in the
preamble, he has not pointed out a single indication in the Constitution of the
great change which he conceives has been effected in this respect.

Now, sir, I intend to prove that the only argument on which the gentleman
relies on this point must utterly fail him. I do not intend to go into a critical
examination of the expression of the preamble to which I have referred. I do
not deem it necessary ; but were it, it might be easily shown that it is at least
as applicable to my view of the Constitution as to that of the senator ; and that
the whole of his argument on this point rests on the ambiguity of the term thir
teen United States ; which may mean certain territorial limits, comprehending
•within them the whole of the states and territories of the Union. In this sense
the people of the United States may mean all the people living within these
limits, without reference to the states or territories in which they may reside,
or of which they may be citizens, and it is in this sense only that the expres
sion gives the least countenance to the argument of the senator.

But it may also mean the states united, which inversion alone, without farther
explanation, removes the ambiguity to which I have referred. The expression,
in this sense, obviously means no more than to speak of the people of the sev
eral states in their united and confederated capacity ; and, if it were requisite,
it might be shown that it is only in this sense that the expression is used in the
Constitution. But it is not necessary. A single argument will forever settle
this point. Whatever may be the true meaning of this expression, it is not ap
plicable to the condition of the states as they exist under the Constitution, but
as it was under the old confederation, before its adoption. The Constitution
had not yet been adopted, and the states, in ordaining it, could only speak of
themselves in the condition in which they then existed, and not in that in which
they would exist under the Constitution. So that, if the argument of the sena
tor proves anything, it proves, not, as he supposes, that the Constitution forms
the American people into an aggregate mass of individuals, but that such was
their political condition before its adoption, under the old confederation, direct
ly contrary to his argument in the previous part of this discussion.

But I intend not to leave this important point, the last refuge of those who
advocate consolidation, even on this conclusive argument. I have shown that
the Constitution affords not the least evidence of the mighty change of the po
litical condition of the states and the country, which the senator supposed it
effected ; and I intend now, by the most decisive proof, drawn from the consti
tutional instrument itself, to show that no such change was intended, and that
the people of the states are united under it as states and not as individuals. On
this point there is a very important part of the Constitution entirely and strange
ly overlooked by the senator in this debate, as it is expressed in the first reso
lution, which furnishes the conclusive evidence, not only that the Constitution
is a compact, but a subsisting compact, binding between the states. I allude to
the seventh article, which provides that " the ratification of the convention of
nine states shall be sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution betivtcn

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 109

ike, states so ratifying the same." Yes, between the states : these little words
mean a volume — compacts, not laws, bind between the states ; and it here binds,
not between individuals, but between the states : the states ratifying, implying,
as strong as language can make it, that the Constitution is what I have assert
ed it to be — a compact, ratified by the states, and a subsisting compact, binding
the states ratifying it.

But, sir, I will not leave this point, all-important in establishing the true the
ory of our government, on this argument alone, as demonstrative and conclusive
as I hold it to be. Another, not much less powerful, but of a different charac
ter, may be drawn from the tenth amended article, which provides that " the
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
to it by the states, are reserved to the states respectively or to the people."
The article of ratification which I have just cited informs us that the Constitu
tion, which delegates powers, was ratified by the states, and is binding between,
them. This informs us to whom the powers are delegated, a most important
fact in determining the point immediately at issue between the senator and my
self. According to his views, the Constitution created a union between indi
viduals, if the solecism may be allowed, and that it formed, at least to the ex
tent of the powers delegated, one people, and not a Federal Union of the states,
as I contend ; or, to express the same idea differently, that the delegation of
powers was to the American people in the aggregate (for it is only by such
delegation that they could be made into one people), and not to the United
States, directly contrary to the article just cited, which declares that the pow
ers are delegated to the United States. And here it is worthy of notice that
the senator cannot shelter himself under the ambiguous phrase " to the people
of the United States," under which he would certainly have taken refuge, had
the Constitution so expressed it ; but, fortunately for the cause of truth and for
the great principles of constitutional liberty for which I am contending, " peo
ple" is omitted : thus making the delegation of power clear and unequivocal to
the United States, as distinct political communities, and conclusively proving
that all the powers delegated are reciprocally delegated by the states to each
other, as distinct political communities.

So much for the delegated powers. Now, as all admit, and as it is express
ly provided for in the Constitution, the reserved powers are reserved to the
states respectively, or to the people : none will pretend that, as far as they are
concerned, we are one people, though the argument to prove it, however ab
surd, would be far more plausible than that which goes to show that we are
one people to the extent of the delegated powers. This reservation " to the
people" might, in the hands of subtle and trained logicians, be a peg to hang a
doubt upon ; and had the expression " to the people" been connected, as fortu
nately it is not, with the delegated instead of the reserved powers, we should
not have heard of this in the present discussion.

I have now established, I hope, beyond the power of controversy, every alle
gation contained in the first resolution — that the Constitution is a compact
formed by the people of the several states, as distinct political communities,
subsisting and binding between the states in the same character ; which brings
me to the consideration of the consequences which may be fairly deduced in
reference to the character of our political system from these established facts.

The first, and most important, is, that they conclusively establish that ours is
a federal system : a system of states arranged in a Federal Union, and each re
taining its distinct existence and sovereignty. Ours has every attribute which
belongs to a federative system. It is founded on compact ; it is formed by
sovereign communities ; and is binding between them in their sovereign capaci
ty. I might appeal, in confirmation of this assertion, to all elementary writers
on the subject of government, but will content myself with citing one only :
Burlamaqui, quoted with approbation by Judge Tucker, in his Commentary oil

110 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

Blackstone, himself a high authority, who says (here Mr. C. read from Tuck
er's Blackstone as follows) :

Extracts from Blackstone's Commentaries.

" Political bodies, whether great or small, if they are constituted by a people
formerly independent, and under no civil subjection, or by those who justly
claim independence from any civil power they were formerly subject to, have
the civil supremacy in themselves, and are in a state of equal right and liberty
with respect to all other states, whether great or small. No regard is to be had
in this matter to names, whether the body politic be called a kingdom, an em
pire, a principality, a dukedom, a country, a republic, or free town. If it can
exercise justly all the essential parts of civil power within itself, independently
of any other person or body politic, and no other hath any right to rescind or
annul its acts, it has the civil supremacy, how small .soever its territory may be,
or the number of its people, and has all the rights of an independent state.

" This independency of states, and there being distinct political bodies from
each other, is not obstructed by any alliance or confederacies whatsoever, about
exercising jointly any parts of the supreme powers, such as those of peace and
war, in league offensive and defensive. Two states, notwithstanding such
treaties, are separate bodies, and independent.

" These are, then, only deemed politically united when some one person or
council is constituted with a right to exercise some essential powers for both,
and to hinder either from exercising them separately. If any person or coun
cil is empowered to exercise all these essential powers for both, they are then
one state : such is the State of England and Scotland, since the act of union
made at the beginning of the eighteenth century, whereby the two kingdoms
were incorporated into one, all parts of the supreme power of both kingdoms
being thenceforward united, and vested in the three estates of the realm of Great
Britain ; by which entire coalition, though both kingdoms retain their ancient
laws and usages in many respects, they are as effectually united and incorpo
rated as the several petty kingdoms which composed the heptarchy were before
that period.

" But when only a portion of the supreme civil power is vested in one person
or council for both, such as that of peace and war, or of deciding controversies
between different states, or their subjects, while each within itself exercises
other parts of the supreme power, independently of all the others — in this case
they are called systems of states, which Burlamaqui defines to be an assemblage
of perfect governments, strictly united by some common bond, so that they seem
to make but a single body with respect to those affairs which interest them in
common, though each preserves its sovereignty, full and entire, independently
of all others. And in this case, he adds, the confederate states engage to each
other only to exercise with common consent certain parts of the sovereignty,
especially that which relates to their mutual defence against foreign enemies.
But each of the confederates retains an entire liberty of exercising as it thinks
proper those parts of the sovereignty which are not mentioned in the treaty of
union, as parts that ought to be exercised in common. And of this nature is the
American confederacy, in which each state has resigned the exercise of certain
parts of the supreme civil power which they possessed before (except in com
mon with the other states included in the confederacy), reserving to themselves
all their former powers, which are not delegated to the United States by the
common bond of union.

" A visible distinction, and not less important than obvious, occurs to our ob
servation in comparing thes3 different kinds of union. The kingdoms of Eng
land and Scotland are united into one kingdom ; and the two contracting states,
by such an incorporate union, are, in the opinion of Judge Blackstone, totally
annihilated, without any power of revival ; and a third arises from their con-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. Ill

junction, in which all the rights of sovereignty, and particularly that of legisla
tion, are vested. From whence he expresses a doubt whether any infringe
ments of the fundamental and essential conditions of the union would of itself
dissolve the union of those kingdoms ; though he readily admits that, in the
case of a federate alliance, such an infringement would certainly rescind the
compact between the confederated states. In the United States of America, on
the contrary, each state retains its own antecedent form of government ; its own.
laws, subject to the alteration and control of its own Legislature only ; its own
executive officers and council of state ; its own courts of judicature, its own
judges, its own magistrates, civil officers, and officers of the militia ; and, in
short, its own civil state, or body politic, in every respect whatsoever. And
by the express declaration of the 12th article of the amendments to the Consti
tution, the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the
people. In Great Britain, a new civil state is created by the annihilation of two
antecedent civil states ; in the American States, a general federal council and
administration is provided for the joint exercise of such of their several powers
as can be more conveniently exercised in that mode than any other, leaving their
civil state unaltered ; and all the other powers, which the states antecedently
possessed, to be exercised by them respectively, as if no union or connexion
were established between them.

" The ancient Achaia seems to have been a confederacy founded upon a
similar plan : each of those little states had its distinct possessions, territories,
and boundaries ; each had its Senate or Assembly, its magistrates and judges ;
and every state sent deputies to the general convention, and had equal weight
in all determinations. And most of the neighbouring states which, moved by
fear of danger, acceded to this confederacy, had reason to felicitate themselves.
" These confederacies, by which several states are united together by a per
petual league of alliance, are chiefly founded upon this circumstance, that each
particular people choose to remain their own masters, and yet are not strong
enough to make head against a common enemy. The purport of such an
agreement usually is, that they shall not exercise some part of the sovereignty
there specified without the general consent of each other. For the leagues to
which these systems of states owe their rise seem distinguished from others
(so frequent ^mong different states) chiefly by this consideration, that, in the
latter, each confederate people determine themselves, by their own judgment,
to certain mutual performances, yet so that in all other respects they design not
in the least to ma^e the exercise of that part of the sovereignty, whence these
performances proceed, dependant on the consent of their allies, or to retrench
anything from their full and unlimited power of governing their own states.
Thus we see that ordinary treaties propose, for the most part, as their aim, only
some particular advantage of the states thus transacting — their interests happen
ing at present to fall in with each other — but do not produce any lasting union
as to the chief management of affairs. Such was the treaty of alliance between
America and France in the year 1778, by which, among other articles, it was
agreed that neither of the two parties should conclude either truce or peace
with Great Britain without the formal consent of the other first obtained, and
whereby they mutually engaged not to lay down their arms until the independ
ence of the United States should be formally or tacitly assured by the treaty
or treaties which should terminate the war. Whereas, in these confederacies^
of which we are now speaking, the contrary is observable, they being estab
lished with this design, that the several states shall forever link their safety one
with another, and, in order to their mutual defence, shall engage themselves not
to exercise certain parts of their sovereign power, otherwise than by a common
agreement and approbation. Such were the stipulations, among others, con
tained in the articles of confederation and perpetual union between the Amen-

H2 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

can States, by which it was agreed that no state should, without the consent
of the United States in Congress assembled, send any embassy to, or receive
any embassy from, or enter into any conference, agreement, alliance, or treaty
•with, any king, prince, or state ; nor keep up any vessels of war, or body of
forces, in time of peace ; nor engage in any war, without the consent of the
United States in Congress assembled, unless actually invaded ; nor grant com
missions to any ships of war, or letters of marque and reprisal, except after a
declaration of war by the United States in Congress assembled, with several
others ; yet each state respectively retains its sovereignty, freedom, and inde
pendence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right which is not expressly dele
gated to the United States in Congress assembled. The promises made in
these two cases here compared run very differently ; in the former, thus : ' 1
will join you in this particular war as a confederate, and the manner of our
attacking the enemy shall be concerted by our common advice ; nor will we
desist from war till the particular end thereof, the establishment of the inde
pendence of the United States, be obtained.' In the latter, thus : ' None of us
•who have entered into this alliance will make use of our right as to the affairs
of war and peace, except by the general consent of the whole confederacy.'
"We observed before that these unions submit only some certain parts of the
sovereignty to mutual direction ; for it seems hardly possible that the affairs of
different states should have so close a connexion, as that all and each of them
should look on it as their interest to have no part of the chief government ex
ercised without the general concurrence. The most convenient method, there
fore, seems to be, that the particular states reserve to themselves all those
branches of the supreme authority, the management of which can have little or
no influence in the affairs of the rest."

Mr. CALHOUN proceeded :

If we compare our present system with the old confederation, which all
acknowledge to have been federal in its character, we shall find that it possesses
all the attributes which belong to that form of government as fully and com
pletely as that did. In fact, in this particular, there is but a single difference,
and that not essential, as regards the point immediately under consideration,
though very important in other respects. The confederation was the act of the
state governments, and formed a union of governments. The present Consti
tution is the act of the states themselves, or, which is the same thing, of the
people of the several states, and forms a union of them as sovereign communi
ties. The states, previous to the adoption of the Constitution, vere as separate
and distinct political bodies as the governments which represent them, and there
is nothing in the nature of things to prevent them from uniting ander a compact,
in a federal union, without being blended in one mass,ran/ more than uniting
the governments themselves, in like manner, without mergicg them in a single
government. To illustrate what I have stated by reference to ordinary trans
actions, the confederation was a contract between agents — the present Consti
tution between the principals themselves ; or, to take a more analogous case,
one is a league made by ambassadors ; the other, a league made by sovereigns
— the latter no more tending to unite the parties into a single sovereignty than
the former. The only difference is in the solemnity of the act and the force of
the obligation.

There, indeed, results a most important difference, under our theory of govern
ment, as to the nature and character of the act itself, whether executed by the
states themselves, or by their governments ; but a result, as I have already
stated, not at all affecting the question under consideration, but which will
throw much light on a subject in relation to which I must think the senator
from Massachusetts has formed very confused conceptions.

The senator dwelt much on the point that the present system is a constitu
tion and a government, in contradistinction to the old confederation, with a view

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 113

of proving that the Constitution was not a compact. Now, I concede to the
senator that our present system is a constitution and a government ; and that
the former, the old confederation, was not a constitution or government : not,
however, for the reason which he assigned, that the former was a compact, and
the latter not, but from the difference of the origin from which the two com
pacts are derived. According to our American conception, the people alone
can form constitutions or governments, and not their agents. It is this differ
ence, and this alone, which makes the distinction. Had the old confederation
been the act of the people of the several states, and not of their governments,
that instrument, imperfect as it is, would have been a constitution, and the
agency which it created to execute its powers, a government. This is the
true cause of the difference between the two acts, and not that in which the
senator seems to be bewildered.

There is another point on which this difference throws important light, and
which has been frequently referred to in debate on this and former occasions.
I refer to the expression in the preamble of the Constitution, which speaks of
" forming a more perfect union," and in the letter of General Washington, lay
ing the draught of the Convention before the old Congress, in which he speaks
of " consolidating the Union ;" both of which I conceive to refer simply to the
fact that the present Union, as already stated, is a union between the states
themselves, and not a union like that which had existed between the govern
ments of the states.

We will now proceed to consider some of the conclusions which necessarily
follow from the facts and positions already established. They enable us to de
cide a question of vital importance under our system : Where does sovereignty
reside ? If I have succeeded in establishing the fact that ours is a federal sys
tem, as I conceive I conclusively have, that fact of itself determines the ques
tion which I have proposed. It is of the very essence of such a system, that
the sovereignty is in the parts, and not in the whole ; or, to use the language of
Mr. Palgrave, the parts are the units in such a system, and the whole the mul
tiple ; and not the whole the units and the parts the fractions. Ours, then, is
a government of twenty-four sovereignties, united by a constitutional compact,
for the purpose of exercising certain powers through a common government as
their joint agent, and not a union of the twenty-four sovereignties into one,
which, according to the language of the Virginia Resolutions, already cited, would
form a consolidation. And here I must express my surprise that the senator
from Virginia should avow himself the advocate of these very resolutions, when
he distinctly maintains the idea of a union of the states in one sovereignty,
which is expressly condemned by those resolutions as the essence of a consol
idated government.

Another consequence is equally clear, that, whatever modification was made
in the condition of the states under the present Constitution, were modifications
extending only to the exercise of their powers by compact, and not to the sover
eignty itself, and are such as sovereigns are competent to make : it being a con
ceded point, that it is competent to them to stipulate to exercise their powers
in a particular manner, or to abstain altogether from their exercise, or to dele
gate them to agents, without in any degree impairing sovereignty itself. The
plain state of the facts, as regards our government, is, that these states have
agreed by compact to exercise their sovereign powers jointly, as already stated ;
and that, for this purpose, they have ratified the compact in their sovereign ca
pacity, thereby making it the constitution of each state, in nowise distinguish
ed from their own separate constitution, but in the superadded obligation of com
pact — of faith mutually pledged to each other. In this compact, they have stip
ulated, among other things, that it may be amended by three fourths of the states :
that is, they have conceded to each other by compact the right to add new pow
ers or to subtract old, by the consent of that proportion of the states, without re-

P

114 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

quiring, as otherwise would be the case, the consent of all : a modification no
more inconsistent, as has been supposed, with their sovereignty, than any other
contained in the compact. In fact, the provision to which I allude furnishes
strong evidence that the sovereignty is, as I contend, in the states severally :
as the amendments are effected, not by any one three fourths, but by any three
fourths of the states, indicating that the sovereignty is in each of the states.

If these views be correct, it follows, as a matter of course, that the allegiance
of the people is to their several states, and that treason consists in resistance
to the joint authority of the states united, not, as has been absurdly contended,
in resistance to the government of the United States, which, by the provision of
the Constitution, has only the right of punishing.

These conclusions have all a most important bearing on that monstrous and
despotic bill which, to the disgrace of the Senate and the age, has passed this
body. I have still a right thus to speak without violating the rules of order,
as it is not yet a law. These conclusions show that the states can violate no
law ; that they neither are, nor in the nature of things can be, \mder the domin
ion of the law ; that the worst that can be imputed to them is a violation of
compact, for which they, and not their citizens, are responsible ; and that, to
undertake to punish a state by law, or to hold the citizens responsible for the
acts of the state, which they are on their allegiance bound to obey, and liable
to be punished as traitors for disobeying, is a cruelty unheard of among civilized
nations, and destructive of every principle upon which our government is found
ed. It is, in short, a ruthless and complete revolution of our entire system.

I was desirous to present these views fully before the passage of this long-
to-be-lamented bill, but as I was prevented -by the majority, as I have stated at
the commencement of my remarks, I trust that it is not yet too late.

Having now said what I intended in relation to my first resolution, both in
reply to the senator from Massachusetts, and in vindication of its correctness, I
will now proceed to consider the conclusions drawn from it in the second res
olution — that the General Government is not the exclusive and final judge of
the extent of the powers delegated to it, but that the states, as parties to the
compact, have a right to judge, in the last resort, of the infractions of the com
pact, and of the mode and measure of redress.

It can scarcely be necessary, before so enlightened a body, to premise that
our system comprehends two distinct governments — the General and State Gov
ernments, which, properly considered, form but one. The former representing
the joint authority of the states in their confederate capacity, and the latter that
of each state separately. I have premised this fact simply with a view of pre
senting distinctly the answer to the argument offered by the senator from Mas
sachusetts to prove that the General Government has a final and exclusive right
to judge, not only of its delegated jpowers, but also of those reserved to the
states. That gentleman relies for his main argument on the assertion that a
government, which he defines to be an organized body, endowed with both will,
and power, and authority in propriv vigore to execute its purpose, has a right
inherently to judge of its powers, it is not my intention to comment upon the
definition of the senator, though it would not be difficult to show that his ideas
of government are not very American. My object is to deal with the conclu
sion, and not the definition. Admit, then, that the government has the right of
judging of its powers, for which he contends. How, then, will he withhold,
upon his own principle, the right of judging from the state governments, which
he has attributed to the General Government ? If it belongs to one, on his prin
ciple it belongs to both ; and if to both, when they differ, the veto, so abhorred
by the senator, is the necessary result : as neither, if the right be possessed by
both, can control the other.

The senator felt the force of this argument, and, in order to sustain his main
position, he fell back on that clause of the Constitution which provides that

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 115

- this Constitution, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, shall be the su
preme law of the land."

This is admitted : no one has ever denied that the Constitution, and the laws
made in pursuance of it, are of paramount authority. But it is equally undenia
ble that laws not made in pursuance are not only not of paramount authority,
but are of no authority whatever, being of themselves null and void ; which pre
sents the question, Who are to judge whether the laws be or be not pursuant
to the Constitution ? and thus the difficulty, instead of being taken away, is re
moved but one step farther back. This the senator also felt, and has attempted
to overcome the difficulty by setting up, on the part of Congress and the judi
ciary, the final and exclusive right of judging, both ibr the Federal Government
and the states, as to the extent of their powers. That I may do full justice to
the gentleman, I will give his doctrine in his own words. He states :

" That there is a supreme law, composed of the Constitution, the laws pass
ed in pursuance of it, and the treaties ; but in cases coming before Congress,
not assuming the shape of cases in law and equity, so as to be subjects of ju
dicial discussion, Congress must inteiprec the Constitution so often as it has oc
casion to pass laws ; and in cases capable of assuming a judicial shape, the Su
preme Court must be the final interpreter.'3

Now, passing over this vague snd loose phraseology, I would ask the sena
tor upon what principle can lie concede this extensive power to the legislative
and judicial departments, and withhold it entirely from the executive ? If one
has the right, it cannoi be withheld from the other. I would also ask him on
what principle, if the departments of the General Government are to possess
the right of judging, finally" and conclusively, of their respective powers, on what
principle can the same right be withheld from the State Governments, which,
as well as the General Government, properly considered, are but departments
of the same general system, and form together, properly speaking, but one gov
ernment. This vas a favourite idea of Mr. Macon, for whose wisdom I have
a respect, increasing with my experience, and whom I have frequently heard
say that most of the misconceptions and errors in relation to our system origi
nated in forgetting that they were but parts of the same system. I would far
ther tell the senator, that, if this right be withheld from the State Governments ;
if this restraining influence, by which the General Government is coerced to its
proper spiiere, be withdrawn, then that department of the government from which
he has withheld the right of judging of its own powers (the executive) will, so
far from being excluded, become the sole interpreter of the powers of the gov
ernment. It is the armed interpreter, with powers to execute its own construc
tion, and without the aid of which the construction of the other departments
will be impotent.

But I contend that the states have a far clearer right to the sole construction
of their powers than any of the departments of the Federal Government can
have ; this power is expressly reserved, as I have stated on another occasion,
not only against the several departments of the General Government, but against
the United States themselves. I will not repeat the arguments which I then
offered on this point, and which remain unanswered, but I must be permitted to
offer strong* additional proof of the views then taken, and which, if I am not
mistaken, are conclusive on this point. It is drawn from the ratification of the
Constitution by Virginia, and is in the following words (Mr. C. then read as
follows) :

" We, the delegates of the people of Virginia, duly elected in pursuance of a
recommendation from the General Assembly, and now met in Convention, hav
ing fully and freely investigated and discussed the proceedings of the Federal
Convention, and being prepared, as well as the most mature deliberation hath
enabled us, to decide thereon, do, in the name and in behalf of the people of
Virginia, declare and make knov/n that the powers granted under the Constitu-

116 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

tion, being derived from the people of the United States, may be resumed by
them whensoever the same shall be perverted to their injury or oppression, and
that every power not granted thereby remains with them, and at their will ; that,
therefore, no right of any denomination can be cancelled, abridged, restrained,
or modified by the Congress, by the Sena-te or House of Representatives, act
ing in any capacity, by the President or any departmer>t or officer of the United
States, except in \hose instances in which power is given by the Constitution
for those purposes ; and that, among other essential rights, the liberty of con
science and of the pres-s cannot be cancelled, abridged, restrained, or modified
by any authority of the United States. With these impressions, with a solemn
appeal to the Searcher of all hearts for the purity of our intentions, and under
the conviction that whatsoever imperfections may exist in the Constitution ought
rather to be examined in the mode prescribed therein, than to bring the Union
in danger by a delay, with the hojve of obtaining amendments previous to the
ratification — we, the said delegate*, in the name and in the behalf of the people
of Virginia, do, by these presents, Assent to and ratify the Constitution recom
mended on the 17th day of September, 1787, by the Federal Convention, for
the government of the United States, hereby announcing to all those whom it
may concern, that the said Constitution is Binding upon the said people, accord
ing to an authentic copy hereto annexed, in \he words following," &c.

It thus appears that that sagacious state (I fear, however, that her sagacity
is not as sharpsighted now as formerly) ratified the Constitution, with an ex
planation as to her reserved powers ; that they \vei? powers subject to her own
will, and reserved against every department of the general Government — le
gislative, executive, and judicial — as if she had a prophetic knowledge of the at
tempts now made to impair and destroy them : which explanation can be con
sidered in no other light than as containing a condition <m which she ratified,
and, in fact, making part of the Constitution of the United States— extending as
well to the other states as herself. I am no lawyer, and it may appear to be
presumption in me to lay down the rule of law which governs i* such cases, in a
controversy with so distinguished an advocate as the senator from Massachusetts.
But I shall venture to lay it down as a rule in such cases, which I have no fear
that the gentleman will contradict, that, in case of a contract betveen several
partners, if the entrance of one on condition be admitted, the condition enures to
the benefit of all the partners. But I do not rest the argument simply upon this
view : Virginia proposed the tenth amended article, the one in question, and her
ratification must be at least received as the highest evidence of its true mean
ing and interpretation.

If these views be correct — and I do not see how they can be resisted — the
rights of the states to judge of the extent of their reserved powers stands on tKe
most solid foundation, and is good against every department of the General Gov
ernment ; and the judiciary is as much excluded from an interference with the
reserved powers as the legislative or executive departments. To establish the
opposite, the senator relies upon the authority of Mr. Madison, in the Federal
ist, to prove that it was intended to invest the court with the power in question.
In reply, I will meet Mr. Madison with his own opinion, given on a most solemn
occasion, and backed by the sagacious Commonwealth of Virginia. *The opinion
to which I allude will be found in the celebrated report of 1799, of which Mr.
Madison was the author. It says :

•" But it is objected, that the JUDICIAL AUTHORITY is to be regarded as the soU
expositor of the Constitution in the last resort ; and it may be asked for what
reason, the declaration by the General Assembly, supposing it to be theoretical
ly true, could be required at the present day, and in so solemn a manner.

" On this objection it might be observed, first, that there may be instances
of usurped power, which the forms of the Constitution would never draw with
in the control of the judicial department : secondly, that, if the decision of the ju-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 117

diciary be raised above the authority of the sovereign parties to the Constitu
tion, the decisions of the other departments, not carried by the forms of the
Constitution before the judiciary, must bo equally authoritative and final with
decisions of the department. But the proper answer to this objection is, that
the resolution of the General Assembly relates to those great and extraordinary
cases in which all the forms of the Constitution may prove ineffectual against
infractions dangerous to the essential rights of the parties to it. The resolution
supposes that dangerous powers, not delegated, may not only be usurped and
executed by the other departments, but that the judicial department, also, may
exercise or sanction dangerous powers beyond the grant of the Constitution ;
and, consequently, that the ultimate right of the parties to the Constitution to
judge whether the compact was dangerously violated, must extend to violations
by one delegated authority as well as by another ; by the judiciary as well as
by the executive or the legislative."

The senator also relies upon the authority of Luther Martin to the same
point, to which I have already replied so fully on another occasion (in answer
to the senator from Delaware, Mr. CLAYTON), that I do not deem it necessary
to add any farther remarks on the present occasion.

But why should I waste words in reply to these or any other authorities,
when it has been so clearly established that the rights of the states are reserved
against all and every department of the government, that no authority in oppo
sition can possibly shake a position so well established ? Nor do I think it ne
cessary to repeat the argument which I offered when the bill was under dis
cussion, to show that the clause in the Constitution which provides that the ju
dicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this Con
stitution, and to the laws and treaties made under its authority, has no bearing
on the point in controversy ; and that even the boasted power of the Supreme
Court to decide a law to be unconstitutional, so far from being derived from this
or any other portion of the Constitution, results from the necessity of the case —
where two rules of unequal authority come in conflict — and is a power belong
ing to all courts, superior and inferior, state and general, domestic and foreign.

I have now, I trust, shown satisfactorily that there is no provision in the
Constitution to authorize the General Government, through any of its depart
ments, to control the action of the state within the sphere of its reserved pow
ers ; and that, of course, according to the principle laid down by the senator from
Massachusetts himself, the government of the states, as well as the General
Government, has the right to determine the extent of their respective powers,
without the right on the part of either to control the other. The necessary re
sult is the veto, to which he so much objects ; and to get clear of which, he in
forms us, was the object for which the present Constitution was formed. I know
not whence he has derived his information, but my impression is very different
as to the immediate motives which led to the formation of that instrument. I
have always understood that the principal was, to give to Congress the power
to regulate commerce, to lay impost duties, and to raise a revenue for the pay
ment of the public debt and the expenses of the government ; and to subject the
action of the citizens individually to the operation of the laws, as a substitute
for force. If the object had been to get clear of the veto of the states, as the
senator states, the Convention certainly performed their work in a most bungling
manner. There was unquestionably a large party in that body, headed by men
of distinguished talents and influence, who commenced early and worked ear
nestly to the last, to deprive the states — not directly, for that would have been
too bold an attempt, but indirectly — of the veto. The good sense of the Con
vention, however, put down every effort, however disguised and perseveringly
made. I do not deem it necessary to give from the journals the history of these
various and unsuccessful attempts, though it would afford a very instructive les
son. It is sufficient to say that it was attempted by proposing to give Congress

118 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

power to annul the acts of. the states which they might deem inconsistent with
the Constitution ; to give to the President the power of appointing the governors
of the states, with a view of vetoing state laws through his authority ; and,
finally, to give to the judiciary the power to decide controversies between the
states and the GenerM Government : all of which failed — fortunately for the
liberty of the country — utterly and entirely failed ; and in their failure we have
the strongest evidence that it was not the intention of the Convention to deprive
the states of the veto power. Had the attempt to deprive them of this power
been directly made, and failed, every one would have seen and felt that it would
furnish conclusive evidence in favour of its existence. Now, I would ask,
What possible difference can it make in what form this attempt was made ?
whether by attempting to confer on the General Government a power incom
patible with the exercise of the veto on the part of the states, or by attempting
directly to deprive them of the right of exercising it. We have thus direct and
strong proof that, in the opinion of the Convention, the states, unless deprived
of it, possess the veto power, or, what is another name for the same thing, the
light of nullification. I know that there is a diversity of opinion among the
friends of state rights in regard to this power, which I regret, as I cannot but
consider it as a power essential to the protection of the minor and local inter
ests of the community, and the liberty and the union of the country. It is the
very shield of state rights, and the only power by which that system of injus
tice against which we have contended for more than thirteen years can be
arrested : a system of hostile legislation, of plundering by law, which must ne
cessarily lead to a conflict of arms if not prevented.

But I rest the right of a state to judge of the extent of its reserved powers,
in the last resort, on higher grounds — that the Constitution is a compact, to
which the states are parties in their sovereign capacity; and that, as in all
other cases of compact between parties having no common umpire, each has a
right to judge for itself. To the truth of this proposition the senator from Mas
sachusetts has himself assented, if the Constitution itself be a compact — and
that it is, I have shown, I trust, beyond the possibility of a doubt. Having es
tablished that point, I now claim, as I stated I would do in the course of the dis
cussion, the admissions of the senator, and, among them, the right of secession
and nullification, which he conceded would necessarily follow if the Constitu
tion be indeed a compact.

I have now replied to the arguments of the senator from Massachusetts so
far as they directly apply to the resolutions, and will, in conclusion, notice some
of his general and detached remarks. To prove that ours is a consolidated gov
ernment, and that there is an immediate conriexion between the government and
the citizen, he relies on the fact that the laws act directly on individuals. That
such is the case I will not deny ; but I am very far from conceding the point
that it affords the decisive proof, or even any proof at all, of the position which
the senator wishes to maintain. I hold it to be perfectly within the competen
cy of two or more states to subject their citizens, inr certain cases, to the direct
action of each other, without surrendering or impairing their sovereignty. I rec
ollect, while I was a member of Mr. Monroe's cabinet, a proposition was sub
mitted by the British Government to permit a mutual right of search and seizure
on the part of each government of the citizens of the other, on board of vessels
engaged in the slave-trade, and to establish a joint tribunal for their trial and pun
ishment. The proposition was declined, not because it would impair the sover
eignty of either, but on the ground of general expediency, and because it would
be incompatible with the provisions of the Constitution which establish the ju
dicial power, and which provisions require the judges to be appointed by the
President and Senate. If I am not mistaken, propositions of the same kind
were made and acceded to by some of the Continental powers.

With the same view, the senator cited the suability of the states as evidence

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 119

of their want of sovereignty ; at which. I must express my surprise, coming from
the quarter it does. No one knows better than the senator that it is perfectly
within the competency of a sovereign state to permit itself to be sued. We have
on the statute-book a standing law, under which the United States maybe sued
in certain land cases. If the provision in the Constitution on this point proves
anything, it proves, by the extreme jealousy with which the right of suing a state
is permitted, the very reverse of that for which the senator contends.

Among other objections to the views of the Constitution for which I contend,
it is said that they are novel. I hold this to be a great mistake. The novelty
is not on my side, but on that of the senator from Massachusetts. The doctrine
of consolidation which he maintains is of recent growth. It is not the doctrine
of Hamilton, Ames, or any of the distinguished federalists of .that period, all of
•whom strenuously maintained the federative character of the Constitution,
though they were accused of supporting a system of policy which would neces
sarily lead to consolidation. The first disclosure of that doctrine was in the
case of M'Culloch,in which the Supreme Court held the doctrine, though wrapped
up in language somewhat indistinct and ambiguous. The next, and more open
avowal, was by the senator of Massachusetts himself, about three years ago, in
the debate on Foot's resolution. The first official annunciation of the doctrine
was in the recent proclamation of the President, of which the bill that has re
cently passed this body is the bitter fruit.

It is farther objected by the senator from Massachusetts, and others, against
this doctrine of state rights, as maintained in this debate, that, if they should
prevail, the peace of the country would be destroyed. But what if they should
not prevail ? Would there be peace ? Yes, the peace of despotism : that peace
which is enforced by the bayonet and the sword ; the peace of death, where
all the vital functions of liberty have ceased. It is this peace which the doc
trine of state sovereignty may disturb by that conflict, which in every free state,
if properly organized, necessarily exists between liberty and power ; but which,
if restrained within proper limits, is a salutary exercise to our moral and intel
lectual faculties. In the case of Carolina, which has caused all this discus
sion, who does not see, if the effusion of blood be prevented, that the excite
ment, the agitation, and the inquiry which it has caused, will be followed by
the most beneficial consequences ? The country had sunk into avarice, in
trigue, and electioneering, from which nothing but some such event could rouse
it, or restore those honest and patriotic feelings which had almost disappeared
under their baneful influence. What government has ever attained power and
distinction without such conflicts ? Look at the degraded state of all those na
tions where they have been put down by the iron arm of the government.

I, for rny part, have no fear of any dangerous conflict, under the fullest ac
knowledgment of state sovereignty : the very fact that the states may interpose
will produce moderation and justice. The General Government will abstain
from the exercise of any power in which they may suppose three fourths of the
states will not sustain them ; while, on the other hand, the states will not in
terpose but on the conviction that they will be supported by one fourth of their
co-states. Moderation and justice will produce confidence, attachment, and patri
otism ; and these, in turn, will offer most powerful barriers against the excess
of conflicts between the states and the General Government.

But we are told that, should the doctrine prevail, the present system would
be as bad, if not worse, than the old confederation. I regard the assertion only
as evidence of that extravagance of declaration in which, from excitement of
feeling, we so often indulge. Admit the power, and still the present system
would be as far removed from the weakness of the old confederation as it would
be from the lawless and despotic violence of consolidation. So far from being-
the same, the difference between the confederation and the present Constitution
would still be most strongly marked. If there were no other distinction, the

120 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

fact that the former required the concurrence of the states to execute its acts,
and the latter, the act of a state to arrest its acts, would make a distinction as
broad as the ocean : in the former, the vis inertia of our nature is in opposition to
the action of the system. Not to act was to defeat. In the latter, the same
principle is on the opposite side — action is required to defeat. He who under
stands human nature will see in this difference the difference between a feeble
and illy-contrived confederation, and the restrained energy of a federal system.
Of the same character is the objection that the doctrine will be the source of
weakness. If we look to mere organization and physical power as the only
source of strength, without taking into the estimate the operation of moral
causes, such would appear to be the fact ; but if we take into the estimate the
latter, we shall find that those governments have the greatest strength in which
power has been most efficiently checked. The government of Rome furnishes
a memorable example. There, two independent and distinct powers existed —
the people acting by tribes, in which the plebeians prevailed, and by centuries,
in which the patricians ruled. The tribunes were the appointed representa
tives of the one power, and the Senate of the other : each possessed of the au
thority of checking and overruling one another, not as departments of the gov
ernment, as supposed by the senator from Massachusetts, but as independent
powers — as much so as the State and General Governments. A shallow ob
server would perceive, in such an organization, nothing but the perpetual source
of anarchy, discord, and weakness ; and yet, experience has proved that it was
the most powerful government that ever existed ; and reason teaches that this
power was derived from the very circumstance which hasty reflection would
consider the cause* of weakness. I will venture an assertion, which may be
considered extravagant, but in which history will fully bear me out, that we have
no knowledge of any people in which a power of arresting the improper acts of the
government, or what may be called the negative power of government, was too>
strong, except Poland, where every freeman possessed a veto ; but even there,
although it existed in so extravagant a form, it was the source of the highest
arid most lofty attachment to liberty, and the most heroic courage : qualities that
more than once saved Europe from the domination of the crescent and cime-
ter. It is worthy of remark, that the fate of Poland is not to be attributed so
much to the excess of this negative power of itself, as to the facility which it
afforded to foreign influence in controlling its political movements.

I am not surprised that, with the idea of a perfect government which the
senator from Massachusetts has formed — a government of an absolute majority,
unchecked and unrestrained, operating through a representative body — that he
should be so much shocked with what he is pleased to call the absurdity of the
state veto. But let me tell him that his scheme of a perfect government, as
beautiful as he conceives it to be, though often tried, has invariably failed, and
has always run, whenever tried, through the same uniform process of faction,
corruption, anarchy, and despotism. He considers the representative principle
as the great modern improvement in legislation, and of itself sufficient to secure
liberty. I cannot regard it in the light in which he does. Instead of modern,
it is of remote origin, and has existed, in greater or less perfection, in every
free state, from the remotest antiquity. Nor do I consider it as of itself sufficient
to secure liberty, though I regard it as one of the indispensable means — the
means of securing the people against the tyranny and oppression of their rulers.
To secure liberty, another means is still necessary — the means of securing the
different portions of society against the injustice and oppression of each other,
which can only be effected by veto, interposition, or nullification, or by what
ever name the restraining or negative power of government may be called.

The senator appears to be enamoured with his conception of a consolidated
government, and avows himself to be prepared, seeking no lead, to rush, in its
defence, to the front rank, where the blows fall heaviest and thickest. I ad-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 121

mire his gallantry and courage, but I will tell him that he will find in the op
posite ranks, under the flag of liberty, spirits as gallant as his own ; and that
experience will teach him that it is infinitely easier to carry on the war of
legislative exaction by bills and enactments, than to extort by sword and bayo
net from the brave and the free.

The bill which has passed this body is intended to decide this great contro
versy between that view of our government entertained by the senator and those
who act with him, and that supported on our side. It has merged the tariff,
and all other questions connected with it, in the higher and direct issue which
it presents between the federal and national system of governments. I con
sider the bill as far worse, and more dangerous to liberty, than the tariff. It has
been most wantonly passed, when its avowed object no longer justified it. I
consider it as chains forged and fitted to the limbs of the states, and hung up to
be used when occasion may require. We are told, in order to justify the pas
sage of this fatal measure, that it was necessary to present the olive-branch,
with one hand and the sword with the other. We scorn the alternative. You
have no right to present the sword. The Constitution never put the instru
ment in your hands to be employed against a state ; and as to the olive-branch,
whether we receive it or not will not depend on your menace, but on our own
estimate of what is due to ourselves and the rest of the community in reference
to the difficult subject on which we have taken issue.

The senator from Massachusetts has struggled hard to sustain his cause, but
the. load was too heavy for him to bear. I am not surprised at the ardour and
zeal with which he has entered into the controversy. It is a great struggle
between power and liberty — power on the side of the North, and liberty on the
side of the South. But, while I am not surprised at the part which the sena
tor from Massachusetts has taken, I must express my amazement at the prin
ciples advanced by the senator from Georgia, nearest me (Mr. Forsyth). I had
supposed it was impossible that one of his experience and sagacity should not
perceive the new and dangerous direction which this controversy is about to take.
For the first time, we have heard an ominous reference to a provision in the Con
stitution which I have never known to be before alluded to in discussion, or in
connexion with any of our measures. I refer to that provision in the Constitu
tion in which the General Government guaranties a republican form of gov
ernment to the states — a power which hereafter, if not rigidly restricted to the
objects intended by the Constitution, is destined to be a pretext to interfere
•with our political affairs and domestic institutions in a manner infinitely more
dangerous than any other power which has ever been exercised on the part of
the General Government. I had supposed that every Southern senator, at least,
would have been awake to the danger which menaces us from this new quar
ter ; and that no sentiment would be uttered, on their part, calculated to coun
tenance the exercise of this dangerous power. With these impressions, I heard
the senator, with amazement, alluding to Carolina as furnishing a case which
called for the enforcement of this guarantee. Does he not see the hazard of
the indefinite extension of this dangerous power? There exists in every
Southern State a domestic institution, which would require a far less bold con
struction to consider the government of every state, in that quarter, not to be
Republican, and, of course, to demand, on the part of this government, a sup
pression of the institution to which I allude, in fulfilment of the guarantee. I
believe there is now no hostile feelings combined with political considerations,
in any section, connected with this delicate subject. But it requires no stretch
of the imagination to see the danger which must one day come, if not vigilant
ly watched. With the rapid strides with which this government is advancing
to power, a time will come, and that not far distant, when petitions will be re
ceived from the quarter to which I allude for protection : when the faith of the
guarantee will be, at least, as applicable to that case as the senator from Geor-

Q

122 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CAUIOUN.

gia now thinks it is to Carolina. Unless his doctrine be opposed by united and
iirm resistance, its ultimate effect will be to drive the white population from the
Southern Atlantic States.

VII.

SPEECH ON THE SUBJECT OF THE REMOVAL OF THE DEPOSITES FROM THE BANK OF
THE UNITED STATES, JANUARY 13, 1834.

THE Special Order now came up, the question being on Mr. CLAY'S resolu
tions in regard to the removal of the Public Deposites.

Mr. CALHOUN then rose, and said, that the statement of this case might be
given in a very few words. The 16th section of the act incorporating the Bank
provides that, wherever there is a bank or branch of the United States Bank,
the public moneys should be deposited therein, unless otherwise ordered by the
Secretary of the Treasury, and that, in that case, he should report to Congress,
if in session, immediately ; and, if not, at the commencement of the next ses
sion. The secretary, acting under the provision of this section, has ordered
the deposites to be withheld from the Bank, and has reported his reasons, in
conformity with the provisions of the section. The Senate is now called upon
to consider his reasons, in order to determine whether the secretary is justified
or not. I have examined them with care and deliberation, without the slightest
bias, as far as I am conscious, personal or political. I have but a slight ac
quaintance with the secretary, and that little is not unfavourable to him. I
stand wholly disconnected with the two great parties now contending for as
cendency. My political connexions are with that small and denounced party
which has voluntarily wholly retired from the party strifes of the day, with a
view of saving, if possible, the liberty and the Constitution of the country, in
this great crisis of our affairs.

Having maturely considered, with these impartial feelings, the reasons of the
secretary, I am constrained to say that he has entirely failed to make out his
justification. At the very commencement, he has placed his right to remove
the deposites on an assumption resting on a misconception of the case. In the
progress of his argument he has entirely abandoned the first, and assumed a new
and greatly enlarged ground, utterly inconsistent with the first, and equally un
tenable ; and yet, as broad as his assumptions are, there is an important part of
the transaction which he does not attempt to vindicate, and to which he has not
even alluded. I shall, said Mr. CALHOUN, now proceed, without farther remark,
to make good these assertions.

The secretary, at the commencement of his argument, assumes the position
that, in the absence of all legal provision, he, as the head of the financial depart
ment, had the right, in virtue of his office, to designate the agent and place for
the safe-keeping of the public deposites. He then contends that the 16th sec
tion does not restrict his power, which stands, he says, on the same ground that
it had before the passing of the act incorporating the Bank. It is unnecessary
to inquire into the correctness of the position assumed by the secretary ; but, if
it were, it would not be difficult to show that when an agent, with general pow
ers, assumes, in the execution of his agency, a power not delegated, the assump
tion rests on the necessity of the case ; and that no power, in such case, can be
lawfully exercised, which was not necessary to effect the object intended. Nor
would it be difficult to show tha% in this case, the power assumed by the secre
tary would belong, not to him, but to the treasurer, who, under the act organ
izing the Treasury Department, is expressly charged with the safe-keeping of
the public funds, for which he is responsible under bond, in heavy penalties.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 123

But, as strongly and directly as these considerations bear on the question of the
power of the secretary, I do not think it necessary to pursue them, for the plain
reason that the secretary has entirely mistaken the case. It is not a case, as
he supposes, where there is no legal provision in relation to the safe-keeping
of the public funds, but one of precisely the opposite character. The 16th sec
tion expressly provides that the deposites shall be made in the Bank and its
branches, and, of course, it is perfectly clear that all powers which the secre
tary has derived from the general and inherent powers of his office, in the ab
sence of such provision, are wholly inapplicable to this case. Nor is it less
clear that, if the section had terminated with the provision directing the deposites
to be made in the Bank, the secretary would have had no more control over the
subject than myself, or any other senator ; and it follows, of course, that he must
derive his power, not from any general reasons connected with the nature of
his office, but from some express provision contained in the section, or some
other part of the act. It has not been attempted to be shown that there is any
such provision in any other section or part of the act. The only control, then,
which the secretary can rightfully claim over the deposites is contained in the
provision which directs that the deposites shall be made in the Bank, unless
otherwise ordered by the Secretary of the Treasury ; which brings the whole
question in reference to the deposites to the extent of the power which Con
gress intended to confer upon the secretary, in these few words, " unless other
wise ordered."

In ascertaining the intention of Congress, I lay it down as a rule, which I
suppose will not be controverted, that all political powers under our free insti
tutions are trust powers, and not rights, liberties, or immunities, belonging per
sonally to the officer. I also lay it down as a rule not less incontrovertible,
that trust powers are necessarily limited (unless there be some express pro
vision to the contrary) to the subject-matter and object of the trust. This brings
us to the question, What is the subject and object of the trust in this case ? The
whole section relates to deposites — to the safe and faithful keeping of the pub
lic funds. With this view they are directed to be made in the Bank. With
the same view, and in order to increase the security, power was conferred on
the secretary to withhold the deposites ; and, with the same view, he is direct
ed to report his reasons for the removal, to Congress. All have one common
object, the security of the public funds. To this point the whole section con
verges. The language of Congress, fairly understood, is, We have selected
the Bank because we confide in it as a safe and faithful agent to keep the pub
lic money ; but, to prevent the abuse of so important a trust, we invest the sec
retary with power to remove the deposites, with a view te their increased se
curity. And lest the secretary, on his part, should abuse so important a trust,
and in order still farther to increase that security, we direct, in case of removal,
that he shall report his reasons. It is obvious, under this view of the subject,
that the secretary has no right to act in relation to the deposites but with a view
to their increased security ; that he has no right to order them to be withheld
from the Bank so long as the funds are safe, and the Bank has faithfully per
formed the duties imposed in relation to them ; and not even then, unless the
deposites can be placed in safer and more faithful hands. That such was the
opinion of the executive in the first instance, we have demonstrative proof in
the message of the President to Congress at the close of the last session, which
placed the subject of the removal of the deposites exclusively on the question
of their safety ; and that such was also the opinion of the House of Representa
tives then, we have equally conclusive proof from the vote of that body that the
public funds in the Bank were safe, which was understood, at that time, on all
sides, by friends and foes, as deciding the question of the removal of the de
posites.

The extent of the power intended to be conferred being established, the ques-

124 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

lion now arises, Has the secretary transcended its limit ? It can scarcely be
necessary to argue this point. It is not even pretended that the public deposites
were in danger, or that the Bank had not faithfully performed all the duties im
posed on it in relation to them, nor that the secretary had placed the money in
a safer or in more faithful hands. So far otherwise, there is not a man who
hears me who will not admit that the public moneys are now less safe than
they were in the Bank of the United States. And I will venture to assert that
not a capitalist can be found who would not ask a considerably higher per cent-
age to ensure them in their present, than in the place of deposite designated by
law. If these views are correct, and I hold them to be unquestionable, the ques
tion is decided. The secretary has no right to withhold the deposites from the
Bank. There has been, and can be but one argument advanced in favour of his
right, which has even the appearance of being tenable — that the power to with
hold is given in general terms, and without qualification, " unless the secretary
otherwise direct.'1'' Those who resort to this argument must assume the posi
tion, that the letter ought to prevail over the clear and manifest intention of the
act. They must regard the power of the secretary, not as a trust power, limit
ed by the subject and the object of the trust, but as a chartered right, to be used
according to his discretion and pleasure. There is a radical defect in our mode
of construing political powers, of which this and many other instances afford
striking examples, but I will give the secretary his choice : either the intention
or the letter must prevail : he may select either, but cannot be permitted to take
one or the other as may suit his purpose. If he chooses the former, he has
transcended his powers, as I have clearly demonstrated. If he selects the lat
ter, he is equally condemned, as he has clearly exercised power not compre
hended in the letter of his authority. He has not confined himself simply to-
withholding the public moneys from the Bank of the United States, but he has
ordered them to be deposited in other banks, though there is not a word in the
section to justify it. I do not intend to argue the question whether he had a
right to order the funds withheld from the United States Bank to be placed in
the state banks, which he has selected ; but I ask, How has he acquired that
right ? It rests wholly on construction — on the supposed intention of the Legis
lature, which, when it gives a power, intends to give all the means necessary to
render it available. But, as clear as this principle of construction is, it is not
more clear than that which would limit the right of the secretary to the question,
of the safe and faithful keeping of the public funds ; and I cannot admit that the
secretary shall be permitted to resort to the letter or to construction, as may
best be calculated to enlarge his power, when the right construction is denied
to those who would limit his power by the clear and obvious intention of Con
gress.

I might here, said Mr. Calhoun, rest the question of the power of the secre
tary over the deposites, without adding another word. I have placed it on
grounds from which no ingenuity, however great, or subtlety, however refined,
can remove it ; but such is the magnitude of the case, and such my desire to
give the reasons of the secretary the fullest consideration, that I shall follow
him through the remainder of his reasons.

That the secretary was conscious that the first position which he assumed,
and which I have considered, was untenable, we have ample proof in the pre
cipitancy with which he retreated from it. He had scarcely laid it down, when,
without illustration or argument, he passed with a rapid transition, and, I must
say, a transition as obscure as rapid, to another position wholly inconsistent
with the first, and in assuming which, he expressly repudiates the idea that the
safe and faithful keeping of the puolic funds had any necessary connexion with
his removal of the deposites ; his power to do which, he places on the broad
and unlimited ground that he had a right to make such disposition of them as
the public interest or the convenience of the people might require. I have

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 125

said that the transition of the secretary was as obscure as it was rapid ; but, ob
scure as it is, he has said enough to enable us to perceive the process by which
he has reached so extraordinary a position ; and we may safely affirm, that his
arguments are not less extraordinary than the conclusion at which he arrives.
His first proposition, which, however, he has not ventured to lay down express
ly, is, that Congress has an unlimited control over the deposites, and that it
may dispose of them in whatever manner it may please, in order to promote
the general welfare and convenience of the people. He next asserts that Con
gress has parted with this power under the sixteenth section, which directs the
deposites to be made in the Bank of the United States, and then concludes
with affirming that it has invested the Secretary of the Treasury with it, for
reasons which I am unable to understand.

It cannot be necessary, before so enlightened a body, that I should undertake
to refute an argument so utterly untrue in premises and conclusion — to show
that Congress never possessed the power which the secretary claims for it —
that it is a power, from its very nature, incapable of such enlargement, being-
limited solely to the safe keeping of the public funds ; that if it existed, it
would be susceptible of the most dangerous abuses ; that Congress might make
the wildest and most dangerous association the depository of the public funds ;
might place them in the hands of the fanatics and the madmen of the North,
who are waging war against the domestic institutions of the South, under the
plea of promoting the general welfare. But admitting that Congress possessed
the power which the secretary attributes to it, by what process of reasoning can
he show that it has parted with this unlimited power, simply by directing the
public moneys to be deposited in the Bank of the United States 1 or, if it has
parted with the power, by what extraordinary process has it been transferred
to the Secretary of the Treasury by those few and simple words, "unless he
shall otherwise direct ?" In support of this extraordinary argument, the secre
tary has offered not a single illustration, nor a single remark bearing the sem
blance of reason, but one, which I shall now proceed to notice.

He asserts, and asserts truly, that the Bank charter is a contract between the
government, or, rather, the people of the United States and the Bank, and then
assumes that it constitutes him a common agent or trustee, to superintend the
execution of the stipulations contained in that portion of the contract compre
hended in the sixteenth section. Let us now, taking these assumptions to be
true, ascertain what those stipulations are, the superintendence of the execution
of which, as he affirms, are jointly confided by the parties to the secretary.
The government stipulated, on its part, that the public money should be deposi
ted in the Bank of the United States — a great and valuable privilege, on which
the successful operation of the institution mainly depends. The Bank, on its
part, stipulated that the funds should be safely kept, that the duties imposed in
relation to them should be faithfully discharged, and that for this, with other
privileges, it would pay to the government the sum of one million five hundred
thousand dollars. These are the stipulations, the execution of which, accord
ing to the secretary's assumption, he has been appointed, as joint agent or trus
tee, to superintend, and from which he would assume the extraordinary power
which he claims over the deposites, to dispose of them in such manner as he
may think the public interest or the convenience of the people may require.

Is it not obvious that the whole extent of power conferred upon him, admitting
his assumption to be true, is to withhold the deposites in case that the Bank
should violate its stipulations in relation to them, on one side, and on the other,
to prevent the government from withholding the deposites, so long as the Bank
faithfully performed its part of the contract ? This is the full extent of his, pow
er. According to his own showing, not a particle more can be added. But
there is another aspect in which the position in which the secretary has pla
ced himself may be viewed. It offers for consideration riot only a question of

126 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

the extent of his power, but a question as to the nature and extent of duty
which has been imposed upon him. If the position be such as he has descri
bed, there has been confided to him a trust of the most sacred character, ac
companied by duties of the most solemn obligation. He stands, by the mutual
confidence of the parties, vested with the high judicial power to determine on
the infraction or observance of a contract in which government and a large and
respectable portion of the citizens are deeply interested ; and, in the execution
of this high power, he is bound, by honour and conscience, so to act as to pro
tect each of the parties in the full enjoyment of their respective portion of ben
efit in the contract, so long as they faithfully observe it. How has the secre
tary performed these solemn duties, which, according to his representation,
have been imposed upon him ? Has he protected the Bank against the aggres
sion of the government, or the government against the unfaithful conduct of the
Bank in relation to the deposites ? Or has he, forgetting his sacred obligations,
disregarded the interests of both : on one side, divesting the Bank of the de
posites, and on the other, defeating the government in the intended security of
the public funds, by seizing on them as the property of the executive, to be dis
posed at pleasure to favourite and partisan banks ?

But I shall relieve the secretary from this awkward and disreputable posi
tion in which his own arguments have placed him. He is not the mutual trus
tee, as he has represented, of the government and the Bank, but simply the
agent of the former, vested, under the contract, with power to withhold the de
posites, with a view, as has been stated, to their additional security — to their
safe keeping ; and if he had but for a moment reflected on the fact that he was
directed to report his reasons to Congress only, and not also to the Bank, for
withholding the deposites, he could scarcely have failed to perceive that he
was simply the agent of one of the parties, and not, as he supposes, a joint
agent of both.

The secretary having established, as he supposes, his right to dispose of
the deposites as, in his opinion, the general interest and convenience of the
people might require, proceeds to claim and exercise power with a boldness
commensurate with the extravagance of the right which he has assumed. He
commences with a claim to determine, in his official character, that the Bank
of the United States is unconstitutional : a monopoly, baneful to the welfare of
the community. Having determined this point, he comes to the conclusion
that the charter of the Bank ought not to be renewed, and then assumes that it
will not be renewed. Having reached this point, he then determines that it is
his duty to remove the deposites. No one can object that Mr. Taney, as a
citizen, in his individual character, should entertain an opinion as to the uncon
stitutionally of the Bank ; but that he, acting in his official character, and per
forming official acts under the charter of the Bank, should undertake to deter
mine that the institution was unconstitutional, and that those who granted the
charter, and bestowed upon him his power to act under it, had violated the
Constitution, is an assumption of power of a nature which I will not undertake
to characterize, as I wish not to be personal.

But he is not content with the power simply to determine on the uriconstitu-
tionality of the Bank. He goes far beyond : he claims to be the organ of the
voice of the people. In this high character, he pronounces that the question
of the renewal of the Bank charter was put at issue at the last presidential elec
tion, and that the people had determined that it should not be renewed. I do
not, said Mr. Calhoun, intend to enter into the argument whether, in point of
tact, the renewal of the charter was put at issue at the last election. That
point was ably and fully discussed by the honourable senators from Kentucky
(Mr. Clay) and New-Jersey (Mr. Southard), who conclusively proved that no
such question was involved in the issue ; and if it were, the issue comprehend
ed so many others, that it was impossible to conjecture on which the election

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 127

turned. I look to higher objections. I would inquire by what authority the
Secretary of the Treasury constitutes himself the organ of the people of the Uni
ted States. He has the reputation of being an able lawyer, and can he be ig
norant that, so long as the Constitution of the United States exists, the only or
gans of the people of these states, as far as the action of the General Govern
ment is concerned, are the several departments, legislative, executive, and judi
cial, which, acting within the respective limits assigned by the Constitution,
have a right to pronounce authoritatively the voice of the people ? A claim on
the part of the executive to interpret, as the secretary has done, the voice of
the people through any other channel, is to shake the foundation of our system.
Has the secretary forgotten that the last step to absolute power is this very as
sumption which he has claimed for that department ? I am thus brought, said
Mr. C., to allude to the extraordinary manifesto read by the President to the
cabinet, and which is so intimately connected with the point immediately under
consideration. That document, though apparently addressed to the cabinet,
was clearly and manifestly intended as an appeal to the people of the United
States, and opens a new and direct organ of communication between the Presi
dent and them unknown to the Constitution and the laws. There are but two
channels known to either through which the President can communicate with
the people — by messages to the two houses of Congress, as expressly provided
for in the Constitution, or by proclamation, setting forth the interpretations
which he places upon a law it has become his official duty to execute. Going
beyond, is one among the alarming signs of the times which portend the over
throw of the Constitution and the approach of despotic power.

The secretary, having determined that the, Bank was unconstitutional, and
that the people had pronounced against the recharter, concludes that Congress
had nothing to do with the subject. With a provident foresight, he perceives
the difficulty and embarrassment into which the currency of the country would
be thrown on the termination of the Bank charter ; to prevent which, he pro
ceeds deliberately, with a parental care, to supply a new currency, " equal to or
better" than that which Congress had supplied. With this view, he determines
on an immediate removal of the deposites ; he puts them in certain state insti
tutions, intending to organize them, after the fashion of the empire state, into a
great safety-fund system, but which, unfortunately, undoubtedly for the project
ors, if not for the country, the limited power of the state banks did not permit
him to effect. But a substitute was found by associating them in certain arti
cles of agreement, and appointing an inspector-general of all this league of
banks ! and all this without law or appropriation ! Is it not amazing that it never
occurred to the secretary that the subject of currency belonged exclusively to
Congress, and that to assume to regulate it was a plain usurpation of the pow
ers of that department of the government ?

Having thus assumed the power officially to determine on the constitutional
ity of the Bank ; having erected himself into an organ of the people's voice, and
settled the question of the regulation of the currency, he next proceeds to as
sume the judicial powers over the Bank. He declares that the Bank has trans
cended its powers, and has, therefore, forfeited its charter, for which he inflicts
on the institution the severe and exemplary punishment of withholding the de
posites ; and all this in the face of an express provision investing the court
with power touching the infraction of the charter, directing in what manner the
trial should be commenced and conducted, and securing expressly to the Bank
the sacred right of trial by jury in finding the facts. All this passed for nothing
in the eyes of the secretary, who was too deeply engrossed in providing for the
common welfare to regard either Congress, the Court, or the Constitution. The
secretary next proceeds to supervise the general operations of the Bank, pro
nouncing, with authority, that at one time it has discounted too freely, and at an
other too sparingly, without reflecting that all the control which the government

128 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

can rightfully exercise over the operations of the institution is through the five
directors who represent the government in this respect. Directors ! Mr. Cal-
houn exclaimed, did I say ? (alluding to the present). No, spies is their prop
er designation.

I cannot, said Mr. C., proceed with the remarks which I intended on the re
mainder of the secretary's reasons : I have not patience to dwell on assump
tions of power so bold, so lawless, and so unconstitutional ; they deserve not
the name of argument, and I cannot waste time in treating them as such.
There are, however, two which I cannot pass over, not because they are more
extraordinary or audacious than the others, but for another quality, which I
choose not to designate.

The secretary alleges that the Bank has interfered with the politics of the
country. If this be true, it certainly is a most heinous offence. The Bank is
a great public trust, possessing, for the purpose of discharging the trust, great
power and influence, which it could not pervert from the object intended to that
of influencing the politics of the country without being guilty of a great politi
cal crime. In making these remarks, I do not intend to give any countenance
to the truth of the charge alleged by the secretary, nor to deny to the officers
of the Bank the right which belongs to them, in common with every citizen, free-
l/ to form political principles, and act on them in their private capacity, with
out permitting them to influence their official conduct. But it is strange it did
not occur to the secretary, while he was accusing and punishing the Bank on
the charge of interfering in the politics oC the country, that the government also
was a great trust, vested with powers still more extensive, and influence im
measurably greater than that of the Bank, given to enable it to discharge the ob
ject for which it was created ; and that it has no more right to pervert its pow
er and influence into the means of controlling the politics of the country than
the Bank itself. Can it be unknown to him that the fourth auditor of the treasu
ry (an officer in his own department), the man who has made so prominent a
figure in this transaction, was daily and hourly meddling in politics, and that
he is one of the principal political managers of the administration ? Can he be
ignorant that the whole power of the government has been perverted into a great
political machine, with a view of corrupting and controlling the country ? Can
he be ignorant that the avowed and open policy of the government is to reward
political friends and punish political enemies ? and that, acting on this princi
ple, it has driven from office hundreds of honest and competent officers for opin
ion's sake only, and filled their places with devoted partisans ? Can he be ig
norant that the real offence of the Bank is not that it has intermeddled in poli
tics, but because it would not, intermeddle on the side of power ? There is no
thing more dignified than reproof from the lips of innocence, or punishment from
the hands of justice ; but change the picture — let the guilty reprove and the
criminal punish, and what more odious, more hateful, can be presented to the
imagination ?

The secretary next tells us, in the same spirit, that the Bank had been waste
ful of the public funds. That it has spent some thirty, forty, or fifty thousand
dollars — I do not remember the exact amount (trifles have no weight in the
determination of so great a question) — in circulating essays and speeches in de
fence of the institution, of which sum, one fifth part — some seven thousand dol
lars — belonged to the government. Well, sir, if the Bank has really wasted this
amount of the public money, it is a grave charge. It has not a right to waste a
single cent ; but I must say, in defence of the Bank, that, assailed as it was by
the executive, it would have been unfaithful to its trust, both to *he- stockholders
and to the public, had it not resorted to every proper means in its power to de
fend its conduct, and, among others, the free circulation of able and judicious
publications.

But admit that the Bank has been guilty of wasting the public funds to the

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 129

full extent charged by the secretary, I would ask if he, the head of the finan
cial department of the government, is not under as high and solemn obligation
to take care of the moneyed interest of the public as the Bank itself. I would
ask him to answer me a few simple questions : How has he performed this dutj
in relation to the interest which the public holds in the Bank 1 Has he been
less wasteful than he has charged the Bank to have been ? Has he not wast
ed thousands where the Bank, even according to his own statement, has hun
dreds ? Has he not, by withdrawing the deposites and placing them in the
state banks, where the public receives not a cent of interest, greatly affected
the dividends of the Bank of the United States, in which the government, as n.
stockholder, is a loser to the amount of one fifth of the diminution ? a sum which
I will venture to predict will many fold exceed the entire amount which the
Bank has expended in its defence. But this is a small, a very small proportion
of the public loss, in consequence of the course which the executive has pur
sued in relation to the Bank, and which has reduced the value of the shares
from 130 to 108 (a senator near me says much more. It may be; I am not
particular in such things), and on which the public sustains a corresponding
loss on its share of the stock, amounting to seven, millions of dollars — a sum
more than two hundred fold greater than the waste which he has charged upon
the Bank. Other administrations may exceed this in talents, patriotism, and
hionesty, but, certainly, in audacity, in effrontery, it stands without a parallel '

The secretary has brought forward many and grievous charges against the
Bank. I will not condescend to notice them — it is the conduct of the secreta
ry, and not that of the Bank, which is immediately under examination, and he
has no right to drag the conduct of the Bank into the issue, beyond its opera
tions in regard to the deposites. To that extent I am prepared to examine his
allegations against it, but beyond that he has no right — no, not the least — to ar
raign the conduct of the Bank ; and I, for one, will not, by noticing his charges
beyond that point, sanction his authority to call its conduct in question. But
let the point in issue be determined, and I, as far as my voice extends, will give
to those who desire it the means of the freest arid most unlimited inquiry into
its conduct. I am no partisan of the Bank — I am connected with it in no way,
by moneyed or political ties. I might say, with truth, that the Bank owes as
much to me as to any other individual in the country ; and 1 might even add
that, had it not been for my efforts, it would not have been chartered. Standing
in this relation to the institution, a high sense of delicacy, a regard to independ
ence and character, has restrained me from any connexion with the institution
•whatever, except some trifling accommodations in the way of ordinary business,
which were not of the slightest importance either to the Bank or myself.

But while I shall not condescend to notice the charges of the secretary
against the Bank beyond the extent which [ have stated, a sense of duty to the
institution, and regard to the part which I took in its creation, compels me to
notice two allegations against it which have fallen from another quarter. It is
said that the Bank had no agency, or at least efficient agency, in the restoration
of specie payment in 1817, and that it had failed to furnish the country with a
uniform and sound currency, as had been promised at its creation. Both of
these allegations I pronounce to be without just foundation. To enter into a
minute examination of them would carry me too far from the subject, and I must
content myself with saying that, having been on the political stage, without in
terruption, from that day to this — having been an attentive observer of the ques
tion of the currency throughout the whole period — that the Bank has been an
indispensable agent in the restoration of specie payments ; that without it the
restoration could riot have been effected short of the utter prostration of all the
moneyed institutions of the country, and an entire depreciation of bank paper ;
and that it has not only restored specie payment, but has given a currency far
more uniform between the extremes of the country than was anticipated, or even

R

130 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

dreamed of, at the time of its creation. I will say for myself, that. I did not be
lieve, at that time, that the exchange between the Atlantic and the West would
be brought lower than two and a half per cent. — the estimated expense then,
including insurance and loss of time, of transporting specie between the two-
points. How much it was below the anticipated point I need not state : the
whole commercial world knows that it was not a fourth part at the time of the
removal of the deposites.

But to return from this digression. Though I will not notice the charges of
the secretary for the reasons already stated, 1 will take the liberty of propound
ing to those who support them on this floor a few plain questions. If there
be in banking institutions an inherent tendency so strong to abuse and corrup
tion as they contend — if, in consequence of this tendency, the Bank of the Uni
ted States be guilty of the enormous charges and corruptions alleged, notwith
standing its responsibility to the government and our control over it, what is to
be expected from an irresponsible league of banks, as called by the senator from
Kentucky (Mr. CLAY), over which we have no legal control ? If our power of
renewing the charter of the Bank of the United States — if our right to vacate
the charter by scire facias, in case of misconduct— if the influence which the
appointment of five government directors gives us — and, finally, if the power
which we have of appointing committees to examine into its condition, are not
sufficient to hold the institution in check : if, in spite of all these, it has, from the
innate corruption of such institutions, been guilty of the enormous abuses and
crimes charged against it, what may we not expect from the associated banks>
the favourites of the treasury, over the renewal of whose charter the government
has no power, against which it can issue no scire facias, in whose direction it
has not a single individual, and into whose conduct Congress can appoint no
committee to look ? With these checks all withdrawn, what will be the con
dition of the public funds ?

I, said Mr. CALHOUN, stated in the outset of my remarks, that, as broad as
was the power which the secretary had assumed in relation to the deposites,
there was a portion of the transaction of a highly important character, to which
he has not alluded, and in relation to which he has not even attempted a justifi
cation. I will now proceed to make good this assertion to the letter.

There is a material difference between withholding money from going into the
Bank, and withdrawing it after it has been placed there. The former is authorized
in the manner which I have stated, under the sixteenth section, which directs, as
has been frequently stated, that the public money shall be deposited in the Bank,
unless otherwise ordered by the Secretary of the Treasury. But neither that sec
tion, nor any portion of the act incorporating the Bank, nor, in truth, any other
act, gives the secretary any authority of himself to withdraw public money de
posited in the Bank. There is, I repeat, a material difference between with
holding public money from deposite and withdrawing it. When paid into the
place designated by law as the deposite of the public money, it passes to the
credit of the treasurer, and then is in the treasury of the United States, where
it is placed under the protection of the Constitution itself, and from which, by
an express provision of the Constitution, it can only be withdrawn by an appro
priation made by law. So careful were the framers of the act of 1816 to leave
nothing to implication, that express authority is given to the Secretary of the
Treasury, in the fifteenth section, to transfer the deposites from one place to an
other, for the convenience of disbursements ; but which, by a strange perversion,
is now attempted to be so construed as to confer on the secretary the power to
withdraw the money from the deposite, and loan it to favourite state banks — I
express myself too favourably, I should say give (they pay no interest) — with
a view to sustain their credits or enlarge their profits — a power not only far be
yond the secretary, but which Congress itself could not exercise without a fla
grant breach of the Constitution. But it is said, in answer to these views,

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 131

that money paid in deposite into the Bank, as directed by law, is not in the
treasury. I will not stop, said Mr. C., to reply to such an objection. If it be
not in the treasury, where is the treasury ? If it be not money in the treasury,
where is the money annually reported to be in the treasury ? where the eight or
nine millions which, by the annual report of the secretary, are said to be now in
the treasury ? Are we to understand that none of this money is, in truth, in the
treasury 1 that it is floating about at large, subject to be disposed of, to be given
away, at the will of the executive, to favourites and partisans ? So it would
seem ; for it appears, by a correspondence between the treasurer and the cash
ier of the Bank, derived through the Bank (the secretary not deeming it worth
while to give the slightest information of the transaction, as if a matter of
course), that he has drawn out two millions and a quarter of the public money
without appropriation, and distributed it at pleasure among his favourites !

But it is attempted to .indicate the conduct of the secretary on the ground of
precedent. I will not otop to notice whether the cases cited are in point, nor
will I avail myself of the great and striking advantage that I might have on the
question of precedent : this case stands alone and distinct from all others. There
is none similar to it in magnitude and importance. I waive all that : I place
myself on higher grounds — I stand on the immovable principle that, on a ques
tion of law and constitution, in a deliberative assembly, there is no room — no
place for precedents. To admit them would be to make the violation of to-day
the law and Constitution of to-morrow ; and to substitute in the place of the writ"
ten and sacred will of the people and the Legislature, the infraction of those char
ged with the execution of the law. Such, in my opinion, is the relative force of
law and constitution on one side, as compared with precedents on the other.
Viewed in a different light, not in reference to the law or Constitution, but to
the conduct of the officer, I am disposed to give rather more weight to prece
dents, when the question relates to an excuse or apology for the officer, in case
of infraction. If the infraction be a trivial one, in a case not calculated to ex
cite attention, an officer might fairly excuse himself on the ground of precedent ;
but in one like this, of the utmost magnitude, involving the highest interests and
most important principles, where the attention of the officer must be aroused to
a most careful examination, he cannot -avail himself of the plea of precedent to
excuse his conduct. It is a case where false precedents are to be corrected, and
not followed. An officer ought to be ashamed, in such a case, to attempt to vin
dicate his conduct on a charge of violating law or Constitution by pleading pre
cedent. The principle in such case is obvious. If the secretary's right to
withdraw public money from the treasury be clear, he has no need of precedent
to vindicate him. If not, he ought not, in a case of so much magnitude, to
have acted.

I have not (said Mr. Calhoun) touched a question, which has had so promi
nent a part in the debate, whether the withholding of the deposites was the act
of the secretary or the President. Under my view of the subject, the question,
is not of the slightest importance. It is equally unauthorized and illegal,
whether done by President or secretary ; but, as the question has been agitated,
and as my views do not entirely correspond on this point with those advocating
the side which I do, I deem it due to frankness to express my sentiments.

I have no doubt that the President removed the former secretary, and placed
the present in his place, expressly with a view to the removal of the deposites.
I am equally clear, under all the circumstances of the case, that the President's
conduct is wholly indefensible ; and, among other objections, I fear he had in
view, in the removal, an object eminently dangerous and unconstitutional — to
give an advantage to his veto never intended by the Constitution — a power in
tended as a shield to protect the executive against the encroachment of the
legislative department — to maintain the present slate of things against dangerous
or hasty innovation, but which, I fear, is, in this case, intende? < s a sword to

132 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

defend the usurpation of the executive. I say I fear ; for. although the circum
stance of this case leads to a just apprehension that such is the intention, I will
not permit myself to assert that such is the fact — that so lawless and unconsti
tutional an object is contemplated by the President, till his act shall compel me
to believe to the contrary. But while I thus severely condemn the conduct of
the President in removing the former secretary and appointing the present, I
must say that, in my opinion, it is a case of the abuse, and not of the usurpation
of power. The President has the right of removal from office. The power of
removal, wherever it exists, does, from necessity, involve the power of general
supervision ; nor can I doubt that it might be constitutionally exercised in ref
erence to the deposites. Reverse the present case : suppose the late secreta
ry, instead of being against, had been in favour of the removal, and that the
President, instead of for, had been against it, deeming the removal not only in
expedient, but, under the circumstances, illegal ; would any man doubt that,
under such circumstances, he had a right to remove his secretary, if it were the
only means of preventing the removal of the deposites ? Nay, would it not be
his indispensable duty to have removed him ? and had he not, would not he
have been universally, and justly, held responsible ?

1 have now (said Mr. C.) offered all the remarks I intended in reference to
the deposite question ; and, on reviewing the whole ground, I must say, that
the secretary, in removing the deposites, has clearly transcended his power ; that
he has violated the contract between the Bank and the United States ; that, in
so doing, he has deeply injured that large and respectable portion of our citi
zens who have been invited, on the faith of the government, to invest their
property in the institution ; while, at the same time, he has deeply injured the
public in its character of stockholder ; and, finally, that he has inflicted a deep
wound on the public faith. To this last I attribute the present embarrassment
in the currency, which has so injuriously affected all the great interests of the
country. The credit of the country is an important portion of the currency of
the country — credit in every shape, public and private — credit, not only in the
shape of paper, but that of faith and confidence between man and man — through
the agency of which, in all its forms, the great and mighty exchanges of this
commercial country, at home and abroad^ are, in a great measure, effecte,d« To
inflict a wound anywhere, particularly on the public faith, is to embarrass all
the channels of currency and exchange ; and it is to this, and not to the with
drawing the few millions of dollars from circulation, that I attribute the present
moneyed embarrassment. Did I believe the contrary — if I thought that any great
and permanent distress would of itself result from winding up, in a regular and
legal manner, the present or any other Bank of the United States, I would deem
it an evidence of the dangerous power of the institution, and, to that extent, an
argument against its existence ; but, as it is, I regard the present embarrass
ment, not as an argument against the Bank, but an argument against the law
less and wanton exercise of power on the part of the executive — an embarrass
ment which is likely to continue if the deposites be not restored. The banks
which have received them, at the expense of the public faith, and in violation
of law, will never be permitted to enjoy their spoils in quiet. No one who re
gards the subject in the light in which I do, can ever give his sanction to any
law intended to protect or carry through the present illegal arrangement ; on
the contrary, all such must feel bound to wage perpetual war against a usurpa
tion of power so flagrant as that which controls the present deposites of the
public money. If I stand alone (said Mr. Calhoun), I, at least, will continue
to maintain the contest so long as I remain in public life.

As important (said Mr. Calhoun) as I consider the question of the deposites,
in all its bearings, public and private, it is one on the surface, a mere pretext
to another, and one greatly more important, which lies beneath, and which
must be taken into consideration, to understand correctly all the circumstances

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 133

attending this extraordinary transaction. It is felt and acknowledged on all
sides that there is another and a deeper question, which has excited the pro
found sensation and alarm which pervade the country.

If we are to believe what we hear from the advocates of the administration,
we would suppose at one time that the real question was Bank or no Bank ; at
another, that the question was between the United States Bank and the state
banks ; and, finally, that it was a struggle on the part of the administration to
guard and defend the rights of the states against the encroachments of the Gen
eral Government. The administration the guardians and defenders of the
rights of the states ! What shall I call it ? audacity or hypocrisy ? The au
thors of the proclamation the guardians and defenders of the rights of the states !
The authors of the war message against a member of this confederacy — the au
thors of the " bloody bill" the guardians and defenders of the rights of the
states! 'This a struggle for state rights ? No, sir : state rights are no more.
The struggle is over for the present. The bill of the last session, which vested
in the government the right of judging of the extent of its powers, finally and
conclusively, and gave it the right of enforcing its judgments by the sword, de
stroyed all distinction between delegated and reserved rights, concentrated in
the government the entire power of the system, and prostrated the states, as poor
and helpless corporations, at the foot of this sovereignty.

Nor is it more true that the real question is Bank or no Bank. Taking the
deposite question in the broadest sense : suppose, as it is contended by the
friends of the administration, that it involves the question of the renewal of the
charter, and, consequently, the existence of the Bank itself, still the banking sys
tem would stand almost untouched and unimpaired. Four hundred banks
would still remain scattered over this wide Republic, and on the ruins of the
United States Bank many would rise to be added to the present list. Under
this aspect of the subject, the only possible question that could be presented
for consideration would be, whether the banking system was more safe, more
beneficial, or more constitutional, with or without the United States Bank.

If, said Mr. Calhoun, this was a question of Bank or no Bank — if it involved
the existence of the banking system, it would indeed be a great question — one
of the first magnitude, and, with my present impression, long entertained and
daily increasing, I would hesitate — long hesitate — before I would be found un
der the banner of the system. I have great doubts, if doubts they may be call
ed, as to the soundness and tendency of the whole system, in all its modifica
tions : I have great fears that it will be found hostile to liberty and the advance
of civilization — fatally hostile to liberty in our country, where the system ex
ists in its worst and most dangerous form. Of all institutions affecting the
great question of the distribution of wealth — a question least explored and the
most important of any in the whole range of political economy — the banking in
stitution has, if not the greatest, one of the greatest, and, I fear, most pernicious
influence on the mode of distribution. Were the question really before us, I
would not shun the responsibility, as great as it might be, of freely and fully of
fering my sentiments on these deeply-important points ; but, as it is, I must
content myself with the few remarks which I have thrown out.

What, then, is the real question which now agitates the country ? I answer,
it is a struggle between the executive and legislative departments of the gov
ernment : a struggle, not in relation to the existence of the Bank, but which,
Congress or the President, shall have the power to create a Bank, and the
consequent control over the currency of the country. This is the real question.
Let us not deceive ourselves : this league, this association of banks, created by
the executive, bound together by its influence, united in common articles of as
sociation, vivified and sustained by receiving the deposites of the public money,
and having their notes converted, by being received everywhere by the treasu
ry, into the common currency of the country, is, to all intents and purposes, a

134 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

Bank of the United States — the executive Bank of the United States, as distin
guished from that of Congress. However it might fail to perform satisfactorily
the useful functions of the Bank of the United States as incorporated by law, it
would outstrip it — far outstrip it — in all its dangerous qualities, in extending the
power, the influence, and the corruption of the government. It is impossible
to conceive any institution more admirably calculated to advance these objects.
Not only the selected banks, but the whole banking institutions of the country,
and with them the entire money power, for the purpose of speculation, peculation,
and corruption, would be placed under the control of the executive. A system
of menaces and promises will be established : of menace to the banks in po^-
session of the deposites, but which might not be entirely subservient to execu
tive views ; and of promise of future favours to those who may not as yet enjoy
its favours. Between the two, the banks would be left without influence, hon
our, or honesty, and a system of speculation and stock-jobbing would com
mence, unequalled in the annals of our country. I fear they have already com
menced ; I fear the means which have been put in the hands of the minions of
power by the removal of the deposites, and placing them in the vaults of de
pendant banks, have extended their cupidity to the public lands, particularly in
the Southwest, and that to this we must attribute the recent phenomena in that
quarter — immense and valuable tracts of land sold at short notice ; sales fraudu
lently postponed to aid the speculators, with which, if I am not misinformed, a
name not unknown to this body has performed a prominent part. But I leave
this to my vigilant and able friend from Mississippi (Mr. Poindexter), at the
head of the Committee on Public Lands, who, I doubt not, will see justice done
to the public. As to stock-jobbing, this new arrangement will open a field
which Rothschild himself may envy. It has been found hard work — very
hard, no doubt — by the jobbers in stock, who have been engaged in attempts to
raise or depress the price of United States Bank stock ; but no work will be
more easy than to raise or depress the price of the stock of the selected banks,
at the pleasure of the executive. Nothing more will be required than to give
or withhold deposites ; to draw, or abstain from drawing warrants ; to pamper
them at one time, and starve them at another. Those who would be in the se
cret, and who would know when to buy and when to sell, would have the means
of realizing, by dealing in the stocks, whatever fortune they might please.

So long as the question is one between a Bank of the United States incorpo
rated by Congress, and that system of banks which has been created by the
will of the executive, it is an insult to the understanding to discourse on the
pernicious tendency and unconstitutionality of the Bank of the United States.
To bring up that question fairly and legitimately, you must go one step farther :
you must divorce the government and the banking system. You must refuse
all connexion with banks. You must neither receive nor pay away bank-notes ;
you must go back to the old system of the strong box, and of gold and silver.
If you have a right to receive bank-notes at all — to treat them as money by re
ceiving them in your dues, or paying them away to creditors — you have a right
to create a bank. Whatever the government receives and treats as money, is
money in effect ; and if it be money, then they have the right, under the Consti
tution, to regulate it. Nay, they are bound by a high obligation to adopt the
most efficient means, according to the nature of that which they have recogni
sed as money, to give it the utmost stability and uniformity of value. And if
it be in the shape of bank-notes, the most efficient means of giving those quali
ties is a Bank of the United States, incorporated by Congress. Unless you
give the highest practical uniformity to the value of bank-notes, so long as you
receive them in your dues, and treat them as money, you violate that provision
of the Constitution which provides that taxation shall be uniform throughout the
United States. There is no other alternative : I repeat, you must divorce the
government entirely from the banking system, or, if not, you are bound to incor-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 135

porate a bank as the only safe and efficient means of giving stability and uni
formity to the currency. And should the deposites not be restored, and the
present illegal and unconstitutional connexion between the executive and the
league of banks continue, I shall feel it my duty, if no one else moves, to in
troduce a measure to prohibit government from receiving or touching bank-notes
in any shape whatever, as the only means left of giving safety and stability to
the currency, and saving the country from corruption and ruin.

Viewing "the question, in its true light, as a struggle on the part of the execu
tive to seize on the power of Congress, and to unite in the President the power
of the sword and the purse., the senator from Kentucky (Mr. Clay) said, truly,
and, let me add, philosophically, that we are in the midst of a revolution. Yes,
the very existence of free governments rests on the proper distribution and or
ganization of power ; and to destroy this distribution, and thereby concentrate
power in any one of the departments, is to effect a revolution ; but, while I
agree with the senator that we are in the midst of a revolution, I cannot agree
with him as to the time at which it commenced, or the point to which it has
progressed. Looking to the distribution of the powers of the General Govern
ment — into the legislative, executive, and judicial departments — and confining
his views to the encroachment of the executive upon the legislative, he dates
the commencement of the revolution but sixty days previous to the meeting of
the present Congress. I, said Mr. Calhoun, take a wider range, and date it
from an earlier period. Besides the distribution among the departments of the
General Government, there belongs to our system another, and a far more im
portant division or distribution of power — that between the states and the Gen
eral Government, the reserved and delegated rights, the maintenance of which
is still more essential to the preservation of our institutions. Taking this wide
review of our political system, the revolution in the midst of which we are, be
gan, not, as supposed by the senator from Kentucky, shortly before the com
mencement of the present session, but many years ago, with the commence
ment of the restrictive system, and terminated its first stage with the passage
of the force bill of the last session, which absorbed all the rights and sovereign
ty of the states, and consolidated them in this government. While this pro
cess was going on, of absorbing the reserved powers of the states on the part
of the General Government, another commenced, of concentrating in the execu
tive the powers of the other two, the legislative and judicial departments of the
government, which constitutes the second stage of the revolution, in which we
have advanced almost to the termination.

The senator from Kentucky, in connexion with this part of his argument, read a
striking passage from one of the most pleasing and instructive writers in any lan
guage (Plutarch), giving the description of Caesar forcing himself, sword in hand,
into the treasury of the Roman Commonwealth. We are at the same stage of
our political revolution, and the analogy between the two cases is complete, va
ried only by the character of the actors and the circumstances of the times.
That was a case of an intrepid and bold warrior, as an open plunderer, seiz
ing forcibly the treasury of the country, which, in that Republic, as well as
ours, was confided to the custody of the legislative department of the govern
ment. The actors in our case are of a different character : artful and cunning
politicians, and not fearless warriors. They have entered the treasury, not
sword in hand, as public plunderers, but with the false keys of sophistry, under
the silence of midnight. The motive and object are the same, varied only by
character and circumstances. " With money I will get men, and with men
money," was the maxim of the Roman plunderer. With money we will get
partisans, with partisans votes, and with votes money, is the maxim of our pub
lic pilferers. With men and money, Caesar struck down Roman liberty at the
fatal battle of Pharsalia, never to rise again ; from which disastrous hour, all the
powers of the Roman Republic were consolidated in the person of Caesar, and

136 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

perpetuated in his line. With money and corrupt partisans, a great effort is
now making to choke and stifle the voice of American'liberty, through all its con
stitutional and legal organs ; by pensioning the press ; by overawing the other
departments ; and, finally, by setting up a new organ, composed of office-holders
and partisans, under the name of a national convention, which, counterfeiting the
voice of the people, will, if not resisted, in their name dictate the succession ;
when the deed shall have been done — the revolution completed — and all the
powers of our Republic, in like manner, consolidated in the executive in time,
and perpetuated by his dictation.

The senator from Kentucky (Mr. C.) anticipates with confidence that the
small party, who were denounced at the last session as traitors and disunionists
will be found, on this trying occasion, standing in the front rank, and manfully-
resisting the advance of despotic power. I, said Mr. CALHOUN, heard the an
ticipation with pleasure, not on account of the compliment which it implied, but
the evidence which it affords that the cloud which has been so industriously
thrown over the character and motive of that small, but patriotic party, begins
to be dissipated. The senator hazarded nothing in the prediction. That party-
is the determined, the fixed, and sworn enemy to usurpation, come from what
quarter and under what form it may — whether from the executive upon the other
departments of this government, or from this government on the sovereignty and
rights of the states. The resolution and fortitude with which it maintained its
position at the last session, under so many difficulties and dangers, in defence
of the states against the encroachments oif the General Government, furnished
evidence riot to be mistaken, that that party, in the present momentous struggle,
would be found arrayed in defence of the rights of Congress against the en
croachments of the President. And let me tell the senator from Kentucky, said
Mr. C., that, if the present struggle against executive usurpation be successful,
it will be owing to the success with which we, the nullifiers — I am not afraid
of the word — maintained the rights of the states against the encroachment of
the General Government at the last session.

A very few words will place this point beyond controversy. To the inter
position of the State of South Carolina we are indebted for the adjustment of
the tariff question; without it, all the influence of the senator from Kentucky
over the manufacturing interest, great as it deservedly is, would have been
wholly incompetent, if he had even thought proper to exert it, to adjust the
question. The attempt would have prostrated him, and those who acted with
him, and not the system. It was the separate action of the state that gave him
the place to stand upon, created the necessity for the adjustment, and disposed
the minds of all to compromise. Now, I put the solemn question to all who
hear me, If the tariff had not then been adjusted — if it was now an open ques
tion — what hope of successful resistance against the usurpations of the executive,
on the part of this or any other branch of the government, could be entertained ?
Let it not be said that this is the result of accident — of an unforeseen contin
gency. It was clearly perceived, and openly stated, that no successful resist
ance could be made to the corruption and encroachments of the executive while
the tariff question remained open — while it separated trie North from the South,
and wasted the energy of the honest and patriotic portions of the community
against each other, the joint effort of which is indispensably necessary to expel
those from authority who are converting the entire powers of government into*
a corrupt electioneering machine ; and that, without separate state interposition,
the adjustment was impossible. The truth of this position rests not upon the
accidental state of things, but on a profound principle growing out of the nature
of government and party struggles in a free state. History and reflection teach
us that, when great interests come into conflict, and the passions and the preju
dices of men are roused, such struggles can never be composed by the influ
ence of any individuals, however great ; and if there be not somewhere in the

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 137

system some high constitutional power to arrest their progress, and compel the
parties to adjust the difference, they go on till the state falls by corruption or
violence.

I will, said Mr. C., venture to add to these remarks another, in connexion
with the point under consideration, not less true. We are not only indebted to the
cause which I have stated for our present strength in this body against the pres
ent usurpation of the executive, but if the adjustment of the tariff had stood alone,
as it ought to have done, without the odious bill which accompanied it — if those
who led in the compromise had joined the State Rights party in their resistance
to that unconstitutional measure, and thrown the responsibility on its real authors,
the administration, their party would have been so prostrated throughout the en
tire South, and their power, in consequence, so reduced, that they would not
have dared to attempt the present measure ; or, if they had, they would have
been broke and defeated.

Were I, said Mr. C., to select the case best calculated to illustrate the ne
cessity of resisting usurpation at the very commencement, and to prove how
difficult it is to resist it in any subsequent stage if not met at first, I would se
lect this very case. What, he asked, is the cause of the present usurpation of
power on the part of the executive ? What the motive, the temptation, which
has induced them to seize on the deposites ? What but the large surplus
revenue 1 the eight or ten millions in the public treasury beyond the wants of
the government ? And what has put so large an amount of money in the treas
ury, when not needed ? I answer, the protective system — that system which
graduated duties, not in reference to the wants of the government, but in refer
ence to the importunities and demands of the manufacturers, and which poured
millions of dollars into the treasury beyond the most profuse demands, and even,
the extravagance of the government — taken — unlawfully taken, from the pockets
of those who honestly made it. I hold that those who make are entitled to
what they make against all the world, except the government ; and against it,
except to the extent of its legitimate and constitutional wants ; and that for the
government to take one cent more is robbery. In violation of this sacred prin
ciple, Congress first removed the deposites into the public treasury from the
pockets of those who made it, where they were rightfully placed by all laws,
human and divine. The executive, in his, turn, following the example, has
taken them from that deposite, and distributed them among favourite and partisan
banks. The means used have been the same in both cases. The Constitution
gives to Congress the power to lay duties with a view to revenue. This power,
without regarding the object for which it was intended, forgetting that it was a.
great 'trust power, necessarily limited, by the very nature of such powers, to the
subject and the object of the trust, was perverted to a use never intended, that
of protecting the industry of one portion of the country at the expense of another ;
and, under this false interpretation, the money was transferred from its natural
and just deposite, the pockets of those who made it, into the public treasury, as
I have stated. In this, too, the executive followed the example of Congress.

By the magic construction of a few simple words — " unless otherwise order
ed" — intended to confer on the Secretary of the Treasury a limited power — to
give additional security to the public deposites, he has, in like manner, pervert
ed this power, and made it the instrument, by similar sophistry, of drawing the
money from the treasury, and bestowing it, as I have stated, on favourite and
partisan banks. Would to God, said Mr, C., would to God I could reverse the
whole of this nefarious operation, and terminate the controversy by returning
the money to the pockets of the honest and industrious citizens, by the sweat
of whose brows it was made, and to whom only it rightfully belongs. But, as
this cannot be done, I must content myself by giving a vote to return it to the
public treasury, where it was ordered to be deposited by an act of the Legis
lature.

S

J138 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

There is another aspect, said Mr. C., in which this subject may be viewed.
We all remember how early the question of the surplus revenue began to agi
tate the country. At a very early period, a senator from New- Jersey (Mr.
DICKERSON) presented his scheme for disposing of it by distributing it among
the states. The first message of the President recommended a similar project,
which was followed up by a movement on the part of the Legislature of New-
York, and, I believe, some of the other states. The public attention was aroused
— the scheme scrutinized — its gross unconstitutionally and injustice, and its
dangerous tendency — its tendency to absorb the power and existence of the
states, were clearly perceived and denounced. The denunciation was too deep
to be resisted, and the scheme was abandoned. What have we now in lieu
of it ? What is the present scheme but a distribution of the surplus revenue ?
A distribution at the sole will and pleasure of the executive — a distribution to
favourite banks, and through them, in the shape of discounts and loans, to corrupt
partisans, as the means of increasing political influence ?

We have, said Mr. C., arrived at a fearful crisis. Things cannot long re
main as they are. It behooves all who love their country — who have affection
for their offspring, or who have any stake in our institutions, to pause and re
flect. Confidence is daily withdrawing from the General Government. Alien
ation is hourly going on. These will necessarily create a state of things
inimical to the existence of our institutions, and, if not arrested, convulsions
must follow ; and then comes dissolution or despotism, when a thick cloud will
be thrown over the cause of liberty arid the future prospects of our country.

VIII.

SPEECH ON MR. WEBSTER'S PROPOSITION TO RECHARTER THE UNITED STATES
BANK, MARCH 26, 1834.

THE question being upon granting leave to Mr. Webster to introduce into tne
Senate a bill to recharter, for the term of six years, the Bank of the United
States, with modifications :

I rise, said Mr. Calhoun, in order to avail myself of an early opportunity to
express my opinion on the measure proposed by the senator from Massachu
setts, and the questions immediately connected with it, under the impression
that, on a subject so intimately connected with the interests of every class in
the community, there should be an early declaration of their sentiments by the
members of this body, so that all might know what to expect, and on what to
calculate.

I shall vote for the motion of the senator, not because I approve of the meas
ure he proposes, but because I consider it due in courtesy to grant leave, un
less there be strong reasons to the contrary, which is not the case in this in
stance ; but while I am prepared to vote for his motion, and, let me add, to do
ample justice to his motives for introducing the bill, I cannot approve of the
measure he proposes. In every view which I have been able to take, it is ob
jectionable. Among the objections, I place the uncertainty as to its object. It
is left perfectly open to conjecture whether a renewal of the charter is intend
ed, or a mere continuance, with the view of affording the Bank time to wind up
its affairs ; and what increases the uncertainty is, if we compare the provisions
of the proposed bill with the one or the other of these objects, it is equally un-
suited to either. If a renewal of the charter be intended, six years is too short ;
if a continuance, too long. I, however, state this as a minor objection. There
-is another of far more decisive character : it settles nothing ; it leaves every
thing unfixed ; it perpetuates the present struggle, which so injuriously agitates

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 139

the country — a struggle of bank against bank — of one set of opinions against
another ; and prolongs the whole, without even an intervening armistice, to the
year 1842 : a period that covers two presidential terms, and, by inevitable con
sequence, running, for two successive presidential elections, the politics of the
country into the Bank question, and the Bank question into politics, with the
mutual corruption which must be engendered ; keeping, during the whole peri
od, the currency of the country, which the public interest requires should have
the utmost stability, in a state of uncertainty and fluctuation.

But why should I pursue the objections to the plan proposed by the senator ?
He himself acknowledged the measure to be defective, and that he would pre
fer one of a more permanent character. He has not proposed this as the best
measure, but has brought it forward under a supposed necessity — under the im
pression that something must be done — something prompt and immediate, to re
lieve the existing distress which overspreads the land. I concur with him in
relation to the distress, that it is deep and extensive ; that it fell upon us sudden
ly, and in the midst of prosperity almost unexampled ; that it is daily consign
ing hundreds to poverty and misery ; blasting the hopes of the enterprising ;
taking employment and bread from the labourer ; and working a fearful change in
the relative condition of the money dealers on one side, and the man of busi
ness on the other — raising the former rapidly to the top of the wheel, while it
is whirling the latter, with equal rapidity, to the bottom. While I thus agree
with the senator as to the distress, I am also sensible that there are great pub
lic emergencies in which no permanent relief can be afforded, and when the
wisest are obliged to resort to expedients : to palliate and to temporize, in order
to gain time with a view to apply a more effectual remedy. But there are also
emergencies of precisely the opposite character : when the best and most per
manent is the only practicable measure, and when mere expedients tend but to
distract, to divide, and confound, and thereby to delay or defeat all relief ; and
such, viewed in all its relations and bearing, I consider the present ; and that
the senator from Massachusetts has not also so considered it, I attribute to the
fact that, of the two questions blended in the subject under consideration, he
has given an undue prominence to that which has by far the least relative im
portance — I mean those of the Bank and of the currency. As a mere bank
question, as viewed by the senator, it would be a matter of but little importance
whether the renewal should be for six years or for a longer period ; and a pref
erence might very properly be given to one or the other, as it might be suppo
sed most likely to succeed ; but I must say, that, in my opinion, in selecting the
period of six years, he has taken that which will be much less likely to succeed
than one of a reasonable and proper duration. But had he turned his view to the
other and more prominent question involved ; had he regarded the question as
a question of currency, and that the great point was to give it uniformity, per
manency, and safety ; that, in effecting these essential objects, the Bank is a
mere subordinate agent, to be used or not to be used, and to be modified, as to
its duration and other provisions, wholly in reference to the higher question of
the currency, I cannot think that he would ever have proposed the measure
which he has brought forward, which leaves, as I have already said, everything
connected with the subject in a state of uncertainty and fluctuation.

All feel that the currency is a delicate subject, requiring to be touched with
the utmost caution ; but in order that it may be seen as well as felt why it is
so delicate, why slight touches, either in depressing or elevating it, agitate and
^convulse the whole community, I will pause to explain the cause. If we take
the aggregate property of a community, that which forms the currency consti
tutes, in value, a very small proportion of the whole. What this proportion is
in our country and other commercial and trading communities, is somewhat un
certain. I speak conjecturally in fixing it as one to twenty-five or thirty, though
J presume that is not far from the truth ; and yet this small proportion of the

140 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

property of the community regulates the value of all the rest, and forms the me
dium of circulation by which all its exchanges are effected ; bearing, in this re
spect, a striking similarity, considering the diversity of the subjects, to the blood
in the human or animal system.

If we turn our attention to the laws which govern the circulation, we shall
find one of the most important to be, that, as the circulation is decreased or in
creased, the rest of the property will, all other circumstances remaining the
same, be decreased or increased in value exactly in the same proportion. To
illustrate : If a community should have an aggregate amount of property of thir
ty-one millions of dollars, of which one million constitutes its currency ; and
that one million should be reduced one tenth part, that is to say, one hundred
thousand dollars, the value of the rest will be reduced in like manner one tenth
part, that is, three millions of dollars. And here a very important fact dis
closes itself, which explains why the currency should be touched with such
delicacy, and why stability and uniformity are such essential qualities ; I mean
that a small absolute reduction of the currency makes a great absolute reduction
of the value of the entire property of the community, as we see in the case pro
posed ; where a reduction of one hundred thousand dollars in the currency re
duces the aggregate value of property three millions of dollars — a sum thirty
times greater than the reduction of the currency. From this results an impor
tant consideration. If we suppose the entire currency to be in the hands of one
portion of the community, and the property in the hands of the other portion,
the former, by having the currency under their exclusive control, might control
the value of all the property in the community, and possess themselves of it at
their pleasure. Take the case already selected, and suppose that those who
hold the currency diminish it one half by abstracting that amount from circula
tion : the effect of which would be to reduce the circulation to five hundred
thousand dollars ; the value of property would also be reduced one half, that is,
fifteen millions of dollars. Let the process be reversed, and the money abstract
ed gradually restored to circulation, and the value of the property would agaia
be increased to thirty millions. It must be obvious that, by alternating these
processes, and purchasing at the point of the greatest depression, when the cir
culation is the least, and selling at the point of the greatest elevation, when it is
the fullest, the supposed moneyed class, who could at pleasure increase or di
minish the circulation, by abstracting or restoring it, might also at pleasure con
trol the entire property of the country. Let it be ever borne in mind, that the
exchangeable value of the circulating medium, compared with the property and
the business of the community, remains fixed, and can never be diminished or
increased by increasing or diminishing its quantity ; while, on the contrary, the
exchangeable value of the property, compared to the currency, must increase
or decrease with every addition or diminution of the latter. It results, from this,
that there is a dangerous antagonist relation between those who hold or com
mand the currency and the rest of the community ; but, fortunately for the coun
try, the holders of property and of the currency are so blended as not to consti
tute separate classes. Yet it is worthy of remark — it deserves strongly to at
tract the attention of those who have charge of the public affairs — that under
the operation of the banking system, and that peculiar description of property ex
isting in the shape of credit or stock, public and private, which so strikingly dis
tinguishes modern society from all that preceded it, there is a strong tendency
to create a separate moneyed interest, accompanied with all the dangers which
must necessarily result from such interest, and which deserves to be most care
fully watched and restricted.

I do not stand here the partisan of any particular class in society — the rich
or the poor, the property holder or the money holder ; and, in making these re
marks, I am not actuated by the slightest feeling of opposition to the latter.
My object is simply to point out important relations that exiet between them, re-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 141

suiting from the laws which govern the currency, in order that the necessity
for a uniform, stable, and safe currency, to guard against dangerous control of
one class over another, may be clearly seen. I stand in my place simply as a
senator from South Carolina, to represent her on this floor, and to advance the
common interest of these states as far as we have the constitutional power, and
as far as it can be done consistently with equity and justice to the parts. I am
the partisan, as I have said, of no class, nor, let me add, of any political party.
I am neither of the opposition nor of the administration. If I act with the former
in any instance, it is because I approve of the course on the particular occasion ;
and I shall always be happy to act with them when I do approve. If I oppose
the administration — if I desire to see power change hands— it is because I dis
approve of the general course of those in authority — because they have depart
ed from the principles on which they came into office — because, instead of using
the immense power and patronage put in their hands to secure the liberty of the
country and advance the public good, they have perverted them into party in
struments for personal objects. But mine has not been, nor will it be, a syste
matic opposition. Whatever measure of theirs I may deem right, I shall cheer
fully support ; and I only desire that they shall afford me more frequent occa
sions for support, and fewer for opposition, than they have heretofore done.

With these impressions, and entertaining a deep conviction that an unfixed,
unstable, and fluctuating currency is to be ranked among the most fruitful sour
ces of evil, whether viewed politically, or in reference to the business transac
tions of the country, 1 cannot give my consent to any measure that does not
place the currency on a solid foundation. If I thought this determination would
delay the relief so necessary to mitigate the present calamity, it would be to me
a subject of the deepest regret. I feel that sympathy which I trust I ought, for
the suffering of so many of my fellow-citizens, who see their hopes daily with
ered. I, however, console myself with the reflection that delay will not be
the result, but, on the contrary, relief will be hastened by the view which I
take of the subject. I hold it impossible that anything can be effected, regard
ing the subject as a mere bank question. Viewed in that light, the opinion of
this house, and of the other branch of Congress, is probably definitively made
up. In the Senate, it is known that we have three parties, whose views, con
sidering it as a bank question, appear to be irreconcilable. All hope, then, of
relief, must centre in taking a more elevated view, and in considering it, in its
true light, as a subject of currency. Thus regarded, I shall be surprised if, on
full investigation, there will not appear a remarkable coincidence of opinion,
even between those whose views, on a slight inspection, would seem to be con
tradictory. Let us, then, proceed to the investigation of the subject under the
aspect which I have proposed.

What, then, is the currency of the United States ? What its present state
and condition ? These are the questions which I propose now to consider, with
a view of ascertaining what is the disease, what the remedy, and what the
means of applying it, that may be necessary to restore our currency to a sound
condition.

The legal currency of this country — that in which alone debts can be dis
charged according to law — are certain gold, silver, and copper coins authorized
by Congress under an express provision of the Constitution. Such is the law.
What, now, are the facts ? That the currency consists almost exclusively of
bank-notes, gold having entirely disappeared, and silver, in a great measure,
expelled by banks instituted by twenty-five distinct and independent powers,
and notes issued under the authority of the direction of those institutions. They
are, in point of fact, the mint of the United States. They coin the actual
money (for such we must call bank-notes), and regulate its issue, and, conse
quently, its value. If we inquire as to their number, the amount of their issue,
and other circumstances calculated to show their actual condition, we shall find

142 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

that, so rapid has been their increase, and so various their changes, that no ac
curate information can be had. According to the latest and best that I have
been able to obtain, they number at least four hundred and fifty, with a capital
of not less than one hundred and forty-five millions of dollars, with an issue ex
ceeding seventy millions ; and the whole of this immense fabric standing on a
metallic currency of less than fifteen millions of dollars, of which the greater
part is held by the Bank of the United States. If we compare the notes in
circulation with the metallic currency in their vaults, we shall find the propor
tion about six to one ; and if we compare the latter with the demands that may
be made upon the banks, we shall find that the proportion is about one to elev
en. If we examine the tendency of the system at this moment, we shall find
that it is on the increase — rapidly on the increase. There is now pending a
project of a ten million bank before the Legislature of New-York ; but recently
one of five millions was established in Kentucky ; within a short period one of
a large capital was established in Tennessee, besides others in agitation in
several of the other states (here Mr. Porter, of Louisiana, said that one of
eleven millions had just been established in that state).

This increase is not accidental. It may be laid down as a law, that, where
two currencies are permitted to circulate in any country, one of a cheap and
the other of a dear material, the former necessarily tends to grow upon the lat
ter, and will ultimately expel it from circulation, unless its tendency to increase
t^e restrained by a powerful and efficient check. Experience tests the truth of
this remark, as the history of the banking system clearly illustrates. The sen
ator from Massachusetts truly said that the Bank of England was derived from
that of Amsterdam, as ours, in turn, are from that of England. Throughout its
progress, the truth of what I have stated to be a law of the system is strongly
evinced. The Bank of Amsterdam was merely a bank of deposite — a storehouse
for the safe-keeping of the bullion and precious metals brought into that com
mercial metropolis, through all the channels of its widely-extended trade. It
was placed under the custody of the city authorities ; and on the deposite, a cer
tificate was issued as evidence of the fact, which was transferable, so as to en
title the holder to demand the return. An important fact was soon disclosed —
that a large portion of the deposites might be withdrawn, and that the residue
would be sufficient to meet the returning certificates ; or, what is the same in
effect, that certificates might be issued without making a deposite. This sug
gested the idea of a bank of discount as well as deposite. The fact thus dis
closed fell too much in with the genius of the system to be lost, and, accord
ingly, when transplanted to England, it suggested the idea of a bank of discount
and of deposite ; the very essence of which form of banking, that on which their
profit depends, consists in issuing a greater amount of notes than it has specie
in its vaults. But the system is regularly progressing, under the impulse of the
laws that govern it, from its present form to a mere paper machine — a machine
for fabricating and issuing notes, not convertible into specie. Already has it
once reached this condition, both in England and the United States, and from
which it has been forced back, in both, to a redemption of its notes with great,
difficulty.

The natural tendency of the system is accelerated in our country by pecu
liar causes, which have greatly increased its progress. There are two power
ful causes in operation. The one resulting from that rivalry which must ever
take place in states situated, as ours are, under one General Government, and
having a free and open commercial intercourse. The introduction of the bank
ing system in one state necessarily, on this principle, introduces it into all the
others, of which we have seen a striking illustration on the part of Virginia
and some of the other Southern States, which entertained, on principle, strong
aversion to the system ; yet they were compelled, after a long and stubborn re
sistance, to yield their objections, or permit their circulation to be furnished by

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 143

the surrounding states, at the expense of their own capital and commerce.
The same cause which thus compels one state to imitate the example of an
other, in introducing the system from self-defence, will compel the other states, in
like manner, and from the same cause, to enlarge and give increased activity
to the banking operation, whenever any one of the states sets the example of
so doing on its part ; and thus, by mutual action and reaction, the whole sys
tem is rapidly accelerated to the final destiny which I have assigned.

This is strikingly exemplified in the rapid progress of the system since its
first introduction into our country. At the adoption of our Constitution, forty-
five years ago, there were but three banks in the United States, the amount of
whose capital I do not now recollect, but it was very small. In this short
space, they have increased to four hundred and fifty, with a capital of one hun
dred and forty-five millions, as has already been stated : an increase exceeding
nearly a hundred fold the increase of our wealth and population, as great as
they have been.

But it is not in numbers only that they have increased : there has, in the
same time, been a rapid advance in the proportion which their notes in circu
lation bear to the specie in their vaults. Some twenty or thirty years ago, it
was not considered safe for the issues to exceed the specie by more than two
and a half or three for one ; but now, taking the whole, and including the Bank
of the United States with the state banks, the proportion is about six to one ;
and excluding that Bank, it would very greatly exceed that proportion. This
increase of paper in proportion to metal results from a cause which deserves
much more notice than it has heretofore attracted. It originates mainly in the
number of the banks. I will proceed to illustrate it.

The senator from New- York (Mr. WRIGHT), in assigning his reasons for be
lieving the Bank of the United States to be more dangerous than those of the
states, said that one bank was more dangerous than many. That in some re
spects may be true ; but in one, and that a most important one, it is strikingly
the opposite — I mean in the tendency of the system to increase. Where there
is but one bank, the tendency to increase is not near so strong as where there
are many, as illustrated in England, where the system has advanced much less
rapidly, in proportion to the wealth and population of the kingdom, than in the
United States. But where there is no limitation as to their number, the in
crease will be inevitable, so long as banking continues to be among the most
certain, eligible, and profitable employments of capital, as now is the case.
With these inducements, there must be constant application for new banks,
whenever there is the least prospect of profitable employment — banks to be
founded mainly on. nominal and fictitious capital, and adding but little additional
capital to that already in existence — and with our just and natural aversion to
monopoly, it is difficult, on principles of equality and justice, to resist such ap
plication. The admission of a new bank tends to diminish the profits of the
old, and, between the aversion of the old to reduce their income and the desire
of the new to acquire profits, the result is an enlargement of discounts, effected
by a mutual spirit of forbearance ; an indisposition on the part of each to oppress
the other ; and, finally, the creation of a common feeling to stigmatize and oppose
those, whether banks or individuals, who demand specie in payment of their
notes. This community of feeling, which ultimately identifies the whole as a,
peculiar and distinct interest in the community, increases, and becomes more and
more intense, just in proportion as banks multiply ; as they become, if I may
use the expression, too populous, when, from the pressure of increasing num
bers, there results a corresponding increase of issues, in proportion to their
means, which explains the present extraordinary disproportion between specie
and notes in those states where banks have been most multiplied ; equal, in
some, to sixteen to one. There results from this state of things some political
considerations, which demand the profound attention of all who value the liberty
and peace of the country.

144 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

While the banking system rests on a solid foundation, there will be, on their
part, but little dependance on the government, and but little means by which the
government can influence them, and as little disposition on the 'part of the
banks to be connected with the government ; but in the progress of the system,
•when their number is greatly multiplied, and their issues, in proportion to their
means, are correspondingly increased, the condition of the banks becomes more
and more critical. Every adverse event in the commercial world, or political
movement that disturbs the existing state of things, agitates and endangers them.
They become timid and anxious for their safety, and necessarily court those in
power, in order to secure their protection. Property is, in its nature, timid, and
seeks protection, and nothing is more gratifying to government than to become
a protector. A union is the result ; and when that union takes place — when the
government, in fact, becomes the bank direction, regulating its favours and ac
commodation — the downfall of liberty is at hand. Are there no indications that
we are not far removed from this state of things ? Do we not behold in those
events which have so deeply agitated us within the last few months, and which
have interrupted all the business transactions of this community, a strong ten
dency to this union on the part of a department of this government, and a por
tion of the banking system ? Has not this union been, in fact, consummated in
the largest and most commercial of the states ? What is the safety-fund system
of New-York but a union between the banks and the state, and a consummation
by law of that community of feeling in the banking system which I have at
tempted to illustrate, the object of which is to extend their discounts, and to ob
tain which, the interior banks of that state have actually put themselves under
the immediate protection of the government ? The effects have been striking.
Already have they become substantially mere paper machines, several having
not more than from one to two cents in specie to the dollar, when compared
with their circulation ; and, taking the aggregate, their average condition will
be found to be but little better. I care not, said Mr. C., whether the present
commissioners are partisans of the present state administration or not, or
•whether the assertion of the senator from New-York (Mr. WRIGHT), that the
government of the state has not interfered in the control of these institutions, be
correct. Whether it has taken place or not, interference is inevitable. In such
state of weakness, a feeling of dependance is unavoidable, and the control of
the government over the action of the banks, whenever that control shall be
come necessary to subserve the ambition or the avarice of those in power, is
certain.

Such is the strong tendency of our banks to terminate their career in the pa
per system — in an open suspension of specie payment. Whenever that event
occurs, the progress of convulsion and revolution will be rapid. The currency
will become local, and each state will have a powerful interest to depreciate
its currency more rapidly than its neighbour, as means, at the same time, of ex
empting itself from the taxes of the government, and drawing the commerce of
the country to its ports. This was strongly exemplified after the suspension
of specie payment during the late war, when the depreciation made the most
rapid progress, till checked by the establishment of the present Bank of the Uni
ted States, and when the foreign trade of the country was as rapidly conver
ging to the point of the greatest depreciation, with a view of exemption from du-
'ties, by paying in the debased currency of the place.

WThat, then, is the disease which afflicts the system ? what the remedy ? and
•what the means of applying it ? These are the questions which I shall next
proceed to consider. What I have already stated points out the disease. It
consists in a great and growing disproportion between the metallic and paper
circulation of the country, effected through the instrumentality of the banks : a
disproportion daily arid hourly increasing, under the impulse of most powerful
causes, which are rapidly accelerating the country to that state of convulsion

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 145

and revolution which I have indicated. The remedy is to arrest its future prog
ress, and to diminish the existing disproportion — to increase the metals and to
diminish the paper — advancing till the currency shall be restored to a sound,
safe, arid settled condition. On these two points all must be agreed. There
is no man of any party, capable of reflecting, and who will take the pains to in
form himself, but must agree that our currency is in a dangerous condition, and
that the danger is increasing ; nor is there any one who can doubt that the only
safe and effectual remedy is to diminish this disproportion to which I have re
ferred. Here the extremes unite : the senator from Missouri (Mr. Benton),
and the senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster), who stands here as the able
and strenuous advocate of the banking system, are on this point united, and must
move from it in the same direction : though it may be the design of the one to
go through, and of the other to halt after a moderate advance.

There is another point on which all must be agreed — that the remedy must
be gradual — the change from the present to another and sounder condition, slow
and cautious. The necessity for this results from that highly delicate nature
of currency which I have already illustrated. Any sudden and great change
from our present to even a sounder condition would agitate and convulse socie
ty to the centre. On another point there can be but little disagreement. What
ever may be the different theoretical opinions of the members of the Senate as
to the extent to which the reformation of the currency should be carried, even
those who think it may be carried practically and safely to the restoration of a
metallic currency, to the entire exclusion of paper, must agree that the restora
tion ought not to be carried farther than a cautious and slow experience shall
prove that it can be done, consistently with the prosperity of the country, in the
existing fiscal and commercial condition of the world. To go beyond the point
to which experience shall show it is proper to go, would be to sacrifice the pub
lic interest merely to a favourite conception. There may be ultimately a disa
greement of opinion where that point is, but, since all must be agreed to move
forward in the same direction and at the same pace, let us set out in the spirit •
of harmony and peace, though we intend to stop at different points. It may be
that, enlightened by experience, those who intended to stop at the nearest point
may be disposed to advance farther, and that those who intended the farthest,
may halt on this side, so that finally all may agree to terminate the journey to
gether.

This brings us to the question of how shall so salutary a change be effected ?
What the means, and the mode of application ? A great and difficult question,
on which some diversity of opinion may be expected.

No one can be more sensible than I am of the responsibility that must be in
curred in proposing measures on questions of so much magnitude, and which
in so distracted a state, must affect seriously great and influential interests.
But. this is no time to shun responsibility. The danger is great and menacing,
and delay hazardous, if not ruinous. While, however, I would not shun, I have
not sought the responsibility. 1 have waited for others ; and, had any one pro
posed an adequate remedy, I would have remained silent. And here, said Mr.
Calhoun, let me express the deep regret which I feel that the administration,
with all that weight of authority which belongs to its power and immense pat
ronage, had not, instead of the deposite question, which has caused such agita
tion and distress, taken up the great subject of the currency ; examined it grave
ly and deliberately in all its bearings ; pointed out its diseased condition ; des
ignated the remedy, and proposed some safe, gradual, and effectual means of
applying it. Had that course been pursued, my zealous and hearty co-opera
tion would not have been wanting. Permit me, also, to express a similar re
gret that the administration, having failed in this great point of duty, the oppo
sition, with all its weight and talents, headed on this question by the distinguish
ed and able senator from Massachusetts, who is so capable of comprehending

T

146 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

this subject in all its bearings, had not brought forward, under its auspices, some
permanent system of measures, based upon a deliberate and mature investiga
tion into the cause of the existing disease, and calculated to remedy the disor
dered state of the currency. What might have been brought forward by them
with such fair prospects of success, has been thrown on more incompetent hands,
unaided by patronage or influence, save only that power which truth clearly
developed, and honestly and zealously advanced, may be supposed to possess,
and on which I must wholly rely.

But to return to the subject. Whatever diversity of sentiment there may be
as to the means, on one point all must be agreed : nothing effectual can be done,
no check interposed to restore or arrest the progress of the system, by the ac-
toi of the states. The reasons already assigned to prove that banking by one:
state compels all others to bank, and that the excess of banking in one in like
manner compels all others to like excess, equally demonstrate that it is impossi
ble for the states, acting separately, to interpose any means to prevent the catas
trophe which certainly awaits the system, and perhaps the government itself, un
less the great and growing danger to which I refer be timely and effectually
arrested. There is no power anywhere but in this government — the joint agent
of all the states, and through which a concert of action can be effected adequate
to this great task. The responsibility is upon us, and upon us alone. The
means, if means there be, must be applied by our hands, or not applied at all —
a consideration, in so great an emergency, arid in the presence of such imminent
danger, calculated, I should suppose, to arouse even the least patriotic.

What means do we possess, and how can they be applied ?

If the entire banking system was under the immediate control of the Gener
al Government, there would be no difficulty in devising a safe and effectual
remedy to restore the equilibrium, so desirable, between the specie and the pa
per which compose our currency. But the fiict is otherwise. With the ex
ception of the Bank of the United States, all the other banks owe their origin
to the authority of the several states, and are under their immediate control,
which presents the great difficulty experienced in devising the proper means
of effecting the remedy which all feel to be so desirable.

Among the means which have been suggested, a senator from Virginia, not
now a member of this body (Mr. Rives), proposed to apply the taxing power to-
suppress the circulation of small notes, with a view of diminishing the paper
and increasing the specie circulation. The remedy would be simple and effect
ive, but is liable to great objection. The taxing power is odious under any
circumstances ; it would be doubly so when called into exercise with an over
flowing treasury ; and still more so, with the necessity of organizing an expen
sive body of officers to collect a single tax, and that of an inconsiderable
amount. But there is another, and of itself a decisive objection. It would be
unconstitutional — palpably and dangerously so. All political powers, as I sta
led on another occasion, are trust powers, and limited in their exercise by the
subject and object of the grant. The tax power was granted to raise revenue
for the sole purpose of supplying the necessary means of carrying on the oper
ations of the government. To pervert this power from the object thus intend
ed by the Constitution, to that of suppressing the circulation of bank-notes,
would be to convert it from a revenue into a penal power — a power in its nature
and object essentially different from that intended to be granted in the Consti
tution ; and a power which in its full extension, if once admitted, would be suf
ficient of itself to give an entire control to this government over the property
and the pursuits of the community, and thus concentrate and consolidate in it
the entire power of the system.

Rejecting, then, the taxing power, there remains two obvious and direct
means in possession of the government, which may be brought into action to
effect the object intended, but neither of which, either separately or jointly, is

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 147

of sufficient efficacy, however indispensable they may be as a part of an effi-
,cient system of measures, to correct the present, or repress the growing disor
ders of the currency ; I mean that provision in the Constitution which empow
ers Congress to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and
the power of prohibiting anything but the legal currency to be received, either
in whole or in part, in the dues of the government. The mere power of coining
and regulating the value of coins, of itself, and unsustained by any other meas
ure, can exercise but a limited control over the actual currency of the country,
and is inadequate to check excess or correct disorder, as is demonstrated by the
present diseased state of the currency. Congress has had, from the beginning,
laws upon the statute-books to regulate the value of coins ; and at an early pe
riod of the government the mint was erected, and has been in active operation
ever since ; and yet, of the immense amount which has been coined, a small res
idue only remains in the country, the great body having been expelled under
the banking system. To give efficiency to this power, then, some other must
be combined with it. The most immediate and obvious is that which has been
suggested— of excluding all but specie in the receipts of the government. This
measure would be effectual to a certain extent; but with a declining income,
which must take place under the operation of the act of the last session, to ad
just the tariff, and which must greatly reduce the revenue (a point of the ut
most importance to the reformation and regeneration of our institutions), the effi
cacy of the measure must be correspondingly diminished. From the nature
of things, it cannot greatly exceed the average of the government deposites,
which I hope will, before many years, be reduced to the smallest possible
amount, so as to prevent the possibility of the recurrence of the shameful and
dangerous state of things which now exists, and which has been caused by the
vast amount of the surplus revenue. But there is, in my opinion, a strong ob
jection against resorting to this measure, resulting from the fact that an exclu
sive receipt of specie in the treasury would, to give it efficacy, and to prevent
extensive speculation and fraud, require an entire disconnexion on the part of
the government with the banking system in ail its forms, and a resort to the
strong box as the means of preserving and guarding its funds — a means, if prac
ticable, in the present state of things liable to the objection of being far less
safe, economical, arid efficient than the present.

What, then, Mr. Calhoun inquired, what other means do we possess, of suffi
cient efficacy, in combination with those to which I have referred, to arrest its
progress, and correct the disordered state of the currency ? This is the deeply-
important question, and here some division of opinion must be expected, how
ever united we may be, as I trust we are thus far, on all other points. I intend
to meet this question explicitly and directly, without reservation or concealment.

After a full survey of the whole subject, I see none : I can conjecture no
means of extricating the country from the present danger, and to arrest its, far
ther increase, but a Bank — the agency of which, in some form, or under some
authority, is indispensable. The country has been brought into the present dis
tressed state of currency by banks, and must be extricated by their agency.
We must, in a word, use a bank to unbank the banks, to the extent that may be
necessary to restore a safe and stable currency — just as we apply snow to a
frozen limb in order to restore vitality and circulation, or hold up a burn to the
flame to extract the inflammation. All must see that it is impossible to sup
press the banking system at once. It must continue for a time. Its greatest
enemies, and the advocates of an exclusive specie circulation, must make it a
part of their system to tolerate the banks for a longer or a shorter period. To
suppress them at once would, if it were possible, work a greater revolution — a
greater change in the relative condition of the various classes of the communi
ty, than would the conquest of the country by a savage enemy. What, then,
must be done ? I answer, a new and safe system must gradually grow up un-

148 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

der, and replace the old ; imitating, in this respect, the beautiful process which
we sometimes see of a wounded or diseased part in a living organic body-
gradually superseded by the healing process of nature.

How is this to be effected ? How is a bank to be used as the means of cor
recting the excess of the banking system ? and what bank is to be selected as
the agent to effect this salutary change ? I know, said Mr. C., that a diversity
of opinion will be found to exist, as to the agent to be selected, among those
who agree on every other point, and who, in particular, agree on the necessity
of using some bank as the means of effecting the object intended : one prefer
ring a simple recharter of the existing Bank, another the charter of a new Bank
of the United States ; a third, a new Bank ingrafted upon the old ; and a fourth,
the use of the state banks as the agent. I wish, said Mr. C., to leave all these
as open questions, to be carefully surveyed and compared with each other,
calmly and dispassionately, without prejudice or party feeling ; and that to be
selected which, on the whole, shall appear to be best, the most safe, the most,
efficient, the most prompt in application, and the least liable to constitutional
objections. It would, however, be wanting in candour on my part not to de
clare that my impression is, that a new Bank of the United States, ingrafted
upon the old, will be found, under all the circumstances of the case, to combine
the greatest advantages, and to be liable to the fewest objections ; but this im
pression is not so firmly fixed as to be inconsistent with a calm review of the
whole ground, or to prevent my yielding to the conviction of reason, should the
result of such review prove that any other is preferable. Among its peculiar
recommendations may be ranked the consideration that, while it would afford the
means of a prompt and effectual application for mitigating and finally removing
the existing distress, it would, at the same time, open to the whole community a
fair opportunity of participation in the advantages of the institution, be they what
they may.

Let us, then, suppose (in order to illustrate, and not to indicate a preference)
that the present Bank be selected as the agent to effect the intended object.
What provisions will be necessary ? I will suggest those that have occurred to
me, mainly, however, with a view of exciting the reflections of those much
more familiar with banking operations than myself, and who, of course, are more
competent to form a correct judgment of their practical effect.

Let, then, the Bank charter be renewed for twelve years after the expiration
of the present term, with such modifications and limitations as may be judged
proper ; and that after that period it shall issue no notes under ten dollars — that
government shall not receive in its dues any sum less than ten dollars, except
in the legal coins of the United States ; that it shall not receive in its dues the
notes of any bank that issues notes of a denomination less than five dollars ;
and that the United States Bank shall not receive in payment, or on deposite,
the notes of any bank whose notes are not receivable in the dues of the govern
ment, nor the notes of any bank which may receive the notes of any bank whose
notes are not receivable by the government. At the expiration of six years from
the commencement of the renewed charter, let the Bank be prohibited from is
suing any note under twenty dollars, and let no sum under that amount be re
ceived in dues of the government, except in specie ; and let the value of gold be
raised at least equal to that of silver, to take effect immediately ; so that the
country may be replenished with the coin, the lightest and the most portable
in proportion to its value, to take the place of the receding bank-notes. It is
unnecessary for me to state, that at present the standard value of gold is less
than that of silver ; the necessary effect of which has been to expel gold entire
ly from circulation, and to deprive us of a coin so well calculated for the
circulation of a country so great in extent, and having so vast an intercourse,
commercial, social, and political, between all its parts, as ours. As an addition
al recommendation to raise its relative value, gold has, of late, become an impor-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 149

tant product of three considerable states of the Union — Virginia, North Caro
lina, and Georgia — to the industry of which the measure proposed would give
a strong impulse, and which, in turn, would greatly increase the quantity pro
duced.

Such are the means which have occurred to me. There are members of this
body far more competent to judge of their practical operation than myself; and
as my object is simply to suggest them for their reflection, and for that of others
who are more familiar with this part of the subject, I will not at present enter
into an inquiry as to their efficiency, with a view of determining whether they
are fully adequate to effect the object in view or not. There are, doubtless, others
of a similar description, and perhaps more efficacious, that may occur to the ex
perienced, which I would freely embrace, as my object is to adopt the best and
most efficient. And it may be hoped, that if, on experience, it should be found
that neither these provisions, nor any other in the power of Congress, are fully
adequate to effect the important reform which I have proposed, the co-operation
of the states may be afforded, at least to the extent of suppressing the circula
tion of notes under five dollars, where such are permitted to be issued under
their authority.

I omitted, in the proper place, to state my reason for suggesting twelve years
as the term for the renewal of the charter of the Bank. It appears to me that
it is long enough to permit the agitation and distraction which now disturbs the
country to subside, while it is sufficiently short to enable us to avail ourselves
of the full benefit of the light of experience, which may be expected to.be de
rived frtfm the operation of the system under its new provisions. But there is
another reason which appears to me to be entitled to great weight. The char
ter of the Bank of England has recently been renewed for the term of ten
years, with very important changes, calculated to furnish much experience upon
the nature of banking operations and currency. It is highly desirable, if
the Bank charter should be renewed, or a new bank created, that we should
have the full benefit of that experience before the expiration of the term, which
would be effected by fixing the period I have designated. But as my object in
selecting the recharter of the Bank of the United States was simply to enable
me to present the suggestions I have made in the clearest form, and not advocate
the recharter, I shall omit to indicate many limitations and provisions, which
seem to me to be important to be considered, when the question of its perma
nent renewal is presented, should it ever be. Among others, I entirely concur
in the suggestion of the senator from Georgia, of fixing the rate of interest at
five per cent. — a suggestion of importance, and to which but one objection can,
in my opinion, be presented — I mean the opposing interest of existing state in
stitutions, all of which discount at higher rates, and which may defeat any
measure of which it constitutes a part. In addition, I will simply say that I,
for one, shall feel disposed to adopt such provisions as are best calculated to
secure the government from any supposed influence on the part of the Bank, or
the Bank from any improper interference on the part of the government, or
which may be necessary to protect the rights or interests of the states.

Having now stated the measure necessary to apply the remedy, I am thus
brought to the question, Can the measure succeed '? which brings up the inqui
ry of how far it may be expected to receive the support of the several parties
which now compose the Senate, and on which 1 shall next proceed to make a
few remarks.

Firsjt^then, can the State Rights party give it their support ? that party of
which I am iproud of being a member, and for which I entertain so strong an
attachment — the stronger becaus.© we are few among many. In proposing this
question, I am not igncfrant oftheir long-standing constitutional objection to the
Bank, on the ground >hat tni§ was intended to be, as it is usually expressed, a
hard-money government, whoseNqirculating medium was intended to consist of

150 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

the precious metals, and for which object the power of coining money, and
regulating the value thereof, was expressly conferred by the Constitution. I
know how long and how sincerely this opinion has been entertained, and under
how many difficulties it has been maintained. It is not my intention to attempt
to change an opinion so firmly fixed ; but I may be permitted to make a few
observations, in order to present what appears to me to be the true question in
reference to this constitutional point, in order that we may fully comprehend the
circumstances under which we are placed in reference to it.

With this view, I do not deem it necessary to inquire whether, in conferring
the power to coin money, and to regulate the value thereof, the Constitution in
tended to limit the power strictly to coming money and regulating its value, or
whether it intended to confer a more general power over the currency ; nor do I in
tend to inquire whether the word coin is limited simply to the metals, or may be
extended to other substances, if, through a gradual change, they may become the
medium of the general circulation of the world. I pass these points. Whatever
opinion there may be entertained in reference to them, we must all agree, as a
fixed principle in our system of thinking on constitutional questions, that the
power under consideration, like other powers, is a trust power ; and that, like
all such powers, it must be so exercised as to effect the object of the trust as
far as it may be practicable. Nor can we disagree that the object of the power
was to secure to these states a safe, uniform, and stable currency. The nature
of the power, the terms used to convey it, the history of the times, the necessi
ty, with the creation of a common government, of having a common and uniform
circulating medium, and the power conferred to punish those who, by- coun
terfeiting, may attempt to debase and degrade the coins of the country, all pro
claim this to be the object.

It is not my purpose to inquire whether, admitting this to be the object, Con
gress is not bound to use all the means in its power to give this safety, this sta
bility, this uniformity to the currency, for which the power was conferred ; nor
to inquire whether the states are not bound to abstain from acts, on their part, in
consistent with them ; nor to inquire whether the right of banking, on the part
of a state, does not directly, and by immediate consequence, injuriously affect
the currency — whether the effect of banking is not to expel the specie currency,
which, according to the assumption that this is a hard-money government, it
was the object of the Constitution to furnish, in conferring the power to coin
money ; or whether the effect of banking does not necessarily tend to diminish
the value of a specie currency as certainly as clipping or reducing its weight
would ; and whether it has not, in fact, since its introduction, reduced the val
ue of the coins one half. Nor do I intend to inquire whether Congress is not
bound to abstain from all acts, on its part, calculated to affect injuriously the
specie circulation, and whether the receiving anything but specie, in its dues,
must not necessarily so affect it by diminishing the quantity in circulation, and
depreciating the value of what remains. All these questions I leave open. I
decide none of them. There is one, however, that I will decide. If Congress
has a right to receive anything else than specie in its dues, they have the right
to regulate its value ; and have a right, of course, to adopt all necessary and
proper means, in the language of the Constitution, to effect the object. It mat
ters not what they receive, tobacco, or anything else, this right must attach to
it. I do not assert the right of receiving, but I do hold it to be incontroverti
ble, that, if Congress were to order the dues of the government to be paid, for in
stance, in tobacco, they would have the right, nay, more, they would be bound
to use all necessary and proper means to give it a uniform and stable value —
inspections, appraisement, designation of qualities, and whatever else would be
necessary to that object. So, on the same principle, if they receive bank-notes,
they are equally bound to use all means necessary and proper, according to the
peculiar nature of the subject, to give them uniformity, stability, and safety.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 151

The very receipt of bank-notes, on the part of the government, in its dues,
would, it is conceded, make them money, as for as the government may be
concerned, and, by a necessary consequence, would make them, to a great ex
tent, the currency of the country. I say nothing of the positive provisions in
the Constitution which declare that *' all duties, imposts, and excises shall be
uniform throughout the United "States," which cannot be, unless that in which
they are paid should also have, as nearly as practicable, a uniform value
throughout the country. To effect this, if bank-notes are received, the bank
ing power is necessary and proper within the meaning of the Constitution ; and,
consequently, if the government has the right to receive bank-notes in its dues,
the power becomes constitutional. Here lies, said Mr. Calhoun, the real con
stitutional question : Has the government a right to receive bank-notes, or not ?
The question is not upon the mere power of incorporating a bank, as it has
been commonly argued ; though even in that view there would be as great a
constitutional objection to any act on the part of the executive, or any other
branch of the government, which should unite any association of state banks
into one system, as the means of giving the uniformity and stability to the cur
rency which the Constitution intends to confer. The very act of so associa
ting or uniting them into one, by whatever name called, or by whatever depart
ment performed, would be, in fact, an act of incorporation.

But, said Mr. Calhoun, my object, as I have stated, is not to discuss the con
stitutional questions, nor to determine whether the Bank be constitutional or
not. It is, I repeat, to show where the difficulty lies : a difficulty which I have
felt from the time I first came into the public service. I found then, as now,
the currency of the country consisting almost entirely of bank-notes. I found
the government intimately connected with the system : receiving bank-notes in
its dues, and paying them away, under its appropriations, as cash. The fact was
beyond my control : it existed long before my time, and without my agency ;
and I was compelled to act on the fact as it existed, without deciding on the
many questions which I have suggested as connected with this subject, and on
many of which I have never yet formed a definite opinion. No one can pay
less regard to the precedent than I do, acting here, in my representative and de
liberative character, on legal or constitutional questions ; but I have felt from
the beginning the full force of the distinction so sensibly taken by the senator
from Virginia (Mr. Leigh) between doing and undoing an act, and which he
so strongly illustrated in the case of the purchase of Louisiana. The constitu
tionality of that act was doubted by many at the time, and, among others, by its
author himself ; yet he would be considered a madman who, coming into polit
ical life at this late period, would now seriously take up the question of the
constitutionality of the purchase, and, coming to the conclusion that it was un
constitutional, should propose to rescind the act, and eject from the Union two
flourishing states and a growing territory : nor would it be an act of much less
madness thus to treat the question of the currency, and undertake to suppress
at once the system of bank circulation which has been growing up from the
beginning of the government, which has penetrated into and connected itself
with every department of our political system, on the ground that the Constitu
tion intended a specie circulation ; or who would treat the constitutional ques
tion as one to be taken up de novo, and decided upon elementary principles,
without reference t6 the imperious state of facts.

But in raising the question whether my friends of the State Rights party can
consistently vote for the measure which I have suggested, I rest not its decision
on the ground that their constitutional opinion in reference to the Bank is errone
ous. I assume their opinion to be correct — I place the argument, not on the
constitutionality or unconstitutionality, but on wholly different ground. I lay it
down, as an incontrovertible principle, that, admitting an act to be unconstitu
tional, but of such a nature that it cannot be reversed at once, or at least without

152 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

involving gross injustice to the community, we may, under such circumstances,
vote for its temporary continuance, for undoing gradually, as the only practica
ble mode of terminating it, consistently with the strictest constitutional objects.
The act of the last session, adjusting the tariff, furnishes an apt illustration.
All of us believed that measure to be unconstitutional and oppressive, yet we
voted for it without supposing that we violated the Constitution in so doing,
although it allowed upward of eight years for the termination of the system,
on the ground that to reverse it at once would spread desolation and ruin over
a large portion of the country. I ask the principle in that case to be applied
to this. It is equally as impossible to terminate suddenly the present system
of paper currency, without spreading a desolation still wider and deeper over
the face of the country. If it can be reversed at all — if we can ever return to
a metallic currency, it must be by gradually undoing what we have done, and
to tolerate the system while the process is going on. Thus, the measure
which I have suggested proposes, for the period of twelve years, to be follow
ed up by a similar process, as far as a slow and cautious experience shall prove
we may go consistently with the public interest, even to its entire reversal, if
experience shall prove we may go so far, which, however, I, for one, do not
anticipate ; but the effort, if it should be honestly commenced and pursued, would
present a case every way parallel to the instance of the tariff to which I have
already referred. I go farther, and ask the question, Can you, consistently with
your obligation to the Constitution, refuse to vote for a measure, if intended, in
good faith, to effect the object already stated ? Would not a refusal to vote for
the only means of terminating it consistently with justice, and without involving
the horror of revolution, amount in fact, and in all its practical consequences, to
a vote to perpetuate a state of things which all must acknowledge to be emU
nently unconstitutional, and highly dangerous to the liberty of the country ?

But I know that it will be objected that the Constitution ought to be amended,
and the power conferred in express terms. I feel the full force of the objection.
I hold the position to be sound, that, when a constitutional question has been
agitated involving the powers of the government, which experience shall prove
cannot be settled by reason, as is the case of the Bank question, those who
claim the power ought to abandon it, or obtain an express grant by an amend
ment of the Constitution ; and .yet, even with this impression, I would, at the
present time, feel much, if not insuperable objection, to vote for an amendment,
till an effort shall be fairly made, in order to ascertain to what extent the power
might be dispensed with, as I have proposed.

I hold it a sound principle, that no more power should be conferred upon the
General Government than is indispensable ; and if experience should prove that
the power of banking is indispensable, in the actual condition of the currency
of this country and of the world generally, I should even then think that, what
ever power ought to be given, should be given with such restrictions and limita
tions as would limit it to the smallest amount necessary, and guard it with the
utmost care against abuse. As it is, without farther experience, we are at a
loss to determine how little or how much would be required to correct a dis
ease which must, if not corrected, end in convulsions and revolution. I con
sider the whole subject of banking and credit as undergoing at this time,
throughout the civilized world, a progressive change, of which I think I per
ceive many indications. Among the changes in progression, it appears to me-
there is a strong tendency in the banking system to resolve itself into two
parts — one becoming a bank of circulation and exchange, for the purpose of
regulating and equalizing the circulating medium, and the other assuming
more the character of private banking ; of which separation there are indica
tions in the tendency of the English system, particularly perceptible in the late
modification of the charter of the Bank of England. In the mean time, it would
be wise in us to avail ourselves of the experience of the next few years before-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 153'

any change be made in the Constitution, particularly as the course which, it
'seems to me, it would be advisable to pursue, would be the same, whether the
power be expressly conferred or not.

I next address myself to the members of the opposition, who principally rep
resent the commercial and manufacturing portions of the country, where the
banking system has been the farthest extended, and where a larger portion of
the property exists in the shape of credit than in any other section, and to
whom a sound and stable ' currency is most necessary, and the opposite most
dangerous. You have no constitutional objection : to you it is a mere question
of expediency. Viewed in this light, can you vote for the measure suggested ?
A measure designed to arrest the approach of events which, I have demonstra
ted, must, if not arrested, create convulsions and revolutions ; and to correct a
disease which must, if not corrected, subject the currency to continued agita
tions and fluctuations ; and, in order to give that permanence, stability, and uni
formity, which is so essential to your safety and prosperity. To effect this
may require some diminution of the profits of banking, some temporary sacri
fice of interest ; but if such should be the fact, it will be compensated more
than a hundred fold by increased security and durable prosperity. If the sys
tem must advance in the present course without a check, and if explosion must
follow, remember that where you stand will be the crater — should the system
quake, under your feet the chasm will open that will ingulf your institutions and
your prosperity.

Can the friends of the administration vote for this measure ? If I understand
their views, as expressed by the senator from Missouri, behind me (Mr. Ben-
ton), and the senator from New- York (Mr. Wright), and other distinguished
members of the party, and the views of the President as expressed in reported
conversations, I see not how they can reject it. They profess to be the advo
cates of a metallic currency.

I propose to restore it by the most effectual, measures that can be devised ;
gradually and slowly, and to the extent that experience may show that it can
be done consistently with a due regard to the public interest. Farther no one
can desire to go. If the means I propose are not the best and most effectual,
let better and more effectual be devised. If the process which I propose be too
slow or too fast, let it be accelerated or retarded. Permit me to add to these
views what, it appears to me, those whom I address ought to feel with deep
and solemn obligation of duty. They are the advocates and the supporters of
the administration. It is now conceded, almost universally, that a rash and
precipitate act of the executive, to speak in the mildest terms, has plunged this
country into deep and almost universal distress. You are the supporters of that
measure — you personally incur the responsibility by that support. How are
its consequences to terminate ? Do you see the end ? Can things remain,
as they are, with the currency and the treasury of the country under the ex
clusive control of the executive ? And by what scheme, what device, do you
propose to extricate the country and the Constitution from their present dan
gers ?

I have now said what I intended. I have pointed out, without reserve, what
I believe in my conscience to be for the public interest. May what I have said
be received with favour equal to the sincerity with which it has been uttered. In
conclusion, I have but to add, that, if what I have said shall in any degree con
tribute to the adjustment of this question, which I believe cannot be left open
without imminent danger, I shall rejoice ; but if not, I shall at least have the;
consolation of having discharged my duty.

154 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

V ix.

SPEECH DELIVERED IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES APRIL 9, 1834, ON
THE BILL TO REPEAL THE FORCE ACT.

I HAVE, said Mr. Calhoun, introduced this bill from a deep conviction
that the act which it proposes to repeal is, in its tendency, subversive of our
political institutions, and fatal to the liberty and happiness of the country ;
which I trust to be able to establish to the satisfaction of the Senate,
should I be so fortunate as to obtain a dispassionate and favourable hear
ing.

In resting the repeal on this ground, it is not my intention to avail my
self of the objections to the details of the act, as repugnant as many of
them are to the principles of our government. In illustration of the truth
of this assertion, I might select that provision which vests in the Pres
ident, in certain cases, of which he is made the judge, the entire force of
the country, civil, military, and naval, with the implied power of pledging
the public faith for whatever expenditure he may choose to incur in its
application. And, to prove how dangerous it is to vest such extraordi
nary powers in the executive, I might avail myself of the experience which
\ve have had in the last few months of the aspiring character of that de
partment of the government, and which has furnished conclusive evidence
of the danger of vesting in it even a very limited discretion. It is not for
me to judge of the propriety of the course which the members of this
body may think proper to pursue in reference to the question under con
sideration ; but I must say that I am at a loss to understand how any one,
who regards as I do the acts to which I have referred, as palpable usur
pations of power, and as indicating on the part of the executive a danger
ous spirit of aggrandizement, can vote against the bill under considera
tion, and thereby virtually vote to continue in the President the extraor
dinary and dangerous power in question.

But it may be said that the provision of the act which confers this pow
er will expire, by its own limitation, at the termination of the present
session. It is true it will then cease to be law ; but it is no less true
that the precedent, unless the act be expunged from the statute-book, will
live forever, ready, on any pretext of future danger, to be quoted as an au
thority to confer on the chief magistrate similar, or even more dangerous
powers, if more dangerous can be devised. We live in an eventful period,
and, among other things, we have had, recently, some impressive lessons
on the danger of precedents. To them immediately we owe the act which
has caused the present calamitous and dangerous condition of the coun
try ; which has been defended almost solely on the ground of precedents
• — precedents almost unnoticed at the time ; but had they not existed, or
had they been reversed at the time by Congress, the condition of the
country would this day be far different from what it is. With this knowl
edge of the facts, we must see that a bad precedent is as dangerous as
the bad measure itself; and in some respects more so, as it maj- give rise
to acts far worse than itself, as in the case to which I have alluded. In
this view of the subject, to refuse to vote against the repeal of the act,
and thereby constitute a precedent to confer similar, or more dangerous
powers hereafter, would be as dangerous as to vote for an act to vest per
manently in the President the power in question.

But I pass over this and other objections to the details not much less
formidable. I take a higher stand against the act : I object to the princi
ple in which it originated, putting the details aside, on the ground, as I

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 155

have stated, that they are subversive of our political institutions, and fatal,
in their tendency, to the liberty and happiness of the country. Fortunate
ly, we are not left to conjecture or inference as to what these principles
are. It was openly proclaimed, both here and elsewhere, in the debates
of this body and the proclamation and message of the President, in which
the act originated, that the very basis on which it rests — the assumption
on which only it could be supported — was, that this government had the
final and conclusive right, in the last resort, to judge of the extent of its
powers ; and that, to execute its decision, it had the right to use all the
means of the country, civil, military, and fiscal, not only against individ
uals, but against the states themselves, and all acting under their author
ity, whether in a legislative, executive, or judicial capacity.

If farther evidence be required as to the nature and character of the
act, it will be found in the history of the events in which it took its ori
gin. It originated, as we all know, in a controversy between this govern
ment and the State of South Carolina, in reference to a power which in
volved the question of the constitutionality of a protective tariff. I do not
intend to give the history of this controversy j it is sufficient for my pur
pose to say that the state, in maintenance of what she believed to be her
unquestionable power, assumed the highest ground : she placed herself on
her sovereign authority as a constituent member of this confederacy, and
made her opposition to the encroachment on her rights through a conven
tion of the people, the only organ by which, according to our conception,
the sovereign will of a state can be immediately and directly pronounced.
This government, on its part, in resistance to the action of the state, as
sumed the right to t*rample upon the authority of the convention, and to
look beyond the state to the individuals who compose it : not as form
ing a political community, but as a mere mass of insolated individuals,
without political character or authority ; and thus asserted in the strongest
manner, not only the right of judging of its own powers, but that of over
looking, in a contest for power, the very existence of the state itself, and
of recognising, in the assertion of what it might claim to be its power, no
other authority whatever in the system but its, own.

Such being the principle in which this bill originated, we are brought
to the consideration of a question of the deepest import. Is an act, which
assumes such powers for this government, consistent with the nature and
character of our political institutions 1

It is not my intention, in the discussion of this question, to renew the
debate of the last session. But, in declining to renew that discussion, I
wish to be directly understood that I do so exclusively on the ground
that I do not feel myself justified in repeating arguments so recently ad
vanced ; and not on the ground that there is the least abatement of con
fidence in the positions then assumed, or in the decisive bearing which
they ought to have against the act. So far otherwise, time and reflection
have but served to confirm me in the impression which I then entertain
ed ; and, without repeating the arguments, I now avail myself, in this dis
cussion, of the positions then established, and stand prepared to vindicate
them against whatever assaults may be made upon them, come from what
quarter they may. Without, then, reopening the discussion of the last
session on the elementary principles of our government, which were
then brought into controversy, I shall now proceed to take the plainest
and most common-sense view of our political institutions, regarding them
merely in a matter-of-fact way, in order to ascertain the parts of which
they are composed, and the relations which they bear to each other.

Thus regarding our institutions, we are struck, on the first view, with
the number and complexity of the parts — with the division, classification,

156 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

and organization which pervade every part of the system. It is, in fact,
a system of governments ; and these, in turn, are a system of departments —
a system in which government bears the same relation to government, in
reference to the whole, as departments do to departments, in reference to
each particular government. As each government is made up of the le
gislative, executive, and judicial departments organized into one, so the
system is made up of this government, and the state governments, in like
manner, organized into one system. So, too, as the powers which consti
tute the respective governments are divided and organized into depart
ments, in like manner in the formation of the governments, their powers
are classed into two distinct divisions : the one containing powers local
and peculiar in their character, which the interests of the states require
to be exercised by each state through a separate government ; the other
containing those which are more general and comprehensive, and which
can be best exercised in some uniform mode through a common govern
ment. The former of these divisions constitutes what, in our system, are
known as the reserved powers, and are exercised by each state through
its own separate government. The latter are known as the delegated
powers, and are exercised through this, the common government of the
several states. This division of power into two parts, with distinct and
independent governments, regularly organized into departments, legisla
tive, executive, and judicial, to carry their respective parts into effect,
constitutes the great striking and peculiar character of our system, and is
without example in ancient or modern times j and may be regarded as the
fundamental distribution of power under the system, and as constituting
its great conservative principle.

If we extend our eyes beyond, we shall find another striking division
between the power of the people and that of the government — between
that inherent, primitive, creative power which resides exclusively in the
people, and from which all authority is derived, and the delegated power
or trust conferred upon the government to effect the object of their cre
ation. If we look still beyond, we shall find another and most important
division. The people, instead of being united in one general community,
are divided into twenty-four states, each forming a distinct sovereign com
munity, and in which, separately, the whole power of the system ulti
mately resides.

If we examine how this ultimate power is called into action, we shall
find that its only organ is a primary assemblage of the people, known un
der the name of a convention, through which their sovereign will is an
nounced, and by which governments are formed and organized. If we
trace historically the exertion of this power in the formation of the gov
ernments constituting our system, we shall find that, originally, on the
separation of the thirteen colonies from the crown of Great Britain, each
state for itself, through its own convention, formed separate constitu
tions and governments, and that these governments, in turn, formed a
league or confederacy for the purpose of exercising those powers, in the
regulation of which the states had a common interest. But this confed
eracy, proving incompetent for its object, was superseded by the present
Constitution, which essentially changed the character of the system. If
we compare the mode of the adoption of this Constitution with that of
the adoption of original constitutions of the several states, we shall find
them precisely the same. In both, each state adopted the Constitution
through its own convention, by its separate act, each for itself, and is
only bound in consequence of its own adoption, without reference to the
adoption of any other state. The only point in which they can be dis
tinguished is the mutual compact, in which each state stipulated with the

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 157

other to adopt it as a common Constitution. Thus regarded, this Con
stitution is, in fact, the Constitution of each state. In Virginia, for in
stance, it is the Constitution of Virginia ; and so, too, this government,
and the laws which it enacts, are, within the limits of the state, the gov
ernment and the laws of the state. It is, in fact, the Constitution and gov
ernment of the whole, because it is the Constitution and government of
each part ; and not the Constitution and government of the parts because
it is of the whole. The system commences with the parts, and ends with
the whole. The parts are the units, and the whole the multiple, instead
of the whole being a unit and the parts the fractions. Thus viewed, each
state has two distinct Constitutions and governments — a separate Consti
tution and government, instituted, as I have stated, to regulate the object in
which each has a peculiar interest j and a general one to regulate the inter
ests common to all, and binding by a common compact the whole into one
community, in which the separate and independent existence of each
state as a sovereign community is preserved, instead of being fused into
a common mass.

Such is our system : such are its parts, and such their relation to each
other. I have stated no fact that can be questioned, nor have I omitted
any that is essential which I am capable of perceiving. In reviewing the
whole, we must be no less struck with the simplicity of the means by
which all are blended into one, than we are by the number and complex-
ity of the parts. I know of no system, in either respect, ancient or mod
ern, to be compared with it ; and can compare it to nothing but that sub
lime and beautiful system of which our globe constitutes a part, and to
which it bears in many particulars so striking a resemblance. In this sys
tem, this government, as we have seen, constitutes a part — a prominent,
•but a subordinate part, with defined, limited, and restricted powers.

I now repeat the question, Is the act which assumes for this government
the right to interpret, in the last resort, the extent of its powers, and to
enforce its interpretation against all other authority, consistent with our
institutions 1 To state the question is to answer it. We might with
equal propriety ask whether a government of unlimited power is consist
ent with one of enumerated and restricted powers. I say unlimited, for I .
would hold his understanding in low estimation who can make, practical
ly, any distinction between a government of unlimited powers, and one
which has an unlimited right to construe and enforce its powers as it
pleases; who does not see that, to divide power, and to give one of the
parties the exclusive right to determine what share belongs to him, is to
annihilate the division, and to vest the whole in him who possesses the
right 1 It would be no less absurd, than for one in private life to divide
his property with another, and vest in that other the absolute and uncon
ditional right to determine the extent of his share ; which would be, in
fact, to give him the whole. Nor could I think much more highly of the
understanding of him who does not perceive that this exclusive right, on
the part of this government, of determining the extent of its powers, ne
cessarily destroys all distinction between reserved and delegated powers;
and that it thus strikes a fatal blow at that fundamental distribution of
power which lies at the bottom of our system. It also, by inevitable con
sequence, destroys all distinction between constitutional and unconstitu
tional laws, making the latter to the full as obligatory as the former ; of
which we had a remarkable example when the act proposed to be repeal
ed was before the Senate. It is well known that the power in controver
sy between this government and the State of South Carolina had been
pronounced to be unconstitutional by the legislatures of most of the
Southern States, and also by many of the members of this body ; and yet

158 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

there were instances, however extraordinary it may appear, of members
of the body voting to enforce an act which they believed to be unconsti
tutional, and that, too, at the hazard of civil war. As strange as such a
course must appear, it was the natural and legitimate consequence of the
power which the act assumed for this government, and illustrates, in the
strongest manner imaginable, the truth of what I have advanced. But to
proceed. This unlimited right of judging as to its powers, not only de
stroys, as I have stated, all distinction between constitutional and uncon
stitutional acts, but merges in this government the very existence of the
separate governments of the states, by reducing them from that independ
ent and distinct existence, as co-governments, assigned to them in the
system, to mere subordinate and dependant bodies, holding their power
and existence at the mercy of this government. It stops not here — it an
nihilates the states themselves. The right which it assumes of trampling
upon the authority of a Convention of the people of the states, the only
organ through which the sovereignty of the states can exert itself, and to
look beyond the states to the individuals who compose them, and to treat
them as entirely destitute of all political character or power, is, in fact,
to annihilate the states, and to transfer their sovereignty, and all their
powers, to this government.

If we now raise our eyes, and direct them towards that once beautiful
system, with all its various, separate, and independent parts blended into
one harmonious whole, we must be struck with the mighty change ! All
have disappeared — gone — absorbed — concentrated and consolidated in this
government, which is left alone in the midst of the desolation of the sys
tem, the sole and unrestricted representative of an absolute and despotic
majority.

Will it be tolerated, that I should ask whether an act which has caused
so complete a revolution — which has entirely subverted our political sys
tem, as it emanated from the hands of its creators, and reared in its place
one in every respect so different — must not, in its consequences, prove fa
tal to the liberty and the happiness of these states 1 Can it be necessary
for me to prove that no other system that human ingenuity can devise,
or imagination conceive, but that which this fatal act has subverted, can
preserve the liberty or secure the happiness of the country 1 Need I show
that the most difficult problem which ever was presented to the mind of
a legislator to solve, was to devise a system of government for a country
of such vast extent, that should at once possess sufficient power to hold
the whole together, without, at the same time, proving fatal to liberty %
There never existed an example before of a free community spreading
over such an extent of territory ; and the ablest and profoundest thinkers,
at the time, believed it to be utterly impracticable that there should be.
Yet this difficult problem was solved — successfully solved, by the wise
and sagacious men who framed our Constitution. No : it was above un
aided human wisdom — above the sagacity of the most enlightened. It
was the result of a fortunate combination of circumstances, co-operating
and leading the way to its formation ; directed by that kind Providence
which has so often and so signally disposed events in our favour.

To solve this difficult problem, and to overcome the apparently insu
perable obstacle which it presents, required that peculiar division, distribu
tion, and organization of power which, as I have stated, so remarkably
distinguish our system, and which serve as so many breakwaters to ar
rest the angry waves of power, impelled by avarice and ambition, and
which, driven furiously over a broad and unbroken expanse, would be re
sistless. Of this partition and breaking up of power into separate parts,
the most remarkable division is that between the reserved and delegated

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 159

powers, which forms the basis on which this and the separate governments
of the states are organized, as the great and primary departments of the
system. It is this important division which mainly gives that expansive
character to our institutions, by means of which they have the capacity of
being spread over the vast extent of our country without exposing us on
the one side to the danger of disunion, or on the other to the loss of lib
erty. Without this happy device, the people of these states, after having
achieved their independence, would have been compelled to resolve them
selves into small and hostile communities, in despite of a common origin,
a common language, and the common renown and glory acquired by their
united wisdom and valour in the war of the Revolution, or have submitted
quietly to the yoke of despotic power as the only alternative.

In the place of this admirably-contrived system, the act proposed to be
repealed has erected one great consolidated government. Can it be ne
cessary for me to show what must be the inevitable consequences 1 Need
I prove that all consolidated governments — governments in which a sin
gle power predominates (for such is their essence) — are necessarily despot
ic, whether that power be wielded by the will of one man, or that of an
absolute and unchecked majority 1 Need I demonstrate that it is, on the
contrary, the very essence of liberty that the power should be so divided,
distributed, and organized, that one interest may check the other, so as
to prevent the excessive action of the separate interests of the communi
ty against each other ; on the principle that organized power can only be
checked by organized power 1

The truth of these doctrines was fully understood at the time of the
formation of this Constitution. It was then clearly foreseen and foretold
what must be the inevitable consequences of concentrating all the powers
of the system in this government. Yes, we are in a state predicted, fore
told, prophesied from the beginning. All the calamities we have expe
rienced, and those which are yet to come, are the result of trie consolida
ting tendency of the government ; and unless that tendency be arrested
— unless we reverse our steps, all that has been foretold will certainly
befall us — even to the pouring out of the last vial of wrath — military des
potism. To this fruitful source of woes may be traced that remarkable
decay of public virtue ; that rapid growth of corruption arid subserviency ;
that decline of patriotism ; that increase of faction ; that tendency to an
archy 5 and, finally, that visible approach of the absolute power of one man
which so lamentably characterizes the times. Should there be any one
seeing and acknowledging all these morbid and dangerous symptoms, but
should doubt whether the disease is to be traced to the cause which I
have assigned, I would ask him, To what other can it be attributed 1 There
is no event — no, not in the political or moral world, more than in the physi
cal — without an adequate cause. I would ask hip, Does he attribute it to
the people 1 to their want of sufficient intelligence and virtue for self-gov
ernment I If the true cause may be traced to them, very melancholy
would be our situation ; gloomy would be the prospect before us. If such
be the fact, that our people are, indeed, incapable of self-government, I
know of no people upon earth with whom we might not desire to change
condition. When the day comes when this people shall be compelled to
surrender self-government, a people so spirited and so long accustomed
to liberty, it will be indeed a day of revolution, of convulsion and blood,
such as has rarely, if ever, been witnessed in any age or country ; and,
until compelled by irresistible evidence, so fearful a cause cannot be ad
mitted.

Can it be attributed to the nature of our system of government 1 Shall
we pronounce it radically defective, and incapable of effecting the objects

160 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALIIOUN.

for which it was created 1 If that be, in truth, the case, our situation would
be, in fact, not much less calamitous than if attributable to the people. To
what other system could we resort 1 To a confederation 1 That has already
been tried, and has proved utterly inadequate. To consolidation 1 Rea
son and experience (as far as we have had experience) proclaim it to be
the worst possible form. But if the cause be not in the people or the
system, to what can it be attributed but to some misapprehension of the
nature and character of our institutions, and consequent misdirection of
their powers or functions 1 And if so, to what other misapprehension or
misdirection, but that which directed our system towards consolidation,
and consummated its movement in that direction in the act proposed to
be repealed 1 That such is the fact — that this is the true explanation of
all the symptoms of decay and corruption which I have enumerated — is,
in reality, our only consolation ; furnishes the only hope that can be ra
tionally entertained of extricating ourselves from our present calamity,
and of averting the still greater that are impending.

I know that there are those who take a different, but, in my opinion, a
very superficial view of the cause of our difficulties. They attribute it
exclusively to those who are in power, and see in the misconduct of Gen
eral Jackson the cause of all that has befallen us. That he has done much
to aggravate the evil, I acknowledge with pain. I had my full share of
responsibility in elevating him to power, and there once existed between
us friendly relations, personal and political, and I would rejoice had he so
continued to conduct himself as to advance the interests of the country,
and his own reputation and fame. He certainly might have effected
much good. He came into office under circumstances, and had a weight
of popularity which placed much in his power, for good or for evil ; but
either from a want of a just comprehension of the duties attached to the
situation in which he is placed, or an indisposition to discharge them, or
the improper influence and control of those who, unfortunately for the
country and for himself, have acquired, through flattery and subserviency,
an ascendency over him, he has disappointed the hopes of his friends, and
realized the predictions of his enemies. But the question recurs, How
happened it that he who has proved himself so illy qualified to fill the
high station that he occupies, was elected by the people 1 If it be attrib
uted to a misapprehension of his qualifications, or to an undue gratitude
for distinguished military services, which at times leads astray the most
intelligent and virtuous people in the selection of rulers — how shall we
explain his re-election, after he had actually proved himself so incompe
tent ; after he had violated every pledge which he had made previous to
election ; after he had disregarded the principles on which he had permit
ted his friends and partisans to place his elevation, and had outraged the
feelings of the community by attempting to regulate the domestic inter
course and relations of Society ! Shal. we say that the feelings of grat
itude for military services outweighed all this 1 or that the people, with
all this experience, were incapable of forming a correct opinion of his con
duct or character, or of understanding the tendency of the measures of
his administration 1 To assert this would be neither more nor less than
to assert that they have neither the intelligence nor the virtue for self-
government ; as the very criterion by which their capacity in that respect
is tested, is their ability duly to appreciate the character and conduct of
public rulers, and the true tendency of their public measures ; and to ad
mit their incapacity in that respect would, in fact, bring us back to the
people as the cause.

To understand truly how the distinguished individual now at the head
of the nation was elevated to this exalted station, in despite of his ac-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 161

knowledged defects in several respects, and how he has retained his
power among an intelligent and patriotic people, notwithstanding all the
objections to his administration that have been stated, we must elevate
our views from the individual, and his qualifications and conduct, to the
working of the system itself, by which only we can come to a knowledge
of the true cause of our present condition ; how we have arrived at it,
and by what means we can extricate ourselves from its dangers and diffi
culties. I do not deem it necessary, in taking this view, to go back and
trace the operation of our government from the commencement, or to
point out the departure from its true principles from the beginning, with
the evils thence resulting, however interesting and instructive the inves
tigation might be. I might show that from the first, beginning with the
formation of the Constitution, there were two parties in the Convention :
one in favour of a national, or, what is the same thing, a consolidated
government, and the other in favour of the confederative principle j how
the latter, from being in the minority at first, gradually, and after a long
struggle, gained the ascendency ; and how the fortunate result of that as
cendency terminated in the establishment of that beautiful, complex, fed
erative system of government which I have attempted to explain.

I might show that the struggle between the two parties did not termi
nate with the adoption of the Constitution ; that after it went into opera
tion the national party gained the ascendency in the counsels of the na
tion ; and that the result of that ascendency was to give an impulse to the
government in the direction which their principles led, and from which
it never afterward recovered. I a;n far from attributing this to any sin
ister design. The party were not less distinguished for patriotism than
for ability, and no doubt honestly intended to give the system a fair trial;
but they would have been more than men, if their attachment to a favour
ite plan had not biased their feelings and judgment. I (said Mr. C.)
avail myself of the occasion to avow my high respect for both of the
great parties which divided the country in its early history. They were
both eminently honest and patriotic, and the preference which each gave
to its respective views resulted from a zealous attachment to the public
interest. At that early period, before there was any experience as to the
operation of the system, it is not surprising that one should believe that
the danger was a tendency to anarchy, while the other be^'eved it to be
towards despotism, and that these different theoretical vi^ws should hon
estly have a decided influence on their public conduct.

I pass over the intermediate events : the reaction pgainst the national,
or, as it was then called, federal party — the elevatiri of Mr. Jefferson in
consequence of that reaction in 1801 — and the gradual departure (from
the influence of power) of the Republican party torn the principles which
brought them into office. I come down at once to the year eighteen hun
dred and twenty-four, when a protective tariff was for the first time adopt
ed ; when the power to impose duties, grafted for the purpose of raising
revenue, was converted into an instrument of regulating, controlling, and
organizing the entire capital and industry of the country, and placing them
under the influence of this government ; and when the principles of con
solidation gained an entire ascendency in both houses of Congress. Its
first fruit was to give a sectional potion to the government, and, of course,
a sectional character to political parties — arraying the non-exporting states^
against the exporting, and the IVorthern against the Southern section.

It is my wish to speak of tAe events to which I feel myself compelled
to refer, in illustration of ihe practical operation of that consolidating
tendency of the government, which was consummated by the act pro-
posed to be repealed, and which I believe to be the cause of all our evils

X

162 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

with the greatest possible moderation. I know how delicate a task it .is
to speak of recent political events, and of the actors concerned in them ;
and I would, on this occasion, gladly avoid so painful a duty, if I did not
believe that truth and public interest require it. Without a full under
standing of the events of this period, from '24< down to the present time,
it is impossible that we can have a just knowledge of the cause of our
present' condition, or a clear perception of the means of remedying it.
To avoid all personal feeling, I shall endeavour to recede, in imagination,
a century from the present time, and from that distant position regard the
events to which I allude, in that spirit of philosophical inquiry by which an.
earnest seeker after truth, at so remote a day, may be supposed to be ac
tuated. I feel I may be justified in speaking with the less reserve of these
events, as the great question which, during the greater part of the period,
so deeply agitated the country (the protective tariff), may now be consid
ered as terminated in the adjustment of the last winter, never to be re-
agitated, as I trust ; and, of course, may be spoken of with the freedom of
a past event.

But to proceed with the narrative : the presidential contest, which was
terminated the next year, placed the executive department under the con
trol of the same interest that controlled the legislative, so that all depart
ments of this government were united in favour of that great interest.
The successful termination of the election in favour of the individual then
elevated to the chief magistracy, and for whom 1 then and now entertain,
kind feelings, may be attributed in part, no doubt, to the predominance
of the tariff interest, and may be considered as the first instance of the
predominance of that interest in a presidential contest.

Let us pause at this point (it is an important one), in order to survey
the state of public affairs at that juncture. In casting our eyes over the
scene, we find the country divided into two great hostile and sectional
parties — placed in conflict on a question, believed to be on both sides of
vital importance, in reference to their respective interests ; and, on the
side of the weaker party, believed, in addition, to involve a constitutional
question of the greatest magnitude, and having a direct,, and important
bearing on the duration of the liberty "and Constitution of the country. In
this conflict, we find both houses of Congress, with the chief magistrate,
and, of cour&e, the government itself, on the side of the dominant interest,
and identified vith it in principles and feelings. In this state of things, a
great and solem* question, What ought to be done 1 was forced on the
decision of the minority. Shall we acquiesce, or shall we oppose 1 and if
oppose, how 1 To Acquiesce quietly would be to subject the property
and industry of an entVe section of the country to an unlimited and indef
inite exaction ; as it vva^ openly avowed that the protective system could
only be perfected by beiLo- carried to the point of prohibition on all ar
ticles of which a sufficient supply could be made or manufactured in the
country. To submit under sech circumstances would have been, accord
ing to our view of the subject, a gross dereliction both of interest and
duty. It was impossible. But \iow' could the majority be successfully-
opposed, possessed, as they were, o? every department of the government I
How, in this state of things, could *he minority effect a change in their
favour through the ordinary operation* of the government 1 They could
effect no favourable change in this or the other house — the majority in
*both but too faithfully represented what vheir constituents believed to be
the interest of their section, to whom only and not to us, they were re
sponsible. The only branch of the government, then, on which the mi
nority could act, and through which they could hope to effect a favourable
change, was the executive. The President is elected by a majority of

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUtf. 163

the whole electoral votes, and, of course, the minority have a weight in his
election, in proportion to their number and the unity of their voice. Here
was all our hope, and to this point all our efforts to effect a change were
necessarily directed j but even here our power of acting with effect was
limited to a narrow circle. It would have been hopeless to present a can
didate openly and fully identified with our own interest. Defeat would have
been the certain result, had his acknowledged qualifications for intelli
gence, experience, and patriotism been ever so great. We were thus
forced by inevitable consequence — neither to be avoided nor resisted — to
abandon the contest, or to select a candidate who, at best, was but a
choice of evils j one whose opinions were intermediate or doubtful on.
the subject which divided the two sections. However great the hazard,
or the objections to such a selection for such an office, it must be char
ged, not to us, but to that action of the system which compelled us to
make the choice— compelling us by that consolidating tendency which
had drawn under the control of this government the local and reserved
powers belonging to the states separately ; the exercise of which had ne
cessarily given that direction to its action, that created and placed in con
flict the two great sectional, political parties.

But it was not sufficient that the opinion of our candidate should not
be fully in coincidence with our own. That alone could not be sufficient
to ensure his success. It was necessary that he should have great per
sonal popularity, distinct from political ; to be, in a wor^, a successful
military chieftain, which gives a popularity the most extensive, and the
least affected by political considerations ; and this w=s another fruit — a
necessary fruit of consolidation. To these recommendations others must
be added, in order to conciliate the feelings of the wiinority — that he should
be identified, for instance, with them in interest, possess the same prop
erty, and pursue the same industry. These qualifications, all of which
were made indispensable by the juncture, pointed clearly to one man, and
but one, General Jackson. There was, however, another circumstance
which gave him great prominence arU strength, and which greatly con
tributed to recommend him as the opposing candidate. He had been de
feated in the presidential contest before the House of Eepresentatives
(though returned with the highest vote) under circumstances which were
supposed to involve a disregard of the public voice. I do not deem it
necessary to enter into an inquiry as to the principles which controlled
the election, or as to the view of the actors in that scene. Many con
siderations doubtless governed, and, among others, the feelings of prom
inent irfdividuals in reference to the candidates, and their opinion of their
respective qualifications, besides the one to which I have alluded— that of
giving to the dominant interest that control over the executive which
they had over the legislative department.

These combined motives, as I have stated, pointed distinctly to Gen
eral Jackson. He was selected as the candidate of the minority, and the
canvass entered into with all that zeal which belonged to the magnitude
of the stake, united with the consciousness of honest and patriotic pur
pose. The leading objects were to effect a great political reform, and to
arrest, if possible, what we believed to be a dangerous, and felt to be an
oppressive action of the government. It is true that the qualifications of
the individual, thus necessarily selected, were believed to be, in many im
portant particulars, defective ; that he lacked experience, extensive polit
ical information, and a command of temper ; but it was believed that his
firmness of purpose, and his natural sagacity, by calling to his aid the ex
perience, the talents, and patriotism of those who supported his claims,
would compensate for these defects.

164 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

I do not deem it necessary to enter into a history of this interesting
and animated canvass ; but there is one circumstance attendino- it so
striking, so full of instruction, and so illustrative of the point under con
sideration, that I cannot pass it in silence. The canvass soon ran into
the great and absorbing question of the day, as all ordinary diseases run
into the prevailing one. Those in power sought to avail themselves of
the popularity of the system with which they were identified. I speak
it not in censure. It was natural, perhaps unavoidable, as connected with
the morbid action of the government. That portion of our allies iden
tified with the same interest were in like manner, and from the same
motive and cause, forced into a rivalry of zeal for the same interest. The
result of these causes, combined with a monopolizing spirit of the protect
ive system, was the tariff of eighteen hundred and twenty-eight : that
disastrous measure, which has brought so many calamities upon us, and
put in peril the Union and liberty of the country. It poured millions into
the treasury, beyond even the most extravagant wants of the government j
and which, on the payment of the public debt, caused that hazardous junc
ture, resulting from a large undisposable surplus revenue, which has
spread such deep corruption in every direction.

This disastrous event opened our eyes (I mean myself, and those imme
diately connected with me) as to the full extent of the danger and op
pression of the protective system, and the hazard of failing to effect the
reform intended through the election of General Jackson. With these
disclosures, it Vecame necessary to seek some other ultimate, but more
certain measure oC protection. We turned to the Constitution to find this
remedy. We directed a more diligent and careful scrutiny into its pro
visions, in order to ascertain fully the nature and character of our polit
ical system. We found * certain and effectual remedy in that great fun
damental division of the powers of the system between this government
and its independent co-deptuctments : the separate government of the
states, to be called into action to arrest the unconstitutional acts of this
government, by the interposition of the state — the paramount source
from which both governments derive their power. But in relying on this
as our ultimate remedy, we did not abate our zeal in the presidential
canvass; we still hoped that General Jackson, if elected, would effect the
necessary reform, and thereby supersede the necessity for calling into
action the sovereign authority of the state, which we were anxious to
avoid. With these views, the two were pushed with equal zeal at the
same time ; which double operation commenced in the fall of eighteen
hundred and twenty-eight, but a few months after the passage of "the Tar
iff Act of that year ; and at the meeting of the Legislature of the State,
at the same period, a paper, known as the South Carolina Exposition, was
reported to that body, containing a full development, as, well on the con
stitutional point, as the operation of the protective system, preparatory
to a state of things which might eventually render the action of the state
necessary in order to protect her rights and interests, and to stay a course
of policy which we believed would, if not arrested, prove destructive of
liberty and the Constitution. This movement on the part of the state
places beyond all controversy the true character of the motives which
governed us in the presidential canvass. We were not the mere partisans
of the candidate we supported. We aimed at a far more exalted object
than his election — the defence of the rights of the state, and the security
of liberty and of the Constitution. To this we held his election entirely
subordinate. This we pursued, unwarped by selfish or ambitious views.

The contest terminated in the elevation of him who now presides j but
it soon became apparent that our apprehensions that we might be dis-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 165

appointed in the expected reform, was not without foundation. That oc
curred, which we ought, perhaps, to have expected, and which, under
similar circumstances, has rarely failed to follow. He who was elevated
to power proved to be more solicitous to retain what he had acquired
than to fulfil the expectation of those who had honestly contributed to his
elevation, with a view to political reform. The tale may be readily told:
not a promise fulfilled — not a measure adopted to correct the abuses of
the system — not a step taken to arrest the progress of consolidation, and
to restore the confederative principles of our government — not a look cast
to the near approach of the payment of the public debt — nor an effort
made to reduce gradually the duties, in order to prevent a surplus revenue,
and to save the manufactures which had grown up under the protective
system, from the hazard of a shock caused by a sudden reduction of the
duties. All were forgotten; and, instead of attempting to control events,
the executive was only solicitous to occupy a position the most propitious
to retain and increase his power. It required but little penetration to see
that the position sought was a middle one between the contending parties :
to be identified with no principle or policy, and rely on the personal pop
ularity of the incumbent, and the power and patronage of the government,
as the means of support. Hence a third party was formed, a personal
and government party, made up of those who were attached to the person,
and the fortunes of a successful political chief. In a word, we had ex
hibited to our view, for the first time under our system, that most danger
ous spectacle, in a country like ours, a prerogative party, who take their
creed wholly from the mandate of their chief. The times were eminently
propitious for the formation of such a party. Millions were poured into
the treasury by the high protective duties of eighteen hundred and
twenty-eight, furnishing an overflowing fund to secure the services of ex
pectants and partisans. Against these superabundant means of power
there was not, nor could there be, as things were situated, any effective
resistance, all being necessarily withdrawn in consequence of the fierce
contest between the two sections which continued to rage with increasing
violence, and which wasted the strength of the parties on each other, in
stead of opposing the rapidly-increasing power of the executive. This,
and not the personal or the military popularity of General Jackson, is the
true explanation of the fact, which has struck so many with wonder, that
no misconduct, that no neglect of duty nor perversions of the power of
government, however gross, has been able to shake his power and pop
ularity ; and that the people have looked idly on, apparently bereaved of
every patriotic sentiment, or joined to swell the tide of power with shouts
of approbation at every act, however outrageous. I do not doubt that his
personal popularity, arising from his military achievements, contributed
much to his elevation (in fact, it was one of the elements, as stated, which
governed his selection as a candidate), and to sustain him while in power;
but I feel a perfect conviction that, whatever advantage he has gained
from this source, has been more than counterbalanced by the mismanage
ment and blunders of his administration, and that it would be equally dif
ficult to expel from power any individual of sagacity and firmness, in
possession of that department, under the circumstances which he has held
it. Let us learn, from the instructive history of this interesting period,
that despotic power, under our system, commences with usurpation of
this government on the reserved powers of the states, and terminates in
the concentration of all the powers of this government in the person of a
chief magistrate ; and that, unless the first be resisted, the latter follows
by a necessary, resistless, and inevitable law, as much so as that which
governs the movements of the solar system.

166 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

As soon as it was perceived that he whom we had elevated to office
was, as I have stated, more intent to retain and augment his power than
to meet the just expectations on which he was supported, we totally de
spaired of relief and reform through the ordinary action of this govern
ment, and separated, from that moment, from the administration j with
drew from the political contest here, and concentrated all our energies on
that ultimate remedy which we had taken the precaution to prepare, in
order to be called into action in the event of things taking the direction
which they have.

An active discussion followed in the state, in which the principles and
character of our political institutions were fully investigated, and a clear
perception of the danger to which the. country was exposed was impress
ed upon the public mind. Still the determination was fixed not to act
while there was a ray of hope of redress from the government ; and we
accordingly waited the approach of the final payment of the public debt,
when all pretexts for keeping up the extravagant duties of eighteen hun
dred and twenty-eight would cease. The near approach of that event
caused the passage of the act of eighteen hundred and thirty-two, which
was proclaimed on both sides, by the opposition and the administration,
to be a final and permanent adjustment of the protective system. We
felt every disposition to acquiesce in any reasonable adjustment, but
it was impossible, consistently with our views of the nature of our rights,
and the consequences involved in the contest, to submit to the act. The
protective principle was fully maintained; the reduction was small, and
the distribution of the burden between the two sections more unequal than
under the act of eighteen hundred and twenty-eight. Every effort was
made to magnify the amount of reduction. With that view false and de-
ceptious calculations were made, and that, too, in official documents, in
order to make the impression that the revenue would be reduced to the
legitimate wants of the government, or, at least, nearly so. We were not
to be imposed upon by such calculations. We clearly perceived that the
income would be at least from twenty-two to twenty-five millions of dol
lars, nearly double what the government ought to expend ; and we as
clearly saw how much so large a permanent surplus must contribute to
corrupt the country and undermine our political institutions. Seeing
this, with a prospect of an indefinite continuance of the heavy and useless
tax levied in the shape of duties, the state interposed, and by that inter
position prepared to arrest within its limits the operation of the protective
system — interposed, not to dissolve the Union, as was calumniously
charged, but to compel an adjustment here or through a convention of the
states, or, if an adjustment could not be had through either, to compel
the government to abandon the protective system.

The moment was portentous. Our political system rocked to the
centre. Whatever diseases existed within, engendered by long corrup
tion and abuse, were struck to the surface. The proclamation and the
message of the President appeared, containing doctrines never before
officially avowed — going far beyond the extreme tenets of the Federal
party, and in direct conflict with all that had ever been entertained by the
Republican party ; and yet, such was the corruption, such the subserviency
to power, that both parties, forgetting the past, abandoning every political
principle, however sacred or long entertained, rushed to the embrace of
the new creed — suddenly, instantly, without the slightest hesitation.
Never did a free people exhibit so degraded a spectacle ; give such evi
dence of the loose attachment to principle, or greater subserviency to
power. At this moment the current of events tended towards despotic
authority in the person of the chief magistrate on one side, and to dis-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 167

union on the other : on one side to clothe the President with power more
than dictatorial, in order to maintain the ascendency of the protective
system ; and, on the other, to resist the loss of liberty at every hazard.
Fortunately for the country, there was at the time in the councils of the
nation an individual who had the highest weight of authority with the
supporters of that system — one who had done more to advance it than
any other — who was the most intimately identified with it, and to whom,
of course, the task of adjustment most appropriately belonged. For
tunately, also, he had the disposition and the fortitude to undertake it.
An adjustment followed; the crisis of our disease was passed ; the body
politic from that moment became convalescent ; the tendency to despotic
power in the executive was weakened — doubly weakened — by enabling
those who had been so long wasting their strength in mutual conflict, to
unite in resisting the usurpation of that department, as we this day behold
on the question of the deposites ; and by diminishing the revenue — the
food on which it had grown to such enormous dimensions. In a short
time the decreasing scale of duties will cause the effect of this diminution
to be felt : a period that will be hastened by that profuse and profligate
disbursement which has nearly doubled the public expenditure, and which
is so rapidly absorbing the surplus revenue.

I have said that the crisis is passed; yet there remains some trouble
some and even dangerous symptoms, growing out of the former cause of
the disease, which, however, may be overcome by skill and decision; un
less, indeed, they should run into the lurking cause of another, and most
dangerous disease, with which it is intimately connected, and excite it
into action ; I mean the rotten state of the currency. There are indica
tions of a very dangerous and alarming character of this tendency, at the
point where the currency is the most disordered. I refer to the measure
now pending before the Legislature of New-York, to pledge the capital
and the industry of the state, to the amount of six millions of dollars, in
support of the banks — a measure of a kind that a British minister (Lord
Althorp), with all the power of Parliament to support him, refused to adopt,
because of its dangerous and corrupting tendency.

Let us now turn, and inquire, What would have been the course of
events if the state had not interposed, and things had been permitted to
take their natural course 1 The act of eighteen hundred and thirty-two
was proclaimed, as I have stated, on both sides, to be a final settlement
of the tariff question, and, of course, was intended to be a permanent law
of the land. The revenue, as I have already stated, under that act,
and the sales of public lands, would, in all probability, be not less than
twenty-live millions of dollars per annum : a sum exceeding the legiti
mate wants of the government, estimated on a liberal scale, by ten or
eleven millions of dollars. Now, I ask, What would have been our situa
tion, with so large an annual surplus, and a fierce sectional conflict raging
between the Northern and Southern portions of the Union 1 If we find it
so difficult to resist the usurpation of the executive department with a
temporary surplus revenue, to continue at most but for one or two years,
how much more difficult would it have been to resist with a permanent
surplus such as I have stated 1 If we find it so difficult to resist that de
partment when those who have been separated by the tariff are united,
how utterly hopeless would have been the prospect of resistance were
that question now open, and those who are now united against executive
encroachments were exhausting their strength against each other 1 Is
it not obvious that the executive power, under such circumstances, would
have been irresistible, and that we should have been impelled rapidly to
despotism or disunion 1 One or the other would certainly have been our

368 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

fate, if events had been permitted to move in the channel in which they
were then flowing, and despotism much more probably than disunion.
It is almost without example that free states should be disunited in con
sequence of the violence of internal conflicts ; but very numerous are the
cases in which such conflicts have terminated in the establishment of de
spotic power. The danger of disunion is small ; that of despotism great.
We have, however, I trust, escaped, for the present, the danger of both,
for which we are indebted to that great conservative principle of our sys
tem, which considers this government and that of the states as co-depart
ments 5 and which proved successful, although rejected by every state but
one, and although called into action on the most trying occasion that can
be imagined, and under the most adverse circumstances.

1 said that the danger has passed for the present. The seeds of the
disease still remain in the system. The act which I propose to repeal
accompanied the adjustment of the tariff. It was passed solely on the
ground of recognising the principles in which it originated, and to estab
lish them, as far as an act of Congress could do so, as the permanent law
of the land. While these seeds remain, it will be in vain to expect a
healthy state of the body politic: alienation, the loss of confidence, sus
picion, jealousy, on the part of the weaker section at least, who have ex
perienced the bitter fruits that* spring from those principles, must accom
pany the movements of this government. But these seeds will not remain,
in the system without germinating. Unless removed, the genius of con
solidation will again exhibit itself; but in what form, whether in revival
of the question from whose dangers we have not yet wholly escaped ;
whether between North and South, East and West ; whether between the
slaveholding and the non-slaveholding states ; the rich and poor, or the
capitalists and the operatives, it is not for me to say ; but that it will
again revive (unless, by your votes, you expunge the act from your statute-
book), to divide, distract, and corrupt the community, is certain. Nor is
it much less so that, when it again revives, it will pass through all those
stages which we have witnessed, and, in all human probability, consum
mate itself, arid terminate, finally, in a military despotism. Keverse the
scene — let the act be obliterated forever from among our laws ; let the
principle of consolidation be forever suppressed, and that admirable and
beautiful federative system, which I have so imperfectly portrayed, be
firmly established, and renovated health and vigour will be restored to the
body politic, and our country may yet realize that permanent state of
liberty, prosperity, and greatness, which we all once so fondly hoped was
our allotted destiny.

x.

A REPORT ON THE EXTENT OF EXECUTIVE PATRONAGE, FEBRUARY 9, 1835

The Select Committee appointed to inquire into the extent of the executive patron
age ; the circumstances which have contributed to its great increase of late ; the
expediency and practicability of reducing the same, and the means of such re
duction, have bestowed on the subjects into which they were directed to inquire
that deliberate attention which their importance demands, and submit, as the re
sult of their investigation, the following report, -in part :

To ascertain the extent of executive patronage, the first subject to which the
resolution directs the attention of the committee, it becomes necessary to as-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 169

certain previously the amount of the revenue and the expenditure, and the number
of officers, agents, and persons in the employment of the government, or who
receive money from the public treasury, all of which, taken collectively, consti
tute the elements of which patronage is mainly composed.

As the returns of the revenue and expenditure for the year 1834 are not yet
completed, your committee have selected the year 1833 as being the last of
which complete and certain returns can be obtained.

The result of their investigation on all these points will be found in a table an
nexed to the report, which contains a statement of the gross amount of the rev
enue under the various heads of customs, lands, postoffice, and miscellaneous,
for the year 1833 ; the expenditures for the same period, arranged under the va
rious heads of appropriations, the number of officers, agents, contractors, and
persons in the employment of the government, or who receive money from the
public treasury. From this table it appears that the aggregate amount of the
revenue for the year was $35,298,426, and of the disbursements $22,713,755;
that the number of officers, agents, and persons in the employment of the gov
ernment is 60,294 : of which there belong to the civil list, including persons
in civil employ, attached to the army and navy, 12,144 ; to the military and In
dian department, 9643 ; to the navy, including marine corps, 6499 ; to the post-
office, 31,917 ; all of whom hold their places directly or indirectly from the ex
ecutive, and, with the exception of the judicial officers, are liable to be dismiss
ed at his pleasure. If to the above there be added 39,5^9 pensioners, we shall
have a grand total of 100,079 persons who are in the employ of the govern
ment, or dependant directly on the public treasury.

But, as great as is this number, it gives a very imperfect conception of the
sum-total of those who, as furnishing supplies or otherwise, are connected with,
and more or less dependant on, the government, and, of course, liable to be in
fluenced by its patronage, the number of whom, with their dependants, cannot
even be conjectured. If to these be added the almost countless host of expect
ants who are seeking to displace those in office, or to occupy their places as
they become vacant, all of whom must look to the executive for the gratification
of their wishes, some conception may be formed of the immense number sub
ject to the influence of executive patronage.

But to ascertain the full extent of this influence, and the prodigious control
which it exerts over public opinion and the movements of the government, we
must, in addition to the amount, of the revenue and expenditure, and the num
ber of persons dependant upon the government, or in its employ, take into
the estimate a variety of circumstances which contribute to add to the force and
extent of patronage. These, in the regular course of the investigation, would
next claim the attention of your committee ; but as all, or, at least, a far greater
part of them, are of recent origin, they will properly fall under the next head to
which the resolution directs the attention of your committee, and which they
will now proceed to investigate.

Among the circumstances which have contributed to the great increase of
executive patronage of late, the most prominent, doubtless, are the great increase
of the expenditure of the government, which, within the last eight years (from,
1825 to 1833), has risen from $11,490,460 to $22,713,755, not including pay
ments on account of the public debt : a corresponding increase of officers, agents,
contractors, and others, dependant on the government ; the vast quantity ot land
to which the Indian title has, in the same period, been extinguished, and which
has been suddenly thrown into the market, accompanied with the patronage in
cident to holding Indian treaties, and removing the Indians to the west of the
Mississippi, and also a great increase of the number and influence of survey
ors, receivers, registers, and others employed in the branch of the administra
tion connected with the public lands ; all of which have greatly increased the
influence of executive patronage over an extensive region, and that the most

Y

170 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

growing and flourishing portion of the Union. In this connexion, the recent
practice of the government must be taken into estimate, of reserving to individ-
aal Indians a large portion of the best land of the country, to which the title of
the nation is extinguished, to be disposed of under the sanction of the execu
tive, on the recommendation of agents appointed solely by him, and which has
prevailed to so great an extent of late, especially in the Southwestern section
of the Union.

It is difficult to imagine a device better calculated to augment the patronage
of the executive, and, with it, to give rise to speculations calculated to deprave
and corrupt the community, without benefit to the Indians. But as greatly as
these causes have added to the force of patronage of late, there are others of a
different nature, which have contributed to give it a far greater and more dan
gerous influence. At the head of these should be placed the practice so great
ly extended, if not for the first time introduced, of removing from office persons
well qualified, and who had faithfully performed their duty, in order to fill their
places with those who are recommended on the ground that they belong to the
party in power.

Your committee feel that they are touching ground which may be considered
•of a party character, and which, were it possible consistently with the discharge
©f their duty, they would wholly avoid, as their object is to inquire into facts
©nly, as contributing to increase the patronage of the executive, without looking
to intention, or desiring to cast censure on those in power ; but while they
would cautiously avoid any remark of a party character, as inconsistent with the
gravity of the subject, and incompatible with the intention of the Senate in di-
jccting the inquiry, they trust that they are incapable of shrinking from the per
formance of the important and solemn duty confided to them, of thoroughly in
vestigating to the bottom a subject involving, as they believe, the fate of our po
litical institutions and the liberty of the country, by declining to investigate, fully
and freely, as regards its character and consequence, every measure or practice
of the government connected with the inquiry, whether ft has or has not been
a subject of party controversy.

In speaking of the practice of removing from office on party ground as of re
cent date, and, of course, comprehended under the causes which have, of late,
contributed to the increase of executive patronage, your committee are aware
that cases of such removals may be found in the early stages of the govern-
jnent ; but they are so few, and exercised so little influence, that they may be
said to constitute instances rather than as, forming a practice. It is only within
the last few years that removals from office have been introduced as a system ;
and for the first time, an opportunity has been afforded of testing the tendency
of the practice, and witnessing the mighty increase which it has given to the
force of executive patronage ; and the entire and fearful change, in conjunction
with other causes, it is effecting in the character of our political system. Nor
will it require much reflection to perceive in what manner it contributes to in
crease so vastly the extent of executive patronage.

So long as offices were considered as public trusts, to be conferred on the
honest, the faithful, and capable, for the common good, and not for the benefit
or gain of the incumbent or his party, and so long as it was the practice of the
government to continue in office those who faithfully performed their duties, its
patronage, in point of fact, was limited to the mere power of nominating to ac
cidental vacancies or to newly-created offices, and could, of course, exercise but a
moderate influence, either over the body of the community, or of the office-hold
ers themselves ; but when this practice was reversed — when offices, instead of
being considered as publiq trusts, to be conferred on the deserving, were regard
ed as the spoils of victory, to be bestowed as rewards for partisan services,
without respect to merit ; when it came to be understood that all who hold of
fice hold by the tenure of partisan zeal and party service, it is easy to see that

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 171

the certain, direct, and inevitable tendency of such a state of things is to convert
the entire body of those in office into corrupt and supple instruments of power,
and to raise up a host of hungry, greedy, and subservient partisans, ready for
every service, however base and corrupt. Were a premium offered for the best
means of extending to the utmost the power of patronage ; to destroy the love
of country, and to substitute a spirit of subserviency and man-worship ; to en
courage vice and discourage virtue ; and, in a word, to prepare for the subver
sion of liberty and the establishment of despotism, no scheme more perfect could
be devised ; and such must be the tendency of the practice, with whatever in
tention adopted, or to whatever extent pursued.

As connected with this portion of the inquiry, your committee cannot avoid
adverting to the practice, similar in its character and tendency, growing out of
the act of the 15th of May, 1820, which provides, among other things, that,
from and after its passage, all district attorneys, collectors, and other disbur
sing officers therein mentioned, to be appointed under the laws of the United
States, shall be appointed for the term of four years. The object of Congress
in passing this act was, doubtless, to enforce a more faithful performance of
duty on the part of the disbursing officers, by withholding reappointments
from those who had not faithfully discharged their duty, without intending
to reject those who had. At first the practice conformed to the intention of
the law, and thereby the good intended was accomplished, without material
ly increasing the patronage of the executive ; but a very great change has fol
lowed, which has, in the opinion of your committee, defeated the object of
the act, and, at the same time, added greatly to the influence of patronage.
Faithful performance of duty no longer ensures a renewal of appointment. The
consequence is inevitable : a feeling of dependance on the executive, on the
part of the incumbent, increasing as his term approaches its end, with a great
increase of the number of those who desire his place, followed by an active com
petition between the occupant and those who seek his place, accompanied by
all those acts of compliance and subserviency by which power is conciliated ;
and, of course, with a corresponding increase of the number of those influenced
by the executive will.

In enumerating the causes which have, of late, increased executive patronage,
your committee cannot, without a dereliction of duty, pass over one of very re
cent origin, although they are aware that it is almost impossible to allude to it,
in the most delicate manner, without exciting feelings of a party character, which
they are sincerely anxious to avoid : they refer to the increased power which
late events have given to the executive over the public funds, and, with it, the
currency of the country.

In considering this part of the subject of their inquiry, it is the intention of
the committee to confine themselves exclusively to the tendency of the events
to which they refer as increasing executive patronage, avoiding all allusion to
motives, or to the legality of the acts in question.

Whatever diversity of opinion may exist as to the expediency or the legality
of removing the deposites, there can, it is supposed, be none as to the fact that
the removal has, as things now stand, increased the power and patronage of
the executive in reference to the public funds. They are now, in point of fact,
under his sole and unlimited control ; and may, at his pleasure, be withdrawn
from the banks where he has ordered them to be deposited, be placed in other
banks, or in the custody of whomsoever he may choose to select, without limit
ation or restriction ; arid must continue subject to his sole will, till placed, by
an act of Congress, under the custody of the laws. Whether any provision can
be devised which would place them as much beyond the control of the execu
tive in their present as they were in their former place of deposite, and which,
at the same time, would not endanger their safety, are points on which your com
mittee do not deem it necessary to venture an opinion. What addition this un-

172 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

limited control over the public funds, from the time of their collection till that
of their expenditure, makes to the patronage of the executive, is difficult to es
timate. According to the report of the Secretary of the Treasury, the amount
of the public funds in deposite on the 1st of January, 1834, was $11,702,905 ;
and their estimated amount, on the 31st of December last, was $8,695,981 ;
making an average amount for the year of $10,199,443, the use of which, con
sidering the permanency of the deposites, may be estimated as not of less value
to the banks in which they were deposited than four per cent. ; making, at that
rate, on the average amount in deposite, the sum of $407,977 per annum. This
immense gain to these powerful and influential monopolies depends upon the
will and pleasure of the executive, and must give him a corresponding control
over them ; but this, of itself, affords a very imperfect view of the extent of his
patronage, dependant on his control over the public deposites. To ascertain its
full extent, the advantages which these banks have, in consequence of the de
posites, in circulating their notes and in dealing in exchanges, and the compe
tition which it must excite among the banks generally to supplant each other in.
these advantages, and, of course, in executive favour, on which they depend,
and which must tend to create, on their part, a universal spirit of dependance
and subserviency ; the means which the deposites necessarily afford to raise or
depress at pleasure the value of the stock of this or that bank ; and the wide
field which is consequently opened to the initiated partisans of power for the
accumulation of fortunes by speculations in bank stock ; the facility which all
these causes combined must give to political favourites in obtaining bank accom
modations ; and, finally, the control which the accompanying power of desig
nating the notes of what banks may, and what may not, be received in the pub
lic dues, gives to the executive over these institutions, must be taken into the
estimate, to form a correct opinion of the full force of this tremendous engine of
power and influence, wielded, as things now stand, by the will of a single in
dividual.

Your committee have now enumerated the principal causes which have of
late contributed to increase so greatly the patronage of the executive. There
are others still remaining to be noticed, which have greatly contributed to this
increase, and which claim the most serious consideration ; but, as they are of
an incidental character, it is proposed to consider them in their proper connex
ion, in a subsequent part of this report. Having completed, under its proper
head, the inquiry as to the extent of executive patronage, and the cause of its
recent increase, your committee will next proceed to investigate the deeply-in
teresting questions of the expediency and practicability of its reduction.

In considering the question of the expediency of its reduction, your commit
tee do not deem it necessary to enter into an elaborate argument to prove that
patronage, at best, is but a necessary evil ; that its tendency, where it is not
effectually checked and regulated, is to debase and corrupt the community ;
and that it is, of course, a fundamental maxim in all states having free and pop
ular institutions, that no more should be tolerated than is necessary to maintain,
the proper efficacy of government. How little this principle, so essential to
the preservation of liberty in popular governments, has been respected under
ours, the view which has already been presented of the vast extent to which
patronage has already attained under this government, and its rapid growth, but
too clearly demonstrate. But as great and as rapid as has been its growth, it
may be thought by some who have not duly reflected upon the subject, that it
is. not more than sufficient to maintain the government in its proper efficiency,
and that it cannot be diminished without exposing our institutions to the danger
of weakness and anarchy. To demonstrate the utter fallacy of such a suppo
sition, it is only necessary to compare the present to the past, in reference to
the point under consideration.

No one capable of judging will venture to assert that the patronage of th©

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 173

executive branch of this government, in any stage of its existence, from the
time it went fairly into operation, has ever proved deficient in proper influence
and control ; yet, if the present be compared with any past period of our histo
ry, excluding, of course, that of the late war, the patronage now under the con
trol of the executive will be found greatly to exceed that of any former period.
To illustrate the truth of this remark, your committee will select, for compari
son, the years 1825 and 1833 : the former, because it was thought, even then,
by many of the most experienced and reflecting of our citizens, that executive
patronage had attained a dangerous extent ; and the latter, because it is the
latest period of which we have the requisite materials with which to make the
comparison. What, then, is the comparative extent of executive patronage,
respectively, with the short interval of but eight years between them ? What,
at these respective periods, was the amount of the revenue and expenditure ?
What the number of persons in the employ of the government, or dependant on
its bounty ? and what the extent to which, according to the practice of the re
spective periods, the patronage of the government was brought to exert over
those subject to its control ? A short comparative statement will show.

The income of the government, in all its branches, including the postoffice,
was, in 1825, $28,147,883 ; and 1833, $36,667,274. The gross expenditures,
including the public debt, in 1825, was $24,814,847; in 1833, $27,229,389.
Excluding the public debt, it was, in 1825, $12,719,503 ; in 1833, $25,685,846.
The number of persons employed, and living on the bounty of the government,
in 1825,55,777; in 1833, 100,079.

Measuring the extent of the patronage, at these respective periods, by these
elements combined, without taking into consideration the circumstances which,
as already shown, have in this short period given such increased force to ex
ecutive patronage, the result of the whole, in 1825, compared to 1833, is as 65
to 89, making an increase of upward of 36 per cent. If the comparative ra
pidity of this great increase be examined, it will be found that it has had a pro
gressive acceleration throughout the period. If we divide the period into equal
parts of four years each, the increase in the first four years will be found much
Jess than in the last four. The increase, for instance, of the revenue during
the first four years, was 4,616,594 dollars ; and during the last four, 4,906,026
dollars ; of the expenditures during the first four, 1,873,675 dollars ; and during
the last four, 9,313,340 dollars.

It may be said that this increase of patronage, great as it is, does not mate
rially exceed the growth and population of the country, with which it is as
sumed that it ought to keep pace. This view overlooks entirely the increase
of patronage from those circumstances which have so much increased it during
the period in question, as has already been shown. If these be taken into con
sideration ; if to the increase of revenue and expenditure, and the number de
pendant on government, we add the vast increase of executive patronage from the
immense public domain recently thrown into market, the great extent of Indian
reservations, the control which the practice of removal has established over those
in office, and the great addition to executive power over the public funds, and,
through this, over the banking institutions of the country, it cannot be doubted
that, instead of increasing only 36 per cent., it has more than doubled in the
period in question, while the growth and population of the country have prob
ably not exceeded 24 per cent.

But your committee cannot agree that there is any substantial reason why
executive patronage should increase in the same proportion with the growth and
population of the country. With the exception of the postoffice establishment,
there is no necessary connexion between the increasing growth and population
of the country and the increasing patronage of the government. On the con
trary, many of the public establishments are, or ought to be, stationary ; others
on the decrease ; others, though necessarily increasing, increase at a rate far

174 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

less than our population ; and yet we find that, for the last eight years, there
has been a progressive increase of patronage far greater than the growth and
population of the country.

But the assumption that executive patronage and influence should increase in
the same ratio with the growth and population of the country, is not less dan
gerous than it is erroneous. If this assumption be carried out in practice, it
must finally prove fatal to our institutions and liberty. The same amount of
patronage and influence, in proportion to the extent and population of a country,
which, in a small state, moderately populous, would be perfectly safe, might
prove fatal in an extensive and populous community, just as a much smaller
military force, in proportion, would hold under subjection the latter than the
former. The principle is the same in both cases : the great advantage which
an organized body, such as a government or an army, has over an unorganized
mass — an advantage increasing with the increased difficulty of concert and co
operation ; and this, again, increasing with the number and dispersion of those
on whose concert and co-operation resistance depends ; and hence, from their
combined action, both as applied to the civil and military, the great advan
tage which power has over liberty in large and populous countries — an advan
tage so great that it is utterly impossible in such countries to defend the latter
against the former, unless aided by a highly artificial political organization such,
as ours, based on local and geographical interests. If to this difficulty, result
ing from numbers and extent only, there be added others of a most formidable
character, the greater capacity, in proportion, on the part of the government, in
large communities, to seize on and corrupt all the organs of public opinion, and
thus to delude and impose on the people ; the greater tendency in such com
munities to the formation of parties on local and separate interests, resting on
opposing and conflicting principles, with separate and rival leaders at the head
of each, and the great difficulty of combining such parties in any system of re
sistance against the common danger from the government, some conception may
be formed of the vast superiority which that organized and central party, con
sisting of office-holders and office-seekers, with their dependants, forming one
compact, disciplined corps, wielded by a single individual, without conflict of
opinion within either as to policy or principle, and aiming at the single object
of retaining and perpetuating power in their own ranks, must have, in such a
country as ours, over the people a superiority so decisive, that it may be safe
ly asserted that, whenever the patronage and influence of the government are
sufficiently strong to form such a party, liberty, without a speedy reform, must
inevitably be lost. When we add that this great advantage of the government
over the people, of power over liberty, must increase proportionately with the
growth and population of our country, it must be apparent how fatal would be
the assumption, if acted on, that patronage and influence should increase in the
same proportion ; and how infinitely dangerous has been the tendency of our
affairs of late, when, as has been shown, instead of increasing simply in the
same proportion, they have advanced with a rapidity more than double. So far
is the assumption from being true, if we regard the duration of our institutions
and the preservation of our liberty, we must hold it as a fundamental maxim,
that the action of the government should, with our growth, gradually be
come more moderate instead of more intense : a maxim resting on principles
deep and irreversible, and which cannot be violated without inevitable destruc
tion. Moderation in the action of this government, the great central power of
our system, is, in fact, the condition on which our political existence depends ;
and, in acting in conformity, it but conforms to the principle which Divine wis
dom has impressed upon the beautiful and sublime system of which our globe
is a part, and in which the great mass that gives life, and harmony, and action
to the whole, reposes almost motionless in the centre.

Your committee are aware that, since 1833, there has been a very consid-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 175

erable decrease of revenue, under the act of March 2d, 1833, known as the
Compromise Law, with other preceding acts, in consequence of the payment
of the public debt, which would very considerably affect the comparison, if
the year 1834, instead of 1833, had been selected ; and they have to express
their regret that the want of full and accurate materials for the former year
prevents them from furnishing a statement which, while it would show the de
crease, would also show how little the final discharge of the public debt has
contributed to diminish either the public expenditure or the patronage of the
executive : facts of no small moment, as connected with the subject of inquiry.
The deep interest which the enlightened and patriotic took in that great event
was not to indulge in the idle boast that the country was free from debt, but
that it would, as they believed, be necessarily followed by the substantial bless
ing of reducing the public burdens, and, with it, the patronage of the govern
ment ; and thus, while it relieved industry, it would, at the same time, strength
en liberty against power. Thus far, these anticipations have been but very im
perfectly, if at all, realized. As great as has been the reduction of the revenue, it
is still as great as it was when the debt exceeded more than $100,000,000 ;
and, what is more to the point, what conclusively shows how much easier it is
to discharge a public debt than to obtain the corresponding benefits, a proportion
ate diminution of the public expenditure, is the fac't, that now, when we are free
from all debt, the public expenditure is as great as it was when the debt was
most burdensome to the country. The only difference is, that then the money
went to the public creditors, but now goes into the pockets of those who live
on the government, with great addition to the patronage and influence of the ex
ecutive, but without diminution of burden to the people.

Your committee will next proceed to inquire what has been the effects of
this great, growing, and excessive patronage on our political condition and
prospects : a question of the utmost importance in deciding on the expediency
of its reduction. ' Has it tended to strengthen our political institutions, and to
give a stronger assurance of perpetuating them, and, with them, the blessings
of liberty to our posterity ? Has it purified the public and political morals of
our country, and strengthened the feeling of patriotism ? Or, on the other hand,
has it tended to sap the foundation of our institutions ; to throw a cloud of un
certainty over the future ; to degrade and corrupt the public morals ; and to
substitute devotion and subserviency to power, in the place of that disinterested
and noble attachment to principles and country, which are essential to the pres
ervation of free institutions ? These are the questions to be decided ; and it
is with profound regret that your committee are constrained, however painful, to
say that the decision admits of little doubt. They are compelled to admit the
fact, that there never has been a period, from the foundation of the government,
when there were such general apprehensions and doubts as to the permanency
and success of our political institutions ; when the prospect of perpetuating-
them, and, with them, our liberty, appeared so uncertain ; when public and po
litical morals were more depressed ; when attachment to country and principles
were more feeble, and devotion to party and power stronger : for the truth of
all which they appeal to the observation and reflections of the experienced and
enlightened of all parties. If we turn our eyes to the government, we shall find
that, with this increase of patronage* the entire character and structure of the
government itself is undergoing a great and fearful change, which, if not arrest
ed, must, at no distant period, concentrate all its power in a single department.

Your committee are aware that, in a country of such vast extent and diversity
of interests as ours, a strong executive is necessary ; and, among other reasons,
in order to sustain the government, by its influence, against the local feelings
and interests which it must, in the execution of its duties, necessarily encoun
ter ; and it was doubtless with this view mainly that the framers of the Consti
tution vested the executive powers in a single individual, and clothed him with

176 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

the almost entire patronage of the government. As long as the patronage of
the executive is so moderate as to compel him to identify his administration
•with the public interest, and to hold his patronage subordinate to the principles
and measures necessary to promote the common good, the executive power may
be said to act within the "sphere assigned to it by the Constitution, and may be
considered as essential to the steady and equal operation of the government ;
but when it becomes so strong as to be capable of sustaining itself by its influ
ence alone, unconnected with any system of measures or policy, it is the cer
tain indication of the near approach of irresponsible and despotic power. When
it attains that point, it will be difficult to find anywhere in our system a power
sufficient to restrain its progress to despotism. The very causes which render
a strong executive necessary, the great extent of country and diversity of inter
ests, will form great and almost insuperable impediments to any effectual re
sistance. Each section, as has been shown, will have its own party and its
own favourites, entertaining views of principles and policy so different as to
render a united effort against executive power almost impossible, while their
separate and disjointed efforts must prove impotent against a power far stronger
than either, taken separately ; nor can the aid of the states be successfully in
voked to arrest the progress to despotism. So far from weakening, they will
add strength to executive patronage. A majority of the states, instead of oppo
sing, will be usually found acting in concert with the Federal Government, and,
of course, will increase the influence of the executive : so that, to ascertain his
patronage, the sum-total of the patronage of all the states, acting in conjunction
•with the federal executive, must be added to his. The two, as things now
stand, constitute a joint force, difficult to be resisted.

Against a danger so formidable, which threatens, if not arrested, and that
speedily, to subvert the Constitution, there can be but one effectual remedy : a
prompt and decided reduction of executive patronage ; the practicability and
means of effecting which, your committee will next proceed to consider.

The first, most simple, and usually the most certain mode of reducing patron
age, is to reduce the public income, the prolific source from which it almost ex
clusively flows. Experience has shown that it is next to impossible to reduce
the public expenditure with an overflowing treasury ; and not much less difficult
to reduce patronage without a reduction of expenditure ; or, in other words, that
the most simple and effectual mode of retrenching the superfluous expenditure
of the government, of introducing a spirit of frugality and economy in the admin
istration of public affairs, oficorrecting the corruption and abuses of the government,
and, finally, of arresting the progress of power, is to leave the money in the pock
ets of those who made it, where all laws, human and divine, place it, and from
which it cannot be removed by government itself, except for its necessary and
indispensable wants, without violation of its highest trust and the most sacred
principles of justice. Yet, as manifest as is this truth, such is our peculiar
(it may be said extraordinary) situation, that this simple and obvious remedy to
excessive patronage, the reduction of the revenue, can be applied only to a very
limited extent.

But before they proceed to the question of reducing the revenue, your com
mittee propose to show what will be its probable amount in future, as the laws
now stand, to what limits the public expenditure may be reduced consistently
with the just wants of government, and, finally, what, with such reduction, will
be the probable annual surplus to the year 1842, when the highest duties will
be reduced to 20 per cent, under the act of March 2, 1833 ; and when, as the
act provides, the revenue is to be reduced to a sum necessary to an economical
administration of the government.

According to the statement from the Treasury Department, the receipts of the
year 1834, from all sources, amounted to $22,584,365 ; of which, customs yield
ed $16,105,372; land, $5,020,940; the residue being made uo of bank divi-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 177

dends and incidental items ; and the question now for consideration is, What
will be the probable annual receipts from all sources during the next seven
years, if the income, as has just been irtated, is to be reduced to the economical
wants of the government ? a question which, from its nature, can only be an
swered by probable estimates and conjectures, and which, in this case, is the
more difficult to be answered frcKii a defect of data in reference to the customs,
the principal source of revenue. The changes in the rates of duties have been
so great latterly, and the period so recent since the laws, as they now stand,
commenced operation, thai- it is impracticable to resort to those average results,
deduced from long periods, by which only the temporary changes and fluctu
ations of commerce can be detected, and its habitual current ascertained and
subjected to calculation. The act of the 2d of March, 1833, which made the
last change, and on the provisions of which the estimates of the income from
the customs for the period in question must be based, commenced its operation
on the first of January, 1834, and we, of course, have the result of but a single
year. From a statement furnished by the treasury department, it seems that
the domestic exports of that year amounted, in round numbers, to eighty mill
ions of dollars, and the imports, given in round numbers (as all the subsequent
statements are), to $125,500,000; of which $23,000,000 were reshipped,
leaving $102,500,000 for the consumption and use of the country, of which
$55,000,000 were of articles free of duty, and $47,000,000 of those liable to du
ties; that the gross receipts amounted to $ 15,572,448, and the nett to $14,222,448,
leaving $1,350,000 as the expense of collection; that the reduction of one tenth
of the duties above 20 per cent, ad valorem every two years, according to the
provisions of the act of 2d of March, 1833, amounted to $850,000.

As scanty as are these data, it is believed that it may be safely anticipated
that the average annual income of the period in question will be equal, at least,
to the income of the last year. Instead of entering into all the details through
which your committee have come to this conclusion, which would swell this re
port to an unwieldy size, they will content themselves with simply giving the
results of the causes which, as far as can be foreseen, may either increase or
diminish the receipts of the customs for the next seven years as compared
with the past year, accompanied by a statement of their probable effects in the
aggregate.

It will, however, be previously necessary to inquire whether the receipts
from the customs during the last year in fact equalled the amount which the
commercial transactions of the year, under ordinary circumstances, ought to
have produced. It is not possible, in such an inquiry, to overlook the very un
usual importation of the precious metals during the year, which, according to
the statements from the treasury department, amounted to $16,572,582, consti
tuting, to that amount, a part of the articles imported in the year free of duty.
The reshipment for the same period amounted to $1,676,208, leaving in the
country, of the amount imported, $14,896,374 : a sum greatly exceeding our an
nual consumption, which, in addition to the supplies from our own mines, prob
ably falls short of $2,000,000. The excess was doubtless caused by the pecu
liar condition of the country, in reference to its currency, during the year ; and
would, under ordinary circumstances, have been imported in goods of various
descriptions for the usual supply of the country instead of gold and silver. Sub
tracting, then, the two millions from this sum, and the balance from the amount
of the articles free of duty, which, as stated, is $55,000,000, it would reduce
the annual consumption of goods free of duty, including the precious metals, to
$42,103,626; and assuming that the proportion between goods free of duty,
and those liable to duty, to be as that sum is to $47,000,000 ; and, also, that
the excess of the supply of gold and silver imported during the year would, un
der ordinary circumstances, have returned in that proportion between the dutied
and the free articles, it would add to the former $7,133,313, and, of course, in-

Z

178 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

crease the receipts from the customs in the same proportion ; that is, it would
make an addition to them of $2,150,000, and would have raised the receipts
from customs during the year from $14,220,000 to $16,370,000 ; which last,
it is believed, may be assumed, at the present rate of the duties, as the proba
ble receipts, under ordinary circumstances, of an export and import trade equal
to that of the last year.

Let us now inquire into the causes which may tend to diminish or increase
this estimated receipt during the next seven years, and their probable effects,
in the aggregate, on the income from the customs.

The only cause, as is believed, that will tend to diminish the amount, as far
as can now be foreseen, is the gradual reduction of one tenth every two years,
under the act of the 2d of March, 1833, till the year 1841, as has been stated. It
will be seen, by reference to the statement from the treasury already given, that
this reduction last year, on an importation of $47,000,000 of dutiable articles,
amounted to $850,000. If, however, instead of that amount, the importation
of such articles had been $54,133,000, as it is assumed they would have been
had not the derangement of the currency prevented,, the reduction on account
of the one tenth would have increased in the same proportion, and would have,
of course, amounted to $975,000.

Against this increased reduction there must be set off a probable gradual in
crease of the domestic exports of the country ; and with them, as a necessary
consequence, a corresponding increase of the imports, and with them the re
ceipts from the customs. If we take the last six years, from 1828 to 1834, the
last included, the average annual increase of domestic exports in the period is
nearly $5,000,000, of which the increase in 1833 was $7,200,000, and in 1834,
$9,600,000, making in the last two years an average increase of $8,800,000 :
thus showing a much more rapid increase at the end than at the beginning of
the series. If to this fact we add the effect which the decrease of duties under
the act of the 2d of March, 1833, must have on the exports, the growing de
mand for the great staples of the country, and the vast amount of fertile and
fresh lands brought into market within the last five years in the region most
congenial to the growth of cotton, it is believed that it may be safely assumed
that the average annual increase of our domestic exports for the next seven
years will, at least, equal $6,000,000. This increase must be followed by a
corresponding increase of imports, and with them, as stated, of the receipts
from the customs. Assuming that the proportion between the free and dutied
articles, in consequence of this increase of imports, will be as has been estimated,
it will add to the receipts from the customs an annual increase of $1,000,000,
from which, however, must be deducted $59,000 on account of the biennial
reduction of one tenth, which would reduce the increase to $941.000. If this
be deducted from the average reduction of one tenth, as above ascertained,
we shall have, taking the two causes together, the increase of the customs
from increased imports, and the decrease from the biennial reduction of one
tenth, a decrease of revenue equal to $34,000 annually : making, in seven years,
$238,000.

But it must be taken into the estimate, that the increase of revenue from the
increase of exports is annually added, while the reduction on account of the
one tenth is biennially. Taking this into the estimate, the increase of revenue
on account of the increase of the exports over the decrease, on account of the
biennial reduction of one tenth, will in the seven years equal $3,298,500 ; from
which take $238,000, and it will leave an aggregate increase over the decrease
of $3,060,500.

This conclusion, however, rests on the assumption that the proportion be
tween the free and dutied articles will remain during the period the same as is
estimated for last year ; but it is probable that the reduction of the price of the
free articles, in conseouence of the repeal of the duties, will greatly increase

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 179

their consumption, and, of course, have a corresponding effect in reducing the
amount of the dutiable articles, and, with them, the receipts into the treasury.
It is, however, believed to be a safe estimate, that the reduction of the receipts
from this cause will be more than counterbalanced by the excess of the increase
of income from the increase of exports over the reduction of one tenth biennial
ly, as has been shown ; and that it may, therefore, be assumed with reasonable
confidence, if no untoward event should intervene, that the average annual re
ceipts from the customs will be equal to the sum of $16,370,000, the sum
which the commerce of last year ought to have yielded, as has been shown,
under ordinary circumstances.

Your committee will next inquire what will be the probable amount of re
ceipts from the public lands during the period in question. The receipts from
that source during the last year, according to a statement from the treasury,
equalled $5,020,940. This, however, probably greatly exceeds the permanent
receipts from that source, as it was caused, probably, by the great quantity of
rich and valuable land thrown into the market during the year. The receipts
of 1833 equalled $3,967,682, and that of the last four years averaged $3,705,405.
If we take into consideration, with these facts, the rapid increase of our popu
lation, the steady rise in landed property generally, the vast quantity of lands
held by the government, it is believed to be a safe estimate, that the average an
nual income from this source, during the period in question, will be at least equal
to $3,500,000.

Of the remaining sources of revenue, the bank dividends is the only one that
requires notice. They amounted in 1833 to $450,000 ;* and it is probable that
they will give an equal annual income till the expiration of its charter, 1836,
after which time there will be a reduction from the income of the government
equal to the annual dividends ; but it is believed, by those who are most familiar
•with the subject, that a retrenchment in the collection of the customs, by a reform
ation of that branch of the administration, may be effected, at least equal to this re
duction. It cost the government the last year $1,350,000 to collect $14,222,448,
which is more than equal to nine per cent. : a rate, considering the facility of
collecting this branch of the revenue, and the decreased inducement to elude
the duties in consequence of the great reduction in the rate of duties, altogether
extravagant.

If these calculations should prove correct, the average income of the gov
ernment for the next seven years, not including incidental items, will equal
$20,320,000, making in the whole period the aggregate sum of $142,240,000 ; to
which, if we add the residue of the government stock in the United States Bank,
amounting to $6,343,400, and which must be paid into the treasury at the ex
piration of its charter, and the surplus in the treasury on the 31st of December
last, which, .after deducting $2,000,000, will amount to $6,695,981, it will
give an aggregate sum of $148,679,381 ; which, divided by seven, will make
the average annual sum, subject to the disposition of the government for the
next seven years, amount to $21,239,911.

Such being the probable average annual income and means of the govern
ment for the seven ensuing years, the next question which presents itself for
consideration is, What ought to be the average expenditure for the same period ?

The expenditure for the year 1834, as taken from the annual report of the
Secretary of the Treasury, equals $19,430,373, and for the preceding year
$22,713,753 ; deducting in both cases the payments on account of the public
debt. Your committee are, however, of the opinion, that these amounts far
exceed what ought to be the expenditure on a just and economical scale, and
that it may be very greatly reduced without injury to the public service. They
are also of opinion, that to this great and extravagant expenditure may be at-

* The amount of dividends for 1834 could not be obtained from the treasury.

180 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

tributed, in no small degree, the disease which now threatens so seriously the
body politic. That a just conception may be formed of this extraordinary in
crease, they have annexed a table of expenditures from the year 1823 to 1833,
deducting the payment on account of the public debt, by which it appears that,
in this short period of ten years, the expenditure has risen from $9,784,000
to $22,713,000, being an increase in the latter over the former of almost
$3,000,000 beyond the whole expenditure of the government in 1823, exclu
ding, as stated, the public debt ; and this, too, during a period of profound peace,
when not an event had occurred calculated to warrant any unusual expenditure.
Of this enormous increase the greater part occurred in the last three years, in
which time the expenditure has risen nearly $9,000,000, which may well ac
count for the present dangerous symptoms.

Your committee have not time to give that minute attention to the expendi
tures necessary to determine what particular items can or ought to be retrenched ;
nor do they deem it important, at present, to enter into so laborious an inquiry,
even if time did not prevent. It is sufficient for their purpose to assume that
the expenditures of 1823 were, at the time, considered ample to meet all the just
•wants of the government ; and that, so far from being a period distinguished by
parsimony, the then administration were thought by many to be unreasonably
profuse, and were, accordingly, the object of systematic attacks on account of
their supposed extravagance. Assuming, then, the expenditure of $9,784,000
to have been ample at that period, the question which presents itself is, What
ought it to be at present, taking into consideration the necessity of increased
expenditures in consequence of increased population ?

They have already shown that the government cannot bear a permanent in
crease of expenditure in proportion to the growth of the population, which may
be estimated at about three per cent., without an increase of patronage which
must, in its progress, inevitably prove fatal to the institutions and liberty of the
country. On this principle, the expenditure, instead of increasing nearly thir
teen millions in ten years, as it has, ought to have increased much less than
three, and ought not, in the opinion of your committee, to have exceeded two
millions at the farthest. Assuming that sum as a liberal allowance, and adding
it to the expenditure of 1823, we shall have the sum of $11,784,000, beyond
which the present expenditure ought not to have passed, including the pensions ;
and, excluding them, $10,012,412, instead of $22,713,000. the sum actually
expended.

But it is believed that this sum will very considerably exceed, on the basis
assumed, what ought to be the average annual expenditure for the next seven
years. Of the items which compose the present expenditure, that for pensions
constituted, last year, the sum of $3,341,877. Considering the advanced age
of the pensioners, there ought to be, according to the annuity tables, a decrease
by deaths of fourteen per cent, annually, which, in seven years, would diminish
the expenditure on pensions from the sum above mentioned to $1,040,802 annu
ally, giving an annual average deduction of $328,725, and would reduce the
expenditure on pensions for the ensuing seven years to an average sum of
$2,048,000. Add this sum to $10,012,412, the sum beyond which the present
expenditure ought not to extend, excluding the pensions, and we shall have
$12,060,412, as what the annual average expenditure for the next seven years
ought to be.

Take this from the sum of $21,239,911, which, as has been shown, will be
the probable average annual means of the government for the same period, and
it would leave $9,179,499 ; or, in round numbers, for the facility of calculation,
nine millions, as the average surplus means during the period at the disposition
of the government, on the supposition that the expenditures will be reduced to
the economical wants of the government.

Having shown what will be the probable surplus revenue should the expen-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 181

diture be reduced to its proper limits, the committee propose next to consider
whether, under existing circumstances, the revenue can be reduced.

The two great sources of revenue are lands and customs. The others (not
including the postoffice, which is a particular fund) are of small amount. Af
ter a careful investigation, your committee are of opinion that the act of 2d of
March, 1833, has reduced the duties on imports, with some exceptions, as far
as is practicable, under existing circumstances, consistently with the intent and
spirit of the act.

The act provides, among other things, that after the 31st day of December,
1833, in all cases where the duties shall exceed twenty per cent, ad valorem,
one tenth, part of such excess shall be reduced, and, in like manner, one tenth
part every two years, till the 31st of December, 1839 ; and that, on the 31st of
December, 1841, one half of the residue of such excess shall be deducted ;
and on the 30th of June, 1842, the residue. It also provides that, till the 30th
of June, 1842, the duties imposed by the then existing law shall remain un
changed, except as provided in the sixth section.

Your committee do not deem it necessary to inquire whether the circumstan
ces under which it passed involves anything in the nature of a pledge or con
tract, which would forbid any alterations of its provisions. It is sufficient for
their purpose to state the fact, that the act is the result of a compromise between
great sectional interests, brought into conflict under circumstances which threat
ened the peace and safety of the country ; and that it continues to be the only
ground on which the adjustment of the controversy can stand. Under these
circumstances, to disregard the provisions of the act would be to open a contro
versy which your committee hope is closed forever : a controversy which, if
renewed, would do more to increase the power and influence of the executive
than any other event that could occur. With the impression, then, that the
provisions of the act cannot be disturbed without endangering the peace of the
country, and adding greatly, by its consequences, to executive patronage, your
committee have limited their inquiries to the reduction of the duties on such ar
ticles as, by the provisions of the act, are subject to be reduced ; and. after a
careful investigation, they are of the opinion that all the reductions which can
be effected, consistently with the spirit of the compromise, are inconsiderable ;
and that, to make those that might be made, would require too much time and
investigation to permit it to be done at this session, as will appear by a reference
to the letter of the Secretary of the Treasury, herewith annexed ; but, in order
that the subject may be taken up with full information at the next session, they
have instructed their chairman to submit a resolution for the consideration of
the Senate, directing the Secretary of the Treasury to report, at the commence
ment of the next session, what duties under twenty per cent, ad valorem may,
with a due regard to the manufacturing interests of the country, be repealed or
reduced, with an estimate of the probable amount of the reduction.

In turning from the customs to the public lands, your committee find that the
difficulty of reducing the revenue from that source is not less considerable than
that from the customs. They fully agree in that liberal policy in relation to the
public lands that regards them as the means of settlement, as well as a source
of revenue ; and that they should be disposed of, accordingly, in the manner best
calculated to diffuse a flourishing and happy population over the vast regions
placed under our dominion ; a policy, the wisdom of which is best illustrated
by the wonderful success with which it has been accomplished. It is an es
sential maxim of this noble and generous policy, that the price of the public
lands should be fixed so low as to be accessible to the great mass of the citi
zens, and, at the same time, so high as not to subject them to the monopoly of
the great capitalists of the country. Your committee are of opinion that this
happy medium is attained by the present price ; and, judging from many indica
tions of late, that no considerable reduction can be made in the price without

182 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

making them the prey of hungry and voracious speculators and monopolists, to
the great injury of the honest and industrious portion of the community, as
well as to the portion of the country where the lands may be situated. Be thisr
however, as it may, it is at least certain that the immediate effect of reduction
would be to increase rather than diminish the revenue from lands, and, of course,
to augment instead of reducing the public income.

To this may be added another, and, under ordinary circumstances, conclusive
objection against the reduction.

The reduction of the price of public lands, while it would act, in effect, as a
bounty to the purchasers from the government, by enabling them to acquire more
land for the same sum of money, would act, at the same time, as a tax upon the
entire body of landholders, who constitute the great mass of our population — a
tax on them immeasurably greater than the bounty to the purchasers.

The government of the United States is, in fact, the great land-dealer of the
country, and, as such, has the power, by raising or reducing the price of its lands,
to reduce or raise, in a greater or less degree, the value of lands everywhere,
and, of course, to affect in the same degree the property of the landholders
throughout the Union. To what extent any given reduction of the price of pub
lic lands would affect the price of lands generally, would be difficult, if not im
possible, to ascertain. It would be greater or less, according td the circumstan
ces. The price of land in the adjacent portion of the country, or that from
which emigration principally flowed, would be reduced nearly in the same pro
portion with that of the public lands ; that is, if the price of public lands be re
duced one half, lands adjacent, or lying in the emigrating portion of the country,
would generally fall one half, while the more remote would be less affected, in.
proportion to distance and the absence of emigration. But it may be safely as
sumed, taking the whole country, that the actual fall in the value of lands gen
erally, in the hands of the holders, would greatly exceed the actual reduction of
the price of public lands. To illustrate : if the price of the latter be reduced
one half, which at present would be sixty-two and one half cents per acre, lands
generally throughout the country would be reduced in value per acre much
more than that sum ; and if the far greater quantity held by the whole body of
land proprietors, compared to the quantity sold by the government, be taken into
the estimate, some idea may be formed how great the aggregate loss of the pro
prietors generally would be, on any reduction of price, compared with the ag
gregate gain of the purchasers. As great, however, as it must be, none who
know the public spirit and enlightened patriotism of that great and respectable
portion of our citizens can doubt their cheerful acquiescence in the sacrifice,
should the public interest, or the fundamental maxim which ought to govern in
the disposition of the public lands, require it ; but, otherwise, it would be a plain
and palpable sacrifice of one, and that the largest portion of the community, to
the other, without a corresponding benefit. In presenting this view, it is not
the intention of your committee to offer any opinion on the propriety of a grad
uated reduction, as a measure of general policy, in the price of such public lands
as have remained long in the market unsold, and of which there is no imme
diate prospect of making sale at the present price, because of their inferior qual
ity. Their case is very distinguishable from that of the great body of the pub
lic lands ; but the immediate effects of such reduction would obviously be to
raise instead of reduce the revenue, and would, of course, increase instead of
diminish the difficulty under consideration.

Having now shown that no other reduction of the revenue can be effected,
under existing circumstances, than the progressive reduction already provided
for by the act of March 2d, 1833, in either of the great sources of our public
income, with the exception already stated, your committee will next proceed to
inquire whether executive patronage can be reduced by reducing the expendi
tures of the Government.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 183

The result of their investigation on this point is, that, for reasons which will
Itereafter be offered, a reduction of expenditure, under existing circumstances,
would tend to increase instead of reducing executive patronage. But if it were
otherwise, it would be found utterly impracticable, for reasons already assigned,
to reduce the expenditure much below the income. Experience has abundant
ly proved that, so long as there is a large surplus in the treasury, the interests
in favour of its expenditure will ever be stronger than that opposed to it ; and
that no prudential consideration, arising from the necessity of accumulating
funds to meet future wants, or the hazard of enlarging executive patronage, or
the danger of corrupting the political and public morals of the country by use
less and profuse expenditure, or any other whatever, is sufficient to resist the
temptation to expend. If one unworthy object of appropriation is defeated, an
other, with no greater claims on the public bounty or justice, will ever stand
ready to urge its claims, till the frugal and patriotic are wearied out with inces
sant and useless efforts to guard the treasury. But were it practicable, with
an overflowing treasury, to bring the expenditures within proper limits, such is
the present condition of things, that to reduce expenditure would, as has been
stated, increase the patronage of the executive, and that to an extent so great
that no object of expenditure can be suggested, having a plausible claim on the
justice or bounty of the public, which would tend half so much to increase his
patronage as leaving the public money unexpended, to accumulate as surplus
revenue in the deposite banks.

To realize the truth of this remark, it must be borne in mind that the depos-
ites are under the exclusive control of the executive ; that they are deposited
in banks selected by him ; that they have the free use of trfem without com
pensation to the public, arid they may be continued or dismissed as depositories
of the public funds, at the pleasure of the executive.

With these facts before us, the result must be obvious. To accumulate a per
manent surplus revenue in the banks is, in fact, but to add so much additional
bank capital — capital, in this case, exclusively under executive control, without
check or limitation ; and, with its increasing amount, daily giving to him a
greater control over the deposite banks, and, through them, over the banking
institutions of the country generally : thus adding the deep and wide-spread
influence of the banks to the already almost overwhelming patronage of the
executive.

As the expenditure cannot be reduced, the next inquiry is, whether some ob
ject of general utility, in which every portion of the country has an interest, may
not be selected as a fixed and permanent object on which to expend the sur
plus revenue.

Your committee admit that, if such an object of expenditure could be selected,
under a well-regulated system of disbursements established by law, much of the
patronage incident to the present loose and unregulated disbursements might be
curtailed ; but they are at a loss to find such an object. Internal improvement
approaches the nearest; but there is opposed to it, with the object in view, in
superable objections. To pass by the formidable difficulty, the long-establish
ed diversity of opinion as to its constitutionality, which divides the two great
sections of the country, experience has shown that there is no expenditure so
little susceptible of being regulated by law ; none calculated to excite deeper
competition, or to enlist a greater number in its favour, in proportion to the
amount expended ; and, of course, calculated to add more to executive patron
age. To these an additional objection of a recent origin may be added. Your
committee allude to the executive veto, as applied to internal improvements, the
effect o( which has been to increase very considerably his power and patronage
in reference to this branch of expenditure. The executive, in his veto mes
sage, assumes the ground that internal improvements may or may not be con
stitutional, according to the nature of each particular object ; the distinction to

184 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN

be determined by him in the exercise of his constitutional function of giving or
withholding his approval to acts of Congress ; the practical effect of which is
to draw within his control the power and influence which appertain, not only
to the administration, but also to the enactment of the law ; and, of course, to in
crease in the same degree his influence and patronage in reference to internal
improvements.

In making these remarks, the object of your committee is not to call in ques
tion the motive of the executive, or his right to draw what distinction he may
think just and right in the exercise of his veto power, or the correctness of the
distinctions in reference to the particular subject under consideration ; but sim
ply to exhibit the full extent of the objections to selecting it as the subject on
which to expend the surplus revenue — objections, in their nature, incapable of
being wholly removed even by an amendment of the Constitution, were an.
amendment practicable.

But if no subject of expenditure can be selected on which the surplus can be
safely expended, and if neither the revenue nor expenditure can, under existing
circumstances, be reduced, the next inquiry is, What is to be done with the sur
plus ? which, as has been shown, will probably equal, on an average, for the next
eight years, the sum of $9.000,000 beyond the just wants of the government :
a surplus of which, unless some safe disposition can be made, all other means
of reducing the patronage of the executive must prove ineffectual.

Your committee are deeply sensible of the great difficulty of finding any sat
isfactory solution of this question ; but, believing that the very existence of our
institutions, and, with them, the liberty of the country, may depend on the suc
cess of their investigation, they have carefully explored the whole ground, and
the result of their inquiry is, that but one means has occurred to them holding
out any reasonable prospect of success. A few preliminary remarks will be
necessary to explain their views.

Amid all the difficulties of our situation, there is one consolation — that the
danger from executive patronage, as far as it depends on excess of revenue,
must be temporary. Assuming that the act of 2d of March, 1833, will be left
undisturbed by its provisions, the income, after the year 1842, is to be reduced
to the economical wants of the government. The government, then, is in a
state of passage from one where the revenue is excessive, to another in which,
at a fixed and no distant period, it will be reduced to its proper limits. The
difficulty, in the intermediate time, is, that the revenue cannot be brought down
to the expenditure, nor the expenditure, without great danger, raised to the rev
enue, for reasons already explained. How is this difficulty to be overcome ?
It might seem that the simple and natural means would be to vest the surplus
in some safe and profitable stock, to accumulate for future use ; but the difficul
ty in such a course will, on examination, be found insuperable.

At the very commencement, in selecting the stock, there would be great, if
not insurmountable difficulties. No one would think of investing the surplus in
bank stock, against which there are so many, and such decisive reasons, that it
is not deemed necessary to state them ; nor would the objections be less deci
sive against vesting in the stock of the states, which would create the danger
ous relation of debtor and creditor between the government and the members of
the Union. But suppose this difficulty surmounted, and that some stock, per
fectly safe, was selected, there would still remain another that could not be sur
mounted. There cannot be found a stock with an interest in its favour suffi
ciently strong to compete with the interests which, with a large surplus reve
nue, will ever be found in favour of expenditures. It must be perfectly obvious
to all who have the least experience, or who will duly reflect on the subject,
that, were a fund selected in which to vest the surplus revenue for future use,
there would be found in practice a constant conflict between the interest in fa
vour of some local or favourite scheme of expenditure, and that in favour of the

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 185

stock. Nor can it be less obvious that, in point of fact, the former would prove
far stronger than the latter. The result is obvious. The surplus, be it ever
so great, would be absorbed by appropriations instead of being vested in the
stock, and the scheme, of course, would, in practice, prove an abortion ; which
brings us back to the original inquiry, How is the surplus to be disposed of un
til the excess shall be reduced to the just and economical wants of the govern
ment 1

After bestowing on this question, on the successful solution of which so muck
depends, the most deliberate attention, your committee, as they have already
stated, can advise but one means by which it can be effected ; and that is an
amendment of the Constitution, authorizing the temporary distribution of the
surplus revenue among the states till the year 1843, when, as has been shown,
the income and expenditure will be equalized.

Your committee are fully aware of the many and fatal objections to the dis
tribution of the surplus revenue among the states, considered as a part of the
ordinary and regular system of this government. They admit them to be as
great as can be well imagined. The proposition itself, that the government
should collect money for the purpose of such distribution, or should distribute a
surplus for the purpose of perpetuating taxes, is too absurd to require refutation ;
and yet what would be, when applied, as supposed, so absurd and pernicious, is,
in the opinion of your committee, in the present extraordinary and deeply-dis
ordered state of our affairs, not only useful and salutary, but indispensable to
the restoration of the body politic to a sound condition : just as some potent
medicine, which it would be dangerous and absurd to prescribe to the healthy,
may, to the diseased, be the only means of arresting the hand of death. Dis
tribution, as proposed, is not for the preposterous and dangerous purpose of
raising a revenue for distribution, or of distributing the surplus as a means of
perpetuating a system of duties or taxes, but a temporary measure to dispose of
an unavoidable surplus while the revenue is in the course of reduction, and
which cannot be otherwise disposed of without greatly aggravating a disease
that threatens the most dangerous consequences ; and which holds out hope,
not only of arresting its farther progress, but also of restoring the body politic
to a state of health and vigour. The truth of this assertion a few observations
will suffice to illustrate.

It must be obvious, on a little reflection, that the effects of distribution of the
surplus would be to place the interests of the states, on all questions of expen
diture, in opposition to expenditure, as every reduction of expense would ne
cessarily increase the sum to*be distributed among the states. The effect of
this would be to convert them, through their interests, into faithful and vigilant
sentinels on the side of economy and accountability in the expenditures of this
government ; and would thus powerfully tend to restore the government, in its
fiscal action, to the honest simplicity of former days.

It may, perhaps, be thought by some that the power which the distribution,
among the states would bring to bear against the expenditure, and its conse
quent tendency to retrench the disbursements of the government, would be so
strong as not only to curtail useless or improper expenditure, but also the use
ful and necessary. Such, undoubtedly, would be the consequence if the pro
cess were too long continued ; but in the present irregular and excessive ac
tion of the system, when its centripetal force threatens to concentrate all its
powers in a single department, the fear that the action of this government will
be too much reduced by the measure under consideration, in the short period to
which it is proposed to limit its operation, is without just foundation. On the
contrary, if the proposed measure should be applied in the present diseased
state of the government, its effect would be like that of some powerful altera
tive medicine, operating just long enough to change the present morbid action,
but not sufficiently long to superinduce another of an opposite character.

AA

186 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

But it may be objected, that, though the distribution might reduce all useless
expenditure, it would, at the same time, give additional power to the interest in
favour of taxation. It is not denied that such would be its tendency ; and, if
the danger from increased duties or taxes was at this time as great as that from
a surplus revenue, the objection would be fatal ; but it is confidently believed
that such is not the case. On the contrary, in proposing the measure, it is as
sumed that the act of March 2, 1833, will remain undisturbed. It is on the
strength of this assumption that the measure is proposed, and, as it is believed,
safely proposed.

It may, however, be said that the distribution may create, on the part of the
states, an appetite in its favour which may ultimately lead to its adoption as a
permanent measure. It may, indeed, tend to excite such an appetite, short as
is the period proposed for its operation ; but it is obvious that this danger is far
more than countervailed by the fact, that the proposed amendment to the Con
stitution to authorize the distribution would place the power beyond the reach
of legislative construction, and thus effectually prevent the possibility of its
adoption as a permanent measure, as it cannot be conceived that three fourths
of the states will ever assent to an amendment of the Constitution to authorize
a distribution, except as an extraordinary measure, applicable to some extraor
dinary condition of the country like the present.

Giving, however, to these, and other objections which may be urged, all the
force that can be claimed for them, it must be remembered, the question is not
whether the measure proposed is or is not liable to this or that objection, but
whether any other less objectionable can be devised ; or, rather, whether there
is any other which promises the least prospect of relief that can be applied.
Let not the delusion prevail that the disease, after running through its natural
course, will terminate of itself, without fatal consequences. Experience is op
posed to such anticipations. Many and striking are the examples of free states
perishing under that excess of patronage which now afflicts ours. It may, in.
fact, be said with truth, that all, or nearly all, diseases which afflict free govern
ments, may be traced directly or indirectly to excess of revenue and expendi
ture ; the effect of which is to rally around the government a powerful, corrupt,
and subservient corps — a corps ever obedient to its will, and ready to sustain
it in every measure, whether right or wrong, and which, if the cause of the dis
ease be not eradicated, must ultimately render the government stronger than
the people.

What progress this dangerous disease has already made in our country it is
not for your committee to say; but when they reflect on the present symptoms,
on the almost unbounded extent of executive patronage, wielded by a single
will ; the 'surplus revenue, which cannot be reduced within proper limits in less
than seven years — a period which covers two presidential elections, on both of
which all this mighty power and influence will be brought to bear — and when
they consider that, with the vast patronage arid influence of this government,
that of all the states acting in concert with it will be combined, there are just
grounds to fear that the fate which has befallen so many other free governments
must also befall ours, unless, indeed, some effectual remedy be forthwith ap
plied. It is under this impression that your committee have suggested the one
proposed, not as free from all objections, but as the only one of sufficient power
to arrest the disease, and to restore the body politic to a sound condition ; and
they have, accordingly, reported a resolution so to amend the Constitution that
the money remaining in the treasury at the end of each year, till the 1st of
January, 1843, deducting therefrom the sum of $2,000,000 to meet current
and contingent .expenses, shall annually be distributed among the states and
territories, including the District of Columbia ; and, for that purpose, the sum
to be distributed to be divided into as many shares as there are senators and
representatives in Congress, adding two for each territory, and two for the Dis-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 187

trict of Columbia ; and that there shall be allotted to each state a number of
shares equal to its representation in both houses, and to the territories, inclu
ding the District of Columbia, two shares each. Supposing the surplus to be
distributed should average $9,000,000 annually, as estimated, it would give to
each share $3*0,405 ; which, multiplied by the number of senators and repre
sentatives of any state, would show the sum to which it would be entitled.

The reason for selecting the ratio of distribution proposed in the amendment
is too obvious to. require much illustration. It is that which indicates the rela
tive political weight assigned by the Constitution to the members of the confed
eracy respectively, and, it is believed, approaches as nearly to equality as any
other that can be selected. It may be objected that some states, under the
distribution, may receive more, and others less than their actual contribution to
the treasury, under the existing system of revenue. The truth of the objec
tion may be acknowledged, but it must also be acknowledged that the inequali
ty is at least as great under the present system of disbursement, and would be
as great under any other disposition of the surplus that can be adopted.

But as effectual as the distribution must be, if adopted, to retrench improper
expenditure, and reduce correspondingly the patronage of the government, yet
other means must be added to bring it within safe limits, and to prevent the re
currence hereafter of the danger which now threatens the institutions and the
liberty of the country ; and, with this view, your committee have reported a bill
to repeal the first and second sections of the act to limit the term of certain
officers therein named, passed 13th May, 1820 ; to make it the duty of the
President to lay before Congress, on the first of January next, and on the first
of January every four years thereafter, the names of all defaulting officers and
agents charged with the collection and disbursement of the public money,
whose commissions shall be vacated from and after the date of such message ;
and also to make it his duty, in all cases of nomination to fill vacancies occa
sioned by removal from office, to assign the reason for which said officer may
have been removed.

The provisions of this bill are the same as those contained in bill No. 2, re
ported to the Senate on the 4th of May, 1826, by a select committee appointed to
" inquire into the expediency of reducing the patronage of the government of
the United States," and which was accompanied by an explanatory report, to
which your committee would refer the Senate ; and, in order to facilitate the
reference, they have instructed their chairman to move to reprint the report for
their use.

But the great and alarming strides which patronage has made in the short
period that has intervened since the date of the report, has demonstrated the
necessity of imposing other limitations on the discretionary powers of the ex
ecutive, particularly in reference to the General Postoffice and the public funds,
on which important subject the executive has an almost unlimited discretion as
things now are.

In a government like ours, liable to dangers so imminent from the excess
and abuse of patronage, it would seern extraordinary that a department of such
vast powers, with an annual income and expenditure so great, and with a host
of persons in its service, extending and ramifying itself to the remotest point,
and into every neighbourhood of the Union, and having a control over the cor
respondence and intercourse of the whole community, should be permitted to
remain so long, without efficient checks or responsibility, under the almost un
limited control of the executive. Such a power, wielded by a single will, is
sufficient of itself, when made an instrument of ambition, to contaminate the
community, and to control to a great extent public opinion. To guard against
this danger, and to impose effectual restrictions on executive patronage, acting
through this important department, your committee are of the opinion that an
entire reorganization of the department is required ; but their labour, in refer-

188 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

ence to this subject, has been superseded by the Committee on the Postoffice,
which has bestowed so much attention on it, and which is so much more mi
nutely acquainted with the diseased state of the department than your committee
can be, that it would be presumption on their part to attempt to add to their
recommendation.

But, as extensive and dangerous as is the patronage of the executive through
the postoffice department, it is not much less so in reference to the public
funds, over which, as has been stated, it now has unlimited control, and, through
them, over the entire banking system of the country. With a banking system
spread from Maine to Louisiana, from the Atlantic to the utmost West, consist
ing of not less than five or six hundred banks, struggling among themselves for
existence and gain, with an immense public fund under the control of the ex
ecutive, to be deposited in whatever banks he may favour, or to be withdrawn at
his pleasure, it is impossible for ingenuity to devise any scheme better calcu
lated to convert the surplus revenue into a most potent engine of power and in
fluence ; and, it may be added, of peculation, speculation, corruption, and fraud.
The first and most decisive step against this danger is that already proposed,
of distributing tbe surplus revenue among the states, which will prevent its
growing accumulation in the banks, and, with it, the corresponding increase of
executive power and influence over the banking system. In addition, your
committee have reported a bill to charge the deposite banks at the rate of
per cent, per annum for the use of the public funds, to be calculated on the
average monthly deposites ; to prohibit transfers, except for the purpose of dis
bursements ; and to prevent a removal of the public funds from the banks in
which they are now, or may hereafter be deposited, without the consent of
Congress, except as is provided in the bill. The object of the bill is to secure
to the government an equivalent for the use of the public funds, to prevent the
abuses and influence incident to transfer- warrants, and to place the deposite
banks, as far as it may be practicable, beyond the control of the executive.

In addition to these measures, there are, doubtless, many others connected
with the customs — Indian affairs, public lands, army, navy, and other branches
of the administration — into which, it is feared, there have crept inany abuses,
which have unnecessarily increased the expenditures and the number of per
sons employed, and, with them, the executive patronage ; but to reform which
would require a more minute investigation into the general state of the adminis
tration than your committee can at present bestow. Should the measures which
they have recommended receive the sanction of Congress, they feel a strong
conviction that they will greatly facilitate the work of carrying accountability,
retrenchment, and economy through every branch of the administration, and
thereby reduce the patronage of the executive to those safe and economical
limits which are necessary to a complete restoration of the equilibrium of the
system, now so dangerously disturbed. Your committee are deeply impressed
with the necessity of commencing early, and of carrying through to its full and
final completion, this great work of reform.

The disease is daily becoming more aggravated and dangerous, and, if it be
permitted to advance for a few years longer with the rapidity with which it
has of late, it will soon pass beyond the reach of remedy. This is no party
question. Every lover of his country and of its institutions, be his party what
it may, must see and deplore the rapid growth of patronage, with all its attend
ant evils, and the certain catastrophe which awaits its farther progress, if not
timely arrested. The question now is not how, or where, or with whom the
danger originated, but how it is to be arrested ; not the cause, but the remedy ;
not how our institutions and liberty have been endangered, but how they are to
be rescued.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 189

XI.

A REPORT ON THAT PORTION OF THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE WHICH RE
LATED TO THE ADOPTION OF EFFICIENT MEASURES TO PREVENT THE
CIRCULATION OF INCENDIARY ABOLITION PETITIONS THROUGH THE
MAIL, FEBRUARY 4, 1836.

The Select Committee to whom was referred that portion of the President's Mes
sage which relates to the attempts to circulate, through the mail, inflammatory
appeals, to excite the slaves to insurrection, submit the following report:

THE committee fully concur with the President as to the character and ten
dency of the papers which have been attempted to be circulated in the South
through the mail, and participate with him in the indignant regret which he ex
presses at conduct so destructive of the peace and harmony of the country, and
so repugnant to the Constitution and the dictates of humanity and religion. They
also concur in the hope that, if the strong tone of disapprobation which these
unconstitutional and wicked attempts have called forth does not arrest them,
the non-slaveholding states will be prompt to exercise their power to suppress
them, as far as their authority extends. But, while they agree with the Presi
dent as to the evil and its highly dangerous tendency, and the necessity of ar
resting it, they have not been able to assent to the measure of redress which he
recommends — that Congress should pass a law prohibiting, under severe pen
alty, the transmission of incendiary publications through the mail, intended to
instigate the slaves to insurrection.

After the most careful and deliberate investigation, they have been constrain
ed to adopt the conclusion that Congress has not the power to pass such a law ;
that it would be a violation of one of the most sacred provisions of the Consti
tution, and subversive of reserved powers essential to the preservation of the
domestic institutions of the slaveholding states, and, with them, their peace and
security. Concurring, as they do, with the President in the magnitude of the
evil and the necessity of its suppression, it would hare been the cause of deep
regret to the committee, if they thought the difference of opinion, as to the right
of Congress, would deprive the slaveholding states of any portion of the protec
tion which the measure recommended by the President was intended to afford
them. On the contrary, they believe all the protection intended may be afford
ed, according to the views they take of the power of Congress, without infrin
ging on any provision of the Constitution on one side, or the reserved rights of
the states on the other.

The committee, with these preliminary remarks, will now proceed to estab
lish the positions which they have assumed, beginning with the first — that the
passage of a law would be a violation of an express provision of the Constitution.
In the discussion of this point, the committee do not deem it necessary to in
quire whether the right to pass such a law can be derived from the power to
establish postoffices and postroads, or from the trust of " preserving the relation
created by the Constitution between the states," as supposed by the President.
However ingenious or plausible the arguments may be by which it may be at
tempted to derive the right from these or any other sources, they must fall short
of their object. The jealous spirit of liberty which characterized our ancestors
at the period when the Constitution was adopted, forever closed the door by
which the right might be implied from any of the granted powers, or any other
source, if there be any other. The committee refer to the amended article of
the Constitution, which, among other things, provides that Congress shall pass
no law which shall abridge the liberty of the press — a provision which inter
poses, as will be hereafter shown, an insuperable objection to the measure rec-

190 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

ommended by the President. That the true meaning of this provision may be
fully comprehended, as bearing on the point under consideration, it will be ne
cessary to recur briefly to the history of the adoption of the Constitution.

It is well known that great opposition was made to the adoption of the Con
stitution. It was acknowledged on all sides, at the time, that the old confeder
ation, from its weakness, had failed, and that something must be done to save
the country from anarchy and convulsion ; yet, so high was the spirit of liberty
— so jealous were our ancestors of that day of power, that the utmost efforts
were necessary, under all the then existing pressure, to obtain the assent of the
states to the ratification of the Constitution. Among the many objections to its
adoption, none were more successfully urged than the absence in the instrument
of those general provisions which experience had shown to be necessary to
guard the outworks of liberty : such as the freedom of the press and of speech,
the rights of conscience, of trial by jury, and others of like character. It was
the belief of those jealous and watchful guardians of liberty, who viewed the
adoption of the Constitution with so much apprehension, that all these sacred
barriers, without some positive provision to protect them, would, by the power
of construction, be undermined and prostrated. So strong was this apprehen
sion, that it was impossible to obtain a ratification of the instrument in many of
the states without accompanying it with the recommendation to incorporate in
the Constitution various articles, as amendments, intended to remove this defect,
and guard against the danger apprehended, by placing these important rights
beyond the possible encroachment of Congress. One of the most important of
these is that which stands at the head of the list of amended articles, and which,
among other things, as has been stated, prohibits the passage of any law abridg
ing the freedom of the press, and which left that important barrier against pow
er under the exclusive authority and control of the states.

That it was the object of this provision to place the freedom of the press be
yond the possible interference of Congress, is a doctrine not now advanced for
the first time. It is the ground taken, and so ably sustained by Mr. Madison,
in his celebrated report to the Virginia Legislature, in 1799, against the alien
and sedition law, and which conclusively settled the principle that Congress
has no right, in any form or in any manner, to interfere with the freedom of
the press.* The establishment of this principle not only overthrew the se
dition act, but was the leading cause of the great political revolution which,
in 1801, brought the Republican party, with Mr. Jefferson at its head, into
power.

With these remarks, the committee will turn to the sedition act, in order to
show the identity in principle between it and the act which the message recom
mends to be passed,, as far as it relates to the freedom of the press. Among its
other provisions, it inflicted punishment on all persons who should publish any
false, scandalous, or malicious writing against the government, with intent to
defame the same, or bring it into contempt or disrepute. Assuming this pro
vision to be unconstitutional, as abridging the freedom of the press, which no
one now doubts, it will not be difficult to show that if, instead of inflicting pun
ishment for publishing, the act had inflicted punishment for circulating through
the mail for the same offence, it would have been equally unconstitutional. The
one would have abridged the freedom of the press as effectually as the other. The
object of publishing is circulation ; and to prohibit circulation is, in effect, to
prohibit publication. They both have a common object — the communication
of sentiments and opinions to the public ; and the prohibition of one may as
effectually suppress such communication as the prohibition of the other ; and, of

* The article is in the following words :

" Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer
cise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ; or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble, and petition the government for a redress of grievances."

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 191

course, would as effectually interfere with the freedom of the press, and be
equally unconstitutional.

But, to understand more fully the extent of the control which the right of
prohibiting circulation through the mail would give to the government over the
press, it must be borne in mind that the power of Congress over the post-
office and the mail is an exclusive power. It must also be remembered that
Congress, in the exercise of this power, may declare any road or navigable
water to be a post-road; and that, by the act of 1825, it is provided "that no
stage, or other vehicle which regularly performs trips on a post-road, or on a
road parallel to it, shall carry letters." The same provision extends to packets,
boats, or other vessels, on navigable waters. Like provision may be extended
to newspapers and pamphlets ; which, if it be admitted that Congress has the right
to discriminate in reference to their character, what papers shall or what shall
not be transmitted by the mail, would subject the freedom of the press on all
subjects, political, moral, and religious, completely to its will and pleasure. It
would, in fact, in some respects, more effectually control the freedom of the
press than any sedition law, however severe its penalties. The mandate of the
government alone would be sufficient to close the door against circulation through
the mail ; and thus, at its sole will and pleasure, might intercept all communica
tion between the press and the people, while it would require the intervention,
of courts and juries to enforce the provisions of a sedition law, which experi
ence has shown are not always passive and willing instruments in the hands of
government, where the freedom of the press is concerned.

From these remarks, it must be apparent that, to prohibit publication on one
side, and circulation through the mail on the other, of any paper, on account of
its religious, moral, or political character, rests on the same principle ; and that
each is equally an abridgment of the freedom of the press, and a violation of
the Constitution. It would, indeed, have been but a poor triumph for the cause
of liberty, in the great contest of 1799, had the sedition law been put down on
principles that would have left Congress free to suppress the circulation through
the mail of the very publications which that odious act was intended to pro
hibit. The authors of that memorable achievement would have had but slen
der claims on the gratitude of posterity, if their victory over the encroachment
of power had been left so imperfect.

It will, after what has been said, require but few remarks to show that the
same principle which applied to the sedition law would apply equally to a law
punishing, by Congress, such incendiary publications as are referred to in the
message, and, of course, to the 'passage of a law prohibiting their transmission
through the mail. The principle on which the sedition act was condemned as
unconstitutional was a general one, and not limited in its application to that act.
It withdraws from Congress all right of interference with the press, in any form
or shape whatever ; and the sedition law was put down as unconstitutional, not
because it prohibited publications against the government, but because it inter
fered at all with the press. The prohibition of any publication on the ground
of its being immoral, irreligious, or intended to excite rebellion or insurrection,
would have been equally unconstitutional ; and, from parity of reason, the sup
pression of their circulation through the mail would be no less so.

But, as conclusive as these reasons are against the right, there are others not
less so, derived from the powers reserved to the states, which the committee
will next proceed to consider.

The message, as has been stated, 'recommends that Congress should pass a
la\v to punish the transmission through the mail of incendiary publications in
tended to instigate the slaves to insurrection. It of course assumes for Congress
a right to determine what, papers are incendiary, and intended to excite insur
rection. The question, then, is, Has Congress such a right ? A question of
vital importance to the slavehoJding states, as will appear in the course of the
discussion.

192 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

After examining this question with due deliberation, in all its bearings, the
committee are of opinion, not only that Congress has not the right, but to admit
it would be fatal to the states. Nothing is more clear than that the admission
of the right, on the part of Congress, to determine what papers are incendiary,
and, as such, to prohibit their circulation through the mail, necessarily involves
the right to determine what are not incendiary, and to enforce their circulation.
Nor is it less certain that, to admit such a right, would be virtually to clothe
Congress with the power to abolish slavery, by giving it the means of breaking-
down all the barriers which the slaveholding states have erected for the pro
tection of their lives and property. It would give Congress, without regard to
the prohibition laws of the states, the authority to open the gates to the flood
of incendiary publications which are ready to break into those states, and to
punish all who dare resist as criminals. Fortunately, Congress has no such
light. The internal peace and security of the states are under the protection
of the states themselves, to the entire exclusion of all authority and control on
the part of Congress. It belongs to them, and not to Congress, to determine
•what is, or is not, calculated to disturb their peace and security ; and, of course,
in the case under consideration, it belongs to the slaveholding states to deter
mine what is incendiary and intended to incite to insurrection, and to adopt
such defensive measures as may be necessary for their security, with unlimited
means of carrying them into effect, except such as may be expressly inhibited
to the states by the Constitution. To establish the truth of this position, so es
sential to the safety of those states, it would seem sufficient to appeal to their
constant exercise of this right at all times, without restriction or question, both
before and since the adoption of the Constitution. But, on a point of so much
importance, which may involve the safety, if not the existence itself, of an en
tire section of the Union, it will be proper to trace it to its origin, in order to
place it on a more immovable foundation.

That the states which form our Federal Union are sovereign and independent
communities, bound together by a constitutional compact, and are possessed of
all the powers belonging to distinct and separate states, excepting such as are
delegated to be exercised by the General Government, is assumed as unques
tionable. The compact itself expressly provides that all powers not delegated
•are reserved to the states and the people. To ascertain, then, whether the
power in question is delegated or reserved, it is only necessary to ascertain
"whether it is to be found among the enumerated powers or not. If it be not
among them, it belongs, of course, to the reserved powers. On turning to the
Constitution, it will be seen that, while the power of defending the country
against external danger is found among the enumerated, the instrument is whol
ly silent as to the power of defending the internal peace and security of the
states, and, of course, reserves to the states this important power, as it stood
before the adoption of the Constitution, with no other limitation, as has been
stated, except such as are expressly prescribed by the instrument itself. From
what has been stated, it may be inferred that the right of a state to defend it
self against internal dangers is a part of the great, primary, and inherent right
of self-defence, which, by the laws of nature, belongs to all communities ; and
so jealous were the states of this essential right, without which their independ
ence could not be preserved, that it is expressly provided by the Constitution,*
that the General Government shall not assist a state, even in case of domestic
violence, except on the application of the authorities of the state itself: thus ex
cluding, by a necessary consequence, its interference in all other cases.

Having now shown that it belongs to the slaveholding states, whose institu
tions are in danger, and not to Congress, as is supposed by the message, to de
termine what papers are incendiary and intended to excite insurrection among

* See 4th article, 4th section, of the Constitution.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 193

the slaves, it remains to inquire, in the next place, what are the corresponding
duties of the General Government, and the other states, from within whose lim
its and jurisdiction their institutions are attacked : a subject intimately connect
ed with that with which the committee are immediately charged, and which,
at the present juncture, ought to be fully understood by all the parties. The
committee will begin with the first.

It may not be entirely useless to premise that rights and duties ar$ recipro
cal — the existence of a right always implying a corresponding duty. If, con
sequently, the right to protect her internal peace and security belongs to a state,
the General Government is bound to respect the measures adopted by her for
that purpose, and to co-operate in their execution, as far as its delegated pow
ers may admit, or the measure may require. Thus, in the present case, the
slaveholding states having the unquestionable right to pass all such laws as may
be necessary to maintain the existing relation between master and slave in those
states, their right, of course, to prohibit the circulation of any publication or any
intercourse calculated to disturb or destroy that relation, is incontrovertible. In
the execution of the measures which may be adopted by the states for this pur
pose, the powers of Congress over the mail, and of regulating commerce with
foreign nations and between the states, may require co-operation on the part of
the General Government ; and it is bound, in conformity to the principle estab
lished, to respect the laws of the state in their exercise, and so to modify its
acts as not only not to violate those of the states, but, as far as practicable, to
co-operate in their execution. The practice of the government has been in
conformity to these views.

By the act of the 28th of February, 1803, entitled "An act to prevent the
importation of certain persons into certain states," where, by the laws of those
states, their importation is prohibited, masters or captains of ships or vessels are
forbidden, under severe penalty, " to import or bring, or cause to be imported or
brought, any negro or mulatto, or person of colour, not being a native or citizen,
or registered seaman of the United States, or seamen, natives of countries be
yond the Cape of Good Hope, into any port or place which shall be situated in
any state which, by law, has prohibited, or shall prohibit, the admission or im
portation of such negro, mulatto, or other person of colour." This provision
speaks for itself, and requires no illustration. It is a case in point, and fully
embraces the principle laid down. To the same effect is the act of the 25th of
February, 1799, respecting quarantine and health laws, which, as belonging to
the internal police of the states, stand on the same ground. The act, among
other things, " directs the collectors and all other revenue officers, the masters
and crews of the revenue cutters, and the military officers in command on the
station, to co-operate faithfully in the execution of the quarantine and other re
strictions which the health laws of the state may establish."

The principles embraced by these acts, in relation to the commercial inter
course of the country, are equally applicable to the intercourse by mail. There
may, indeed, be more difficulty in co-operating with the states in the latter than
in the former, but that cannot possibly affect the principle. Regarding it, then,
as established both by reason and precedents, the committee, in conformity
with it, have prepared a bill, and directed their chairman to report the same to
the Senate, prohibiting, under the penalty of fine and dismission from office, any
deputy postmaster in any state, territory, or district, from knowingly receiving
and putting into the mail any letter, packet, pamphlet, paper, or pictorial repre
sentation, directed to any postoffice or person in a state, territory, or district, by
the laws of which the circulation of the same is forbidden ; and also prohibit
ing, under a like penalty, any deputy postmaster in said state, territory, or dis
trict, from knowingly delivering the same, except to such persons as may be
authorized to receive them by the civil authority of said state, territory, or dis
trict.

BB

194 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

It remains next to inquire into the duty of the states, from within whose lim
its and jurisdiction the internal peace and security of the slaveholding states
are endangered.

In order to comprehend more fully the nature and extent of their duty, it will
be necessary to make a few remarks on the relations which exist between the
states of our Federal Union, with the rights and obligations reciprocally result
ing from such relations.

It has already been stated that the states which compose our Federal Union
are sovereign arid independent communities, united by a constitutional compact.
Among its members the laws of nations are in full force and obligation, except
as altered or modified by the compact ; and, of course, the states possess, with
that exception, all the rights, arid are subject to all the duties which separate
and distinct communities possess, or to which they are subject. Among these
are comprehended the obligation which all states are under to prevent their citi
zens from disturbing the peace or endangering the security of other states ; and,
in case of being disturbed or endangered, the right of the latter to demand of
the former to adopt such measures as will prevent their recurrence ; and, if re
fused or neglected, to resort to such measures as its protection may require.
This right remains, of course, in force among the states of this Union, with
such limitations as are imposed expressly by the Constitution. Within their
limits, the rights of the slaveholding states are as full to demand of the states
within whose limits and jurisdiction their peace is assailed, to adopt the meas
ures necessary to prevent the same, and, if refused or neglected, to resjort to
means to protect themselves, as if they were separate and independent commu
nities.

Those states, on the other hand, are not only under all the obligations which
independent communities would be to adopt such measures, but also under the
obligation which the Constitution superadds, rendered more sacred, if possible,
by the fact that, while the Union imposes restrictions on the right of the slave-
holding states to defend themselves, it affords the medium through which their
peace and security are assailed. It is not the intention of the committee to in
quire what those restrictions are, and what are the means which, under the
Constitution, are left to the slaveholding states to protect themselves. The pe
riod has not yet come, and they trust never will, when it may be necessary to
decide those questions ; but come it must, unless the states whose duty it is to
suppress the danger shall see in time its magnitude, and the obligations which
they are under to adopt speedy and effectual measures to arrest its farther prog
ress. That the full force of this obligation may be understood by all parties,
the committee propose, in conclusion, to touch briefly on the movements of the
Abplitionists, with the view of showing the dangerous consequences to which
they must lead if not arrested.

Their professed object is the emancipation of slaves in the Southern States,
which they propose to accomplish through the agency of organized societies,
spread throughout the Lon-slaveholding states, arid a powerful press, directed
mainly to excite in the other states hatred arid abhorrence against the institu
tions and citizens of the slaveholding states, by addresses, lectures, and picto
rial representations, abounding in false and exaggerated statements.

If the magnitude of the mischief affords, in any degree, the measure by which
to judge of the criminality of a project, few have ever been devised to be com
pared with the present, whether the end be regarded, or the means by which
it is proposed to be accomplished. The blindness of fanaticism is proverbial.
With more zeal than understanding, it constantly misconceives the nature of
the object at which it aims, and towards which it rushes with headlong violence,
regardless of the means by which it is to be effected. Never was its charac
ter more fully exemplified than in the present instance. Setting out with the
abstract principle that slavery is an evil, the fanatical zealots come at once to

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 195

the conclusion that it is their duty to abolish it, regardless of all the disasters
which must follow. Never was conclusion more false or dangerous. Admit
ting their assumption, there are innumerable things which, regarded in the ab
stract, are evils, but which it would be madness to attempt to abolish. Thus
regarded, government itself is an evil, with most of its institutions intended to
protect life and property, comprehending the civil as well as the criminal and
military code, which are tolerated only because to abolish them would be to
increase instead of diminishing the evil. The reason is equally applicable to
the case under consideration : to illustrate which, a few remarks on slavery, as
it actually exists in the Southern States, will be necessary.

He who regards slavery in those states simply under the relation of master
and slave, &s important as that relation is, viewed merely as a question of prop
erty to the slaveholding section of the Union, has a very imperfect conception
of the institution, and the impossibility of abolishing it without disasters unex
ampled in the history of the world. To understand its nature and importance
fully, it must be borne in mind that slavery, as it exists in the Southern States
(including under the Southern all the slaveholding States), involves not only
the relation of master and slave, but also the social and political relations of
two races, of nearly equal numbers, from different quarters of me globe, and the
most opposite of all others in every particular that distinguishes one race of
men from another. Emancipation would destroy these relations — would divest
the masters of their property, and subvert the relation, social and political, that
has existed between the races from almost the first -settlement -of the Southern
States.

It is not the intention of the committee to dwell on the pecuniary aspect
of this vital subject : the vast amount of property involved, equal, at least, to
$950,000,000, the ruin of families and individuals, the impoverishment and
prostration of an entire section of the Union, and the fatal blow that would be
given to the productions of the great agricultural staples, on which the com
merce, the navigation, the manufactures, and the revenue of the country almost
entirely depend. As great as these disasters would be, they are nothing com
pared to what must follow the subversion of the existing relation between the
two races, to which the committee will confine their remarks.

Under this relation the two races have long lived in peace and prosperity,
and, if not disturbed, would long continue so to live. While the European race
has rapidly increased in wealth arid numbers, and, at the same time, has main
tained an equality, at least morally and intellectually, with their brethren of the
non-slaveholding states, the African race has multiplied with not less rapidity
accompanied by great improvement, physically and intellectually, and a degree
of comfort which the labouring class in few other countries enjoy, and con
fessedly greatly superior to what the free people of the same race possess in
the non-slaveholding states. It may, indeed, be safely asserted, that there is
no example in history in which a savage people, such as their ancestors were
when brought into the country, have ever advanced in the same period so rap
idly in numbers and improvement.

To destroy the existing relations, would be to destroy this prosperity, and to
place the two races in a state of conflict, which must end in the expulsion or
extirpation of one or the other. No other can be substituted compatible with
their peace or security. The difficulty is in the diversity of the races. So
strongly drawn is the line between the two in consequence, and so strengthen
ed by the force of habit and education, that it is impossible for them to exist to
gether in the same .community, where their numbers are so nearly equal as in
the slaveholding states, under any other relation than that which now exists.
Social and political equality between them is impossible. No power on earth
can overcome the difficulty. The causes lie too deep in the principles of our
nature to be surmounted. But, without such equality, to change the present

196 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

condition of the African race, were it possible, would be but to change the form
of slavery. It would make them the slaves of the community instead of the
slaves of individuals, with less responsibility and interest in their welfare on the
part of the community than is felt by their present masters ; while it would destroy
the security and independence of the European race, if the African should be per
mitted to continue in their changed condition within the limits of those states.
They would loojc to the other states for support and protection, and would be
come, virtually, their allies and dependants ; and would thus place in the hands
of those states the most effectual instrument to destroy the influence and con
trol the destiny of the rest of the Union.

It is against this relation between the two races that the blind and criminal
zeal of the Abolitionists is directed — a relation that now preserves ill quiet and
security more than 6,500,000 of human beings, and which cannot be destroyed
without destroying the peace and prosperity of nearly half the states of the
Union, and involving their entire population in a deadly conflict, that must ter
minate either in the expulsion or extirpation of those who are the object of the
misguided and false humanity of those who claim to be their friends.

He must be blind indeed who does not perceive that the subversion of a re
lation which must be followed with such disastrous consequences, can only be
effected by convulsions -that would devastate the country, burst asunder the
bonds of the Union, and ingulf in a sea of blood the institutions of the country.
It is madness to suppose that the slaveholding states would quietly submit to be
sacrificed. Every consideration — interest, duty, and humanity ; the love of
country, the sense of wrong, hatred of oppressors, and treacherous and faithless
confederates, and, finally, despair — would impel them to the most daring and
desperate resistance in defence of property, family, country, liberty, and exist
ence.

But wicked and cruel as is the end aimed at, it is fully equalled by the
criminality of the means by which it is proposed to be accomplished. These,
as has been stated, consist in organized societies and a powerful press, directed
mainly with a view to excite the bitterest animosity and hatred of the people of
the non-slaveholding states against the citizens and institutions of the slave-
holding states. It is easy to see to what disastrous results such means must
tend. Passing over the more obvious effects, their tendency to excite to insur
rection and servile war, with all its horrors, and the necessity which such ten
dency must impose on the slaveholding states to resort to the most rigid disci
pline and severe police, to the great injury of the present condition of the slaves,
there remains another threatening, incalculable mischief to the country.

The inevitable tendency of the means to which the Abolitionists have resort
ed to effect their object must, if persisted in, end in completely alienating the
two great sections of the Union. The incessant action of hundreds of societies,
and a vast printing establishment, throwing out daily thousands of artful and in
flammatory publications, must make, in time, a deep impression on the section
of the Union where they freely circulate, and are mainly designed to have ef
fect. The well-informed and thoughtful may hold them in contempt, but the
young, the inexperienced, the ignorant, and thoughtless will receive the poison.
In process of time, when the number of proselytes is sufficiently multiplied, the
artful and profligate, who are ever on the watch to seize on any means, how
ever wicked and dangerous, will unite with the fanatics, and make their move
ments the basis of a powerful political party, that will seek advancement by
diffusing, as widely as possible, hatred against the slaveholding states. But,
as hatred begets hatred, and animosity animosity, these feelings would become
reciprocal, till every vestige of attachment would cease to exist between the
two sections ; when the Union and the Constitution, the offspring of mutual af
fection and confidence, would forever perish.

Such is the danger to which the movements of the Abolitionists expose the

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 197

country. If the force of the obligation is in proportion to the magnitude of the
danger, stronger cannot be imposed than is at present on the states within
whose limits the danger originates, to arrest its farther progress — a duty they
owe, not only to the states whose institutions are assailed, but to the Union and
Constitution, as has been shown, and, it may be added, to themselves. The
sober and considerate portions of citizens of the non-slaveholding states, who
have a deep stake in the existing institutions of the country, would have little
forecast not to see that the assaults which are now directed against the institu
tions of the Southern States may be very easily directed against those which
uphold their own property and security. A very slight modification of the ar
guments used against the institutions which sustain the property and security
of the South would make them equally effectual against the institutions of the
North, including banking, in which so vast an amount of its property and capi
tal is invested. It would be well for those interested to reflect whether there
now exists, or ever has existed, a wealthy and civilized community in which
one portion did not live on the labour of another ; and whether the form in
which slavery exists in the South is not but one modification of this universal
condition ; and, finally, whether any other, under all the circumstances of the
case, is more defensible, or stands on stronger ground of necessity. It is time
to look these questions in the face. Let those who are interested remember
that labour is the only source of wealth, and how small a portion of it, in all
old and civilized countries, even the best governed, is left to those by whose
labour wealth is created. Let them also reflect how little volition or agency
the operatives in any country have in the question of its distribution — as little,
with a few exceptions, as the African of the slaveholding states has in the distri
bution of the proceeds of his labour. Nor is it the less oppressive, that in the
one case it is effected by the stem and powerful will of the government, and in
the other by the more feeble and flexible will of a master. If one be an evil,
so is the other. The only difference is the amount and mode of the exaction,
and distribution, and the agency by which they are effected.

XII.

SPEECH ON THE ABOLITION PETITIONS, MARCH 9, 1836.

THE question of receiving the petitions from Pennsylvania for the abo
lition of slavery in the District of Columbia being under consideration,

Mr. Calhoun rose and said : If we may judge from what has been said,
the mind of the Senate is fully made up on the subject of these petitions.
With the exception of the two senators from Vermont, all who have
spoken have avowed their conviction, not only that they contain nothing
requiring the action of the Senate, but that the petitions are highly mis
chievous, as tending to agitate and distract the country, and to endanger
the Union itself. With these concessions, I may fairly ask, Why should
these petitions be received 1 Why receive when we have made up our
mind not to act 1 Why idly waste our time and lower our dignity in the
useless ceremony of receiving to reject, as is proposed, should the peti
tions be received 1 Why, finally, receive what all acknowledge to be
highly dangerous and mischievous 1 But one reason has, or can be as
signed — that not to receive would be a violation of the rig-hit of petition,
and, of course, that we are bound to receive, however objectionable and
dangerous the petitions may be. If such be the fact, there is an end to
the question. As great as would be the advantage to the Abolitionists if
we are bound to receive, if it would be a violation of the right of petition

198 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

not to receive, we must acquiesce. On the other hand, if it shall be
shown, not only that we are not bound to receive, but that to receive, on
the ground on which it has been placed, would sacrifice the constitutional
rights of this body, would yield to the Abolitionists all they could hope
at this time, and would surrender all the outworks by which the slave-
holding states can defend their rights and property HERE, then a unani
mous rejection of these petitions ought of right to follow.

The decision, then, of the question now before the Senate is reduced
to the single point, Are we bound to receive these petitions 1 Or, to vary
the form of the question, Would it be a violation of the right of petition
not to receive them 1

When the ground was first taken that it would be a violation, I could
scarcely persuade myself that those who took it were in earnest, so con
trary was it to all my conceptions of the rights of this body and the
provisions of the Constitution : but finding it so earnestly maintained, I
have since carefully investigated the subject, and the result has been a
confirmation of my first impression, and a conviction that the claim of
right is without shadow of foundation. The question, I must say, has
not been fairly met. Those opposed to the side wrhich we support have
discussed the question as if we denied the right of petition, when they
could not but know that the true issue is not as to the existence of the
right, which is acknowledged by all, but its extent and limits, which not
one of our opponents has so much as attempted to ascertain. What they
have declined doing I undertake to perform.

There must be some point, all will agree, where the right of petition
ends, an4 that of this body begins. Where is that point 1 I have exam
ined this question carefully, and I assert boldly, without the least fear of
refutation, that, stretched to the utmost, the right cannot be extended be
yond the presentation of a petition, at which point the rights of this body
commence. When a petition is presented, it is before the Senate. It
must then be acted on. Some disposition must be made of it before the
Senate can proceed to the consideration of any other subject. This no one
will deny. With the action of the Senate its rights commence : rights
secured by an express provision of the Constitution, which vests each
house with the right of regulating its own proceedings, that is, to deter
mine by fixed rules the order and form of its action. To extend the right
of petition beyond presentation, is clearly to extend it beyond that point
where the action of the Senate commences, and, as such, is a manifest
violation of its constitutional rights. Here, then, we have the limits be
tween the right of petition and the right of the Senate to regulate its
proceedings clearly fixed, and so perfectly defined as not to admit of mis
take, and, I would add, of controversy, had it not been questioned in this
discussion.

If what I have asserted required confirmation, ample might be found in
our rules, which imbody the deliberate sense of the Senate on this point,
from the commencement of the government to this day. Among them,
the Senate has prescribed that of its proceedings on the presentation of
petitions. It is contained in the 24th Rule, which I ask the secretary to
read, with Mr. Jefferson's remarks in reference to it.
. " Before any petition or memorial addressed to the Senate shall be re
ceived and read at the table, whether the same shall be introduced by the
President or a member, a brief statement of the contents of the petition
or memorial shall verbally be made by the introducer." — Rule 24.

Mr. Jefferson's remarks : " Regularly a motion for receiving it must be
made and seconded, and a question put whether it shall be received ; but a cry
from the house of ' Receive,' or even a silence, dispenses with the for
mality of the question."

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 199

Here we have a confirmation of all I have asserted. It clearly proves
that, when a petition is presented, the action of the Senate commences.
The first act is to receive the petition. Received by whom 1 Not the
secretary, but the Senate. And how can it be received by the Senate
but on a motion to receive, and a vote of a majority of the body 1 And
Mr. Jefferson, accordingly, tells us that, regularly, such a motion must be
made and seconded. 'On this question, then, the right of the Senate
begins, and its right is as perfect and full to receive or reject, as it is to
adopt or reject any other question, in any subsequent stage of its pro
ceedings. When I add that this rule was adopted as far back as the 19th
of April, 1789, at the first session of the Senate, and that it has been re
tained, without alteration, in all the subsequent changes and modifications
of the rules, we have the strongest evidence of the deliberate sense of this
body in reference to the point under consideration.

I feel that I might here terminate the discussion. I have shown con
clusively that the right of petition cannot possibly be extended beyond
presentation. At that point it is met by the rights of the Senate ; and it
follows, as a necessary consequence, that, so far from being bound to re
ceive these petitions, so far would a rejection be from violating the right
of petition, we are left perfectly free to reject or to receive at pleasure,
and that we cannot be deprived of it without violating the rights of this
body, secured by the Constitution.

But, on a question of such magnitude, I feel it to be a duty to remove
every difficulty ; and, that not a shadow of doubt may remain, I shall
next proceed to reply to the objections our opponents have made to the
grounds I have taken. At the head of these it has been urged, again and
again, that petitioners have a right to be heard, and that not to receive
petitions is to refuse a hearing. It is to be regretted that, throughout
this discussion, those opposed to us have dealt in such vague generalities,
and ventured assertions with so little attention to facts. Why have they
not informed us, in the present instance, what is meant by the right to
be heard, and how that right is violated by a refusal to receive 1 Had
they thought proper to give us this information, it would, at least, have
greatly facilitated my reply; but as it is, I am constrained to inquire into
the different senses in which the assertion may be taken, and then to
show that in not one of them is the right of petition in the slightest de
gree infringed by a refusal to receive.

What, then, is meant by the assertion that these petitioners have a right
to be heard 1 Is it meant that they have a right to appear in the Senate
chamber in person to present their petition and to be heard in its defence^.
If this be the meaning, the dullest apprehension must see that the ques
tion on receiving has not the slightest bearing on such right. If they
have the right to be heard personally at our bar, it is not the 24-th rule of
our proceedings, but the 19th which violates that right. That rule ex
pressly provides that a motion to admit any person whatever within the
doors of the Senate to present a petition shall be out of order, and, of
course, excludes the petitioners from being heard in person. But it may
i)e meant that petitioners have a right to have their petitions presented
to the Senate and read in their hearing. If this be the meaning, the right
has been enjoyed in the present instance to the fullest extent. The peti
tion was presented by the senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Buchanan) in
the usual mode, by giving a statement of its contents, and on my call was
read by the secretary at his table.

But one more sense can be attached to the assertion. It may be meant
that the petitioners have a right to have their petitions discussed by the
Senate. If this be intended, I will venture to say that there never was an

200 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

assertion more directly in the teeth of facts than that which has been so
frequently made in the course of this discussion, that, to refuse to receive
the petition, is to refuse a hearing to the petitioners. Has not this ques
tion heen before us for months! Has not the petition been discussed
day after day, fully and freely, in all its bearings 1 And how, with these
facts before us, with the debates still ringing in our ears, any senator can,
rise in his place, and gravely pronounce that to refuse to receive this pe
tition is to refuse a hearing to the petitioners, to refuse discussion in the
broadest sense, is past my comprehension. Our opponents, as if in their
eagerness to circumscribe the rights of the Senate, and to enlarge those
of the Abolitionists (for such must be the effect of their course), have
closed their senses against facts passing before their eyes ; and have en
tirely overlooked the nature of the question now before the Senate, and
which they have been so long discussing.

The question on receiving the petition not only admits discussion, but
admits it in the most ample manner ; more so, in fact, than any other,
except the final question on the rejection of the prayer of the petition, or
some tantamount question. Whatever may go to show that the petition
is or is not deserving the action of this body, may be freely urged for
or against it, as has been done on the present occasion. In this respect
there is a striking difference between it and many of the subsequent ques
tions which may be raised after reception, and particularly the one made
by the senator from Tennessee (Mr. Grundy), who now is so strenuous
an advocate in favour of the right of the petitioners to be heard. He
spoke with apparent complacency of his course as it respects another of
these petitions. And what was that course 'I He who is now so eager
for discussion to give a hearing, moved to lay the petition on the table,
a motion which cuts off all discussion.

But it may be asked, If the question on receiving petitions admits of
so wide a scope for discussion, why not receive this petition, and discuss
it at some subsequent stage ! Why not receive, in order to reject its
prayer, as proposed by the senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Buchanan),
instead of rejecting the petition itself on the question of receiving, as we
propose 1 What is the difference between the two \

I do not intend at this stage to compare, or, rather, to contrast the two
courses, for they admit of no comparison. My object at present is to
establish, beyond the possibility of a doubt, that we are not bound to re
ceive these petitions j and when that is accomplished, I will then show
the disastrous consequences which must follow the reception of the peti
tion, be the after disposition what it may. In the mean time, it is suffi
cient to remark, that it is only on the question of receiving that oppo
sition can be made to the petition itself. On all others the opposition is
to its prayer. On the decision, then, of the question of receiving depends
the important question of jurisdiction. To receive is to take jurisdic
tion ; to give an implied pledge to investigate and decide on the prayer,
and to give the petition a place in our archives, and become responsible
for its safe keeping ; and who votes for receiving this petition on the
ground on which its reception is placed, votes that Congress is bound to
take jurisdiction of the question of abolishing slavery both here and in
the states ; gives an implied pledge to take the subject under considera
tion, and orders the petition to be placed among the public records for
safe keeping.

But to proceed in reply to the objections of our opponents. It is next
urged that precedents are against the side we support. I meet this ob
jection Avith a direct denial. From the beginning of the government to
the commencement of this session, there is not a single precedent that

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 201

justifies the receiving of these petitions on the ground on which their re
ception is urged. The real state of the case is, that we are not following,
but making precedents. For the first time has the principle been assumed
that we are bound to receive petitions ; that we have no discretion, but
must take jurisdiction over them, however 'absurd, frivolous, mischievous,
or foreign from the purpose for which the government was created. Re
ceive these petitions, and you will create a precedent which will hereaf
ter establish this monstrous principle. As yet there are none. The case
relied on by the senator from Tennessee (Mr. Grundy) is in no respect
analogous. , No question, in that case, was made on the reception of the
petition. The petition slipped in without taking a vote, as is daily done
where the attention of the Senate is not particularly called to the subject.
The question on which the discussion took place was on the reference,
and not on the reception, as in this case ; but what is decisive against the
precedent, and which I regret the senator (Mr. Grundy) did not state, so
that it might accompany his remarks, is the fact that the petition was not
for abolishing slavery. The subject was the African slave-trade ; and the
petition simply prayed that Congress would inquire whether they might
not adopt some measure of interdiction prior to 1808, when, by the Con
stitution, they would be authorized to suppress that trade. I ask the sec
retary to read the prayer of the petition :

" But we find it indispensably incumbent on us, as a religious body, as
suredly believing that both the true temporal interests of nations and
eternal well-being of individuals depend on doing justly, loving mercy,
and walking humbly before God, the creator, preserver, and benefactor of
men, thus to attempt to excite your attention to the affecting subject
(slave-trade), earnestly desiring that the infinite Father of Spirits may so
enrich our minds with his love and truth, and so influence your under
standing by that pure wisdom which is full of mercy and good fruits, as
that a sincere and an impartial inquiry may take place, whether it be not
an essential part of the duty of your exalted station to exert upright en
deavours, to the full extent of your power, to remove every obstruction
to public righteousness, which the influence of artifice of particular per
sons, governed by the narrow, mistaken views of self-interest, has occa
sioned ; and whether, notwithstanding such seeming impediments, it be
not really within your power to exercise justice and mercy, which, if ad
hered to, we cannot doubt abolition must produce the abolition of the
slave-trade."

Now, I ask the senator, Where is the analogy between this and the pres
ent petition, the reception of which he so strenuously urges 1 He is a
lawyer of long experience and of distinguished reputation, and I put the
question to him, On what possible principle can a case so perfectly dis
similar justify the vote he intends to give on the present occasion] On
what possible ground can the vote of Mr. Madison, to refer that petition,
on which he has so much relied, justify him in receiving this 1 Does he
not perceive, in his own example, the danger of forming precedents 1 If
he may call to his aid the authority of Mr. Madison, in a case so dissim
ilar, to justify the reception, of this petition, and thereby extend the juris
diction of Congress over the question of emancipation, to what purpose,
hereafter, may not the example of his course on the present occasion be
perverted 1

It is not my design to censure Mr. Madison's course, but I cannot re
frain from expressing my regret that his name is not found associated, on
that occasion, with the sagacious and firm representatives from the South
— Smith, Tucker, and Burke of South Carolina, James Jackson of Geor
gia, and many others, who, at that early period, foresaw the danger,

Cc

202 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

and met it as it ought ever to be met by those who regard the peace and
security of the slaveholding states. Had he added the weight of his tal
ents and authority to theirs, a more healthy tone of sentiment than that
which now, unfortunately, exists, would this day have been the conse
quence.

Another case has been cited to justify the vote for reception. I refer
to the petition from the Quakers in 1805, which the senator from Pennsyl
vania (Mr. Buchanan) relies on to sustain him in receiving the present pe
tition. What I have said in reply to the precedent cited by the senator
from Tennessee applies equally to this. Like that, the petition prayed
legislation, not on abolition of slavery, but the African slave-trade, over
which subject Congress then in a few years would have full jurisdiction
by the Constitution, and might well have their attention called to it in ad
vance. But, though their objects were the same, the manner in which
the petitions were met was very dissimilar. Instead of being permitted
to be received silently, like the former, this petition was met at the
threshold. The question of receiving was made, as on the present oc
casion, and its rejection sustained by a strong Southern vote, as the jour
nal will show. The secretary will read the journal :

" Mr. Logan presented a petition, signed Thomas Morris, clerk, on be
half of the meeting of the representatives of the people called Quakers,
in Pennsylvania, New-Jersey, &c., stating that the petitioners, from a
sense of religious duty, had again come forward to plead the cause of
their oppressed and degraded fellow-men of the African race. On the
question, ' Shall this petition be received V it passed in the affirmative —
yeas 19, nays 9."

Among those to receive the petition there were but four from the
slaveholding states, and this on a single petition praying for legislation on
a subject over which Congress in so short a time would have full author
ity. What an example to us on the present occasion ! Can any man
doubt, from the vote, if the Southern senators on that occasion had been
placed in our present situation — that, had it been their lot, as it is ours,
to meet that torrent of petitions which is now poured in on Congress, not
from peaceable Quakers, but ferocious incendiaries — not to suppress the
African slave-trade, but to abolish slavery, they would with united voice
have rejected the petition with scorn and indignation] Can any one who
&new him doubt that one of the senators from the South (the gallant Sum-
ter), who, on that occasion, voted for receiving the petition, would have
been among the first to vindicate the interests of those whom he rep
resented, had the question at that day been what it is on the present oc
casion'?

We are next told that, instead of looking to the Constitution in order
to ascertain what are the limits to the right of petition, we must push that
instrument aside, and go back to Magna Charta and the Declaration of
Eights for its origin and limitation. We live in strange times. It seems
there are Christians now more orthodox than the Bible, and politicians
whose standard is higher than the Constitution ; but I object not to tracing
the right to these ancient and venerated sources ; I hold in high estima
tion the institutions of our English ancestors. They grew up gradually,
through many generations, by the incessant and untiring efforts of an in
telligent and brave people struggling for centuries against the power of
the crown. To them we are indebted for nearly all that has been gained
for liberty in modern times, excepting what we have added. But may I
not ask how it has happened that our opponents, in going back to these
sacred instruments, have not thought proper to cite their provisions, or
to show in what manner our refusal to receive these petitions can violate

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 203

the right of petition as secured by them ^ I feel under no obligation to
supply the omission — to cite what they have omitted to cite, or to prove,
from the instruments themselves, that to be no violation of them which
they have not proved to be a. violation. It is unnecessary. The practice
of Parliament is sufficient for my purpose. It proves conclusively that
it is no violation of the right, as secured by those instruments, to refuse
to receive petitions. To establish what this practice is, I ask the secretary
to read from Hatsel, a work of the highest authority, the several para
graphs which are marked with a pencil, commencing at page 760, under
the head of Petitions on Matter of Supply :

" On the 9th of April, 1694, a petition was tendered to the house re*
lating to the bill for granting to their majesties several duties upon the
tonnage of ships ; and the question being put that the petition be re
ceived, it passed in the negative."

" On the 28th of April, 1698, a petition was offered to the house against
the bill for laying a duty upon inland pit coal j and the question being
put that the petition be received, it passed in the negative. See, also, the
29th and 30th of June, 1698, petitions relating to the duties upon Scotch
linens, and upon whale fins imported. — Vid. 20th of April, 1698."

" On the 5th of January, 1703, a petition of the maltsters of Nottingham
being offered against the bill for continuing the duties on malt, and the
question being put that the petition be brought up, it passed in the nega
tive."

" On the 21st of December, 1706, Resolved, That this house will receive
no petition for any sum of money relating to public service but what is
recommended from the crown. Upon the llth of June, 1713, this is de
clared to be a standing order of the house."

" On the 29th of March, 1707, Resolved, That the house will not pro
ceed on any petition, motion, or bill for granting any money, or for re
leasing or compounding any money owing to the crown, but in a com
mittee of the whole house ; and this is declared to be a standing order.
See, also, the 29th of November, 1710."

" On the 23d of April, 1713, Resolved, That the house will receive no
petition for compounding debts to the crown, upon any branch of the rev
enue, without a certificate from the proper officer annexed, stating the
debt, what prosecutions have been made for the recovery thereof, and
•what the petitioner and his security are able to pay."

"On the 25th of March, 1715, this is declared to be a standing order.
See the 2d of March, 1735, and the 9th of January, 1752, the proceedings
upon petitions of this sort."

" On the 8th of March, 1732, a petition being offered against a bill de
pending for securing the trade of the sugar colonies, it was refused to be
brought up. A motion was then made that a committee be appointed to
search precedents in relation to the receiving or not receiving petitions
against the imposing of duties ; and the question being put, it passed in
the negative."

Nothing can be more conclusive. Not only are petitions rejected, but
resolutions are passed refusing to receive entire classes of petitions, and
that, too, on the subject of imposing taxes — a subject, above all others, in
Delation to which we would suppose the right ought to be held most sa
cred, and this within a few years after the Declaration of Rights. With
these facts before us, what are we to think of the assertion of the senator
from Tennessee (Mr. Grundy), who pronounced in his place, in the bold
est and most unqualified manner, that there was no deliberative body
•which did not act on the principle that it was bound to receive petitions I
That a member of his long experience and caution should venture to

204 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

make an assertion so unfounded, is one among the many proofs of the
carelessness, both as to facts and argument, with which this important
subject has been examined and discussed on that side.

But it is not necessary to cross the Atlantic, or to go back to remote
periods, to find precedents for the rejection of petitions. This body, on a
memorable occasion, and after full deliberation, a short time since reject
ed a petition; and among those who voted for the rejection will be found
the names (of course I exclude my own), of the most able and experienced
members of the Senate. I refer to the case of resolutions in the nature
of a remonstrance from the citizens of York, Pennsylvania, approving the
act of the President in removing the deposites. I ask the secretary to
read the journals on the occasion :

""The Vice-president communicated a preamble and a series of resolu
tions adopted at a meeting of the citizens of York county, Pennsylvania,
approving the act of the executive removing the public money from the
Bank of the United States, and opposed to the renewal of the charter of
said bank ; which having been read, Mr. Clay objected to the reception.
And on the question, ' Shall they be received V it was determined in the
negative — yeas 20, nays 24.

" On motion of Mr. Preston, the yeas and nays being desired by one
fifth of the senators present, those who voted in the affirmative are,

" Messrs. Benton, Brown, Forsyth, Grundy, Hendricks, Hill, Kane,
King of Alabama, King of Georgia, Linn, M'Keari, Mangum, Morris,
Robinson, Shepley, Tallmadge, Tipton, White, Wilkins, Wright.

" Those who voted in the negative, are,

" Messrs. Bibb, Black, Calhoun, Clay, Clayton, Ewing, Frelinghuysen,
Kent, Leigh, Moore, Naudain, Poindexter, Porter, Prentiss, Preston, Rob-
bins, Silsbee, Smith, Southard, Sprague, Swift, Tomlinson, Waggaman,
Webster."

In citing this case it is not my intention to call in question the con
sistency of any member on this floor : it would be unworthy of the occa
sion. I doubt not the vote then given was given from a full conviction,
of its correctness, as it will doubtless be in the present case, on whatever
side it may be found. My object is to show that the principle for which
I contend, so far from being opposed, is sustained by precedents, here and
elsewhere, ancient and modern.

In following as I have those opposed to me, to Magna Charta and the
Declaration of Rights for the origin and the limits of the right of petition,
I am not disposed, with them, to set aside the Constitution. I assent to
the position they assume, that the right of petition existed before the
Constitution, and that it is not derived from it ; but while I look beyond
that instrument for the right, I hold the Constitution, on a question as to
its extent and limits, to be the highest authority. The first amended ar
ticle of the Constitution, which provides that Congress shall pass no law
to prevent the people from peaceably assembling and petitioning for a re
dress of grievances, was clearly intended to prescribe the limits within
which the right might be exercised. It is not pretended that to refuse
to receive petitions touches in the slightest degree on these limits. To
suppose that the framers of the Constitution — no, not the framers, but
those jealous patriots who were not satisfied with that instrument as it
came from the hands of the framers, and who proposed this very provision
to guard what they considered a sacred right, performed their task so
bunglingly as to omit any essential guard, would be to do great injustice
to the memory of those stern and -sagacious men; and yet this is what
the senator from Tennessee (Mr. Grundy) has ventured to assert. He
said that no provision was added to guard against the rejection of petitions,

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 205

because the obligation to receive was considered so clear that it was
deemed unnecessary j when he ought to have known that, according to
the standing practice at that time, Parliament was in the constant habit,
as has been shown, of refusing to receive petitions — a practice which
could not have been unknown to the authors of the amendment ; and from
which it may be fairly inferred that, in omitting to provide that petitions
should be received, it was not intended to comprehend their reception in
the right of petition.

I have now, I trust, established, beyond all controversy, that we are not
bound to receive these petitions, and that if we should reject them we
would not in the slightest degree infringe the right of petition. It is now
time to look to the rights of this body, and to see whether, if we should
receive them, when it is acknowledged that the only reason for receiving
is that we are bound to do so, we would not establish a principle which
would trench deeply on the rights of the Senate. I have already shown
that, where the action of the Senate commences, there also its rights to
determine how and when it shall act also commences. I have also shown
that the action of the Senate necessarily begins on the presentation of a
petition j that the petition is then before the body ; that the Senate can
not proceed to other business without making some disposition of it ; and
that, by the 24th rule, the first action after presentation is on a question
to receive the petition. . To extend the right of petition to the question
on receiving is to expunge this rule — to abolish this unquestionable right
of the Senate, and that for the benefit, in this case, of the Abolitionists.
Their gain would be at the loss of this body. I have not expressed my
self too strongly. Give the right of petition the extent contended for,
decide that we are bound under the Constitution to receive these in
cendiary petitions, and the very motion before the Senate would be out
of order. If the Constitution makes it our duty to receive, we would
have no discretion left to reject, as the motion presupposes. Our rules
of proceeding must accord with the Constitution. Thus, in the case of
revenue bills, which, by the Constitution, must originate in the other house,
it would be out of order to introduce them here, and it has, accordingly,
been so decided. For like reason, if we are bound to receive petitions,
the present motion would be out of order ; and, if such be your opinion,
it is your duty, as the presiding officer, to call me to order, and to arrest
all farther discussion on the question of reception. Let us now turn our
eyes for a moment to the nature of the right which, I fear, we are about
to abandon, with the view to ascertain what must be the consequence if
we should surrender it.

Of all the rights belonging to a deliberative body, I know of none more
universal, or indispensable to a proper performance of its functions, than
the right to determine at its discretion what it shall receive, over what it
shall extend its jurisdiction, and to what it shall direct its deliberation and
action. It is the first and universal law of all such bodies, and extends
not only to petitions, but to reports, to bills, and resolutions, varied only
in the two latter in the form of the question. It may be compared to the
function in the animal economy, with which all living creatures are en
dowed, of selecting through the instinct of taste what to receive or reject,
and on which the preservation of their existence depends. Deprive them
of this function, and the poisonous as well as the wholesome would be
indifferently received into their system. So with deliberative bodies :
deprive them of the essential and primary right to determine at their
pleasure what to receive or reject, and they would become the passive
receptacle, indifferently, of all that is frivolous, absurd, unconstitutional,
immoral, and impious, as well as what may properly demand their cle-

206 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

liberation and action. Establish this monstrous, this impious principle
(as it would prove to be in practice), and what must be the consequence?
To what would we commit ourselves 1 If a petition should be presented
praying the abolition of the Constitution (which we are bound by our
oaths to protect), according to this abominable doctrine it must be re
ceived. So if it prayed the abolition of the Decalogue, or of the Bible
itself. I go farther. If the abolition societies should be converted into
a body of Atheists, and should ask the passage of a law denying the ex
istence of the Almighty Being above us, the Creator of all, according to
this blasphemous doctrine we would be bound to receive the petition ; to
take jurisdiction of it. I ask the senators from Tennessee and Pennsyl
vania (Mr. Grundy and Mr. Buchanan), Would they vote to receive such
a petition 1 I wait not an answer. They would instantly reject it with
loathing. What, then, becomes of the unlimited, unqualified, and universal
obligation to receive petitions, which they so strenuously maintain, and
to which they are prepared to sacrifice the constitutional rights of this
body'?

I shall now descend from these hypothetical cases to the particular
question before the Senate. What, then, must be the consequences of
receiving this petition, on the principle that we are bound to receive it,
and all similar petitions whenever presented 1 I have considered this
question calmly in all its bearings, and do not hesitate to pronounce that
to receive would be to yield to the Abolitionists all that the most sanguine
could for the present hope, and to abandon all the outworks upon which
we of the South rely for our defence against their attacks here.

No one can believe that the fanatics, who have flooded thft and the
other house with their petitions, entertain the slightest hope that Con
gress would pass a law at this time to abolish slavery in this District. In
fatuated as they are, they must see that public opinion at the North is
not yet prepared for so decisive a step, and that seriously to attempt it
now would be fatal to their cause. What, then, do they hope 1 What but
that Congress should take jurisdiction of the subject of abolishing slavery
— should throw open to the Abolitionists the halls of legislation, and en
able them to establish a permanent position within their walls, from which
hereafter to carry on their operations against the institutions of the slave-
holding states I If we receive this petition, all these advantages will be
realized to them to the fullest extent. Permanent jurisdiction would be
assumed over the subject of slavery not only in this District, but in the
states themselves, whenever the Abolitionists might choose to ask Con
gress, by sending their petitions here, for the abolition of slavery in the
states. We would be bound to receive such petitions, and, by receiving,
would be fairly pledged to deliberate and decide on ttyem. Having suc
ceeded in this point, a most favourable position would be gained. The
centre of operations would be transferred from Nassau Hall to the Halls
of Congress. To this common centre the incendiary publications of the
Abolitionists would flow, in the form of petitions, to be received and pre
served among the public records. Here the subject of abolition would be
agitated session after session, and from hence the assaults on the prop
erty and institutions of the people of the slaveholding states would be dis
seminated, in the guise of speeches, over the whole Union.

Such would be the advantages yielded to the Abolitionists. In propor
tion to their gain would be our loss. What would be yielded to them
would be taken from us. Our true position — that which is indispensable
to our defence here — is, that Congress has no legitimate jurisdiction over
the subject of slavery either here or elsewhere. The reception of this
petition surrenders this commanding position 5 yields the question of ju-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 207

risdiction, so important to the cause of abolition, and so injurious to us ;
compels us to sit in silence to witness the assaults on our character and
institutions, or to engage in an endless contest in their defence. Such a
contest is beyond mortal endurance. We must, in the end, be humbled,
degraded, broken down, and worn out.

The senators from the slaveholding states, who, most unfortunately,
have committed themselves to vote for receiving these incendiary peti
tions, tell us, that whenever the attempt shall be made to abolish slavery,
they will join with us to repel it. I doubt not the sincerity of their dec
laration. We all have a common interest, and they cannot betray ours
without betraying, at the same time, their own. But I announce to them
that they are now called on to redeem their pledge. The attempt is NOW
making. The work is going on daily and hourly. The war is waged, not
only in the most dangerous manner, but in the only manner it can be
waged. Do they expect that the Abolitionists will resort to arms, and
commence a crusade to liberate our slaves by force 1 Is this what they
mean when they speak of the attempt to abolish slavery 1 If so, let me
tell our friends of the South who differ from me, that the war which the
Abolitionists wage against us is of a very different character, and far more
effective. It is a war of religious and political fanaticism, mingled, on
the part of the leaders, with "ambition and the love of notoriety, and waged,
not against our lives, but our character. The object is to humble and
debase us in our own estimation, and that of the world in general } to blast
our reputation, while they overthrow our domestic institutions. This is
the mode in which they are attempting abolition with such ample means
and untiring industry ; and now is the time for all who are opposed to them
to meet the attack. How can it be successfully met 1 This is the im
portant question. There is but one way: we must meet the enemy on
the frontier — on the question of receiving ; we must secure that important
pass — it is our Thermopylae. The power of resistance, by a universal
law of nature, is on the exterior. Break through the shell — penetrate
the crust, and there is no resistance within. In the present contest, the
question on receiving constitutes our frontier. It is the first, the exterior
question, that covers and protects all the others. Let it be penetrated
by receiving this petitioa, and not a point of resistance can be found
within, as far as this government is concerned. If we cannot maintain
ourselves there, we cannot on any interior position. Of all the questions
that can be raised, there is not one on which we can rally on ground more
tenable for ourselves, or more untenable for our opponents, not excepting
the ultimate question of abolition in the states. For our right to reject
this petition is as clear and unquestionable as that Congress has no right
to abolish slavery in the states.

Such is the importance of taking our stand immovably on the question
now before us. Such are the advantages that we of the South would
sacrifice, and the Abolitionists would gain, were we to surrender that im
portant position by receiving this petition. What motives have we for
making so great a sacrifice 1 What advantages can we hope to gain that
would justify us!

We are told of the great advantages of a strong majority. I acknowl
edge it in a good cause, and on sound principles. I feel, in the present
instance, how much our cause would be strengthened by a strong and de
cided majority for the rejection of these incendiary petitions. If anything
we could do here could arrest the progress of the Abolitionists, it would
be such a rejection. But, as advantageous as would be a strong majority
on sound principles, it is in the same degree dangerous when on the op
posite — when it rests on improper concessions and the surrender of prin-

208 SPEECHES OF JOHN*C. CALHOUN.

ciples, whicrj would be the case at present. Such a majority must, in this
instance, be purchased by concessions to the Abolitionists, and a surrender,
on our part, that would demolish all our outworks, give up all our strong-
positions, and open all the passes to the free admission of our enemies.
It is only on this condition that we can hope to obtain such a majority —
a majority which must be gathered together from all sides, and entertain
ing every variety of opinion. To rally such a majority, the senator from
Pennsylvania .has fallen on the device to receive this petition, and imme
diately reject it, without consideration or reflection. To my mind, the
movement looks like a trick — a mere piece of artifice to juggle and de
ceive. :I intend no disrespect to the senator. I doubt not his intention
is good, and believe his feelings are with us ; but I must say that the
course he has intimated is, in my opinion, the worst possible for the slave-
holding states. It surrenders all to Abolitionists, and gives nothing in
turn that would be of the least advantage to us. Let the majority for the
course he indicates be ever so strong, can the senator hope that it will
make any impression on the Abolitionists'! Can he even hope to maintain
his position of rejecting their petitions without consideration or deliber
ation on their merits! Does he not see that, in assuming jurisdiction by
receiving their petitions, he gives an implied pledge to inquire, to delib
erate, and decide on them! Experience will teach him that we must
either refuse to receive, or go through. I entirely concur with the sen
ator from Vermont (Mr. Prentiss) on that point. There is no middle
ground that is tenable, and, least of all, that proposed to be occupied by
the senator from Pennsylvania, and those who act with him. In the mean
time, the course he proposes is calculated to lull the people of the slave-
holding states into a false security, under the delusive impression which
it is calculated to make, that there is more strength here against the Abo
litionists than really does exist.

But we are told that the right of petition is popular in the North, and
that to make an issue, however true, which might bring it in question,
would weaken our friends here, and strengthen the Abolitionists. I have
no doubt of the kind feelings of our brethren from the North on this
floor ; but I clearly see that, while we have their feelings in our favour,
their constituents, right or wrong, will have their votes, however we may
be affected. But I assure our friends that we would not do anything
willingly which would weaken them at home ; and if we could be assured
that, by yielding to their wishes the right of receiving petitions, they
would be able to arrest permanently the progress of the Abolitionists,
we then might be induced to yield ; but nothing short of the certainty of
permanent security can induce us to yield an inch. If to maintain our
rights must increase the Abolitionists, be it so. I would at no period make
the least sacrifice of principle for any temporary advantage, and much
less at the present. If there must be an issue, now is our time. We
never can be more united or better prepared for the struggle ; and I, for
one, would much rather meet the danger now than to turn it over to those
who are to come after us.

But, putting these views aside, it does seem to me, taking a general
view of the subject, that the course intimated by the senator from Penn
sylvania is radically wrong, and must end in disappointment. The at
tempt to unite all must, as it usually does, terminate in division and dis
traction. It will divide the South on the question of receiving, and the
North on that of rejecting, with a mutual weakening of both. I already
see indications of division among Southern gentlemen on this floor, even
in this stage of the question. A division among them would give a great
impulse to the cause of abolition. Whatever position the parties may

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 209

take, in the event of such division, one or the other would be considered
more or less favourable to the abolition cause, which could not fail to run
it into the political struggles of the two great parties of the North. With
these views, I hold that the only possible hope of arresting the progress
of the Abolitionists in that quarter is to keep the two great parties there
united against them, which would be impossible if they divide here. The
course intimated by the senator from Pennsylvania will effect a division
here, and, instead of uniting the North, and thereby arresting the progress
of the Abolitionists, as he anticipates, will end in division and distraction,
and in giving thereby a more powerful impulse to their cause. I must
say, before I close my remarks in this connexion, that the members from
the North, it seems to me, are not duly sensible of the deep interest
which they have in this question, not only as affecting the Union, but as
it relates immediately and directly to their particular section. A? great
as may be our interests, theirs are not less. If the tidecontinue-s to roll
on its turbid waves of folly and fanaticism, it must, in the end, prostrate
in the North all the institutions that uphold their peace aixf prosperity,
and ultimately overwhelm all that is eminent, morally and intellectually.
I have now concluded what I intended to say on the question immedi
ately before the Senate. If I have spoken earnestly, it is because I feel
the subject to be one of the deepest interest. We are about to take the
first step ; that must control all our subsequent movements. If it should
be such as I fear it will, if we receive this petition, and thereby establish
the principle that we are obliged to receive all such petitions ; if we shall
determine to take permanent jurisdiction over the subject of abolition,
whenever and in whatever manner the Abolitionists may ask, either here
or in the states, 1 fear that the consequences \vill be ultimately disastrous.
Such a course would destroy the confidence of the people of the slave-
holding states in this government. W> love and cherish the Union : we
remember with the kindest feelings our common origin, with pride our
common achievements, and fondly anticipate the common greatness and
glory that seem to await us ; bu* origin, achievements, and anticipation
of coming greatness are to us as nothing compared to this question. It
is to us a vital question. It involves not only our liberty, but, what is
greater (if to freemen anything can be), existence itself. The relation
which now exists between the two races in the slaveholding states has
existed for two centuries. It has grown with our growth, and strength
ened with our strength. It has entered into and modified all our institu
tions, civil and political None other can be substituted. We will not,
cannot permit it to be destroyed. If we were base enough to do so, we
would be traitors to our section, to ourselves, our families, #nd to poster
ity. It is our anxious desire to protect and preserve this relation by the
joint action of this government and the confederated states of the Union ;
but if, instead of closing the door — if, instead of denying all jurisdiction
and all interference in this question, the doors of Congress are to be
thrown open ; and if we are to be exposed here, in the heart of the Union,
to an endless attack on our rights, our character, and our institutions ; if
the other states are to stand and look on without attempting to suppress
these attacks, originating within their borders ; and, finally, if this is to
be our fixed and permanent condition as members of this confederacy,
we will then be compelled to turn our eyes on ourselves. Come what
will, should it cost every drop of blood and every cent of property, we
must defend ourselves ; and if compelled, we would stand justified by all
laws, human and divine.

If I feel alarm, it is not for ourselves, but the Union and the institu
tions of the country, to which I have ever been devotedly attached, how-

D D

210 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

ever calumniated and .slandered. Few have made greater sacrifices to
maintain them, and none is more anxious to perpetuate them to the latest
generation ; but they can and ought to be perpetuated only on the con
dition that they fulfil the great objects for which they were created — the
liberty and protection of these states.

As for ourselves, I feel no apprehension. I know to the fullest extent
the magnitude of the danger that surrounds us. I am not disposed to under
estimate it. My colleague has painted it truly. But, as great as is the
danger, we have nothing to fear if true to ourselves. We have many and
great resources ; a numerous, intelligent, and brave population ; great and
valuable staples ; ample fiscal means ; unity of feeling and interest, and
an entire exemption from those dangers originating in a conflict between,
labour and capital, which at this time threatens so much danger to con
stitutional governments. To these may be added, that we would act un
der an imperious necessity. There would be to us but one alternative —
to triumph or perish as a people. We would stand alone, compelled to
defend life, Character, and institutions. A necessity so stern and impe
rious would develop to the full all the great qualities of our nature, men
tal and moral, requisite for defence — intelligence, fortitude, courage, and
patriotism ; and th°se, with our ample means, and our admirable mate
rials for the construction of durable free states, would ensure security,
liberty, and renown.

With these impressions, I ask neither sympathy nor compassion for
the slaveholding states. We can take care of ourselves. It is not we,
but the Union which is in danger. It is that which demands our care-^-
demands that the agitation of this question shall cease here — that you
shall refuse to receive these petitions, and decline all jurisdiction over
the subject of abolition in tjvery form and shape. It is only on these
terms that the Union can be safe. We cannot remain here in an endless
struggle in defence of our character, our property, and institutions.

I shall now, in conclusion, make a single remark as to the course I shall
feel myself compelled to pursue, should, the Senate, by receiving this pe
tition, determine to entertain jurisdiction over the question of abolition.
Thinking as I do, I can perform no act that would countenance so dan
gerous an assumption ; and, as a participation in the subsequent proceed
ings on this petition, should it unfortunately be received, might be so
construed, in that event I shall feel myself constrained to decline such
participation, and to leave the responsibility wholly on those who may
assume it.

XIII.

SPEECH ON THE BILL TO PROHIBIT DEPUTY POSTMASTERS FROM RECEIV
ING AND TRANSMITTING THROUGH THE MAIL CERTAIN PAPERS THERE
IN MENTIONED, APRIL 12, 1836.

I AM aware, said Mr. Calhoun, how offensive it is to speak of one's self; but
as the senator from Georgia on my right (Mr. King) has thought proper to im
pute to me improper motives, I feel myself compelled, in self-defence, to state
the reasons which have governed my course in reference to the subject now
under consideration. The senator is greatly mistaken in supposing that I was
governed by hostility to General Jackson. So far is that from being the fact,
that I came here at the commencement of the session with fixed and settled
principles on the subject under discussion, and which, in pursuing- the course
that the senator condemns, I have but attempted to carry into effect.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 211

As soon as the subject of abolition began to agitate the South last summer,
in consequence of the transmission of incendiary publications through the mail,
I saw at once that it would force itself on the notice of Congress at the present
session, and that it involved questions of great delicacy and difficulty. I im
mediately turned my attention, in consequence, to the subject, and, after due re
flection, arrived af the conclusion that Congress could exercise no direct power
over it ; and that, if it acted at all, the only mode in which it could act, consist
ently with the Constitution arid the rights and safety of the slaveholding states,
•would be in the manner proposed by this bill. I also saw that there was no
inconsiderable danger in the excited state of the feelings of the South ; that
the power, however dangerous and unconstitutional, might be thoughtlessly
yielded to Congress, knowing full well how apt the weak and timid are, in a
state of excitement and alarm, to seek temporary protection in any quarter, re
gardless of after-consequences, and how ready the artful and designing ever are
to seize on such occasions to extend and perpetuate their power.

With these impressions I arrived here at the beginning of the session. The
President's message was not calculated to remove my apprehensions. He as
sumed for Congress direct power over the subject, and that on the broadest,
most unqualified, and dangerous .principles. Knowing the influence of his name,
by reason of his great patronage and the rigid discipline of party, with a large
portion of the country, who have scarcely any other standard of Constitution,
politics, and morals, I saw the full extent of the danger of having these danger
ous principles reduced to practice, and I determined at once to use every effort
to prevent it. The senator from Georgia will, of course, understand that I do
not include him in this subservient portion of his party. So far from it, I have
always considered him as one of the most independent. It has been our for
tune to concur in opinion in relation to most of the important measures which
have been agitated since he became a member of this body, two years ago, at
the commencement of the session during which the deposite question was agi
tated. On that important question, if I mistake not, the senator and myself con
curred in opinion, at least as to its inexpediency, and the dangerous consequen
ces to which it would probably lead. If my memory serves n?e, we also agreed
in opinion on the connected subject of the currency, whick was then incident
ally discussed. We agreed, too, on the question of raising the value of gold
to its present standard, and in opposition to the bill fef the distribution of the
proceeds of public land, introduced by the senator Aom Kentucky (Mr. Clay).
In recurring to the events of that interesting session, I can remember but one
important subject on which we disagreed, a«d tfiat was the President's protest.
Passing to the next, I find the same concurrence of opinion on most of the im
portant subjects of the session. We agreed on the question of executive pat
ronage, on the propriety of amending thc Constitution for a temporary distribu
tion of the surplus revenue, on the svbject of regulating the deposites, and in
support of the bill for restricting the power of the executive in making removals
from office. We also agreed m <fle propriety of establishing branch mints in
the South and West — a subject not a little contested at the time.

Even at the present session we have not been so unfortunate as to disagree
entirely. We have, it is true, on the question of receiving abolition petitions,
which I regret, as I miwt consider their reception, on the principle on which they
were received, as a surrender of the whole ground to the Abolitionists, as far as
this government is concerned. It is also true that we disagreed, in part, in ref
erence to the p^sent subject. The senator has divided, in relation to it, be
tween myself and General Jackson. He has given his speech in support of
his message, and announced his intention of giving his vote in favour of my bill.
I certainly have no right to complain of this division. I had rather have his
vote thsn his speech . The one will stand forever on the records of the Senate

212 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOTJN.

(unless expunged) in favour of the bill, and the important principles on which
it rests, while the other is destined, at no distant day, to oblivion.

I now put to the senator from Georgia two short questions. In the numerous
and important instances in which we have agreed, I must have been either right
or wrong. If right, how could he be so uncharitable as to attribute my course
to the low and unworthy motive of inveterate hostility t<3 General Jackson?
But if wrong, in what condition does his charge against me place himself, who
has concurred with me in all these measures ? (Here Mr. King disclaimed
the imputation of improper motives to Mr. C.) I am glad to hear the gentle
man's disclaimer, said Mr. C., but I certainly understood him as asserting that,
such was my hostility to General Jackson, that his support of a measure was
sufficient to1 ensure my opposition; and this he undertook to illustrate by an
anecdote borrowed from O'Connell and the pig, which, I must tell the senator,
was much better suited to the character of the Irish mob to which it was ori
ginally addressed, than to the dignity of the Senate, where he has repeated it.

But to return from this long digression. I saw, as I have remarked, that
there was reason to apprehend that the principles embraced in the message
might be reduced to practice — principles which I believe to be dangerous to
the South, and subversive of the liberty of the press. The report fully states
what those principles are, but it may not be useless to refer to them briefly on
the present occasion.

The message assumed for Congress the right of determining what publica
tions are incendiary and calculated to excite the slaves to insurrection, and to
prohibit the transmission of such publications through the mail ; and, of course,
it also assumes the right of deciding what are not incendiary, and of enforcing
the transmission of such through the mail. But the senator from Georgia de
nies this inference, and treats it as a monstrous absurdity. I had (said Mr. C.)
considered it so nearly intuitive, that I had not supposed it necessary in the re
port to add anything in illustration of its truth ; but as it has been contested by
the senator, I will add, in illustration, a single remark.

The senator will not deny that the right of determining what papers are in
cendiary, and of preventing their circulation, implies that Congress has jurisdic
tion over the subject ; that, is, of discriminating as to what papers ought or ought
not to be transmitted by the mail. Nor will he deny that Congress has a right,
when acting within its acknowledged jurisdiction, to enforce the execution of
its acts ; and yet the admission of these unquestionable truths admits the con
sequence asserted by the report, and so sneered at by the senator. But, lest he
should controvert so plain a deduction, to cut the matter short, I shall propound
a plain question to him. He beiiev^s that Congress has the right to say what
papers are incendiary, and to prohibit their circulation. Now, I ask him, if he
does not also believe that it has the iigj^ to enforce the circulation of such as
it may determine not to be incendiary, tve* against a law of Georgia that might
prohibit their circulation ? If the senator should answer in the affirmative. I
then would prove by his admission the tru\h of the inference for which I con
tend, and which he has pronounced to be so ^bsard ; but if he should answer in
the negative, and deny that Congress can enforce 'A\e circulation againt the law
of the state, I must tell him he would place hiiaseif in the neighbourhood of
nullification. He would, in fact, go beyond. Tlxe Denial would assume the
right of nullifying what the senator himself must, with his views, consider a
constitutional act, when nullification only assumes the righ\ of a state to nullify
an unconstitutional act.

But the principle of the message goes still farther. It assumes for Congress
jurisdiction over the liberty of the press. The framers of tlu Constitution
(or, rather, those jealous patriots who refused to consent to its adoption without
amendments to guard against the abuse of power) have, by the first amended
article, provided that Congress shall pass no law abridging the liberty of the

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 213

press, with the view of placing the press beyond the control of congressional
legislation. But this cautious foresight would prove in vain, if we should con
cede to Congress the power which the President assumes of discriminating, in
reference to character, what publications shall not be transmitted by the mail.
It would place in the hands of the General Government an instrument more
potent to control the freedom of the press than the sedition law itself, as is fully
established in the report.

Thus regarding the message, the question which presented itself on its first
perusal was, How to prevent powers so dangerous and unconstitutional from
being carried into practice ? To permit the portion of the message relating to
the subject under consideration to take its regular course, and be referred to the
Committee on Postoffices and Post-roads, would, I saw, be the most certain
way to defeat what I had in view. I could not doubt, from the composition of
the committee, that the report would coincide with the message, and that it
would be drawn up with all that tact, ingenuity, and address, for which the
chairman of the committee and the head of the postoffice department are not a
little distinguished. With this impression, I could not but apprehend that the
authority of the President, backed by such a report, would go far to rivet in the
public mind the dangerous principles which it was my design to defeat, and
which could only be effected by referring the portion of the message in question
to a select committee, by which the subject might be thoroughly investigated,
and the result presented in a report. With this view I moved the committee,
and the bill and report which the senator has attacked so violently are the
result. - v; •

These are the reasons which governed me in the course I took, and not the
base and unworthy motive of hostility to General Jackson. I appeal with con
fidence to my life to prove that neither hostility nor attachment to any man or
any party can influence me in the discharge of my public duties ; but were I
capable of being influenced by such motives, I must- tell the senator from Geor
gia, that I have not such regard for the opinion of General Jackson as to permit
his course to influence me in the slightest degree, either for or against any
measure.

Having now assigned the motives which governed me, it is with satisfaction
I add that I have a fair prospect of success. So entirely are the principles of
the message abandoned, that not a friend of the President has ventured, and I
hazard nothing in saying, will venture, to assert them practically, whatever they
may venture to do in argument. They well know now that, since the subject
has been investigated, a bill to carry into effect the recommendation of the mes
sage would receive no support even from the ranks of the administration, de
voted as they are to their chieftain.

The senator from Georgia made other objections to the report besides those
which I have thus incidentally noticed, to which I do not deem it necessary to
reply. I am content with his vote, and cheerfully leave the report and his
speech to abide their fate, with a brief notice of a single objection.

The senator charges me with what he considers a strange and unaccountable
contradiction. He says that the freedom of the press and the right of petition
are both secured by the same article of the Constitution, and both stand on the
same principle ; yet I, who decidedly opposed the receiving of abolition peti
tions, now as decidedly support the liberty of the press. To make out the con
tradiction, he assumes that the Constitution places the right of petitioners to
have their petitions received and the liberty of the press on the same ground.
I do not deem it necessary to show that in this he is entirely mistaken, and
that my course on both occasions is perfectly consistent. I take the senator at
his word, and put to him a question for his decision. If, in opposing the receiv
ing of the abolition petitions, and advocating the freedom of the press, I have
involved myself in a palpable contradiction, how can he escape a similar charge,

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

when his course was the reverse of mine on both occasions ? Does he not see
that, if mine be contradictory, as he supposes, his too must necessarily be so ?
But the senator forgets his own argument, of which I must remind him, in order
to relieve him from the awkward dilemma in which he has placed himself in
his eagerness to fix on me the charge of contradiction. He seems not to recol
lect that, in his speech on receiving the abolition petitions, he was compelled,
to abandon the Constitution, and to place the right, not on that instrument, as he
would now have us believe, but expressly on the ground that the right existed
anterior to the Constitution, and that we must look for its limits, not to the Con
stitution, but to the Magna, Charta and the Declaration of Rights.

Having now concluded what I intended to say in reply to the senator from
Georgia, I now turn to the objections of the senator from Massachusetts (Mr.
Davis), which were directed, not against the report, but the bill itself. The
senator confined his objections to the principles of the bill, which he pronoun
ces dangerous and unconstitutional. It is my wish to meet his objections fully,
fairly, and directly. For this purpose, it will be necessary to have an accurate
and clear conception of the principles of the bill, as it is impossible, without it,
to estimate correctly the force either of the objections or the reply. I am thus
constrained to restate what the principles are, at the hazard of being considered
somewhat tedious.

The first and leading principle is, that the subject of slavery is under the
sole and exclusive control of the states where the institution exists. It belongs
to them to determine what may endanger its existence, and when and how it
may be defended. In the exercise of this right, they may prohibit the intro
duction or circulation of any paper or publication which may, in their opinion,
disturb or endanger the institution. Thus far all are agreed. To this extent
no one has questioned the right of the states ; not even the senator from Mas
sachusetts, in his numerous objections to the bill.

The next and remaining principle of the bill is intimately connected with the
preceding, and, in fact, springs directly from it. It assumes that it is the duty
of the General Government, in the exercise of its delegated rights, to respect
the laws which the slaveholding states may pass in protection of their institutions ;
or, to express it differently, it is its duty to pass such laws as may be necessa
ry to make it obligatory on its officers and agents to abstain from violating the
laws of the states, and to co-operate, as far as it may consistently be done, in
their execution. It is against this principle that the objections of the senator
from Massachusetts have been directed, and to which I now proceed to reply.

His first objection is, that the principle is new ; by which I understand him
to mean, that it never has, heretofore, been acted on by the government. The
objection presents two questions : Is it true in point of fact ? and if so, what
weight or force properly belongs to it ? If I am not greatly mistaken, it will
be found wanting in both particulars ; and that, so far from being new, it has
been frequently acted on ; and that if it were new, the fact would have little or
no force.

If our government had been in operation for centuries, and had been exposed
to the various changes and trials to which political institutions, in a long-pro
tracted existence, are exposed in the vecissitudes of events, the objection, under
such circumstances, that a principle has never been acted upon, if not decisive,,
would be exceedingly strong ; but when made in reference to our government,
which has been in operation for less than half a centuiy, and which is so com
plex and novel in its structure, it is very feeble. We all know that new prin
ciples are daily developing themselves under our system, with the changing
condition of the country, and, doubtless, will long continue so to do in the new
and trying scenes through which we are destined to pass. It may, I admit, be
good reason even with us for caution — for thorough and careful investigation,
if a principle proposed to be acted upon be new ; for I have long since been

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 215

taught by experience, that whatever is untried is to be received with caution in.
politics, however plausible. But to go farther in this early stage of our politi
cal existence, would be to deprive ourselves of means that might be indispensa
ble to meet future dangers and difficulties.

But I take higher grounds in reply to the objection. I deny its truth in point
of fact, and assert that the principle is not new. The report refers to two in
stances in which it has been acted on, and to which, for the present, I shall con
fine myself : one in reference to the quarantine laws of the states, and the oth
er more directly connected with the subject of this bill. I propose to make a
few remarks in reference to both : beginning with the former, with the view of
showing that the principle in both cases is strictly analogous, or, rather, identi
cal with the present.

The health of the state, like that of the subject of slavery, belongs exclusively
to the states. It is reserved, and not delegated ; and, of course, each state has
a right to judge for itself what may endanger the health of its citizens, what
measures are necessary to prevent it, and when and how such measures are to
be carried into effect. Among the causes which may endanger the health of a
state, is the introduction of infectious or contagious diseases through the medi
um of commerce. The vessel returning with a rich cargo, in exchange for the
products of a state, may also come freighted with the seeds of disease and death.
To guard against this danger, the states at a very early period adopted quaran
tine or health laws. These laws, it is obvious, must necessarily interfere with
the power of Congress to regulate commerce — a power as expressly given as
that to regulate the mail, and, as far as the present question is concerned, every
•way analogous ; and acting, accordingly, on the principles of this bill, Congress,
as far back as the year '96, passed an act making it the duty of its civil and mil
itary officers to abstain from the violation of the health laws of the states, and
to co-operate in their execution. This act was modified and repealed by that
of '99, which has since remained unchanged on the statute-book.

But the other precedent referred to in the report is still more direct and im
portant. That case, like the present, involved the right of the slaveholding
states to adopt such measures as they may think proper to prevent their domes
tic institutions from being disturbed or endangered. They may be endangered,
not only by introducing and circulating inflammatory publications calculated to
excite insurrection, but also by the introduction of free people of colour from
abroad, who may come as emissaries, or with opinions and sentiments hostile
to the peace and security of those states. The right of a state to pass laws to
prevent danger from publications is not more clear than the right to pass those
which may be necessary to 'guard against this danger. The act of 1803, to
•which the report refers as a precedent, recognises this right to the fullest ex
tent. It was intended to sustain the laws of the states against the introduction,
of free people of colour from the West India Islands. The senator from Mas
sachusetts, in his remarks upon this precedent, supposes the law to have been,
passed under the power given to Congress by the Constitution to suppress the
slave-trade. I have turned to the journals in order to ascertain the facts, and
find that the senator is entirely mistaken. The law was passed on a memorial
of the citizens of Wilmington, North Carolina, and originated in the following
facts :

After the successful rebellion of the slaves of St. Domingo, and the expul
sion of the French power, the government of the other French West India
Islands, in order to guard against the danger from the example of St. Domingo,
adopted rigid measures to expel and send out their free blacks. In 1803, a brig,
having on board five persons of that description who were driven from Guada-
loupe, arrived at Wilmington. The alarm which this caused gave birth to the
memorial, and the memorial to the act.

I learn from the journals, that the subject was fully investigated and discuss-

216 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

ed in both houses, and that it passed by a very large majority. The first sec
tion of the bill prevents the introduction of any negro, mulatto, or mustee, into
any state, by the laws of which they are prevented from being introduced, ex
cept persons of the description from beyond the Cape of Good Hope, or register
ed seamen, or natives of the United States. The second section prohibits the
entry of vessels having such persons on board, and subjects the vessels to sei
zure and forfeiture for landing, or attempting to land them contrary to the laws
of the states ; and the third and last section makes it the duty of the officers of
the General Government to co-operate with the states in the execution of their
laws against their introduction. I consider this precedent to be one of vast im
portance to the slaveholding states. It not only recognises the right of those
states to pass such laws as they may deem necessary to protect themselves
against the slave population, and the duty of the General Government to respect
those laws, but also the very important right, that the states have the authority
to exclude the introduction of such persons as may be dangerous to their insti
tutions : a principle of great extent and importance, and applicable to other
states as well as slaveholding, and to other persons as well as blacks, and
which may hereafter occupy a prominent place in the history of our legislation.
Having now, I trust, fully and successfully replied to the first objection of the
senator from Massachusetts, by showing that it is not true in fact, and if it
were, that it would have had little or no force, I shall now proceed to reply to
the second objection, which assumes that the principles for which I contend
would, if admitted, transfer the power over the mail from the General Govern
ment to the states.

If the objection be well founded, it must prove fatal to the bill. The power
over the mail is, beyond all doubt, a delegated power ; and whatever would di
vest the government of this power, and transfer it to the states, would certainly
be a violation of the Constitution. But would the principle, if acted on, transfer
the power ? If admitted to its full extent, its only effect would be to make it
the duty of Congress, in the exercise of its power over the mail, to abstain
from violating the laws of the state in protection of their slave property, and to
co-operate, where it could with propriety, in their execution. Its utmost effect
would then be a modification, and not a transfer or destruction of the power ;
and surely the senator will not contend that to modify a right amounts either to
its' transfer or annihilation. He cannot forget that all rights are subject to
modifications, and all, from the highest to the lowest, are held under one uni
versal condition — that their possessors should so use them as not to injure oth
ers. Nor can he contend that the power of the General Government over the
mail is without modification or limitation. He himself admits that it is subject
to a very important modification, when he concedes that the government cannot
discriminate in reference to the character of the publications to be transmitted
by the mail, without violating the first amended article 'of the Constitution,
which prohibits Congress from passing laws abridging the liberty of the press.
Other modifications of the right might be shown to exist, not less clear, nor of
much less importance. It might be easily shown, for instance, that the power over
the mail is limited to the transmission of 'intelligence, and that Congress cannot,
consistently with the nature and the object of the power, extend it to the ordinary
objects of transportation without a manifest violation of the Constitution, and the
assumption of a principle which would give the government control over the
general transportation of the country, both by land and water. But if it be
subject to these modifications, without either annihilating or transferring the
power, why should the modification for which I contend, and which I shall
show hereafter to rest upon unquestionable principles, have such effect ? That
it would not, in fact, might be shown, if other proof were necessary, by a refer
ence to the practical operation of the principle in the two instances already re
ferred to. In both, the principle which I contend for in relation to the mail

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 217

has long been in operation in reference to commerce, without the transfer of
the power of Congress to regulate commerce to the states, which the senator
contends would be its effect if applied to the mail. So far otherwise, so little
has it affected the power of Congress to regulate the commerce of the country,
that few persons, comparatively, are aware that the principle has been recog
nised and acted on by the General Government.

I come next (said Mr. Calhoun) to what the senator seemed to rely upon as
his main objection. He stated that the principles asserted in the report were
contradicted by the bill, and that the latter undertakes' to do indirectly what the
former asserts that the General Government cannot do at all.

Admit (said Mr. C.) the objection to be true in fact, and what does it prove,
but that the author of the report is a bad logician, and that there is error some
where, but without proving that it is in the bill, and that it ought, therefore, to
be rejected, as the senator contends. If there be error, it may be in the report
instead of the bill, and till the senator can fix it on the latter, he cannot avail
himself of the objection. But does the contradiction which he alleges exist ?
Let us turn to the principles asserted in the report, and compare them with,
those of the bill, in order to determine this point.

What, then, are the principles which the report maintains ? It asserts that
Congress has no right to determine what papers are incendiary, and calculated
to excite insurrection, and, as such, to prohibit their circulation, but, on the con
trary, that it belongs to the states to determine on the character and tendency
of such publications, and to adopt such measures as they may think proper to
prevent their introduction or circulation. Does the bill deny any of these prin
ciples ? Does it not assume them all? Is it not drawn up on the supposition
that the General Governmentfchave none of the powers denied by the report, and
that the states possess all for which it contends ? How, then, can it be said
that the bill contradicts the report ? But the difficulty, it seems, is, that the
General Government would do through the states, under the provisions of the
bill, what the report denies that it can do directly ; and this, according to the
senator from Georgia, is so manifest and palpable a contradiction, that he caa
find no explanation for my conduct but an inveterate hostility to General Jack
son, which he is pleased to attribute to me.

I have, I trust, successfully repelled already the imputation, and it now re
mains to show that the gross and palpable errors which the senator perceives
exist only in his own imagination, and that, instead of the cause he supposes, it
originates, on his part, in a dangerous and fundamental misconception of the na
ture of our political system — particularly of the relation between the states and
the General Government. Were the states the agents of the General Govern
ment, as the objection clearly presupposes, then what he says would be true,,
and the government, in recognising the law of the states, would adopt the acts,
of its agents. But the fact is far otherwise. The General Government and
the governments of the states are distinct and independent departments in our,
complex political system. The states, in passing laws in protection of their,
domestic institutions, act in a sphere as independent as the General Govern
ment passing laws in regulation of the mail ; and the latter, in abstaining from
violating the laws of the states, as provided for in the bill, so far from making
the states its agents, but recognises the right of the states, and performs on its
part a corresponding duty. Rights and duties are in their nature reciprocal*
The existence of one presupposes that of the other, and the performance of the
duty, so far from denying the right, distinctly recognises its existence. The
senator, for example, next to me (Judge White) has the unquestionable right
to the occupation of his chair, and I am, of course, in duty bound to abstain
from violating that right ; but would it not be absurd to say, that in performing
that duty by abstaining from violating his right, I assume the right of occupa-r
tion ? Again : suppose the very quiet and peaceable senator from Maine (Mr.

EE

218 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

Shepley), who is his next neighbour on the other side, should undertake to oust
the senator from Tennessee, would it not be a strange doctrine to contend that,
if I were to co-operate with the senator from Tennessee in maintaining pos
session of his chair, it would be an assumption on my part of a right to the
chair ? And yet this is the identical principle which the senator from Georgia
assumed, in charging a manifest and palpable contradiction between the bill and
the report.

But to proceed with the objections of the senator from Massachusetts. He
asserts, and asserts truly, that rights and duties are reciprocal ; and that, if it
be the duty of the General Government to respect the laws of the state, it is in
like manner the duty of the states to respect those of the General Government.
The practice of both have been in conformity to the principle. I have already
cited instances of the General Government respecting the laws of the states,
and many might be shown of the states respecting those of the General Govern
ment.

But the senator from Massachusetts affirms that the laws of the General Gov>
ernment regulating the mail, and those of the government of the states prohibit
ing the introduction and circulation of incendiary publications, may come into
conflict, and that, in such event, the latter must yield to the former ; and he rests
this assertion on the ground that the power of the General Government is ex.
pressly delegated by the Constitution. I regard the argument as wholly incon
clusive. Why should the mere fact that a power is expressly delegated give
it paramount control over the reserved powers ? What possible superiority can
the mere fact of delegation give, unless, indeed, it be supposed to render the
right more clear, and, of course, less questionable ? Now I deny that it has, in
this instance, any such superiority. Though the power of the General Govern
ment over the mail is delegated, it is not more dfcar and unquestionable than
the rights of the states over the subject of slavery — a right which neither' has,
nor can be denied. In fact, I might take higher grounds, if higher grounds
•were possible, by showing that the rights of the states are as expressly reserved
as those of the General Government are delegated ; for, in order to place the
reserved rights beyond controversy, the tenth amended article of the Constitu
tion expressly provides, that all powers not delegated to the United States, nor
prohibited to the states, are reserved to the states or the people ; and, as the
subject of slavery is acknowledged by all not to be delegated, it may be fairly
considered as expressly reserved under this provision of the Constitution.

But, while I deny his conclusion, I agree with the senator that the laws of
the states and General Government may come into conflict, and that, if they do,
one or the other must yield ; the question is, Which ought to yield ? The ques
tion is one of great importance. It involves the whole merit of the controversy,
and I must entreat the Senate to give me an attentive hearing while I state my
yiews in relation to it.

In order to determine satisfactorily which ought to yield, it becomes neces
sary to have a clear and full understanding of the point of difficulty ; and for
this purpose it is necessary to make a few preliminary remarks.

Properly considered, the reserved and delegated powers can never come into
conflict. The fact that a power is delegated is conclusive that it is not re
served ; and that it is not delegated, that it is reserved, unless, indeed, it be pro
hibited to the states. There is but a single exception : the case of powers of
such nature that they be exercised concurringly by the state and General Gov
ernment — such as the power of laying taxes, which, though delegated, may also
be exercised by the states. In illustration of the truth of the position I have
laid down, I might refer to the case now under consideration. Regarded in
the abstract, there is not the slightest conflict between the power delegated by
the Constitution to the General Government to establish postoffices and post-
loads, and that reserved to the states over the subject of slavery. How, then,

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 219

•can there be conflict ? It occurs, not between the powers themselves, but the
laws respectively passed to carry them into effect. The laws of the state, pro
hibiting the introduction or circulation of incendiary publications, may come in
conflict with the laws of the General Government in relation to the mail ; and
the question to be determined is, Which, in the event, ought to give way ?

I will not pretend to enter into a full and systematic investigation of this high
ly important question, which involves, as I have said, the merits of the whole
controversy. I do not deem it necessary. I propose to lay down a single
principle, which I hold to be not only unquestionable, but decisive of the ques
tion as far as the present controversy is concerned. My position is, that, in de
ciding which ought to yield, regard must be had to the nature and magnitude
of the powers to which the laws respectively relate. The low must yield to
the high ; the convenient to the necessary ; mere accommodation to safety and
security. This is the universal principle which governs in all analogous cases,
both in our social and political relations. Wherever the means of enjoying or
securing rights come into conflict (rights themselves never can), this universal
and fundamental principle is the one which, by the consent of mankind, gov
erns in all such cases. Apply it to the case under consideration, and need I
ask which ought to yield ? Will any rational being say that the laws of eleven.
states of this Union, which are necessary to their peace, security, and very ex
istence, ought to yield to the laws of the General Government regulating the
postofFice, which, at best, is a mere accommodation and convenience, and this,
when this government was formed by the states mainly with a view to secure
more perfectly their peace and safety ? But one answer can be given. All
must feel that it would be improper for the laws of the states, in such case, to
yield to those of the General Government, and, of course, that the latter ought
to yield to the former. When I say ought, I do not mean on the principle of
concession. I take higher grounds. I mean under the obligation of the Consti
tution itself. That instrument does not leave this important question to be de
cided by mere inference. It contains an express provision which is decisive
of the question. I refer to the provision which invests Congress with the pow
er of passing laws to carry into effect the granted powers, and which express
ly restricts its power to laws necessary and proper to carry into effect the dele
gated powers. We here have the limitation on the power of passing laws.
They must be necessary and proper. I pass the term necessary with the sin
gle remark, that, whatever may be its true and accurate meaning, it clearly in
dicates that this important power was granted with the intention of being spa
ringly used by the framers of the Constitution. I come to the term proper ;
and I boldly assert, if it has any meaning at all — if it can be said of any law
whatever that it is not proper, and that, as such, Congress has no constitution
al right to pass it, surely it may be said of that which would abrogate, in fact,
the laws of nearly half of the states of the Union, and which are conceded to
be necessary for their peace and safety. If it be proper for Congress to pass
such a law, what law could possibly be improper ? We have heard much, of
late, of state rights. All parties profess to respect them, as essential to the
preservation of our liberty. I do not except the members of the old Federal
party — that honest, high-minded, patriotic party, though mistaken as to the
principles and tendency of the government. But what, let me ask, would be
the value of state rights, if the laws of Congress, in such cases, ought not to
yield to the states ? If they must be considered paramount, whenever they
come into conflict with those of the states, without regard to their safety, what
possible value can be attached to the rights of the states, and how perfectly un
meaning their reserved powers ? Surrender the principle, and there is not one
of the reserved powers which may not be annulled by Congress under the pre
text of passing laws to carry into effect the delegated powers.

The senator from Massachusetts next objects, that, if the principles of the bill

220 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

be admitted, they may be extended to morals and religion. I do not feel bound
to admit or deny the truth of this assertion ; but if the senator will show me a
case in which a state has passed laws under its unquestionable reserved powers,
in protection of its morality or religion, I would hold it to be the duty of the
General Government to respect the laws of the states, in conformity to the prin
ciples which I maintain.

His next objection is, that the bill is a manifest violation of the liberty of the
press. He has not thought proper to specify wherein the violation consists.
Does he mean to say that the laws of the states prohibiting the introduction and
circulation of papers calculated to excite insurrection, are in violation of the
liberty of the press ? Does he mean that the slaveholding states have no right
to pass such laws ? I cannot suppose such to be his meaning ; for I understood
him, throughout his remarks, to admit the right of the states — a right which
they have always exercised, without restriction or limitation, before and since
the adoption of the Constitution, without ever having been questioned. But
if this be not his meaning, he must mean that this bill, in making it the duty
of the officers and agents of the government to respect the laws of the states,
violates the liberty of the press, and thus involves the old misconception that the
states are the agents of this government, which pervades the whole argument
of the senator, and to which I have already replied.

The senator next objects that the bill makes it penal on deputy postmasters
to receive the papers and publications which it embraces. I must say, that my
friend from Massachusetts (for such I consider him, though we differ-in politics)
has not expressed himself with his usual accuracy on the present occasion. If
he will turn to the provisions of the bill, he will find that the penalty attaches
only in cases of knowingly receiving and delivering out the papers and publi
cations in question. All the consequences which the senator drew from the
view which he took of the bill of course fall, and relieves me from the necessity
of showing that the deputy postmasters will not be compelled to resort to the
espionage into letters and packages, in order to exonerate themselves from the
penalty of the bill, which he supposed.

The last objection of the senator is, that, under the provision of the bill, every
thing touching on the subject of slavery will be prohibited from passing through
the mail. I again must repeat, that the senator has not expressed himself with
sufficient accuracy. The provisions of the bill are limited to the transmission
of such papers in reference to slavery as are prohibited by the laws of the slave-
holding states — that is, by eleven states of the Union — leaving the circulation
through the mail without restriction or qualification as to all other papers, and
wholly so as to the remaining thirteen states. But the senator seems to think
that even this restriction, as limited as it is, would be a very great inconveni
ence. It may, indeed, prove so to the lawless Abolitionists, who, without regard
to the obligations of the Constitution, are attempting to scatter their firebrands
Throughout the Union. But is their convenience the only thing to be taken into
the estimate ? Are the peace, security, and safety of the slaveholding states
nothing? or are these to be sacrificed for the accommodation of the Abolition
ists?

I have now replied directly, fully, and, I trust, successfully to the objections
to the bill, and shall close what I intended to say by a few general and brief
remarks.

We have arrived at a new and important point in reference to the abolition
question. It is no longer in the hands of quiet and peaceful, but I cannot add,,
harmless Quakers. It is now under the control of ferocious zealots, blinded by
fanaticism, and, in pursuit of their object, regardless of the obligations of religion,
or morality. They are organized throughout every section of the non-slave-
holding states ; they have the disposition of almost unlimited funds, and are in
possession of a powerful press, which, for the first time, is enlisted in the cause

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 221

ot abolition, and turned against the domestic institutions, and the peace and se
curity of the South. To guard against the danger in this new arid more men
acing form, the slaveholding states will be compelled to revise their laws
against the introduction and circulation of publications calculated to disturb
ih£ir peace and endanger their security, and to render them far more full and
efficient than they have heretofore been. In this new state of things, the proba
ble conflict between the laws which those states may think proper to adopt, and
those of the General Government regulating the mail, becomes far more impor
tant than in any former state of the controversy ; and Congress is now called
upon to say what part it will take in reference to this deeply-interesting sub
ject. We of the slaveholding states ask nothing of the government but that it
should abstain from violating laws passed within our acknowledged constitu
tional competency, and conceded to be essential to our peace and security. I
am anxious to see how this question will be decided. I am desirous that my
constituents should know what they have to expect, either from this govern
ment or from the non-slaveholding states. Much that I have said and done
during the session has been with the view of affording them correct information
on this point, in order that they might know to what extent they might rely upon
others, and how far they must depend on themselves.

Thus far (I say it with regret) our just hopes have not been realized. The
Legislatures of the South," backed by the voice of their constituents, expressed
through innumerable meetings, have called upon the non-slaveholding states to
repress the movements made within the jurisdiction of those states against their
peace and security. .Not a step has been taken ; not a law has been passed, or
even proposed ; and I venture to assert that none will be : not but what there is
a favourable disposition towards us in the North, but I clearly see the state of
political parties there presents insuperable impediments to any legislation on the
subject. I rest my opinion on the fact that the non-slaveholding states, from the
elements of their population, are, and will continue to be, divided and distracted
by parties of nearly equal strength ; and that each will always be ready to seize
on every movement of the other which may give them the superiority, without
much regard to consequences as affecting their own states, and much less re
mote and distant sections.

Nor have we been less disappointed as to the proceedings of Congress. Be
lieving that the General Government has no right or authority over the subject
of slavery, we had just grounds to hope Congress would refuse all jurisdiction
in reference to it, in whatever form it might be presented. The very opposite
course has been pursued. Abolition petitions have not only been received in
both houses, but received on the most obnoxious and dangerous of all grounds —
that we are bound to receive them ; that is, to take jurisdiction of the question of
slavery whenever the Abolitionists may think proper to petition for its abolition,
either here or in the states.

Thus far, then, we of the slaveholding states have been grievously disappoint
ed. One question still remains to be decided — that presented by this bill. To
refuse to pass this bill would be virtually to co-operate with the Abolitionists —
would be to make the officers and agents of the postoffice department in effect
their agents and abettors in the circulation of their incendiary publications in
violation of the laws of the states. It is your unquestionable duty, as I have
demonstrably proved, to abstain from their violation ; and, by refusing or neglect
ing to discharge that duty, you would clearly enlist in the existing controversy,
on the side of the Abolitionists, against the Southern States. Should such be
your decision by refusing to pass this bill, I shall say to the people of the
South, look to yourselves — you have nothing to hope from others. But I must
tell the Senate, be your decision what it may, the South will never abandon the
principles of this bill. If you refuse co-operation with our laws, and conflict
should ensue between your and our law, the Southern States will never yield

222 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALTIOUN

to the superiority of yours, We have a remedy in our hands, which, in such
event, we shall not fail to apply. We have high authority for asserting, that in
such cases " state interposition is the rightful remedy" — a doctrine first an
nounced by Jefferson — adopted by the patriotic and Republican State of Ken
tucky, by a solemn resolution in '98, and finally carried out into successful prac
tice on a recent occasion, ever to be remembered by the gallant state which I,
in part, have the honour to represent. In this well-tested and efficient remedy,
sustained by the principles developed in the report, and asserted in this bill, the
slaveholding states have an ample protection. Let it be fixed — let it be riveted
in every Southern mind, that the laws of the slaveholding states for the protec
tion of their domestic institutions are paramount to the laws of the General
Government in the regulation of commerce and the mail, and that the latter must
yield to the former in the event of conflict ; and that, if the government should
refuse to yield, the states have a right to interpose, and we are safe. With
these principles, nothing but concert would be wanting to bid defiance to the
movements of the Abolitionists, whether at home or abroad ; and to place our
domestic institutions, and, with them, our security and peace, under our own pro
tection, and beyond the reach of danger.

XIV.

SPEECH ON THE RECEPTION OF ABOLITION PETITIONS, FEBRUARY, 1837.

IF the time of the Senate permitted, I should feel it to be my duty to
call for the reading of the mass of petitions on the table, in order that
\ve might know what language they hold towards the slaveholding states
and their institutions ; but as it will not, I have selected indiscriminately
from the pile, two : one from those in manuscript, and the other from the
printed ; and, without knowing their contents, will call for the reading of
them, so that we may judge, by them, of the character of the whole.

(Here the secretary, on the call of Mr. Calhoun, read the two petitions.)

Such, resumed Mr. C., is the language held towards us and ours ; the
peculiar institutions of the South, that on the maintenance of which the
very existence of the slaveholding states depends, is pronounced to be
sinful and odious, in the sight of God and man ; and this with a systematic
design of rendering us hateful in the eyes of the world, with a view to a
general crusade against us and our institutions. This, too, in the legis
lative halls of the Union ; created by these confederated states for the
better protection of their peace, their safety, and their respective insti
tutions j and yet we, the representatives of twelve of these sovereign states
against whom this deadly war is waged, are expected to sit here in silence,
hearing ourselves and our constituents day after day denounced, without
uttering a word ; if we but open our lips, the charge of agitation is re
sounded on all sides, and we are held up as seeking to aggravate the evil
which we resist. Every reflecting mind must see in all this a state of
things deeply and dangerously diseased.

I do not belong, said Mr. C., to the school which holds that aggression
is to be met by concession. Mine is the opposite creed, which teaches
that encroachments must be met at the beginning, and that those who act
on the opposite principle are prepared to become slaves. In this case, in
particular, I hold concession or compromise to be fatal. If we concede
an inch, concession would follow concession — compromise would follow
compromise, until our ranks would be so broken that effectual resistance
would be impossible. We must meet the enemy on the frontier, with a

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 223

fixed determination of maintaining our position at every hazard. Con
sent to receive these insulting petitions, and the next demand will be that
they be referred to a committee, in order that they may be deliberated
and acted upon. At the last session, we were modestly asked to receive
them simply to lay them on the table, without any view of ulterior action.
I then told the senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Buchanan), who strongly
urged that course in the Senate, that it was a position that could not be
maintained ; as the argument in favour of acting on the petitions, if we
were bound to receive, could not be resisted. I then said that the next
step would be to refer the petition to a committee, and I already see in
dications that such is now the intention. If we yield, that will be followed
by another, and we would thus proceed, step by step, to the final consum
mation of the object of these petitions. We are now told that the most
effectual mode of arresting the progress of abolition is to reason it down ;
and with this view, it is urged that the petitions ought to be referred to a
committee. That is the very ground which was taken at the last session
in the other house ; but, instead of arresting its progress, it has since ad-
vanced more rapidly than ever. The most unquestionable right may be
rendered doubtful, if once admitted to be a subject of controversy, and
that would be the case in the present instance. The subject is beyond
the jurisdiction of Congress — they have no right to touch it in any shape
or form, or to make it the subject of deliberation or discussion.

In opposition to this view, it is urged that Congress is bound by the
Constitution to receive petitions in every case and on every subject,
whether within its constitutional competency or not. I hold the doctrine
to be absurd, and do solemnly believe that it would be as easy to prove
that it has the right to abolish slavery, as that it is bound to receive peti
tions for that purpose. The very existence of the rule that requires a
question to be put on the reception of petitions, is conclusive to show
that there is no such obligation. It has been a standing rule from the
commencement of the government, and clearly shows the sense of those
who formed the Constitution on this point. The question on the recep
tion would be absurd, if, as is contended, we are bound to receive ; but
I do not intend to argue the question ; I discussed it fully at the last ses
sion, and the arguments then advanced neither have nor can be answered.
As widely as this incendiary spirit has spread, it has not yet infected
this body, or the great mass of the intelligent and business portion
of the North ; but unless it be speedily stopped, it will spread and work
upward till it brings the two great sections of the Union into deadly con
flict. This is not a new impression with me. Several years since, in a
discussion with one of the senators from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster),
before this fell spirit had showed itself, I then predicted that the doctrine
of the proclamation and the force bill — that this government had a right,
in the last resort, to determine the extent of its own powers, and enforce
it at the point of the bayonet, which was so warmly maintained by that
senator — would at no distant day arouse the dormant spirit of Aboli
tionism ; I told him that the doctrine was tantamount to the assump
tion of unlimited power on the part of the government, and that such
would be the impression on the public mind in a large portion of the
Union. The consequence would be inevitable — a large portion of the
Northern States believed slavery to be a sin, and would believe it to be
an obligation of conscience to abolish it, if they should feel themselves
in any degree responsible for its continuance, and that his doctrine would
necessarily lead to the belief of such responsibility. I then predicted
that it would commence, as it has, with this fanatical portion Of society ;
and that they would begin their operation on the ignorant, the weak, the

224. SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN

young, and the thoughtless, and would gradually extend upward till they
became strong enough to obtain political control, when he, and others
holding the highest stations in society, would, however reluctant, be
compelled to yield to their doctrine, or be driven into obscurity. But
four years have since elapsed, and all this is already in a course of regu
lar fulfilment.

Standing at the point of time at which we have now arrived, it will not
be more difficult to trace the course of future events now than it was then.
Those who imagine that the spirit now abroad in the North will die away
of itself without a shock or convulsion^ have formed a very inadequate-
conception of its real character ; it will continue to rise and spread, un
less prompt and efficient measures to stay its progress be adopted. Al
ready it has taken possession of the pulpit, of the schools, and, to a con
siderable extent, of the press; those great instruments by which the mind
of the rising generation will be formed.

However sound the great body of the non-slaveholding states are at
present, in the course of a few years they will be succeeded by those who
will have been taught to hate the people and institutions of nearly one
half of this Union, with a hatred more deadly than one hostile nation
ever entertained towards another. It is easy to see the end. By the
necessary course of events, if left to themselves, we must become, finally,
two people. It is impossible, under the deadly hatred which must spring
tip between the two great sections, if the present causes are permitted to
operate unchecked, that we should continue under the same political sys
tem. The conflicting elements would burst the Union asunder, as power
ful as are the links which hold it together. Abolition and the Union can
not coexist. As the friend of the Union, I openly proclaim it, and the
sooner it is known the better. The former may now be controlled, but
in a short time it will be beyond the power of man to arrest the course
of events. We of the South will not, cannot surrender our institutions.
To maintain the existing relations between the two races inhabiting that
section of the Union is indispensable to the peace and happiness of both.
It cannot be subverted without drenching the country in blood, and extir
pating one or the other of the races. Be it good or bad, it has grown up
with our society and institutions, and is so interwoven with them that to
destroy it would be to destroy us as a people. But let me not be under
stood as admitting, even by implication, that the existing relations be
tween the two races, in the siaveholding states, is an evil : far otherwise ;
I hold it to be a good, as it has thus far proved itself to be, to both, and
will continue to prove so, if not disturbed by the fell spirit of abolition.
I appeal to facts. Never before has the black race of Central Africa, from
the dawn of history to the present day, attained a condition so civilized
and so improved, not only physically, but morally and intellectually. It
came among us in a low, degraded, and savage condition, and, in the
course of a few generations, it has grown up under the fostering care of
our institutions, as reviled as they have been, to its present comparative
civilized condition. This, with the rapid increase of numbers, is conclu
sive proof of the general happiness of the race, in spite of all the exag
gerated tales to the contrary.

In the mean time, the white or European race has not degenerated. It
has kept pace with its brethren in other sections of the Union where sla
very does not exist. It is odious to make comparison ; but I appeal to
all sides whether the South is not equal in virtue, intelligence, patriotism,
courage, disinterestedness, and all the high qualities which adorn our na
ture. I ask whether we have not contributed our full share of talents
and political wisdom in forming and sustaining this political fabric ; and

<

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 225

whether we have not constantly inclined most strongly to the side of 1
erty, and been the first to see, and first to resist, the encroachments of
power. In one thing only are we inferior — the arts of gain ; we acknowl
edge that we are less wealthy than the Northern section of this Union,
but I trace this mainly to the fiscal action of this government, which has
extracted much from, and spent little among us. Had it been the reverse —
if the exaction had been from the other section, and the expenditure with
us — this point of superiority would not be against us now, as it was not at
the formation of this government.

But I take higher ground. I hold that, in the present state of civiliza
tion, where two races of different origin, and distinguished by colour,
and other physical differences, as well as intellectual, are brought to
gether, the relation now existing in the slaveholding states between the two
is, instead of an evil, a good — a positive good. 1 feel myself called upon
to speak freely upon the subject, where the honour and interests of those
I represent are involved. I hold, then, that there never has yet existed a
wealthy and civilized society in which one portion of the community did
not, in point of fact, live on the labour of the other. Broad and general
as is this assertion, it is fully borne out by history. This is not the
proper occasion, but, if it were, it would not be difficult to trace the va
rious devices by which the wealth of all civilized communities has been
so unequally divided, and to show fcy what means so small a share has
been allotted to those by whose labour it was produced, and so large a
share given to the non-producing class. The devices are almost innu
merable, from the brute force and gross superstition of ancient times, to
the subtle and artful fiscal contrivances of modern. I might well chal
lenge a comparison between them and the more direct, simple, and patri
archal mode by which the labour of the African race is among us com
manded by the European. I may say, with truth, that in few countries
so much is left to the share of the labourer, and so little exacted from
him, or where there is more kind attention to him in sickness or infirmi
ties of age. Compare his condition with the tenants of the po'or-houses
in the most civilized portions of Europe — look at the sick, and the old
and infirm slave, on one hand, in the midst of his family and friends, un
der the kind superintending care of his master and mistress, and compare
it with the forlorn and wretched condition of the pauper in the poor-
house. But I will not dwell on this aspect of the question : I turn to the
political ; and here I fearlessly assert, that the existing relation between
the two races in the South, against which these blind fanatics are waging
war, forms the most solid and durable foundation on which to rear free
and stable political institutions. It is useless to disguise the fact. There
is, and always has been, in an advanced stage of wealth and civilization,
a conflict between labour and capital. The condition of society in the
South exempts us from the disorders and dangers resulting from this con
flict ; and which explains why it is that the political condition of the
slaveholding states has been so much more stable and quiet than those of
the North. The advantages of the former, in this respect, will become
more and more manifest, if left undisturbed by interference from without,
as the country advances in wealth and numbers. We have, in fact, but
just entered that condition of society where the strength and durability of
our political institutions are to be tested ; and I venture nothing in pre
dicting that the experience of the next generation will fully test how
vastly more favourable our condition of society is to that of other sec-
tions for free and stable institutions, provided we are not disturbed by
the interference of others, or shall have sufficient intelligence and spirit
to resist promptly and successfully such interference. It rests with our-

FF

226 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

selves to meet and repel them. I look not for aid to this government, or
to the other states ; not but there are kind feelings towards us on the
part of the great body of the non-slaveholding states ; but, as kind as their
feelings may be, we may rest assured that no political party in those
states will risk their ascendency for our safety. If we do not defend our
selves, none will defend us ; if we yield, we will be more-and more pressed
as we recede j and, if we submit, we will be trampled under foot. Be
assured that emancipation itself would not satisfy these fanatics : that
gained, the next step would be to raise the negroes to a social and polit
ical equality with the whites ; and, that being effected, we would soon find
the present condition of the two races reversed. They, and their Northern
allies, would be the masters, and we the slaves ;' the condition of the
white race in the British West India Islands, as bad as it is, would be hap
piness to ours ; there the mother-country is interested in sustaining the
supremacy of the European race. It is true that the authority of the
former master is destroyed, but the African will there still be a slave,
not to individuals, but to the community — forced to labour, not by the au
thority of the overseer, but by the bayonet of the soldiery and the rod of
the civil magistrate.

Surrounded, as the slaveholding states are, with such imminent perils, I
rejoice to think that our means of defence are ample, if we shall prove
to have the intelligence and spirit do see and apply them before it is too
late. All we want is concert, to lay aside all party differences, and unite
with zeal and energy in repelling approaching dangers. Let there be
concert of action, and we shall find ample means of security without re
sorting to secession or disunion. I speak with full knowledge and a thor
ough examination of the subject, and, for one, see my way clearly. One
thing alarms me — the eager pursuit of gain which overspreads the land,
and which absorbs every faculty of the mind and every feeling of the
heart. Of all passions, avarice is the most blind and compromising — the
last to see, and the first to yield to danger. I dare not hope that anything
I can say will arouse the South to a due sense of danger ; I fear it is be
yond the power of mortal voice to awaken it in time from the fatal secu
rity into which it has fallen.

xv.

SPEECH ON THE PUBLIC DEPOSITES, MAY 28, 1836.

THE Senate then proceeded to the consideration of the bill to regulate the
deposites of the public money.

After some words from Mr. Wright in explanation, Mr. Calhoun said : This
bill, which the senator from New- York proposes to strike out in order to sub
stitute his amendment, is no stranger to this body. It was reported at the last
session by the Select Committee on Executive Patronage, and passed the Sen
ate after a full and deliberate investigation, by a mixed vote of all parties, of
twenty to twelve. As strong as is this presumptive evidence in its favour, I
would, notwithstanding, readily surrender the bill and adopt the amendment of
the senator from New-York, if I did not sincerely believe that it is liable to
strong and decisive objections. I seek no lead on this important subject ; my
sole aim is to aid in applying a remedy to what I honestly believe to be a deep
and dangerous disease of the body politic : and I stand prepared to co-operate
with any one, be he of what party he may, who may propose a remedy, provi
ded it shall promise to be safe and efficient. I, in particular, am desirous of co-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALIIOUN. 227

operating with the senator from New-York, not only because I desire the aid
of his distinguished talents, but, still more, of his decisive influence with the
powerful party of which he is so distinguished a member, and which now, for
good or evil, holds the destiny of the country in its hands. It was in this spirit
that I examined the amendment proposed by the senator ; and I regret to say,
after a full investigation, I cannot acquiesce in it, as I feel a deep conviction
that it will be neither safe nor efficient. So far from being substantially the
same as the bill, as stated by the senator, I cannot but regard it as essentially
different, both as to objects and means. The objects of the bill are, first, to se
cure the public interest as far as it is connected with the deposites ; and, next-,
to protect the banks in which they are made against the influence and control
of the executive branch of this government, with the view both to their and
the public interest. Compared with the bill, in respect to both, the proposed
amendment will be found to favour the banks against the people, and the exec
utive against the banks. I do not desire the Senate to form their opinion on
my authority. I wish them to examine for themselves ; and, in order to aid
them in the examination, I shall now proceed to .state, and briefly illustrate, the
several points of difference between the bill and the proposed amendment, ta
king them in the order in which they stand in the bill.

The first section of the bill provides that the banks shall pay at the rate of
two per cent, per annum on the deposites for the use of the public money. This
provision is entirely omitted in the amendment, which proposes to give to the
banks the use of the money without interest. That the banks ought to pay
something for the use of the public money, all must agree, whatever diver
sity of opinion there may be as to the amount. According to the last return of
the treasury department, there was, on the first of this month, $45,000,000 of
public money in the thirty-six depository banks, which they are at liberty to
use as their own for discount or business, till drawn out for disbursements, an
event that may not happen for years. In a word, this vast amount is so much
additional banking capital, giving the same, or nearly the same, profit to those
institutions as their permanent chartered capital, without rendering any other
service to the public than paying away, from time to time, the portion that might
be required for the service of the government. Assuming that the banks real
ize a profit of six per cent, on these deposites (it cannot be estimated at less),
it would give, on the present amount, nearly three millions of dollars per annum,
and on the probable average public deposites of Ae year, upward of two mill
ions of dollars ; which enormous profit is derived from the public by compara
tively few individuals, without any return or charge, except the inconsiderable
service of paying out the draughts of the treasury when presented. But it is due
to the senator to acknowledge that his amendment is predicated on the suppo
sition that some disposition must be made of the surplus revenue, which would
leave in the banks a sum not greater than would be requisite to meet the 'cur
rent expenditure : a supposition which necessarily must affect, very materially
affect, the decision of the question of the amount of compensation the banks
ought to make to the public for the use of its funds ; but, let the disposition be
what it may, the omission in the amendment of any compensation whatever is,
in my opinion, wholly indefensible.

The next point of difference relates to transfer warrants. The bill prohibits
the use of transfer warrants, except with a view to disbursement, while the
amendment leaves them, without regulation, under the sole control of the treas
ury department. To understand the importance of this difference, it must be
borne in mind that the transfer warrants are the lever by which the whole bank
ing operations of the country may be controlled through the deposits . By them
the public money may be transferred from one bank to another, or from one state
or section of the country to another state or section ; and thus one bank may be
elevated and another depressed, and a redundant currency created in one state

228 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

or section, arid a deficient in another ; and, through such redundancy or defi
ciency, all the moneyed engagements and business transactions of the whole
community may be made dependant on the will of one man. With the present
enormous surplus, it is difficult to assign limits to the extent of this power. The
secretary, or the irresponsible agent unknown to the laws, who, rumour says,
has the direction of this immense power (we are permitted to have no certain,
information), may raise and depress stocks and property of all descriptions at
his pleasure, by withdrawing from one place and transferring to another, to the
unlimited gain of those who are in the secret, and certain ruin of those who are
not. Such a field of speculation has never before been opened in any country ;
a field so great, that the Rothschilds themselves might be tempted to enter it
with their immense funds. Nor is the control which it would give over the pol
itics of the country much less unlimited. To the same extent that it may be
used to affect the interests and the fortunes of individuals, to the like extent it
may be employed as an instrument of political influence and control. I do not
intend to assert that it has or will be so employed ; it is not essential at pres
ent to inquire how it has or will be used. It is sufficient for my purpose to
show, as I trust I have satisfactorily, that it may be so employed. To guard
against the abuse of so dangerous a power, the provision was inserted in the
bill to prohibit the use of transfer warrants, except, as stated, for the purpose of
disbursement ; the omission of which provision in the amendment is a fatal ob
jection to it of itself, were there no other. But it is far from standing alone :
the next point of difference will be found to be not less striking and fatal.

The professed object of both the bill and the amendment is to place the safe
keeping of the public moneys under the regulation and control of law, instead
of being left, as it now is, at the discretion of the executive. However strange
it may seem, the fact is, nevertheless, so, that the amendment entirely fails to
effect the object which it is its professed object to accomplish. In order that
it may be distinctly seen that what I state is the case, it will be necessary to
view the provisions of the bill and the amendment in reference to the deposite
separately, as they relate to the banks in which the public funds are now de
posited, and those which may hereafter be selected to receive them.

The bill commences with the former, which it adopts as banks of deposite,
and prescribes the regulations and conditions on the observance of which they
shall continue such ; while^at the same time, it places them beyond the con
trol and influence of the executive department, by placing them under the pro
tection of law so long as they continue faithfully to perform their duty as fiscal
agents of the government. It next authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to
select, under certain circumstances, additional banks of deposite, as the exigen
cy of the public service may require, on which it imposes like regulations and
conditions, and places, in like manner, under the protection of law. In all this
the amendment pursues a very different course. It begins with authorizing the
secretary to select the banks of deposite, and limits the regulations and condi
tions it imposes on such banks ; leaving, by an express provision, the present
banks wholly under the control of the treasury or the executive department, as
they now are, without prescribing any time for the selection of other banks of
deposite, or making it the duty of the secretary so to do. The consequence is
obvious. The secretary "may continue the present banks as long as he pleases ;
and so long as he may choose to continue them, the provisions of the amend
ment, so far as relates to the deposites, will be a dead letter ; and the banks, of
course, instead of being under the control of the law, will be contrary, as I have
said, to the professed object both of the bill and amendment — subject exclusive
ly to his will.

The senator has attempted to explain this difference, but, I must say, very un
satisfactorily. He said that the bill prohibited the selection of other banks ;
and, as he deemed others to be necessary, at certain important points, in con-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 229

sequence of the present enormous surplus, he inserted the provision authorizing
the selection of other banks. The senator has not stated the provisions of the
bill accurately : so far from not authorizing, it expressly authorizes the selec
tion of other banks where there are now none ; but I presume he intended to
limit his remarks to places where there are no existing banks of deposite.
Thus limited, the fact is as he states ; but it by no means explains the extraor
dinary omission (for such I must consider it) of not extending the regulations
to the existing banks, as well as to those hereafter to be selected. If the public
service requires additional banks at New- York and other important points, in
consequence of the vast sums deposited there (as I readily agree it does), if no
disposition is to be made of the surplus, it is certainly a very good reason for
enlarging the provisions of the bill, by authorizing the secretary to select other
banks at those points ; but it is impossible for me to comprehend how it proves
that the regulations which the amendment proposes to impose should be ex
clusively limited to such newly-selected banks. Nor do I see why the senator
has not observed the same rule, in this case, as that which he adopted in refer
ence to the compensation the banks ought to pay for the use of the public money.
He omitted to provide for any compensation, on the ground that his amendment
proposed to dispose of all the surplus money, leaving in the possession of the
banks, a sum barely sufficient to meet the current expenditure, for the use of
which he did not consider it right to charge a compensation. On the same
principle, it was unnecessary to provide for the selection of additional banks
where there are now banks of deposite, as they would be ample if the surplus
was disposed of. In this I understood the senator himself to concur.

But it is not only in the important point of extending the regulations to the
existing banks of deposite that the bill and the amendment differ. There is a stri
king difference between them in reference to the authority of Congress over the
banks of deposite embraced both in the bill and the amendment. The latter, fol
lowing the provision in the charter of the late Bank of the United States, authorizes
the secretary to withdraw the public deposites, and to discontinue the use of any
one of the banks whenever, in his opinion, such bank shall have violated the
conditions on which it has been employed, or the public funds are not safe in
its vaults, with the simple restriction, that he shall report the fact to Congress.
We know, from experience, how slight is the check which this restriction im
poses. It not only requires the concurrence of both houses of Congress to
overrule the act of the secretary, where his power may be improperly exerci
sed, but the act of Congress itself, intended to control such exercise of power,
may be overruled by the veto of the President, at whose will the secretary
holds his place ; so as to leave the control of the banks virtually under the con
trol of the executive department of the government. To obviate this, the bill
vests the secretary with the power simply of withdrawing the deposites and
suspending the use of the bank as a place of deposite ; and provides that,
if Congress shall not confirm the removal, the deposites shall be returned to the
bank after the termination of the next session of Congress.

The next point of difference is of far less importance, and is only mentioned as
tending to illustrate the different character of the bill and the amendment. The
former provides that the banks of deposite shall perform the duties of commis
sioners of loans without compensation, in like manner as was the duty of the
late Bank of the United States and its branches, under its charter. Among
these duties is that of paying the pensioners — a very heavy branch of disburse
ment, and attended with considerable expense, and which will be saved to the
government under the bill, but will be lost if the amendment should prevail.

Another difference remains to be pointed out, relating to the security of the
deposites. With so large an amount of public money in their vaults, it is im
portant th,at the banks should always be provided with ample means to meet
their engagements. With this view, the bill provides that the specie in the

230 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

vaults of the several banks, and the aggregate of the balance in their favour with
other specie-paying banks, shall be equal to one fifth of the entire amount of
their notes and bills in circulation, and their public and private deposites — a
sum, as is believed, sufficient to keep them in a sound, solvent condition. The
amendment, on the contrary, provides that the banks shall keep in their own
vaults, or the vaults of other banks, specie equal to one fourth of its notes and
bills in circulation, and the balance of its accounts with other banks payable on
demand.

I regret that the senator has thought proper to change the phraseology, and
to use terms less clear and explicit than those in the bill. I am not certain
that I comprehend the exact meaning of the provision in the amendment. What
is meant by specie in the vaults of other banks ? In a general sense, all depos
ites are considered as specie ; but I cannot suppose that to be the meaning in
this instance, as it would render the provision in a great measure inoperative.
I presume the amendment means special deposites in gold and silver in other
banks, placed there for safe keeping, or to be drawn on, and not to be used by
the bank in which it is deposited. Taking that to be the meaning, what is there
to prevent the same sum from being twice counted in estimating the means of
the several banks of deposite 1 Take two of them, one having $100,000 in
specie in its vaults, and the other the same amount in the vaults of the other bank,
which, in addition, has, besides, another $100,000 of its own ; what is there to
prevent the latter from returning, under the amendment, $200,000 of specie in
its vaults, while the former would return $100,000 in its own vaults, and an
other in the vaults of the other bank, making, in the aggregate, between them,
$400,000, when, in reality, the amount in both would be but $300,000?

But this is not the only difference between the bill and amendment, in this
particular, deserving of notice. The object of the provision is to compel the
banks of deposite to have, at all times, ample means to meet their liabilities, so
that the government should have sufficient assurance that the public moneys in
their vaults would be forthcoming when demanded. With this view, the bill
provides that the available means of the bank shall never be less than one fifth
of its aggregate liabilities, including bills, notes, and deposites, public and pri
vate ; while the amendment entirely omits the private deposites, and includes
only the balance of its deposites with other banks. This omission is the more
remarkable, inasmuch as the greater portion of the liabilities of the deposite
banks must, with the present large surplus, result from their deposites, as every
one who is familiar with banking operations will readily perceive.

I have now presented to the Senate the several points of difference which I
deem material between the bill and the amendment, with such remarks as to
enable them to form their own opinion in reference to the difference, so that they
may decide how far the assertion is true with which I set out, that, wherever
they differ, the amendment favours the banks against the interests of the public,
and the executive against the banks.

The senator, acting on the supposition that there would be a permanent surplus
beyond the expenditures of the government, which neither justice nor regard to
the public interest would permit to remain in the banks, has extended the provis
ions of his amendment, with great propriety, so as to comprehend a plan to with
draw the surplus from the banks. His plan is to vest the commissioners of the
sinking fund with authority to estimate, at the beginning of every quarter, the
probable receipts and expenditures of the quarter ; and if, in their opinion, the
receipts, with the money in the treasury, should exceed the estimated expenditure
by a certain sum, say $5,OOC,000, the excess should be vested in state stocks ;
and if it should fall short of that sum, a sufficient amount of the stocks should
be sold to make up the deficit. We have thus presented for consideration the
important subject of the surplus revenue, and with it the question so anxiously
and universally asked, What shall be done with the surplus ? Shall it be ex-

SPEECHES OF JOHN* C. CALHOUN. 231

pended by the government, or remain where it is, or be disposed of as proposed
by the senator ? or, if not, what other disposition shall be made of it 1 questions,
the investigation of which necessarily embraces the entire circle of our policy,
and on the decision of which the future destiny of the country may depend.

But before we enter on the discussion of this important question, it will be
proper to ascertain what will be the probable available means of the year, in
order that some conception may be formed of the probable surplus which may
lemain, by comparing it with the appropriations that may be authorized.

According to the late report of the Secretary of the Treasury, there was de
posited in the several banks a little upward of $33,000,000 at the termination
of the first quarter of the year, not including the sum of about $3,000,000 de
posited by the disbursing agents of the government. The same report stated
the receipts of the quarter at about $11,000,000, of which lands and customs
yielded nearly an equal amount. Assuming for the three remaining quarters an
equal amount, it would give, for the entire receipts of the year, $44.000,000.
I agree with the senator, that this sum is too large. The customs will prob
ably average an amount throughout the year corresponding with the receipts
of the first quarter, but there probably will be a considerable falling off in
the receipts from the public lands. Assuming $7,000,000 as the probable
amount, which I presume will be ample, the receipts of the year, subtract
ing that sum from $44,000,000, will be $37,000,000 ; and subtracting from
that $11,000,000, the receipts of the first quarter, would leave $26,000,000 as
the probable receipts of the last three quarters. Add to this sum $33,000,000,
the amount in the treasury on the last day of the first quarter, and it gives
$59,000.000. To this add the amount of stock in the United States Bank, which,
at the market price, is worth at least $7,000,000, and we have $66,000,000,
which I consider as the least amount at which the probable available means of
the year can be fairly estimated. It will, probably, very considerably exceed
this amount. The range may be put down at between $66,000,000 and
$73,000,000, which may be considered as the two extremes between which *
the means of the year may vibrate. But, in order to be safe, I have assumed
the least of the two.

The first question which I propose to consider is, Shall this sum be expend
ed by the government in the course of the year ? A sum nearly equal to the
entire debt of the war of the Revolution, by which the liberty and independence
of these states were established ; more than five times greater than the expen
diture of the government at the commencement of the present administration,
— deducting the payments on account of the public debt — and more than four
times greater than the average annual expenditure of the present administration,
making the same deduction, extravagant as its expenditure has been. The
very magnitude of the sum decides the question against expenditure. It may
be wasted, thrown away, but it cannot be expended. There are not objects on
which to expend it ; for proof of which I appeal to the appropriations already
made and contemplated. We have passed the navy appropriations, which, as
liberal as they are admitted to be on all sides, are raised only about $2,000,000
compared with the appropriations of last year. The appropriations for fortifi-.
cations, supposing the bills now pending should pass, will amount to about
$3,500,000, and would exceed the ordinary appropriations, assuming them at
$1,000,000, which I hold to be ample, by $2,500,000. Add a million for ord
nance, seven or eight for Indian treaties, and four for Indian wars, and suppo
sing the companies of the regular army to be filled as recommended by the war
department, the aggregate amount, including the ordinary expenditures, would
be between thirty and thirty-five millions, and would leave a balance of at least
$30,000,000 in the treasury at the end of the year.

But suppose objects could be devised on which to expend the whole of the
available means of the year, it would still be impossible to make the expendi-

232 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

ture without immense waste arid confusion. To expend so large an amount, reg
ularly and methodically, would require a vast increase of able and experienced
disbursing officers, and a great enlargement of the organization of the govern
ment, in all the branches connected with disbursements. To effect such an en
largement, and to give a suitable organization, placed under the control of skil
ful and efficient officers, must necessarily be a work of time ; but, without it,
so sudden and great an increase of expenditure would necessarily be followed
by inextricable confusion and heavy losses.

But suppose this difficulty overcome, and suitable objects could be devised,
would it be advisable to make the expenditure ? Would it be wise to draw off
so vast an amount of productive labour, to be employed in unproductive objects,
in building fortifications, dead walls, and in lining the interior frontier with a
large military force, neither of which would add a cent to the productive power
of the country ?

The ordinary expenditure of the government, under the present administra
tion, may be estimated, say at $18,000,000, a sum exceeding by five or six
millions what, in my opinion, is sufficient for a just and efficient administration,
of the government. Taking eighteen from sixty-six would leave forty-eight
millions as the surplus, if the affairs of the government had been so administer
ed as to avoid the heavy expenditures of the year, which I firmly believe, by
early and prudent management, might have been effected. The expenditure of
this sum, estimating labour at $20 a month, would require 200,000 operatives,
equal to one third of the whole number of labourers employed in producing the
great staple of our country, which is spreading wealth and prosperity over the
land, and controlling, in a great measure, the commerce and manufactures of
the world. But take what will be the actual surplus, and estimate that at half
the sum which, with prudence and economy, it might have been, and it would
require the subtraction of 100,000 operatives from their present useful employ
ment, to be employed in the unproductive service of the government. Would
it, I again repeat, be wise to draw off this immense mass of productive labour,
in order to employ it in building fortifications and swelling the military estab
lishment of the country ? Would it add to the strength of the Union, or give in
creased security to its liberty, or accelerate its prosperity ? the great objects for
which the government was constituted.

To ascertain how the strength of any country may be best developed, its pe
culiar state and condition must be taken into consideration. Looking to ours
with this view, who can doubt that, next to our free institutions, the main source
of our growing greatness and power is to be found in our great and astonishing
increase of numbers, wealth, and facility of intercourse ? If we desire to see
our country powerful, we ought to avoid any measure opposed to their develop
ment, and, in particular, ought to make the smallest possible draught, consistent
with our peace and security, on the productive powers of the country. Let these
have the freest possible play. Leave the resources of individuals under their
own direction, to be employed in advancing their own and their country's wealth,
and prosperity, with the extraction of the least amount required for the expen
diture of the government ; and draw off not a single labourer from his present
productive pursuits to the unproductive employment of the government, except
ing such as the public service may render indispensable. Who can doubt that
such a policy would add infinitely more to the power and strength of the coun
try than the extravagant schemes of spending millions on fortifications and the
increase of the military establishment ?

Let us next examine how the liberty of the country may be affected by the
scheme of disposing of the surplus by disbursements. And here. I would ask,
Is the liberty of the country at present in a secure and stable condition ? and,
if not, by what is it endangered ? and will an increase of disbursements aug
ment or dimmish the danger ?

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 233

Whatever may be the diversity of opinion on other points, there is not an in
telligent individual of any party, who regards his reputation, that will venture to
deny that the liberty of the country is at this time more insecure and unstable
than it ever has been. We all know that there is in every portion of the Union,
and with every party, a deep feeling that our political institutions are undergoing
a great and hazardous change. Nor is the feeling much less strong, that the
vast increase of patronage and influence of the government is the cause of the
great and fearful change which is so extensively affecting the character of our
people and institutions. The effect of increasing the expenditures at this time,
so as to absorb the surplus, would be to double the number of those who live, or
expect to live, by the government, and in the same degree augment its patron
age and influence, and accelerate that downward course which, if not arrested,
must speedily terminate in the overthrow of our free institutions.

These views I hold to be decisive against the wild attempt to absorb the im
mense means of the government by the expenditures of the year. In fact, with
the exception of a few individuals, all seem to regard the scheme either as im
practicable or unsafe ; but there are others, who, while they condemn the at
tempt of disposing of the surplus by immediate expenditures, believe it can be
safely and expediently expended in a period of four or five years, on what they
choose to call the defences of the country.

In order to determine how far this opinion may be correct, it will be neces
sary first to ascertain what will be the available means of the next four or five
years ; by comparing which with what ought to be the expenditure, we may
determine whether the plan would, or would not, be expedient. In making the
calculation, I will take the term of five years, including the present, and which
will, of course, include 1840, after the termination of which, the duties above
twenty per cent, are to go off, by the provisions of the Compromise Act, in
eighteen months, when the revenue is to be reduced to the economical and just
wants of the government.

The available means of the present year, as I have already shown, will equal,
at least $66,000,000. That of the next succeeding four years (including 1840)
may be assumed to be twenty-one millions annually. The reason for this as
sumption may be seen in the report of the select committee at the last session,
which I have reviewed, and in the correctness of which I feel increased con
fidence. The amount may fall short of, but will certainly not exceed, the esti
mate in the report, unless some unforeseen event should occur. Assuming,
then, $21,000,000 as the average receipts of the next four years, it will give an
aggregate of $84,000,000, which, added to the available means of this year,
will give $150,000,000 as the sum that will be at the disposal of the govern
ment for the period assumed. Divide this sum by five, the number of years,
and it will give $30,000,000 as the average annual available means of the
period.

The next question for consideration is, Will it be expedient to raise the dis
bursement during the period to an average expenditure of $30,000,000 annual
ly ? The first, and strong objection to the scheme is, that it would leave in the
deposite banks a heavy surplus during the greater part of the time, beginning
with a surplus of upward of thirty millions at the commencement of next year,
and decreasing at the rate of eight or nine millions a year till the termination
ot the period. But, passing this objection by, I meet the question directly. It
would be highly inexpedient and dangerous to attempt to keep up the disburse
ments at so high a rate. I ask, On what shall this money be expended ? Shall
it be expended by an increase of the military -establishment 1 by an enlarge
ment of the appropriations for fortifications, ordnance, and the navy, far beyond
what is proposed for the present year ? Have those who advocate the scheme
reflected to what extent this enlargement must be carried to absorb so great a
sum ? Even this year, with the extraordinary expenditure upon Indian treaties

Go

234 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

and Indian wars, and with profuse expenditure in every other branch of service,
the aggregate amount of appropriations will not greatly exceed $30,000,000,
and that of disbursements will not, probably, equal that sum.

To what extent, then, must the appropriations for the army, the navy, the
fortifications, and the like, be carried, in order to absorb that sum, especially
with a declining expenditure in several branches of the service, particularly in
the pensions, which, during the period, will fall off more than a million of dol
lars ? But, in order to take a full view of the folly and danger of the scheme
it will be necessary to extend our view beyond 1842, in order to form some
opinion of what will be the income of the government when the tariff shall be
so reduced, under the Compromise Act, that no duty shall exceed twenty per
cent, ad valorem. I know that any estimate made at this time cannot be con
sidered much more than conjectural ; but still, it would be imprudent to adopt a
system of expenditure now, without taking into consideration the probable state
of the revenue a few years hence.

After bestowing due reflection on the subject, I am of the impression that
the income from the imposts, after the period in question, will not exceed
$10,000,000. It will probably fall below, rather than rise above,. that sum. I
assume, as the basis of this estimate, that our consumption of foreign articles
will not then exceed $150,000,000. We all know that the capacity of the coun
try to consume depends upon the value of its domestic exports, and the profits of
its commerce and navigation. Of its domestic exports it would not be safe to
assume any considerable increase in any article except cotton. To what ex
tent the production and consumption of this great staple, which puts in motion
so vast an amount of the industry and commerce of the world, may be increas
ed between now and 1842, is difficult to conjecture ; but I deem it unsafe to
suppose that it can be so increased as to extend the capacity of the country to
consume beyond the limits I have assigned. Assuming, then, the amount which
I have, and dividing the imports into free and dutiable articles, the latter, ac
cording to the existing proportion between the two descriptions, would amount
in value to something less than $70,000,000. According to the Compromise
Act, no duty, after the period in question, can exceed twenty per cent., and the
rates would range from that down to five or six per cent. Taking fifteen per
cent, as the average, which would Jbe, probably, full high, and allowing for the ex
penses of collection, the nett income would be something less than $10,000,000.

The income from public lands is still more conjectural than that from cus
toms. There are so many, and such various causes in operation affecting this
source of the public income, that it is exceedingly difficult to form even a con
jectural estimate as to its amount, beyond the current year. But, in the midst
of this uncertainty, one fact may be safely assumed, that the purchases during
the last year, and thus far this, greatly exceed the steady, progressive demand
for public lands, from increased population, and the consequent emigration to
the new states and territories. Much of the purchases have been, unquestion
ably, made upon speculation, with a view to resales, and must, of course, come
into market hereafter in competition with the lands of the government, and to
that extent must reduce the income from their sales. Estimating even the de
mand for public lands from what it was previous to the recent large sales, and
.taking into estimate the increased population and wealth of the country, I do
jiot consider it safe to assume more than $5,000,000 annually from this branch
.of the revenue, which, added to the customs, would give for the annual receipts
.between fourteen and fifteen millions of dollars after 1842.

I now ask whether it woulcj be prudent to raise the public expenditures to
ihe sum of $30,000,000 annually during the intermediate period, with the
prospect that they must be suddenly reduced to half that amount ? Who does
.not see the fierce conflict which must follow between those who maybe interest
ed in keeping up the expenditures, and those who have an equal interest against

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 235

£n increase of the duties as the means of keeping them up ? I appeal to the
senators from the South, whose constituents have so deep an interest in low du
ties, to resist a course so impolitic, unwise, and extravagant, and which, if
adopted, might again renew the tariff, so recently thrown off by such hazard
ous and strenuous efforts, with all its oppression and disaster. Let us remem
ber what occurred in the fatal session of 1828. With a folly unparalleled.
Congress then raised the duties to a rate so enormous as to average one half
the value of the imports, when on the eve of discharging the debt, and when,
of course, there would be no objects on which the immense income from such
extravagant duties could be justly and constitutionally expended. It is ama
zing that there was such blindness then as not to see what has since follow
ed — the sudden discharge of the debt, and an overflowing treasury, without the.
means of absorbing the surplus ; the violent conflict resulting from such a state
of things ; and the vast increase of the power and patronage of the government,
with all its corrupting consequences. , We are now about, I fear, to commit an
error of a different character : to raise the expenditure far beyond all example,
in time of peace, and with a decreasing revenue, which must, with equal cer
tainty, bring on another conflict, not much less dangerous, in which the strug
gle will not be to find objects to absorb an overflowing treasury, but to devise
means to continue an expenditure far beyond the just and legitimate wants of
the country. It is easy to foresee that, if we are thus blindly to go on in the
management of our affairs, without regard to the future, the frequent and violent
concussion which must follow from such folly cannot but end in a catastrophe
that will ingulf our political institutions.

With such decided objections to the dangerous and extravagant scheme of
absorbing the surplus by disbursements, I proceed to the next question, Shall
the public money remain where it now is ? Shall the present extraordinary
state of things, without example or parallel, continue, of a government, calling
itself free, extracting from the people millions beyond what it can expend, and
placing that vast sum in the custody of a few monopolizing corporations, selected
at the sole will of the executive, and continued during his pleasure, to be used
as their own from the time it is collected till it is disbursed ? To this question
there must burst from the lips of every man who loves his country and its insti
tutions, and who is the enemy of monopoly, injustice, and oppression, an indig
nant no. And here let me express the pleasure I feel that the senator from
New-York, in moving his amendment, however objectionable his scheme, has
placed himself in opposition to the continuance of the present unheard-of and
dangerous state of things ; and I add, as a simple act of justice, that the tone
and temper of his remarks in support of his amendment were characterized by a
courtesy and liberality which I, on my part, shall endeavour to imitate. But
I fear, notwithstanding this favourable indication in so influential a quarter, the
very magnitude of the evil (too great to be concealed) will but serve to perpetu
ate it. So great and various are the interests enlisted in its favour, that I
greatly fear that all the efforts of the wise and patriotic to arrest it will prove
unavailing. At the head of these stand the depository banks themselves, with
their numerous stockholders and officers ; with their $40,000,000 of capital, and
an equal amount of public deposites, associated into one great combination ex
tending over the whole Union, under the influence and control of the treasury
department. The whole weight of this mighty combination, so deeply interest
ed in the continuance of the present state of things, is opposed to any change.
To this powerful combination must be added the numerous and influential body
who are dependant on banks to meet their engagements, and who, whatever
may be their political opinions, must be alarmed at any change which may
limit their discounts and accommodation. Then come the stock-jobbers, a
growing and formidable class, who live by raising and depressing stocks, and
who behold in the present state of things the most favourable opportunity of

236 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

carrying on their dangerous and corrupting pursuits. With the control which
the Secretary of the Treasury has over the banks of deposite, through transfer
warrants, with the power of withdrawing the deposites at pleasure, he may,
whenever he chooses, raise or depress the stock of any bank, and, if disposed
to use this tremendous power for corrupt purposes, may make the fortunes of
the initiated, and overwhelm in sudden ruin those not in the secret. To the
stock-jobbers must be added speculators of every hue and form ; and, in particu
lar, the speculators in public lands, who, by the use of the public funds, are
rapidly divesting the people of the noble patrimony left by our ancestors in the
public domain, by giving in exchange what may, in the end, prove to be broken
credit and worthless rags. To these we must add the artful and crafty poli
ticians, who wield this mighty combination of interests for political purposes.
I am anxious to avoid mingling party politics in this discussion ; and, that I may
not even seem to do so, I shall not attempt to exhibit, in all its details, the fear
ful, and, I was about to add, the overwhelming power which the present state
of things places in the hands of those who have control of the government,
and which, if it be not wielded to overthrow our institutions and destroy all
responsibility, must be attributed to their want of inclination, and not to their
want of means.

Such is the power and influence interested to continue the public money where
it is now deposited. To these there are opposed the honest, virtuous, and patri
otic of every party, who behold in the continuance of the present state of things
almost certain convulsion and overthrow of our liberty. There would be found
on the same side the great mass of the industrious and labouring portion of the
community, whose hard earnings are extracted from them without their knowl
edge, were it not that what is improperly taken from them is successfully used
as the means of deceiving and controlling them. If such were not the case —
if those who work could see how those who profit are enriched at their ex
pense — the present state of things would not be endured for a moment ; but as
it is, I fear that, from misconception, and consequent want of union and co
operation, things may continue as they are, till it will be too late to apply a
remedy. I trust, however, that such will not be the fact ; that the people will
be roused from their false security ; and that Congress will refuse to adjourn till
an efficient remedy is applied. In this hope, I recur to the inquiry, What shall
that remedy be ? Shall we adopt the measure recommended by the senator
from New- York, which, as has been stated, proposes to authorize the commis
sioners of the sinking fund to ascertain the probable income of each quarter,
and, if there should be a probable excess above $5,000,000, to vest the surplus
in the purchase of state stocks ; but, if there shall be a deficiency, to sell so-
much of the stock previously purchased as would make up the difference ?

I regret that the senator has not furnished a statement of facts sufficiently full
to enable us to form an opinion of what will be the practical operation of his
scheme. He has omitted, for instance, to state what is the aggregate amount of
stocks issued by the several states : a fact indispensable in order to ascertain
how the price of the stocks would be affected by the application of the surplus to
their purchase. All who are in the least familiar with subjects of this kind,
must know that the price of stocks rises proportionably with the amount of the
sum applied to their purchase. I have already shown that the probable surplus
at the end of this year, notwithstanding the extravagance of the appropriations,
will be between thirty and thirty-five millions ; and before we can decide un-
derstandingly whether this great sum can with propriety be applied as the sen
ator proposes, we should know whether the amount of state stocks be sufficient
to absorb it, without raising their price extravagantly high.

The senator should also have informed us, not only as to the amount of the
stock, but how it is distributed among the states, in order to enable us to deter
mine whether his scheme would operate equally between them. In the ab-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 237

sence of correct information on both of these points, we are compelled to use
such as we may possess, however defective and uncertain, in order to make up
our mind on his amendment.

We all know, then, that while several of the states have no stocks, and many
a very inconsiderable amount, three of the large states (Pennsylvania, Ohio, and
New-York) have a very large amount, not less in the aggregate, if I am cor
rectly informed, than thirty-five or forty millions. What amount is held by the
rest of the states is uncertain, but I suppose that it may be safely assumed that,
taking the whole, it is less than that held by those states. With these facts,
it cannot be doubted that the application of the surplus, as proposed to be ap
plied by the senator, would be exceedingly unequal among the states, and that
the advantage of the application would mainly accrue to these states. To most
of these objections, the senator, while he does not deny that the application of
the surplus will greatly raise the price of stocks, insists that the states issuing
them -will not derive any benefit from the advance, and, consequently, have no
interest in the question of the application of the surplus to their purchase.

If by states he means the government of the states, the view of the senator
may be correct. They may, as he says, have but little interest in the market
value of their stocks, as it must be redeemed by the same amount, whether that
be high or low. But if we take a more enlarged view, and comprehend the
people of the state as well as the government, the argument entirely fails. The
senator will not deny that the holders have a deep interest in the application
of so large a sum as the present surplus in the purchase of their stocks. He
will 'not deny that such application must greatly advance the price ; and, of
course, in determining whether the states having stocks will be benefited by
applying the surplus as he proposes, we must first ascertain who are the hold
ers. Where do they reside ? Are they foreigners residing abroad ? If so,
would it be wise to apply the public money so as to advance the interests of
foreigners, to whom the states are under no obligation but honestly to pay to
them the debts which they have contracted ? But if not held by foreigners, are
they held by citizens of such states ? If such be the fact, will the senator deny
that those states will be deeply interested in the application of the surplus, as
proposed in his amendment, when the effects of such application must be, as is
conceded on all sides, greatly to enhance the price of the stocks, and, conse
quently, to increase the wealth of their citizens 1 Let us suppose that, instead
of purchasing the stocks of the states in which his constituents are interested,
the senator's amendment had proposed to apply the present enormous surplus
to the purchase of cotton or slaves, in which the constituents of the Southern
senators are interested, would any one doubt that the cotton-growing or slave-
holding states would have a deep interest in the question ? It will not be de
nied that, if so applied, their price would be greatly advanced, and the wealth
of their citizens proportionably increased. Precisely the same effect would re
sult from the application to the purchase of stocks, with like benefits to the citi
zens of the states which have issued large amounts of stock. The principle is
the same in both cases.

But there is another view of the subject which demands most serious consid
eration. Assuming, what will not be questioned, that the application of the sur
plus, as proposed by the amendment, will be very unequal among the states,
some having little or none, and others a large amount of stocks, the result would
necessarily be to create, in effect, the relation of debtor and creditor between
the states. The states whose stocks might be purchased by the commission
ers would become the debtors of the government ; arid as the government would,
in fact, be but the agent between them and the other states, the latter would, in
reality, be their creditors. This relation between them could not fail to be pro
ductive of important political consequences, which would influence all the op
erations of the government. It would, in particular, have a powerful bearing

238 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

upon the presidential election ; the debtor and creditor states each striving to
give such a result to the elections as might be favourable to their respective in
terests ; the one to exact, and the other to exempt themselves from the pay
ment of the debt. Supposing the three great states to which I have referred,
whose united influence would have so decided a control, to be the principal
debtor states, as would, in all probability, be the fact, it is easy to see that the
result would be, finally, the release of the debt, and, consequently, a correspond
ent loss to the creditor, and gain to the debtor states.

But there is another view of the subject still more deserving, if possible, of
attention than either of those which have been presented. It is impossible not
to see, after what has been said, that the power proposed to be conferred by the
amendment of the senator, of applying the surplus in buying and selling the
stocks of the states, is one of great extent, and calculated to have powerful in
fluence, not only on -a large body of the most wealthy and influential citizens
of the states which have issued stocks, but on the states themselves. The
next' question is, In whom is the exercise of this power to be vested ? Where
shall we find individuals sufficiently detached from the politics of the day, and
whose virtue, patriotism, disinterestedness, and firmness can raise them so far
above political and sinister motives as to exercise powers so high and influen
tial exclusively for the public good, without any view to personal or political
aggrandizement ? Whom has the amendment selected as standing aloof from pol
itics, and possessing these high qualifications 1 Who are the present commis
sioners of the sinking fund, to whom this high and responsible trust is to be
confided ? At the head stands the Vice-president of the United States, with
whom the Chief-justice of the United States, the Secretary of State, the Secre
tary of the Treasury, and the Attorney-general, are associated ; all party men>
deeply interested in the maintenance of power in the present hands, and having
the strongest motives to apply the vast power which the amendment would con
fer upon them, should it become a law, to party purposes. I do not say it would
be so applied ; but I must ask, Would it be prudent, would it be wise, would it
be seemly, to vest such great and dangerous powers in those who have so
strong a motive to abuse it, and who, if they should have elevation and virtue
enough to resist the temptation, would still be suspected of having used the
power for sinister and corrupt purposes ? I am persuaded, in drawing the
amendment, that the senator from New- York has, without due reflection on the
impropriety of vesting the power where he proposes, inadvertently inserted the
provision which he has, and that, on review, he will concur with me, that, should
his amendment be adopted, the power ought to be vested in others, less expo
sed to temptation, and, consequently, less exposed to suspicion.

I have now stated the leading objections to the several modes of disposing of
the surplus revenue which I proposed to consider ; and the question again recurs,
What shall be done with the surplus ? The Senate is not uninformed of my
opinion on this important subject. Foreseeing that there would be a large sur
plus, and the mischievous consequences that must follow, I moved, during the
last session, for a select committee, which, among other measures, reported a
resolution so to amend the Constitution as to authorize the temporary distribu
tion of the surplus among the states ; but so many doubted whether there would
be a surplus at the time, that it rendered all prospect of carrying the resolution
hopeless. My opinion still remains unchanged, that the measure then proposed
was the best ; but so rapid has been the accumulation of the surplus, even be
yond my calculation, and so pressing the danger, that what would have been
then an efficient remedy, would now be too tardy to meet the danger, and, of
course, another remedy must be devised, more speedy in its action.

After bestowing on the subject the most deliberate attention, I have come to
the conclusion that there is no other so safe, so efficient, and so free from ob
jections as the one I have proposed, of depositing the surplus that may remain

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 239

at the termination of the year, in the treasury of the several states, in the man
ner provided for in the amendment. But the senator from New- York objects
to the measure, that it would, in effect, amount to a distribution, on the ground,
as he conceives, that the states would never refund. He does not doubt but
that they would, if called on to refund by the government ; but he says that Con
gress will, in fact, never make the call. He rests this conclusion on the sup
position that there would be a majority of the states opposed to it. He admits,
in case the revenue should become deficient, that the Southern or staple states
would prefer to refund their quota rather than to raise the imposts to meet the
deficit ; but he insists that the contrary would be the case with the manufacturing
states, which would prefer to increase the imposts to refunding their quota, on
the ground that the increase of the duties would promote the interests of manu
factures. I cannot agree with the senator that those states would assume a po^
sition so entirely untenable as to refuse to refund a deposite which their faith
would be plighted to return, and rest the refusal on the ground of preferring to
lay a tax, because it would be a bounty to them, and would, consequently, throw
the whole burden of the tax on the other states. But, be this as it may, I can
tell the senator that, if they should take a course so unjust and monstrous, he
may rest assured that the other states would most unquestionably resist the in
crease of the imposts ; so that the government would have to take its choice,
either to go without the money, or call on the states to refund the deposites.
But I so far agree with the senator as to believe that Congress would be very
reluctant to make the call ; that it would not make it till, from the wants of the
treasury, it should become absolutely necessary ; and that, in order to avoid
such necessity, it would resort to a just and proper economy in the public ex
penditures as the preferable alternative. I see in this, however, much good in
stead of evil. The government has long since departed from habits of econo
my, and fallen into a profusion, a waste, and an extravagance in its disburse
ments, rarely equalled by any free state, and which threatens the most disas
trous consequences.

But I am happy to think that the ground on which the objection of the sena
tor stands may be removed, without materially impairing the provisions of the
bill. It will require but the addition of a few words to remove it, by giving to
the deposites all the advantages, without the objections, which he proposes by
his plan. It will be easy to provide that the states shall authorize the proper
officers to give negotiable certificates of deposite, which shall not bear interest
till demanded, when they shall bear the usual rates till paid. Such certificates
would be, in fact, state stocks, every way similar to that in which the senator
proposes to vest the surplus, but with this striking superiority : that, instead of
being partial, and limited to a few states, they would be fairly and justly appor
tioned among the several states. They would have another striking advantage
over his. They would create among all the members of the confederacy, recip
rocally, the relation of debtor and creditor, in proportion to their relative weight
in the Union ; which, in effect, would leave them in their present relation, and
would, of course, avoid the danger that would result from his plan, which, as
has been shown, would necessarily make a part of the states debtors to the rest,
with all the dangers resulting from such relation.

The next objection of the senator is to the ratio of distribution proposed in the
bill among the states, which he pronounces to be unequal, if not unconstitution
al. He insists that the true principle would be to distribute the surplus among
the states in proportion to the representation of the House of Representatives,
without including the senators, as is proposed in the bill, for which he relies on
the fact, that, by the Constitution, representation and taxation are to be appor
tioned in the same manner among the states.

The Senate will see that the effect of adopting the ratio supported by the
senator would be to favour the large states, while that in the bill will be more
favourable to the small.

240 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

The state I in part represent occupies a neutral position between the two.
She cannot be considered either a large or a small state, forming, as she does,
one twenty-fourth part of the Union ; and, of course, it is the same to her which
ever ratio may be adopted. But I prefer the one contained in my amendment,
on the ground that it represents the relative weight of the states in the govern
ment. It is the weight assigned to them in the choice of the President arid
Vice-president in the electoral college, and, of course, in the administration of
the laws. It is also that assigned to them in the making of the laws by the ac
tion of the two houses, and corresponds very nearly to their weight in the ju
dicial department of the government, the judges being nominated by the Presi
dent and confirmed by the Senate. In addition, I was influenced, in selecting
the ratio, by the belief that it was a wise and magnanimous course, in case of
doubt, to favour the weaker members of the confederacy. The larger can al
ways take care of themselves ; and, to avoid jealousy and improper feelings,
ought to act liberally towards the weaker members of the confederacy. To
which may be added, that I am of the impression that, even on the principle as
sumed by the senator, that the distribution of the surplus ought to be apportion
ed on the ratio with direct taxation (which maybe well doubted), the ratio which
I support would conform in practice more nearly to the principle than that which
he. supports. It is a fact not generally known, that representation in the other
house, and direct taxes, should they be laid, would be very far from being equal,
although the Constitution provides that they should be. The inequality would
result from the mode of apportioning the representatives. Instead of apportion
ing them among the states, as near as may be, as directed by the Constitution,
an artificial mode of distribution has been adopted, which, in its effects, gives to
the large states a greater number, and to the small a less than that to which they
are entitled. I would refer those who may desire to understand how this ine
quality is effected, to the discussion in this body on the apportionment bill un
der the last census. So great is this inequality, that, were a direct tax to be
laid, New- York, for instance, would have at least three members more than her
apportionment of the tax would require. The ratio which I have proposed
would, I admit, produce as great an inequality in favour of some of the small states,
particularly the old, whose population is nearly stationary ; but among the new
and growing members of the confederacy, which constitute the greater portion
of the small states, it would not give them a larger share of the deposites than
what they would be entitled to on the principle of direct taxes. But the objec
tion of the senator to the ratio of distribution, like his objection to the condition
on which the bill proposes to make it, is a matter of small comparative conse
quence. I am prepared, in the spirit of concession, to adopt either, as one or
the other may be more acceptable to the Senate.

It now remains to compare the disposition of the surplus proposed in the bill
with the others I have discussed ; and, unless I am greatly deceived, it pos
sesses great advantages over them. Compared with the scheme of expending
the surplus, its advantage is, that it would avoid the extravagance and waste
which must result from suddenly more than quadrupling the expenditures, with
out a corresponding organization in the disbursing department of the govern
ment to enforce economy and responsibility. It would also avoid the diversion
of so large a portion of the industry of the country from its present useful direc
tion to unproductive objects, with heavy loss to the wealth and prosperity of the
country, as has been shown, while it would, at the same time, avoid the increase
of the patronage and influence of the government, with all their corruption and
danger to the liberty and institutions of the country. But its advantages would
not be limited simply to avoiding the evil of extravagant and useless disburse
ments. It would confer positive benefits, by enabling the states to discharge
their debts, and complete a system of internal improvements, by railroads and
canals, which would not only greatly strengthen the bonds of the confederacy,
but increase its power, by augmenting infinitely our resources and prosperity

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 241

I do not deem it necessary to compare the disposition of the surplus which
is proposed in the bill with the dangerous, and, I must say, wicked scheme of
leaving the public funds where they are, in the banks of deposite, to be loaned
out 6y those institutions to speculators and partisans, without authority or con
trol of law.

Compared with the plan proposed by the senator from New-York, it is suffi
cient, to prove its superiority, to say that, while it avoids all of the objections to
which his is liable, it at the same time possesses all the advantages, with
others peculiar to itself. Among these, one of the most prominent is, that it
provides the only efficient remedy for the deep-seated disease which now af
flicts the body politic, and which threatens to terminate so fatally, unless it be
speedily and effectually arrested.

All who have reflected on the nature of our complex system of government,
and the dangers to which it is exposed, have seen that it is susceptible, from its
structure, to two dangers of opposite character, one threatening consolidation,
and the other anarchy and dissolution. From the beginning of the government,
•we find a difference of opinion among the wise and patriotic to which the gov
ernment was most exposed : one part believing that the danger was that the
government would absorb the reserved powers of the states, and terminate in
consolidation, while the other were equally confident that the states would ab
sorb the powers of the government, and the system end in anarchy and disso
lution. It was this diversity of opinion which gave birth to the two great, hon
est, and patriotic parties which so long divided the community, and to the many
political conflicts which so long agitated the country. Time has decided the
controversy. We are no longer left to doubt that the danger is on the side of
this government, and that, if not arrested, the system must terminate in an entire
absorption of the powers of the states.

Looking back, with the light which experience has furnished, we now clearly
see that both of the parties took a false view of the operation of the system. It
was admitted by both that there would be a conflict for power between the gov
ernment and the states, arising from a disposition on the part of those who, for
the time being, exercised the powers of the government and the states, to en
large their respective powers at the expense of each other, and which would
induce each to watch the other with incessant vigilance. Had such proved to
be the fact, I readily concede that the result would have been the opposite to
what has occurred, and the Republican, and not the Federal party, would have
been mistaken as to the tendency of the system. But so far from this jealousy,
experience has shown that, in the operation of the system, a majority of the
states have acted in concert with the government at all times, except upon the
eve of a political revolution, when one party was about to go out, to make room
for the other to come in ; and we now clearly see that this has not been the result
of accident, but that the habitual operation must necessarily be so. The mis
conception resulted from overlooking the fact, that the government is but an
agent of the states, and that the dominant majority of the I/nion, which elect
and control a majority of the State Legislatures, would etect also those who
would control this government, whether that majority rested on sectional inter
ests, on patronage and influence, or whatever basis it might, and that they would
use the power both of the General and State Governments jointly, for aggran
dizement and the perpetuation of their power. Regarded in this light, it is not
at all surprising that the tendency of the system is such as it has proved itself
to be, and which any intelligent observer now sees must necessarily terminate
in a central, absolute, irresponsible, and despotic power. It is this fatal ten
dency that the measure proposed in the bill is calculated to counteract, and
which, I believe, would prove effective if now applied. It would place the
states in the relation in which it was universally believed they would stand to
this government at the time of its formation, and make them those jealous and

HH

242 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

vigilant guardians of its action on all measures touching the disbursements and
expenditures of the government, which it was confidently believed they would
be ; which would arrest the fatal tendency to the concentration of the entire
power of the system in this government, if any power on earth can.

But it is objected that the remedy would be too powerful, and would produce
an opposite and equally dangerous tendency. I coincide that such would be
the danger, if permanently applied ; and, under that impression, and believing
that the present excess of revenue would not continue longer, I have limited
the measure to the duration of the Compromise Act. Thus limited, it will act
sufficiently long, I trust, to eradicate the present disease, without superinducing
one of an opposite character.

But the plan proposed is supported by its justice, as well as these high con
siderations of political expediency. The surplus money in the treasury is not
ours. It properly belongs to those who made it, and from whom it has been
unjustly taken. I hold it an unquestionable principle, that the government has
no right to take a cent from the people beyond what is necessary to meet its
legitimate and constitutional wants. To take more intentionally would be rob
bery ; and, if the government has not incurred the guilt in the present case, its
exemption can only be found in its folly — the folly of not seeing and guarding
against a vast excess of revenue, which the most ordinary understanding ought
to have foreseen and prevented. If it were in our power — if we could ascertain
from whom the vast amount now in the treasury was improperly taken, justice
would demand that it should be returned to its lawful owners. But, as that is
impossible, the measure next best, as approaching nearest to restitution, is that
which is proposed, to deposite it in the treasuries of the several states, which
will place it under the disposition of the immediate representatives of the peo
ple, to be used by them as they may think fit till the wants of the government
may require its return.

But it is objected that such a disposition would be a bribe to the people. A
bribe to the people ! to return it to those to whom it justly belongs, and from
whose pockets it should never have been taken. A bribe ! to place it in the
charge of those who are the immediate representatives of those from whom we
derive our authority, and who may employ it so much more usefully than we
can. But what is to be done ? If not returned to the people, it must go some
how ; und is there no danger of bribing those to whom it may go ? If we dis
burse it, is there no danger of bribing the thousands of agents, contractors, and
jobbers, through whose hands it must pass, and in whose pockets, and those of
their associates, so large a part would be deposited ? If, to avoid this, we leave
it where it is, in the banks, is there no danger of bribing the banks in whose
custody it is, with their various dependants, and the numerous swarms of specu
lators whict hover about them in hopes of participating in the spoil ? Is there
no danger of 'nribing the political managers, who, through the deposites, have the
control of these banks, and, by them, of their dependants, and the hungry and vo
racious hosts of ^peculators who have overspread and are devouring the land ?
Yes, literally devouring the land. Finally, if it should be vested as proposed
by the senator from New- York, is there "no danger of bribing the holders of
state stocks, and, through them, the states which have issued them ? Are the
agents, the jobbers, and contractors ; are the directors and stockholders of the
banks ; are the speculators and stock-jobbers ; are the political managers and
holders of state securities, the only honest portion of the community ? Are
they alone incapable of being bribed ? And are the people the least honest,
and most liable to be bribed ? Is this the creed of those now in power ? of
those who profess to be the friends of the people, and to place implicit confi
dence in their virtue and patriotism ?

I have now (said Mr. Calhoun) stated what, in my opinion, ought to be done
with the surplus. Another question still remains : not what shall, but what

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 243

will be done with the surplus ? With a few remarks on this question, I shall
conclude what I intended to say.

There was a time, in the better days of the Republic, when to show what
ought to -be done was to ensure the adoption of the measure. Those days have
passed away, I fear, forever. A power has risen up in the government greater
than the people themselves, consisting of many, and various, and powerful in
terests, combined into one mass, and held together by the cohesive power of
the vast surplus in the banks. This mighty combination will \>e opposed to
any change ; and it is to be feared that, such is its influence, no measure to
which it is opposed can become a law, however expedient and necessary, and
that the public money will remain in their possession, to be disposed of, not as
the public interest, but as theirs may dictate. The time, indeed, seems fast ap
proaching, when no law can pass, nor any honour be conferred, from the chiei
magistrate to the tide-waiter, without the assent^of this powerful and interested
combination, which is steadily becoming the government itself, to the utter sub
version of the authority of the people. Nay, I fear we are in the midst of it ;
and I look with anxiety to the fate of this measure as the test whether we are
or not.

If nothing should be done — if the money which justly belongs to the people
be left where it is, with the many and overwhelming objections to it — the fact
will prove that a great and radical change has been effected; that the govern
ment is subverted ; that the authority of the people is suppressed by a union of
the banks and executive — a union a hundred times more dangerous than that of
Church and State, against which the Constitution has so jealously guarded. It
would be the announcement of a state of things from which, it is to be feared,
there can be no recovery — a state of boundless corruption, and the lowest and
basest subserviency. It seems to be the order of Providence that, with the
exception of these, a people may recover from any other evil. Piracy, robbery,
and violence of every description may, as history proves, be followed by vir
tue, patriotism, and national greatness ; but where is the example to be found
of a degenerate, corrupt, and subservient people, who have ever recovered their
virtue and patriotism ? Their doom has ever been the lowest state of wretch
edness and misery : scorned, trodden down, and obliterated forever from the list
of nations. May Heaven grant that such may never be our doom !

XVI.

SPEECH ON THE BILL FOR THE ADMISSION OF MICHIGAN. JANUARY 2, 1837.

MR. GRUNDY moved that the previous orders of the day be postponed,
for the purpose of considering the bill to admit tie State of Michigan into
the Union.

Mr. Calhoun was opposed to the motion and said, the documents ac
companying the bill had but this mornins been laid upon the tables, and
no time had been allowed for even rearing them over.

Mr. Grundy insisted on his motio*« Of °ne point he was fully satis
fied, that Michigan had a right to *e received into the Union ; on this, he
presumed, there would be but li**le difference of opinion, the chief diffi
culty having respect to the «iode in which it was to be done. There
seemed more difference of opinion, and he presumed there would be
more debate, touching tb~ preamble than concerning the bill itself; but
he could not consent tr postpone the subject. Congress were daily pass
ing laws, the effect of which pressed immediately upon the people of
Michigan, and concerning which they were entitled to have a voice and

244 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

a vote upon this floor 5 and, therefore, the bill for their admission ought
to receive the immediate action of the Senate. As to the documents,
they were not numerous. The gentleman from South Carolina might
readily run his eye over them, and he would perceive that the. facts of
the case were easily understood. Indeed, there was but one of any con
sequence respecting which there was any controversy. When the Senate
adjourned on Thursday, many senators had been prepared, and were de
sirous to speak, although the documents were not then printed. It was
the great principles involved in the case which would form the subjects
of discussion, and they could as well be discussed now. He thought the
Senate had better proceed. One fact in the case was very certain : there had
been more votes for the members to the last convention than for the first.
How many more was a matter of little comparative consequence. The
great question for the Senate to consider was this : What is the will of
Michigan on the subject of entering the Union 1

If this could be decided, it was of less consequence whether the bill
should or should not expressly state that the last convention, and the as
sent by it given, formed the ground of the admission of the state.

Mr. Calhoun here inquired whether the chairman of the committee was
to be understood as being now ready to abandon the preamble 1 If the
Judiciary Committee were agreed to do this, he thought all difficulty
would be at an end.

Mr. Grundy replied, that, as chairman of the Judiciary Committee, he
had no authority to reply to the inquiry, but, as an individual, he consid
ered the preamble as of little consequence, and he should vote for the
bill whether it were in or out. Michigan ought, undoubtedly, to be ad
mitted, and all the consequences would result, whether the preamble were
retained or not. He had received no authority from the committee to
consent that it should be stricken out. For himself, he was settled in the
belief that Congress possessed full power to prescribe the boundaries of
a territory, and that, when that territory passed into a state, the right re
mained still the same. Congress had already established the boundary of
Ohio, and that settled the question. He never had perceived the necessity of
inserting in the admission bill the section which made the assent of Mich
igan to the boundaries fixed for her by Congress a prerequisite to her
admission, because the disputed boundary line was fixed by another bill ;
and, whether the preamble to this bill should be retained or not, Michigan
could not pass the line, so that the preamble was really of very little
consequence.

Mr. Calhoun said that, in inquiring of the honourable chairman whether
he intended to aban6.on the preamble of the bill, his question had had re
spect, not to any pledge respecting boundaries, but to the recognition of
the second convention a*d of its doings. He wanted to know whether
the chairman was ready to abandon that principle. He had examined the
subject a good deal, and his ->wn mind was fully made up that Michigan
could not be admitted on the giound of that second convention ; but the
Senate might set aside the whoio of what had been done, and receive
Michigan as she stood at the commoncement Of the last session.

Mr. Grundy observed, that if the gentleman's mind was fully made up,
then there could be no necessity of postponing the subject. The gentle
man has fully satisfied himself, and now (fcrtid Mr. G.) let us see if he can
satisfy us. His argument, it seems, has bet^ fully matured, and we are
now ready to listen to it. Though I consider that there is no virtue in
the preamble, and that the effect of the bill will be the same whether it
is stricken out or retained, yet I am not ready to s^y that I shall vote to
strike it out. I am ready to hear what can be said both for and against it.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 245

The question was now put on the motion of Mr. Grundy to postpone
the previous orders, and carried, 22 to 16. So the orders were postponed,
and the Senate proceeded to consider the bill, which having been again
read at the clerk's table, as follows :

Jl Bill to admit the State of Michigan into the Union upon an equal footing
with the original States.

Whereas, in pursuance of the act of Congress of June the fifteenth,
eighteen hundred and thirty-six, entitled, "An act to establish the northern
boundary of the State of Ohio, and to provide for the admission of the
State of Michigan into the Union, upon the conditions therein expressed,"
a convention of delegates, elected by the people of the said State of
Michigan, for the sole purpose of giving their assent to the boundaries of
the said State of Michigan as described, declared, and established in and
by the said act, did, on the fifteenth of December, eighteen hundred and
thirty-six, assent to the provisions of said act : therefore,

Be it enacted, #c., That the State of Michigan shall be one, and is here
by declared to be one of the United States of America, and admitted into
the Union on an equal footing with the original states, in all respects
whatever.

SEC. 2. JLnd be it farther enacted, That the Secretary of the Treasury, in
carrying into effect the thirteenth and fourteenth sections of the act of
the twenty-third of June, eighteen hundred and thirty-six, entitled, " An
act to regulate the deposites of the public money," shall consider the
State of Michigan as being one of the United States.

Mr. Calhoun then rose, and addressed the Senate as follows :

I have bestowed on this subject all the attention that was in my power,
and, although actuated by a most anxious desire for the admission of
Michigan into the Union, I find it impossible to give my assent to this
bill. I am satisfied the Judiciary Committee has not bestowed upon the
subject all that attention which its magnitude requires, and I can explain
it on no other supposition why they should place the admission on the
grounds they have. One of the committee, the senator from Ohio on my
left (Mr. Morris), has pronounced the grounds as dangerous and revolu
tionary ; he might have gone farther, and, with truth, pronounced them
utterly repugnant to the principles of the Constitution.

I have not ventured this assertion, as strong as it is, without due reflec
tion, and weighing the full force of the terms I have used, and do not
fear, with an impartial hearing, to establish its truth beyond the power
of controversy.

To understand fully the objection to this bill, it is necessary that we
should have a correct conception of the facts. They are few, and may be
briefly told.

Some time previous to the last session of Congress, the Territory of
Michigan, through its Legislature, authorized the people to meet in con
vention for the purpose of forming a state government. They met, accord
ingly, and agreed upon a constitution, which they forthwith transmitted
to Congress. It was fully discussed in this chamber, and, objectionable
as the instrument was, an act was finally passed, which accepted the con
stitution, and declared Michigan to be a state and admitted intt> the
Union, on the single condition that she should, by a convention of the
people, assent to the boundaries prescribed by the act. Soon after our
adjournment, the Legislature of the State of Michigan (for she had been
raised by our assent to the dignity of a state) called a convention of the
people of the state, in conformity to the act, which met, at the time

246 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

appointed, at Ann Arbour. After full discussion, the convention with
held its assent, and formally transmitted the result to the President of the
United States. This is the first part of the story. I will now give the
sequel. Since then, during the last month, a self-constituted assembly
met, professedly as a convention of the people of the state, but without
the authority of the state. This unauthorized and lawless assemblage
assumed the high function of giving the assent of the State of Michigan
to the condition of admission, as prescribed in the act of Congress. They
communicated their assent to the executive of the United States, and he
to the Senate. The Senate referred his message to the Committee on the
Judiciary, and that committee reported this bill for the admission of the
state.

Such are the facts, out of which grows the important question, Had this
self-constituted assembly the authority to assent for the state 1 Had they
the authority to do what is implied in giving assent to the condition of
admission 1 That assent introduces the state into the Union, and pledges
it, in the most solemn manner, to the constitutional compact which binds
these states in one confederated body ; imposes on her all its obligations,
and confers on her all its benefits. Had this irregular, self-constitued as
semblage, the authority to perform these high and solemn acts of sov
ereignty in the name of the State of Michigan 1 She tcould only come
in as a state, and none could-act or speak for her without her express au
thority ; and to assume the authority without her sanction is nothing
short of treason against the state.

Again : the assent to the conditions prescribed by Congress implies an
authority in those who gave it to supersede, in part, the Constitution of
the State of Michigan ; for her Constitution fixes the boundaries of the
state as part of that instrument, which the condition of admission en
tirely alters, and, to that extent, the assent would supersede the Consti
tution ; and thus the question is presented, whether this self-constituted
assembly, styling itself a convention, had the authority to do an act which
necessarily implies the right to supersede, in part, the Constitution.

But farther : the State of Michigan, through its Legislature, authorized,
a convention of the people, in order to determine whether the condition
of admission should be assented to or not. The convention met, and,
after mature deliberation, it dissented from the condition of admission ; and
thus, again, the question is presented, whether this self-called, self-consti
tuted assemblage, this caucus — for it is entitled to no higher name — had
the authority to annul the dissent of the state, solemnly given by a con
vention of the people, regularly convoked under the express authority of
the constituted authorities of the state 1

If all or any of these questions be answered in the negative — if the self-
created assemblage of December had no authority to speak in the name
of the State of Michigan — if none to supersede any portion of her Con
stitution — if none to annul her dissent from the condition of admission, reg
ularly given by a convention of the people of the state, convoked by the
authority of the state — to introduce her on its authority would be not
only revolutionary and dangerous, but utterly repugnant to the principles
of our Constitution. The question, then, submitted to the Senate is, Had
that assemblage the authority to perform these high and solemn acts 1

The chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary holds that this self-
constituted assemblage had the authority j and what is his reason 1 Why,
truly, because a greater number of votes were given for those who con
stituted that assemblage than for those who constituted the convention
of the people of the state, convened under its constituted authorities.
This argument resolves itself into two questions — the first of fact, and

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 247

the second of principle. I shall not discuss the first. It is not necessary
to do so. But, if it were, it would be easy to show that never was so
important a fact so loosely testified. There is not one particle of official
evidence before us. We have nothing but the private letters of individ
uals, who do not know even the numbers that voted on either occasion ;
they know nothing of the qualifications of voters, nor how their votes
were received, nor by whom counted. Now, none knows better than the
honourable chairman himself, that such testimony as is submitted to us
to establish a fact of this moment, would not be received in the lowest
magistrate's court in the land. But I waive this. I come to the question,
of the principle involved ; and what is it 1 The argument is, that a greater
number of persons voted for the last convention than for the first, and,
therefore, the acts of the last of right abrogated those of the first j in
other words, that mere numbers, without regard to the forms of law or the
principles of the Constitution, give authority. The authority ofnumbersy
according to this argument^ sets aside the authority of law and the Constitution.
Need I show that such a principle goes to the entire overthrow of our
constitutional government, and would subvert all social order 1 It is the
identical principle which prompted the late revolutionary and anarchical
movement in Maryland, and which has done more to shake confidence in
our system of government than any event since the adoption of our Con
stitution, but which, happily, has been frowned down by the patriotism
and intelligence of the people of that state.

What was the ground of this insurrectionary measure, but that the
government of Maryland did not represent the voice of the numerical
majority of the people of Maryland, and that the authority of law arid the
Constitution was nothing against that of numbers 1 Here we find on this
floor, and from the head of the Judiciary Committee, the same principle re
vived, and, if possible, in a worse form ; for, in Maryland, the anarchists
assumed that they were sustained by the numerical majority of the people
of the state in their revolutionary movements 5 but the utmost the chair
man can pretend to have is a mere plurality. The largest number of
votes claimed for the self-created assemblage is 8000 j and no man will
undertake to say that this constitutes anything like a majority of the
voters of Michigan ; and he claims the high authority which he does for
it, not because it is a majority of the people of Michigan, but because it
is a greater number than voted for the authorized convention of the peo
ple that refused to agree to the condition of admission. It may be shown,
by his own witness, that a majority of the voters of Michigan greatly ex
ceed 8000. Mr. Williams, the president of the self-created assemblage,
stated that the population of that state amounted to nearly 200,000 per
sons. If so, there cannot be less than from 20,000 to 30,000 voters, con
sidering how nearly universal the right of suffrage is under its Constitu
tion ; and it thus appears that this irregular, self-constituted meeting did
not represent the vote of one third of the state ; and yet, on a mere prin
ciple of plurality, we are to supersede the Constitution of Michigan, and
annul the act of a convention of the people, regularly convened under the
authority of the government of the state.

But, says the senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Buchanan), this assembly
was not self-constituted. It met under the authority of an act of Con
gress ; and that act had no reference to the state, but only to the people ;
and that the assemblage in December was just such a meeting as that act
contemplated. It is not my intention to discuss the question whether the
honourable senator has given the true interpretation of the act, but, if it
were, I could very easily show his interpretation to be erroneous ; for, if
such had been, the intention of Congress, the act surely would have spe-

248 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

cified the time when the convention was to be held, who were to he the
managers, who the voters, and would not have left it to individuals who
might choose to assume the authority to determine all these important
points. I might also readily show that the word " convention" of the
people, as used in law or the Constitution, always means a meeting of the
people regularly convened by the constituted authority of the state, in their
high sovereign capacity, and that it never means such an assemblage as
the one in question. But I waive this; I take higher ground. If the act
be, indeed, such as the senator says it is, then I maintain that it is utterly
opposed to the fundamental principles of our Federal Union. Congress
has no right whatever to call a convention in a state. It can call but one
convention, and that is a convention of the United States to amend the
Federal Constitution ; nor can it call that, except authorized by two thirds
of the states.

Ours is a Federal Republic — a union of states. Michigan is a state ; a
state in the course of admission, and differing only from the other states
in her federal relations. She is declared to be a state, in the most solemn
manner, by your own act. She can come into the Union only as a state, and
by her voluntary assent, given by the people of the state in convention,
called by the constituted authority of the state. To admit the State of
Michigan on the authority of a self-created meeting, or one called by the
direct authority of Congress, passing by the authorities of the state, would
be the most monstrous proceeding under our Constitution that can be con
ceived ; the most repugnant to its principles, and dangerous in its conse
quences. It would establish a direct relation between the individual citi
zens of a, state and the General Government, in utter subversion of the
federal character of our system. The relation of the citizens to this
government is through the states exclusively. They are subject to its
authority and laws only because the state has assented they should be.
If she dissents, their assent is nothing j on the other hand, if she assents,
their dissent is nothing. It is through the state, then, and through the
state alone, that the United States government can have any connexion
with the people of a state ; and does not, then, the senator from Pennsyl
vania see, that if Congress can authorize a convention of the people in
the State of Michigan without the authority of the state, it matters not
what is the object, it may, in like manner, authorize conventions in any
other state for whatever purpose it may think proper 1

Michigan is as much a sovereign state as any other, differing only, as
I have said, as to her federal relations. If we give our sanction to the
assemblage of December, on the principle laid down by the senator from
Pennsylvania, then we establish the doctrine that Congress has power to
call at pleasure conventions within the states. Is there a senator on this
floor who will assent to such a doctrine 1 Is there one, especially, who
represents the smaller states of this Union, or the weaker section 1 Ad
mit the power, and every vestige of state rights would be destroyed.
Our system would be subverted, and, instead of a confederacy of free and
sovereign states, we should have all power concentrated here, and this
would become the most odious despotism. He, indeed, must be blind,
who does not see that such a power would give the Federal Government
a complete control of all the states. I call upon senators now to arrest
a doctrine so dangerous. Let it be remembered that, under our system^
bad precedents live forever ; good ones only perish. We may not feel
all the evil consequences at once, but this precedent, once set, will surely
be received, and will become the instrument of infinite evil.

It will be asked, What shall be done 1 Will you refuse to admit Michi
gan into the Union 1 I answer, No : I desire to admit her ; and if the sen-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 249

ators from Indiana and Ohio will agree, I am ready now to admit her as
she stood at the beginning of last session, without giving sanction to the
imauthorized assemblage of December.

But if that does not meet their wishes, there is still another by which
she may be admitted. We are told two thirds of the Legislature and peo
ple of Michigan are in favour of accepting the conditions of the act of
last session. If that be the fact, then all that is necessary is, that the
Legislature should call another convention. All difficulty will thus be re
moved, and there will be still abundant time for her admission at this ses
sion. And shall we, for the sake of gaining a few months, give our as
sent to a bill fraught with principles so monstrous as this!

We have been told that, unless she is admitted immediately, it will be
too late for her to receive her proportion of the surplus revenue under
the deposite bill. I trust that on so great a question a difficulty like this
will have no weight. Give her at once her full share. I am ready to do
so at once, without waiting her admission. I was mortified to hear on
so grave a question such motives assigned for her admission, contrary to
the law and Constitution. Such considerations ought not to be present
ed when we are settling great constitutional principles. I trust that we
shall pass by all such frivolous motives on this occasion, and take ground
on the great and fundamental principle that an informal, irregular, self-con
stituted assembly, a mere caucus, has no authority to speak for a sovereign
state in any case whatever ; to supersede its Constitution, or to reverse its
dissent, deliberately given by a convention of the people of the state, reg
ularly convened under its constituted authority.

XVII.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT, JANUARY 5, 1837.

MR. GRUNDY, chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, having
moved that the bill to admit the State of Michigan into the Union be now
read a third time,

Mr. Calhoun addressed the Senate in opposition to the bill.

I have (said Mr. C.) been connected with this government more than
half its existence, in various capacities, and during that long period I have
looked on its action with attention, and have endeavoured to make my
self acquainted with the principles and character of our political institu
tions j and I can truly say, that within that time no measure has received
the sanction of Congress which has appeared to me more unconstitutional
and dangerous than the present. It assails our political system in its
weakest point, and where, at this time, it most requires defence.

The great and leading objections to the bill rest mainly on the ground
that Michigan is a state. They have been felt by its friends to have so
much weight, that its advocates have been compelled to deny the fact, as
the only way of meeting the objections. Here, then, is the main point at
issue between the friends and the opponents of the bill. It turns on a factv
and that fact presents the question, Is Michigan a state \

If (said Mr. C.) there ever was a party committed on a fact — if there.
ever was one estopped from denying it — that party is the present majority
in the Senate, and that fact that Michigan is a state. It is the very party
who urged through this body, at the last session, a bill for the admission
of the State of Michigan, which accepted her Constitution, and declared,
in the most explicit and strongest terms, that she was a state. I will not
take up the time of the Senate by reading this solemn declaration. It has

I i

250 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

frequently been read during this debate, and is familiar to all who hear
me, and has not been questioned or denied. But it has been said there
is a condition annexed to the declaration, with which she must comply
before she can become a state. There is, indeed, a condition ; but it has
been shown by my colleague and others, from the plain wording of the
act, that the condition is not attached to the acceptance of the Constitu
tion, nor the declaration that she is a state, but simply to her admission
into the Union. I will not repeat the argument, but, in order to place the
subject beyond controversy, I shall recall to memory the history of the
last session, as connected with the admission of Michigan. The facts
need but be referred to, in order to revive their recollection.

There were two points proposed to be effected by the friends of the bill
at the last session. The first was to settle the controversy, as to bound
ary, between Michigan and Ohio, and it was that object alone which im
posed the condition that Michigan should assent to the boundary pre
scribed by the act as the condition of her admission. But there was an
other object to be accomplished. Two respectable gentlemen, who had
been elected by the state as senators, were then waiting to take their
seats on this floor ; and the other object of the bill was to provide for
their taking their seats as senators on the admission of the state, and for
this purpose it was necessary to make the positive and unconditional dec
laration that Michigan was a state, as a state only could choose senators,
by an express provision of the Constitution ; and hence, the admission was
made conditional, and the declaration that she was a state was made ab
solute, in order to effect both objects. To show that I am correct, I will
ask the secretary to read the third section of the bill.

[The section was read, accordingly, as follows:

" SECT. 3. Jlnd be it farther enacted, That, as a compliance with the
fundamental condition of admission contained in the last preceding sec
tion of this act, the boundaries of the said State of Michigan, as in that
section described, declared, and established, shall receive the assent of a
convention of delegates elected by the people of said state, for the sole
purpose of giving the assent herein required $ and as soon as the assent
herein required shall be given, the President of the United States shall
announce the same by proclamation ; and thereupon, and without any far
ther proceeding on the part of Congress, the admission of the said state
into the Union, as one of the United States of America, on an equal foot
ing with the original states in every respect whatever, shall be considered
as complete, and the senators and representatives who have been elected
by the said state as its representative in the Congress of the United States,
shall be entitled to take their seats in the Senate and House of Kepre*
sentatives respectively, without farther delay."]

Mr. Calhoun then asked, Does not every senator see the two objects —
the one to settle the boundary, and the other to admit her senators to a
seat in this body ; and that the section is so worded as to effect both, in
the manner I have stated 1 If this needed confirmation, it would find it
in the debate on the passage of the bill, when the ground was openly
taken by the present majority, that Michigan had a right to form her con
stitution, under the ordinance of 1787, without our consent, and that she
was of right, and in fact, a state, beyond our control.

I will (said Mr. C.) explain my own views on this point, in order that
the consistency of my course at the last and present session may be
<clearly seen.

My opinion was, and still is, that the movement of the people of Michi
gan in forming for themselves a state constitution, without waiting for the
assent of Congress, was revolutionary, as it threw off the authority of the

SPEECHES OF JOHN C, CA.LHOUN. 251

United States over the territory ; and that we were left at liberty to treat
the proceedings as revolutionary, and to remand her to her territorial
condition, or to waive the irregularity, and to recognise what was done as
rightfully done, as our authority alone was concerned.

My impression was, that the former was the proper course ; but I also
thought that the act remanding her back should contain our assent in the
usual manner for her to form a constitution, and thus to leave her free to
become a state. This, however, was overruled. The opposite opinion
prevailed, that she had a perfect right to do what she had done, and that
she was, as I have stated, a state both in fact and right, and that we had
no control over her ; and our act, accordingly, recognised her as a state
from the time she had adopted her Constitution, and admitted her into the
Union on the condition of her assenting to the prescribed boundaries.
Having thus solemnly recognised her as a state, we cannot now undo
what was then done. There were, in fact, many irregularities in the pro
ceedings, all of which were urged in vain against its passage j but the
presidential election was then pending, and the vote of Michigan was con
sidered of sufficient weight to overrule all objections and correct all ir
regularities. They were all, accordingly, overruled, and we cannot now
go back.

Such was the course, and such the acts of the majority at the last
session. A few short months have since passed. Other objects are now
to be effected, and all is forgotten as completely as if they had never ex
isted. The very senators who then forced the act through, on the ground
that Michigan was a state, have wheeled completely round, to serve the
present purpose, and taken directly the opposite ground ! We live in
strange and inconsistent times. Opinions are taken up and laid down, as
suits the occasion, without hesitation, or the slightest regard to principles
or consistency. It indicates an unsound state of the public mind, preg
nant with future disasters.

I turn to the position now assumed by the majority to suit the present
occasion ; and, if I mistake not, it will be found as false in fact, and as er
roneous in principle, as it is inconsistent with that maintained at the last
session. They now take the ground that Michigan is not a state, and
cannot, in fact, be a state till she is admitted into the Union ; and this on
the broad principle that a territory cannot become a state till admitted.
Such is the position distinctly taken by several of the friends of this bill,
and implied in the arguments of nearly all who have spoken in its favour.
In fact, its advocates had no choice. As untenable as it is, they were
forced on this desperate position. They had no other which they could
occupy.

I have shown that it is directly in the face of the law of the last ses
sion, and that it denies the recorded acts of those who now maintain the
position. I now go farther, and assert that it is in direct opposition to
plain and unquestionable matter of fact. There is no fact more certain
than that Michigan is a state. She is in the full exercise of sovereign
authority, with a Legislature and a chief magistrate. She passes laws, she
executes them, she regulates titles, and even takes away life — all on her
own authority. Ours has entirely ceased over her, and yet there are those
who can deny, with all these facts before them, that she is a state. They
might as well deny the existence of this hall ! We have long since as
sumed unlimited control over the Constitution, to twist and turn, and deny
it, as it suited our purpose ; and it would seem that we are presumptu
ously attempting to assume like supremacy over facts themselves, as if
their existence or non-existence depended on our volition. I speak freely.
The occasion demands that the truth should be boldly uttered.

252 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

But those who may not regard their own recorded acts, nor the plain
facts of the case, may possibly feel the awkward condition in which
coming events may shortly place them. The admission of Michigan is
not the only point involved in the passage of this bill. A question will
follow, which may be presented to the Senate in a very few days, as to
the right of Mr. Norvell and Mr. Lyon, the two respectable gentlemen
who have been elected senators by Michigan, to take their seats in this
hall. The decision of this question will require a more sudden facing
about than has been yet witnessed. It required seven or eight months
for the majority to wheel about from the position maintained at the last
session to that taken at this, but there may not be allowed them now as
many days to wheel back to the old position. These gentlemen cannot
he refused their seats after the admission of the state by those gentlemen
who passed the act of the last session. It provides for the case. I now
put it to the friends of this bill, and I ask them to weigh the question de
liberately — to bring it home to their bosom and conscience before they
answer — Can a territory elect senators to Congress 1 The Constitution
is express : states only can choose senators. Were not these gentlemen
chosen long before the admission of Michigan ; before the Ann Arbour
meeting, and while Michigan was, according to the doctrines of the
friends of this bill, a territory 1 Will they, in the face of the Constitu
tion, which they are sworn to support, admit as senators on this floor
those who, by their own statement, were elected by a territory 1 These
questions may soon be presented for decision. The majority, who are
forcing this bill through, are already committed by the act of last session,
and I leave them to reconcile as they can the ground they now take with
the vote they must give when the question of their right to take their seats
is presented for decision.

A total disregard of all principle and consistency has so entangled this
subject, that there is but one mode left of extricating ourselves without
trampling the Constitution in the dust ; and that is, to return back to
where we stood when the question was first presented ; to acquiesce in
the right of Michigan to form a constitution, and erect herself into a state,
under the ordinance of 1787 ; and to repeal so much of the act of the last
session as prescribed the condition on which she was to be admitted.
This was the object of the amendment that I offered last evening, in order
to relieve the Senate from its present dilemma. The amendment involved
the merits of the whole case. It was too. late in the day for discussion,
and I asked for indulgence till to-day, that -I might have an opportunity
of presenting my views. Under the iron rule of the present majority, the
indulgence was refused, and the bill ordered to its third reading ; and I
have been thus compelled to address the Senate when it is too late to
amend the bill, and after a majority have committed themselves both as
to its principles and details. Of such proceedings I complain not. I, as
one of the minority, ask no favours. All I ask is, that the Constitution be
not violated. Hold it sacred, and I shall be the last to complain.

I now return to the assumption that a territory cannot become a state
till admitted into the Union, which is now relied on with so much con
fidence to prove that Michigan is not a state. I reverse the position. I
assert the opposite, that a territory cannot be admitted till she becomes
a state ; and in this I stand on the authority of the Constitution itself,
which expressly limits the power of Congress to admitting new states
into the Union. But, if the Constitution had been silent, he would indeed
be ignorant of the character of our political system, who did not see that
states, sovereign and independent communities, and not territories, can
only be admitted. Ours is a union of states, a Federal Republic. States,

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 253

vend not territories, form its component parts, bound together by a solemn
league, in the form of a constitutional compact. In coming into the
Union, the state pledges its faith to this sacred compact : an act which
none but a sovereign and independent community is competent to per
form ; and, of course, a territory must first be raised to that condition be
fore she can take her stand among the confederated states of our Union.
How can a territory pledge its faith to the Constitution'? It has no will
of its own. You give it all its powers, and you can at pleasure overrule
.all her actions. If she enters as a territory, the act is yours, not hers.
Her consent is nothing without your authority and sanction. Can you, can
Congress, become a party to the constitutional compact \ How absurd.
, But I am told, if this be so — if a territory must become a state before it
can be admitted — it would follow that she might refuse to enter the Union
after she had acquired the right of acting for herself. Certainly she may.
A state cannot be, forced into the Union. She must come in by her own
free assent, given in her highest sovereign capacity through a convention
of the people of the state. Such is the constitutional provision ; and those
who make the objection must overlook both the Constitution and the ele
mentary principles of our government, of which the right of self-govern
ment is the first ; the right of every people to form their own government,
and to determine their political condition. This is the doctrine on which
our fathers acted in our glorious Revolution, which has done more for
the cause of liberty throughout the world than any event within the rec
ord of history, and on which the government has acted from the first, as
regards all that portion of our extensive territory that lies beyond the
limits of the original states. Read the ordinance of 1787, and the various
#cts for the admission of new states, and you will find the principle in
variably recognised and acted on, to the present unhappy instance, with
out any departure from it, except in the case of Missouri. The admis
sion of Michigan is destined, I fear, to mark a great change in the his
tory of the admission of new states ; a total departure from the old usage,
and the noble principle of self-government on which that usage was found
ed. Everything, thus far, connected with her admission, has been irreg
ular and monstrous. I trust it is not ominous. Surrounded by lakes
within her natural limits (which ought not to have been departed from),
and possessed of fertile soil and genial climate, with every prospect of
wealth, power, and influence, who but must regret that she should be
ushered into the Union in a manner so irregular and unworthy of her fu
ture destiny 1

But I will waive these objections, constitutional and all. I will sup
pose, with the advocates of the bill, that a territory cannot become a state
till admitted into the Union. Assuming all this, I ask them to explain to
me how the mere act of admission can transmute a territory into a state. By
\vhose authority would she be made a state 1 By ours \ How can we
make a state I We can form a territory ; we can admit states into the
Union 5 but I repeat the question, How can we make a state 1 I had sup
posed this government was the creature of the states, formed by their
authority, and dependant on their will for its existence. Can the crea
ture form the creator! If not by our authority, then by whose 1 Not by
her own ; that would be absurd. The very act of admission makes her a
member of the confederacy, with no other or greater power than is pos
sessed by all the others ; all of whom, united, cannot create a state. By
what process, then, by what authority can a territory become a state, if
not one before admitted'? Who can explain 1 How full of difficulties,
compared to the long-established, simple, and noble process which has
prevailed to the present instant ! According to the old usage, the Gen-

254 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

eral Government first withdraws its authority over a certain portion of its
territory, as soon as it has a sufficient population to constitute a state.
They are thus left to themselves freely to form a constitution, and to ex
ercise the noble right of self-government. They then present their Con
stitution to Congress, and ask the privilege (for one it is of the highest
character) to become a member of this glorious confederacy of states.
The Constitution is examined, and, if Republican, as required by the Fed
eral Constitution, she is admitted, with no other condition except such as
may be necessary to secure the authority of Congress over the public do
main within her limits. This is the old, the established form, instituted
by our ancestors of the Revolution, who so well understood the great
principles of liberty and self-government. How simple, how sublime !•
What a contrast to the doctrines of the present day, and the precedent
which, I fear, we are about to establish ! And shall we fear, so long as
these sound principles are observed, that a state will reject this high priv
ilege — will refuse to enter this Union 1 No, she will rush into the em
brace of the Union so long as your institutions are worth preserving.
When the advantages of the Union shall have become a matter of calcu
lation and doubt ; when new states shall pause to determine whether the
Union is a curse or a blessing, the question which now agitates us will
cease to have any importance.

Having now, I trust, established, beyond all controversy, that Michigan
is a state, I come to the great point at issue — to the decision of which all
that has been said is but preparatory — Had the self-created assembly which
met at Ann Arbour the authority to speak in the name of the people of
Michigan ; to assent to the conditions contained in the act of the last ses
sion ,• to supersede a portion of the Constitution of the state, and to over
rule the dissent of the convention of the people, regularly called by the
constituted authorities of the state, to the condition of admission 1 I
shall not repeat what I said when I first addressed the Senate on this bill.
We all, by this time, know the character of that assemblage ; that it met
without the sanction of the authorities of the state ; and that it did not
pretend to represent one third of the people. We all know that the state
had regularly convened a convention of the people, expressly to take into
consideration the condition on which it was proposed to admit her into
the Union, and that the convention, after full deliberation, had declined
to give its assent by a considerable majority. With a knowledge of all
these facts, I put the question, Had the assembly a right to act for the
state 1 Was it a convention of the people of Michigan, in the true, legal,
and constitutional sense of that term 1 Is there one within the limits of
my voice that can lay his hand on his breast and honestly say it was 1
Is there one that does not feel that it was neither more nor less than a
mere caucus — nothing but a party caucus — of which we have the strongest
evidence in the perfect unanimity of those who assembled 1 Not a vote
was given against admission. Can there be stronger proof that it was a
meeting got up by party machinery, for a party purpose ?

But I go farther. It was not only a party caucus, for party purpose,
but a criminal meeting — a meeting to subvert the authority of the state, and
to assume its sovereignty. I know not whether Michigan has yet passed
laws to guard her sovereignty. It may be that she has not had time to
enact laws for this purpose, which no community is long without j but I
do aver, if there be such an act, or if the common law be in force in the
state, the actors in that meeting might be indicted, tried, and punished
for the very act on which it is now proposed to admit the state into the Union.
If such a meeting as this were to undertake to speak in the name of South
Carolina, we would speedily teach its authors what they owed to the

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 255

authority and dignity of the state. The act was not only in contempt of
the authority of the State of Michigan, but a direct insult on this govern
ment. Here is a self-created meeting, convened for a criminal object,
which has dared to present to this government an act of theirs, and to
expect that we are to receive this irregular and criminal act as a ful
filment of the condition which we had prescribed for the admission of the
state ! Yet I fear, forgetting our own dignity, and the rights of Michi
gan, that we are about to recognise the validity of the act, and quietly to
submit to the insult.

The year 1836 (said Mr. C.) is destined to mark the most remarkable,
change in our political institutions since the adoption of the Constitution.
The events of the year have made a deeper innovation on the principles
of the Constitution, and evinced a stronger tendency to revolution, than
any which have occurred from its adoption to the present day. Sir (said
Mr. C., addressing the Vice-president), duty compels me to speak of facts
intimately connected with yourself. In deference to your feelings as
presiding officer of the body, I shall speak of them with all possible re
serve, much more reserve than I should otherwise have done if you did
not occupy that seat. Among the first of these events which I shall no
tice, is the caucus of Baltimore ; that, too, like the Ann Arbour caucus,
has been dignified with the name of the convention of the people. This
caucus was got up under the countenance and express authority of the
President himself; and its edict, appointing you his successor, has been
sustained, not only by the whole patronage and power of the government,
but by his active personal influence and exertion. Through its instru
mentality he has succeeded in controlling the voice of the- people, and,
for the first time, the President has appointed his successor ; and thus
the first great step of converting our government into a monarchy has
been achieved. These are solemn and ominous facts. No one who has
examined the result of the last election can doubt their truth. It is now
certain that you are not the free and unbiased choice of the people of
these United States. If left to your own popularity, without the active
and direct influence of the President, and the power and patronage of the
government, acting through a mock convention of the people, instead of
the highest, you would, in all probability, have been the lowest of the
candidates.

During the same year, the state in which this ill-omened caucus con
vened, has been agitated by revolutionary movements of the most alarm
ing character. Assuming the dangerous doctrines that they were not
bound to obey the injunctions of the Constitution, because it did not place
the powers of the state in the hands of an unchecked numerical major
ity, the electors belonging to the party of the Baltimore caucus, who hao;
been chosen to appoint the state senators, refused to perform the func
tions for which they had been elected, with the deliberate intention to
subvert the government of the state, and reduce her to the territory con
dition, till a new government could be formed. And now we have before
us a measure not less revolutionary, but of an opposite character. In
the case of Maryland, those who undertook, without the authority of
law or Constitution, to speak and act in the name of the people of the
state, proposed to place her out of the Union by reducing her from a
state to a territory ; but in this, those who, in like manner, undertook to
act for Michigan, have assumed the authority to bring her into the Union
without her consent, on the very condition which she had rejected by a
convention of the people, convened under the authority of the state. If
we shall sanction the authority of the Michigan caucus to force a state
into the Union without its assent, why might we not here sanction a

256 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

similar caucus in Maryland, if one had been called, to place the state out
of the Union 1

These occurrences, which have distinguished the past year, mark the
commencement of no ordinary change in our political system. They an
nounce the. ascendency of the caucus system over the regularly constituted au
thorities of the country. I have long anticipated this event. In early life
my attention was attracted to the working of the caucus system. It was
my fortune to spend five or six years of my youth in the northern por
tion of the Union, where, unfortunately, the system has so long prevailed.
Though young, I was old enough to take interest in public affairs, and to
notice the working of this odious party machine ; and after-reflection,
with the experience then acquired, has long satisfied me that, in the
course of time, the edicts of the caucus would eventually supersede the
authority of law and Constitution. We have at last arrived at the com
mencement of this great change, which is destined to go on till it has
consummated itself in the entire overthrow of all legal and constitutional
authority, unless speedily and effectually resisted. The reason is obvi
ous : for obedience and disobedience to the edicts of the caucus, where
the system is firmly established, are more certainly and effectually re
warded and punished than to the laws and Constitution. Disobedience
to the former is sure to be followed by complete political disfranchise-
ment. It deprives the unfortunate individual who falls under its ven
geance of all public honours and emoluments, and consigns him, if depend
ant on the government, to poverty and obscurity ; while he who bows
down before its mandates, it matters not how monstrous, secures to him
self the honours of the state, becomes rich, and distinguished, and power
ful. Offices, jobs, and contracts flow on him and his connexions. - But
to obey the law and respect the Constitution, for the most part, brings
little except the approbation of conscience — a reward, indeed, high and
noble, and prized by the virtuous above all others, but, unfortunately, little
valued by the mass of mankind. It is easy to see what must be the
end, unless, indeed, an effective remedy be applied. Are we so blind as
not to see this — why it is that the advocates of this bill, the friends of the
system, are so tenacious on the point that Michigan should be admitted
on the authority of the Ann Arbour caucus, and on no other 1 Do we
not see why the amendment proposed by myself, to admit her by rescind
ing the condition imposed at the last session, should be so strenuously
opposed ? Why even the preamble would not be surrendered, though
many of our friends were willing to vote for the bill on that slight con
cession, in their anxiety to admit the state 1

And here let me say that I listened with attention to the speech of the
senator from Kentucky (Mr. Crittenden). I know the clearness of his
understanding and the soundness of his heart, and I am persuaded, in
declaring that- his objection to the bill was confined to the preamble, that
he has not investigated the subject with the attention it deserves. I feel
the objections to the preamble are not without some weight ; but the
true and insuperable objections lie far deeper in the facts of the case,
which would still exist were the preamble expunged. It is these which
render it impossible to pass this bill without trampling under foot the
rights of the states, and subverting the first principles of our government.
It would require but a few steps more to effect a complete revolution,
and the senator from North Carolina has taken the first, I will explain.
If you wish to mark the first indications of a revolution, the commence
ment of those profound changes in the character of a people which are
working beneath, before a ripple appears on the surface, look to the
change of language: you will first notice it in the 'altered meaning of im-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 257

portant words, and which, as it indicates a change in the feelings and
principles of the people, become, in turn, a powerful instrument in accel
erating the change, till an entire revolution is effected. The remarks *of
the senator will illustrate what I have said. He told us that the terms
" convention of the people" were of very uncertain meaning and difficult
to be defined ; but that their true meaning was, any meeting of the people, in
their individual and primary character, for political purposes. I know it
is difficult to define complex terms, that is, to enumerate all the ideas
that belong to them, and exclude all that do not j but there is always, in
the most complex, some prominent idea which marks the meaning of the
term, and in relation to which there is usually no disagreement. Thus, ac
cording to the old meaning (and which I had still supposed was its legal and
constitutional meaning), a convention of the people invariably implied a
meeting of the people, either by themselves, or by delegates expressly
chosen for the purpose, in their high sovereign authority, in expressed con
tradistinction to such assemblies of individuals in their private character,
or having only derivative authority. It is, in a word, a meeting of the
people in the majesty of their power — in that in which they may right
fully make or abolish constitutions, and put up or put down governments
at their pleasure. Such was the august conception which formerly entered
the mind of every American when the terms "convention of the people"
were used. But now, according to the ideas of the dominant party, as
we are told on the authority of the senator from North Carolina, it means
any meeting of individuals for political purposes, and, of course, applies
to the meeting at Ann Arbour, or any other party caucus for party pur
poses, which the leaders choose to designate as a convention of the peo
ple. It is thus the highest authority known to our laws and Constitution
is gradually sinking to the level of those meetings which regulate the
operation of political parties, and through which the edicts of their lead
ers are announced and their authority enforced j or, rather, to speak
more correctly, the latter are gradually rising to the authority of the
former. When they come to be completely confounded ; when the dis
tinction between a caucus and the convention of the people shall be com
pletely obliterated, which the definition of the senator, and the acts of
this body on this bill, would lead us to believe is not far distant, this fair
political fabric of ours, erected by the wisdom and patriotism of our an
cestors, and once the gaze and admiration of the world, will topple to the
ground in ruins.

It has, perhaps, been too much my habit to look more to the future and
less to the present than is wise ; but such is the constitution of my mind,
that, when I see before me the indications of causes calculated to effect
important changes in our political condition, I am led irresistibly to trace
them to their sources, and follow them out in their consequences. Lan
guage has been held in this discussion which is clearly revolutionary in
its character and tendency, and which warns us of the approach of the
period when the struggle will be between the conservatives and the destruc
tives. I understood the senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Buchanan) as
holding language countenancing the principle that the will of a mere nu
merical majority is paramount to the authority of law and Constitution.
He did not, indeed, announce distinctly this principle, but it might fairly
be inferred from what he said ; for he told us, the latter, where the Con
stitution gives the same weight to a smaller as to a greater number, might
take the remedy into their own hand ; meaning, as I understood him, that
a mere majority might, at their pleasure, subvert the Constitution and
government of a state, which he seemed to think was the essence of De
mocracy. Our little state has a Constitution that could not stand a day

KK

258 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

against such doctrines, and yet we glory in it as the best in the Union.
It is a Constitution which respects all the great interests of the state,
giving to each a separate and distinct voice in the management of its po- •
litical affairs, by means of which the feebler interests are protected against
the preponderance of the greater. We call our state a republic, a com
monwealth, not a democracy j and let me tell the senator it is a far more
popular government than if it had been based on the simple principle of
the numerical majority. It takes more voices to put the machine of gov
ernment in motion than those that the senator would consider more pop
ular. It represents all the interests of the state, and is, in fact, the gov
ernment of the people, in the true sense of the term, and not of the mere
majority, or the dominant interests.

I am not familiar with the Constitution of Maryland, to which the sen
ator alluded, and cannot, therefore, speak of its structure with confidence j
but I believe it to be somewhat similar in its character to our own. That
it is a government not without its excellence, we need no better proof
than the fact that, though within the shadow of executive influence, it has
nobly and successfully resisted all the seductions by which a corrupt and
artful administration, with almost boundless patronage, has tempted to
seduce her into its ranks.

Looking, then, to the approaching struggle, I take my stand immova
bly. / am a conservative in its broadest and fullest sense, and such / shall
ever remain, unless, indeed, the government shall become so corrupt and disor
dered that nothing short of revolution can reform it. I solemnly believe that
our political system is, in its purity, not only the best that ever was
formed, but the best possible that can be devised for us. It is the only
one by which free states, so populous and wealthy, and occupying so vast
an extent of territory, can preserve their liberty. Thus thinking, I can
not hope for a better. Having no hope of a better, I am a conservative ;
and, because I am a conservative, I am a state rights man. I believe that in
the rights of the states are to be found the only effectual means of check
ing the overaction of this government ; to resist its tendency to concen
trate all power here, and to prevent a departure from the Constitution ;
or, in case of one, to restore the government to its original simplicity and
purity. State interposition, or, to express it more fully, the right of a
state to interpose her sovereign voice, as one of the parties to our consti
tutional compact, against the encroachments of this government, is the
only means of sufficient potency to effect all this ; and I am, therefore,
its advocate. I rejoiced to hear the senators from North Carolina (Mr.
Brown) and Pennsylvania (Mr, Buchanan) do us the justice to distin
guish between nullification and the anarchical and revolutionary move
ments in Maryland and Pennsylvania. I know they did not intend
it as a compliment, but I regard it as the highest. They are right. Day
and night are not more different — more unlike in everything. They are
unlike in their principles, their objects, and their consequences.

I shall not stop to make good this assertion, as I might easily do. The
occasion does not call for it. As a conservative and a state rights man?
or, if you will have it, a nullifier, I have and shall resist all encroachments
on the Constitution, whether it be the encroachment of this government
on the states, or the opposite — the executive on Congress, or Congress
on the executive. My creed is to hold both governments, and all the
departments of each, to their proper sphere, and to maintain the author
ity of the laws and the Constitution against all revolutionary movements.
I believe the means which our system furnishes to preserve itself are am
ple, if fairly understood and applied ; and I shall resort to them, however
corrupt and disordered the times, so long as there is hope of reforming

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 259

the government. The result is in the hands of the Disposer of events.
It is my part to do my duty. Yet, while I thus openly avow myself -a
conservative, God forbid I should ever deny the glorious right of rebel
lion and revolution. Should corruption and oppression become intoler
able, and cannot otherwise be thrown off — if liberty must perish, or the
government be overthrown, I would not hesitate, at the hazard of life,
to resort to revolution, and to tear down a corrupt government, that
could neither be reformed nor borne by freemen ; but I trust in God
things will never come to that pass. I trust never to see such fearful
times j for fearful, indeed, they would be, if they should ever befall us. It
is the last remedy, and not to be thought of till common sense and the
voice of mankind would justify the resort.

Before I resume my. seat, I feel called on to make a few brief remarks
on a doctrine of fearful import, which has been broached in the course
of this debate — the right to repeal laws granting bank charters, and, of
course, of railroads, turnpikes, and joint-stock companies. It is a doc
trine of fearful import, and calculated to do infinite mischief. There are
countless millions vested in such stocks, and it is a description of property
of the most delicate character. To touch it is almost to destroy it. But,
while I enter my protest against all such doctrines, I have been greatly
alarmed with the thoughtless precipitancy (not to use a stronger phrase)
with which the most extensive and dangerous privileges have been grant
ed of late. It can end in no good, and, I fear, may be the cause of con
vulsions hereafter. We already feel the effects on the currency, which
no one competent of judging but must see is in an unsound condition. I
must say (for truth compels me) I have ever distrusted the banking sys
tem, at least in its present form, both in this country and Great Britain.
It will not stand the test of time ; but I trust that all shocks or sudden
revolutions may be avoided, and that it may gradually give way before
some sounder and better-regulated system of credit, which the growing
intelligence of the age may devise. That a better may be substituted I
cannot doubt ; but of what it shall consist, and how it shall finally super
sede the present uncertain and fluctuating currency, time alone can de
termine. All I can see is, that the present must, one day or another,
come to an end, or be greatly modified, if that, indeed, can save it .from
an entire overthrow. It has within itself the seeds of its own destruction.

XVIII

SPEECH ON THE BILL AUTHORIZING AN ISSUE OF TREASURY NOTES,
SEPTEMBER. 19, 1837.

MR. PRESIDENT : An extraordinary course of events, with which all are too
familiar to need recital, has separated, in fact, the government and the banks.
What relation shall they bear hereafter ? Shall the banks again be used as
fiscal agents of the government ? Be the depositories of the public money ?
And, above all, shall their notes be considered and treated as money in the re
ceipts and expenditures of the government ? This is the great and leading
question ; one of the first magnitude, and full of consequences. I have given
it my most anxious and deliberate attention, and have come to the conclusion
that we. have reached the period when the interests both of the government
and the banks forbid a reunion. I now propose to offer my reasons for this
conclusion. I shall do it with that perfect frankness due to the subject, to the
country, and the position I occupy. All I ask is, that I may be heard with a

260 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

candour and fairness corresponding to the sincerity with which I shall deliver
my sentiments.

Those who support a reunion of the banks and the government have to
overcome a preliminary difficulty. They are now separated by operation of
law, and cannot be united while the present state of things continues, without
repealing the law which has disjoined them. I ask, Who is willing to propose
its repeal ? Is there any one who, during the suspension of specie payments,
would advocate their employment as the fiscal agents of the government, who
would make them the depositories of the public revenue, or who would receive
and pay away their notes in the public dues ? If there be none, then it results
that the separation must continue for the present, and that the reunion must be
the work of time, and depending on the contingency of the resumption of specie
payments.

But suppose this difficulty to be removed, and that the banks were regularly
redeeming their notes, from what party in this body can the proposition come,
or by which can it be supported, lor a reunion between them and the govern
ment ? Who, after what has happened, can advocate the reunion of the govern
ment with the league of state banks ? Can the opposition, who for years have
been denouncing it as the most dangerous instrument of power, and efficient
means of corrupting and controlling the government and country ? Can they,
after the exact fulfilment of all their predictions of disastrous consequences
from the connexion, now turn round and support that which they have so
long and loudly condemned ? We have heard much from the opposite side of
untried experiments on the currency. I concur in the justice of the censure.
Nothing can be more delicate than the currency. Nothing can require to be
more delicately handled. It ought never to be tampered with, nor touched, un
til it becomes absolutely necessary. But, if untried experiments justly deserve
censure, what condemnation would a repetition of an experiment that has failed
deserve ? An experiment that has so signally failed, both in the opinion of sup
porters and opponents, as to call down the bitter denunciation of those who
tried it. If to make the experiment was folly, the repetition would be madness.
But if the opposition cannot support the measure, how can it be expected to
receive support from the friends of the administration, in whose hands the ex
periment has so signally failed as to call down from them execrations deep and
loud ?

If, Mr. President, there be any one point fully established by experience
and reason, I hold it to be the utter incompetency of the state banks to furnish,
of themselves, a sound and stable currency. They may succeed in prosperous
times, but the first adverse current necessarily throws them into utter confusion.
Nor has any device been found to give them the requisite strength and stability
but a great central and controlling bank, instituted under the authority of this
government. I go farther : if we must continue our connexion with the banks
— if we must receive and pay away their notes as money, we not only have
the right to regulate, and give uniformity and stability to them, but we are bound
to do so, and to use the most efficient means for that purpose. The Constitu
tion makes it our duty to lay and collect the taxes and duties uniformly through
out the Union ; to fulfil which, we are bound to give the highest possible equality
of value throughout every part of the country, to whatever medium it may be
collected in ; and if that be bank-notes, to adopt the most effective means of ac
complishing it, which experience has shown to be a Bank of the United States.
This has been long my opinion. I entertained it in 1816, and repeated it, in
my place here on the deposite question, in 1834. The only alternative, then,
is, disguise it as you may, between a disconnexion and a Bank of the United
States. This is the real issue to which all must come, and ought now to be
openly and fairly met.

But there are difficulties in the way of a National Bank, no less formidable

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 261

than a reconnexion with the state banks. It is utterly impracticable, at pres
ent, to establish one. There is reason to believe that a majority of the peo
ple of the United States are deliberately and unalterably opposed to it. At
all events, there is a numerous, respectable, and powerful party — I refer to the
old State Eights party — who are, and ever have been, from the beginning of
the government, opposed to the Bank, and whose opinions, thus long and firmly
entertained, ought, at least, to be so much respected as to forbid the creation
of one without an amendment of the Constitution. To this must be added the
insuperable difficulty, that the executive branch of the government is openly
opposed to it, and pledged to interpose his veto, on constitutional grounds, should
a bill pass to incorporate one. For four years, at least, then, it will be imprac
ticable to charter a bank. What must be done in the mean time ? Shall the
treasury be organized to perform the functions which have been recently dis
charged by the banks, or shall the state institutions be again employed until a
bank can be created ? In the one case, we shall have the so much vilified and
denounced sub-treasury, as it is called ; and in the other, difficulties insur
mountable would grow up against the establishment of a bank. Let the state
institutions be once reinstated and reunited to the government as their fiscal
agents, and they will be found the first and most strenuous opponents of a Na
tional Bank, by which they would be overshadowed and curtailed in their
profits. I hold it certain, that in prosperous times, when the state banks are in
full operation, it is impossible to establish a National Bank. Its creation, then,
should the reunion with the state banks take place, will be postponed until
some disaster similar to the present shall again befall the country. But it re
quires little of the spirit of prophecy to see that such another disaster would be
the death of the whole system. Already it has had two paralytic strokes — the
third would prove fatal.

But suppose these difficulties were overcome, I should still be opposed to the
incorporation of a bank. So far from affording the relief which many an
ticipate, it would be the most disastrous measure that could be adopted. As
great as is the calamity under which the country is suffering, it is nothing to
what would follow the creation of such an institution under existing circum
stances. In order to compel the state institutions to pay specie, the Bank must
have a capital as great, or nearly as great, in proportion to the existing institu
tions, as the late Bank had, whe.n established, to those of that day. This would
give it an immense capital, not much less than one hundred millions of dollars,
of which a large proportion, say twenty millions, must be specie. From what
source is it to be derived ? From the state banks ? It would empty their
vaults, and leave them in the most helpless condition. From abroad, and Eng
land in particular ? it would reproduce that revulsive current which has lately
covered the country with desolation. The tide is still running to Europe, and
if forced back by any artificial cause before the foreign debt is paid, cannot
but be followed by the most disastrous consequences.

But suppose this difficulty overcome, and the Bank re-established, I ask,
What would be the effects under such circumstances ? Where would it find
room for business, commensurate with its extended capital, without crushing
the state institutions, enfeebled by the withdrawal of their means, in order to
create the instrument of their oppression ? A few of the more vigorous might
survive, but the far greater portion, with their debtors, creditors, and stock
holders, would be involved in common ruin. The Bank would, indeed, give a
specie currency, not by enabling the existing institutions to resume, but by de
stroying them and taking their place.

Those who take a different view, and so fondly anticipate relief from a Na
tional Bank, are deceived by a supposed analogy between the present situation
of the country and that of 1816, when the late Bank was chartered, after the
war with Great Britain. I was an actor in that scene, and may be permitted

262 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

to speak in relation to it with some little authority. Between the two periods
there is little or no analogy. They stand almost in contrast. In 1816, the
government was a debtor to the banks ; now it is a creditor : a difference of the
greatest importance, as far as the present question is concerned. The banks
had over-issued, it is true, but their over-issues were to the government, a sol
vent and able debtor, whose credit, held by the banks in the shape of stock, was
at par. It was their excessive issues to the government on its stock which
mainly caused the suspension ; in proof of which, it is a remarkable fact, that
the depreciation of bank paper, compared with gold and silver, was about equal to
the proportion which the government stock held by the banks bore to their is
sues. It was this excess that hung on the market and depressed the value of
their notes. The solution is easy. The banks took the government stock pay
able in twelve years, arid issued their notes for the same, payable on demand,
in violation of the plainest principles of banking. It followed, of course, that
when their notes were presented for payment, they had nothing but government
stock to meet them. But its stock was at par, and all the banks had to do was
to go into market with the stock they held and take up their notes ; and thus
the excess which hung upon the market and depressed their value would have
been withdrawn from circulation, and the residue would have risen to par, or
nearly par, with gold and silver, when specie payments might be'easily resumed.
This they were unwilling to do. They were profiting every way : by drawing
interest on the stock, by discounting on it as capital, and by its continued rise
in the market. It became necessary to compel them to surrender these advan
tages. Two methods presented themselves : one a bankrupt law, and the oth
er a National Bank. I was opposed to the former then, as I am now. I re
garded it as a harsh, unconstitutional measure, opposed to the rights of the
states. If they have not surrendered the rights to incorporate banks, its exer
cise cannot be controlled by the action of this government, which has no power
but what is expressly granted, and no authority to control the states in the ex
ercise of their reserved powers. It remained to resort to a National Bank
as the means of compulsion. It proved effectual. Specie payments were re
stored ; but even with this striking advantage, it was followed by great pressure in
1818, 1819, and 1820, as all who are old enough to remember that period must
recollect. Such, in fact, must ever be the consequence of resumption, when
forced, under the most favourable circumstances ; and such, accordingly, it pro
ved even in England, with all her resources, and with all the caution she used
in restoring a specie circulation, after the long suspension of 1797. What, then,
would be its effects in the present condition of the country, when the govern
ment is a creditor instead of a debtor ; where there are so many newly-created
banks without established credit ; when the over-issues are so great ; and when
so large a portion of the debtors are not in a condition to be coerced ? As great
as is the tide of disaster which is passing over the land, it would be as nothing
to what would follow, were a National Bank to be established as the means of
coercing specie payments.

I am bound to speak without reserve on this important point. My opinion,
then, is, that if it should be determined to compel the restoration of specie pay
ments by the agency of banks, there is but one way — but to that I have insu
perable objections — I mean the adoption of the Pennsylvania Bank of the Uni
ted States as the fiscal agent of the government. It is already in operation,
and sustained by great resources and powerful connexions, both at home and
abroad. Through its agency specie payments might undoubtedly be restored,
and that with far less disaster than through a newly-created bank, but not with
out severe pressure. I cannot, however, vote for such a measure ; I cannot agree
to give a preference and such advantages to a bank of one of the members of
this confederacy, over that of others — a bank dependant upon the will of a state,
and subject to its influence and control. I cannot consent to confer such favours

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 263

on the stockholders, many of whom, if rumour is to be trusted, are foreign cap
italists, and without claim on the bounty of the government. But if all these,
and many other objection-s, were overcome, there is still one which I cannot sur
mount.

There has been, as we all know, a conflict between one of the departments
of the government and that institution, in which, in my opinion, the department
was the assailant ; but I cannot consent, after what has occurred, to give to the
Bank a triumph over the government, for such its adoption as the fiscal agent
of the government would necessarily be considered. It would degrade the
government in the eyes of our citizens and of the world, and go far to make that
Bank the government itself.

But if all these difficulties were overcome, there are others, to me, wholly
insurmountable. I belong to the State Rights party, which at all times, from
the beginning of the government to this day, has been opposed to such an insti
tution, as unconstitutional, inexpedient, and dangerous. They have ever dread
ed the union of the political and moneyed power, and the central action of the
government to which it so strongly tends, and at all times have strenuously
resisted their junction. Time and experience have confirmed the truth of their
principles ; and this, above all other periods, is the one at which it would be
most dangerous to depart from them. Acting on them, I have never given my
countenance or support to a National Bank but under a compulsion which I felt
to be imperious, and never without an open declaration of my opinion as unfa
vourable to a bank.

In supporting the Bank of 1816, 1 openly declared that, as a question de novo,
I should be decidedly against the Bank, and would be the last to give it my sup
port. I also stated that, in supporting the Bank then, I yielded to the necessi
ty of the case, growing out of the then existing and long-established connexion
between the government and the banking system. I took the ground, even at
that early period, that so long as the connexion existed — so long as the govern
ment received and paid away bank-notes as money — they were bound to regu
late their value, and had no alternative but the establishment of a National Bank.
I found the connexion in existence and established before my time, and over
which I could have no control. I yielded to the necessity in order to correct
the disordered state of the currency, which had fallen exclusively under the
control of the states. I yielded to what I could not reverse, just as any mem
ber of the Senate now would, who might believe that Louisiana was unconsti
tutionally admitted into the Union, but who would, nevertheless, feel compelled
to vote to extend the laws to that state, as one of its members, on the ground
that its admission was an act, whether constitutional or unconstitutional, which
he could not reverse.

In 1834 I acted in conformity to the same principle, in proposing the renew
al of the Bank charter for a short period. My object, as expressly avowed, was
to use the Bank to break the connexion between the government and the bank
ing system gradually, in order to avert the catastrophe which has now befallen
us, and which I then clearly perceived. But the connexion, which I believed
to be irreversible in 1816, has now been broken by operation of law. It is now
an open question. I feel myself free for the first time to choose my course on
this important subject ; and, in opposing a bank, I act in conformity to principles
which I have entertained ever since I have fully investigated the subject.

But my opposition to a reunion with the banks is not confined to objections
limited to a national or state banks. It goes beyond, and comprehends others of
a more general nature relating to the currency, which to me are decisive. I
am of the impression that the connexion has a most pernicious influence over
bank currency ; that it tends to disturb that stability and uniformity of value
which is essential to a sound currency, and is among the leading causes of that
tendency to expansion and contraction which experience has shown is incident

264 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

to bank-notes as a currency. They are, in my opinion, at best, without the re
quisite qualities to constitute a currency even when unconnected with the gov
ernment, and are doubly disqualified by reason of that connexion, which sub
jects them to sudden expansions and contractions, and exposes them to fatal
catastrophes, such as the present.

I will explain my views. A bank-note circulates not merely on account of
the credit of the institutions by which it is issued, but because government re
ceives it, like gold and silver, in payment of all its dues, and thus adds its own.
credit to that of the bank. It, in fact, virtually endorses on the note of every
specie-paying bank " receivable by government in its dues." To understand
how greatly this adds to the circulation of bank-notes, we must remember that
government is the great money-dealer of the country, and the holder of immense
public domains ; and that it has the power of creating a demand against every
citizen as high as it pleases, in the shape of a tax or duty, which can be dis
charged, as the law now is, only by bank-notes or gold and silver. This, of
course, cannot but add greatly to the credit of bank-notes, and contribute much
to their circulation, though it may be difficult to determine with any precision
to what extent. It certainly is very great. For why is it that an individual
of the first credit, whose responsibility is so indisputable that his friend, of equal
credit, endorses his note for nothing, should put his with his friend's, being their
joint credit, into a bank, and take out the notes of the bank, which is, in fact,
but the credit of the bank itself, and pays six per cent, discount between the
credit of himself and his friend and that of the bank ? The known and estab
lished credit of the bank may be one reason, but there is another and powerful
one. The government treats the credit ,of the bank as gold and silver in all its
transactions, and does not treat the credit of individuals in the same manner.
To test the truth, let us reverse the case, and suppose the government to treat
the joint credit of the individuals as money, and not the credit of the bank, is it
not obvious that, instead of borrowing from the bank and paying six per cent, dis
count, the bank would be glad to borrow from him on the same terms ? From
this we may perceive the powerful influence which bank circulation derives
from the connexion with the credit of the government.

It follows, as a necessary consequence, that to the extent of this influence the
issues of the banks expand and contract with the expansion and contraction of
the fiscal action of the government ; with the increase of its duties, taxes, in
come, and expenditure ; with the deposites in its vaults acting as additional cap
ital, and the amount of bank-notes withdrawn, in consequence, from circulation :
all of which must directly affect the amount of their business and issues ; and
bank currency must, of course, partake of all those vibrations to which the fis
cal action of the government is necessarily exposed, and, when great and sud
den, must expose the system to catastrophes such as we now witness. In
fact, a more suitable instance cannot be selected, to illustrate the truth of what
I assert, than the present, as I shall proceed to show.

To understand the causes which have led to the present state of things, we
must go back to the year 1824, when the tariff system triumphed in Congress :
a system which imposed duties, not for the purpose of revenue, but to encour
age the industry of one portion of the Union at the expense of the other. This
was followed up by the act of 1828, which consummated the system. It rais
ed the duties so extravagantly, that out of an annual importation of sixty-four
millions, thirty-two passed into the treasury : that is, government took one half
for the liberty of introducing the other. Countless millions were thus poured
into the treasury beyond the wants of the government, which became, in time,
the source of the most extravagant expenditures. This vast increase of receipts
and expenditures was followed by a corresponding expansion of the business of
the banks. They had to discount and issue freely to enable the merchants to
pay their duty-bonds, as well 'as to meet the vastly increased expenditures of

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 265

the government. Another effect followed the act of 1828, which gave a still
farther expansion to the action of the banks, and which is worthy of notice. It
turned the exchange with England in favour of this country. That portion of
the proceeds of our exports which, in consequence of the high duties, could no
longer return with profit in the usual articles which we had been in the habit
of receiving principally from that country in exchange for our exports, returned
in gold and silver, in order to purchase similar articles at the North. This was
the first cause which gave that western direction to the precious metals, the re
vulsive return of which has been followed by so many disasters. With the ex
change in our favour, and, consequently, no demand for gold and silver abroad,
and the vast demand for money attendant on an increase of the revenue, almost
every restraint was removed on the discounts and issues of the banks, especially
in the Northern section of the Union, where these causes principally operated.
With their increase, wages and prices of every description rose in proportion,
followed, of course, by an increasing demand on the banks for farther issues.
This is the true cause of that expansion of the currency which began about the
commencement of the late administration, but which was erroneously charged
by it to the Bank of the United States. It rose out of the action of the govern
ment. The Bank, in increasing its business, acted in obedience to the condi
tion of things at the time, and in conformity with the banks generally in the
same section. It was at this juncture that the late administration came into
power — a juncture remarkable in many respects, but more especially in relation,
to the question of the currency. Most of the causes which have since termi
nated in the complete prostration of the banks and the commercial prosperity of
the country were in full activity.

Another cause, about that time (I do not remember the precise date), began
to produce powerful effects : I refer to the last renewal of the charter of the
Bank of England. It was renewed for ten years, and, among other provisions,
contained one making the notes of that bank a legal tender in all cases except
between the Bank and its creditors. The effect was to dispense still farther
with the use of the precious metals in that great commercial country, which, of
course, caused them to flow out in every direction through the various channels
of its commerce. A large portion took their direction hither ward, and served
still farther to increase the current which, from causes already enumerated, was
already flowing so strongly in this direction, and which still farther increased
the force of the returning current, on the turn of the tide.

The administration did not comprehend the difficulties and dangers which
surrounded it. Instead of perceiving the true reason of the expansion of the
currency, and adopting the measures necessary to arrest it, they attributed it to
the Bank of the United States, and made it the cause or pretext for waging war
on that institution. Among the first acts of hostility, the deposites were remo
ved, and transferred to selected state banks ; the effect of which, instead of resist
ing the tendency to expansion, was to throw off the only restraint that held the
banking institutions of the country in check, and, of course, gave to the swell
ing tide, which was destined to desolate the country, a powerful impulse.
Banks sprung up in every direction ; discounts and issues increased almost
without limitation ; and an immense surplus revenue accumulated in the depos-
ite banks, which, after the payment of the public debt, the most extravagant ap
propriations could not exhaust, and which acted as additional banking capital ;
the value of money daily depreciated ; prices rose ; and then commenced those
unbounded speculations, particularly in public lands, which was transferred, by
millions of acres, from the public to the speculators for worthless bank-notes,
till at length the swelling flood was checked, and the revulsive current burst its
barriers, and overspread and desolated the land.

The first check came from the Bank of England, which, alarmed at the loss
of its precious metals, refused to discount American bills, in order to prevent a

L L

266 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

iarther decrease of its cash means, and cause a return of those which it had
lost. Then followed the objectionable manner of carrying into execution the
deposite act, which, instead of a remedial measure, as it might have been if it
had been properly executed, was made the instrument of weakening the banks,
especially in the great commercial metropolis of the Union, where so large a
portion of the surplus revenue was accumulated. And, finally, the treasury or
der, which still farther weakened those banks, by withdrawing their cash means
to be invested in public lands in the West.

It is often easy to prevent what cannot be remedied, which the present instance
strongly illustrates. If the administration had formed a true conception of the
danger in time, what has since happened might have then been averted. The
Bear approach of the expiration of the charter of the United States Bank would
have afforded ample means of staying the desolation, if it had been timely and
properly used. I saw it then, and purposed to renew the charter for a limited
period, with such modifications as would have effectually resisted the increas
ing expansion of the currency, and, at the same time, gradually and finally wear
out the connexion between the Bank and the government. To use the expres
sion I then used, " to unbank the banks," to let down the system easily, and so
to effect the separation between the Bank and the government, as to avoid the
possibility of that shock which I then saw was inevitable without some such
remedy. The moment was eminently propitious. The precious metals were
flowing in on us from every quarter ; and the vigorous measures I purposed to
adopt in the renewal of the charter would have effectually arrested the increase
of banks, and checked the excess of their discounts and issues ; so that the ac
cumulating mass of gold and silver, instead of being converted into bank capital,
and swelling the tide of paper circulation, would have been substituted in the
place of bank-notes, as a permanent and wholesome addition to the currency of
the country.

But neither the administration nor the opposition sustained me, and the pre
cious opportunity passed unseized. I then clearly saw the coming calamity
was inevitable, and it has neither arrived sooner, nor is it greater, than what I
expected.

Such are the leading causes which have produced the present disordered
state of the currency. There are others of a minor character, connected with
the general condition of the commercial world, and the operation of the execu
tive branch of the government, but which of themselves would have produced
but little effect. To repeat the causes in a few words, the vast increase which
the tariffs of 1824 and 1828 gave to the fiscal action of the government, com
bined with the causes I have enumerated, gave the first impulse to the expan
sion of the currency. That, in turn, gave that extraordinary impulse to over-tra
ding and speculation (they were effects, and not causes) which has finally ter
minated in the present calamity It may thus be ultimately traced to the con
nexion between the banks and the government ; and it is not a little remarkable,
that the suspension of specie payments in 1816 in this country, and in 1797 in
Great Britain, was produced by the same causes.

There is another reason against the union of the government and the banks,
intimately connected with that under consideration, which I shall next proceed
to state. It gives an advantage to one portion of citizens over another, that
is neither fair, equal, nor consistent with the spirit of our institutions. That the
connexion between the Bank and the government, the receiving and paying away
their notes as cash, and the use of the public money from the time of the col
lection to the disbursement, is the source of immense profit to the banks, cannot
be questioned. It is impossible, as I have said, to ascertain with any precision
to what extent their issues and circulation depend upon it, but it certainly con
stitutes a large proportion. A single illustration may throw light upon this
point. Suppose the government were to take up the veriest beggar in the

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 267

street, and enter into a contract with him, that nothing should be received in its
dues or for the sales of its public lands in future, except gold and silver and his
promissory notes, and that he should have the use of the public funds from the
time of their collection until their disbursement. Can any one estimate the
wealth which such a contract would confer? His notes would circulate far
and wide over the whole extent of the Union, would be the medium through
which the exchanges of the country would be performed, and his ample and ex
tended credit would give him a control over all the banking institutions and
moneyed transactions of the community. The possession of a hundred mill-*
ions would not give a control more effectual. 1 ask, Would it be fair, would
it be equal, would it be consistent with the spirit of our institutions, to confer
such advantages on any individual ? And if not on one, would it be if confer
red on any number ? And if not, why should it be conferred on any corporate
body of individuals ? How can they possibly be entitled to benefits so vast,
which all must acknowledge could not be justly conferred on any number of
unincorporated individuals 1

I state not these views with any intention of bringing down odium on bank
ing institutions. I have no unkind feeling towards them whatever. I do not
hold them responsible for the present state of things. It has grown up gradu
ally, without either the banks or the community perceiving the consequences
which have followed the connexion between them. My object is to state facts
as they exist, that the truth may be seen in time by all. This is an age of in
vestigation. The public mind is broadly awake upon this all-important subject.
It affects the interests and condition of the whole community, and will be in
vestigated to the bottom. Nothing will be left unexplored ; and it is for the in
terest of both the banks and of the community that the evils incident to the
connexion should be fully understood in time, and the connexion be gradually
terminated, before such convulsions shall follow as to sweep away the whole
system, with its advantages as well as its disadvantages.

But it is not only between citizen and citizen that the connexion is unfair
and unequal. It is as much so between one portion of the country and another.
The connexion of the government with the banks, whether it be with a combi
nation of state banks or with a national institution, will necessarily centralize
the action of the system at the principal point of collection and disbursement,
and at which the mother-bank, or the head of the league of state banks, must
be located. From that point, the whole system, through the connexion with
the government, will be enabled to control the exchanges both at home and
abroad, and with it the commerce, foreign and domestic, including exports and
imports. After what has been said, these points will require but little illustra
tion. A single one will be sufficient ; and I will take, as in the former in
stance, that of an individual.

Suppose, then, the government, at the commencement of its operation, had
selected an individual merchant, at any one point in the Union, say New- York,
and had connected itself with him, as it has with the banks, by giving him the
use of the public funds from the time of their collection until their disburse
ment, and of receiving and paying away, in all its transactions, nothing but his
promissory notes, except gold and silver ; is it not manifest that a decisive con
trol would be given to the port where he resided, over all the others ; that his
promissory notes would circulate everywhere, through all the ramifications of
commerce ; that they would regulate exchanges ; that they would be the me
dium of paying duty-bonds ; and that they would attract the imports and ex
ports of the country to the ports where such extraordinary facilities were afford
ed ? If such would clearly be the effects in the case supposed, it is equally
clear that the concentration of the currency at the same point, through the
connexion of the government with the banks, would have equal, if not greater
effects ; and that whether one general bank should be used as an agent, or a

268 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

league of banks, which should have their centre there. To other ports of the
country, the trifling advantages which a branch or deposite bank would give in
the safe keeping of the public revenue would be as nothing, compared to the
losses caused to their commerce by centralizing the moneyed action of the coun
try at a remote point. Other gentlemen can speak for their own section ; I
can speak with confidence of that which I have the honour in part to repre
sent. The entire staple states, I feel a deep conviction, banks and all, would,
in the end, be great gainers by the disseverance, whatever might be the tempo-
$ary inconvenience. If there be any other section in which the effects would
be different, it would be but to confirm the views which I have presented.

As connected with this, there is a point well deserving consideration. The
union between bank and government is not only a main source of that danger
ous expansion and contraction in the banking system which I have already il
lustrated, but is also one of the principal causes of that powerful and almost ir
resistible tendency to the increase of banks which even its friends see and de
plore. I dwelt on this point on a former occasion (on Mr. Webster's motion
to renew the Bank charter in 1833), and will not repeat what I then said. But
in addition to the causes then enumerated, there are many others very power
ful, and, among others, the one under consideration. They all maybe summed
up in one general cause. We have made banking too profitable — far, very far
too profitable — and, I may add, influential. One of the most ample sources of
this profit and influence may be traced, as I have shown, to the connexion
with the government ; and is, of course, among the prominent causes of the
strong and incessant tendency of the system to increase, which even its friends
see must finally overwhelm either the banks or the institutions of the country.
With a view to check its growth, they have proposed to limit the number of
banks and the amount of banking capital by an amendment of the Constitution ;
but it is obvious that the effects of such an amendment, if it were practicable,
would but increase the profits and influence of bank capital ; and that, finally, it
would justly produce such indignation on the part of the rest of the community
against such unequal advantages, that in the end, after a long and violent strug
gle, the overthrow of the entire system would follow. To obviate this difficul
ty, it has been proposed to add a limitation upon the amount of their business ;
the effects of which would be the accommodation of favourites, to the exclusion
of the rest of the community, which would be no less fatal to the system.
There can be, in fact, but one safe and consistent remedy — the rendering bank
ing, as a business, less profitable and influential ; and the first and decisive step
towards this is a disseverance between the banks and the government. To this
may be added some effectual limitation on the denomination of the notes to be
issued, which would operate in a similar manner.

I pass over other important objections- to the connexion — the corrupting in
fluence and the spirit of speculation which it spreads far and wide over the
land. Who has not seen and deplored the vast and corrupting influence brought
to bear upon the legislatures to obtain charters, and the means necessary to
participate in the profits of the institutions ? This gives a control to the gov
ernment which grants such favours of a most extensive and pernicious charac
ter, all of which must continue to spread and increase, if the connexion should
continue, until the whole community must become one contaminated and cor
rupted mass.

There is another and a final reason, which I shall assign against the reunion
with the banks. We have reached a new era with regard to these institutions.
He who would judge of the future by the past, in reference to them, will be
wholly mistaken. The year 1833 marks the commencement of this era. That
extraordinary man who had the power of imprinting his own feelings on the
community, then commenced his hostile attacks, which have left such effects
behind, that the war then commenced against the banks, I clearly see, will not

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 269

terminate, unless there be a separation between them and the government ;
until one or the other triumphs ; till the government becomes the bank', or the
bank the government. In resisting their union, I act as the friend of both. I
have, as I have said, no unkind feeling towards the banks. I am neither a bank
man nor 'an anti-bank man. I have but little connexion with them. Many of
my best friends, for whom I have the highest esteem, have a deep interest in
their prosperity, and, as far as friendship or personal attachment extends, my
inclination would be strongly in their favour. But I stand up here as the rep
resentative of no particular interest. I look to the whole, and to the future, as
well as the present ; and I shall steadily pursue that course which, under the
most enlarged view, I believe to be my duty. In 1834 I saw the present crisis.
I, in vain, raised a warning voice, and endeavoured to avert it. I now see,
with equal certainty, one far more portentous. If this struggle is to go on ; if
the banks will insist upon a reunion with the government against the sense of a
large and influential portion of the community ; and, above all, if they should
succeed in effecting it, a reflux flood will inevitably sweep away the whole
system. A deep popular excitement is never without some reason, and ought
ever to be treated with respect ; and it is the part of wisdom to look timely into
the cause, and correct it before the excitement shall become so great as to de
molish the object, with all its good and evil, against which it is directed.

The only safe course for both government and banks is to remain, as they are,
separated ; each in the use of their own credit, and in the management of their
own affairs. The less the control and influence of the one over the other the
better. Confined to their legitimate sphere, that of affording temporary credit
to commercial and business men, bank-notes would furnish a safe and conveni
ent circulation in the range of commerce and business, within which the banks
may be respectively situated, exempt almost entirely from those fluctuations and
convulsions to which they are now so exposed ; or, if they should occasionally
be subject to them, the evil would be local and temporary, leaving undisturbed
the action of the government and the general currency of the country, on the
stability of which the prosperity and safety of the community so much depend.

I have now stated my objections to the reunion of the government and the
banks. If they are well founded ; if the state banks are of themselves incom
petent agents ; if a Bank of the United States be impracticable, or, if practicable,
would at this time be the destruction of a large portion of the existing banks,
and of renewed and severe pecuniary distress ; if it would be against the set
tled conviction of an old and powerful party, whose opposition time cannot
abate ; if the union of government and banks adds to the unfitness of their notes
for circulation, and be unjust and unequal between citizen and citizen, and one
portion of the Union and another ; and, finally, if it would excite an implacable
and obstinate war, which could only terminate in the overthrow of the banking
system or the institutions of the country — it then remains that the only alterna
tive would be permanently to separate the two, and to reorganize the treasury
so as to enable it to perform those duties which have heretofore been performed
by the banks as its fiscal agents. This proposed reorganization has been called
a sub-treasury; an unfortunate word, calculated to mislead and conjure up diffi
culties and danger that do not in reality exist. So far from an experiment, or
some new device, it is only returning to the old mode of collecting and disburs
ing public money, which, for thousands of years, has been the practice of all
enlightened people till within the last century.

In what manner it is intended to reorganize the treasury by the bill reported,
I do not know. I have been too much engaged to read it ; and I can only say
that, for one, I shall assent to no arrangement which provides for a treasury
bank, or that can be perverted into one. If there can be any scheme more fatal
than a reunion with the banks at this time, it would be such a project. Nor
will I give my assent to any arrangement which shall add the least unnecessary

270 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

patronage. I am the sworn foe to patronage, and have done as much and su5-
fered as much in resisting it as any one. Too many years have passed over
me to change, at this late day, my course or principles. But I will say, that it
is impossible so to organize the treasury for the performance of its own functions
as to give to the executive a tenth part of the patronage it will lose by the pro
posed separation, which, when the bill for the reorganization comes up, I may
have an opportunity to show. I have ventured this assertion after much reflec
tion, and with entire confidence in its correctness.

But something more must be done besides the reorganization of the treasury,
Under the resolution of 1816, bank-notes would again be received in the dues
of the government, if the Bank should resume specie payments. The legal, as
well as the actual connexion, must be severed. But I am opposed to all harsh
or precipitate measures. No great process can be effected without a shock
but through the agency of time. I, accordingly, propose to allow time for the final
separation ; and with this view I have drawn up an amendment to this bill,
which I shall offer at the proper time, to modify the resolution of 1816, by pro
viding that after the 1st of January next, three fourths of all sums due to the
government may be received in the notes of specie-paying banks ; and that
after the 1st of January next following, one half; arid after the 1st of January
next subsequent, one fourth ; and after the 1st of January thereafter, nothing but
the legal currency of the United States, or bills, notes, or paper issued under
their authority, and which may by law be authorized to be received in their dues.
If the time is not thought to be ample, I am perfectly disposed to extend it.
The period is of little importance in my eyes, so that the object be effected.

In addition to this, it seems to me that some measure of a remedial character,
connected with the currency, ought to be adopted to ease off the pressure while
the process is going through. It is desirable that the government should make
as few and small demands on the specie market as possible during the time, so
as to throw no impediment in the way of the resumption of specie payments.
With this view, I am of the impression that the sum necessary for the present
wants of the treasury should be raised by a paper, which should, at the same
time, have the requisite qualities to enable it to perform the functions of a paper
circulation. Under this impression, I object to the interest to be allowed on
the treasury notes, which this bill authorizes to be issued, on the very opposite
ground that the senator from Massachusetts bestows his approbation. He
approves of interest, because it would throw them out of circulation, into the
hands of capitalists, as a convenient and safe investment ; and I disapprove,
because it will have that effect. I am disposed to ease off the process ; he.
I would suppose, is very little solicitous on that point.

But I go farther. I am of the impression, to make this great measure suc
cessful, and secure it against reaction, some stable and safe medium of circula
tion, to take the place of bank-notes in the fiscal operations of the government,
ought to be issued. I intend to propose nothing. It would be impossible, with
so great a weight of opposition, to pass any measure without the entire support
of the administration ; and if it were, it ought not to be attempted where so much
must depend on the mode of execution. The best measure that could be devi
sed might fail, and impose a heavy responsibility on its author, unless it met
with the hearty approbation of those who are to execute it. I intend, then,
merely to throw out suggestions, in order to excite the reflection of others on
a subject so delicate and of so much importance, acting on the principle that it
is the duty of all, in so great a juncture, to present their views without reserve.

It is, then, my impression that, in the present condition of the world, a paper
currency, in some form, if not necessary, is almost indispensable in financial
and commercial operations of civilized and extensive communities. In many
respects it has a vast superiority over a metallic currency, especially in great
and extended transactions, by its greater cheapness, lightness, and the facility

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 271

of determining the amount. The great desideratum is, to ascertain what de
scription of paper has the requisite qualities of being free from fluctuation in.
value, and liability to abuse, in the greatest perfection. 1 have shown, I trust,
that the bank-notes do not possess these requisites in a degree sufficiently high
for this purpose. I go farther. It appears to me, after bestowing the best re
flection I can give the subject, that no convertible paper, that is, no paper whose
credit rests upon a promise to pay, is suitable for currency. It is the form of
credit proper in private transactions between man and man, but not for a stand
ard of value to perform exchanges generally, which constitutes the appropriate
functions of money or currency. The measure of safety in the two cases are
wholly different. A promissory note, or convertible paper, is considered safe
so long as the drawer has ample means to meet his engagements, and, in pass
ing from hand to hand, regard is had only to his ability and willingness to pay.
Very different is the case in currency. The aggregate value of the currency
of a country necessarily bears a small proportion to the aggregate value of its
property. This proportion is not well ascertained, and is probably subject to
considerable variation in different countries, and at different periods in the same
country. It may be assumed conjecturally, in order to illustrate what I say, at
one to thirty. Assuming this proportion to be correct, which probably is not very
far from the truth, it follows, that in a sound condition of the country, where the
currency is metallic, the aggregate value of the coin is not more than one in
thirty of the aggregate value of the property. It also follows that an increase
in the amount of the currency, by the addition of a paper circulation of no in
trinsic value, but increases the nominal value of the aggregate property of the
country in the same proportion that the increase bears to the whole amount of
currency ; so that, if the currency be doubled, the nominal value of the property
will also be doubled. Hence it is, that when the paper currency of a country
is in the shape of promissory notes, there is a constant tendency to excess. We
look for their safety to the ability of the drawer ; and so long as his means are
ample to meet his engagements, there is no distrust, without reflecting that, con
sidered as currency, it cannot safely exceed one in thirty in value compared to
property ; and the delusion is farther increased by the constant increase in
value of property with the increase of the notes in circulation, so as to main
tain the same relative proportion. It follows that a government may safely
contract a debt many times the amount of its aggregate circulation ; but if it
were to attempt to put its promissory notes in circulation in amount equal to its
debts, an explosion in the currency would be inevitable. And hence, with
other causes, the constant tendency to an excessive issue of bank-notes in pros
perous times, when so large a portion of the community are anxious to obtain
accommodation, and who are disappointed when good negotiable paper is re
fused by the banks, not reflecting that it would not be safe to discount beyond the
limits I have assigned for a safe circulation, however good the paper offered.

On what, then, ought a paper currency to rest ? I would say on demand and
supply simply, which regulates the value of everything else — the constant de
mand which the government has on the community for its necessary supplies.
A medium resting on this demand, which simply obligates the government to
receive it in all its dues, to the exclusion of everything else except gold and
silver, and which shall be optional with those who have demands on government
to receive or not, would, it seems to me, be as stable in its value as those metals
themselves, and be as little liable to abuse as the power of coining. It would
contain within itself a self-regulating power. It could only be issued to those
who had claims on the government, and to those only with their consent, and,
of course, only at or above par with gold and silver, which would be its ha
bitual state ; for, as far as the government was concerned, it would be equal,
in every respect, to gold and silver, and superior in many, particularly in regu
lating the distant exchanges of the country. Should, however, a demand for

272 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

gold and silver from abroad, or other accidental causes, depress it temporarily,
as compared with the precious metals, it would then return to the treasury ; and
as it could not be paid out during such depression, its gradual diminution in the
market would soon restore it to an equality, when it would again flow out into
the general circulation. Thus there would be a constant alternate flux andre-
ilux into and from the treasury, between it and the precious metals ; but if at
any time a permanent depression in its value be possible, from any cause, the
only effect would be to operate as a reduction of taxes on the community, and
the only sufferer would be the government itself. Against this, its own interest
•would be a sufficient guarantee.

Nothing but experience can determine what amount and of what denomina
tions might be safely issued, but it may be safely assumed that the country
would absorb an amount greatly exceeding its annual income. Much of its ex
changes, which amount to a vast sum, as well as its banking business, would
revolve about it, and many millions would thus be kept in circulation beyond
the demands of the government. It may throw some light on this subject to
state, that North Carolina, just after the Revolution, issued a large amount of pa
per, which was made receivable in dues to her. It was also made a legal ten
der, but which, of course, was not obligatory after the adoption of the Federal
Constitution. A large amount, say between four and five hundred thousand
dollars, remained in circulation after that period, and continued to circulate for
more than twenty years at par with gold and silver during the whole time, with
no other advantage than being received in the revenue of the state, which was
much less than $100,000 per annum. I speak on the information of citizens
of that state, on whom I can rely.

But whatever may be the amount that can be circulated, I hold it clear, that
to that amount it would be as stable in value as gold and silver itself, provided
the government be bound to receive it exclusively with those metals in all its
dues, and that it be left perfectly optional with those who have claims on the
government to receive it or not. It will also be a necessary condition, that
notes of too small a denomination should not be issued, so that the treasury shall
have ample means to meet all demands, either in gold or silver, or the bills of
the government, at the option of those who have claims on it. With these con
ditions, no farther variation could take place between it and gold and silver
than that which would be caused by the action of commerce. An unusual de
mand from abroad for the metals would, of course, raise them a little in their
relative value, and depress, relatively, the government bills in the same propor
tion, which would cause them to flow into the treasury, and gold and silver to
flow out ; while, on the contrary, an increased demand for the bills in the do
mestic exchange would have the reverse effect, causing, as I have stated, an
alternate flux and reflux into the treasury between the two, which would at all
times keep their relative values either at or near par.

No one can doubt that the fact of the government receiving and paying away
bank-notes, in all its fiscal transactions, is one of the principal sources of their
great circulation ; and it was mainly on that account that the notes of the late
Bank of the United States so freely circulated over the Union. I would ask, then,
Why should the government mingle its credit with that of private corporations ?
No one can doubt but that the government credit is better than that of any bank —
more stable and more safe. Why, then, should it mix it up with the less perfect
credit of those institutions ? Why not use its own credit to the amount of its own
transactions ? Why should it not be safe in its own hands, while it shall be consid
ered safe in the hands of 800 private institutions, scattered all over the country,
and which have no other object brt their own private profit, to increase which, they
almost constantly extend their business to the most dangerous extremes ? And
why should the community be compelled to give six per cent, discount for the gov
ernment credit blended with that of the banks, when the superior credit of the

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 273

government could be furnished separately, without discount, to the mutual ad
vantage of the government and the community ? Why, let me ask, should the
government be exposed to such difficulties as the present, by mingling its credit
with the banks, when it could be exempt from all such by using, by itself, its
own safer credit ? It is time the community, which has so deep an interest in
a sound and cheap currency, and the equality of the laws between one portion,
of the citizens of the country and another, should reflect seriously on these
things, not for the purpose of oppressing any interest, but to correct gradually
disorders of a dangerous character, which have insensibly, in the long course
of years, without being perceived by any one, crept into the state. The ques
tion is not between credit and no credit, as some would have us believe, but in
"what form credit can best perform the functions of a sound and safe currency.
On this important point I have freely thrown out rny ideas, leaving it to this
.body and the public to determine what they are worth. Believing that there
might be a sound and safe paper currency founded on the credit of the govern
ment exclusively, I was desirous that those who are responsible, and have the
power, should have availed themselves of the opportunity of the temporary de-
iicit of the treasury, and the postponement of the fourth instalment, intended to
be deposited with the states, to use them as the means of affording a circulation
for the present relief of the country and the banks, during the process of separ
ating them from the government ; and, if experience should justify it, of furnish
ing a permanent and safe circulation, which would greatly facilitate the opera
tions of the treasury, and afford, incidentally, much facility to the commercial
operations of the country. But a different (direction was given, and when the
alternative was presented of a loan, or the withholding of the fourth instalment
from the states, I did not hesitate to give a decided vote for withholding it. My
aversion to a public debt is deep and durable. It is, in my opinion, pernicious,
and is little short of a fraud on the public. I saw too much of it during the late
war not to understand something of the nature and character of public loans.
Never was a country more egregiously imposed on.

Having now presented my views of the course and the measures which the
permanent policy of the country, looking to its liberty and lasting prosperity, re
quires, I come finally to the question of relief. I have placed this last, not that
I am devoid of sympathy for the country in the pecuniary distress which now
pervades it. No one struggled earlier or longer to prevent it than myself; nor
can any one more sensibly feel the wide-spread blight which has suddenly
blasted the hopes of so many, and precipitated thousands from affluence to pov
erty. The desolation has fallen mainly on the mercantile class — a class which
I have ever held in the highest estimation. No country ever had a superior
body of merchants, of higher honour, of more daring enterprise, or of greater
skill and energy. The ruin of such a class is a heavy calamity, and I am so
licitous, among other things, to give such stability to our currency as to prevent
the recurrence of a similar calamity hereafter. But it was first necessary, in
the order of things, that we should determine what sound policy, looking to the
future, demands to be done at the present juncture, before we consider the
question of relief; which, as urgent as it may be, is subordinate, and must yield
to the former. The patient lies under a dangerous disease, with a burning
thirst and other symptoms, which distress him more than the vital organs
which are attacked. The skilful physician first makes himself master of the
nature of the disease, and then determines on the treatment necessary for the
restoration of health. This done, he next alleviates the distressing symptoms
as far as is consistent with the restoration of health, and no farther. Such shall
be my course. As far as I possibly can, consistently with the views I entertain,
and what I believe to be necessary to restore the body politic to health, I will
do everything in my power to mitigate the present distress. Farther I cannot go.

After the best reflection, I am of opinion that the government can do but lit-

M M

274 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

tie in the way of relief ; and that it is a case which must be mainly left to the
constitution of the patient, who, thank God, is young, vigorous, and robust, with
a constitution sufficient to sustain and overcome the severest attack. I dread
the doctor and his drugs much more than the disease itself. The distress of
the country consists in its indebtedness, and can only be relieved by payment
of its debts. To effect this, industry, frugality, economy, and time are neces
sary. I rely more on the growing crop — on the cotton, rice, and tobacco of the
South, than on all the projects or devices of politicians. I am utterly opposed
to all coercion by this government. But government may do something to re
lieve the distress. It is out of debt, and is one of the principal creditors both
of the banks and of the merchants, and should set an example of liberal indul
gence. This I am willing to give freely. I am also prepared to vote freely
the use of government, credit in some safe form, to supply any deficit in the cir
culation, during the process of recovery, as far as its financial wants will per
mit. I see not what more can be safely done. But my vision may be obtuse
upon this subject. Those who differ from me, and who profess so much sym
pathy for the public, seem to think that much relief may be afforded. I hope
they will present their views. I am anxious to hear their prescriptions, and I
assure them, that whatever they may propose, if it shall promise relief, and be
not inconsistent with the course which I deem absolutely necessary for the
restoration of the country to perfect health, shall cheerfully receive my support.
They may be more keensighted than I am as to the best, means of relief, but
cannot have a stronger disposition to afford it.

We have, Mr. President, arrived at a remarkable era in our political history.
The days of legislative and executive encroachments, of tariffs and surpluses,
of bank and public debt, and extravagant expenditure, are past for the present.
The government stands in a position disentangled from the past, and freer to
choose its future course than it ever has been since its commencement. We
are about to take a fresh start. I move off under the State Rights banner, and
go in the direction in which I have been so long moving. I seize the opportunity
thoroughly to reform the government ; to bring it back to its original principles ;
to retrench and economize, and rigidly to enforce accountability. I shall op
pose strenuously all attempts to originate a new debt ; to create a National
Bank ; to reunite the political and money powers (more dangerous than Church
and State) in any form or shape ; to prevent the operation of the compromise,
which is gradually removing the last vestige of the tariff system ; and, mainly,
1 shall use my best efforts to give an ascendency to the great conservative prin
ciple of state sovereignty, over the dangerous and despotic doctrine of consoli
dation. I rejoice to think that the executive department of the government is
now so reduced in power and means, that it can no longer rely on its influence
and patronage to secure a majority. Henceforward it can have no hope of sup
porting itself but on wisdom, moderation, patriotism, and devoted attachment to
the Constitution, which, I trust, will make it, in its own defence, an ally in ef
fecting the reform which I deem indispensable to the salvation of the country
and its institutions.

I look, sir, with pride to the wise arid noble bearing of the little State Rights
party, of which it is my pride to be a member, throughout the eventful period
through which the country has passed since 1824. Experience already bears
testimony to their patriotism, firmness, and sagacity, and history will do it jus
tice. In that year, as I have stated, the tariff system triumphed in the councils
of the nation. We saw its disastrous political bearings — foresaw its surpluses,
and the extravagances to which it would lead — we rallied on the election of
the late President to arrest it through the influence of the executive department
of the government. In this we failed. We then fell back upon the rights and
sovereignty of the states ; and by the action of a small, but gallant state, and
through the potency of its interposition, we brought the system to the ground,

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOTJN. 275

sustained as it was by the opposition arid the administration, and by the whole
power and patronage of the government. The pernicious overflow of the treas
ury, of which it was the parent, could not be arrested at once. The surplus
was seized on by the executive, and, by its control over the banks, became the
fruitful source of executive influence and encroachment. Without hesitation,
Ave joined our old opponents on the tariff question, but under our own flag, and
without merging in their ranks, and made a gallant and successful war against
the encroachments of the executive. That terminated, we part with our late
allies in peace, and move forward, lag or onward who may, to secure the fruits
of our long, but successful struggle, under the old Republican flag of '98, which,
though tattered and torn, has never yet been lowered, and, with the blessing of
God, never shall be with my consent.

XIX.

SPEECH ON HIS AMENDMENT TO SEPARATE THE GOVERNMENT FROM THE BANKS,

OCTOBER 3, 1837.

Mr. PRESIDENT : In reviewing this discussion, I have been struck with the
fact, that the argument on the opposite side has been limited, almost exclu
sively, to the questions of relief and the currency. These are, undoubtedly, im
portant questions, and well deserving tlie deliberate consideration of the Sen
ate ; but there are other questions involved in this issue of a far more elevated
character, which more imperiously demand our attention. The banks have
ceased to be mere moneyed incorporations. They have become great political
institutions, with vast influence over the welfare of the community ; so much
so, that a highly distinguished senator (Mr. C^y) has declared, in his place,
that the question of the disunion of the government and the banks involved in
its consequences the disunion of the states themselves. With this declaration
sounding in our ears, it is time to look into the origin of a system which has
already acquired such mighty influence ; to inquire into the causes which have
produced it, and whether they are still on the increase ; in what they will ter
minate, if left to themselves ; and, finally, whether the system is favourable to
the permanency of our free institutions ; to the industry and business of the
country ; and, above all, to the moral and intellectual development of the com
munity. I feel the vast importance and magnitude of these topics, as well as
their great delicacy. I shall touch them with extreme reluctance, and only be
cause I believe them to belong to the occasion, and that it would be a derelic
tion of public duty to withhold any opinion, which I have deliberately formed,
on the subject under discussion.

The rise and progress of the banking system is one of the most remarkable
and curious phenomena of modern times. Its origin is modern and humble,
and §-ave no indication of the extraordinary growth and influence which it was
destined to attain. It dates back to 1609, the year that the Bank of Amsterdam
was established. Other banking institutions preceded it ; but they were insula
ted, and not immediately connected with the systems which have since sprung up,
and which may be distinctly traced to that bank, which was a bank of deposite
— a mere storehouse — established under the authority of that great commer
cial metropolis, for the purpose of safe-keeping the precious metals, and facili
tating the vast system, of exchanges which then centred there. The whole sys
tem was the most simple and beautiful that can be imagined. The depositor,
on delivering his bullion or coin in store, received a credit, estimated at the
standard value on the books of the bank, and a certificate of deposite for the
amount, which was transferable from hand to hand, and entitled the holder to

276 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

withdraw the deposite on payment of a moderate fee for the expense and hazard
of safe-keeping. These certificates became, in fact, the circulating medium of
the community, performing, as it were, the hazard and drudgery, while the pre
cious metals, which they, in truth, represented, guilder for guilder, lay quietly in
store, without being exposed to the wear and tear, or losses incidental to actual
use. It was thus a paper currency was created, having all the solidity, safety,
and uniformity of a metallic, with the facility belonging to that of paper. The
whole arrangement was admirable, and worthy of the strong sense and down
right honesty of the people with whom it originated.

Out of this, which may be called the first era of the system, grew the bank of
deposite, discount, and circulation — a great and mighty change, destined to ef
fect a revolution in the condition of modern society. It is not difficult to explain
how the one system should spring from the other, notwithstanding the striking
dissimilarity in features and character between the offspring and the parent. A
vast sum, not less than three millions sterling, accumulated and remained habit
ually in deposite in the Bank of Amsterdam, the place of the returned certifi
cates being constantly supplied by new depositors. With so vast a standing
deposite, it required but little reflection to perceive that a very large portion of
it might be withdrawn, and that a sufficient amount would be still left to meet
the returning certificates ; or, what would be the same in effect, that an equal
amount of fictitious certificates might be issued beyond the sum actually depos-
^ ited. Either process, if interest be charged on the deposites withdrawn, or the
fictitious certificates issued, would be a near approach to a bank of discount.
This once seen, it required but little reflection to perceive that the same pro-

Ecess would be equally applicable to a capital placed in bank as stock ; and from
.^that the transition was easy to issuing bank-notes payable on demand, on bills
of exchange, or promissory notes, having but a short time to run. These, com
bined, constitute the elements of a bank of discount, deposite, and circulation.
Modern ingenuity and dishonesty would not have been long in perceiving and
turning such advantages to accost ; but the faculties of the plain Belgian was
either too blunt to perceive, or his honesty too stern to avail himself of them.
To his honour, there is reason to believe, notwithstanding the temptation, the
deposites were sacredly kept, and that for every certificate in circulation, there
was a corresponding amount in bullion or coin in store. It was reserved for
another people, either more ingenious or less scrupulous, to make the change.
The Bank of England was incorporated in 1694, eighty-five years after that
of Amsterdam, and was the first bank of deposite, discount, and circulation.
Its capital was £1,200,000, consisting wholly of government stock, bearing an
interest of eight per cent, per annum. Its notes were received in the dues of
the government, and the public revenue was deposited in the bank. It was au
thorized to circulate exchequer bills, and make loans to government. Let us
pause for a moment, and contemplate this complex and potent machine, under
its various character and functions.

As a bank of deposite, it was authorized to receive deposites, not simply for
safe-keeping, to be returned when demanded by the depositor, but to ta used
and loaned out for the benefit of the institution, care being taken always lo be
provided with the means of returning an equal amount, when demanded. As
a bank of discount and circulation, it issued its notes OR the faith of its capital
stock and deposites, or discounted bills of exchange and promissory notes back
ed by responsible endorsers, charging an interest something greater than was
authorized by law to be charged on loans ; and thus allowing it, for the use of
its credit, a higher rate of compensation than what individuals were authorized
to receive for the use and hazard of money or capital loaned out. It will, per
haps, place this point in a clear light, if we should consider the transaction in
its true character, not as a loan, but as a mere exchange of credit. In discount
ing, the bank takes, in the shape of a promissory note, the credit of an indi-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 277

vidual so good that another, equally responsible, endorses his note for nothing,
and gives out its credit in the form of a bank-note. The transaction is obvious
ly a mere exchange of credit. If the drawer and endorser break, the loss is
the Bank's ; but if the Bank breaks, the loss fails on the community ; and yet
this transaction, so dissimilar, is confounded with a loan, and the bank per
mitted to charge, on a mere exchange of credit, in which the hazard of the
breaking of the drawer and endorser is incurred by the Bank, and that of the
Bank by the community, a higher sum than the legal rate of interest on a loan ;
in which, besides the use of his capital, the hazard is all on the side of the
lender.

Turning from these to the advantages which it derived from its connexion
with the government, we shall find them not less striking. Among the first of
these in importance is the fact of its notes being received in the dues of the
government, by which the credit of the government was added to that of the
Bank, which added so greatly to the increase of its circulation. These, again,
when collected by the government, were placed in deposite in the Bank ; thus
giving to it not only the profit resulting from their abstraction from circulation,
from the time of collection till disbursement, but also that from the use of the
public deposites in the interval. To complete the picture, the Bank, in its ca
pacity of lender to the government, in fact paid its own notes, which rested on
the faith of the government stock, on which it was drawing eight per cent. ;
so that, in truth, it but loaned to the government its own credit.

Such were the extraordinary advantages conferred on this institution, and of
which it had an exclusive monopoly ; and these are the causes which gave such
an extraordinary impulse to its growth and influence, that it increased in a lit
tle more than a hundred years — from 1694, when the second era of the sys
tem commenced, with the establishment of the Bank of England, to 1797, when
it terminated— from £1,200,000 to nearly £1 1,000,000, and this mainly by the
addition to its capital through loans to the government above the profits of its
annual dividends. Before entering on the third era of the system, I pause to
make a few reflections on the second.

I am struck, in casting my eyes over it, to find that, notwithstanding the great
dissimilarity of features which the system had assumed in passing from a mere
bank of deposite to that of deposite, discount, and circulation, the operation of
the latter was confounded, throughout this long period, as it regards the effects
on the currency, with the bank of deposite. Its notes were universally regard
ed as representing gold and silver, and as depending on that representation ex* •
clusively for their circulation ; as much so as did the certificates of deposite in the
original Bank of Amsterdam. No one supposed that they could retain their
credit for a moment after they ceased to be convertible into the metals on de
mand ; nor were they supposed to have the effect of increasing the aggregate
amount of the currency ; nor, of course, of increasing prices. In a word, they
were in the public mind as completely identified with the metallic currency as if
every note in circulation had laid up in the vaults of the Bank an equal amount,
pound for pound, into which all its paper could be converted the moment it was
presented.

All this was a great delusion. The issues of the Bank never did represent,
from the first, the precious metals. Instead of the representatives, its notes
were, in reality, the substitute for coin. Instead of being the mere drudges,
performing all the out-door service, while the coins reposed at their ease in the
vaults of the banks, free from wear and tear, and the hazard of loss or destruc
tion, as did the certificates of deposite in the original Bank of Amsterdam, they
substituted, degraded, and banished the coins. Every note circulated became
the substitute of so much coin, and dispensed with it in circulation, and thereby
depreciated the value of the precious metals, and increased their consumption
in the same proportion ; while it diminished in the same degree the supply, by

278 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

rendering mining less profitable. The system assumed gold and silver as the
basis of its circulation ; and yet, by the laws of its nature, just as it increased
its circulation, in the same degree the foundation on which the system stood
was weakened. The consumption of the metals increased, and the supply di- ,
minished. As the weight of the superstructure increased, just in the same pro
portion its foundation was undermined and weakened. Thus the germe of de
struction was implanted in the system at its birth ; has expanded with its growth,
and must terminate, finally, in its dissolution, unless, indeed, it should, by some
transition, entirely change its nature, and pass into some other and entirely dif
ferent organic form. The conflict between bank circulation and metallic (though
not perceived in the first stage of the system, when they were supposed to be
indissolubly connected) is mortal ; one or the other must perish in the struggle.
Such is the decree of fate : it is irreversible.

Near the close of the second era, the system passed the Atlantic, and took
root in our country, where it found the soil still more fertile, and the climate
more congenial than even in the parent country. The Bank of North America
was established in 1781, with a capital of $400,000, and bearing all the fea
tures of its prototype, the Bank of England. In the short space of a little more
than half a century, the system has expanded from one bank to about eight hun
dred, including branches (no one knows the exact number, so rapid the increase),
and from a capital of less than half a million to about $300,000,000, without,
apparently, exhausting or diminishing its capacity to increase. So accelerated
has been its growth with us, from causes which I explained on a former occa
sion,* that already it has approached a point much nearer the limits beyond
which the system, in its present form, cannot advance, than in England.

During the year 1797, the Bank of England suspended specie payments : an
event destined, by its consequences, to effect a revolution in public opinion in re
lation to the system, and to accelerate the period which must determine its fate.
England was then engaged in that gigantic struggle which originated in the
French Revolution, and her financial operations were on the most extended scale,
followed by a corresponding increase in the action of the Bank, as her fiscal
agent. It sunk under its over-action. Specie payments were suspended.
Panic and dismay spread through the land — so deep and durable was the im
pression that the credit of the Bank depended exclusively on the punctuality of
its payments.

In the midst of the alarm, an act of Parliament was passed making the notes
of the Bank a legal tender ; and, to the surprise of all, the institution proceeded
on, apparently without any diminution of its credit. Its notes circulated freely
as ever, and without any depreciation, for a time, compared with gold and silver ;
and continued so to do for upward of twenty years, with an average diminution
of about one per cent, per annum. This shock did much to dispel the delusion
that bank-notes represented gold and silver, and that they circulated in conse
quence of such representation, but without entirely obliterating the old impres
sion which had taken such strong hold on the public mind. The credit of its
notes during the suspension was generally attributed to the tender act, and the
great and united resources of the Bank and the government.

But an event followed of the same kind, under circumstances entirely differ
ent, which did more than any preceding to shed light on the true nature of the
system, and to unfold its vast capacity to sustain itself without exterior aid.
"We finally became involved in the mighty struggle that had so long desolated
Europe and enriched our country. War was declared against Great Britain in
1812, and in the short space of one year our feeble banking system sunk un
der the increased fiscal action of government. I was then a member of the
other house, and had taken my full share of responsibility in the measures which

* See Speech on Mr. Webster's motion to renew the charter of the United States Bank in 1834

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 279

liad led to that result. I shall never forget the sensation which the suspension,
and the certain anticipation of the prostration of the currency of the country, as
a consequence, excited in my mind. We could resort to no tender act ; we had
no great central regulating power, like the Bank of England ; and the credit and
resources of the government were comparatively small. Under such circum
stances, I looked forward to a sudden and great depreciation of bank-notes, and
that they would fall speedily as low as the old continental money. Guess my
surprise when I saw them sustain their credit, with scarcely any depreciation,
for a time, from the shock. I distinctly recollect when I first asked myself the
•question, What was the cause ? and which directed my inquiry into the extraordi
nary phenomenon. I soon saw that the system contained within itself a self-sus
taining power ; that there was between the banks and the community, mutually,
the relation of debtor and creditor, there being at all times something more due to
the banks from the community than from the latter to the former. I saw, in this""'
reciprocal relation of debts and credits, that the demand of the banks on the com
munity was greater than the amount of their notes in circulation could meet ; and
that, consequently, so long as their debtors were solvent, and bound to pay at
short periods, their notes could not fail to be at or near a par with gold and sil
ver. I also saw that, as their debtors were principally the merchants, they
would take bank-notes to meet their bank debts, and that that which the mer
chant and the government, who are the great money-dealers, take, the rest of
the comimmity would also take. Seeing all this, I clearly perceived that self-
sustaining principle which poised the system, self-balanced, like some celestial
body, moving with scarcely a perceptible deviation from its path, from the con
cussion it had received.

Shortly after the termination of the war, specie payments were coerced with
us by the establishment of a National Bank, and a few years afterward, in Great
Britain, by an act of Parliament. In both countries the restoration was follow
ed by wide-spread distress, as it always must be when effected by coercion ;
for the simple reason that banks cannot pay unless their debtors first pay, and
that to coerce the banks compels them to coerce their debtors before they have
the means to pay. Their failure must be the consequence ; and this involves
the failure of the banks themselves, carrying with it universal distress. Hence
I am opposed to all kinds of coercion, and am in favour of leaving the disease
to time, with the action of public sentiment and the states, to which the banks
are al'one responsible.

But to proceed with my narrative. Although specie payments were restored,
and -the system apparently placed where it was before the suspension, the great
capacity it proved to possess of sustaining itself without specie payments, was
not forgot by those who had its direction. The impression that it was indispen
sable to the circulation of bank-notes that they should represent the precious
metals, was almost obliterated ; and the latter were regarded rather as restrictions
on the free and profitable operation of the system than as the means of its security.
Hence a feeling of opposition to gold and silver gradually grew up on the part
of the banks, which created an esprit du corps, followed by a moral resistance
to specie payments, if I may so express myself, which in fact suspended, in a
great degree, the conversion of their notes into the precious metals, long before
the present suspension. With the growth of this feeling, banking business as
sumed a bolder character, and its profits were proportionably enlarged, and with
it the tendency of the system to increase kept pace. The effect of this soon
displayed itself in a striking manner, which was followed by very important con
sequences, which I shall next explain.

It so happened that the charters of the Bank of England and the late Bank
of the United States expired about the same time. As the period approached,
a feeling of hostility, growing out of the causes just explained, which had ex
cited a strong desire in the community, who could not participate in the profits

280 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

of these two great monopolies, to throw off their restraint, began to disclose it
self against both institutions. In Great Britain it terminated in breaking down
the exclusive monopoly of the Bank of England, and narrowing greatly the spe
cie basis of the system, by making the notes of the Bank of England a legal
tender in all cases, except between it and its creditors. A sudden and vast in
crease of the system, with a great diminution of the metallic basis in proportion,
to banking transactions, followed, which has shocked and weakened the stabil
ity of the system there. With us the result was different. The Bank fell un
der the hostility of the government. All restraint on the system was removed,
and banks shot up in every direction almost instantly, under the growing im
pulse which I have explained, and which, with the causes I stated when I first
addressed the Senate on this question, is the cause of the present catastrophe.

With it commences the fourth era of the system, which we have just entered
— an era of struggle, and conflict, and changes. The system can advance no
farther in our country, without great and radical changes. It has come to a
stand. The conflict between metallic and bank currency, which I have shown, ^
to be inherent in the system, has, in the course of time, and with the progress
of events, become so deadly that they must separate, and one or the other fall.
The degradation of the value of the metals, and their almost entire expulsion,
from their appropriate sphere as the medium of exchange and the standard of
value, have gone so far, under the necessary operation of the system, that they
are no longer sufficient to form the basis of the widely-extended system of bank
ing. From the first, the gravitation of the system has been in one direction — 7\
to dispense with Ihe use of the metals ; and hence the descent from a bank of de-
posite to one of discount ; and hence, from being the representative, their notes )
have become the substitute for gold and silver ; and hence, finally, its present \
tendency to a mere paper engine, totally separated from the metals. One law<
has steadily governed the system throughout — the enlargement of its profits and
influence ; and, as a consequence, as metallic currency became insufficient for
circulation, it has become, in its progress, insufficient for the basis of banking
operations ; so much so, that, if specie payments were restored, it would be but
nominal, and the system would in a few years, on the first adverse current,
sink down again into its present helpless condition. Nothing can prevent it but
great and radical changes, which would diminish its profits and influence, so as
effectually to arrest that strong and deep current which has carried so much of
the wealth and capital of the community in that direction. Without that, the
system, as now constituted, must fall ; unless, indeed, it can form an alliance
with the government, and through it establish its authority by law, and make its
credit, unconnected with gold and silver, the medium of circulation. If the al
liance should take place, one of the first movements would be the establishment
of a great central institution ; or, if that should prove impracticable, a combina
tion of a few selected and powerful state banks, which, sustained by the govern
ment, would crush or subject the weaker, to be followed by an amendment of
the Constitution, or some other device, to limit their number and the amount of
their capital hereafter. This done, the next step would be to confine and con
solidate the supremacy of the system over the currency of the country, which,
would be in its hands exclusively, and, through it, over the industry, business,
and politics of the country ; all of which would be wielded to advance its prof
its and power.

The system having now arrived at this point, the great and solemn duty de
volves on us to determine this day what relation this government shall hereafter
bear to it. Shall we enter into an alliance with it, and become the sharers of
its fortune and the instrument of its aggrandizement and supremacy ? This is
the momentous question on which we must now decide. Before we decide, it
behooves us to inquire whether the system is favourable to the permanency of
our free Republican institutions, to the industry and business of the country, and^

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 281

above all, to our moral and intellectual development, the great object for which
we were placed here by the Author of our being.

Can it be doubted what must be the effects of a system whose operations have ^
been shown to be so unequal on free institutions, whose foundation rests on an
equality of rights ? Can that favour equality which gives to one portion of the
citizens and the country such decided advantages over the other, as I have shown
it does in my opening remarks 1 Can that be favourable to liberty which cton-
centrates the money power, and places it under the control of a few powerful
and wealthy individuals ? It is the remark of a profound statesman, that the
revenue is the state ; and, of course, those who control the revenue control the
state ; and those who can control the money power can control the revenue,
and through it the state, with the property and industry of the country, in all its
ramifications. Let us pause for a moment, and reflect on the nature and extent
of this tremendous power.

The currency of a country is to the community what the blood is to the hu
man system. It constitutes a small part, but it circulates through every portion,
and is indispensable to all the functions of life. The currency bears even a
smaller proportion to the aggregate capital of the community than what the blood
does to the solids in the human system. What that proportion is, has not been,
and perhaps cannot be, accurately ascertained, as it is probably subject to con
siderable variations. It is, however, probably between twenty-five and thirty-five
to one. I will assume it to be thirty to one. With this assumption, let us sup
pose a community whose aggregate capital is $31,000,000 ; its currency woul<£
be, by supposition, one million, and the residue of its capital thirty millions. This1
being assumed, if the currency be increased or decreased, the other portion of
the capital remaining the same, according to the well-known laws of currency,
property would rise or fall with the increase or decrease ; that is, if the cur
rency be increased to two millions, the aggregate value of property would rise
to sixty millions ; and, if the currency be reduced to $500,000, it would be re
duced to fifteen millions. With this law so well established, place the money
power in the hands of a single individual, or a combination of individuals, and
they, by expanding or contracting the currency, may raise or sink prices at
pleasure ; and by purchasing when at the greatest depression, and selling at
the greatest elevation, may command the whole property and industry of the
community, and control its fiscal operations. The banking system concentrates
and places this power in the hands of those who control it, and its force in
creases just in proportion as it dispenses with a metallic basis. Never was an.
engine invented better calculated to place the destiny of the many in the hands
of the few, or less favourable to that equality and independence which lies at the '
bottom of our free institutions.

These views have a bearing not less decisive on the next inquiry — the effects
of the system on the industry and wealth of the country. Whatever may have
been its effects in this respect in its early stages, it is difficult to imagine any
thing more mischievous on all of the pursuits of life than the frequent and sud
den expansions and contractions, to which it has now become so habitually sub
ject that it may be considered its ordinary condition. None but those in the
secret know what to do. All are pausing and looking out to ascertain whether
an expansion or contraction is next to follow, and what will be its extent and
duration ; and if, perchance, an error be committed — if it expands when a con
traction is expected, or the reverse — the most prudent may lose by the miscalcu
lation the fruits of a life of toil and care. The consequence is, to discourage
industry, and to convert the whole community into stock-jobbers and speculators.
The evil is constantly on the increase, and must continue to increase just as tha
banking system becomes more diseased, till it shall become utterly intolerable.

But its most fatal effects originate in its bearing on the moral and intellectual
development of the community. The great principle of demand and supply gov-

N N

282 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

erns the moral and intellectual world no less than the business and commercial.
If a community be so constituted as to cause a demand for high mental at
tainments, or if its honours arid rewards are allotted to pursuits that require
their development, by creating a demand for' intelligence, knowledge, wisdom,
justice, firmness, courage, patriotism, and the like, they are sure to be produced.
But if, on the contrary, they be allotted to pursuits that require inferior qualities,
the higher are sure to decay and perish. I object to the banking system, be
cause it allots the honours and rewards of the community, in a very undue pro
portion, to a pursuit the least of all favourable to the development of the higher
mental qualities, intellectual or moral, to the decay of the learned professions,
and the more noble pursuits of sciene, literature, philosophy, and statesmanship,
and the great and more useful pursuits of business and industry. With the vast
increase of its profits and influence, it is gradually concentrating in itself most
of the prizes of life — wealth, honour, and influence, to the great disparagement
and degradation of all the liberal, and useful, and generous pursuits of society.
The rising generation cannot but feel its deadening influence. The youths
who crowd our colleges, and behold the road to honour and distinction termina
ting in a banking-house, will feel the spirit of emulation decay within them, and
will no longer be pressed forward by generous ardour to mount up the rugged
steep of science as the road to honour and distinction, when, perhaps, the high
est point they could attain, in what was once the most honourable and influential
of all the learned professions, would be the place of attorney to a bank.

Nearly four years since, on the question of the removal of the deposites,
although I was opposed to the removal, and in favour of their restoration, be
cause I believed it to be illegal, yet, foreseeing what was coming, and not
wishing there should be any mistake as to my opinion on the banking system,
I stated here in my place what that opinion was. I declared that I had long
entertained doubts, if doubts they might be called, which were daily increasing,
that the system made the worst possible distribution of the wealth of the com
munity, and that it would ultimately be found hostile to the farther advancement
of civilization and liberty. This declaration was not lightly made : and I have
now unfolded the grounds on which it rested, and which subsequent events and
reflection have matured into a settled conviction.

With all these consequences before us, shall we restore the broken connex
ion ? Shall we again unite the government with the system ? And what are
the arguments opposed to these high and weighty objections? Instead of meet
ing them and denying their truth, or opposing others of equal weight, a rabble
of objections (I can call them by no better name) are urged against the separa
tion : one currency for the government, and another for the people ; separation
of the people from the government ; taking care of the government, and not the
people ; and a whole fraternity of others of like character. When I first saw
them advanced in the columns of a newspaper, I could not but smile, in thinking
}iow admirably they were suited to an electioneering canvass. They have a
certain plausibility about them, which makes them troublesome to an opponent
simply because they are merely plausible, without containing one particle of
leason. I little expected to meet them in discussion in this place ; but since
they have been gravely introduced here, respect for the place and company ex
acts a passing notice, to which, of themselves, they are not at all entitled.

I begin with that which is first pushed forward, and seems to be most relied
on — one currency for the government and another for the people. Is it meant
that the government must take in payment of its debts whatever the people take
in payment of theirs ? If so, it is a very broad proposition, and would lead to
important consequences. The people now receive the notes of non-specie-
paying banks. Is it meant that the government should also receive them!
They receive in change all sorts of paper, issued by we know not whom.
Mu^t the government also receive them ? They receive the notes of banks

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 283

issuing notes under five, ten, and twenty dollars. Is it intended that the gov
ernment shall also permanently receive them ? They receive bills of exchange.
Shall government, too, receive them ? If not, I ask the reason. Is it because
they are not suitable for a sound, stable, arid uniform currency 1 The reason
is good ; but what becomes of the principle, that the government ought to take
whatever the people take ? But I go farther. It is the duty of government
to receive nothing in its dues that it has not the right to render uniform and
stable in its value. We are, by the Constitution, made the guardian of the
money of the country. For this the right of coining and regulating the value
of coins was given, and we have no right whatever to receive or treat anything
as money, or the equivalent of money, the value of which we have no right to
regulate. If this principle be true, and it cannot be controverted, I ask, What
right has Congress to receive and treat the notes of the state banks as money ?
If the states have the right to incorporate banks, what right has Congress to
regulate them or their issues ? Show me the power in the Constitution. If
the right be admitted, what are its limitations, and how can the right of subject
ing them to a bankrupt law in that case be denied ? If one be admitted, the
other follows as a consequence ; and yet those who are most indignant against
the proposition of subjecting the state banks to a bankrupt law, are the most
clamorous to receive their notes, not seeing that the one power involves the
other. I am equally opposed to both, as unconstitutional and inexpedient. We
are next told, to separate from the banks is to separate from the people. The
banks, then, are the people, and the people the banks — united, identified, and in
separable ; and as the government belongs to the people, it follows, of course,
according to this argument, it belongs also to the banks, and, of course, is bound
to do their biddings. I feel on so grave a subject, and in so grave a body, an
almost invincible repugnance in replying to such arguments ; and I shall hasten
over the only remaining one of the fraternity which I shall condescend to notice
with all possible despatch. They have no right of admission here, and, if I
were disposed to jest on so solemn an occasion. I should say they ought to be
driven from this chamber, under the 47th rule.*H The next of these formidable
objections to the separation from the banks is, that the government, in so doing,
takes care of itself, and not of the people. Why, I had supposed that the gov
ernment belonged to the people ; that it was created by them for their own use,
to promote their interest, and secure their peace and liberty ; that, in taking care
of itself, it takes the most effectual care of the people ; and in refusing all em
barrassing, entangling, and dangerous alliances with corporations of any de
scription, it was but obeying the great law of self-preservation. But enough ; I
cannot any longer waste words on such objections. I intend no disrespect to
those who have urged them ; yet these, and arguments like these, are mainly
Telied on to countervail the many and formidable objections, drawn from the
highest considerations that can influence the action of governments or individu
als, none of which have been refuted, and many not even denied.

The senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster) urged an argument of a very /
different character, but which, in my opinion, he entirely failed to establish. He
asserted that the ground assumed on this side was an entire abandonment of a
great constitutional function conferred by the Constitution on Congress. To
establish this, he laid down the proposition, that £aiigr-ess was bound to take
care of the money of the country. Agreed ; and with this view the Constitu
tion confers on us the -right of coining and regulating the value of coins, in or
der to supply the country with money of proper standard and value ; and is it
an abandonment of this right to take care, as this bill does, that it shall not be
expelled from circulation, as far as the fiscal action of this government extends ?
But having taken this unquestionable position, the senator passed (by what

* It is the rule regulating the admission of persons in the lobby of the Senate.

284 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

means lie did not condescend to explain) from taking care of the money of the-
country to the right of establishing a currency, and then to the right of estab
lishing a bank currency, as I understood him. On both of these points I leave
him in the hands of the senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Buchanan), who, in an
able and constitutional argument, completely demolished, in my judgment, the
position assumed by the senator from Massachusetts. I rejoice to hear such
an argument from such a quarter. The return of the great State of Pennsyl
vania to the doctrines of rigid construction and state rights sheds a ray of light
on the thick darkness which has long surrounded us.

But we are told that there is not gold and silver enough to fill the channels
of circulation, and that prices would fall. Be it so. What is that, compared to
the dangers which menace on the opposite side ? But are we so certain that
there is not a sufficiency of the precious metals for the purpose of circulation ?
Look at France, with her abundant supply, with her channels of circulation full
to overflowing with coins, and her flourishing industry. It is true that our sup
ply is insufficient at present. How could it be otherwise ? The banking sys
tem has degraded and expelled the metals — driven them to foreign lands —
closed the mines, and converted their products into costly vases, and splendid
utensils and ornaments, administering to the pride and luxury of the opulent, in
stead of being employed as the standard of value, and the instrument of making
exchanges, as they were manifestly intended mainly to be by an all-wise Provi
dence. Restore them to their proper functions, and they will return from their
banishment; the mines will again be opened, and the gorgeous splendour of
wealth will again reassume the more humble, but useful, form of coins.

But, Mr. President, I am not driven to such alternatives. I am not the ene
my, but the friend of credit — not as the substitute, but the associate and the as
sistant of the metals. In that capacity, I hold credit to possess, in many re
spects, a vast superiority over the metals themselves. I object to it in the form
which it has assumed in the banking system, for reasons that are neither light
nor few, and that neither have nor can be answered. The question is not*
whether credit can be dispensed with, but what is its best possible form — the
most stable, the least liable to abuse, and the most convenient and cheap. I
threw out some ideas on this important subject in my opening remarks. I have
heard nothing to change my opinion. I believe that government credit, in the
form I suggested, combines all the requisite qualities of a credit circulation in
the highest degree, and also that government ought not to use any other credit
but its own in its financial operations. When the senator from Massachusetts
made his attack on my suggestions, I was disappointed. I expected argument,
and he gave us denunciation. It is often easy to denounce, when it is hard to
refute ; and when that senator gives denunciations instead of arguments, I con
clude that it is because the one is at his command, and the other not.

We are told the form I suggested is but a repetition of the old Continental
money — a ghost that is ever conjured up by all who wish to give the banks an
exclusive monopoly of government credit. The assertion is not true : there is
not the least analogy between them. The one was a promise to pay when
there was no revenue, and the other a promise to receive in the dues of gov
ernment when there is an abundant revenue. ^

We are also told that there is no instance of a government paper that did not
depreciate. In reply, I affirm that there is none, assuming the form I pro
pose, that ever did depreciate. Whenever a paper receivable in the dues of
government had anything like a fair trial, it has succeeded. Instance the case of
North Carolina, referred to in my opening remarks. The draughts of the treas
ury at this moment, with all their encumbrance, are nearly at par with gold
and silver ; and 1 might add the instance alluded to by the distinguished sena
tor from Kentucky, in which he admits that, as soon as the excess of the issues
of the Commonwealth Bank of Kentucky were reduced to the proper point, its

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 285

notes rose to par. The case of Russia might also be mentioned. In 1827, she
had a fixed paper circulation, in the form of bank-notes, but which were incon
vertible, of upward of $120,000,000, estimated in the metallic ruble, and which
had for years remained without fluctuation, having nothing to sustain it but that
it was received in the dues of the government, and that, too, with a revenue of
only about $90,000,000 annually. I speak on the authority of a respectable
traveller. Other instances, no doubt, might be added, but it needs no such
support. How can a paper depreciate which the government is bound to re
ceive in all its payments, and'while those to whom payments are to be made
are under no obligation to receive it ? From its nature, it can only circulate
Avhen at par with gold and silver ; and if it should depreciate, none could be in
jured but the government.

But my colleague objects that it would partake of the increase and decrease
of the revenue, and would be subject to greater expansions and contractions
than bank-notes themselves. He assumes that government would increase the
amount with the increase of the revenue, which is not probable, for the aid of its
credit would be then less needed ; but if it did, what would be the effect ? On
the decrease of the revenue, its bills would be returned to the treasury, from
which, for the want of demand, they could not be reissued ; and the excess,
instead of hanging on the circulation, as in the case of bank-notes, and expo
sing it to catastrophes like the present, would be gradually and silently with
drawn, without shock or injury to any one. It has another and striking advan
tage over bank circulation — in its superior cheapness, as well as greater stabili
ty and safety. Bank paper is cheap to those who make it, but dear, very dear,
to those who use it — fully as much so as gold and silver. It is the little cost
of its manufacture, and the dear rates at which it is furnished to the communi
ty, which give the great profit to those who have a monopoly of the article.
Some idea may be formed of the extent of the profit by the splendid palaces
which we see under the name of banking-houses, and the vast fortunes which
have been accumulated in this branch of business ; all of which must ultimate
ly be derived from the productive powers of the community, and, of course, adds
so much to the cost of production. On the other hand, the credit of govern
ment, while it would greatly facilitate its financial operations, would cost no
thing, or next to nothing, both to it and the people, and, of course, would add
nothing to the cost of production, which would give every branch of our indus
try, agriculture, commerce, and manufactures, as far as its circulation might ex
tend, great advantages, both at home and abroad.

But there remains another and great advantage. In the event of war, it
would open almost unbounded resources to carry it on, without the necessity of
resorting to what I am almost disposed to call a fraud — public loans. I have
already shown that the loans of the Bank of England to the government were
very little more than loaning back to the government its own credit ; and this
is more or less true of all loans, where the banking system prevails. It was
pre-eminently so in our late war. The circulation of the government credit, in
the shape of bills receivable exclusively with gold and silver in its dues, and
the sales of public lands, would dispense with the necessity of loans, by in
creasing its bills with the increase of taxes. The increase of taxes, and, of
course, of revenue and expenditures, would be followed by an increased de
mand for government bills, while the latter would furnish the means of paying
the taxes, without increasing, in the same degree, the pressure oia the commu
nity. This, with a judicious system of funding, at a low rate of interest, would
go far to exempt the government from the necessity of contracting public loans
in the event of war.

I am not, Mr. President, ignorant, in making these suggestions (I wish them
to be considered only in that light), to what violent opposition every measure of
the kind must be exposed. Banks have been so long in the possession of gov-

286 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

eminent credit, that they very naturally conclude they have an exclusive right
to it, and consider the withdrawal of it, even for the use of the government it
self, as a positive injury. It was my fortune to take a stand on the side of the

government against the banks during the most trying period of the late war

the winter of 1814 and 1815 — and never in my life was I exposed to more cal
umny and abuse — no, not e^en on this occasion. It was my first lesson on the
subject. I shall never forget it. I propose to give a very brief narrative of the
scenes through which I then passed ; not with any feeling of egotism, for I
trust I am incapable of that, but to illustrate the truth of much I have said, and
to snatch from oblivion not an unimportant portion of our financial history. I ;
see the senators from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster) and of Alabama (Mr.
King), who were then members of the House of Representatives, in their places,
and they can vouch for the correctness of my narrative, as far as the memory
of transactions so long passed will serve.

The finances of the country had, at that time, fallen into great confusion.
Mr. Campbell had retired from the head of the treasury, and the late Mr. Dal
las had succeeded — a man of talents, bold and decisive, but inexperienced in
the affairs of the department. His first measure to restore order, and to furnish
the supplies to carry on the war, was to recommend a bank of $50,000,000, to
be constituted almost exclusively of the new stocks which had been issued du
ring the war, to the exclusion of the old, which had been issued before. The
proposed bank was authorized to make loans to the government, and was not
bound to pay specie during the war, and for three years after its termination.

It so happened that I did not arrive here till some time after the commence
ment of the session, having been detained by an attack of bilious fever. I
had taken a prominent part in the declaration of the war, and had every
motive and disposition to sustain the administration, and to vote every aid
to carry on the war. Immediately after my arrival, I had a full conversation
with Mr. Dallas, at his request. I entertained very kind feelings towards
him, and assured him, after he had explained his plan, that I would give it
my early and favourable attention. At that time I had reflected but little on
the subject of banking. Many of my political friends expressed a desire that I
should take a prominent part in favour of the proposed bank. Their extreme
anxiety aroused my attention, and, being on no committee (they had been ap
pointed before my arrival), I took up the subject for a full investigation, with
every disposition to give it my support. I had -not proceeded far before I was
struck with the extraordinary character of the project : a bank of $50,000,000,
whose capital was to. consist almost exclusively of government credit in the
shape of stock, and not bound tQ pay its debts during the war, and for three
years afterward, to furnish the government with loans to carry on the war ! I
saw at once that the effect of the arrangement would be, that government would
borrow back its own credit, and pay six per cent, per annum for what they had
already paid eight or nine. It was impossible for me to give it my support
under any pressure, however great. I felt the difficulty of my situation, not
only in opposing the leading measure of the administration at such a crisis, but,
what was far more responsible, to suggest one of my own, that would afford
relief to the embarrassed treasury. I cast my eyes around, and soon saw that -\
the government should use its own credit directly, without the intervention of a /
bank ; which I proposed to do in the form of treasury notes, to be issued in the >
operations ofrthe government, and to be funded in the subscription to the stock '
of the bank. Treasury notes were, at that time, below par, even with bank -
paper. The opposition to them was so great on the part of the banks, that they
refused to receive them on deposite, or payment, at par with their notes ; while
the government, on its part, received and paid away notes of the banks at par
with its own. Such was the influence of the banks, and to such degradation
did the government, in its weakness, submit. All this influence I had to en-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 287

counter, with the entire weight of the administration thrown into the same scale.
I hesitated not. I saw the path of duty clearly; and determined to tread it, as
sharp and rugged as it was. When the bill came up, I moved my amendment,
the main features of which were, that, instead of government stock already is
sued, the capital of the bank should consist of funded treasury notes ; and that,
instead of a mere paper machine, it should be a specie-paying bank, so as to be
an ally instead of an opponent, in restoring the currency to a sound condition
on the return of peace. These were, with me, indispensable conditions. I
accompanied my amendment with a short speech of fifteen or twenty minutes,
and so overpowering was the force of truth, that, notwithstanding the influence
of the administration, backed by the money power, and the Committee of Ways
and Means, which was unanimous, with one exception, as I understood, my
amendment prevailed by a large majority ; but it, in turn, failed — the opposition,
the adherents of the administration, and those who had constitutional scruples,
combining against it. Then followed various, but unsuccessful, attempts to
charter a bank. One was vetoed by the President, and another was lost by the
casting vote of the speaker (Mr. Cheves). After a large portion of the session
was thus unsuccessfully consumed, a caucus was called, in order to agree on
some plan, to which I, and the few friends who still adhered to me after such
hard service, were especially invited. We, of course, attended. The plan of
compromise was unfolded, which approached much nearer to our views, but
which was still objectionable in some features. I objected, and required far
ther concessions, which were refused, and was told the bill could be pass
ed without us ; at which I took up my hat and bade good-night. The bill was
introduced in the Senate, and speedily passed that body. On the second read
ing, 1 rose and made a few remarks, in which I entreated the house to remem
ber that they were about to vote for the measure against their conviction, as
had been frequently expressed ; and that, in so doing, they acted under a suppo
sed necessity, which had been created by those who expected to profit by the
measure. I then reminded them of the danger of acting under such pressure ;
and I said that they were so sensible of the truth of what I uttered, that, if peace
should arrive before the passage of the bill, it would not receive the support of
fifteen members. 1 concluded by saying that I would reserve what I intended
to say on the question of the passage of the bill, when I would express my
opinion at length, and appeal to the country. My objections, as yet, had not
gone to the people, as nothing that I had said had been reported — such was my
solicitude to defeat the bill without extending our divisions beyond the walls of
the house, in the then critical condition of the country. My object was to ar
rest the measure, and not to weaken confidence in the administration.

In making the supposition, I had not the slightest anticipation of peace,
England had been making extensive preparations for the ensuing campaign,
and had made a vigorous attack on New-Orleans, but had just been repelled ;
but, by a most remarkable coincidence, an opportunity (as strange as it may
seem) was afforded to test the truth of what I said. Late in the evening of the
day I met Mr. Sturges, then a member of Congress from Connecticut. He said
that he had some information which he could not withhold from me : that a
treaty of peace had been made ; and that it had actually arrived in New- York,
and would be here the next day, so that I would have an opportunity of test
ing the truth of my prediction. He added, that his brother, who had a mercan
tile house in New-York, had forwarded the information to him by express, and
that he had forwarded the information to connected houses in Southern cities,,
with direction to purchase the great staples in that quarter, and that, he wished
me to consider the information as confidential. I thanked him for the intelli
gence, and promised to keep it to myself. The rumour, however, got out, and
the next day an attempt was made to pass through the bill ; but the house was
unwilling to act till it could ascertain whether a treaty had been made. It ar-

288 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

lived in the course of the day, when, on my motion, it was laid on the table ;
and I had the gratification of receiving the thanks of many for defeating the bill,
who, a short time before, were almost ready to cut my throat for my perseve
ring opposition to the measure. An offer was then made to me to come to my
terms, which I refused, declaring that I would rise in my demand, and would
agree to no bill which should not be formed expressly with the view to the
speedy restoration of specie payments. It was afterward postponed, on the
conviction that it could not be so modified as to make it acceptable to a major
ity. This was my first lessons on banks. It has made a durable impression
on my mind.

My colleague, in the course of his remarks, said he regarded this measure
as a secret war waged against the banks. I am sure he could not intend to at
tribute such motives to me. I wage no war, secret or open, against the exist
ing institutions. They have been created by the legislation of the states, and
are alone responsible to the states. I hold them not answerable for the present
state of things, which has been brought about under the silent operation of time,
without attracting notice or disclosing its danger. Whatever legal or constitu
tional rights they possess under their charters ought to be respected ; and, if
attacked, I would defend them as resolutely as I now oppose the system.
Against that I wage, not secret, but open and uncompromising hostilities, origi
nating not in opinions recently or hastily formed. I have long seen the true
character of the system, its tendency and destiny, and have looked forward for
many years, as many of my friends know, to the crisis in the midst of which
we now are. My ardent wish has been to effect a gradual change in the bank
ing system, by which the crisis might be passed without a shock, if possible ;
but I have been resolved for many years, that should it arrive in my time, I
would discharge my duty, however great the difficulty and danger. I have thus
far faithfully performed it, according to the best of my abilities, and, with the
blessing of God, shall persist, regardless of every obstacle, with equal fidelity,
to the end. >

He who does not see that the credit system is on the eve of a great revolu
tion, has formed a very imperfect conception of the past and anticipation of the
future. What changes it is destined to undergo, and what new form it will ulti
mately assume, are concealed in the womb of time, and not given us to foresee.
But we may perceive in the present many of the elements of the existing sys
tem which must be expelled, and others which must enter it in its renewed form.
In looking at the elements at work, I hold it certain, that in the process there
will be a total and final separation of the credit of government and that of indi
viduals, which have been so long blended. The good of society, and the in
terests of both, imperiously demand it, and the growing intelligence of the age
will enforce it. It is unfair, unjust, unequal, contrary to the spirit of free insti
tutions, and corrupting in its consequences. How far the credit of govern
ment may be used in a separate form, with safety and convenience, remains to
be seen. To the extent of its fiscal action, limited strictly to the function of
the collection and disbursement of its revenue, and in the form I have suggested,
I am of the impression it may be both safely and conveniently used, and with
great incidental advantages to the whole community. Beyond that limit I see
no safety, and much danger.

What form individual credit will assume after the separation, is still more un
certain, but I see clearly that the existing fetters that restrain it will be thrown
off. The credit of an individual is his property, and belongs to him as much
.as his land and houses, to use it as he pleases, with the single restriction,
which is imposed on all our rights, that it is not to be used so as to injure
others. What limitations this restriction may prescribe, time and experience
will show ; .but, whatever they may be, they ought to assume the character of
general laws, obligatory on all alike, and open to' all ; and under the provisions

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 289

of which all may be at liberty to use their credit, jointly or separately, as freely
as they now use their land and houses, without any preference by special acts,
in any form or shape, to one over another. Everything like monopoly must ul
timately disappear before the process which has begun will finally terminate.

I see, not less clearly, that, in the process, a separation will take place be
tween the use of capital and the use of credit. They are wholly different, and,
under the growing intelligence of the times, cannot much longer remain con
founded in their present state of combination. They are as distinct as a loan
and an endorsement ; in fact, the one is but giving to another the use of our
capital, and the other the use of our credit ; and yet, so dissimilar are they, that
we daily see the most prudent individuals lending their credit for nothing, in
the form of endorsement or security, who would not loan the most inconsider
able sum without interest. But as dissimilar as they are, they are completely
confounded in banking operations, which is one of the main sources of the
profit, and the consequent dangerous flow of capital in that direction. A bank
idiscount, instead of a loan, is very little more, as I have shown, than a mere
exchange of credit — an exchange of the joint credit of the drawer and endorser
of the note discounted for the credit of the bank in the shape of its own note.
In the exchange, the bank ensures the parties to the note discounted, and the
community, which is the loser if the bank fails; virtually ensures the bank,- and
yet, by confounding this exchange of credit with the use of capital, the bank is
permitted to charge an interest for this exchange, rather greater than an indi
vidual is permitted to charge for a loan, to the great gain of *he bank and loss
to the community. I say loss, for the community can nev^f enjoy the great and
full benefit of the credit system, till loans and credit are considered as entirely
distinct in their nature, and the compensation for the use of each be adjusted to
their respective nature and character. Nothing would give a greater impulse
to all the business of society. The superior cheapness of credit would add in
calculably to the productive powers of the community, when the immense gains
which are now made by confounding them shall come in aid of production. •
Whatever other changes the credit system is destined to undergo, these are
certainly some which it must ; but ^hen, and how the revolution will end —
whether it is destined to be sudden and convulsive, or gradual and free from
shock, time alone can disclose. Much will depend on the decision of the present
question, and the course which the advocates of the system will pursue. If the
separation takes place, and is acquiesced in by those interested in the system,
the prospect will be, that it will gradually and quietly run down, without shock
or convulsions, which i^ my sincere prayer ; but if not — if the reverse shall be
insisted on, and, above all, if it should be effected through a great political
struggle (it can onlv so be effected), the revolution would be violent and convul
sive. A great arki thorough change must take place. It is wholly unavoida
ble. The public attention begins to be roused throughout the civilized world
to this all-absorbing subject. There is nothing left to be controlled but the
mode and manner, and it is better for all that it should be gradual and quiet than
the reverse. All the rest is destiny.

I have now, Mr. President, said what I intended, without reserve or disguise.
In taking the stand I have, I change no relation, personal or political, nor alter
any opinion I have heretofore expressed or entertained. I desire nothing from the
government or the people. My only ambition is to do my duty, and shall follow
wherever that may lead, regardless alike of attachments or antipathies, personal
or political. I know full well the responsibility I have assumed. I see clearly
the magnitude and the hazard of the crisis, and the danger of confiding the
execution of measures in which I take so deep a responsibility, to those in
whom I have no reason to have any special confidence. But all this deters me
not, when I believe that the permanent interest of the country is involved. My
course is fixed. I go forward. If the administration recommend what I ap-

Oo

290 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

prove on this great question, I will cheerfully give my support ; if not, I shall
oppose ; but, in opposing, I shall feel bound to suggest what I believe to be the
proper measure, and which I shall be ready to back, be the responsibility what
it may, looking only to the country, and not stopping to estimate whether the
benefit shall inure either to the administration or the opposition.

XX.

SPEECH ON THE SUB-TREASURY BILL, FEBRUARY 15, 1838.

I REGARD this measure, which has been so much denounced, as very little
more than an attempt to carry out the provisions of the joint resolution of 1816,
and the deposite act of 1836. The former provides that no notes but those of
specie-paying banks shall be received in the dues of the government, and the
latter that such banks only shall be the depositories of the public revenues and
fiscal agents of the government ; but it omitted to make provisions for the con
tingency of a general suspension of specie payments, such as is the present.
It followed, accordingly, on the suspension in May last, which totally separated
the government and the banks, that the revenue was thrown in the hands of
the executive, where it has since remained under its exclusive control, without
any legal provision for its safe-keeping. The object of this bill is to supply
this omission ; to lake the public money out of the hands of the executive and
place it under the custody of the laws, and to prevent the renewal of a connex
ion which has proved so unfortunate to. both the government and the banks.
But it is this measure, originating in an exigency caused by our own acts, and
that seeks to make the most of a change effected by operation of law, instead
of attempting to innovate, or to make another experiment, as has been errone
ously represented, which has been denounced under the name of the sub-treas
ury with such unexampled bitterness.

In lieu of this bill, an amendment has been offered, as a substitute, by the
senator from Virginia farthest from the chuir (Mr. Rives), which, he informs
us, is the first choice of himself and those who agree with him, and the second
choice of those with whom he is allied on this question. If I may judge from
appearances, which can hardly deceive, he might have said their first choice
under existing circumstances ; and have added, that, despairing of a National
Bank, the object of their preference, they have adopted his substitute, as the
only practical alternative at present. We have, then, the question thus nar
rowed down to this bill and the proposed substitute : it ic agreed on all sides,
that one or the other must be selected, and that to adopt or reject the one is to
reject or adopt the other. The single question, then, is, Which shall we choose 1
A deeply momentous question, which we are now called on to decide in behalf
of the states of this Union ; and on our decision their future destmy must in a
great degree depend, so long as their Union endures.

In comparing the relative merits of the two measures, preparatory to a decis
ion, I shall touch very briefly on the principles and details of the bill. The
former is well understood by the Senate and the country at large, and the latter
has been so ably and lucidly explained by the chairman of the committee in his
opening speech, as to supersede the necessity of farther remarks on them at
this stage of the discussion. I propose, then, to limit myself to a mere general
summary, accompanied by a few brief observations.

The object of the bill, as I have already stated, is to take the public funds out
of the hands of the executive, where they have been thrown by operation of our
acts, and to place them under the custody of law ; and to provide for a gradual
and slow, but a perpetual separation between the government and the banks.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 291

It proposes to extend the process of separating to the year 1845, receiving da
ring the first year of the series the notes of such banks as may pay specie, and
reducing thereafter the amount receivable in notes one sixth annually, till the
separation shall be finally consummated at the period mentioned.

The provisions of the bill are the most simple and effectual that an able com
mittee could devise. Four principal receivers, a few clerks, and a sufficient
number of agents to examine the state of the public funds, in order to see that
ail is" right, at an annual charge not exceeding forty or fifty thousand dollars at
most, constitute the additional officers and expenditures required to perform all
the functions heretofore discharged by the banks, as depositories of the public
money and fiscal agents of the treasury. This simple apparatus will place the
public treasury on an independent footing, and give to the government, at all
times, a certain command of its funds to meet its engagements, and preserve its
honour and faith inviolate. If it be desirable to separate from the banks, the
government must have some independent agency of its own to keep and dis
burse the public revenue ; and if it must have such an agency, none, in my
opinion, can be devised more simple, more economical, more effectual and safe
than that provided by this bill. It is the necessary result of the separation, and
to reject it, without proposing a better (if, indeed, a better can be), is to reject
the separation itself.

I turn, now, to the substitute. Its object is directly the reverse of that of the
bill. It proposes to revive the league of state banks, and to renew our connex
ion with them, and which all acknowledge has contributed so much to corrupt,
the community, and to create a spirit for speculation heretofore unexampled in
our history.

The senator, in offering it, whether wisely or not, has at least acted consistent
ly. He was its advocate at first in 1834, when the alternative was between it and
the recharter of the late Bank of the United States. He then defended it zealous
ly and manfully against the fierce assaults of his present allies, as he now defends
it, when those who then sustained him have abandoned the measure. Whether
wisely or not, there is something heroic in his adherence, and I commend him for .
it ; but I fear I cannot say as much for his wisdom arid discretion. He acknowl
edged, with all others, the disasters that have followed the first experiment,
but attributes the failure to inauspicious? circumstances, and insists that the
measure has not had a fair trial. I grant that a second experiment may suc
ceed after the first has failed ; but the senator must concede, in return, that
every failure must necessarily weaken confidence, both in the experiment and
the experimenter. He cannot be more confident in making this second trial
than he was in the first ; and, if I doubted the success then, and preferred the
sub-treasury to his league of banks, he must excuse me for still adhering to my
opinion, and doubting the success of his second trial. Nor ought he to be sur
prised that those who joined him in the first should be rather shy of trying
the experiment again, after having been blown into the air, and burned and scald
ed by the explosion. But, i( the senator has been unfortunate in failing to se
cure the co-operation of those who aided him in the first trial, he has been com
pensated by securing the support of those who were then opposed to him.
They are now his zealous supporters. In contrasting their course then and
now, I intend nothing personal. I make no charge of inconsistency, nor do I
intend to imply it. My object is truth, and not to wound the feelings of any
one or any party. I know that to make out a charge of inconsistency, not only
the question, but all the material circumstances must be the same. A change
in either may make a change of vote necessary ; and, with a material variation
in circumstances, we are often compelled to vary our course, in order to pre
serve our principles. In this case, I conceive that circumstances, as far as the
present allies of the , senator are concerned, have materially changed. Then
the option was between a recharter of the late Bank and a league of state banks

292 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

but now the former is out of the question, and the option is between such a
league and a total separation from the banks. This being the alternative, they
may well take that which they rejected in 1834, without subjecting themselves
to the charge of inconsistency, or justly exposing themselves to the imputation,
of change of principle or opinion. I acquit them, then, of all such charges.
They, doubtless, think now as they formerly did of the measure which they
denounced and rejected, but which a change of circumstances now compels them
to support. But in thus acquitting them of the charge of inconsistency, they
must excuse me if I should avail myself of the fact, that their opinion remains un
changed, as an argument in favour of the bill, against the substitute. The choice
is between them. They are in the opposite scales. To take from the one is,
in effect, to add to the other ; and any objection against the one is an argument
equally strong in favour of the other. I, then, do avail myself of their many pow
erful objections in 1834 against the measure, which this substitute proposes now
to revive. I call to my aid and press into my service every denunciation they
then uttered, and every argument they then so successfully urged against it.
They— no, we (for I was then, as now, irreconcilably opposed to the measure)
charged against it, and proved what we charged, that it placed the purse and
the sword in the same hands ; that it would be the source of boundless patron
age and corruption, and fatal, in its consequences, to the currency of the coun
try ; and I now avail myself of these, and all other objections then urged by us,
in as full force against this substitute, as if you were again to rise in your pla
ces and repeat them now ; and, of course, as so many arguments, in effect, in
favour of the bill ; and on their strength I claim your vote in its favour, unless,
indeed, still stronger objections can be urged against it. I say stronger, be
cause time has proved the truth of all that was then said against the measure
now proposed to be revived by this substitute. What was then prediction is
now fact. But whatever objections have been, or may be urged against the
bill, however strong they may appear in argument, remain yet to be tested by
the unerring test of time and experience. Whether they shall ever be realized,
must be admitted, even by those who may have the greatest confidence in them,
to be at least uncertain ; and it is the part of wisdom and prudence, where ob
jections are equally strong against two measures, to prefer that which is yet un
tried to that which has been tried and failed. Against this conclusion there
is but one escape.

It may be said that we are sometimes compelled, in the midst of the many
extraordinary circumstances in which we may be placed, to prefer that which is
of itself the more objectionable to that which is less so ; because the former may
more probably lead, in the end, to some desired result than the latter. To ap
ply the principle to this case. It may be said that the substitute, though of
itself objectionable, is to be preferred, because it would more probably lead to
the establishment of a National Bank than the bill, which you believe to be the
only certain remedy for all the disorders that affect the currency. I admit the
position to be sound in principle, but It is one exceedingly bold and full of dan
ger in practice, and ought never to be acted on but in extreme cases, and
where there is a rational prospect of accomplishing the object ultimately aimed
at. The application in this case, I must think, would be rashness itself. It
may be safely assumed, that the success of either, whichever may be adopted,
the bill or the substitute, would be fatal to the establishment of a National Bank.
It can never put down a successful measure to take its place ; and, of course,
that which is most likely to fail, and replunge the country into all the disasters
of a disordered currency, is that which would most probably lead to the restora
tion of a National Bank ; and to prefer the substitute on that account is, in fact,
to prefer it because it is the worst of the two. But are you certain that another
explosion would be followed by a bank ? We have already had two ; and it is
far more probable that the third would impress, universally and indelibly, on the

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 293

public mind, that there was something radically and incurably wrong in the sys
tem which would blow up the whole concern, National Bank and all.

If I may be permitted to express an opinion, I would say you havs pursued
a course on this subject unfortunate both for yourselves arid country. You are
opposed both to the league of banks and the sub-treasury. You prefer a Na
tional Bank, and regard it as the only safe and certain regulator of the currency,
but consider it, for the present, out of the question, and are therefore compelled
to choose between the other two. By supporting the substitute, you will be
held responsible for all the mischief and disasters that may follow the revival of
the pet-bank system, as it has been called, with the almost certain defeat of
your first and cherished choice ; and those you oppose will reap all the benefits
of the power, patronage, and influence which it may place in their hands, with
out incurring any portion of the responsibility. But that is not all. The suc
cess of the substitute would be the defeat of the bill, which would, in like man
ner, place on you the responsibility of its defeaj;, and give those you oppose all
the advantage of having supported it, without any of the responsibility that would
have belonged to it had it been adopted. Had a different course been taken,
• — had you joined in aiding to extend the custody of the laws over the public
revenue in the hands of the executive, where your own acts have placed it,
and for which you, of course, are responsible, throwing, at the same time, on
those to whom you attribute the present disordered state of the currency, the
burden of the responsibility — you would have stood ready to profit by events.
If the sub-treasury, contrary to your anticipation, succeeded, as patriots, you
would have cause to rejoice in the unexpected good. If it failed, you would
have the credit of having anticipated the result, and might then, after a double
triumph of sagacity and foresight, have brought forward your favourite measure,
with a fair prospect of success, when every other had failed. By not taking
this course, you have lost the only prospect of establishing a National Bank.

Nor has your course, in my opinion, been fortunate for the country. Had it
been different, the currency question would have been decided at the called
session; and had it been decided then, the country would this day have been
in a much better condition : at least the manufacturing and commercial section
to the North, where the derangement of the currency is felt the most severely.
The South is comparatively in an easy condition.

Such are the difficulties that stand in the way of the substitute at the very
threshold. Those beyond are vastly greater, as I shall now proceed to show.
Its object, as I have stated, is to revive the league of state banks ; and the first
question presented for consideration is, How is this to be done — how is the
league to be formed ? how stimulated into life when formed ? and what, after it
has been revived, would be the true character of the league or combination ?
To answer these questions we must turn to its provisions.

It provides that the Secretary of the Treasury shall select twenty-five specie-
paying banks as the fiscal agents of the government, all to be respectable and
substantial, and that the selection shall be confirmed by the joint vote of the two
houses. It also provides that the shall be made the depositories of the public
money, and that their notes shall be receivable in the dues of the government ;
and that, in turn, for these advantages, they shall stipulate to perform certain
duties, and comply with various conditions, the object of which is to give the
Secretary of the Treasury full knowledge of their condition and business, with
the view to supervise and control their acts, as far as the interest of the govern
ment is concerned. In addition to these, it contains other and important pro
visions, which I shall not enumerate, because they do not fall within the scope
of the objections that I propose to urge against the measure.

Now, I ask, What does all this amount to ? What but a proposal, on the part
of the government, to enter into a contract or bargain with certain selected state
banks, on the terms and conditions contained ? Have we the right to make such

294 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

a bargain ? is the first question ; and to that I give a decided negative, which I
hope to place on constitutional grounds that cannot be shaken. I intend to dis
cuss it, with other questions growing out of the connexion of the government
with the banks, as a new question, for the first time presented for consideration
and decision. Strange as it may seem, the questions growing out of it, as long
as it has existed, have never yet been presented nor investigated in reference
to their constitutionality. How this has happened, I shall now proceed to ex
plain, preparatory to the examination of the question which I have proposed.

The union of the government and the banks was never legally solemnized.
It originated shortly after the government went into operation, not in any legal
enactment, but in a short order of the treasury department of not much more
than half a dozen of lines, as if it were a mere matter of course. We thus
glided imperceptibly into a connexion, which was never recognised by law till
1816 (if my memory serves), but which has produced more important after-
consequences, and has had a greater control over the destiny of this country,
than any one of the mighty questions which have so often and deeply agitated
the country. To it may be traced, as their seminal principle, the vast and ex
traordinary expansion of our banking system, our excessive import duties, un
constitutional and profuse disbursements, the protective tariff, and its associated
system for spending what it threw into the treasury, followed in time by a vast
surplus, which the utmost extravagance of the government could not dissipate,
and, finally, by a sort of retributive justice, the explosion of the entire banking
system, and the present prostrated condition of the currency, now the subject
of our deliberation.

How a measure fraught with such important consequences should at first,
and for so long a time, escape the attention and the investigation of the public,
deserves a passing notice. It is to be explained by the false conception of the
entire subject of banking which, at that early period, universally prevailed in
the community. So erroneous was it, that a bank-note was then identified in
the mind of the public with gold and silver, and a deposite in bank was regarded
as under the most safe and sacred custody that could be devised. The origi
nal impression, derived from the Bank of Amsterdam, where every note or cer
tificate in circulation was honestly represented by an equal and specific quantity
sof gold or silver in bank, and where every deposite was kept as a sacred trust, to
be safely returned to the depositor when demanded, was extended to banks of
discount, down to the time of the formation of our government, with but slight
modifications. With this impression, it is not at all extraordinary that the de
posite of the revenue in banks for safe keeping, and the receipt of their notes
in the public dues, should be considered a matter of course, requiring no higher
authority than a treasury order ; and hence a connexion, with all the important
questions belonging to it, and now considered of vast magnitude, received so
little notice till public attention was directed to it by its recent rupture. This
total separation from the system in which we now find ourselves placed for the
first time, authorizes and demands that we shall investigate freely and fully, not
only the consequences of the connexion, but all the questions growing out of it,
more especially those of a constitutional character ; and I shall, in obedience
to this demand, return to the question from which this digression has carried me.

Have we, then, the right to make the bargain proposed ? Have we the
right to bestow the high privileges, I might say prerogatives, on them of
being made the depositories of the public revenue, and of having their notes
received and treated as gold and silver in the dues of the government, and
in all its fiscal transactions 1 Have we the right to do all this in order to
bestow confidence in the banks, with the view to enable them to resume
specie payments ? What is the state of the case ? The banks are deeply in
debted to the country, and are unable to pay ; and we are asked to give them
these advantages in order to enable them to pay their debts. Can we grant the

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 295

boon ? In answering this important question, I begin with the fact that our
government is one of limited powers. It can exercise no right but what is
specifically granted, nor pass any law but what is necessary and proper to carry
such power into effect. This small pamphlet (holding it up) contains the Con
stitution. Its grants of power are few and plain, and I ask gentlemen to turn
to it and point out the power that authorizes us to do what is proposed to be
done, or to show that the passage of this substitute is necessary to carry any
of the granted powers into effect. If neither can be shown, what is proposed
cannot be constitutionally done ; and till it is specifically pointed out, I am war
ranted in believing that, it cannot be shown.

Our reason is often confounded by a mere name. An act, in the minds of
many, may become of doubtful constitutional authority when applied to a bank,
which none would for a moment hesitate to pronounce grossly unconstitutional
when applied to, an individual. To free ourselves from this illusion, I ask.
Could this government constitutionally bestow on individuals, or a private asso
ciation, the advantages proposed to be bestowed on the selected banks, in order
to enable them to pay their debts ? Is there one who hears me, who would
venture to say yes, even in the case of the most extensive merchant or mercan
tile concern, such as some of those in New- York or New-Orleans, at the late
suspension, whose embarrassments involved entire sections in distress ? But,
if not, on what principle can a discrimination be made in favour of the banks ?
They are local institutions, created by the states for local purposes, composed,
like private associations, of individual citizens, on whom the acts of the state
cannot confer a particle of constitutional right under this Constitution that does
not belong to the humblest citizen. So far from it, if there be a distinction, it
is against the banks. They are removed farther from the control of this gov
ernment than trie individual citizens, who, by the Constitution, are expressly-
subject to the direct action of this government in many instances, while the
state banks, as constituting a portion of the domestic institutions of the states,
and resting on their reserved rights, are entirely beyond our control ; so much
so as not to be the subject of a bankrupt law, although the authority to pass
one is expressly granted by the Constitution.

On what possible ground, then, can the right in question be placed, unless,
indeed, on the broad principle that these local institutions, intended for state
purposes, have been so extended, and have so connected themselves with the
general circulation and business of the country, as to affect the interest of the
whole community, so as to make it the right and duty of Congress to regulate
them ; or, in short, on the broad principle of the general welfare ? There is
none other that I can perceive ; but this would be to adopt the old and exploded
principle, at all times dangerous, but pre-eminently so at this time, when such
loose and dangerous conceptions of the Constitution are abroad in the land. If
the argument is good in one case, it is good in all similar cases. If this gov
ernment may interfere with any one of the domestic institutions of the states, on
the ground of promoting the general welfare, it may with others. If it may be
stow privileges to control them, it may also appropriate money for the same
purpose ; and thus a door might be opened to an interference with state in
stitutions, of which we of a certain section ought at this time to be not a little
jealous.

The argument might be pushed much farther. We not only offer to confer
great and important privileges on the banks to be selected, but, in turn, ask them
to stipulate to comply with certain conditions, the object of which is to bring
them under the supervision and control of this government. It might be asked,
Where is the right to purchase or assume such supervision gr control ? It
might be repeated, that they are state institutions, incorporated solely for state
purposes, and to be entirely under state control, and that all supervision on our
part is in violation of the rights of the states. It might be argued that such su-

296 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALIIOUN.

pervision or control is calculated to weaken the control of the states over their
own institutions, and to render them less subservient to their peculiar and local
interests, for the promotion of which they were established, and too subservient
to other, and, perhaps, conflicting interests, which might feel but little sympathy
with those of the states. But I forbear. Other, and not less urgent objections
claim my attention. To dilate too much on one would necessarily sacrifice the
claim of others.

I next object that, whatever may be the right to enter into the proposed bar
gain, the mode in which it is proposed to make it is clearly unconstitutional, if
I rightly comprehend it. I am not certain that I do ; but, if I understand it right
ly, the plan is, for the Secretary of the Treasury to select twenty-five state banks,
as described in the substitute, which are to be submitted to the two houses, to
be confirmed or rejected by their joint resolutions, without the approval of the
President ; in the same mode as they would appoint a chaplain, or establish a
joint rule for the government of their proceedings.

In acting on the joint resolution, if what I suppose be intended, each house
would have the right, of course, to strike from it the name of any bank and in
sert another, which, would, in fact, vest in the two houses the uncontrollable
right of making the selection. Now if this be the mode proposed, as I infer
from the silence of the mover, it is a plain and palpable violation of the Consti
tution. The obvious intention is to evade the veto power of the executive,
which cannot be without an infraction of an express provision of the Constitu
tion, drawn up with the utmost care, and intended to prevent the possibility of
evasion. It is contained in the 1st article, 7th section, and the last clause,
which I ask the secretary to read :

[" Every order, resolution, or vote, to which the concurrence of the Senate
and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of adjourn
ment), shall be presented to the President of the United States ; and before the
same shall take effect, shall be approved by him, or, being disapproved by him,
shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives,
according to the rules and limitations prescribed in the case of a bill."]

Nothing can be more explicit or full. It is no more possible to evade the
executive veto, on any joint vote, than on the passage of a bill. The veto was
vested in him not only to protect his own powers, but as an additional guard to
the Constitution. I am not the advocate of executive power, which I have
been often compelled to resist of late, when extended beyond its proper limits,
as I shall ever be prepared to do when it is. Nor am I the advocate of legis
lative or judicial. I stand ready to protect all, within the sphere assigned by
the Constitution, and to resist them beyond. To this explicit and comprehen
sive provision of the Constitution, in protection of the veto, there is but a single
exception, resulting, by necessary implication, from another portion of the in
strument, not less explicit, which authorizes each house to establish the rules
of its proceedings. Under this provision the two houses have full and uncon
trollable authority within the limits of their respective walls, and over those sub
ject to their authority, in their official character. To that extent they may pass
joint votes and resolutions, without the approval of the executive ; but beyond
that, without it they are powerless.

There are in this case special reasons why his approval should not be eva
ded. The President is at the head of the administrative department of the gov
ernment, and is especially responsible for its good management. In order to
hold him responsible,' he ought to have due power in the selection of its agents,
and proper control over their conduct. These banks would be by far the most
powerful and influential of all the agents of the government, and ought not to be
selected without the concurrence of the executive. If this substitute should be
adopted, and the provision in question be regarded such as I consider it, there
3an be no doubt what must be the fate of the measure. The executive will be

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 297

bound to protect, by the intervention of its constitutional right, the portion of
power clearly allotted to that department by that instrument, which would make
it impossible for it to become a law with the existing division in the two
houses.

I have not yet exhausted my constitutional objections. I rise to higher and to
broader, applying directly to the very essence of this substitute. I deny your right
to make a general deposite of the public revenue in a bank. More than half
of the errors of life may be traced to fallacies originating in an improper use of
words ; and among not the least mischievous is the application of this word to
bank transactions, in a sense wholly different from its original meaning. Ori
ginally it meant a thing placed in trust, or pledged to be safely and sacredly
kept, till returned to the depositor, without being used by the depositary while
in his possession. All this is changed when applied to a deposite in bank.
Instead of returning the identical thing, the bank is understood to be bound to
return only an equal value ; and instead of not having the use, it is understood
to have the right to loan it out on interest, or to dispose of it as it pleases, with
the single condition, that an equal amount be returned when demanded, which,
experience has taught is not always done. To place, then, the public money
in deposite in bank, without restriction, is to give the free use of it, and to al
low them to make as much as they can out of it between the time of fleposite
and disbursement. Have we such a right ? The money belongs to the people
— collected from them for specific purposes, in which they have a general in
terest — and for that only ; and what possible right can we have to give such
use of it to certain selected corporations ? I ask for the provision of the Con
stitution that authorizes it. I ask if we could grant the use, for similar purpo
ses, to private associations or individuals ? Or, if not to them, to individual of
ficers of the government ; for instance, to the four principal receivers under this
bill, should it pass. And if this cannot be done, that the distinction be point
ed out.

If these questions be satisfactorily answered, I shall propound others still
more difficult. I shall then ask, If the substitute should become a law, and
the -twenty-five banks be selected, whether they would not, in fact, be the treas
ury ? And if not, I would ask, Where would be the treasury ? But if they
would be the treasury, I would ask, If public money in bank would not be in
the treasury ? And if so, how can it be drawn from it to be lent for the purpose
of trade, speculation, or any other use whatever, against an express provision of
the Constitution ? Yes, as express as words can make it. I ask the secretary
to read the 1st article, 9th section, and the clause next to the last.

[" No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appro
priations made by law ; and a regular statement and account of the receipts
and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time."]

How clear ! How explicit ! No money to be drawn from the treasury but
in consequence of appropriations made by law ; that is, the object on which the
expenditure is to be made, to be designated by law, and the sum allotted to ef
fect it, specified ; and yet we have lived in the daily and habitual violation of
this great fundamental provision, from almost the beginning of our political ex
istence to this day. Behold the consequences ! It has prostrated and ingulfed
the very institutions which have enjoyed this illicit favour, and tainted, above
all other causes, the morals and politics of the whole country. Yes, to this
must be traced, as one of the main causes, the whole system of excessive reve
nue, excessive expenditure, and excessive surpluses ; and to them, especially
the last, the disastrous overthrow of ^ue banks and the currency, and the un
exampled degeneracy of public and private morals, which have followed. We
have suffered the affliction : may the blessing which follows chastisement, when
its justice is confessed, come in due season.

But I take still higher ground. I strike at the root of the mischief. I deny

PP

298 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

the right of this government to treat bank-notes as money in its fiscal transac
tions. On this great question I never have before committed myself, though
not generally disposed to abstain from forming or expressing opinions. In all
instances in which a National Bank has come in question, I have invariably
taken my ground, that if the government has the right to receive and treat bank
notes as money, it had the right, and was bound, under the Constitution, to
regulate them so as to make them uniform and stable as a currency. The rea
sons for this opinion are obvious, and have been so often and fully expressed
on former occasions, that it would be useless to repeat them now ; but I never
-•* examined fully the right of receiving, or made up my mind on it, till since the
catastrophe in May last, which, as I have said, entirely separated the govern
ment from the banks. Previous to that period, it was an abstract question, with
no practical bearing ; as much so as is now the constitutional right of admitting
Louisiana into the Union. Things are now altered. The connexion is dis
solved, and it has become a practical question of the first magnitude.

The mover of the substitute assumed as a postulate, that this government had
a right to receive in its dues whatever it might think proper. I deny the posi
tion in toto. It is one that ought not to be assumed, and cannot be proved, and
which is opposed by powerful objections. The genius of our Constitution is
opposed *to the assumption of power. Whatever power it gives is expressly
granted ; and if proof were wanted, the numerous grants of powers far more
obvious, and apparently much more safe to be assumed than the one in question,
would afford it. I shall cite a few striking instances.

If any powers might be assumed, one would suppose that of applying money
to pay the debts of the government, and borrowing it to carry on its operations,
would be among them; yet both are expressly provided for by the Constitution.
Again, to Congress is granted the power to declare war and raise armies and
navies ; yet the power to grant letters of marque and reprisal, and to make
rules for the regulation of the army and navy, are not left to assumption, as ob
vious as they are, but are given by express grant. With these, and other in
stances not less striking, which might be added, it is a bold step to assume,
without proof, the far less obvious power of the government receiving whatever
it pleases in its dues as money. Such an assumption would be in direct con
flict with the great principle which the State Rights party, with which the sen
ator (Mr. Rives) classes himself, have ever adopted in the construction of the
Constitution. But, if the former cannot be assumed, it would be in vain to at
tempt to prove that it has been granted, or that it is necessary and proper to
carry any of the granted powers into effect. No such attempt has been made,
nor can be with success. On the contrary, there are strong objections to the
power, which, in my opinion, cannot be surmounted.

If once admitted, it would lead, by consequence, to a necessary interference
with individual and state concerns never contemplated by the Constitution. Let
us, for instance, suppose that, acting on the assumption of the senator, the gov
ernment should choose to select tobacco as an article to be received in pay
ment of its dues, which would be as well entitled to it as any other product,
and in which the senator's constituents are so much interested. Does he not
see the consequences ? In order to make its taxes uniform, which it is bound
to do by the Constitution, and which cannot be done unless the medium in
v/hich it is paid is so, the government would have to assume a general control
over the great staple in question ; to regulate the weight of the hogshead or
package ; to establish inspections under its own officers in order to determine
the quality, and whatever else might be necessary to make the payments into
the treasury uniform. So, likewise, if the still greater staple, cotton, be- select
ed. The weight of the bale, the quality of the cotton, and its inspection, would
all necessarily fall under the control of the government ; and does not the sena
tor see that the exercise of a power that must lead to such consequences — con-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 299

sequences so far beyond the sphere assigned to this government by the Consti
tution — must be unconstitutional ? Nor does the objection extend only to these
and other staple articles. It applies with equal, if not greater force, to receiv
ing the notes of state banks, as proposed by the substitute, in the dues of the
government and the management of its fiscal concerns. It must involve the
government in the necessity of controlling and regulating state banks, as this
substitute abundantly proves, as well as the whole history of our connexion
with them ; and it has been shown that banks are at least as far removed from
the control of this government as the cultivators of the soil, or any other class
of citizens. To this I might add another objection, not less strong, that for the
government to receive and treat bank-notes as money in its dues, would be in
direct conflict, in its effect, with the important power conferred expressly on.
Congress of coining money .and regulating the value thereof ; but as this will
come in with more propriety in answer to an argument advanced by the senator
from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster), I shall now state his argument, and reply
to it.

He asserted again and again, both now and at the extra session, that it is
the duty of the government not only to regulate, but to furnish a sound curren
cy. Indeed, it is the principal argument relied on by the senator in opposition
to the bill, which, he says, abandons this great duty. Now, if by currency be
meant gold and silver coins, there will be but little difference between him and
myself. To that extent the government has a clear and unquestionable right
by express grant ; but if he goes farther, and intends to assert that the govern
ment has the right to make bank-notes a currency, which it is bound to regulate,
then his proposition is identical in effect, though differently expressed, with that
of the senator from Virginia (Mr. Rives), and all the arguments I have urged
against it are equally applicable to his. I hold, on my part, that the power of
the government on this subject is limited to coining money and regulating its
value, and punishing the counterfeiting of the current coins — that is, of the
coins made current by law, the only money known to the Constitution. It is
time to make a distinction between money, or currency, if you please — between
that which will legally pay debts, and mere circulation, which has its value
from its promise to be paid in the former, and under which classification, bank
notes, as well as bills or promissory notes of individuals, fall. These are all in
their nature private and local, and cannot be elevated to the level of currency,
or money, in the fiscal transactions of government, without coming into conflict,
more or less, with the object of the Constitution in vesting the power of coining
money and regulating its value in Congress, as I shall now proceed to show.

It will hardly be questioned that the object was to fix a standard, in order to
furnish to the Union a currency of uniform and steady value, and was therefore
united in the same sentence with the kindred power to fix the standard of
weights and measures, the objects being similar. Now, if our experience has
proved anything, it has amply shown that so long as the government is connect
ed with the banks, and their notes received in its transactions as money, so
long it is impossible to give anything like stability to the standard of value ; and
that the power of coining and regulating the coins becomes, in a great measure,
a mere nullity. Every dollar issued in bank-notes", when it is made the substi
tute for money, drives out of circulation more or less of the precious metals ;
and when the issue becomes exorbitant, gold and silver almost entirely disap
pear, as our experience at this time proves. The effects ^,re analogous to
alloying or clipping the coin, as far as stability of standard is concerned ; and
it would be not less rational to suppose that such a power on the part of indi
viduals would be consistent with a uniform and stable currency, than to sup
pose the receiving and treating bank-notes as a substitute for money by the
government would be. The only check or remedy is to restrict them to their
proper sphere, to circulate in common with bills of exchange or other private

300 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

and local paper, for the convenience of business arid trade. So far from such a
course operating injuriously on the people, or from being liable to the charge of
forming one currency for the people and another for the government, as has been
so often and with such effect repeated, it is the very reverse. Government, by
refusing to receive bank-notes, as it is bound to do, would, in fact, furnish a choice
to the people, to take either money or notes at their pleasure. The demand of
the government will always keep a plentiful supply of the former in the country,
so as to afford the people a choice ; while the opposite would expel the money,
and leave no option to them but to take bank-notes, or worse, as at present.

I have now shown how it is proposed to form the league of banks, and have
presented the constitutional impediments that stand in the way. These are
numerous and strong ; so much so, that they ought to be irresistible with all,
except the latitudinous in construction ; but I cannot expect they will produce
their full effect. I know too well the force of long-entertained impressions,
however erroneous, to be sanguine — how strongly the mind rebels against the
expulsion of the old and the admission of new opinions. Yet in this case,
where we clearly see how gradually and silently error crept in under the dis
guise of words, applied to new and totally different ideas, without exciting notice
or alarm ; and when we have experienced such deep disasters in consequence
of parting from the plain intent and meaning of the Constitution, I cannot but
hope that all who believe that the success of the government depends on a rigid
adherence to the Constitution, will lay aside all previous impressions, taken up
without reflection, and give to the objections their due weight.

I come now to the next point, to show how this league is to be revived or
stimulated into life. Till this can be done, the substitute, should it become a
law, would be a dead letter. The selection is to be made from specie-paying
banks. None but such can receive the public deposites, or have their notes
received in the dues of the government. There are none such now. The
whole banking system lies inanimate, and must be vivified before it can be
reunited with the government. No one is bold enough to propose a union with
this lifeless mass. How, then, is the extinguished spark to be revivified ? How
is the breath of life, the Promethean fire, to be breathed into the system. anew ?
is the question. This is the task.

The mover tells us that it must be the work of the government. He says
that it is bound to aid the banks to resume payments, and for that purpose
ought to hold out to them some adequate inducement. He tells us that they
have been long preparing, and had made great efforts, but can go no farther ;
have rolled the round, huge rock almost to the summit, but unless the govern
ment put forth its giant arm, and give the last push, it will recoil and rush down
the steep to the bottom, and all past labour be lost. Now, what is this adequate
inducement ? What this powerful stimulus, which it is proposed the govern
ment should apply, in order to enable the banks to accomplish this Herculean
task ? The substitute shall answer.

It proposes to fix the 1st of July next for the period of resumption ; .and, as
the inducement to resume, it proposes to select twenty-five of the most respecta
ble and solid out of the resuming banks to be depositories of the public moneys
and the fiscal agent of the government, as has been already stated. It also pro
poses — and this is the stimulus, the essence of the whole — to make the notes of
such banks as may resume on or before that day exclusively receivable in the
public dues. He'Ve is a quid pro quo ; something proposed to be done, for
which something is to be given. We tell the banks plainly, If you resume, we,
on our part, stipulate to make twenty-five of you our fiscal agents and deposi
tories of the revenue ; "and we farther stipulate, that those who resume by the
time fixed, shall have the exclusive privilege, forever, of having their notes re
ceivable in the dues of the government, in common with gold and silver. If
the banks perform their part, we shall be bound in honour and good faith to

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 301

perform ours. It would be a complete contract, as obligatory as if signed,
sealed, and delivered. Such is the inducement.

The next question is, Will it be adequate ? Yes, abundantly adequate. The
battery is strong enough to awaken the dead to life ; the consideration sufficient
to remunerate the banks for whatever sacrifice they may be compelled to make
in order to resume payment. It is difficult to estimate the value of these high
privileges, or prerogatives, as I might justly call them. They are worth mill
ions. If you were to enter into a similar contract with an individual, I doubt
not that he could sell out in open market for at least thirty, forty, or fifty mill
ions of dollars. I do, then, the mover the justice to say, that his means are am
ple to effect what he proposes. As difficult as is the work of resumption — and
difficult it will turn out to be when tried — the inducement will prove all-sufficient.
But the resumption, however desirable, may be purchased too dearly ; and such
would prove to be the case, should the project succeed. Not only is the offer
too great, but the mode of effecting it is highly objectionable. Its operation
would prove not less disastrous than the bargain has been shown to be uncon
stitutional, which I shall now proceed to establish.

The offer will have a double effect. It will act as a powerful stimulus to re
sumption, but will act, at the same time, with equal force to excite a struggle
among the banks, not only to resume themselves, but to prevent others from re
suming. The reason is clear. The advantage to each will increase as the
number of the resuming banks decreases ; and, of course, the great point of
contest among the strong will be to restrict the proffered prize to the smallest
number. The closer the monopoly the greater the profits. In this struggle, a
combination of a few powerful and wealthy banks, the most respectable and
solid, as designated in the substitute, will overthrow and trample down the res
idue. Their fall will spread desolation over the land. Whatever may be the
fate of others in this desperate contest, there is one in relation to which no
doubt can be entertained — I refer to the United States Bank of Pennsylvania,
a long name, and a misnomer ; and which, for the sake of brevity, but with no
personal disrespect to the distinguished individual at its head, I shall call Mr.
Biddle's bank. That, at least, will be one of the winners, one of the twenty-
five to whom the prize will be. assigned. Its vast resources, its wealth and in
fluential connexions, both at home and abroad, the skill and ability of the offi
cer at its head, and, what is less honourable, the great resource it holds in the
notes of the late United States Bank, of which more than six millions have been
put into circulation, in violation, to say the least, of a trust, constituting more
than five sixths of all its circulation, and which it is not bound to pay, with the
still greater amount on hand, making, in the whole, more than twenty-six mill
ions, and which may be used in the same way, if not prevented, would place it be
yond all doubt among the victors. He starts without proper weights, and will
lead the way from the first. Who the others may be is uncertain ; this will de
pend mainly upon his good-will and. pleasure. It may be put down as certain,
whoever they may be, that they will be powerful and influential, and not unfa
vourable to his interest or aggrandizement. But the mischievous effect will not
be limited to this deathlike struggle, in which so many must fall and be crush
ed, that might otherwise weather the storm. The forced resumption, for such
it will be in effect, would be followed by wide-spread desolation. It is easy
to sink to suspension, but hard to return to resumption. Under the most fa
vourable circumstances, and when conducted most leisurely and cautiously, the
pressure must be severe ; but, if coerced or precipitated by bankrupt laws or
temptations such as this, it will be ruinous. To make it safe and easy must
be the work of time. Government can do but little. The disease originates in
excessive indebtedness, and the only remedy is payment or reduction of debts.
It is estimated that, when the banks suspended payments, the community was
indebted to them the enormous sum of $475,000,000. To reduce this within

302 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

the proper limits is not the work of a few days, and can be but little aided by
us. The industry and the vast resources of the country, with time, are the only
remedies to be relied on for the reduction ; and to these, with the state legisla
tures, and the public opinion, the resumption must be left. To understand the
subject fully, we must look a little more into the real cause of the difficulty.

This enormous debt was incurred in prosperous times. The abundant means
of the banks, from the surplus revenue and a combination of other causes, indu
ced them to discount freely. This increased the circulation, and with its in
crease its value depreciated, and prices rose proportionably. With this rise,
enterprise and speculation seized the whole community, and every one expect
ed to make a fortune at once ; and this, in turn, gave a new impulse to discounts
and circulation, till the swelling tide bursted its barriers and deluged the land.
Then began the opposite process of absorbing the excess. If it had been pos
sible to return it back to the banks, the sources from which it flowed, through
its debtors, the speculating, enterprising, and business portion of the communi
ty, the mischief would have been in a great measure avoided. But circulation
had flowed off into other reservoirs — those of the moneyed men and bankers,
who hoard when prices are high, and buy when they are low. The portion thus
drawn off and held in deposite, either in banks or the chests of individuals, was
as effectually lost, as far as the debtors of the banks were concerned, as if it
had been burned. The means of payment was thus diminished ; prices fell in
proportion, and the pressure increased as they fell. Though the amount in cir
culation be greatly reduced, yet the banks are afraid to discount, lest, on re
sumption, the hoarded mass of deposites held by individuals or other banks
should be let loose, and, in addition to what might be put into circulation should
discounts be made, would cause another inundation, to be followed by another
suspension. How is this difficulty to be safely surmounted, but by unlocking
the hoarded means ? And how is that to be done without deciding the curren
cy question? This is the first and necessary step. That done, all will be able
to calculate and determine what to do. The period of inaction and uncertainty
would cease, and that of business revive. Funds that are now locked up would
be brought again into operation, and the channels of circulation be replenished
in the only mode that can be done with safety. Thus thinking, I am now, and
have been from the first, in favour of an early decision, and averse to all coer
cion, or holding out temptation to resume ; leaving the^ disease to the gradual
and safe operation of time, with as little tampering as possible. In the mean
time, I hold it to be unwise to cease discounting, and to adopt an indiscriminate
system of curtailment. Its effects are ruinous to the business of the country,
and calculated to retard rather than to accelerate a resumption. The true sys
tem, I would say, would be to discount business paper as freely as usual, and
curtail gradually permanent debts. The former would revive business, and
would increase the debts to the banks less than it would increase the ability of
the community to pay them.

Having now shown how this league or combination of banks is to be formed
and revived, with the difficulties in the way, it remains to determine what will
be the true character and nature of the combination when formed. It will con
sist of state banks retaining their original powers, that of discounting and all,
without being in the slightest degree impaired. To these the substitute pro
poses to make important additions : to receive their notes as gold and silver in
the public dues, to give them the use of the public deposites, and to organize
and blend the whole into one, as the fiscal agent of the government, to be pla
ced under the immediate supervision and control of the Secretary of the Treas
ury. Now, what does all this amount to ? Shall I name the word — be not
startled : A BANK — a government bank — the most extensive, powerful, and
dangerous that ever existed. This substitute would be the act of incorpora
tion ; and the privileges it confers, so much additional banking capital, increas-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 303

ing immensely its powers, and giving it an unlimited control over the business
and exchanges of the country.

The senator from Virginia (Mr. Rives) was right in supposing that this new-
trial of the experiment would be made under very different circumstances from
the first, and would have a different termination. That, too, like this, was a
bank — a government bank— as distinguished from the late Bank, to which it
was set up as a rival, and was at the time constantly so designated in debate.
But circumstances now are indeed different, very different, and so would be the
result of the experiment. This bank would not be the same rickety concern
as the former. That ended in anarchy, and this would end in despotism. I
will explain.

The former failed not so much in consequence of the adverse circumstances
of the times, or any essential defect in the system, as from the want of a head
— a common sensorium, to think, to will, and decide for the whole — which was
indispensably necessary to ensure concert, and give unity of design and exe
cution. A head will not be wanting now. Mr. Biddle's bank will supply the
defect. His would be not only one of the resuming banks, as I have shown,
but would also be one of the twenty-five to be selected. If there should be
the temerity to omit it, the present project would share the fate of its predeces^
sor. Mr. Biddle's bank, at the head of those excluded, would be an overmatch
for the selected, in skill, capital, and power, and the whole league would in
evitably be overthrown. But, if selected, the position of his bank in the league
would be certain. Its vast capital, its extensive connexions, its superior au
thority, and his skill, abilities, and influence, would place it at the head, to
think and act for the whole-. The others would be as dependant on his as the
branches of the late bank were on the mother institution. The whole would
form one entire machine, impelled by a single impulse, and making a perfect
contrast with its predecessor in the unity and energy of its operations.

Nor would its fate be less dissimilar. Anarchy was inscribed on the first
from the beginning. Its deficiency in the great and essential element to en
sure concert was radical, and could not be remedied. Its union with the gov
ernment could not supply it, nor avert its destiny. But very different would be
the case of the present. Add its intimate union with the government, for
which the substitute provides, to its other sources of power, and it would be
come irresistible. The two, government and bank, would unite and constitute
a single power ; but which would gain the ascendency — whether the govern
ment would become the bank, or the bank the government — is neither certain
nor material ; for, whichever it might be, it would form a despotic money-cracy
(if I may be permitted to unite an English and a Greek word) altogether irre
sistible.

It is not a little surprising that the senator from Virginia (Mr. Rives), whose
watchful jealousy could detect, as he supposed, the embryo of a government
bank in the bill, should overlook this regular incorporation of one by his own
substitute. Out of the slender materials of treasury warrants, and draughts to pay
public creditors, or transfer funds from place to place, as the public service
might require, and four principal receivers to keep the public money, he ha&
conjured up, with the aid of a vivid imagination, a future government bank,
which, he told us, with the utmost confidence, would rise like a cloud, at first
as big as a hand, but which would soon darken all the horizon. Now, it is
not a little unfortunate for his confident predictions, that these seminal princi
ples from which the bank is to spring have all existed, from the commence
ment of our government, in full force, except the four receivers, without show
ing the least tendency to produce the result he anticipates. Not only ours, but
every civilized government, has the power to draw treasury warrants and trans
fer draughts ; nor has the power in a single instance terminated in a bank. Nor
can the fact that the money is to be kept by receivers contribute in the least

304 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

to produce one. The public funds in their hands will be as much beyond the
control of the executive as it was in the vaults of the banks. But, to shorten
discussion, I would ask, How can there be a bank without the power to dis
count or to use the deposites ? and out of which of the provisions of the bill
could the treasury by any possibility obtain either, under its severe penalties,
which prohibits the touching of the public money, except on warrants or draughts,
drawn by those having authority in due form, and for the public service.

But the danger which an excited imagination anticipates hereafter from the
bill would exist in sober reality under the substitute. There it would require
neither fancy nor conjecture to create one. It would exist with all its facul
ties and endowments complete — discount, deposites, and all — with immense
means, guided by a central and directing head, and blended and united with
the government, so as to form one great mass of power. What a contrast
with the bill ! How simple and harmless the one, with its four principal re
ceivers, twice as many clerks, and five inspectors, compared with this complex
and mighty engine of power ! And yet there are many, both intelligent and
patriotic, who oppose the bill and support the substitute, on the ground that the
former would give more patronage and power than the latter ! How strange
and wonderful the diversity of the human mind !

So far from being true, the very fact of the separation of the government
from the banks, provided for in the bill, would, of itself, be the most decisive
blow that could be given against government patronage, and the union of the
two the most decisive in its favour. When their notes are received in the
public dues as cash, and the public money deposited in their vaults, the banks be
come the allies of the government on all questions connected with its fiscal action
The higher its taxes and duties, the greater its revenue and expenditure : and
the larger its surplus, the more their circulation and business, and, of course, the
greater their profit ; and hence, on all questions of taxation and disbursements,
and the accumulation of funds in the treasury, their interest would throw them
on the side of the government, and against the people.

All this is reversed when separated. The higher the taxation and disburse
ments, and the larger the surplus, the less would be their profit ; and their in
terest, in that case, would throw them with the people, and against the govern
ment. The reason is obvious. Specie is the basis of banking operations, and
the greater the amount they can command the greater will be their business and
profits ; but when the government is separated from them, and collects and pays
away its dues in specie instead of their notes, it is clear that the higher the tax
es and disbursements, and the greater the surplus in the treasury, the more spe
cie will be drawn from the use of the banks, and the less will be left as the ba
sis of their operations ; and, consequently, the less their profit. Every dollar
withdrawn from them would diminish their business fourfold at least; and
hence a regard to their own interest would inevitably place them on the side
to which I have assigned them.

The effects on the politics of the country would be great and salutary. The
weight of the banks would be taken from the side of the tax-consumers, where
it has been from the commencement of the government, and placed on the side
of the tax-payers. This great division of the community necessarily grows out
of the fiscal action of the government. Take taxation and disbursement togeth
er, and it will always be found that one portion of the community pays into the
treasury, in the shape of taxes, more than it receives back in that of disburse
ments, and that another receives back more than it pays. The former are the
tax-payers, and the latter the consumers — making the great, essential, and con
trolling division in all civilized communities. If, with us, the government has
been thrown on the side of the consumers, as it has. it must, in a considerable
degree, be attributed to its alliance with the banks, whose influence has been,
in consequence, at all times steadily and powerfully on that side. It is to this

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 305

mischievous and unholy alliance that may be traced the disasters which have
befallen us, and the great political degeneracy of the country. Hence the pro
tective system ; hence its associated and monstrous system of disbursements ;
hence the collection of more money from the people than the government could
require ; hence the vast and corrupting surpluses ; hence legislative and execu
tive usurpations ; and, finally, hence the prostration of the currency, and the
disasters which give rise to our present deliberations. Revive this fatal con
nexion — adopt this substitute, and all this train of evils will again follow, with re
doubled disasters and corruption. Refuse the connexion— adopt this bill, and
all will be reversed, and we shall have some prospect of restoring the Consti
tution and country to their primitive simplicity and purity. The effect of the
refusal on the patronage of the government would be great and decisive. Burke
has wisely said, that the " revenue is the state in modern times." Violence
and coercion are no longer the instruments of government in civilized commu
nities. Their reign is past. Everything is now done by money. It is not
only the sinew of war, but of politics, over A*hich, in the form of patronage, it
exercises almost unlimited control Just as the revenue increases or dimin
ishes, almost in the same proportion is patronage increased or diminished.

But admit, for a moment, that neither the separation nor the connexion would
have any sensible effect to increase or diminish the revenue, and that it would
be of the same amount, whether the bill or substitute should be adopted, yet,
even on that supposition, the patronage of the latter would be a hundred fold
greater than the former. In estimating the amount of patronage of any meas
ure, three particulars must be taken into the calculation : the number of persons
•who may be affected by it, their influence in the community, and the extent of
the control exercised over them. It will be found, on comparison, that the sub
stitute combines aH these elements in a far greater degree than the bill, as I
shall now proceed to show. I begin with the number.

The bill provides, as has been stated, for four principal receivers, eight or
ten clerks, and a suitable number of agents to act as inspectors, making, in the
whole, say 25 individuals. These would constitute the only additional officers
to keep and disburse the public money. The substitute, in addition to the offi
cers now in service, provides for the selection of 25 banks, to be taken from the
most powerful and influential, and which would have, on an average, at the least
100 officers and stockholders each, making, in the aggregate, 2500 persons
who would be directly interested in the banks, and, of course, under the influ
ence of the government.

As to the relative influence of the officers and the selected banks over the
community, every impartial man must acknowledge that the preponderance
would be greater on the side of the latter. Admitting the respectability of the
receivers and other officers provided for in the bill, and the officers and stock
holders of the banks to be individually the same, still the means of control at
the disposition of the former would be as nothing compared to that of the latter.
They would not touch a cent of public money. Their means would be limited
to their salary, which would be too small to be felt in the community. Very
different would be the case with the officers and stockholders of the banks.
They, of all persons, are by far the most influential in the community. A
greater number depend on them for accommodation and favour, and the success
of their business and prospects in life, than any other class in society ; and
this would be especially true of the banks connected with the government.

It only remains, now, to compare the extent of the control that may be exer
cised by the government over the two, in order to complete the comparison ;
and here, again, the preponderance will be found to be strikingly on the same
side. The whole amount of expenditure, under the bill, would not exceed
$30,000 or $40,000 annually, at the very farthest, and this constitutes the
whole amount of control which the government can exercise, There would be

306 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

no perquisites, no contracts, jobs, or incidental gains. The offices and salaries
would be all. To that extent those who may hold them would be dependant
on the government, and thus far they may be controlled. How stands the ac
count on the other side? What value shall be put on the public deposites in
the banks ? What on the receivability of their notes as cash by the govern
ment? What on their connexion with the government as their fiscal agent,
which w,ouid give so great a control over the exchanges and business of the
country? How many millions shall these be estimated at, and how insig
nificant must the paltry sum of $30,000 or $40,000 appear to those countless
millions held, under the provisions of the substitute, at the pleasure of the gov
ernment !

Having now finished the comparison as to the relative patronage of the two
measures, I shall next compare them as fiscal agents of the government ; and
here let me say, at the outset, that the discussion has corrected an error which
I once entertained. I had supposed that the hazard of keeping the public mon
ey under the custody of officers of the government would be greater than ia
bank. The senators from New-Hampshire and Connecticut (Messrs. Hubbart?
and Niles) have proved from the record, that the hazard is on the other side,
and that we have lost more by the banks than by the collecting and disbursing
officers combined. What can be done to increase the security by judicious se
lection of officers and proper organization is strongly illustrated by the fact,,
stated by the chairman (Mr. Wright) in his opening speech, that in the war
department there has been no loss for 15 years— from 1821 to 1836 — on an
expenditure certainly not less than $100,000,000. I take some pride in this
result of an organization which I originated and established, when Secretary of
War, against a formidable opposition.

As to the relative expense of the two agencies, that of th« bill, as small as it
is, if we are to judge by appearances, is the greatest ; but if by facts, the substi
tute would be much the most so, provided we charge it with all the advantages
which the banks would derive from their connexion with the government, as
ought in fairness to be done, as the whole ultimately comes out of the pockets
of the people.

In a single particular the banks have the advantage as fiscal agents. They
would be the more convenient. To this they are entitled, and I wish to with
hold from them no credit which they may justly claim. ,<4j ;

The senator from Virginia (Mr. Rives) appeared to have great apprehension
that the collection of the public dues in specie might lead to hoarding. He
may dismiss his fears on that head. It is not the genius of modern and civil
ized governments to hoard ; and if it were, the banks will take care that there
shall be no extraordinary accumulation of cash in the treasury. Pass the bill,
and I underwrite that we shall never have again to complain of a surplus. It
would rarely, if ever, in peace and settled times, exceed three or four millions at
the outside. Nor is his apprehension that hoarding of specie would lead to
war less groundless. The danger is in another quarter. War is the harvest
of banks, when they are connected with government. The vast increase of
revenue and expenditures, and the enormous public loans, which necessarily
inure mainly to their advantage, swell their profits in war to the utmost limits.
But separate them from government, and war would then be to them a state of
famine, for reasons which must be apparent after what has been said, which
would throw their weight on the side of peace, and against war; just as cer
tainly as I have shown that the separation would throw it on the side of tax
payers, and against the tax-consumers.

I come, now, to the comparison of the effects of the two measures on the
currency of the country. In this respect, the senator from Virginia (Mr. Rives)
seemed to think that his substitute would have a great superiority over the bill,
but his reasons were to me wholly unsatisfactory. If we are to judge from ex-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 307

perience, it ought to be pronounced to be the worst possible measure. It has
been in operation but twice (each for but a few years) since the commence
ment of the government, and it has so happened that the only two explosions
of the currency occurred during those periods. But, without relying on these
disastrous occurrences, we have seen enough to satisfy the most incredulous
>hat there are great and radical defects in our bank circulation, which no remedy
heretofore applied has been able to remove. It originates in the excess of pa
per compared to specie, and the only effective cure is to increase the latter and
reduce the former ; and this the substitute itself impliedly acknowledges, by pro
posing a remedy that would prove wholly inoperative. It proposes that, after a
certain period mentioned, none of the banks to be selected should issue notes
under ten dollars. The effects would clearly be, not a diminution of the circu
lation of small notes, but a new division of the banking business, in which the
issue of large notes would fall to the lot of the selected banks, and the small
to the others, without restricting in the least the aggregate amount of paper
circulation.

But what the substitute would fail to do, the bill would effectually remedy.
None doubt but the separation from the banks would greatly increase the pro
portion of specie to paper ; but the senator from Virginia (Mr. Rives) appre
hends that its operation would be too powerful, so much so, in fact, as to destroy
the banks. His argument is, that specie would be always at a premium, arid
that it would be impossible for the banks to do business so long as th?; was
the case. His fears are groundless. What he dreads would be but a temporary
evil. The very fact that specie would bear a premium would have ^he double
effect to diminish paper circulation and increase the importation of specie, till
an equilibrium between the two would be restored, when they ^ould be at par.
At what point this would be effected is a little uncertain ; hit the fear is, that
with our decreasing revenue, instead of the specie being increased to excess,
it would not be increased sufficiently to give the desired stability to the cur
rency.

In this connexion, the senator urged, an objection against the bill, which I
regard as wholly groundless. He said that the psympiit of the dues of the gov
ernment in specie would create a double demand : a domestic, as well as a
foreign, the effects of which would be to ip~rea.<*3 greatly its fluctuations : and
so deeply was he impressed with the ide*, tb*t he drew a vivid picture of its
alternate flow from the coast to the interior. <tnd from North to South, and back
again. All this is the work of imagination. The effect would be directly the
reverse. The more numerous tte demands the less the fluctuation ; so much
so, that the greatest stability would be where it exclusively performed the func
tion of circulation, and where each individual must keep a portion to meet his
daily demands. This is so obvious, that I shall not undertake to illustrate it.

But the superiority of the bill over the substitute would not be limited only to
a more favourable proportion between specie and paper. It would have another
important advantage, that cannot be well over-estimated : it would make a prac
tical distinction between currency and circulation — between the currency of the
country and private and local circulation, under which head bank paper would
be comprehended. The effocts would be, to render a general explosion of the
circulation almost impossible. Whatever derangements might occur would be
local, and confined to some one particular commercial sphere ; and even within
its limits there would be a sound currency to fall back on, not partaking of the
shock, and which would greatly diminish the intensity and duration of the dis
tress. In the mean time, the general business and finances of the country
would proceed, almost without feeling the derangement.

With a few remarks on the comparative effects of the two measures on the
industry and business of the country, I shall conclude the comparison. What
has been said on their relative effects on the currency goes far to decide the
question of their relative effects on business and industry.

308 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

I hold a sound and stable currency to be among the greatest encouragements
to industry and business generally ; and an unsound and fluctuating one, n-ow
expanding and now contracting, so that no honest man can tell what to do, as
among the greatest discouragements. The dollar and the eagle are the meas
ure of value, as the yard and the bushel are of quantity ; and what would we
think of the incorporation of companies to regulate the latter — to expand or
contract, to shorten or lengthen them at pleasure, with the privilege to sell by
the contracted or shortened, and buy by the expanded or lengthened ? Is it
not seen that it would place the whole industry and business of the country
under the control of such companies ? But it would not more certainly effect
it than a similar control possessed by the money institutions of the country
over the measure of value. But I go farther, and assert confidently, that the
excess of paper currency, as well as its 'unsteadiness, is unfavourable to the in
dustry and business of the country. It raises the price of everything, and, con
sequently, increases the price of production and consumption ; and is, in the
end, hostile to every branch of industry.

I hold that specie and paper have each their proper sphere : the latter for
large and distant transactions, and the former for all others ; and that the near
er our circulation approaches gold and silver, consistently with convenience,
the better for the industry and the business of the country. The more specie
the better, till that point is reached. When attained, it would combine, in the
greatest possible degree, soundness and facility, and would be favourable to the
productive classes universally ; I mean men of business, planters, merchants,
and manufacturers, as well as operatives. It would be particularly favourable
to the South. Our great staples are cash articles everywhere ; and it was well
remarked by the senator from Mississippi (Mr. Walker), at the extra session, that
we sold at cash ptices and bought at paper prices ; that is, sold low and bought
high. The manufacturing, commercial, and navigating interests would also
feel its beneficial effec*. It would cheapen productions, and be to manufactu
rers in lieu of a prott^tivt tariff. Its effects would be to enable them to meet
foreign competition, noi by raising prices by high duties, but by enabling them
to sell as cheap or cheaper than the foreigner," which would harmonize every
interest, and place our maihifacfcires on the most solid basis. It is the only
mode by which the foreign racket can ever be commanded ; and commanded
it would be, with a sound and moderately expanded currency. Our ingenuity,
invention, and industry are equal v> those of any people ; and all our manu
facturers want is a sound currency a^d aiv even chance, to meet competition
with success everywhere, at home or abroad. But with a bloated and fluctua
ting paper circulation this will be impossible. Among its many drawbacks, it
levies an enormous tax on the community.

I have already stated that the community is estima^d to have been indebted
to the banks $475,000,000 at the suspension of specie payments. The inter
est on this sum, estimated at six per cent, (it ought to be higher), would give
an annual income to those institutions of upward of thirty miiUons • and this is
the sum yearly paid by the community for bank accommodation*, to the excess
of which we owe our bloated and unstable circulation. Never vas a circu
lation so worthless furnished at so dear a rate. « How much of this vast in
come may be considered as interest on real capital it is difficult to estimate ;
but it 'would, I suppose, be ample to set down ten millions to that head, which
would leave upward of twenty millions annually as the profits derived from
banking privileges, over and above a fair compensation for the capital invested,
which somebody must pay, and which must ultimately fall on the industry and
business of the country. But this enormous expansion of the system is not as
tonishing, so great is the stimulus applied to its growth. Ingenious men of
other ages devoted themselves in vain to discover the art of converting the ba
ser metals into gold and silver • but we have conferred on a portion of the com-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 309

munity an art still higher — of converting paper, to all intents and purposes, into
the precious metals ; and ought we to be surprised that an article so cheap to
the manufacturers, and so dear to the rest of the community, should be so great
ly over-supplied, and without any reference to the interest or to the wants of
the community ?

If we are to believe the senator from Virginia, and others on the same side,
we owe almost all our improvements and prosperity to the banking system ; and
if it should fail, the age of barbarism would again return. I had supposed that
the bases of our prosperity were our free institutions, the wide-spread and fer
tile region we occupy, and the hereditary intelligence and energy^ of the stock
from which we are descended ; but it seems that all these go for nothing, and
that the banks are everything. I make no war on them. All I insist on is, that
the government shall separate from them, which I believe to be indispensable,
for the reasons I have assigned both now and formerly. But I cannot concur in
attributing to them our improvements and prosperity. That they contributed to
give a strong impulse to industry and enterprise in the early stages of their op
eration, I doubt not. Nothing is more stimulating than an expanding and de
preciating currency. It creates a delusive appearance of prosperity, which puts
everything in motion. Every one feels as if he was growing richer as prices
rise, and that he has it in his power, by foresight and exertion, to make his for
tune. But it is the nature of stimulus, moral as Well as physical, to excite at
first, and to depress afterward. The draught which at first causes unnatural
excitement and energy, is sure to terminate in corresponding depression and
weakness ; nor is it less certain that the stimulus of a currency, expanding be
yond its proper limits, follows the same law- We have had the exhilaration,
and the depression has succeeded. We have had the pleasure of getting drunk,
and now experience the pain of becoming sober. The good is gone, and the
evil has succeeded ; and, on a fair calculation, the latter will be found to be
greater than the former. Whatever impulse the banking system was calculated
to give to our improvement and prosperity, has already been given ; and the
reverse effects will hereafter follow, unless the system should undergo great and
radical changes ; the first step towards which would be the adoption of the
measure proposed by this bill.

I have, Mr. President, finished what I intended to say. I have long antici
pated the present crisis, but did not, until 1837, expect its arrival in my time.
When I saw its approach, I resolved to do my duty, be the consequences to me
what they might ; and I offer my thanks to the Author of my being, that he has
given me the resolution and opportunity of discharging what I honestly believe
to be my duty in reference to this great subject.

How the question will be decided is acknowledged to be doubtful, so nearly
are the two houses supposed to be divided ; but whatever may be its fate now,
I have the most perfect confidence in its final triumph. The public attention
is roused. The subject will be thoroughly investigated, and I have no fears but
the side I support will prove to be the side of truth, justice, liberty, civilization,
and the advancement of moral and intellectual improvement.

XXI. <

SPEECH IN REPLY TO MR. CLAY, ON THE SUB-TREASURY BILL, MARCH 10, 1838.

I RISE to fulfil a promise I made some time since, to notice at my leisure
the reply of the senator from Kentucky farthest from me (Mr. Clay), to
my remarks when I first addressed the Senate on the subject now under
discussion.

310 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

On comparing- with care the reply with the remarks, I am at a loss to
determine whether it is the most remarkable for its omissions or mis-
statements. Instead of leaving not a hair on the head of my arguments,
as the senator threatened (to use his not very dignified expression), he
has not even attempted to answer a large, and not the least weighty por
tion j and of that which he has, there is not one fairly stated or fairly an
swered. I speak literally, and without exaggeration ; nor would it be dif
ficult to make good to the letter what I assert, if I could reconcile it to
myself to consume the time of the Senate in establishing a long series
of negative propositions, in which they could take but little interest, how-
ever important they may be regarded by the senator and myself. To
avoid so idle a consumption of the time, I propose to present a few in
stances of his misstatements, from which the rest may be inferred ; and,
that I may not be suspected of having selected them, I shall take them in
the order in which they stand in his reply.

The Senate will recollect, that when the senator from Virginia farthest
from me (Mr. Rives) introduced his substitute, he accompanied it with
the remark that it was his first choice, and the second choice of those
who are allied with him on this occasion. In noticing this remark, I
stated, that if I might judge from appearances, which could scarcely de
ceive one, the senator might have said not only the second, but, under
existing circumstances, it was their first choice ; and that, despairing of a
bank for the present, they would support his substitute. Assuming this
inference to be correct, I stated that the question was narrowed down, in
fact, to the bill and substitute, of which one or the other must be selected.
The senator from Kentucky, in his reply, omitted all these qualifications,
and represented me as making the absolute assertion that, in the nature
of the case, there was no other alternative but the bill or the substitute,
and then gravely pointed out two others — to do nothing, or adopt a Na
tional Bank, as if I could possibly be ignorant of what wras so obvious.
After he had thus replied, not to what I really said, but his own misstate-
ment of it, as if to make compensation, he proceeded in the same breath
to confirm the truth of what I did say, by giving his support to the sub
stitute, which he called a half-way house, where he could spend some
pleasant hours. Nothing is more easy than to win such victories.

Having inferred, as has turned out to be the fact, that there was no
other alternative at present but the bill and substitute, I next showed the
embarrassment to which the gentleman opposite to me would be involved
from having, four years ago, on the question of the removal of the de-
posites, denounced a league of state banks similar to that proposed to be
revived by the substitute. After enlarging on this point, I remarked, that
if I might be permitted to state my opinion, the gentlemen had taken a
course on this subject unfortunate for themselves and the country — un
fortunate for them, for, let what would come, they would be responsible.
If the bill was lost, theirs would be the responsibility ; if the substitute was
carried, on them the responsibility would fall ; and if nothing was done,
it would be at their door ; and unfortunate for the country, because it had
prevented the decision of the question at the extra session, which \vould
not have failed to put an early termination to the present commercial and
pecuniary embarrassment. This the senator, in his reply, met by sta
ting that I had called on him and his friends to follow my lead j and thus
regarding it, he made it the pretext of some ill-natured personal remarks,
which I shall notice hereafter. I never dreamed of making such a call ;
and what I said cannot be tortured, by the force of construction, to bear
a meaning having the least semblance to it.

After making these preliminary remarks, I took up the substitute, and

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 311

showed that it proposed to make a bargain with the banks. I then
stated the particulars and the conditions of the proposed bargain ; that its
object was to enable the banks to pay their debts, and for that purpose it
proposed to confer important privileges ; to give them the use of the pub
lic funds from the time of deposite to disbursement, and to have their
notes received as cash in the dues of the government. I then asked if
we had a right to make such a bargain. The senator, leaving out all
these particulars, represented me as saying that the government had no
right to make a bargain with the banks ; and then undertakes to involve
me in an inconsistency in supporting the bill, because it proposes to bar
gain with the banks for the use of their vaults as a place of safe-keeping
for the public money ; as if there was a possible analogy between the two
cases. Nothing is more easy than to refute the most demonstrative ar
gument in this way. Drop an essential part of the premises, and the
most irresistible conclusion, of course, fails.

In the same summary and easy mode of replying to my arguments, the
senator perverted my denial that the government had a right to receive
bank-notes as cash, into the assertion that it had no right to receive any
thing but cash j and then accuses me with inconsistency, because I voted,
at the extra session, for the bill authorizing the receipt of treasury notes
in the dues of the government ; as* if any one ever doubted that it could
receive its own paper, or securities, in payment of its own debts. Such
are the misstatements of the senator, taken in their regular order as they
stand in his reply, and they present a fair specimen of what he chooses
to consider an answer to my argument. There is not one less unfairly
stated, or unfairly met, than the instances I have cited.

The senator presented two difficulties in reply to what I said against
receiving bank-notes by the government, which demand a passing notice
before I dismiss this part of the subject. He objected, first, that it was
contrary to the provision of the bill itself, which authorizes the receipts
of the notes of specie-paying banks for a limited time. To answer this
objection, it will be necessary to advert to the object of the provision.
By the provisions of the joint resolutions of 1816, the notes of specie-
paying banks are made receivable in the dues of the government ; and,
of course, on the resumption of specie payments, barik-notes would again
be received by the government as heretofore, without limitation as to
time, unless some provision be adopted to prevent it. In a word, the
government, though wholly separated, in fact, at present from the banks,
is not so by law ; and the object of the provision is to effect a permanent
separation in law and in fact. This it proposes to do by a gradual repeal
of the joint resolution of 1816, in order to prevent, as far as possible, any
injurious effects to the community or the banks. The senator, in making
his objection, overlooks the broad distinction between the doing and un
doing of an unconstitutional act. There are some unconstitutional acts
that are difficult, if not impossible, to be undone ; such, for instance, as
the admission of Louisiana into the Union, admitting it to be unconstitu
tional, which I do not. There are others which cannot be undone sud
denly without wide-spread distress and ruin ; such as the protective tariff,
which, accordingly, the Compromise Act allowed upward of eight years
for the gradual repeal. Such, also, is the case under consideration,
which, under the provisions of the bill, would be effected in seven years.
In all such cases, I hold it to be not only clearly constitutional for Con
gress to make a gradual repeal, but its duty to do so ; otherwise it would
be often impossible to get clear of an unconstitutional act short of a rev
olution.

His next objection was, that the reasons which would make the receipt

312 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

of bank-notes unconstitutional, would also make the China trade so, which
he represented as absorbing a large portion of the specie of the country.
There is no analogy whatever between the two cases. The very object
of specie is to carry on trade, and it would be idle to attempt to regulate
the distribution and fluctuation which result from its operation. Expe
rience proves that all attempts of the kind must either prove abortive or
mischievous. In fact, it may be laid down as a law, that the more uni
versal the demand for specie, and the less that demand is interrupted, the
more steady and uniform its value, and the more perfectly, of course, it
fulfils the great purpose of circulation, for which it was intended. There
are, however, not a few who, taking a different view, have thought it to
be the duty of the government to prohibit the exportation of specie to
China, on the very ground which the senator assumes, and I am not cer
tain but that he himself has been in favour of the measure.

But the senator did not restrict himself to a reply to my arguments.
He introduced personal remarks, which neither self-respect, nor a regard
to the cause I support, will permit me to pass without notice, as adverse
as I am to all personal controversies. Not only my education and dis
position, but, above all, my conception of the duties belonirig to the sta
tion I occupy, indisposes me to such controversies. We are sent here,
not to wrangle or indulge in personal afouse, but to deliberate and decide
on the common interests of the states of this Union, as far as they have
been subjected by the Constitution to our jurisdiction. Thus thinking
and feeling, and having perfect confidence in the cause I support, I ad
dressed myself, when 1 was last up, directly and exclusively to the rea
son of the body, carefully avoiding every remark which had the least per
sonal or party bearing. In proof of this, I appeal to you, senators, my
witnesses on this occasion. But it seems that no caution on my part
could prevent what I was so anxious to avoid. The senator, having no
pretext to give a personal direction to the discussion, made a premedi
tated and gratuitous attack on me. I say having no pretext, for there is
not a shadow of foundation for the assertion that I called on him and his
party to follow my lead, at which he seemed to take offence, as I have
already shown. I made no such call, or anything that could be construed
into it. It would have been impertinent, in the relation between myself
and his party, at any stage of this question ; and absurd at that late period,
when every senator had made up his mind. As there was, then, neither
provocation nor pretext, what could be the motive of the senator in making
the attack'? It could not be to indulge in the pleasure of personal abuse,
the lowest and basest of all our passions, and which is so far beneath the dig
nity of J;he senator's character and station. Nor could it be with the view
to intimidation. The senator knows me too long and too well to make such
an attempt. I am sent here by constituents as respectable as those he
represents, in order to watch over their peculiar interests, and take care
of the general concern ; and if I were capable of being deterred by any
one, or any consequence, in discharging my duty, from denouncing what
I regard as dangerous or corrupt, or giving a decided and zealous sup
port to what I think right and expedient, I would, in shame and confu
sion, return my commission to the patriotic and gallant state I represent,
to be placed in more resolute and trustworthy hands.

If, then, neither the one nor the other of these be the motive, what, I
again repeat, can it be 1 In casting my eyes over the whale surface, I
can see but one — which is, that the senator, despairing of the sufficiency
of his reply to overthrow my arguments, had resorted to personalities, in
the hope, with their aid, to effect what he could not accomplish by main
strength. He well knows that the force of an argument on moral or po-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 31 3~

Jitical subjects depends greatly on the character of him who advanced it;
and that, to cast suspicion on his motive, or to shake confidence in his un
derstanding, is often the most effectual mode to destroy its force. Thus
viewed, his personalities may be fairly regarded as constituting a part
of his reply to my argument ; and we, accordingly, find the senator throw
ing them in front, like a skilful general, in order to weaken my arguments
before he brought on his main attack. In repelling, then, his personal
attacks, I also defend the cause which I advocate. It is against that his
blows are aimed, and he strikes at it through me, because he believes his
blows will be the more effectual.

Having given this direction to his reply, he has imposed on me a double
duty to repel his attacks — duty to myself and the cause I support. I shall
not decline its performance $ and when it is discharged, I trust I shall
have placed my character as far beyond the darts which he has hurled at
it as my arguments have proved to be above his abilities to reply to them.
In doing this, I shall be compelled to speak of myself. No one can be
more sensible than I am how odious it is to speak of one's self. I shall
endeavour to confine myself within the limits of the strictest propriety ;
but if anything should escape me that may wound the most delicate ear,
the odium ought, in justice, to fall, not on me, but the senator who, by
his unprovoked and wanton attack, has imposed on me the painful neces
sity of speaking of myself.

The leading charge of the senator — that on which all others depend,
and which, being overthrown, they fall to the ground — is, that I have gone
over $ have left his side, and joined the other. By this vague and indef
inite expression, I presume he meant to imply that I had either changed
my opinion, or abandoned my principles, or deserted my party. If he did
not mean one or all ; if I have changed neither opinions, principles, nor
party, then the charge meant nothing deserving notice. But if he in
tended to imply, what I have presumed he did, I take issue on the fact —
I meet and repel the charge. It happened fortunately for me, fortunately
for the cause of truth and justice, that it was not the first time that I had
offered my sentiments on the question now under consideration. There
is scarcely a single point in the present issue on which I did not expli
citly express my opinion four years ago, in my place here, when the re
moval of the deposites, and the questions connected with it, were under
discussion — so explicitly as to repel effectually the charge of any change
on my part, and to make it impossible for me to pursue any other course
but what I have without involving myself in gross inconsistency. I in
tend not to leave so important a point to rest on my bare assertion.
What I assert stands on record, which I now hold in my possession, and
intend, at the proper time, to introduce and read. But, before I do that,
it will be proper I should state the questions now at issue, and my course
in relation to them ; so that, having a clear and distinct perception of
them, you may, senators, readily and satisfactorily compare and deter
mine whether my course on the present occasion coincides with the opin
ions I then expressed.

There are three questions, as is agreed by all, involved in the present
issue : Shall we separate the government from the banks, or shall we re
vive the league of state banks, or create a National Bank 1 My opinion?
and course in reference to each are well known. 1 prefer the separation,
to either of the others ; and, as between the other two, I regard a Na*
tional Bank as a more efficient and a less corrupting fiscal agent than u.
league of state banks. It is also well known that I have expressed my
self on the present occasion hostile to the banking system as it exists,
and against the constitutional power of making a bank, unless on the as-

R R

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

sumption that we have the right to receive and treat bank-notes as cash
in our fiscal operations, which I, for the first time, have denied on the
present occasion. Now, I entertained and expressed all these opinions,
on a different occasion, four years ago, except the right of receiving bank-
•notes, in regard to which I then reserved my opinion ; and if all this should
be fully and clearly established by the record, from speeches delivered
and published at the time, the charge of the senator must, in the opinion
of all, however prejudiced, sink to the ground. I am now prepared to
introduce and have the record read. I delivered two speeches in the
session of 1833-34, one on the removal of the deposites, and the other
on the question of the renewal of the charter of the late Bank. I ask the
secretary to turn to the volume lying before him, and read the three
paragraphs marked in my speech on the deposites. I will thank him to
raise his voice and read slowly, so that he may be distinctly heard ; and
I must ask you, senators, to give your attentive hearing, for on the coin
cidence between my opinions then and my course now, my vindication
against this unprovoked and groundless charge rests.

[" If (said Mr. C.) this was a question of bank or no bank j if it involved
the existence of the banking- system, it would indeed be a great question
— one of the first magnitude ; and, with my present impression, long en
tertained and daily increasing, I would hesitate, long hesitate, before I
would be found under the banner of the system. I have great doubts (if
doubts they maybe called) as to the soundness and tendency of the whole
system, in all its modifications. I have great fears that it will be found
hostile to liberty and the advance of civilization ; fatally hostile to liberty
in our country, where the system exists in its worst and most dangerous
form. Of all institutions affecting the great question of the distribution
of wealth — a question least explored, and the most important of any in
the whole range of political economy — the banking institution has, if not
the greatest, among the greatest, and, I fear, most pernicious influence on
the mode of distribution. Were the question really before us, I would
not shun the responsibility, great as it might be, of freely and fully offer
ing my sentiments on these deeply-important points ; but as it is, I must
content myself with the few remarks which I have thrown out.

" What, then, is the real question which now agitates the country 1 I
answer, it is a struggle between the executive and legislative departments
of the government ; a struggle, not in relation to the existence of the
•Lank, but which, Congress or the President, should have the power to
•create a bank, and the consequent control over the currency of the coun
try. This is the real question. Let us not deceive ourselves. This
league, this association of banks, created by the executive, bound to
gether by its influence, united in common articles of association, vivified
and sustained by receiving the deposites of the public money, and having
their notes converted, by being received everywhere by the treasury,
into the common currency of the country, is, to all intents and purposes,
•a Bank of the United States, the Executive Bank of the United States, as
distinguished from that of Congress.

" However it might fail to perform satisfactorily the useful functions
of the Bank of the United States, as incorporated by law, it would outstrip
it, far outstrip it, in all its dangerous qualities : in extending the power,
the influence, and the corruption of the government. It is impossible
to conceive any institution more admirably calculated to advance these
objects. Not only the selected banks, but the whole banking institutions
of the country, and, with them, the entire money power, for the purposes
-of speculation, peculation, and corruption, would be placed under the
control of the executive. A system of menaces and promises would be

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 315

established : of menaces to the banks in possession of the deposites, but
which might not be entirely subservient to executive views, and of prom
ises of future favours to those who may not as yet enjoy its favours.
Between the two, the banks would be left without influence, honour, or
honesty, and a system of speculation and stock-jobbing would commence
unequalled in the annals of our country.

" So long as the question is one between a Bank of the United States,
incorporated by Congress, and that system of banks which has been cre
ated by the will of the executive, it is an insult to the understanding to
discourse on the pernicious tendency and unconstitutionality of the Bank
of the United States. To bring up that question fairly and legitimately,
you must go one step farther — you must divorce the government and the
banking system. You must refuse all connexion with banks. You must
neither receive nor pay away bank-notes ; you must go back to the old
system of the strong box, and of gold and silver. If you have a right to
receive bank-notes at all — to treat them as money by receiving them in
your dues, or paying them away to creditors — you have a right to create
a bank. Whatever the government receives and treats as money is
money ; and if it be money, then they have the right, under the Consti
tution, to regulate it. Nay, they are bound, by a high obligation, to adopt
the most efficient means, according to the nature of that which they have
recognised as money, to give to it the utmost stability and uniformity of
value. And if it be in the shape of bank-notes, the most efficient means
of giving those qualities is a Bank of the United States, incorporated by
Congress. Unless you give the highest practical uniformity to the value
of bank-notes — so long as you receive them in your dues and treat them
as money, you violate that provision of the Constitution which provides
that taxation shall be uniform throughout the United States. There is
no other alternative. I repeat, you must divorce the government entirely
from the banking system, or, if not, you are bound to incorporate a bank,
as the only safe and efficient means of giving stability and uniformity to
the currency. And should the deposites not be restored, and the present
illegal and unconstitutional connexion between the executive and the
league of banks continue, I shall feel it my duty, if no one else moves, to
introduce a measure to prohibit government from receiving or touching
bank-notes in any shape whatever, as the only means left of giving safety
and stability to the currency, and saving the country from corruption and
ruin."

Such were my sentiments, delivered four years ago, on the question of
the removal of the deposites, and now standing on record; and I now
call your attention, senators, while they are fresh in your minds, and be
fore other extracts are read, to the opinions I then entertained and ex
pressed, in order that you may compare them with those that I have ex
pressed, and the course I have pursued on the present occasion. In the
first place, I then expressed myself explicitly and decidedly against the
banking system, and intimated, in language too strong to be mistaken,
that, if the question was then bank or no bank, as it now is, as far as
government is concerned, I would not be found on the side of the bank.
Now, I ask, I appeal to the candour of all, even the most prejudiced, is
there anything in all this contradictory to my present opinions or course 1
On the contrary, having entertained and expressed these opinions, could
I at this time, when the issue I then supposed is actually presented, have
gone against the separation without gross inconsistency I Again : I then
declared myself to be utterly opposed to a combination or league of state
banks, as being the most efficient and corrupting fiscal agent the govern
ment could select, and more objectionable than a Bank of the United

316 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

States. I again appeal, is there a sentiment or a word in all this contra
dictory to what I have said or done on the present occasion 1 So far
otherwise, is there not a perfect harmony and coincidence throughout,
which, considering the distance of time and the difference of the occasion,
is truly remarkable, and this extending to all the great and governing
questions now at issue 1

But the removal of the deposites was not the only question discussed
at that remarkable and important session. The charter of the United
States Bank was then about to expire. The senator from Massachusetts
nearest me (Mr. Webster), then at the head of the Committee on Finance,
suggested, in his place, that he intended to introduce a bill to renew the
charter. I clearly perceived that the movement, if made, would fail ; and
that there was no prospect of doing anything to arrest the danger ap
proaching, unless the subject was taken up on the broad question of the
currency ; and that, if any connexion of the government with the banks
could be justified at all, it must be in that relation. I am not among
those who believe that the currency was in a sound condition when the
deposites were removed in 1834. I then believed, and experience has
proved I was correct, that it was deeply and dangerously diseased ; and
that the most efficient measures were- necessary to prevent the catas
trophe which has since befallen the circulation of the country. There
was then not more than one dollar in specie, on an average, in the banks,
including the United States Bank and all, for six of bank-notes in circu
lation, and not more than one in eleven compared to the liabilities of the
banks, and this while the United States Bank was in full and active oper
ation, which proves conclusively that its charter ought not to be re
newed, if renewed at all, without great modifications. I saw, also, that
the expansion of the circulation, great as it then was, must still farther
increase ; that the disease lay deep in the system ; that the terms on
which the charter of the Bank of England was renewed would give a
western direction to specie, which, instead of correcting the disorder, by
substituting specie for bank-notes in our circulation, would become the
basis of new banking operations that would greatly increase the swelling
tide. Such were my conceptions then, and I honestly and earnestly en
deavoured to carry them into effect, in order to prevent the approaching
catastrophe.

The political and personal relations between myself and the senator
from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster) were then not the kindest. We stood
in opposition, at the preceding session, on the great question growing out
of the conflict between the state I represented and the General Govern
ment, which could not pass away without leaving unfriendly feelings on both
sides ; but, where duty is involved, I am not in the habit of permitting
my personal relations to interfere. In my solicitude to avert coming
dangers, I sought an interview, through a common friend, in order to com
pare opinions as to the proper course to be pursued. We met, and con
versed freely and fully, but parted without agreeing. I expressed to him
my deep regret at our disagreement, and informed him that, although I
could not agree with him, I would throw no embarrassment in his way,
but should feel it to be my duty, when he made his motion to introduce
a bill to renew the charter of the Bank, to express my opinion at large
on the state of the currency, and the proper course to be pursued, which
I accordingly did. On that memorable occasion I stood almost alone.
One party supported the league of state banks, and the other the United
States Bank, the charter of which the senator from Massachusetts (Mr.
Webster) proposed to renew for six years. Nothing was left me but
to place myself distinctly before the country on the ground I occupied,

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOTTN. 317

which I did, fully and explicitly, in the speech I delivered on the occasion.
In justice to myself, I ought to have every word of it read on the pres
ent occasion. It would of itself be a full vindication of my course.
I stated and enlarged on all the points to which I have already referred;
objected to the recharter as proposed by the mover, and foretold that
what has since happened would follow, unless something effectual was
done to prevent it. As a remedy, I proposed to use the Bank of the
United States as a temporary expedient, fortified with strong guards, in
order to resist and turn back the swelling tide of circulation. With this
view, I proposed to prohibit the issue of any note under ten dollars at
first, and, after a certain interval, under twenty j and to refuse to receive
the notes of any bank that issued notes under five dollars, or that re
ceived the notes of any bank that issued less, in order to make a total
separation between the banks that should refuse to discontinue the issue
of small notes and the others, in the hope that the influence of the latter,
with the voice of the community, would ultimately compel a discontinu
ance. I proposed that the charter, with these and other provisions that
might be devised by a committee appointed for the purpose, should be
renewed for twelve years, two years longer than the Bank of England
had been, in order to avail ourselves of the experience and wisdom
of that great and enlightened nation. All this I proposed, expressly
on the ground of undoing the system, gradually and slowly, until a total
disconnexion should be effected, if experience should show that it could
be carried to that extent. My object was double — to get clear of the sys
tem, and to avert the catastrophe which has since befallen us, and which
I then saw was approaching.

To prove all this, I again refer to the record. If it shall appear from it
that my object was to disconnect the government, gradually and cau
tiously, from the banking system, and with that view, and that only, I
proposed to use the United States Bank for a short time, and that I ex
plicitly expressed the same opinions then as I now have on almost every
point connected with the system, I shall not only have vindicated my
character from the charge of the senator from Kentucky, but shall do
more, much more, to show that I did all an individual, standing alone, as
I did, could do, to avert the present calamities, and, of course, am free
from all responsibility for what has since happened. I have shortened
the extracts as far as was possible to do myself justice, and have left out
much that ought, of right, to be read in my defence, rather than to weary
the Senate. I know how difficult it is to command attention to reading
of documents; but I trust that this, where justice to a member of the
body, whose character has been assailed without the least provocation,
will form an exception. The extracts are numbered, and I will thank the
secretary to pause at the end of each, unless otherwise desired.

[The secretary here read the following extract :

"After a full survey of the whole subject, I see none, I can conjec
ture no means of extricating the country from its present danger, and
to arrest its farther increase, but a bank, the agency of which, in some
form or under some authority, is indispensable. The country has been
brought into the present diseased state of the currency by banks, and
must be extricated by their agency. We must, in a word, use a bank to
unbank the banks, to the extent that may be necessary to restore a safe
and stable currency ; just as we apply snow to a frozen limb in order to
restore vitality and circulation, or hold up a burn to the flame to extract the
inflammation. All must see that it is impossible to suppress the banking
system at once. It must continue for a time. Its greatest enemies, and
the advocates of an exclusive specie circulation, must make it a part of

318 SPEECHES OF JOHN CU CALHOUN.

their system to tolerate the banks for a longer or a shorter period. To
suppress them at once would, if it were possible, work a greater revolu
tion — a greater change in the relative condition of the various classes of
the community, than would the conquest of the country by a savage ene
my. What, then, must be done 1 I answer, a new and safe system must
gradually grow up under and replace the old ; imitating, in this respect,
the beautiful process we sometimes see of a wounded or diseased part in
a living organic body gradually superseded by the healing process of
nature."]

After having so expressed myself, which clearly shows that my object
was to use the bank for a time in such a manner as to break the con
nexion with the system without a shock to the country or currency, I
then proceeded and examined the question, whether this could be best
accomplished by the renewal of the charter of the United States Bank,
or through a league of state banks. After concluding what I had to say
on that subject, in my deep solicitude I addressed the three parties in the
Senate separately, urging such motives as I thought best calculated to
act on them, and pressing them to join me in the measure suggested, in
order to avert approaching danger. I began with my friends of the State
Eights party, and with the administration. I have taken copious extracts
from the address to the first, which will clearly prove how exactly my
opinion, then and now, coincides on all questions connected with the banks.
I now ask the secretary to read the extract numbered two.

["Having now stated the measure necessary to apply the remedy, I am
thus brought to the question, Can the measure succeed'? which brings up
the inquiry of how far it may be expected to receive the support of the
several parties which compose the Senate, and on which I shall next pro
ceed to make a few remarks.

" First, then, Can the State Rights party give it their support 1 that party
of which I am proud of being a member, and for which I entertain so
strong an attachment — the stronger because we are few among many.
In proposing this question, I am not ignorant of their long-standing con
stitutional objection to the Bank, on the ground that this was intended to
be, as it is usually expressed, a hard-money government — a government
whose circulating medium was intended to consist of the precious metals,
and for which object the power of coining money and regulating the value
thereof was expressly conferred by the Constitution. I know how long
and how sincerely this opinion has been entertained, and under how many
difficulties it has been maintained. It is not my intention to attempt to
change an opinion so firmly fixed, but I may be permitted to make a few
observations, in order to present what appears to me to be the true ques
tion in reference to this constitutional point — in order that we may fully
comprehend the circumstances under which we are placed in reference
to it. With this view, I do not deem it necessary to inquire whether, in
conferring the power to coin money and to regulate the value thereof,
the Constitution intended to limit the power strictly to coining money
and regulating its value, or whether it intended to confer a more general
power over the currency j nor do I intend to inquire whether the word
coin is limited simply to the metals, or may be extended to other sub
stances, if, through a gradual change, they may become the medium of
the general circulation of the world.

" The very receipt of bank-notes, on the part of the government, in its
dues, would, it is conceded, make them money as far as the government
may be concerned, and, by a necessary consequence, would make them, to a
great extent, the currency of the country. I say nothing of the positive
provisions in the Constitution which declare that ' all duties, imposts, and

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 319

excises shall be uniform throughout the United States,' which cannot be,
unless that in which they are paid should also have, as nearly as prac
ticable, a uniform value throughout the country. To effect this, where
bank-notes are received, the banking power is necessary and proper with
in the meaning of the Constitution; and, consequently, if the government
has the right to receive bank-notes in its dues, the power becomes con
stitutional. Here lies (said Mr. C.) the real constitutional question : Has
the government a right to receive bank-notes, or not 1 The question is
not upon the mere power of incorporating a bank, as it has been com
monly argued ; though, even in that view, there would be as great a con
stitutional objection to any act on the part of the executive, or any other
branch of the government, which should unite any association of state
banks into one system, as the means of giving the uniformity and stability
to the currency which the Constitution intends to confer. The very act
of so associating or incorporating them into one, by whatever name called,
or by whatever department performed, would be, in fact, an act of incor
poration.

" But (said Mr. C.) my object, as I have stated, is not to discuss the
constitutional questions, nor to determine whether the Bank be constitu
tional or not. It is, I repeat, to show where the difficulty lies — a diffi
culty which I have felt from the time I first came into the public service.
I found then, as now, the currency of the country consisting almost en
tirely of bank-notes. I found the government intimately connected with
the system, receiving bank-notes in its dues, ana! paying them away, under
its appropriations, as cash. The fact was beyond my control ; it existed
long before my time, and without my agency ; and I was compelled to
act on the fact as it existed, without deciding on the many questions
which I have suggested as connected with this subject, and on many of
which I have never yet formed a definite opinion. No one can pay less
regard to precedent than I do, acting here in my representative and de
liberative character, on legal or constitutional questions ; but I have felt,
from the beginning, the full force of the distinction so sensibly taken by
the senator from Virginia (Mr. Leigh) between doing and undoing an act,
and which he so strongly illustrated in the case of the purchase of Lou
isiana. The constitutionality of that act was doubted by many at the
time, and, among others, by its author himself; yet he would be consid
ered a madman who, coming into political life at this late period, should
now seriously take up the question of the constitutionality of the purchase,
and, coming to the conclusion that it was unconstitutional, should propose
to rescind the act, and eject from the Union two flourishing states and a
growing territory."]

^ I next ask the attention of the senators, especially from the Northern
States, while the secretary reads the short address to the opposition, that
they may see how distinctly I foresaw what was coming, and how anx
ious I was to avert the calamity that has fallen on the section where I
anticipated it would. I ask the secretary to read the extract numbered
three.

[" I next address myself to the members of the opposition, who princi
pally represent the commercial and manufacturing portions of the coun
try, where the banking system has been the farthest extended, and where
a larger portion of the property exists in the shape of credit than in any
other section ; arid to whom a sound, stable currency is most necessary,
and the opposite most dangerous. You have no constitutional objection;
to you it is a mere question of expediency ; viewed in this light, can you
vote for the proposed measure'? a measure designed to arrest the ap
proach of events which I have demonstrated must, if not arrested, create

320 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

convulsions and revolutions j and to correct a disease which must, if not
corrected, subject the currency to continued agitations and fluctuations,
and in order to give that permanence, stability, and uniformity, which are
so essential to your prosperity. To effect this may require some dimi
nution on the profits of banking, some temporary sacrifice of interest ;
but, if such should be the fact, it will be compensated in more than a hun
dred-fold proportion, by increased security and durable prosperity. If
the system must advance in the present course without a check, and if
explosion must follow, remember that where you stand will be the crater ;
should the system quake, under your feet the chasm will open that will
ingulf your institutions and your prosperity."]

I regret to trespass on the patience of the Senate, but I wish, in justice
to myself, to ask their attention to one more, which, though not imme
diately relating to the question under consideration, is not irrelevant to
my vindication. I not only expressed my opinions freely in relation to
the currency and the Bank, in the speech from which such copious ex
tracts have been read, but had the precaution to define my political posi
tion distinctly in reference to the political parties of the day, and the
course I would pursue in relation to each. I then, as now, belonged to
the party to which it is my glory ever to have been attached exclusively;
and avowed, explicitly, that I belonged to neither of the two parties, op
position or administration, then contending for superiority, which of itself
ought to go far to repel the charge of the senator from Kentucky, that I
have gone over from one party to the other. The secretary will read the
last extract.

[" I am the partisan, as I have said, of no class, nor, let me add, of any
political party. I am neither of the opposition nor of the administration.
If I act with the former in any instance, it is because I approve of their
course on the particular occasion ; and I shall always be happy to act
with them when I do approve. If I oppose the administration ; if I desire
to see power change hands, it is because I disapprove of the general
course of those in authority ; because they have departed from the prin
ciples on which they came into office ; because, instead of using the im
mense power and patronage put into their hands to secure the liberty of
the country and advance the public good, they have perverted them into
party instruments for personal objects. But mine has not been, nor will
it be, a systematic opposition. Whatever measure of theirs I may deem
right, I shall cheerfully support, and I only desire that they shall afford
me more frequent occasions for support, and fewer for opposition, than
they have heretofore done."]

Such, senators, are my recorded sentiments in 1834. They are full and
explicit on all the questions involved in the present issue, and prove, be
yond the possibility of doubt, that I have changed no opinion, abandoned
no principle, nor deserted any party. I stand now on the ground I stood
on then ; and, of course, if my relations to the two opposing parties are
changed — if I now act with those that I then opposed, and oppose those
with whom I then acted, the change is not in me. I, at least, have stood
still. In saying this, I accuse none of changing. I leave others to ex
plain their position now and then, if they deem explanation necessary.
But, if I may be permitted to state my opinion, I would say that the
change is rather in the questions and the circumstances than in the opin
ions or principles of either of the parties. The opposition were then,
and are now, National Bank men ,• and the administration, in like man
ner, were anti-national bank, and in favour of a league of state banks ;
•while I preferred then, as now, the former to the latter, and a divorce
from banks to either. When the experiment of the league failed, the ad-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 321

ministration were reduced to the option between a National Bank and a
divorce. They chose the latter, and such, I have no reason to doubt,
would have been their choice had the option been the same four years
ago. Nor have I any doubt, had the option been then between a league of
banks and divorce, the opposition then, as now, would have been in favour
of the league. In all this there is more apparent than real change. As
to myself, there has been neither. If I acted with the opposition and op
posed the administration then, it was because I was openly opposed to
the removal of the deposites and the league of banks, as I now am ; and
if I now act with the latter and oppose the former, it is because I am now,
as then, in favour of a divorce, and opposed to either a league of state
banks or a National Bank, except, indeed, as the means of effecting a di
vorce gradually and safely. What, then, is my offence ^ What but re
fusing to abandon my first choice, the divorce from the banks, because
the administration has selected it, and of going with the opposition for a
National Bank, to which I have been, and am still opposed ! That is all ;
and for this I am charged with going over — leaving one party and joining
the other.

Had some guardian angel, Mr. President, whispered in my ear at the
time, "Be cautious what you say; this question will not terminate here;
four years hence it will be revived under very different circumstances,
when your principles and duty will compel you to act with those you
now oppose, and oppose those with whom you now act, and when you
will be charged with desertion of principles/' I could not have guarded
myself more effectually than I have done. Yet, in the face of all this, the
senator has not only made the charge, but has said in his place, that he
heard, for the first time in his life, at the extra session, that 1 was opposed
to a National Bank ! I could place the senator in a dilemma from which
there is no possibility of escape. I might say to him, you have either
forgot or not what I said in 1834. If you have not, how can you justify
yourself in making the charge you have'? But if you have — if you have
forgot what is so recent, and what, from the magnitude of the question
and the importance of the occasion, was so well calculated to impress itself
on your memory, what possible value can be attached to your recollection
or opinions as to my course on more remote and less memorable occa
sions, on which you have undertaken to impeach my conduct 1 He may
take his choice.

Having now established, by the record, that I have changed no opinion,
abandoned no principle, nor deserted any party, the charge of the senator,
with all the aspersions with which he accompanied it, falls prostrate to
the earth. Here I might leave the subject and close my vindication. But
I choose not. I shall follow the senator up, step by step, in his unprovoked,
and, I may now add, groundless attack, with blows not less decisive and
victorious.

The senator next proceeded to state that, in a certain document (if he
named it I did not hear him), I assigned, as the reason why I could not
join in the attack on the administration, that the benefit of the victory
would not inure to myself or my party, or, as he explained himself, be
cause it would not place myself and them in power. I presume he refer
red to a letter in answer to an invitation to a public dinner offered me by
my old and faithful friends and constituents of Edgefield, in approbation
of my course at the extra session.

[Mr. Clay : " I do."]

The pressure of domestic engagements would not permit me to accept
their invitation ; and, in declining it, I deemed it due to them and myself to
explain my course, in its political and party bearing, more fully than I had

Ss

322 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

done' in debate. They had a right to know my reasons, and I expressed
myself with the frankness due to the long and uninterrupted confidence
that had ever existed between us.

Having made these explanatory remarks, I now proceed to meet the
assertion of the senator. I again take issue on the fact. I assigned no
such reason as the senator attributes to me. I never dreamed nor thought
of such a one ; nor can any force of construction extort it from what I
said. No : my object was not power or place, either for myself or party.
It was far more humble and honest. It was to save ourselves and our
principles from being absorbed and lost in a party more numerous and
powerful, but differing from us on almost every principle and question of
policy.

When the suspension of specie payments took place in May last (not
unexpected to me)^I immediately turned my attention earnestly to the
event, considering it as one pregnant with great and lasting conse
quences. Reviewing the whole ground, I saw nothing to change in the
opinions and principles I had avowed in 1834, and I determined to carry
them out as far as circumstances and my ability would enable me. But
I saw that my course must be influenced by the position which the two
great contending parties might take in reference to the question. I did
not doubt that the opposition would rally either on a National Bank or a
combination of state banks, with Mr. Biddle's at the head, but I was
wholly uncertain what course the administration would adopt, and re
mained so until the message of the President was received and read by
the secretary at his table. When I saw he went for a divorce. I never
hesitated a moment. Not only my opinions and principles, long en
tertained, and, as I have shown, fully expressed years ago, but the high
est political motives, left me no alternative. I perceived, at once, that
the object, to accomplish which we had acted in concert with the oppo
sition, had ceased ; executive usurpations had come to an end for the
present ; and that the struggle with the administration was no longer for
power, but to save themselves. I also clearly saw, that if we should unite
with the opposition in their attack on the administration, the victory over
them, in the position they occupied, would be a victory over us and our
principles. It required no sagacity to see that such would be the result.
It was as plain as day. The administration had taken position, as I have
shown, on the very ground I occupied in 1834, and which the whole
State Rights party had taken, at the same time, in the other house, as its
journals will prove. The opposition, under the banner of the Bank, were
moving against them, for the very reason that they had taken the ground
they did.

Now, I ask, What would have been the result if we had joined in the
attack 1 No one can now doubt that the victory over those in power
would have been certain and decisive, nor would the consequences have
been the least doubtful. The first fruit would have been a National Bank.
The principles of the opposition, and the very object of the attack, would
have necessarily led to that. We would have been not only too feeble
to resist, but would have been committed by joining in the attack with its
avowed object to go for one, while those who supported the administra
tion would have been scattered to the winds. We should then have had a
bank — that is clear ; nor is it less certain that in its train there would
have followed all the consequences which have, and ever will follow,
when tried — high duties, overflowing revenue, extravagant expenditures,
large surpluses ; in a word, all those disastrous consequences which have
well near overthrown our institutions, and involved the country in its
present difficulties. The influence of the institution, the known princi-

* SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 323

pies and policy of the opposition, and the utter prostration of the adminis
tration party, and the absorption of ours, would have led to these results
as certainly as we exist.

I now appeal, senators, to your candour and justice, and ask, Could I,
having all these consequences before me, with my known opinions, and
that of the party to which I belong, and to which only I owe fidelity,
have acted differently from what I did 1 Would not any other course have
justly exposed me to the charge of having abandoned my principles and
party, with which I am now accused so unjustly 1 Nay, would it not
have been worse than folly — been madness in me to have taken any
other ? And yet, the grounds which I have assumed in this exposition
are the very reasons assigned in my letter, and which the senator has per
verted, most unfairly and unjustly, into the pitiful, personal, and selfish
reason which he has attributed to me. Confirmative of what I say, I
again appeal to the record. The secretary will read the paragraph marked
in my Edgefield letter, to which, I presume, the senator alluded.

[" As soon as I saw this state of things, I clearly perceived that a very
important question was presented for our determination, which we were
compelled to decide forthwith — Shall we continue pur joint attack with
the nationals on those in power,, in the new position which they have
been compelled to occupy 1 It was clear, with our joint forces, we could
utterly overthrow and demolish them, but it was not less clear that the
victory would inure, not to us, but exclusively to the benefit of our allies
and their cause. They were the most numerous and powerful, and the
point of assault on the position which the party to be assaulted had taken
in relation to the banks would have greatly strengthened the settled prin
ciples and policy of the national party, and weakened, in the same degree,
ours. They are, and ever have been, the decided advocates of a National
Bank, and are now in favour of one with a capital so ample as to be suf
ficient to control the state institutions, and to regulate the currency and
exchanges of the country. To join them, with their avowed object, in
the attack to overthrow those in power, on the ground they occupied
against a bank, would, of course, not only have placed the government
and country in their hands without opposition, but would have committed
us, beyond the possibility of extrication, for a bank, and absorbed our
party in the ranks of the National Republicans. The first fruits of the
victory would have been an overshadowing National Bank, with an im
mense capital, not less than from fifty to a hundred millions, which would
have centralized the currency and exchanges, and with them the com
merce and capital of the country, in whatever section the head of the in
stitution might be placed. The next would be the indissoluble union with
political opponents, whose principles and policy are so opposite to ours,
and so dangerous to our institutions, as well as oppressive to us."]

I now ask, Is there anything in this extract which will warrant the con
struction that the senator has attempted to force on it 1 Is it not mani
fest that the expression on which he fixes, that the victory would inure,
not to us, but exclusively to the benefit of the opposition, alludes not to
power or place, but to principle and policy 1 Can words be more plain 1
What, then, becomes of all the aspersions of the senator, his reflections
about selfishness and the want of patriotism, and his allusions and illus
trations to give them force and effect 1 They fall to the ground, without
deserving a notice, with his groundless accusation.

But, in so premeditated and indiscriminate an attack, it could not be
expected that my motives 'would entirely escape, and we accordingly find
the senator very charitably leaving it to time to disclose my motive for
going over. Leave it to time to disclose my motive for going over ! I,

324: SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

who have changed no opinion, abandoned no principle, and deserted no
party; I, who have stood still and maintained my ground against every
difficulty, to be told that it is left to time to disclose my motive ! The
imputation sinks to the earth, with the groundless charge on which it
rests. I stamp it, with scorn, in the dust. I pick up the dart, which fell
harmless at my feet. I hurl it back. What the senator charges on me
unjustly, he has actually done. He went over on a memorable occasion,
and did not leave it to time to disclose his motive.

The senator next tells us that I bore a character for stern fidelity,
which he accompanied with remarks implying that I had forfeited it by
my course on the present occasion. If he means by stern fidelity a de
voted attachment to duty and principle, which nothing can overcome, the
character is indeed a high one, and, I trust, not entirely unmerited. I
have, at least, the authority of the senator himself for saying that it be
longed to me before the present occasion, and it is, of course, incumbent
on him to show that I have since forfeited it. He will find the task a
Herculean one. It would be by far more easy to show the opposite — that,
instead of forfeiting, I have strengthened my title to the character ; in
stead of abandoning any principles, I have firmly adhered to them, and
that, too, under the most appalling difficulties. If I were to select an in
stance in the whole course of my life on which, above all others, to rest
my claim to the character which the senator attributed to me, it would
be this very one, which he has selected to prove that I have forfeited it.
I acted with the full knowledge of the difficulties I had to encounter, and
the responsibility I must incur. I saw a great and powerful party, prob
ably the most powerful in the country, eagerly seizing on the catastrophe
which had befallen the currency, and the consequent embarrassments
that followed, to displace those in power, against whom they had been
long contending. I saw that, to stand between them and their object, I
must necessarily incur their deep and lasting displeasure. I also saw
that, to maintain the administration in the position they had taken, to
separate the government from the banks, I would draw down on me, with
the exception of some of the Southern banks, the whole weight of that
extensive, concentrated, and powerful interest — the most powerful by far
of any in the whole community ; and thus I would unite against me a
combination of political and moneyed influence almost irresistible. Nor
was this all. I could not but see that, however pure and disinterested
my motives, and however consistent my course with all I had evor said
or done, I should be exposed to the very charges and aspersions which I
am now repelling. The ease with which they could be made, and the
temptation to make them, I saw were too great to be resisted by the
'party morality of the day, as groundless as I have demonstrated them to
be. But there was another consequence that I could not but foresee, far
more painful to me than all others. I but too clearly saw that, in so sud
den and complex a juncture, called on as I was to decide on my course
instantly, as it were, on the field of battle, without consultation or ex
plaining my reasons, I would estrange for a time many of my political
friends, who had passed through with me so many trials and difficulties,
and for whom I. feel a brother's love. But I saw before me the path of
duty ; and, though rugged, and hedged on all sides with these and many
other difficulties, I did not hesitate a moment to take it. Yes, alone, as
the senator sneeringly says. After I had made up my mind as to my course,
in a conversation with a friend about the responsibility I would assume,
he remarked that my own state might desert me. I replied that it was
not impossible ; but the result has proved that I under-estimated the intel
ligence and patriotism of my virtuous and noble state. I ask her pardon

. ^ SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 325

for the distrust implied in my answer ; but I ask, with assurance it will be
granted, on the grounds I shall put it — that, in being prepared to sacrifice
her confidence, as dear to me as light and life, rather than disobey, on
this great question, the dictates of my judgment and conscience, I proved
myself not unworthy of being her representative.

But if the senator, in attributing to me stern fidelity, meant, not devo
tion to principle, but to party, and especially the party of which he is so
prominent a member, my answer is, that I never belonged to his party,
nor owed it any fidelity; and, of course, could forfeit, in reference to it,
£ no character for fidelity. It is true, we acted in concert against what we
• believed to be the usurpations of the executive ; and it is true that, during
the time, I saw much to esteem in those with whom I acted, and con
tracted friendly relations with many, which I shall not be the first to
forget. It is also true that a common party designation was applied to
the opposition in the aggregate, not, however, with my approbation ; but
it is no less true that it was universally known that it consisted of two
distinct parties, dissimilar in principle and policy, except in relation to
the object for which they had united: the National Republican party, and
the portion of the State Rights party which had separated from the ad
ministration, on the ground that it had departed from the true principles
of the original party. That I belonged exclusively to that detached portion,
and to neither the opposition nor administration party, I prove by my ex
plicit declaration, contained in one of the extracts read from my speech
on the currency in 1834*. That the party generally, and the state which
I represent in part, stood aloof from both of the parties, may be estab
lished from the fact that they refused to mingle in the party and political
contests of the day. My state withheld her electoral vote in two succes
sive presidential elections ; and, rather than bestow it on either the
senator from Kentucky, or the distinguished citizen whom he opposed,
in the first of those elections, she threw her vote on a patriotic citizen
of Virginia, since deceased, of her own politics, but who was not a can
didate 5 and, in the last, she refused to give it to the worthy senator from
Tennessee near me (Judge White), though his principles and views of
policy approached so much nearer to hers than that of the party to which
the senator from Kentucky belongs. But, suppose the fact was otherwise,
and that the two parties had blended so as to form one, and that I owed
to the united party as much fidelity as I do to that to which I exclusively
belonged ; even on that supposition, no conception of party fidelity could
have controlled my course on the present occasion. I am not among
those who pay no regard to party obligations ; on the contrary, I place
fidelity to party among the political virtues, but I assign to it a limited
sphere. I confine it to matters of detail and arrangement, and to minor
questions of policy. Beyond that, on all questions involving principles,
or measures calculated to affect materially the permanent interests of the
country, I look only to God and country.

And here, Mr. President, I avail myself of the opportunity to declare
my present political position, so that there may be no mistake hereafter.
I belong to the old Republican State Rights party of 1798. To that, and
that alone, I owe fidelity, and by that I shall stand through every change,
and in spite of every difficulty. Its creed is to be found in the Kentucky
Resolutions, and Virginia Resolutions and Report ; and its policy is to con
fine the action of this government within the narrowest limits compatible
with the peace and security of these states, and the objects for which the
Union was expressly formed. I, as one of the party, shall support all who
support its principles and policy, and oppose all who oppose them. I have
given, and shall continue to give, the administration a hearty and sincere

326 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

support on the great question now under discussion ; because I regard it
as in strict conformity to our creed and policy, and shall do everything
in my power to sustain them under the great responsibility which they
have assumed. But let me tell those who are more interested in sustain
ing them than myself, that the danger which threatens them lies not here,
but in another quarter. This measure will tend to uphold them, if they
stand fast and adhere to it with fidelity. But, if they wish to know where
the danger is, let them look to the fiscal department of the government.
I said, years ago, that we were committing an error the reverse of the
great and dangerous one that was committed in 1828, and to which we
owe our present difficulties, and all we have since experienced. Then,
we raised the revenue greatly, when the expenditures were about to be
reduced by the discharge of the public debt ; and now, we have doubled
the disbursements, when the revenue is rapidly decreasing: an error which,
although probably not so fatal to the country, will prove, if immediate and
vigorous measures be not adopted, far more so to those in power. The
country will not, and ought not, to bear the creation of a new debt be
yond what may be temporarily necessary to meet the present embarrass
ment j and any attempt to increase the duties must and ought to prove
fatal to those who may make it, so long as the expenditures may, by econ
omy and accountability, be brought within the limits of the revenue.

But the senator did not confine his attack to my conduct and motives
in reference to the present question. In his eagerness to weaken the
cause I support, by destroying confidence in me, he made an indiscrimi
nate attack on my intellectual faculties, which he characterized as meta
physical, eccentric, too much of genius, and too little common sense, and,
of course, wanting a sound and practical judgment.

Mr. President, according to my opinion, there is nothing of which those
who are endowed with superior mental faculties ought to be more cau
tious than to reproach those with their deficiency to whom Providence
has been less liberal. The faculties of our mind are the immediate gift
of our Creator, for which we are no farther responsible than for their
proper cultivation, according to our opportunities, and their proper appli
cation to control and regulate our actions. Thus thinking, 1 trust I shall
be the last to assume superiority on my part, or reproach any one with
inferiority on his ; but those who do not regard the rule when applied to
others, cannot expect it to be observed when applied to themselves. The
critic must expect to be criticized, and he who points out the faults of
others, to have his own pointed out.

I cannot retort on the senator the charge of being metaphysical. I
cannot accuse him of possessing the powers of analysis and generalization,
those higher faculties of the mind (called metaphysical by those who do
not possess them) which decompose and resolve into their elements the
complex masses of ideas that exist in the world of mind, as chemistry
does the bodies that surround us in the material world ; and without which
those deep and hidden causes which are in constant action, and producing
such mighty changes in the condition of society, would operate unseen
and undetected. The absence of these higher qualities of mind is con
spicuous throughout the whole course of the senator's public life. To
this it may be traced that he prefers the specious to the solid, and the
plausible to the true. To the same cause, combined with an ardent tem
perament, it is owing that we ever find him mounted on some popular
and favourite measure, which he whips along, cheered by the shouts of
the multitude, and never dismounts till he has rode it down. Thus, at
one time we find him mounted on the protective system, which he rode
down ; at another, on internal improvement ; and now he is mounted on

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 327

a bank, which will surely share the same fate, unless those who are im
mediately interested shall stop him in his headlong career. It is the fault
of his mind to seize on a few prominent and striking advantages, and to
pursue them eagerly, without looking to consequences. Thus, in the case
of the protective system, he was struck with the advantages of manufac
tures; and, believing that high duties was the proper mode of protecting
them, he pushed forward the system, without seeing that he was enriching
one portion of the country at the expense of the other j corrupting the
one and alienating the other ; and, finally, dividing the community into
two great hostile interests, which terminated in the overthrow of the
system itself. So, now, he looks only to a uniform currency, and a bank
as a means of securing it, without once reflecting how far the banking
system has progressed, and the difficulties that impede its farther prog
ress ; that banking and politics are running together, to their mutual de
struction ; and that the only possible mode of saving his favourite system
is to separate it from the government.

To the defects of understanding which the senator attributes to me, I
make no reply. It is for others, and not me, to determine the portion of
understanding which it has pleased the Author of my being to bestow on
me. It is, however, fortunate for me, that the standard by which I shall
be judged is not the false, prejudiced, and, as I have shown, unfounded
opinion which the senator has expressed, but my acts. They furnish
materials, neither few nor scant, to form a just estimate of my mental
faculties. I have now been more than twenty-six years continuously in
the service of this government, in various stations, and have taken part in
almost all the great questions which have agitated this country during
this long and important period. Throughout the whole I have never fol
lowed events, but have taken my stand in advance, openly and freely,
avowing my opinions on all questions, and leaving it to time and experi
ence to condemn or approve my course. Thus acting, I have often, and
on great questions, separated from those with whom I usually acted ; and
if I am really so defective in sound and practical judgment as the senator
represents, the proof, if to be found anywhere, must be found in such in
stances, or where I have acted on my sole responsibility. Now, I ask, In
which of the many instances of the kind is such proof to be found 1 It is
not my intention to call to the recollection of the Senate all such ; but
that you, senators, may judge for yourselves, it is due, in justice to my
self, that I should suggest a few of the most prominent, which at the time
were regarded as the senator now considers the present ; and then, as
now, because, where duty is involved, I would not submit to party tram
mels.

I go back to the commencement of my public life, the war session, as
it was usually called, of 1812, when I first took my seat in the other
house, a young man without experience to guide me, and I shall select,
as the first instance, the navy. At that time, the administration and the
party to which 1 was strongly attached were decidedly opposed to this
important arm of service. It was considered anti-republican to support
it ; but acting with my then distinguished colleague, Mr. Cheves, who led
the way, I did not hesitate to give it my hearty support, regardless of
party ties. Does this instance sustain the charge of the senator 1

The next I shall select is the restrictive system of that day ; the em
bargo, the Non-importation and Non-intercourse Acts. This, too, was a
party measure, which had been long and warmly contested, and, of course,
the lines of party well drawn. Young and inexperienced as I was, I saw
its defects, and resolutely opposed it, almost alone of my party. The
second or third speech I made, after I took my seat, was in open denim-

328 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

elation of the system ; and I may refer to the grounds I then assumed,
the truth of which have been confirmed by time and experience, with pride
and confidence. This will scarcely be selected by the senator to make
good his charge.

I pass over other instances, and come to Mr. Dallas's bank of 1814-15.
That, too, was a party measure. Banking was then comparatively but
little understood, and it may seem astonishing, at this time, that such a
project should ever have received any countenance or support. It pro
posed to create a bank of $50,000,000, to consist almost entirely of what
was called then the war stocks ; that is, the public debt created in carry
ing on the then war. It was provided that the bank should not pay spe
cie during the war, and for three years after its termination, for carrying
on which it was to lend the government the funds. In plain language,
the government was to borrow back its own credit from the bank, and
pay to the institution six per cent, for its use. I had scarcely ever be
fore seriously thought of banks or banking, but I clearly saw through the
operation, and the danger to the government and country ; and, regardless
of party ties or denunciations, I opposed and defeated it in the manner I
explained at the extra session. I then subjected myself to the very charge
which the senator now makes ; but time has done me justice, as it will in
the present instance.

Passing the intervening instances, I come down to my administration
of the war department, where I acted on my own judgment and respon
sibility. It is known to all that the department, at the time, was perfectly
disorganized, with not much less than $50,000,000 of outstanding and un
settled accounts, and the greatest confusion in every branch of service.
Though without experience, I prepared, shortly after I went in, the bill
for its organization, and on its passage I drew up the body of rules for
carrying the act into execution, both of which remain substantially un
changed to this day. After reducing the outstanding accounts to a few
millions, and introducing order and accountability in every branch of ser
vice, and bringing down the expenditure of the army from four to two
and a half millions annually, without subtracting a single comfort from
either officer or soldier, I left the department in a condition that might
well be compared to the best in any country. If I am deficient in the
qualities which the senator attributes to me, here in this mass of details
and business it ought to be discovered. Will he look to this to make good
his charge 1

From the war department I was transferred to the chair which you now
occupy. How I acquitted myself in the discharge of its duties, I leave it
to the body to decide, without adding a word. The station, from its
leisure, gave me a good opportunity to study the genius of the prominent
measure of the day, called then the American System, of which I profited.
I soon perceived where its errors lay, and how it would operate. 1 clearly
saw its desolating effects in one section, and corrupting influence in the
other; and when I saw that it could not be arrested here, I fell back on
my own state, and a blow was given to a system destined to destroy our
institutions, if not overthrown, which brought it to the ground. This
brings me down to the present time, and where passions and prejudices
are yet too strong to make an appeal with any prospect of a fair and im
partial verdict. 1 then transfer this, and all my subsequent acts, including
the present, to the tribunal of posterity, with a perfect confidence that
nothing will be found, in what I have said or done, to impeach my integ
rity or understanding.

I have now, senators, repelled the attacks on me. I have settled the
account and cancelled the debt between me and my accuser. I have not

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 329

sought this controversy, nor have I shunned it when forced on me. I have
acted on the defensive, and if it is to continue, which rests with the sena
tor, I shall throughout continue so to act. I know too well the advan
tage of my position to surrender it. The senator commenced the con
troversy, and it is but right that he should be responsible for the direc
tion it shall hereafter take. Be his determination what it may, I stand
prepared to meet him.

XXII.

SPEECU IN REPLY TO MR. WEBSTER ON THE SUB-TREASURY BILL, MARCH 22, 1838.

MR. PRESIDENT : After having addressed the Senate twice, I should owe an
apology, under ordinary circumstances, for again intruding myself on its pa
tience. But, after what fell from the senator from Massachusetts nearest to me
(Mr. Webster), the other day, the greater part of which was not only directed
against my arguments, but at me personally, I feel that my silence, and not my
notice of his remarks, would require an apology. And yet, notwithstanding I
am thus constrained again to address the Senate, I fear it will be impossible to
avoid exciting some impatience, fatigued and exhausted as it must be by so long
a discussion ; to prevent which, as far as practicable, I shall aim at as much
brevity as possible, consistently with justice to myself and the side I support.

The senator's speech was long and multifarious, consisting of many parts,
which had little or no connexion with the question under consideration. For
the sake of brevity and distinctness, I propose to consider it under four heads.
First, his preliminary discourse, which treated at large of credits and banks,
with very little reference to the subject. Next, his arguments on the question,
at issue ; and that to be followed by his reply to my arguments at this and the
extra session ; and, finally, his conclusion, which was appropriated wholly to
personal remarks, and a comparison between his and my public course, without
having the slightest relation either to the subject or anything I had said in the
debate, but which the senator obviously considered as the most important por
tion of his speech. He devoted one day almost wholly to it, and delivered him
self with an earnestness and vehemence which clearly manifested the impor
tance which he had attached to it. I shall, as in duty bound, pay my respects
first to that which so manifestly occupied the highest place in his estimation,
though standing at the bottom in the order of his remarks.

The senator opened this portion of his speech with much courtesy, accom
panied by* many remarks of respect arid regard, which I understood to be an in
timation that he desired the attack he was about to make to be attributed to po
litical, and not personal motives. I accept the intimation, and shall meet him
in the sense he intended. Indeed, there never has been between the senator
and myself the least personal difference, nor has a word having a personal
bearing ever passed between us in debate prior to the present occasion, with
in my recollection, during the long period we have been in public life, except
on the discussion of the Force Bill and Proclamation ; which, considering how
often we have stood opposed on deep and exciting questions, may be regarded
as not a little remarkable. But our political relations have not been on as good
a footing as our personal. He seems to think that we had harmonized not
badly till 1824, when, according to his version, I became too sectional for him
to act any longer with me ; but which I shall hereafter show originated in a
very different cause. My impression, I must say, is different, very different
from that of the senator. From the commencement of our public life to the
present time, we have differed on almost all questions involving the principles

TT

330 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

of the government and its permanent policy, with the exception of a short inter
val, while I was in the war department, when the senator agreed with the South
on the protective system and some other measures. I do not consider our cas
ual concert during the last few years of the late administration, when we were
both opposed to the executive power, as constituting an exception. It was un
derstood that we both adhered to our principles and views of policy without the
least surrender, and our personal relations were formal and cold during the
whole period. In fact, we moved in entirely different spheres. We differed
in relation to the origin and character of the government, the principles on
which it rested, and the policy it ought to pursue ; and I could not at all sym
pathize with the grave and deep tone with which the senator pronounced our
final separation, as he was pleased to call it, and which, in my opinion, would
liave been much more appropriate to the separation of those who had been long
and intimately united in^the support of the same principles and policy, than to
the slight and casual relations, personal and political, which had existed be
tween us. rv^v

Setting, then, aside all personal motives, I may well ask, What political grief,
•what keen disappointment is it, which at this time could induce him to make
the attack he has on me, and, I might add, in the manner in which he made it ?
The senator himself shall answer the question. He has unfolded the cause of
his grief, and pointed to the source of his disappointment. He told us that
" victory wras within reach, and my co-operation only was wanted to prostrate
forever those in power." These few words are a volume. They disclose all.
Yes, victory was within reach, the arm outstretched, the hand expanded to seize
it, and I would not co-operate. Hence the grief, hence the keen disappoint
ment, and hence the waters of bitterness that have rolled their billows against
me. And what a victory ! Not simply the going out of one party and the
coming in of another ; not merely the expulsion of the administration, and the
induction of the opposition ; but a great political revolution, carrying with it the
fundamental principles of the government and a permanent change of policy.
It would have brought in, not only the senator and his party, but their political
creed, as announced by him in the discussion on the Proclamation and Force
Bill, with which he now taunts those in power — a fact to be noted and remem
bered. He, the champion of those measures, against whom I contended foot
to foot for one entire session, now casts up to me, that in refusing to co-operate
"with him, I protect the party in power, not a small portion of whom, I have good
reason to believe, were drawn by the adverse current of the times reluctantly
from their own principles to the support of those measures, and with it the sen
ator and his principles. Yes, I repeat, it would have brought in the senator
and his consolidation doctrines, which regard this government as one great Na
tional Republic, with the right to construe finally and conclusively the extent
of its own powers, and to enforce its construction at the point of the bayonet ;
doctrines which at a blow sweep away every vestige of state rights, and re
duce the states to mere petty and dependant corporations. It would also have
brought in his policy — bank, tariff, and all. Even now, when victory is still un
certain, the senator announces the approach of the period when he shall move
the renewal of the protective system : a precious confession, that dropped out
in the heat of discussion.

[Mr. Webster : " No, I spoke deliberately."]

So much, then, the worse. That justifies all I have said and done ; that
proves my foresight and firmness, and will open the eyes of thousands, espe
cially in the South, who have heretofore doubted the correctness of my course
on this question.

'The victory would not only have been complete had I co-operated, but it
would also have been permanent. The portion of the State Rights party with
which I acted would have been absorbed — yes, absorbed ; it is the proper word,

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 331

and I use it in spite of the sarcasm of the senator. The other would have been
scattered and destroyed, and the senator and his party, and their principles and
policy, would have been left undisputed masters of the field, unresisted and ir
resistible. The first fruits of the victory would have been the reunion of the
political and money power — a wedded union, never more to be dissolved. The
tariff would have been renewed — I may now speak positively, after the declara
tion of the senator — to be again followed by an overflowing revenue, profuse and
corrupt expenditures, heavy surplus, and overwhelming patronage, which would
have closed the door to wealth and distinction to all who refused to bend the
knee at the shrine of the combined powers. All this was seen and fully com
prehended by the senator ; and hence again, I repeat, his deep grief, his keen
disappointment, and his attacks on me for refusing to co-operate.

The senator must have known that, in refusing, I acted on principles and
opinions long entertained and fully declared years ago. In my reply to his as
sociate in this joint war on me, in which I am attacked at once in front and rear,
I demonstrated, to the satisfaction of the Senate, the truth of what I assert so
completely, that the senator's associate did not even attempt a denial. And
yet, such is the depth of the senator's grief and disappointment, that it hurried
him to a repetition of exploded charges, which, in his cooler moments, he must
know to be unfounded. He repeated the stale and refuted charge of a somer
set, of going over, and of being struck with a sudden thought ; and summoned
up all his powers of irony and declamation, of which he proved himself to be a
great master on the occasion, to make my Edgefield letter, in which I assigned
my reason for refusing to co-operate, ridiculous. I see in all this but the dis
appointed hopes of one who had fixed his gaze intensely on power that had
eluded his grasp, and who sought to wreak his resentment on him who had re
fused to put the splendid prize in his hands. He resorted to ridicule, because
it was the only weapon that truth and justice left him. He well knows how
much deeper are the wounds that they inflict than the slight punctures that the
pointed, but feeble, shafts of ridicule leave behind ; and he used the more harm
less weapon only because he could not command the more deadly. That is in
my hand. I brandish it in his eyes. It is the only one I need, and I intend to
use it freely on this occasion.

After pouring out his wailing in such doleful tones because I would not co
operate in placing him and his party in power, and prostrating my own, the sen
ator next attacks me because I stated in my Edgefield letter, as I understood
him, that I rallied on General Jacksen with the view of putting down the tariff
by executive influence. I have looked over that letter with care, and can find
no such expression. [Mr. Webster : " It was used at the extra session."] I was
about to add, that I had often used it, and cannot but feel surprised that the sen
ator should postpone the notice of it till this late period, if he thought it deserv
ing reply. Why did he not reply to it years ago, when I first used it in debate ?
But the senator asked what I meant by executive influence. Did I mean his
veto ? He must have asked the question thoughtlessly. He must know that
the veto can only apply to bills on their passage, and could not possibly be used
in case of existing laws, such as the tarifY acts. He also asked if there was
concert in putting down the tariff between myself and the present chief magis
trate. I reply by asking him a question, to which, as a New-England man, he
cannot object. He has avowed his determination, in a certain contingency,
which he thinks is near, that he will move the renewal of the tariff. I ask, Is
there concert on that point between him and his associate in this attack?
And, finally, he asks if I disclosed my motives then. Yes : I am not in the
habit of disguising them. I openly and constantly avowed that it was one of
my leading reasons in supporting General Jackson, because I expected he would
use his influence to effect a gradual, but thorough reduction of the tariff, that
would reduce the system to the revenue point ; and when I saw reason to doubt

332 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

whether he would accomplish what I deem so important, I did not wait the
event of his election, but moved openly and boldly in favour of state interposition
as a certain remedy, which would not fail to effect the reduction, in the event
he should disappoint me.

The senator, after despatching my letter, concluded his speech by volunteer
ing a comparison between his and my public character, not very flattering to
me, but highly complimentary to himself. He represented me as sectional ; in
the habit of speaking constantly of the unconstitutional and oppressive opera
tions of the tariff, which he thought very unpatriotic ; of having certain sinister
objects in view in calling on the South to unite, and of marching off under the
State Rights banner, while he paints himself in the most glowing and opposite
colours. There is, Mr. President, no disputing about taste ; such are the ef
fects of a difference of organization and education, that what is offensive to one
is often agreeable to another. According to my conception, nothing can be
more painful than to pronounce .our own praise, particularly in contrast with
another, even when forced to do so in self-defence ; but how one can rise in
his place when neither his motive nor his conduct is impeached, and when
there is nothing in the question or previous discussion that could possibly jus
tify it, and pronounce a eulogy on himself, which a modest man would blush
to pronounce on a Washington or a Franklin to his face, is to me utterly in
comprehensible. But if the senator, in pronouncing his gorgeous piece of au
tobiography, had contented himself in simply proclaiming, in his deep tone, to
the Senate and the assembled multitude of spectators, that he came into Con
gress as the representative of the American people ; that if he was born for any
good, it was for the good of the whole people, and the defence of the Constitu
tion ; that he habitually acted as if acting in the eyes of the framers of the Con
stitution ; that it would be easier to drive these pillars from their bases than to
drive or seduce him from his lofty purpose ; that he would do nothing to weak
en the brotherly love between these states, and everything that they should re
main united, beneficially and thoroughly, forever, I would have gazed in silent
wonder without uttering a word at the extraordinary spectacle, and the happy
self-delusion in which he seems to exist. But when he undertook, not only to
erect an image to himself, as an object of self-adoration, but to place alongside
of it a carved figure of myself, with distorted limbs and features, to heighten
and render more divine his own image, he invited, he challenged, nay, he com
pelled me to inquire into the high qualities which he arrogates to himself, and
the truth of the comparison which he has drawn between us. If the inquiry
should excite some reminiscences not very agreeable to the senator, or disturb
the happy self-delusion in which he reposes, he must not blame me, but his
own self-sufficiency and boasting at my expense.

" Know yourself" is an ancient maxim, the wisdom of which I never before
so fully realized. How imperfectly even the talented and intelligent know
themselves ! Our understanding, like our eyes, seems to be given, not to see our
own features, but those of others. How diffident we ought to be of any favour
able opinion that we may have formed of ourselves ! That one of the distin
guished abilities of the senator, and his mature age, should form so erroneous
an opinion of his real character, is indeed truly astonishing. I do not deny
that he possesses many excellent qualities. My object is truth, and I intend
neither to exaggerate nor detract. But I must say that the character which he
attributes to himself is wholly unlike that which really belongs to him. So far
from that universal and ardent patriotism which knows neither place nor person,
that he ascribes to himself, he is, above all the distinguished public men with
whom I am acquainted, remarkable for a devoted attachment to the interest, the
institutions, and the place where Providence has cast his lot. I do not cen
sure him for his local feelings. The Author of our being never intended that
creatures of our limited faculties should embrace with equal intenseness of af-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 333

fection the remote and the near. Such an organization would lead us con
stantly to intermeddle with what we would but imperfectly understand, and of
ten to do mischief where we intended good. But the senator is far from being
liable to such a charge. His affections, instead of being too wide and bound
less, are too concentrated. As local as his attachment is, it does not embrace
all within its limited scope. It takes in but a class even there — powerful, in
fluential, and intelligent, but still a class which influences and controls all his
actions, and so absorbs his affections as to make him overlook large portions of
the Union, of which I propose to give one or two striking illustrations.

I must, then, remind the senator that there is a vast extent of our wide-spread
Union, which lies south of Mason and Dixon's line, distinguished by its pecu
liar soil, climate, situation, institutions, and productions, which he has never
encircled within the warm embraces of his universal patriotism. As long as
he has been in public life, he has not, to the best of my knowledge, given a
single vote to promote its interest, or done an act to defend its rights. I wish
not to do him injustice. If I could remember a single instance, I would cite it ;
but I cannot, in casting my eyes over his whole course, call to mind one. As
boundless arid ardent, then, as is his patriotism, according to his own account,
it turns out that it is limited by metes and bounds, that exclude nearly one half
of the whole Union !

But it may be said that this total absence of all manifestation of attachment
to an entire section of the Union is not to be attributed to the want of an ardent
desire to promote its interest and security, but of occasion to exhibit it. Unfor
tunately for the senator, such an excuse is without foundation. Opportunities
are daily and hourly offering. The section is the weakest of the two, and its
peculiar interest and institutions expose it constantly to injustice arid oppression,
which afford many and fine opportunities to display that generous and noble pa
triotism which the senator attributes to himself, and which delights in taking the
side of the assailed against the assailant. Even now, at this moment, there is an
opportunity which one professing such ardent and universal attachment to the
whole country as the senator professes would greedily embrace. A war is
now, and has been systematically and fiercely carried on, in violation of the
Constitution, against a long-standing and widely-extended institution of that
section, that is indispensable, not only to its prosperity, but to its safety and ex
istence, and which calls loudly on every patriot to raise his voice and arm in
its defence. How has the senator acted ? Has he raised his mighty arm in
defence of the assailed, or thundered forth his denunciation against the assail
ants ? These are searching questions. They test the truth of his universal
and boasted attachment to the whole country ; and in order that the Senate may
compare his acts with his professions, I propose to present more fully the facts
of the case, and his course.

It is well known, then, that the section to which I refer is inhabited by two
races, from different continents, and descended from different stocks ; and that
they have existed together under the present relation from the first settlement
of the country. It is also well known that the ancestors of the senator's con
stituents (I include the section) brought no small portion of the ancestors of the
African, or inferior race, from their native home across the ocean, and sold them
as slaves to the ancestors of our constituents, and pocketed the price, and prof
ited greatly by the traffic. It is also known, that when the Constitution was
formed, our section felt much jealousy lest the powers which it conferred
should be used to interfere with the relations existing between the two races ;
to allay which, and induce our ancestors to enter the Union, guards, that were
deemed effectual against the supposed danger, were insertedxin the instrument.
It is also known that the product of the labour of the inferior race has furnished
the basis of our widely-extended commerce and ample revenue, which has
supported the government, and diffused wealth and prosperity through the other

334 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

section. This is one side of the picture. Let us now turn and look at the
other.

How has the other section acted ? I include not all, nor a majority. We
have had recent proof, during the discussion of the resolutions I offered at the
commencement of the session, to what great extent just and* patriotic feelings
exist in that quarter, in reference to the subject under consideration. I then
narrow the question, and ask, How has the majority of the senator's constituents
acted, and especially a large portion of his political supporters and admirers ?
Have they respected the title to our property, which we trace back to their an
cestors, and which, in good faith and equity, carries with it an implied warranty,
that binds them to defend and protect our rights to the property sold us ?
Have they regarded their faith plighted to us on entering into the constitutional
compact which formed the Union, to abstain from interfering with our property,
and to defend and protect us in its quiet enjoyment ? Have they acted as those
ought who have participated so largely in the profits derived from our labour ?
No ; they are striving night and day, in violation of justice, plighted faith, and
the Constitution, to divest us of our property, to reduce us to the level of those
whom they sold to us as slaves, and to overthrow an institution on which our
safety depends.

I come nearer home. How has the senator himself acted 1 He who has
such influence and weight with his constituents, and who boasts of his univer
sal patriotism and brotherly love and affection for the whole Union ? Has he
raised his voice to denounce this crying injustice, or his arm to arrest the blow
of the assailant, which threatens to dissever the Union, and forever alienate
one half of the community from the other ? Has he uttered a word in condem
nation of violated faith, or honour trampled in the dust ? No ; he has sat quiet
ly in his place, without moving a ringer or raising his voice. Without raising-
his voice did I say? I mistake. His voice has been raised, not for us, but
for our assailants. His arm has been raised, not to arrest the aggressor, but to
open the doors of this chamber, in order to give our assailants an entrance here,
•where they may aim the most deadly blow against the safety of the Union, and
our tranquillity and security. He has thrown the mantle, not of protection, over
the Constitution, but over the motive and character of those whose daily avoca
tion is to destroy every vestige of brotherly love between these states, and to
convert the Union into a curse instead of a blessing. He has done more.
The whole Senate have seen him retire from his seat to avoid a vote on one of
the resolutions that I moved, with a view to rally the patriotic of every portion of
the community against this fell spirit, which threatens to dissolve the Union,
and turn the brotherly love and affection in which it originated into deadly hate ;
which was so obviously true that he could not vote against it, but which he dodg
ed, rather than throw his weight on our side, and against our assailants. And
yet, while these things are fresh in our recollection, notorious, known to all, the
senator rises in his place, and proclaims aloud that he comes in as the repre
sentative of the United States ; that, if he was born for any good, it was for the
good of the whole people, and the defence of the Constitution ; that he always
acts as if under the eyes of the framers of the Constitution ; that it would be easier
to drive these pillars from their bases than him from his lofty purpose ; that he
will do nothing to destroy the brotherly love between these states, and every
thing that the Union may exist forever, beneficially and thoroughly for all !
What a contrast between profession and performance ! What strange and extra^
ordinary self-delusion.

But this is not the only instance. There is another, in which the contrast be
tween the course of the senator and his lofty pretension of unbounded and ar
dent patriotism is not less astonishing. I refer to the protective tariff, and his
memorable and inconsistent course in relation to it.

Its history may be told in a few words. It rose subsequent to the late war

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 335

with Great Britain. The senator's associate in this attack was its leading sup
porter and author. Its theory rested on the principle, that all articles which
could be made in our country should be protected ; and it was an axiom of the
system, that its perfection consisted in prohibiting the introduction of all such
articles from abroad. To give the restrictions on commerce necessary to effect
its object a plausible appearance, they were said to be for the protection of home
industry, and the system itself received the imposing name of the American
System. Its effects were desolating in the staple states. The heavy duties
imposed on their foreign exchanges left scarcely enough to the planter to feed
and clothe his slaves and educate his children, while wealth and prosperity
bloomed around the favoured portion of the Union.

The senator was at first opposed to the system. As far back as the autumn
of 1820, he delivered a speech to the citizens of Boston, in Faneuil Hall, in
opposition to it, in which he questioned its constitutionality, and denounced its
inequality and oppression.

His speech was followed by a series of resolutions imbodying the substance
of what he had said, and which received the sanction of himself and constitu
ents, who, at that time, were less interested in manufactures than in commerce
and navigation, which suffered in common with the great staple interests of the
South. I ask the secretary to read the resolutions :

[" Resolved, That no objection ought ever to be made to any amount of taxes
equally apportioned, and imposed for the purpose of raising revenue necessary
for the support of government ; but that taxes imposed on the people for the
sole benefit of any class of men, are equally inconsistent with the principles of
our Constitution, and with sound judgment.

" Resolved, That the supposition that until the supposed tariff, or some simi
lar measure, be adopted, we are, and shall be dependant on foreigners for the
means of subsistence and defence, is, in our opinion, altogether fallacious and
fanciful, and derogatory to the character of the nation.

" Resolved, That high bounties on such domestic manufactures as are prin
cipally benefited by that tariff, favour great capitalists rather than personal in
dustry, or the owners of small capitals, and therefore that we do not perceive
its tendency to promote national industry.

" Resolved, That we are equally incapable of discovering its beneficial ef
fects on agriculture, since the obvious consequence of its Adoption would be, that
the farmer must give more than he now does for all he buys, and receive less
for all he sells.

" Resolved, That, in our opinion, the proposed tariff, and the principles on
which it is avowedly formed, would, if adopted, have a tendency, however dif
ferent may be the motives of those who recommend them, to diminish the in
dustry, impede the prosperity, and corrupt the morals of the people."]

What can be more explicit or decided ? They hold the very sentiments and
language which I have so often held on this floor. That very system was then
pronounced to be unconstitutional, unequal, and oppressive, and corrupting in
its effects, by the senator and his constituents, for pronouncing which now he
accuses me of being sectional, and holding language having a mischievous ef
fect on the rising generation.

Four years after this, in April, 1824, the senator delivered another speech
against the system, in reply to the then speaker, and now his associate on this
occasion, in which he again denounced the inequality and oppression of the
system with equal force, in one of the ablest arguments ever delivered on the
subject, and in which he completely demolished the reasons of his then oppo
nent. But an event was then fast approaching which was destined to work a
mighty and sudden revolution in his views and feelings. A few months after,
the presidential election took place ; Mr. Adams was elected by the co-opera
tion of the author of the American System, and the now associate of the sena-

336 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALKOUN.

tor. Those who had been enemies came together. New political combina
tions were formed, and the result was a close alliance between the East and
the West, of which that system formed the basis. A new light bursted in on
the senator. A sudden thought struck him, but not quite as disinterested as
that of the German sentimentalist. He made a complete somerset, heels over
head ; went clear over ; deserted the free-trade side in a twinkling, and joined
the restrictive policy, and then cried out that he could no longer act with me,
whom he had left standing where he had just stood, because I was too section
al ! At once everything the senator had ever said or done was forgotten — en
tirely expunged from the tablets of his memory. His whole nature was changed
in an instant, and thereafter no measure of protection was too strong for his
palate. With a few contortions and slight choking, he even gulped down, a few
years after, the bill of abomination — the tariff of 1828 — a measure which raised
the duties so high as to pass one half of the aggregate amount in value of the
whole imports into the public treasury. I desire it to be noted and remembered
that, out of an importation of sixty-four millions of dollars, including every de
scription of imports, the free and dutied articles, the government took for its
share thirty-two millions under the tariff of 1828 ; and that the senator, yes, he,
the defender of the Constitution and equal protector of every section and inter
est, voted for that measure, notwithstanding his recent denunciation of the sys
tem as unconstitutional, unequal, and oppressive ! But he did more, and things
still more surprising, as the sequel will show.

The protective tariff did not change the character of its operation with the
change of the senator. Its oppressive and corrupting effects grew with its
growth, till the burden became intolerable under the tariff of 1828. Desolation
spread itself over the entire staple region. Its commercial cities were de
serted. Charleston parted with its last ship, and grass grew in her once busy
streets. The political condition of the country presented a prospect not less
dreary. A deep and growing conflict between the two great sections agitated
the whole country, and a vast revenue, beyond its most extravagant wants, gave
the government, especially the executive branch, boundless patronage and power,
which were rapidly changing the character of the government, and spreading
corruption far and wide through every condition of society. Something must
be done, and that promptly. Every hope of reformation, or change through this
government, had vanished. The absorbing force of the system had drawn into
its support a fixed majority in the community, which controlled, irresistibly,
every department of the government. But one hope was left short of revolu
tion, and that was in the states themselves, in their sovereign capacity as par
ties to the constitutional compact. Fortunately for the country and our institu
tions, one of the members of the Union was found bold enough to interpose her
sovereign authority, and declare the protective tariff that had caused all this
mischief, and threatened so much more, to be unconstitutional, and therefore
pull and void, and of no effect within her limits ; and thus an issue was formed,
which brought events to a crisis.

We all remember what followed. The government prepared to assert by
force its usurped powers. The Proclamation was issued, and the war message
and Force Bill followed, and the state armed to.maintain her constitutional rights.
How, now, I ask, did the senator act in this fearful crisis ; he who had, but a
short time before, pronounced the system to be unconstitutional, unequal, unjust,
and oppressive ? Did he feel any sympathy for those who felt and thought as
he did but a brief period before ? Did he make any allowance for their falling
into the same errors (if such he then considered them) into which he himself had
fallen 1 Did he show that ardent devotion to preserve the brotherly love be
tween the members of the Union he now so boastingly professes ? Did he,
who calls himself the defender of the Constitution, feel any compunction in re
sorting to force to execute laws which he had pronounced to be in violation of

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 337

the Constitution ? Did he, who manifested such deep distrust of those in power,
who had been foremost in proclaiming their usurpations, and calling on the
patriotic of all parties to oppose them, show any dread in clothing the President
with unlimited power to crush one of the members of the Union, and which,
after accomplishing that, might be so readily turned to crush the liberty of all ?
Quite the reverse. A sudden thought again struck him. He again, in a twink
ling, forgot the past, and rushed over into the arms of power, and took his posi
tion in the front rank, as the champion of the most violent measures, to enforce
laws at the point of the bayonet which he had pronounced unconstitutional,
unjust, and oppressive ! and this, too, at the hazard of civil war, and the mani
fest danger of subverting the Constitution and liberties of the country ; refusing
all terms of adjustment, and resisting to the last, with violence, the bill which
compromised and settled the conflict ! And yet, with all this fresh in the recol
lection of himself and all present, he can rise in his place and proclaim himself
the universal patriot ; the defender of the Constitution and benefactor of every
portion of the Union ; the man who has done everything to preserve brotherly
love between its members, and who is ready to make every sacrifice to make it
beneficial to all the parties !

But what is more extraordinary, what is truly wonderful and astonishing, is,
while these words were on his tongue, he, in the same breath, with a full knowl
edge of all the disastrous consequences which have, arid must necessarily follow
the renewal of the protective system, should declare that he anticipates the
speedy arrival of the time when he will again undertake to revive the system !
More cannot be added. The contrast between the senator's course and the
character which he ascribes to himself cannot be rendered more striking. I
shall not add another instance, as many of them as are at my command. A
volume could not more conclusively prove how unfounded are his pretensions
to that lofty, universal, and ardent patriotism which he claims for himself, and
how strong the delusion under which he is in regard to his true character.

Let us now turn and inquire what has been my course; I, whom he repre
sents as sectional, whose course he pronounces to be unfriendly to the Union,
because I now call the protective system unconstitutional and oppressive ; who,
he intimates, desires to unite the South for no patriotic purpose, and represents
as going off under the State Rights banner. And here, Mr. President, let me
say, I put in no claim to the lofty destiny to which the senator says he was
born. Instead of coming here, like the senator, as the representative of the
whole people, I appear in the more humble character of the representative of one
of the states of this Union, sent here to watch over her particular interests,
and to promote the general interest of all, as far as the Constitution has con
ferred power upon us, and as it can be done without oppression to the parts.
These are my conceptions of my representative character, with the trust con
fided to me, and the duties attached to it, which I endeavour to discharge with
industry, fidelity, and all the abilities which it has pleased my Creator to confer
on me. Instead of falling short of what I profess, I trust my public life, if ex
amined with candour, will show that I have ever so interpreted my duty to my
state as to permit it in no instance to interfere with the just claims of the Union.
It is my good fortune to represent a state which holds her character far above
Jher interest, and which claims the first place, when a sacrifice is to be made
for the safety and happiness of all, and would hold me to strict account if, in
representing her interest, I should /brget what is due to her honour among her
confederates. All her acts prove that she is as liberal in making concessions,
when demanded by the common good, as she is prompt and resolute to resist
aggression to promote the interest of others at her expense. Acting in the
same spirit, as her representative, I have never failed to meet and repel aggres
sions, while, I trust, I have on no occasion been unmindful of her honour, and
the general interests of the whole Union. Having made these remarks, I shall

U u

338 SPEECHES OF JOHN c. CALHOUN.

now proceed to show that, as humble as my pretensions are, and as sectional
and unpatriotic as he has thought proper to represent me, my course for lib
erality and a just regard to the interest of every portion of the Union will not
suffer in comparison with his, as lofty as are his pretensions,

In making the inquiry I have into the course of the senator in \-elation to the
section to which I belong, I called on him to point out a single instance, with
all his boasted patriotism, in which he had given a vote to promote its interests,
or done an act to defend its rights ; but now, when the inquiry is into my course
in relation to his section, I propose to reverse the question, and to apply to my
self a much more severe test than I did to him. I ask, then, From what meas
ure, calculated to promote the interests of his section, have I ever withheld my
support, except, indeed, the protective tariff, and certain appropriations, which,
according to my mode of construing the Constitution, I regard as unconstitu
tional, and would, of course, be bound to oppose, wherever the benefit should
fall ? I call on the senator to point out a single instance ; and, if he desires it,
I will yield him the floor, in order to give him an opportunity to do so. Will
the senator call, on his part, for instances in which I have supported the inter
est of his section ? I can point to numerous : to rny early and constant sup
port of the navy ; to my resistance to the system of embargoes, Non-importation
and Non-intercourse Acts ; to my generous course in support of manufactures
that sprung up during the war, in which my friends think I went too far ; to the
liberal terms on which the tariff controversy was settled, and the fidelity with
which I have adhered to it ; and to the system of fortifications for the defence
of our harbours, which I projected and commenced, and which is so important
to the two great interests of commerce and navigation, in which his section has
so deep a stake. To which I might add many more ; but these are sufficient
for one, represented as so sectional, against the blank list of the senator in rela
tion to my section, with all his claim to ardent nnd universal patriotism. If we
turn to the West, my course will at least bear comparison with his for liberality
towards that great and growing section of our country. To pass over other in
stances, I ask him what measure of his can be compared with the cession I
have proposed of the public lands to the new states on the liberal conditions
proposed ? It is a measure above all others calculated to promote their interest,
to elevate their character, to terminate their political dependance, and to raise
them to a complete equality with the old states for the mutual benefit of us and
them, but which, sectional as I am represented to be, proved too liberal for the
senator, with all bis wide-extended and ardent attachment to the whole Union.

But it seems that I mean something very sinister in my call on the South to
unite, and the senator very significantly asks me what is meant. I have nothing
to disguise, and will readily answer. If he would look at home, and open his
eyes to the systematic and incessant attacks made on our peace and quiet by
his constituents — if he would reflect on his threat to renew the system of op
pression from which we have freed ourselves with such difficulty and danger —
and bear in mind that we are the weaker section, and, without union among our
selves, cannot resist the danger that surrounds us — he will see that there is
neither mystery nor danger in the call. I go farther. Our union is not only
necessary to our safety and protection, but is also to the successful operation of
our system. We constitute the check to its over-action ; and, as experience
proves, we are the only power through which, when disordered, reformation can
be peaceably effected. Our union is dangerous to none, and salutary to all.
The machine never works well when the South is divided, nor badly when it
is united.

The senator next tells us that I declared I would march off under the State
Rights banner, which he seized on to impugn my patriotism and to boast of his
own. It is an easy task, by misstating or garbling, to distort the most elevated
or correct sentiment. In this case, the senator, by selecting a single member

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALIIOUN. 339

of the sentence, and throwing a strong emphasis on " off," gave a meaning di
rectly the opposite of representing me as abandoning the cause of the Constitu
tion and country, and himself as being their champion, which, it seems, was
sufficient for his purpose. The declaration is taken from my opening speech at
the extra session ; and, that the Senate may judge for itself, I shall give the en
tire passage :

" We are about to take a fresh start. I move off under the State Rights ban
ner, and go in the direction in which I have been so long moving. I seize the
^opportunity thoroughly to reform the government ; to bring it back to its origi
nal principles ; to retrench, economize, and rigidly to enforce accountability. I
shall oppose strenuously all attempts to originate a new debt, to create a Na
tional Bank, to reunite the political and money power (more dangerous than
Church and State) in any form or shape."

This is what I did declare, and which the senator represents as deserting the
Constitution and country ; and this is the way I am usually answered. I know
not whether I have greater cause to complain or rejoice at the fact that there is
scarcely an argument or a sentiment of mine which is attempted to be met, that
is not garbled or misstated. If I have reason to complain of the injustice, I
have, at the same time, the pleasure to reflect that it is a high implied compli
ment to the truth and correctness of what I say.

There still remains an important chapter to complete the comparison between
the public character of the senator and myself ; I mean the part which we took in
the late war between Great Britain and this country. I intended at one time to
enter on it, and to trace the rise and progress of the war, with its various vicis
situde of disasters and victories, and the part which the senator and his political
associates acted at that important period ; but these are bygone events, belong
ing to the historian, in whose hands I am content to leave them, and shall not
recur to them unless the senator should provoke me hereafter by a renewal of
his attack.

Having now despatched the personalities of the senator, I turn, next, to his
argument, which, as I have stated, consists of three parts : the preliminary dis
course on credit and banks ; the discussion of the question at issue ; and the re
ply to my remarks at this and the extra session. I shall consider each, as I
have begun, in the reverse order. The argument of the senator is, indeed, so
miscellaneous and loosely connected, that it is a matter of but little importance
in what order it is considered.

When he announced his intention to reply to my remarks, both at this and
the extra session, I anticipated that they would be met fully, if not satisfactori
ly, point by point. Guess, then, my surprise on finding him pass by, without
even attempting an answer to the numerous objections which I made to the
union of the political and money power, as affecting the morals, the politics, the
currency, the industry, and prosperity of the count/y, which, if the fourth part
be true, is decisive of the question, and noticing but two out of the long list in
his reply. If we may judge of the strength of those which he has passed over
by his inconclusive answer (as I shall presently show) to the two which he se
lected, my argument may be pronounced to be impregnable. I shall begin with
his reply to my remarks at the present session.

It will be remembered, among other objections against the connexion with the
banks, I ur-ged that the government had no right to make a general deposite in
bank, or receive the notes of banks in the public dues. I placed the first on
the ground that, when public money was placed in deposite in banks, and pass
ed to the credit of the government, it was, if ever, in the treasury ; and that it
could not be drawn out and used for any purpose, unless under an appropriation
made by law, without violating an express provision of the Constitution, which
provides that no money should be drawn out of the treasury but in consequence
of appropriation by law. I then urged, that to place money in general deposite

340 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CAtHOUN.

in banks, with the implied understanding always attached to such transactions,
that they should have the right to draw it out and use it as they please till call
ed for by the government, was a manifest violation of this provision of the Con
stitution.

In support of the other objection against receiving bank-notes in the public
dues, I laid down the known and fundamental rule of construction on all ques
tions touching the powers of this government, that it had no right to exercise
any but such as are expressly given by the Constitution, or that may be neces
sary to carry into effect the granted powers. I then insisted that no such pow
er was granted, nor was its exercise necessary to carry any granted power into
effect ; and concluded, that the power could not be exercised unless compre
hended under one or the other head. To which I added the farther objection,
that if we had the right to receive the notes of state banks in our dues as cash,
it would necessarily involve the right of taking them under our control and reg
ulation, which would bring this government necessarily into conflict with the
reserved rights of the states ; and to this I added, that the receipt of bank-notes
by the government tended to expel gold and silver from circulation, and depre
ciate and render their value more fluctuating, and, of course, could not be rec
onciled with the object of the express power given to Congress to coin money
and regulate the value thereof, to which it is as repugnant in its effects as the
debasing or the clipping the current coin would be. I at the same time con
ceded that the practice of the government had been opposite from the commence
ment. Such are my reasons, and how have they been met 1

The senator commenced by stating that he would consider the two objections
together, as they were connected ; but, instead of that, he never uttered anoth
er word in relation to the right of making a general deposite. That was sur
rendered without an attempt to meet my objections, which, at least, proved his
discretion. He next undertook to show that precedents were in favour of re
ceiving bank-notes, which I had conceded, and no one disputed. Among other
things, he stated I was the first to authorize the receiving of bank-notes by law,
and, in proof, referred to my amendment to the joint resolution of 1816, which
authorizes the receipt of the notes of specie-paying banks in the dues of the
government. He stated that the resolution, as proposed by himself, provided
that nothing but gold and silver and the notes of the United States Bank should
be received, and that my amendment extended it to the notes of state banks.
This is all true, but is not the whole truth. He forgot to inform the Senate that,
at the time, the notes of non-specie-paying banks, as well as specie-paying, were
received in the dues of the government, and that my amendment limited, instead
of enlarging, the existing practice. He also forgot to state that, without my
amendment, the-notes of the United States Bank would have been exclusively
received in the public does, and that I was unwilling to bestow a monopoly of
such immense value on that institution, which would have been worth ten times
the amount of the bonus it ga,ve for its charter.

After bestowing much time to establish what none denied, the senator at
length came to the argument ; and what do you suppose were the convincing
reasons he urged against my positions ? Why, simply that he had no time to
reply to them ! with which, and the erroneous assertion that I had denied that
the government could exercise any incidental power, he passed over all the
weighty objections I had urged against the constitutionality of receiving and
treating bank-notes as cash in the public dues. It was thus he met the only
argument he attempted to answer of the many and strong ones which I have
urged in support of my opinion on this important question, and to which he pro
posed to make a formal reply.

I shall next notice the reply he attempted to my remarks at the late session.
And here, again, he selected a single argument, and to which his answer was
not less inconclusive and unsatisfactory than to that which I have just consider-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 341

ed. Among other objections to the union of the government with the banks, I
stated that it would tend to centralize the circulation and exchanges of the coun
try ; to sustain which, I showed that no small portion of the credit and circula
tion of the banks depended on the public deposites, and the fact that the govern
ment received and treated their notes as cash in its dues. I then showed that
it was that portion which pre-eminently gave a control over the circulation and
exchanges of the country. In illustration, I asked, if the government, when it
first went into operation, had selected a merchant of New- York, and entered
into a contract with him that he should have the free use of the public revenue
from the time it was collected till it was disbursed, and that nothing but his prom
issory notes, except gold and silver, should be received in the public dues,
whether it would not give him a great and decided control over the circulation
and exchanges of the country, accompanied with advantages to the port where
he resided, over all others. I next asked, whether the location of a Bank of
the United States at the same place, with the same privileges, would not give
equal control and advantages ; nay, much greater ; as, in addition, it would
concentrate at the same place an immense amount of capital collected from ev
ery portion of the country.

Such was my argument, which th§ senator, months after it was delivered,
undertakes to controvert ; but, I must say, for my life I could not understand his
reasons. He lost his usual clearness, and became vague and obscure, as any
one must who attempts to refute what is so perfectly evident. To escape from
his difficulty, he, with his usual address, confounded what I had said on an
other subject with another point, which he thought more easily answered, and
against which he directed his attack. He stated that I proposed a government
paper, and that my notion is, that all the paper that circulates should be gov
ernment paper ; and then insisted that it would be the union of the political and
money power, and would do more to centralize the currency and exchanges
than the connexion of the government with the banks.

Now, unfortunately for the senator, I proposed no such thing, and expressed
no notion of the kind, nor anything like it. He may search every speech I
have delivered at this and the extra session, and he can find nothing to justify
his assertion. To put this beyond all dispute, I will quote what I did say, and
the only thing that I ever did that could afford him even a pretext for his asser
tions. The extracts are taken from my remarks at the extra session.

*' I intend to propose nothing. It would be impossible, with so great a weight
of opposition, to pass any measure without the entire support of the administration ;
and, if it were, it ought not to be attempted when so much must depend on the
mode of execution. The best measure that could be devised might fail, and im
pose a heavy responsibility on its author, unless it met with the hearty appro
bation of those who are to execute it. I, then, intend merely to throw out sug
gestions, in order to excite the reflections of others," &c.

" Believing that there might be a sound and safe paper currency founded oa
the credit of the government exclusively, I was desirous that those who are re
sponsible and have the power, should have availed themselves of the opportu
nity of the temporary deficit in the treasury, and the postponement of the fourth
instalment intended to be deposited with the states, to use them as the means
of affording a circulation for the present relief of the country and the banks, du
ring the process of separating them from the government" &c.

Here is not a word about proposing ; on the contrary, I expressly stated I
proposed nothing ; that I but threw out suggestions for reflection. Instead of
excluding all paper from circulation, I suggested the use, not of treasury notes,
as he stated, or any other paper containing a promise to pay money, but sim
ply one which should contain a promise to be received in the dues of the gov
ernment ; and that, too, only to the extent necessary to meet the temporary de
ficit of the treasury, and to alleviate the process of separating from the banks ;

342 SPEECHES Of! JOHN C. CALHOUN.

and this he has arbitrarily construed and perverted to suit his purpose, in the
manner I have shown.

It is a great misfortune that there should be brought into this chamber the
habits contracted at the bar, where advocates contend for victory, without being
scrupulous about the means ; while here the only object ought to be truth and
the good of the country. All other considerations ought to be forgotten within
these walls, and the only struggle ought to be to ascertain what is truth, arid cal
culated to promote the honour and happiness of the community. Great individ
ual injustice is done by such misstatements of arguments. The senator's speech
will be published and circulated in quarters where my correction of his state
ments will never reach, and thousands will attribute opinions to me that I nev
er uttered nor entertained.

The suggestions which 'he has so perverted have been a favourite topic of
attack on the part of the senator, but he has never yet stated nor met what I
really said truly and fairly ; and, after his many and unsuccessful attempts to
show what I suggested to be erroneous, I now undertake to affirm positively,
and without the least fear that I can be answered, what heretofore I have but sug
gested — that a paper issued by government, with the simple promise to receive
it in all its dues, leaving its creditors to take it or gold and silver, at their op
tion, would, to the extent that it would circulate, form a perfect paper circula
tion, which could not be abused by the government ; that would be as steady and
uniform in value as the metals themselves ; and that if, by possibility, it should
depreciate, the loss would fall, not on the people, but on the government itself;
for the only effect of depreciation wo\ftd be virtually to reduce the taxes, to pre
vent which the interest of the government would be a sufficient guarantee. I
shall not go into the discussion now, but on a suitable occasion I shall be able
to make good every word I have uttered. I would be able to do more — to prove
that it is within the constitutional power of Congress to use such a paper, in
the management of its finances, according to the most rigid rule* of construing
the Constitution ; and that those, at least, who think that Congress can author
ize the notes of private state corporations to be received in the public dues, are
estopped from denying its right to receive its own paper. If it can virtually en
dorse by law, on the notes of specie-paying banks, " Receivable in payment of the
public dues," it surely can order the same words to be written on a blank piece
of paper.

Such is the character of the paper I suggested, and which the senator says
would do more to centralize the circulation and exchlnges than the union of the
government and the banks, which, however, he signally failed to prove. That
it would have a greater tendency than the exclusive receipt in its dues of gold
and silver, I readily acknowledge, and to, that extent I think it objectionable;
for I do not agree with the senator that there should be some one great empo
rium, which should have control of the commerce, currency, and exchanges of
the Union. I hold it desirable in neither a political nor commercial point of
view, and to be contrary to the genius of our institutions and the spirit of the
Constitution, which expressly provides, among other things, that no preference
shall be given to the ports of one state over another. But that a receivable
paper, such as I suggested, would have a greater, or as great tendency to cen
tralize the commerce and currency of the country as the union with the banks,
I utterly deny ; and, if I had no other reason, the vehement opposition of the
senator, who approves of such tendency, would be conclusive ; but there are
others that are decisive.

The centralizing tendency of such a paper would result exclusively from the
facility it would afford to remittance from distant portions of the Union, in which
respect it would stand just on a par with bank-notes when received in the dues
of the public ; while the latter would, in addition, give to the favoured port
•where the mother-bank might be located (or 'the head of the league of state

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 343

banks), the immense profits from the use of the public deposites, and the still
greater from having their notes received in government dues. The two united
would afford unbounded facilities in the payment of custom-house bonds, and
give millions of profit annually, derived exclusively from the use of govern
ment credit. This great facility and vast increase of profit would give a great
and decided advantage to the commerce of the section where the head of the
system might be located, and which, in a great measure, accounts for the de
cay of the commerce of the South, where there were no banks when this gov
ernment was established, arid which, of course, gave to the other section ex
clusively all the benefit derived from the connexion. If specie had from the first
been exclusively received in the public dues, the present, commercial inequali
ty would never have existed ; and, I may add, it never will cease till we return
to the constitutional currency. What the senator has said as to the union of
the political and money powers, and the tendency to extravagance from the use
of treasury notes and their depreciation, is so clearly inapplicable to the de
scription of paper I suggested, that I do not deem it necessary to waste words
in reply to it.

Having now repelled his reply to my remarks at this and the extra session, I
shall next proceed to notice his argument on the question under discussion,
•which, extraordinary as it may seem, constitutes by far the most meager and
inconsiderable portion of his speech. The structure he reared with so much
labour is composed of a little centre building, of some twenty or thirty feet
square, with an extended wing on each side, and a huge portico in front. I
Lave, I trust, effectually demolished the wings, and propose next to go through
the same process with the centre building.

As long as was the speech, it contained but three, or. at the utmost, four ar
guments, directly applicable to the question under discussion ; of which two
have again and again been repeated by him every time he has addressed the
Senate ; another was drawn from an argument of mine in favour of the bill, which
the senator has misstated, and pressed into his service against it ; and the other
is neither altogether new, nor very well founded, nor, from its character, of much,
force. I shall begin with it.

The senator objected to the collection of the public dues in gold and silver,
because, as he conceives, it would be exceedingly inconvenient ; in proof of
which, and in order to present as strong a picture as possible, he went into mi
nute calculations and details. He first supposed that the average peace reve
nue would be equal to thirty millions annually, and the average deposites to
twenty-one. He then estimated that this vast sum would have to be counted
at least five times in the year, and then estimated that it would require eight
hundred thousand dollars to be counted daily, which would require a host of
officers, in his opinion, to perform the task. The answer to all this is easy.
In the first place, the senator has over-estimated the average receipts by at least
one hundred per cent. Fifteen millions ought to be much nearer the truth than
thirty. Even that I regard as exceeding what the expenditure ought to be ;
and I venture to assert, that no administration which expends more on an aver
age for the next few years can maintain itself, unless there should be some un
expected demand on the treasury. In the next place, twenty-one millions is
at least five times too large for the average deposites. Should this bill pass,
three millions would be much nearer the truth. We shall hear no more of sur
pluses when the revenue is collected in gold and silver. This would make a
great deduction in his estimate of the trouble and labour in counting. But I give
the senator his own estimate, and ask him if he never heard of other and short*
er modes than counting of ascertaining the amount in coins. Does he not
know that it can be ascertained with as much certainty and exactness by weight
as by counting, and with more despatch, when the amount is large, in coins
than in his favourite bank-notes ? If I am not misinformed, it is the mode

344 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

adopted at the English Exchequer, and it is done with the greatest possible
promptitude by experienced individuals, so that his formidable objection van
ishes.

But the senator next tells us that I stated, in my remarks, that the bill, should
it pass, would place the banks and the government in antagonist relation to each
other, which he considers as a very weighty objection to it. I again must
correct his statement. I made no such remark ; I, indeed, said, when the banks
were connected with the government, they had a direct interest in increasing
its fiscal action. The greater the. revenue and expenditures, and the larger the
surplus, the greater would be their profit ; but, when they were separated, the
reverse would take place. That the greater amount of gold and silver collected
and withdrawn from circulation, the less would be left for banking operations,
and, of course, the less their profit ; and that, in one case, they would be the allies,
and. in the other, the opponents of the government, as far as its fiscal action was
concerned ; or, to express it more concisely, when united with the government,
they would be on the side of the tax-consumers, and, when separated, on that of
the tax-payers. Such were my remarks ; and I now ask, Is it not true ? Can.
any one deny it ? Or, admitting its truth, can its importance be disputed ? Were
there no other reasons in favour of the bill, I would consider this of itself de
cisive. It would be almost impossible to preserve our free institutions with the-
weight of the entire banking system thrown on the side of high taxes and ex
travagant disbursements, or to destroy it if thrown into the opposite scale.

But the senator regards the expression of tax-consumers and tax-payers as
mere catch-words, of dangerous import, and tending to divide society into the
hostile parties of rich and poor. I take a very different view. I hold that the
fiscal action of the government must necessarily divide the community into the
two great classes of tax-payers and tax-consumers. Take taxation and dis
bursements together, and it is unavoidable that one portion of the community
must pay into the treasury, in the shape of taxes, more than they receive back
in disbursements, and another must receive more than they pay. This is the
great disturbing principle in all government^, especially those that are free,
around which all other causes of political divisions and distractions finally rally.
Were it otherwise — if the interest of every portion and class of the community
was the same in reference to taxation and disbursements, nothing would be
more easy than to establish and preserve free institutions ; but as it is, it is the
most difficult of all tasks, as history and experience prove. This principle of
disorder lies deep in the nature of men and society, and extends equally to pri
vate associations as to political communities. There will necessarily spring
up in both a stockholding arid direction interest ; the latter of which, without
wise provisions and incessant vigilance, will absorb the former, of which the
winding up of many a bank will prove.

The two remaining arguments of the senator have been often asserted, and
as often refuted, and I shall despatch them with a few words. He tells us, as
he has often done, that we are bound to regulate the currency ; and that the
Constitution has given to Congress the express power to regulate it, with many
other expressions of similar import. It is manifest that the whole argument
turns on the ambiguity of the word currency. If by it is meant the current
coin of the United States, no one can doubt that Congress has the right to reg
ulate it. The power is expressly given by the Constitution, which says, in so
many words, that it shall have power to coin 4 money and regulate the value
thereof; but if it is intended to include bank-notes, as must be the intention of
the senator, there is no such express power given in the Constitution. It is a
point to be proved, and not assumed ; and every attempt of the senator to prove
it has ended in signal failure. He has not, and cannot meet the answer which
he received from the senator from Pennsylvania, at the extra session ; and his
repetition of the assertion, after so decisive an answer, serves but to prove how

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 345

much more easy it often is to refute an argument than to silence him who ad
vanced it. But I do not despair even of silencing the senator. There is one
whose authority on this point I am sure he must respect : I mean himself.
When the bill granting a charter to the late United States Bank was under
discussion in the other house, in 1816, he then took the opposite side, and ar
gued with great force against the very right for which he now so obstinately
contends. He then maintained that the framers of the Constitution were hard-
money men ; that currency meant the current coin of the United States, and
that Congress has no right to make any other. But the senator shall speak for
himself; and, that he may be heard in his own words, I shall read an extract
from his speech delivered at the time :

" Mr. Webster first addressed the house. He regretted the manner in which
this debate had been commenced, on a detached feature of the bill, and not ar
question affecting the principle ; and expressed his fears that a week or two>
would be lost in the discussion of this question to no purpose, inasmuch as it
might ultimately end in the rejection of the bill. He proceeded to reply to the ar
guments of the advocates of the bill. It was a mistaken idea, he said, which he
had heard uttered on this subject, that we were about to reform the national cur
rency. No nation had a better currency, he said, than the United States ; there
was no nation which had guarded its currency with more care ; for the framers
of the Constitution, and those who enacted the early statutes on this subject,
were hard-money men ; they had felt, and therefore duly appreciated, the evils of
a paper medium ; they, therefore, sedulously guarded the currency of the United.
States from debasement. The legal currency of the United States was gold and
silver coin ; this was a subject in regard to which Congress had run into no
folly.

•; What, then, he asked, was the present evil ? Having a perfectly sound na
tional currency, and the government having no power, in fact, to make anything
else current but gold and silver, there had grown up in different states a currency
of paper issued by banks, setting out with the promise to pay gold and silver,
which they had been wholly unable to redeem ; the consequence was, that there
was a mass of paper afloat, of perhaps fifty millions, which sustained no imme
diate relation to the legal currency of the country — a paper which will not enable
any man to pay money he owes to his neighbour, or his debts to the government.
The banks had issued more money than they could redeem, and the evil was
severely felt, &c. Mr. W. declined occupying the time of the house to prove
that there was a depreciation of the paper in circulation ; the legal standard,
of value was gold and silver ; the relation of paper to it proved its state, and
the rate of its depreciation. Gold and silver currency, he said, was the law of
the land at home, and the law of the world abroad; there could, in the present,
state of the world, be no other currency. In consequence of the immense paper
issues having banished specie from circulation, the government had been obli
ged, in direct violation of existing statutes, to receive the amount of their taxes
in something which was not recognised by law as the money of the country,
and which was, in fact, greatly depreciated, &c. This was the evil."

What can be more decisive ? What more pointed ? They are the very doc
trines which he is in the daily habit of denouncing under the name of Loco-foco.
The senator may hereafter be regarded as the father of the party, and I deem
it not a little unnatural that he should be so harsh and cruel to his offspring.

But it may be said that I then advocated the opposite side. Be it so, and it
follows that his authority and mine stand as opposing qualities on the opposite
sides of an equation ; and I feel confident that the senator will readily admit
that his will, at least, be sufficient to destroy mine.

I readily acknowledge that my opinion, after the lapse of upward of twenty
years, with the light which experience in this long period has shed on the
banking system, has undergone considerable changes. It would be strange if

Xx

M6 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

it had not. I see more clearly now than I did the true, character of the sys
tem, and its dangerous tendency ; but I owe it to myself, and the truth of the
cause, to say I was, even at that early period, far from being its advocate, and
would then have been opposed to the system had it been a new question. But
I then regarded the connexion between the government and the banks indisso
luble, and acquiesced in a state of things that I could not control, and which I
considered as established. The government was then receiving the notes of
non-specie-paying banks in its dues, to its own discredit, and heavy loss to its
creditors. The only practical alternative was at that period between a league
of state banks and a Bank of the United States, as the fis-cal agent of the gov
ernment. I preferred then, as I now do, the latter to the former, as more effi
cient, and not a whit more unconstitutional ; and, if I now were again placed
in the same state of things that I then was, with all my present feelings and
views, I could hardly have acted differently from what I then did.

The senator greatly mistakes in supposing that I feel any disposition to re
pudiate or retract what I then said. So far from it, I have, I think, just cause
to be proud of the remarks I made on the occasion. It put the question of the
bank, for the first time, on its true basis, as far as this government is concern
ed, and the one on which it has ever since stood ; which is no small compli
ment to one then so inexperienced as myself. All I insist on is, that the report
contains but a very hasty sketch — a mere outline, as the reporter himself says
— of my remarks, in which four fifths are omitted, and that it would be doing me
great injustice to regard it as containing a full exposition of my views. But, as
brief as it is, what is reported cannot be read, in a spirit of fairness, without
seeing that I regarded the question at the time as a mere practical one, to be
decided, under all the circumstances of the case, without involving the higher
questions which, now that the connexion between the government and the
banks is broken, come rightfully into discussion. At that time the only ques
tion, as I expressly stated, was, not whether we should be connected with the
bank, for that was existing in full force, but whether it was most advisable, ad
mitting the existence of the connexion, that the United States, as well as the
separate states, should exercise the power of banking. I have made these re
marks, not that I regard the question of consistency, after so great a change of
circumstances, of much importance, but because I desire to stand where truth
and justice place me on this great question.

The last argument of the senator on the question at issue was drawn from
the provision of the Constitution which gives to Congress the right to regulate
commerce, and which, he says, involves the right and obligation to furnish a
sound circulating medium. The train of his reasoning, as far as I could com
prehend it, was, that without a currency commerce could not exist, at least to
any considerable extent, and, of course, there would be nothing to regulate ;
and, therefore, unless Congress furnished a currency, its power of regulating
commerce would become a mere nullity ; and from which he inferred the right
and obligation to furnish not only a currency, but a bank currency ! Whatever
may be said of the soundness of the reasoning, all must admit that his mode of
construing the Constitution is very bold and novel. To what would it lead ?
The same clause in that instrument which gives Congress the right to coin
money and regulate the value thereof, gives it also the kindred right to fix the
standard of weights and measures. They are just as essential to the existence
of Congress as the currency itself. The yard and the bushel are not less impor
tant in the exchange of commodities than the dollar and the eagle ; and the very
train of reasoning which would make it the right and duty of the government
to furnish the one, would make it equally so to furnish the other. Again : com
merce cannot exist without ships and other means of transportation. Is the gov
ernment also bound to furnish them ? Nor without articles or commodities to be
exchanged, such as cotton, rice, tobacco, and the various products of agriculture

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 347

and manufactures. Is it also bound to furnish them ? Nor these, in turn, with
out labour ; and must that, too, be furnished ? If not, I ask the senator to make
the distinction. Where will he draw the line, and on what principles ? Does
he not see that, according to this mode of construction, the higher powers
granted in the Constitution would carry all the inferior, and that this would
become a government of unlimited powers ? Take, for instance, the war power,
and apply the same mode of construction to it, and what power would there be
that Congress could not exercise — nay, be bound to exercise ? Intelligence,
morals, wealth, numbers, currency, all are important elements of power, and
may become so to the defence of the Union and safety of the country ; and, ac
cording to the senator's reasoning, the government would have the right, and
would be in duty bound to take charge of the schools, the pulpits, the industry,
the population, as well as the currency of the country ; and these would com
prehend the entire circle of legislation, and leave the state governments as use
less appendages of the system.

Having now, I trust, taken down to the ground the little centre building, with
its four apartments, nothing remains of the entire structure but the huge portico
in front, and on which I shall next commence the work of demolition. The
senator opened his discourse on credits and banks by asserting that bank credit
was, in truth and reality, so much capital actually added to the community. I
waive the objection, that neither credit nor the banking system is involved in
the question ; and that those who are opposed to the union of the political and
moiiey power oppose that union with other reasons, on the ground that it is un
favourable to a full development of the credit system, and dangerous to the banks
themselves, which they believe can only be saved from entire destruction by
the separation ; and it follows, of course, all that he said in relation to them is
either a begging of the question or irrelevant. But, assuming what he said to
be applicable, I shall show that it is either unfounded in fact or erroneous in
conclusion.

So far from agreeing with the senator, that what he calls bank credit is so
much real capital added to the country, I hold the opposite — that banks do not
add a cent of capital or credit. Regarded strictly, the credit of banks is limit
ed to the capital actually paid in. This, usually, is the only sum for which the
stockholders are liable ; and, without what are called banking privileges, they
would not have a cent of credit beyond that amount. But the capital subscribed
and paid is not created by the banks. It is drawn out of the general fund of
the country. Now, I ask, What constitutes its credit beyond its capital ? In
the first place, and mainly, it is derived from the fact that both General and
State Governments receive and treat bank-notes as cash, and thereby, to the
extent of their fiscal action, virtually give them the use of their credit. It is an.
existing credit, belonging to them exclusively, and is neither created nor in
creased by permitting the banks to use it. In the next place, the deposites
with the banks, both public and private, add a large amount to their credit ; but
this, again, is either the property or credit of the government and individuals,
which they are permitted to use, and which they neither create nor increase.
Finally, notes and bonds, or other credits discounted by the banks, make up
their credit, which are neither more nor less than the credit of the drawers and
endorsers, on which the banks do business. They take in the paper or credit
of others, payable at a given day, deduct the interest in advance, and give out
their own credit or notes, payable on demand, without interest; that is, the
credit of their own paper rests on the credit of the paper discounted or taken
in exchange, which credit they neither create nor increase. In a word, all
their credit beyond the capital actually paid in is but the credit of the public
or individuals, on which, by what are called banking privileges, they are permit
ted to do business and make profit ; and, so far from creating credit or capital,
they, in fact, add not a cent of capital or credit to that which previously existed.

348 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

But the senator next tells us that there is three hundred millions of banking
capital in the Union, and that it is real bona fide solid capital, as much so as the
plantations of the South. This is certainly news to me. I had supposed that
this vast amount was little more than a fictitious mass of credit piled on credit,
in the erection of which but little specie or real capital was used ; and that,
when a new bank was created, the wheelbarrow was put in motion to roll the
specie from the old to the new institution, till it got fully under way, when it
was rolled back again. But it seems that all this is a mistake ; that the whole
capital is actually paid in cash, and is as solid as terra firma itself. This cer
tainly is a bold assertion, in the face of facts daily occurring. There have
been, if I mistake not. four or five recent bank explosions in the senator's own
town, in which the whole vanished into thin air, leaving nothing behind but
ruin and desolation. What has become of that portion of his solid capital ?
Did the senator ever hear of a plantation thus exploding and vanishing ? And
I would be glad to know how large a portion of his three hundred millions of
solid capital will finally escape in the same way ? A few years may enable us
to answer this question.

The senator next, by way of illustration, undertook to draw a distinction be
tween bank credit and government credit, or public stocks, in which he was
not very successful. It would be no difficult task to prove that they both rest
substantially on debt, and that the government stock may be, and is to a great
extent, actually applied in the same mode as bank credit in the use of exchanges
and business. It in fact constitutes, to a great extent, the very basis of banking
operation ; but, after having occupied the Senate so long, it would be unreason
able to consume their time on what was introduced as a mere illustration.

The senator next undertook to prove the immense advantage of banking in
stitutions. He asked, What would be done with the surplus capital of the coun
try, if it could not be invested in bank stocks ? In this new arid growing coun
try, with millions on millions of lands of the best quality still lying unimproved ;
with vast schemes of improvements, constantly requiring capital ; with the im
mense demand for labour for every branch of business, the last question I ever
expected to hear asked is that propounded by the senator. I had supposed the
great difficulty was to find capital, and not how to dispose of it, and that this
difficulty had been one of the main reasons assigned in favour of the banking
system.

The next benefit he attributed to the system was the vast amount of lands
which had passed out of the hands of the public into that of individuals of late,
which he estimated, during the last three years, at thirty-six millions of acres,
forming a surface equal in extent to England, and which, he stated, would rise
in value greatly, in consequence of their passing into private hands. That this
immense transfer has been effected by the banks, I admit ; but that it is to be
considered an advantage to the country, I certainly never expected to hear ut
tered anywhere, especially on this floor, and by one so intelligent as the sen
ator. I had supposed it was infinitely better for the community at large, and
particularly for those not in affluent circumstances, that the lands should remain
in possession of the government than of speculators, till wanted for settlement ;
and that one of the most decided objections to our banking system is, that it be
comes the instrument of making such immense transfers whenever the currency
becomes excessive. This is a point not without interest, and I must ask the
Senate to bear with me while I pause for a few moments to explain it.

The effect of an expanding currency is to raise prices, and to put speculation
in motion. He who buys, in a short time seems to realize a fortune, and every
one is on the look-out to make successful investments ; and thus prices receive
a constant upward impulse, with the exception of the public lands, the price of
which is fixed at $1 25, excepting such as are sold at public auction. The rise
of other landed property soon creates a new demand for the public lands, and

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 349

speculation commences its giant operations in that quarter. Vast purchases are
35iade, and the revenue of the government increases in proportion to the increased
sales. The payment is made in bank-notes, and these pass from the land-offices
to the deposite banks, and constitute a large surplus for new banking facilities
and accommodations. Applicants from all quarters press in to partake of the
rich harvest, and the notes repass into the hands of speculators, to be reinvested
in the purchase of public lands. They again pass through the hands of re
ceivers, and thence to the banks, and again to the speculators ; and every revo
lution of the wheel increases the swelling tide, which sweeps away millions of
the choicest acres from the government to the monopolizers for bank-notes,
•which, in the end, prove as worthless as the paper on which they are written.
Had this process not been arrested by the Deposite Act of 1836, and had the
banks avoided an explosion, in a short time the whole of the public domain, the
precious inheritance of the people of this Union and their descendants, would
have passed through the same process with the thirty-six millions of acres
which the senator so highly commends. What took place then will again take
place at the very next swell of the paper tide, unless, indeed, this bill should
become a law, which would prove an effectual check against its recurrence.

The senator next attributes our extraordinary advance in improvement and
prosperity to the banking system. He puts down as nothing our free institu
tions ; the security in which the people enjoy their rights, the vast extent of
our country, and the fertility of its soil, and the energy, industry, and enterprise-
of the stock from which we are descended. All these, it seems, are as dust.
The banks are everything, and without them we would have been but little ad
vanced in improvement or prosperity. It is much more easy to assign our pros
perity to the banking system than to prove it. That in its early stages it con
tributed to give an impulse to industry and improvement, I do not deny ; but that,
in its present excess, it impedes rather than promotes either, I hold to be cer
tain. That we are not indebted to it for our extraordinary advance and im
provements, wholly or mainly, there is an argument which I regard as decisive.
Before the Revolution we had no banks, and yet our improvement and pros
perity, all things considered, were as great anterior to it as since, whether we
xegard the increase of population or wealth. At that time not a bank-note was
to be seen, and the whole circulation consisted either of gold and silver, or the
colonial paper money, which all now, and especially the senator, consider so
worthless. Had the senator lived during that period, he might, with equal
plausibility, have attributed all the improvement and prosperity of the country to
the old colonial paper money, as he now does to the banks ; and have denounced
any attempt to change or improve it as an overthrow of the credit system, as
warmly as he now does the separation of the government from the banks. I tell
the senator that the time is coming when his present defence of the banking
system, as it is now organized, will be considered as extraordinary as we now
would regard a defence of the old and exploded system of colonial paper money.
He seems not to see that the system has reached a point where great changes
are unavoidable, and without which the whole will explode. The state of its
manhood and vigour has passed, and it is now far advanced in that of decrepi
tude. The whole system must be reformed, or it must perish in the natural
course of events. The first step towards its renovation is the measure he de
nounces in such unmeasured terms — the separation from the government ; and
the next a separation between discount and circulation. The two are incom
patible ; and so long as they are united, those frequent vicissitudes of contractions
and expansions, to which bank circulation is so subject, and which is rapidly
bringing it into discredit, must continue to increase in frequency and intensity, till
it shall become as completely discredited as Continental money.

The senator seems not to be entirely unaware of the danger to which the
system is exposed from its frequent vibrations and catastrophes. He tells us,

350 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

by way of apology, that had it not been for the specie circular, the present catas
trophe would not have occurred. That it hastened it, I do not in the least
doubt ; but that we should have escaped without it, I wholly deny. The causes
of the explosion lay deep — far beneath the circulars, and nothing but the most
efficient measures, during the session immediately after the removal of the de-
posites, could have prevented it. That was the crisis, which, having passed
without doing anything, what has since followed was inevitable. But admit
ting what he says to be true, what a .picture of the system does it exhibit I
How frail how, unstable must it be, when a single act of the executive could
bring it to the ground, and spread ruin over the country ! And shall we again
renew our connexion with such a system, so liable, from the slightest cause, to
such disasters ? Does it not conclusively show that there is some deep and
inherent defect in its very constitution, which renders it too unsafe to confide
in without some radical and thorough reform ?

The senator himself seems conscious of this. He entered into the question
of its expansions and contractions, and suggested several remedies to correct an
evil which none can deny, and which all must see, if not corrected, must end
in the final overthrow of the system. He told us that the remedy was to be
found in the proportion between bullion and circulation, and that the proper rule
to enforce the due proportion between the two was, when exchange was
against us, for the banks to curtail. I admit that the disease originates in the
undue proportion, not between bullion and circulation, but between it and the
liabilities of the banks, including deposites as well as circulation (the former is
even more important than the latter), and that the remedy must consist in en
forcing that proportion. But two questions here present themselves : What is
that due proportion ? and how is it, under our system of banking, to be enfor
ced ? There is one proportion which we know to be safe ; and that is when, for
every dollar of liability, there is a dollar in bullion or specie ; but this would
bring us back again to the old, honest, and substantial Bank of Amsterdam, so
much abused by all the advocates of banks of discount. If that proportion be
transcended — if we admit two or three to one to be the due proportion, or any
other that would make banking more profitable and eligible than the mere loan
ing of money, or other pursuits of society, the evil under which we now suffer
would continue. Too much capital would continue to flow into banking, to be
again followed by the excess of the system, with all its train of disasters. But
admit that such would not be the fact, how are we to compel the twenty-six
states of this Union to enforce the due proportion, all of which exercise the
right of establishing banks at pleasure, and on such principles as they may
choose to adopt ? It can only be done by an amendment of the Constitution ;
and is there any one so wild and visionary as to believe that there is the least
prospect of such an amendment ? Let gentlemen who acknowledge the defect,
before they insist on a reunion with a system, acknowledged to be exposed, as
as it now stands, to such frequent and dangerous vicissitudes, first apply a rem
edy and remove the defect, and then ask for our co-operation.

But the senator tells us that the means of enforcing the due proportion is to
be found in the regulation of the exchanges ; and for this purpose the only rule
necessary to be observed is to curtail when exchanges are against us, and as a
counterpart, I suppose, to enlarge when in our favour. How much dependance
is to be put on this rule, we have a strong illustration in the late catastrophe,
under which the country is now suffering. The exchanges remained in our
favour till the very last ; and before the rule, on which the senator so confi
dently relies, could be applied, the shock was felt and the banks ingulfed ; and
this will ever be the case, when preceded by a general expansion in the com
mercial world, such as preceded the late.

The cause of that commenced on the other side of the Atlantic, and origina
ted mainly in the provisions on which the recharter of the Bank of England

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 351

was renewed, which greatly favoured extension of banking operations in a
country which may be considered as the centre of the commercial system of
the world. The effect of these provisions was a depreciation of the value of
gold and silver there, and their consequent expulsion to other countries, and
especially to ours, which turned the exchange with England in our favour ; and
which, in combination with other causes, the removal of the deposites, and the
expiration of the charter of the late Bank of the United States, was followed by
a great corresponding expansion of our banking system. The result of this
state of things was a great increase of the liabilities of the banks compared
with their specie in both countries, which laid the train for the explosion. The
Bank of England first took the alarm, and began to prepare to meet the threat
ened calamity. It was unavoidable, and the onry question was, where it should
fall. The weakness of our system, and the comparative strength of theirs, turn
ed the shock on ours, but of the approach of which the exchanges gave, as I
have stated, no indications almost to the last moment. And even then, so arti
ficial are exchanges, and so liable to be influenced by other causes besides the
excess of currency on one side and the deficit on the other, after it began to
show unfavourable indications, we all remember that a single individual, at the
head of a state institution, I mean Mr. Biddle, by appearing in New- York, and
bringing into market bonds on England drawn on time, turned the current, and
restored the exchange. All this conclusively proves, that when there is a gen
eral expansion (the most dangerous of all), exchanges give no indication of the
approach of danger, and, of course, their regulation, on which the senator relies,
affords no protection against it.

I might go farther, and show that at no time is it to be relied on as the index
of the relative expansion or contraction in different countries, and that it is lia
ble to be influenced by many circumstances besides those to which I have al
luded, some of which are fleeting, and others more permanent. It presupposes
the perfect fluidity of currency, and that it is not liable to be obstructed or im
peded by natural or artificial causes in its ebbs and flows ; which is far from
being true, as I have already shown in the instance of Mr. Biddle's operation
preceding the late shock. In fact, it may be laid down as a rule, that where
the currency consists of convertible paper, resting on a gold and silver basis, the
small portion of specie which may be required to uphold the whole has its flu
idity obstructed by so many and sucli powerful causes as to afford no certain
criterion of the relative expansion of the currency between it and other coun
tries, and, of course, afford no certain rule of regulating banking operations.
The subject is one that would require more time to discuss than 1 can bestow
on the present occasion ; but of its truth we have a strong illustration in the
state of things preceding the late shock, when, as I have stated, the exchanges
remained favourable to the banks, while the vast amount of our imports, and the
unusual character of many of the articles imported, clearly indicated that our
currency was relatively greatly expanded compared with those countries with
which we have commercial relations.

To correct the defects of the system, the senator must go much deeper.
The evil lies in its strong tendency to increase ; and that, again, in the extra
ordinary and vast advantages which are conferred on it beyond all other pur
suits of the community, which, if not diminished, must terminate in its utter de
struction, or an entire revolution in our social and political system. It is not
possible that the great body of the community will patiently bear that the cur
rency, which ought to be the most stable of all things, should be the most fluc
tuating and uncertain ; and that, too, in defiance of positive provisions in the
Constitution, which all acknowledge were intended to give it the greatest pos
sible stability.

352 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

XXIII.

SPEECH ON THE BILL TO PREVENT THE INTERFERENCE OF CERTAIN FEDERAL
OFFICERS IN ELECTIONS, FEBRUARY 22, 1839.

MR. CALHOUN said: I belong, Mr. President, to that political school
which regards with a jealous eye the patronage of this government, and
believes that the less its patronage the better, consistently with the ob
jects for which the government was instituted. Thus thinking, I have
made no political move of any importance, for the last twelve or thirteen
years, which had not for its object, directly or indirectly, the reduction
of patronage. But, notwithstanding this, I cannot bring my mind to sup
port this bill, decidedly as 1 approve of its object. Among other diffi
culties, there is a constitutional objection which I cannot surmount, and
which I shall, without farther remark, proceed to state and consider.

This bill proposes to inflict the penalty of dismission on a large class
of the officers of this government who shall electioneer, or attempt to
control or influence the election of public functionaries either of the
General or State Governments, without distinguishing between their offi
cial and individual character as citizens $ and the question is, Has Con
gress the constitutional right to pass such a law! That, again, involves
a prior, and still more general question : Has this government the author
ity to interfere with the electoral rights of the citizens of the states 1

In considering this general question, I shall assume, in the first place,
what none will deny, that it belongs to the states separately to determine
who shall, and who shall not, exercise the right of suffrage ; and, in the
second, that it belongs to them, in like manner, to regulate that right ,- that
is, to pass all laws that may be necessary to secure its free exercise on
the one hand, and to prevent its abuse on the other. I iiext advance the
proposition, which no one in the least conversant with our institutions, or
familiar with the Constitution, will venture to question, that, as far as
citizens are concerned, this right belongs solely to the states, to the entire ex
clusion of the General Government, which can in no wise touch or interfere
with it without transcending the limits of the Constitution. Thus far
there can be no difference of opinion.

But a citizen may be also an officer of this government, which brings
tip the question, Has it the right to make it penal for him to use his offi
cial power to control or influence elections ! Can it, for instance, make
it penal in a collector or other officer who holds a bond, in his official
character, on a citizen, to threaten to enforce it if he should refuse to
vote for his favourite candidate 1 I regard this proposition as not less
clear than the preceding. Whenever the government invests an indi
vidual with power which may be used to the injury of others or the pub
lic, it is manifest that it not only has the right, but that it is in duty
bound to prevent its abuse, as far as practicable. But it must be borne
in mind that a citizen does not cease to be one in becoming a federal
officer. This government must, accordingly, take special care, in sub
jecting him to penalties for the abuse of his official powers, that it does
not interfere in any wise with his private rights as a citizen, and which
are, as has been stated, under the exclusive control of the states. But
no such care is taken either in this bill or the substitute proposed by its
author. Neither makes any distinction whatever between the official find
private acts of the officer as a citizen. The broadest and most comprehen
sive terms are used, comprehending and subjecting all acts, without dis
crimination as to character, to the proposed penalty. Under its pro-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 353

visions, if an officer should express an opinion of any candidate, say of
a president, who was a candidate for re-election, whether favourable or
unfavourable, or to whisper an opinion relating to his administration,
whether good or bad, he would subject himself to the penalty of this bill,
as certainly as if he had brought the whole of his official power to bear
directly on the freedom of election. That a bill, containing such broad
and indiscriminate provisions, transcends the powers of Congress, and
violates in the officer the electoral rights of the citizen, held under the
authority of his state, and guarantied by the provision of the Constitu
tion, which secures the freedom of speech to all, is too clear, after what
has been said, to require additional illustration. It cannot pass without
enlarging the power of the government by the abridgment of the rights
of the citizen.

But it may be replied, that these are instances where the government
has subjected its officers to penalties for acts of a private character, over
which the Constitution has given it no control. Such, undoubtedly, is the
fact, and its right to do so, in the instances referred to in the discussion,
cannot be denied ; but all such cases are distinguished from that under
consideration by lines too broad to be mistaken. In all of them, the acts
prohibited were, in the first place, such as were incompatible with the
official duties enjoined; as in the case of the prohibition of commissaries
to purchase or deal in articles similar to those that are made their official
duty to purchase, in order to prevent fraud on the public. And in the
next, the acts prohibited involved only civil rights, belonging to the officer
as an individual, and not political rights, which belong to him as a citizen.
The former he may yield at pleasure, without discredit or disgrace, but
the latter he cannot surrender without debasing himself, and giving up a
sacred trust vested in him, by the state of which he is a member, for the
common good ; nor can this government demand its surrender without
transcending its powers, and infringing the rights of the states and their
citizens.

It may also be said that, in most cases, it would be impossible to dis
tinguish between the official and the political acts of the officer, so as to
subject the former to penal restraints, without interfering with the latter ;
and that it would, in practice, render ineffective the admitted right of the
government to punish its officers for the abuse of their official powers.
It may be so, but little or no evil can result. Whatever defect of right
this government may labour under in such cases, is amply made up by
the plenary power of the states, which has an unlimited control over the
electoral rights of its citizens, whether officers of this government or not.
To them the subject may be safely confided. It is they who are partic
ularly interested in seeing that a right so sacred shall not be abused, nor
the freedom of election be impaired. We must not forget that states and
the people of the states are our constituents and superiors, and we but
their agents ; and that, if the right in question be abused, or the freedom
of election be impaired, it is they, and not we, who must mainly suffer,
and who, of course, are the best judges of the evil and the remedy. If
the policy of the states demands it, they may impose whatever restraint
they please on the federal officers within their respective limits, in order
to guard against their control or influence in elections, and, if it be neces
sary, to divest them entirely of the right of suffrage. To those who are
so much more interested and competent to judge and act on this subject
than we are, I am for leaving the decision as to what ought to be done,
and the application of the remedy. Entertaining these views, I am forced
to the conclusion that this bill is unconstitutional, and, if there were no
other reason to oppose its passage, I should be compelled to vote against it.

Y Y

354 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

But there are others sufficiently decisive to compel me to withhold my
support, were it possible to remove the constitutional objection. So far
from restricting the patronage of the President, should the bill become a
law, it would, if I mistake not, greatly increase his influence. He has
now the almost unlimited power of removing the officers of this govern
ment : a power, the abuse of which has been the subject of much, and, in
my opinion, of just complaint on the part of the chamber to which the
mover of this bill belongs, on the ground that it was calculated to increase
unduly the power and influence of that department of the government.
Now, what is the remedy this bill proposes for that evil 1 To put re'stric-
tions on the removing power] The very reverse. To make it the duty^
as it is now the right of the President, to remove ; and, in discharging this
high duty, he is made the sole judge, without limitation or appeal. The
fate of the accused would be exclusively in his hand, whether charged
with the offence of opposing or supporting his administration. Can any
one, the least conversant with party morals, or the working of the human
heart, doubt how the law would be executed! Is it not certain that it
would be most rigidly enforced against all officers who should venture to
oppose him, either in the Federal or State Governments, with a corre
sponding indulgence and lenity towards those who supported him 1 A.
single view, without prolonging the discussion, will decide. Should there
be a president of such exalted virtue and patriotism as to make no dis
crimination between friend and foe, the law would be perfectly useless j
but if not, it would be made the pretext for indiscriminate removal of all
who may refuse to become his active and devoted partisans 5 and it would
thus prove either useless, or worse than useless.

With the object which the mover of the bill has in view, it seems to
me he ought to take the very opposite course ; and, instead of making it
the duty of the President to remove, he ought to impose restrictions on
the power of removal, or to divest him entirely of it. Place the office
holders, with their yearly salaries, beyond the reach of the executive
power, and they would in a short time be as mute and inactive as this
bill proposes to make them. Their voice, I promise, would then be
scarcely raised at elections, or their persons be faund at the polls.

But suppose the immediate ofoject of the bill accomplished, and the
office-holders rendered perfectly silent and passive, it might even then be
doubted whether it would cause any diminution in the influence of patron
age over elections. It would, indeed, greatly reduce the influence of the
office-holders. . They would become the most insignificant portion of the
community, as far as elections were concerned. But just in the same
proportion as they might sink, the no less formidable corps of office-seek
ers would rise in importance. The struggle for power between the ins
and the outs would not abate in the least, in violence or intensity, by the
silence or inactivity of the office-holders, as the amount of patronage, the
stake contended for, would remain undiminished. Both sides, those in
and those out of power, would turn from the passive and silent body of
incumbents, and court the favour of the active corps that panted to sup
plant them ; and the lesult would be an annual sweep of the former, after
every election, to mak^ room to reward the latter, and that on whichever
side the scale of victory might turn. The consequence would be rotation
with a vengeance. The wheel would turn round with such velocity that
anything like a stable system of policy would be impossible. Each tem
porary occupant that might be thrown into office by the whirl, would
seize the moment to make the most of his good fortune before he might
be displaced by his successor, and a system (if such it might be called)
would follow not less corrupting than unstable.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 355

With these decisive objections, I cannot give my support to the bill ;
but I wish it to be distinctly understood that, in withholding it, I neither
retract nor modify any sentiment I have expressed in relation to the pat
ronage of this government. I have looked over, since the commence
ment of this discussion, the report I made as chairman of a select com
mittee on the subject in 1835, and which has been so frequently referred
to in debate by those on the opposite side of the chamber, and I find
nothing which I would omit if I had now to draw it, but much which
time and reflection would induce me to add, to strengthen the grounds I
then assumed. There is not a sentence in it incompatible with the views
I have presented on the present occasion.

I might here, Mr. President, terminate my remarks, as far as this bill
is concerned; but as the general question of patronage is at all times one
of importance under our system of government, and especially so, in my
opinion, at this present juncture, I trust that I shall be indulged in offer
ing my opinion somewhat more at large in reference to it.

If it be desirable to reduce the patronage of the government (and I
hold it to be eminently so), we must strike at the source — the root, and
not the branches. It is the only way that will not, in the end, prove falla
cious. The main sources of patronage may be found in the powers, the
revenue, and the expenditures of the government ; and the first and neces
sary step towards its reduction is to restrict the powers of this government
within the rigid limits prescribed by the Constitution. Every extension of its
powers beyond would bring within its control subjects never intended
to be placed there, followed by increased patronage, and augmented ex
penditure and revenue.

We must, in the next place, take care not to call the acknowledged
powers of the government into action beyond the limits which the com
mon interest may render necessary, nor to pervert them into means of
doing what it was never intended by the Constitution we should have the
right to do. Of all the sources of power and influence, the perversion,
of the powers of the government has proved, in practice, the most fruit
ful and dangerous ; of which our political history furnishes many exam
ples, especially in reference to the money power, as will appear in the
course of my remarks.

After restricting the powers of the government within proper limits,
the next important step would be to bring down the income and expen
ditures to the smallest practicable amount. It is a primary maxim under
our system, to collect no more money than is necessary to the economi
cal and constitutional wants of the government. We have, in fact, no
right to collect a cent more. Nothing can tend more powerfully to cor
rupt public and private morals, or to increase the patronage of the gov
ernment, than an excessive or surplus revenue, as recent and sad experi
ence has abundantly proved. Nor is it less important to restrict the ex
penditures within the income. It is, in fact, indispensable to a restricted
revenue, as the increase of the former must, in the end, lead to an in
crease of the latter. Nor must an exact administration, and a rigid ac
countability in every department of the government, be neglected. It is
among the most efficient means of keeping down patronage and corrup
tion, as well as the revenue and expenditures, just as the opposite is
among the most prolific source of both.

It is thus, and thus only, that we can reduce effectually the patronage
of the government to the least amount consistent with the discharge of
the few but important duties with which it is charged, and render it,
what the Constitution intended it should be, a cheap and simple govern
ment, instituted by the states for their mutual security, and more perfect

356 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

protection of their liberty and tranquillity. It is the way pointed out by
Jefferson and his associates of the Virginia school, which has ever been
distinguished for its jealous opposition to patronage, as the bane of our
political system, as is so powerfully illustrated in the immortal documents
so frequently referred to in this duscussion — the report to the Virginia
Legislature on the Alien and Sedition Law, in the year 1799.

But there is, and ever has been from the first, another and opposing
school, that regarded patronage with a very different eye, not as a bane,
but as an essential ingredient, without which the government would be
impracticable ; and whose leading policy is, to enlist in its favour the
more powerful classes of society, through their interest, as indispensable
to its support. If we cannot take lessons from this school on the ques
tion of reduction of patronage, we may at least learn, what is of vast im
portance to be known, how, and by what means this school has reared up
a system, which has added so vastly to the power and patronage of the
government, beyond what was contemplated by its framers, as to alarm
its wisest and best friends for its fate. With the view of furnishing this
information, so intimately connected with the object of these remarks, I
propose to give a very brief and rapid narrative of the rise and progress
of that system.

At the head of this school stands the name of Hamilton, than which
there is none more distinguished in our political history. He is the per
fect type and impersonation of the National or Federal school (I use
party names with reluctance, and only for the sake of brevity), as Jeffer
son is of the State Rights Republican school. They were both men of
eminent talent, ardent patriotism, great boldness, and comprehensive and
systematic understanding. They were both men who fixed on a single
object far ahead, and converged all their powers towards its accomplish
ment. The difference between them is, that Jefferson had more genius,
Hamilton more abilities ; the former leaned more to the side of liberty,
and his great rival more to that of power. They both have impressed
themselves deeply on the movements of the government ; but, as yet,
Hamilton far more so than Jefferson, though the impression of the latter
is destined in the end, as I trust, to prove the more durable of the two.

It has been the good fortune of the school of which Mr. Jefferson is the
head to imbody their principles and doctrines in written documents (the
report referred to, and the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions), which are
the acknowledged creed of the party, and may at all times be referred to
in order to ascertain what they are in fact. The opposite school has left
no such written and acknowledged creed, but the declaration and acts
of its great leader leave little doubt as to either its principles or doctrines.
In tracing them, a narrative of his life and acts need not be given. It will
suffice to say, that he entered early in life into the army of the Revolu
tion, and became a member of the military family of Washington, whose
confidence he gained and retained to the last. He next appeared in the
convention which framed the Constitution, where, with his usual boldness,
he advocated a President and Senate for life, and the appointment, by this
government, of the governors of the states, with a veto on state laws.
These bold measures failing, he retired from the convention, it is said, in
disgust ; but afterward, on more mature reflection, became the zealous
and able advocate of the adoption of the Constitution. He saw, as he
thought, in a scheme of government which conferred the unlimited power
of taxing and declaring war, the almost unbounded source of power, in
resolute and able hands ; hence his declaration, that though the gov
ernment was weak in its organization, it would, when put in action, find
the means of supporting itself: a profound reflection, proving that he

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 357

clearly saw how to make it, in practice, what his movements in the Con
vention had failed to accomplish in its organization. Nor has he left it
in doubt as to what were the means on which he relied to effect his ob
ject. We all recollect the famous assertion of the elder Adams, that the
" British Constitution," restored to its original principles, and freed from
corruption, was the wisest and best ever formed by naan ; and Hamilton's
reply, that the British Constitution, freed from corruption, would be im
practicable, but, with its corruption, was the best that ever existed. To
realize what was intended by this great man, it must be understood that
he meant not corruption in its usual sense of bribery. He was too able
and patriotic to resort to such means, or to the petty policy of this bill.
Either of these modes of operation was on too small a scale for him.
Like all great and comprehensive minds, he acted on masses, without
much regard to individuals. He meant by corruption something far
more powerful and comprehensive ; that policy which systematically
favoured the great and powerful classes of society, with the view of
binding them, through their interest, to the support of the government.
This was the single object of his policy, and to which he strictly and
resolutely adhered throughout his career, but which, whether suited or
not to the British system of government, is, as time has shown, uncon
genial and dangerous to ours.

After the Constitution was adopted, he was placed at the head of the
treasury department, a position which gave full scope to his abilities, and
placed ample means at his disposal to rear up the system he meditated.
Well and skilfully did he use them. His first measure was the adoption
of the funding system, on the British model; and on this the two schools,
which have ever since, under one form or another, divided the country,
and ever will divide it, so long as the government endures, came into
conflict. They were both in favour of keeping the public faith, but differed
as to the mode of assuming the public debt, and the amount that ought
to be assumed. The policy of Hamilton prevailed. The amount as
sumed was about $80,000,000, a v#st sum for a country so impoverished,
and with a population so inconsiderable as we then had. The creation
of the system, and the assumption of so large a debt, gave a decided and
powerful impulse to the government, in the direction in which it has since
continued to move, almost constantly.

This was followed by a measure adopted on his own responsibility, and
in the face of law, but which, though at the time it attracted little atten
tion or opposition, has proved the most powerful of all the means em
ployed in rearing up and maintaining his favourite system. I refer to
the treasury order directing the receipt of bank-notes in the dues of the
government, and which was the first link of that unconstitutional and un
holy alliance between this government and the banks that has been fol
lowed by such disastrous consequences. I have, Mr. President, been ac
cused of extravagance in asserting that this unholy connexion with the
paper system was the great and primary cause of almost every departure
from the principles of the Constitution, and of the dangers to which the
government has been exposed. I am happy to have it in my "power to
show that I do not stand alone in this opinion. Our attention has lately
been attracted, by one of the journals of this city, to a pamphlet contain
ing the same sentiment, published as far back as 1794 ; the author of
which was one of the profoundest and purest statesmen to whom our
country has ever given birth, but who has not been distinguished in pro
portion to his eminent talent and ardent patriotism. In confirmation of
what I assert, I will thank the senator from North Carolina near me (Mr.
Strange) to read a paragraph taken from the pamphlet, which contains

358 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

expressions as strong as any I have ever used in reference to the point in
question.

Mr. Strange read as follows :

" Funding and banking systems are indissolubly connected with every
commercial and political question by an interest generally at enmity with
the common good. In the great cases of peace and war, of fleets and
armies, and of taxation and navigation, their cries will forever resound
throughout the continent. Whereas, the undue bias of public officers is
bounded by known salaries, and persons not freeholders are hardly, if at
all, distinguishable from the national interest. One observation is ad
duced in proof of this doctrine. Paper fraud, knowing the restiffness
of liberty when oppressed, is under an impulse to strengthen itself by alli
ances with legislative corruption, with a military force, and with similar for
eign systems. War with Britain can be turned by it to great account. In
case of victory, a military apparatus, united to it by large arrears, and an
aversion to being disbanded, will be on one hand. In case of defeat,
paper will constitute an engine of government analogous to the English
system. Can Republicanism safely intrust a legislative paper junto with the
management of such a war 1 If it does, no prophetic spirit is necessary
to foretell that paper will be heaped upon liberty, from the same design
with which mountains were heaped upon the giants by the dissolute junto
of Olympus."

The next movement he made was the boldest of the whole series.
The union of the government with the paper system was not yet com
plete. A central control was wanting, in order to give to it unity of ac
tion and a full development of its power and influence. This he sought
in a National Bank, with a capital of $10,000,000, to be composed princi
pally of the stock held by the public creditors ; thus binding more
strongly to the government that already powerful class, by giving them,
through its agency, increased profit, and a decided control over the cur
rency, exchanges, and the business transactions of the country. On the
question of chartering the bank, the £reat battle was fought between the
two schools. The contest was long and obstinate, but victory ultimately
declared in favour of the national Federal school.

The leader of that school was not content with these great achieve
ments. His bold and ardent mind was not of a temper to stop short or
the end at which he aimed. His next movement was to seize on the
money power ; and he put forth able reports, in which he asserted the
broad principle, that Congress was under no other constitutional restriction
in the use of the public money but the general we/fare, and that it might be
appropriated to any purpose whatever believed to be calculated to pro
mote the general interest, and as freely to the objects not enumerated as
those that were specified in the Constitution. To this he added another,
and, perhaps, more dangerous assumption of power — that the taxing
power, which was granted expressly to raise revenue, might be used as
a protective power for the encouragement of manufactures, or any other
branch of industry which Congress might choose to foster ; and thus it
was, in fact, perverted from a revenue to a penal power, through which
the entire capital and industry of the Union might be controlled. Con
gress was not prepared, at that early stage, to follow so bold a lead ; but
the seed was sown by a skilful hand, to sprout when the proper season
arrived.

When he retired from office, no controlling mind was left to perfect the
system which he had commenced with such consummate skill and suc
cess ; and shortly after, under the administration of the elder Adams, the
Alien and Sedition Acts, and the quasi war with France, as it was called,

SPEECHES OP JOHN C. CALHOUN. 359

followed the violent and precipitate measures of less sagacious and power
ful minds, and which, in their reaction, expelled their authors from power,
and raised Jefferson to the presidency.

He came in as a reformer ; but, with the most ardent desire and the
highest capacity to effect a reformation, he could do little to change the
direction which his rival had impressed at the outset on the political
machine. Econdmy, indeed, was introduced, and the expenditures re
duced, but the ligatures which united the government with the paper sys
tem were too strong to be bursted. The funded debt, though greatly re
duced by him, could not be extinguished. The charter of the United
States Bank had still half its term to run, and the use of banks and bank
notes in the fiscal transactions of the government had taken too strong
a hold to be superseded at once. In the mean time, the agitation caused
by the gigantic conflict between France and England reached our distant
and peaceful shores, and the administration was almost exclusively occu
pied in efforts to prevent aggressions on our rights, and preserve our neu
trality. To effect that, every expedient was attempted ; negotiation, em
bargo, non-importation, and non-intercourse, but in vain. War followed,
and with it all hopes of carrying out the reform contemplated by Jeffer
son when he came into power failed.

When peace arrived, the country was deeply in debt. Capital and in
dustry had taken new directions in consequence of the long interruption
of our foreign commerce, and the public attention was completely diverted
from the questions which had brought into conflict the two great political
schools, and which had so long divided the country.

The season had now arrived when the seed which had been so skilfully
sowed by Hamilton, as has been stated, began to germinate, and soon
shot forth with the most vigorous growth. Duties came to be imposed
without regard to revenue, and money appropriated without reference to
the granted powers. Tariff followed tariff in rapid succession, carrying in
their train a profusion of expenditures on harbours, roads, canals, pensions,
and a host of others, comprehending objects of almost every description.
In such rapid succession did the protective duties follow, that in 1828,
in the short space of twelve years after the termination of the late war,
they reached the enormous amount of nearly one half of the aggregate
value of the entire imports, after deducting the reshipments. Beyond
this point the system never advanced, and fortunately for the country it
did not. Had it continued its progress a few years longer, the enormous
patronage which it placed at the disposal of the chief magistrate would
have terminated our form of government, by enabling him to nominate
his successor, or by plunging the country into a revolution, to be fol
lowed by disunion or despotism, as was foretold would be the conse
quence in the report to the Legislature of Virginia, so often referred to,
if the system it reprobated were carried out in practice. But, happily,
with the tariff of 1828 the reaction commenced, and has been ever since
progressing. How, or by whom it was commenced, and has been urged
forward to the present point, this is not the proper occasion to state. All I
propose now is to state its progress, and mark the point at which it has
arrived.

The first step of this retrograde movement was the overthrow of the
administration of the younger Adams. He came into power on the ex
treme principles and doctrines of the Federal national school, and on them
he placed the hope of maintaining his elevation. For the truth of this
assertion I appeal to his inaugural address, and his messages to the two
houses at the openings of the annual sessions ; and to expel his administra
tion from power was, of course, a preliminary and indispensable step to-

360 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

wards the restoration of the principles and doctrines of the opposite
school ; and, fortunately, this was effected by a decided majority at the
expiration of his first term.

The next step was the final discharge of the funded debt ; and for this
important step, at so early a period, the country is indebted principally to
a friend, now, unfortunately, no more — -the amiable, the talented, the patri
otic Lowndes — the author of that simple, but effective measure, the Sink
ing Fund Act, passed shortly after the termination of the late war.

But the most formidable of all the obstacles, the source of the vast
and corrupting surplus, with its host of extravagant and unconstitutional
expenditures — the protective tariff — still remained in full force, and ob
structed any farther progress in the reaction that had commenced. By
what decided and bold measures it was overcome is well known to all,
and need not be told on this occasion. It is sufficient to say that, after a
long and desperate struggle, the controversy terminated in the Compromise
Act, which abandoned the protective principle, and has, I trust, closed for
ever what has proved in this government a most prolific source of power,
patronage, and corruption.

The next step in the progress was the overthrow of the Bank of the
United States — the centre and soul of the paper system — a step that may
justly be regarded as not inferior to any other in the whole series. That
was followed by the Deposite Act of 1836, which transferred to the treas
uries of the states the vast surplus which continued to flow in upon us,
notwithstanding the great reduction under the Compromise Act. This
decisive measure disburdened our surcharged treasury, and has forced
on this government the necessity of retrenchment and economy, and there
by has greatly strengthened and accelerated the reaction. So necessary
is the reduction of the income to reform, that I am disposed to regard it
as a political maxim in free states, that an impoverished treasury, once in
a generation at least, is almost indispensable to the preservation'of their
institutions and' liberty.

The next stage in the progress was the suspension of the connexion,
between the government and the banks, in consequence of the suspension,
of specie payments. This occasion afforded an opportunity to strike the
first blow against that illegitimate and unholy alliance. It was given de
cidedly, boldly, and vigorously, but still with only partial success. The
interest in favour of maintaining the connexion was too powerful to be
overcome at once ; but, though not broken, the tie is greatly weakened,
and nothing now is wanting to sever forever this fatal knot but to follow
up what has already been done by persevering and energetic blows.

This is the point to which the reaction has already reached ; and the
question now to be considered is, To what point ought it to be urged, and
what are the intermediate obstacles to be overcome 1 I arn, for myself,
prepared to answer. I have no concealment. My aim is fixed. It is no
less than to turn back the government to where it was when it com
menced its operation in 1789 ; to obliterate all the intermediate measures
originating in the peculiar principles and policy of the school to which I
am opposed, and which experience has proved to be so dangerous and
uncongenial to our system ; to take a fresh start, a new departure, on the
State Rights Republican tack, as was intended by the framers of the Con
stitution. That is the point at which I have aimed for more than twelve
years, and towards which I have persisted, during the whole period, to
urge my way, in defiance of opposing difficulties, dangers, and discourage
ments, and from which nothing shall drive me (while in public life) till
the object at which I aim is accomplished. By far the most formidable
difficulties are already surmounted. Those that remain are comparatively-
insignificant.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 361

Among these, the most important, by far, is to separate the govern
ment from the banks, but which, after the blows the connexion has re
ceived, will require not much more than unyielding firmness and perse
verance. This done, the great work of freeing the government entirely
from the paper system, on which Hamilton laid the foundation of his whole
system, will have been achieved.

The next is to carry out, in the revision of the tariff, which must take
place at the next or succeeding session, the provisions of the Compromise
Act, that there shall be no duty laid but what may be necessary to the eco
nomical and constitutional wants of the government. Should this be ac
complished, there will be an end to the protective system, with all the
evil that followed, and must ever follow, in its train. Nor can I believe,
after what we have experienced, and what has been said during this ses
sion, that there will be any insuperable difficulty in effecting an object so
intimately connected with the peace and tranquillity of the Union.

Having freed the government from the paper and protective systems,
the next step in importance is, to put a final stop to internal improve
ments, the construction and improvement of harbours, and the extrava
gant waste on what we are pleased to call the pension system, but which
has departed from every principle justly belonging to such a system. No
government was ever before burdened with an expenditure so absurd and
monstrous. It confounds all distinctions between the deserving and un
deserving, and yearly draws millions from the treasury without any just
claim on the public bounty, and ought to be both arrested and reformed.

A single step more brings the government to the destined point — I
mean a thorough reformation in the administrative department of the
government. I doubt not but that every branch needs reform. There
are, doubtless, numerous defalcations in addition to those brought to-
light. The fault has been more in that system (a brief narrative of which
I have given) than in those who have been charged with the administration,
of the government. For years money was as dirt. The treasury was
oppressed with it, and the only solicitude was, how to get clear of what
was considered a useless burden. Hence the vast increase of expendi
tures j hence the loose and inattentive administration of our fiscal con
cerns ; hence the heavy defalcations. Nor are these remarks confined to
the executive department of the government ; they apply to all, to the two
houses of Congress as well as to other branches. But there is no longer
a surplus. The treasury is exhausted, and the work of retrenchment,
economy, and accountability is forced on us. Reform in the fiscal action
of the government can no longer be delayed, and I rejoice that such is
the fact. Economy and accountability are virtues belonging to free and
popular governments, and without which they cannot long endure. The
assertion is pre-eminently true when applied to this government, and
hence the prominent place they occupy in the creed of the State Rights
and Republican school.

Having taken these steps, every measure of prominence originating in.
the principles or policy of the national Federal school will become oblit
erated, and the government will have been brought back, after the lapse
of fifty years, to the point of original departure, when it may be put on
its new tack. To guard against a false steerage thereafter, one impor
tant measure, in addition to those enumerated, will be indispensable — to
place the new states, as far as the public domain is concerned, in a con
dition as independent of the government as the old. It is as much due
to them as it is indispensable to accomplish the great object in view.
Tl*e public domain within these states is too great a stake to be left un
der the control of this government. It is difficult to estimate the vast

Zz

362 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

addition it makes to its power and patronage, and the controlling and
corrupting influence which it may exercise over the presidential election,
and, through that, the strong impulse it may receive in a wrong direction.
Till it is removed, there can be no assurance of a successful and safe
steerage, even if every other sinister influence should be removed.

It would be presumptuous in me, Mr. President, to advise those who
are charged with the administration of the government what course to
adopt ; but, if they would hear the voice of one who desires nothing for
himself, and whose only wish is to see the country prosperous, free, and
happy, I would say to them, you are placed in the most remarkable junc
ture that has ever occurred since the establishment of the Federal Gov
ernment. By seizing the opportunity, you may bring the vessel of state
to a position where she may take a new tack, and thereby escape all the
shoals and breakers into the midst of which a false steerage has run her,
and bring her triumphantly into her destined port with honour to your
selves and safety to those on board. Take your stand boldly j avow
your object j disclose your measures, and let the people see clearly that
you intend — what Jefferson designed to do, but, from adverse circum
stances, could not accomplish — to reverse the measures originating in
principles and policy uncongenial to our political system — to divest the
government of all undue patronage and influence — to restrict it to the few
great objects intended by the Constitution — in a word, to give a complete
ascendency to the good old Virginia school over its antagonist, which
time and experience have proved to be dangerous to our system of govern
ment — and you may count with confidence on their support, without look
ing to other means of success. Should the government take such a
course at this propitious moment, our free and happy institutions may be
perpetuated for generations ; but, if a different, short will be their duration.

On this question of patronage let me add, in conclusion, that, according
to my conception, the great and leading err9r in Hamilton and his school
originated in a mistake as to the analogy between ours and the British
system of government. If we were to judge by their outward form, there
is, indeed, a striking analogy between them in many particulars; but, if
we look within, at their spirit and genius, never were two free govern
ments so perfectly dissimilar. They are, in fact, the very opposites.
Of all free governments that ever existed — no, I will enlarge the propo
sition — of all governments that ever existed, free or despotic, the British
government can bear the largest amount of patronage, the greatest exac
tion and pressure on the people, without changing its character or run
ning into revolution. The greater, in fact, its patronage, the stronger it
is, till the pressure begins to crush the mass of population with its super
incumbent weight. But directly the opposite is the case with ours. Of
all governments that ever. existed, it can stand under the least patronage,
in proportion to the population and wealth of the country, without chan
ging its character or the hazard of a revolution. I have not made these
assertions lightly. They are the result of much reflection, and can be
sustained by conclusive reasons drawn from the nature of the two gov
ernments ; but this is not the proper occasion to discuss the subject.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 363

XXIV.

SPEECH ON THE REPORT OF MR. GRUNDY, OF TENNESSEE, IN RELATION TO THE
ASSUMPTION OF THE DEBTS OF THE STATES BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, FEB
RUARY 5, 1840.

ON Mr. Grundy's report in relation to the assumption of the debts of the
states by the Federal Government, Mr. Calhoun said :

When I have heard it asserted, again and again, in this discussion, that this
report was uncalled for ; that there was no one in favour of the assumption of
state debts ; and that the resolutions were mere idle, abstract negatives, of no sort
of importance, I could not but ask myself, If all this be so, why this deep ex
citement ? why this ardent zeal to make collateral issues ? and, above all, why
the great anxiety to avoid a direct vote on the resolutions ? To these inquiries
I could find but one solution ; and that is, disguise it as you may, there is, in
reality, at the bottom, a deep and agitating question. Yes, there is such a ques
tion. The scheme of assuming the debts of the states is no idle fiction. The
evidence of its reality, and that it is now in agitation, bursts from every quarter,
within and without these walls, on this and on the other side of the Atlantic ; not,
indeed, a direct assumption, for that would be too absurd ; and harmless, be
cause too absurd ; but in a form far more plausible and dangerous — an assump
tion in effect, by dividing the proceeds of the sales of the public lands among
the states.

I shall not stop to show that such distribution, under existing circumstances,
with the deep indebtedness and embarrassment of many of the states, would be,
in reality, an assumption. We all know that, without such indebtedness and
embarrassment, the scheme of distribution would not have the least chance for
adoption, and that it would be perfectly harmless, and cause no excitement ;
but plunged, as the states are, in debt, it becomes a question truly formidable,
and on which the future politics of the country are destined for years to turn.
If, then, the scheme should be adopted, it must be by the votes of the indebted
states, in order to aid their credit and lighten their burden ; and who is so blind
as not to see that it would be in truth, what I have asserted it to be in effect,
to that extent an assumption of their debts ?

Here, then, we have the real question at issue, which has caused all this ex
citement and zeal : a question pregnant with the most important consequences,
immediate and remote. What I now propose is, to trace rapidly and briefly
some of the more prominent which would result from this scheme, should it ever
become a law.

The first and most immediate would be to subtract from the treasury a sum
equal to the annual proceeds of the sales of the public lands. I do not intend
to examine the constitutional question whether Congress has or has not the
right to make the subtraction, and to divide the proceeds among the states. It
is not necessary. The committee have conclusively shown that it has no such
power ; that it holds the public domain in trust for the states in their federal ca
pacity as members of the Union, in aid of their contribution to the treasury ;
and that to denationalize the fund (if I may use the expression), by distributing
it among the states for their separate and individual uses, would be a manifest
violation of the trust, and wholly unwarranted by the Constitution. Passing,
then, by the constitutional question, I intend to restrict my inquiry to what
would be its fiscal and moneyed effects.

Thus regarded, the first effect of the subtraction would be to cause an equal
deficit in the revenue. I need not inform the Senate that there is not a surplus
cent in the treasury ; that the most rigid economy will be necessary to meet
.the demands on it during the current year ; that the revenue, so far from being

364 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

on the increase, must be rapidly reduced, under existing laws, in the next two
years ; and that every dollar withdrawn, by subtracting the proceeds of the pub
lic lands, must make a corresponding deficit. We are thus brought to the ques
tion. What would be the probable annual amount of the deficit, and how is it to
be supplied ?

The receipts from the sales of the public lands, I would suppose, may be safe
ly estimated at five millions of dollars at least, on an average, for the next ten
or fifteen years. They were about six millions the last year. The first three
quarters gave within a fraction of five and a half millions. The estimate for
this year is three and a half millions, making the average of the two years but
little short of five millions. If, with these data, we cast our eyes back on the
last ten or fifteen years, we shall come to the conclusion, taking into considera
tion our great increase of population and wealth, and the vast quantity of public
lands held by the government, that the average I have estimated is not too high.
Assuming, then, that the deficit would be five millions, the next inquiry is, How
shall it be supplied ? There is but one way : a corresponding increase of the
duties on imports. We have no other source of revenue but the postoffice. No
one would think of laying it on that, or to raise the amount by internal taxes.
The result, then, thus far, would be to withdraw from the treasury five millions
of the proceeds of the sales of the public lands to be distributed among the
states, and to impose an equal amount of duty on imports to make good the de
ficit. Now, I would ask, What is the difference, regarded as a fiscal transac
tion, between withdrawing that amount for distribution, and imposing a similar
amount of duties on the imports to supply its place, and that of leaving the pro
ceeds of the sales of the lands in the treasury, and imposing an equal amount
of duties for distribution ? It is clearly the same thing, in effect, to retain the
proceeds of the public lands in the treasury and to impose the duties for distri
bution, or to distribute the proceeds, and thereby force the imposition of the du
ties to supply the place.

It is, then, in reality, a scheme to impose five millions of additional duties on
the importations of the country, to be distributed among the states ; and I now
ask, Where is the senator who will openly avow himself an advocate of such a
scheme ? I put the question home, solemnly, to those on the opposite side, Do
you not believe that such a scheme would be unconstitutional, unequal, unjust,
and dangerous ? And can you, as honest men, do that in effect, by indirect
means, which, if done directly, would be clearly liable to every one of those ob
jections ?

I have said such would be the case, regarded as a fiscal transaction. In a
political point of view, the distribution of the proceeds of the sales of the land
would be the worst of the two. It would create opposing and hostile relations
between the old and new states in reference to the public domain. Heretofore
the conduct of the government has been distinguished by the greatest liberality,
not to say generosity, towards the new states, in the administration of the pub
lic lands. Adopt this scheme, and its conduct will be the reverse. Whatever
might be granted to them, would subtract an equal amount from the sum to be
distributed. An austere and rigid administration would be the result, followed
by hostile feelings on both sides, that would accelerate the conflict between
them in reference to the public domain : a conflict advancing but too fast by the
natural course of events, and which any one, in the least gifted with foresight,
must see, come when it will, would shake the Union to the centre, unless pre
vented by wise and timely concession.

Having shown that the scheme is, in effect, to impose duties for distribution,
the next question is, On whom will they fall ? I know that there is a great di
versity of opinion as to who, in fact, pays the duties on imports. I do not in
tend to discuss that point. We of the staple and exporting states have long set
tled the question for ourselves, almost unanimously, from sad experience. We

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 365

know how ruinously high duties fell on us ; how they desolated our cities and
exhausted our section. We also know how rapidly we have been recovering
as they have been going off, in spite of all the difficulties of the times, and. the
distracted and disordered state of the currency. It is now a fixed maxim with
us, that there is not a whit of difference, as far as we are concerned, between
an export and import duty — between paying toll going out or returning in — or
going down to market or returning back. If this be true, of which we have no
doubt, it is a point of no little importance to us of the staple states to know what
portion of the duties will fall to our lot to pay. We furnish about three fourths
of the axports, with about two fifths of the whole population. Four fifths of
five millions is four millions, which would be the measure of our contribution ;
and two fifths of five millions is two millions, which would be our share of the
distribution ; that is to say, for every two dollars we would receive under this
notable scheme, we would pay four dollars to the fund from which it would be
derived.

I now ask, What does it amount to, but making the income of the states, to
the amount of five millions annually, common property, to be distributed among
them, according to numbers, or some such ratio, without the least reference to
their respective contribution ? And what is that but rank agrarianism — agra-
rianism among the states ? To divide the annual income is as much agrarian-
ism as to divide property itself; and would be as much so divided among twen
ty-six states, as among twenty-six individuals. Let me admonish the members
opposite, if they really apprehend the spirit of agrarianism as much as might be
inferred from their frequent declarations, not to set the fatal example here, in
their legislative capacity. Remember, there is but one step between dividing
the income of the states and that of individuals, and between partial and a gen
eral distribution.

Proceeding a step farther in tracing consequences, another question presents
itself : On what articles shall the duties be laid ? On the free or the dutied ar
ticles ? Shall they be laid for revenue or for protection ? Is it not obvious that
so large an amount as five millions, equal to one third of the present income
from that source, and probably not much less than one half what it will be at
the end of two years, cannot be raised without rousing from its slumber the tar
iff question, with all its distraction and danger? Should that, however, not be
the case, there is another consequence connected with this, that cannot fail to
rouse it, as I shall now proceed to explain.

The act of distributing the sales of the public lands among the states, of it
self, as well as the amount to be distributed, will do much to resuscitate their
credit. It is the desired result, and the leading motive for the act. Five mill
ions annually (the amount assumed), on a pledge of the public domain, would,
of itself, be a sufficient basis for a loan of ninety or a hundred millions of dol
lars, if judiciously managed. But suppose that only one half should be applied,
as the means of negotiating loans abroad, in order to complete the old or to com
mence new works of improvement, or other objects. I ask, What would be the
effect on our imports, of negotiating a loan in England, or elsewhere in Europe,
of forty or fifty millions, in the course of the next year or two ? Can any one
doubt, from past experience ? We all know the process. Very little gold or
silver is ever seen in these negotiations. A credit is obtained, and that placed
in bank there, or with wealthy bankers. Bills are drawn on this country, and
then sold to merchants. These are transmitted to Europe, and the proceeds
returned in goods, swelling the tide of imports in proportion to the amount.
The crash of our manufactures follows, and that, in turn, by denunciations
against over-importing and over-trading, in which those who have been most
active in causing it are sure to join, but will take special care to make not the
least allusion to the real source whence it flows. And can it be doubted,
that with the increase of the cause, the clamour for protection will increase, un-

366 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOTJN.

til, with united voices, the friends of the system would demand its renewal 1 If
to this we add, that, under the Compromise Act, the tariff must be revived and re
modelled, who can look at such a concurrence of powerful causes without see
ing that it would be almost impossible to prevent the revival of the protective
system, should the scheme of distribution be adopted ? I hazard nothing in as
serting that the renewal would certainly follow ; and, as this would be one of
the most prominent and durable consequences of that scheme, I propose to con
sider it fully, in its most important bearings.

One of the most striking features of tLe system is its tendency to increase.
Let it be once recognised, and let the most moderate duties be laid for protec
tion — but put the system in motion, and its course would be onward, onward, by
an irresistible impulse, as I shall presently show from past experience ; and
hence the necessity of vigilance, and a determined resistance to every course
of policy that may, by possibility, lead to its renewal. This tendency to increase
results from causes inherent and inseparable from the system, and has evinced
itself by the fact, that every tariff for protection has invariably disappointed its
friends in the protection anticipated, and has been followed periodically, after
short intervals, by a demand for another tariff with increased duties, to afford the
protection vainly anticipated from its predecessor. Such has been the result
throughout, from 1816 to 1828, when the first and last protective tariffs were
laid, which I propose now to show, by a very brief historical sketch of the rise
and progress of the system.

The late war, with the embargo and other restrictive measures that preceded
it, almost expelled our commerce from the ocean, and diverted a vast amount
of capital that had been employed in it to manufactures. Such was the cause
that led to the system. After the termination of the war, there was, on the part
of Congress and the country, the kindest feeling towards the manufacturing in
terest, accompanied by a strong desire so to adjust the duties (indispensable to
meet the expenses of government, and to pay the public debt) as to afford them
ample protection. The manufacturers were consulted, and the act of 1816 was
modelled to their wishes. They regarded it as affording sufficient and perma
nent protection ; and I, in my then want of experience as to the nature of the
system, did not dream that we would hear any more of tariff, till it would be
come necessary to readjust the duties, after the discharge of the public debt.
Vain expectation ! Two years had not passed away before the manufacturers
were as clamorous as ever for additional protection ; and, to meet their wishes,
new duties were laid from time to time, with the same result ; but the clamour
still returned, till 1824, when the tariff of that year passed, which was believed
on all sides to be ample, and was considered, like that of 1816, to be a final
adjustment of the question. It was under this impression that the South acqui
esced (reluctantly) in the very high duties it imposed. The late General
Hayne, then a distinguished member of this body, took a very active part
against it ; and I well remember, after its passage, that he consoled himself
with the belief that, though oppressive, it would be the last. His expectation,
proved as vain as mine in 1816. Before two years had passed, we were again
besieged with the cry of the inadequacy of the protection ; and in the summer
of 1827, a large convention of manufacturers from all parts was held at Harris-
burg, in Pennsylvania, to devise a new and more ample scheme of protection,
to be laid before Congress at the next session. That movement ended in the
adoption of the tariff of 1828, which, in order to make sure work, went far be
yond all its predecessors in the increase of duties. They were raised on the
leading articles of consumption from forty to fifty per cent, above former duties,
as high as they were. I speak conjecturally, without any certain data. In.
less than three years, even that enormous rise proved to be insufficient, as I
shall presently show, and would certainly have been followed by new demands
for protection, had not the small but gallant state I represent arrested its far-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 36T

ther progress — no, that is not strong enough — brought the system to the ground,
against the resistance of the administration and opposition — never, I trust, to
rise again.

The fact disclosed by this brief historical sketch is, that there is a constant
tendency to increase in the protective system ; and that every increase of duty,
however high, requires periodically, after a short interval, an additional increase.
This, as I have stated, is not accidental, but is the result of causes inherent in
the system itself, in the present condition of our country. It originates in the
fact, that every increase of protection is necessarily followed by an expansion,
of the currency, which expansion must continue to enlarge till the increased
price of production, in consequence, shall become equal to the increased duty7
and when the importation of the articles prohibited may again take place with
profit. That is the principle ; and as it is essential to the peace and prosperi
ty of the country that it should be clearly understood, I intend to establish its
truth beyond doubt or cavil ; and for that purpose, shall begin with the tariff of
1828, the last and by far the boldest of the series, with the view of illustrating,
in its case, the operation of the principle. I entreat the Senate to give me its
fixed attention. The principle, well understood, will shed a flood of light on
the past and present difficulties of the country, and guide us in safety in our fu
ture course.

To give a clear conception of the operation of the tariff of 1828, it will be
necessary to premise that it comprehended all the leading articles of consump
tion that could be manufactured in our country, amounting in value to not much
less than one half of the whole of the imports ; that the duties on these articles
were increased enormously, as has been stated — say not less than forty or fifty
per cent. ; that the average domestic exports at the time were not much short of
sixty millions of dollars, and the imports for consumption about the same ; that
the revenue from the imports was about half that sum ; and that, of the exports,
about three fourths consisted of the great agricultural staples of the South.
What, then, with these facts, must have been its necessary operations on the
currency of the manufacturing states ? We export to import. It is impossible
to continue to export for any considerable length of time without a correspond
ing return of imports. It would be to give away our labour for nothing. Our
exports, then, continuing at an average of sixty millions, in what, under the
operation of the tariff of 1828, must the corresponding imports to the same
amount return? Not, certainly, to the same extent as before its .passage, in the
articles on which it had so greatly increased the duties ? Its object in raising
them was to give our manufacturers the home market, by excluding the foreign
articles of the same description. If it failed in that, it failed in accomplishing
any good whatever, and became an unmixed evil, without benefit to any one.
The return, then, of imports, must have been principally in articles on which
the duties were not raised as far as the consumption of the country would war
rant, and the balance, after paying what was due abroad in gold and silver.
The first effect, then, must have been to turn the foreign exchange in our
favour : a most important consequence connected with the increase of gold and
silver in relation to the currency. The next must have been to turn the domes
tic exchanges still more strongly against the staple states, and in favour of the
manufacturing. To understand this portion of the operation, I must again re
peat, that the object of the tariff was to cut off the consumption of the foreign
articles, in order that they should be supplied by our own manufactures. The
necessary consequence of this must have been to diminish the demand abroad,
and to increase it in the manufacturing states, and thereby to turn the influx of
gold and silver to that point, in order to purchase the supplies there, which we
have been in the habit of obtaining from abroad. These causes, combined, must
have had the effect of adding greatly to the capacity of the banks in that quarter
to extend their discounts and accommodations, and with it the circulation of

368 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

their notes. With a growing supply of specie, and the exchange favourable in
every direction, as must have been the case, there is no limit to the business
of banks, nor are they slow to perceive or to act on such favourable circum
stances. Nor must we overlook another powerful cause in operation, the fiscal
action of the government, through the operation of which the vast sums collect
ed under such high duties were transferred to the same quarter, to be applied in
discharge of the public debt, and disbursed on the innumerable objects of ex
penditure there.

Under the operation of such powerful causes, there could not but be a vast
and sudden expansion of the currency where they were in such great activity,
and with that expansion a corresponding increase of prices and the cost of pro
duction. Nor could this state of things cease till the increased cost of produc
tion became equal to the duty imposed for protection. At that point, and not
before, must specie cease to flow in, and the exchange to be favourable ; but
when reached, the tide must turn, importations of the protected articles would
recommence, specie flow out, and exchanges become adverse. This must be
so obvious, that it would only darken to attempt to make it more clear. With
the turn of the tide the banks must contract, and pecuniary embarrassment and
distress follow. Such, under the operation of the causes assigned, must be the
result, for reasons which appear to me irresistible. But, sir, I do not mean to
leave so important a point to the mere force of argument, however clear and
certain. I intend to prove by incontestable authority of documents, such was,
in fact, exactly the result. I intend to place the principle laid down, as I have
said, beyond doubt or cavil.

The first authority I shall adduce is from the* report of a Committee of the
House, made in February, 1832, by Campbell P. White, the chairman, then a
member from the city of New-York. The report is evidently drawn with great
care, and by one familiar with the subject, and has the advantage of being on
another subject (the currency), without any reference to the tariff or protective
system, and evidently without any knowledge of its operation. Hear, then,
what the report says :

" The recent export of specie has swept away the delusive colouring given to
the actual result of production in 1829, 1830, and the early part of 1831. Real
estate appreciated greatly ; local stocks commanded unheard-of prices ; ware
houses and dwellings were improved and embellished, and money was so abun
dant, that it could readily be obtained to any amount upon promissory notes.
How changed is the general aspect of things within a few months ? All our
solid possessions and means of industry remain, land continues to be equally
productive, labour is recompensed with its usual reward ; the seasons have not
been unfriendly. Whence, then, this lamentable change in our affairs ? Why
this great scarcity of money ; depreciation in value of all commodities, and of
all property ; great commercial distress, and absolute impossibility with many
solvent persons to discharge their just debts, so speedily and grievously suc
ceeding the gratifying and prosperous picture which was so lately presented ?"

What a confirmation of the deductions of reason, both in the swelling tide of
prosperity and the turning ebb of adversity. The sketch of the latter is not
unsuited to the present time ; good seasons, and productive years, and every
element, apparently, of plenty and prosperity, and yet deep and wide-spread
distress ; though at that time there had been no removal of deposites, nor had
the sub-treasury been heard of, to which gentlemen are now disposed to at
tribute all the calamities which afflict the country.

The author of the report could give no satisfactory answer to his question,
whence all this sudden and unlooked-for calamity ; but he has furnished us
with the means of tracing it clearly to the tariff of 1828. It went into opera-

* Document 278, House of Representatives.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 369

tion on tlie 1st of September of that year, and the next year felt the swelling,
but delusive tide of an expanding currency ; the exchange turned in our favour ;
gold and silver, following the impulse, flowed in ; banks began to enlarge their
discounts and circulation. It continued to swell with a stronger and stronger
current through all the subsequent year, and the first part of the next, nearly
three years, according to the usual period, when it began to ebb ; and then
followed the reverse scene, so feelingly described by the author, and which to
him appeared so unexpected and unaccountable. It was at this point, had not
the movements in the South arrested the farther progress of the system, that
there would have been another clamour for additional duties. The distress, as
usual, would have been attributed to over-importation, and that to the want of
adequate protection, and in 1832 (the usual period of four years having inter
vened), another protective tariff would have been inflicted, to be followed by
the same train of consequences, and with equal disappointment to its authors.

Now, sir, to show that the flowing in of the precious metals, in consequence
of the tariff of 1828, is not a mere assumption, I have extracted from the public
documents, for the years 1829 and 1830, the imports and exports of gold and
silver, which I hold in my hand. The import in J829 was $7,403,612, and
the export $4,3 11, 134, making an excess of imports over exports of $3,092,478 ;
and for 1830, $8,155,964 against $1,241,622, making an excess of imports of
$6,914,342; making, in the two years, an excess of imports of $10,006,810.
By turning to the report already cited, it will be seen that the estimated amount
of specie in the country on the 1st of January, 1830, was but $25,000,000, of
which $5,000,000 were in circulation, and $20,000,000 in the vaults of the
banks ; so that the addition to the specie in the two years was forty per cent,
on the whole amount.

It now remains to be shown what was the effect of this great proportional
increase of specie, and the favourable state of the exchange which it indi
cates, on the banks in the manufacturing states. The report will furnish the
information, not fully, but enough to satisfy every reasonable man. It gives
the following statement of the amount of bank-notes in circulation in 1830 and .
1832, respectively, in the states of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New- York,
and Pennsylvania, including the Bank of the United States, which will show
the vast increase in the short space of two years.

Here Mr. C. read the following statement :

Relative increase of circulation
in two years.

65 per ct.
100 "
40 "
20 "
67 «

$38,000,000 $56,500,000

These are, it will be borne in mind, the principal manufacturing states. In
the period of two years, we find their bank circulation, taken in the aggregate,
expanded from thirty-eight to fifty-six and a half millions of dollars, making an
f increase of sixteen and a half millions, equal to forty-four per cent. But this
falls far short of the actual increase. The year 1829 is not included. It must
have been one of great expansion, as the import of specie greatly exceeded its
exports ; which, with the favourable state of the exchange implied, must have
greatly increased the business of the banks and the circulation of their notes.
The reverse must have been the case in 1832, which is included, as we know by
the report itself, that that year, and the latter part of the preceding, were a period
of severe contraction. If a return could be had of 1829, 1830, and the early part

A AA

1830.

1832.

Massachusetts,

$4,730,000

$7,700,000

Rhode Island,

670,000

1,340,000

New- York,

10,000,000

14,100,000

Pennsylvania,

7,300,000

8,760,000

Bank U. States,

15,300,000

24,600,000

370 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOtJN.

of 1831, 1 venture nothing in asserting that we should find the comparison, com
pared with 1828, the year of the tariff, far greater in proportion.

That there is no mistake in attributing this great expansion to the tariff, might
be farther shown, if additional proof were necessary after such conclusive evi
dence, from the fact that it is impossible to assign any other adequate cause.
As far as can be seen, there was no other cause in operation, political or com
mercial, that could have produced the results. It was a period of profound
peace, and the exports and imports of the country steady to an unusual degree.

Should doubt, however, still remain in the mind of any one after all this ac
cumulation of evidence, I will next call the attention of the Senate to a fact
which must be conclusive with all disposed to receive the truth. By turning
to the table showing the extent of bank circulation in 1830 and 1832 in the
four states already referred to, it will be seen that the expansion was greater
or less, just as the states, respectively, were more or less manufacturing. It
will not be doubted that Rhode Island is the most manufacturing of the four,
and we accordingly find there the greatest expansion ; and that for the simple
reason, that there the causes assigned must have been in the state of the great
est activity. Her bank circulation doubled in the short space of two years, as
appears by the table. Massachusetts is the next ; and we find hers is the next
highest, being sixty-five per cent. New- York is still less so, and hers is but
forty per cent. ; and Pennsylvania, the least of the four, had, excluding the
Bank of the United States, increased only twenty per cent. If the statement
had extended farther South, and taken in the staple states, I venture little in
making the assertion that, instead of expansion, their bank circulation would, for
the same period, have been found in the opposite state, for the reverse reason.
It will be seen that the Bank of the United States had expanded sixty-seven per
cent. This great increase, compared to the local banks of Pennsylvania, may
probably be attributed partly to loans negotiated farther East, and not improba
bly because her accommodations were somewhat enlarged, from causes con
nected with her efforts, at the time, to obtain a renewal of her charter.

I trust that I have now established, to the entire satisfaction of the Senate,
the truth of the great principle which has been laid down — that every increase
of protective duties is necessarily followed, in the present condition of our
country, by an expansion of the currency, which must continue to increase till
the increased price of production, caused by the expansion, shall be equal to
the duty imposed, when a new tariff will be required. Assuming, then, the
principle as incontrovertible, it follows that the natural tendency of the protect
ive system is to expand, in seeking to accomplish its object, till it terminates
in explosion. It would be easy to show, from what has already been stated,
that this tendency must cominue till the exports shall be so reduced as to be
barely sufficient to meet the demands of the country for the articles not included
in the protection ; as it must be obvious, so long as they exceed that amount,
so long must specie continue to be imported, and the exchange to be in our
favour, till the protection is broken down by the expansion of the currency.

The consummation, therefore, of the system must be one of two things — ex
plosion, or the reduction of the exports, so as -not to exceed the amount of the
unprotected articles ; but either termination must prove disastrous to the system ;
the former by a sudden and violent overthrow, and the latter by the impoverish
ment of customers, and raising up of rivals as they ceased to be customers. To
have a just conception of its operation in this particular, it will be necessary to
bear in mind, that the South and the West are the great consumers of the prod
ucts of the North and East ; and that the capacity of the South to consume
depends on her great agricultural staples almost exclusively, and that their sale
and consumption depend mainly on the foreign market. What, then, would be
the effect of reducing her exports to the point indicated, say to forty or fifty mill
ions of dollars ? Most certainly, to diminish her capacity to consume the prod-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 371

uc!s of the North and East in the same proportion, followed by a correspond
ing diminution of the revenue, and the commerce and navigation of the coun
try. But the evil would not end there, as great as it would be. It would have
an equal or greater effect on the consumption of the West. That great and
growing section is the provision portion of the Union. Her wide and fertile
region gives her an unlimited capacity to produce grain and stock of every de
scription ; and these, for the most part, find their market in the staple states.
Cut off their exports, and their market would be destroyed ; and with it the
means of the West, to a great extent, for carrying on trade with the Northern
and Eastern States. To the same extent, they, and the staple states, would be
compelled to produce their own supplies ; and would thus, from consumers, be
converted into rivals with the other section.

How much wiser for all would be the opposite system of low duties, with the
market of the world opened to our great agricultural staples ? The effects would
be a vast increase of our exports, with a corresponding increase of the capacity
to consume on the part of the South and West, making them rich and content
ed customers, instead of impoverished and discontented rivals of the other sec
tion. It is time that this subject should be regarded in its true light. The
protective system is neither more nor less than a war on the exports. I again
repeat, if we cannot import, we cannot long export ; and just as we cut off or
burden the imports, to the same extent do we, in effect, cut off and burden the
exports. This I have long seen, and shall now proceed to prove, by reference
to the public documents, that my assertion is sustained by facts. The table of
exports shows that during the seven years, from 1824 to 1831, our domestic
exports remained nearly stationary, notwithstanding the great increase of our
population during that period. Your statute-book will show that during the
same period the protective system was in its greatest vigour. The first relax
ation took place in December, 1830, under the act of the 20th of May of the
same year, which made a great deduction in the duties on coffee and tea. I
shall now turn to the table, and give the exports of domestic articles for those
years, beginning with 1824.

Here Mr. C. read the folowing statement :

In 1824 the domestic exports were $50,649,500

1825 " " " 66,944,745

1826 " « " 53,055,710

1827 « " " 58,921,691

1828 " " " 56,669,669

1829 « '• " 55,700,193

1830 " " « 59,462,029

If we take the average of the first three and the last of these years, we shall
find that the former is a million and a half greater than the latter, showing an
actual falling off, instead of an increase, to that extent in our exports.

With 1831, the reduction of duties commenced on the articles mentioned;
and in December, 1833, the first great reduction took place under the Compro
mise Act. I shall turn to the same table, beginning with 1831, and read a
statement of the exports for the eight years under the approach to the free-trado
system. It is but an approach. I invite special attention to the rapid rise after
the great reduction in December, 1833.

In 1831 the domestic exports were $61,277,057

1832 " " " 63,137,470

1833 " " " 70,317,698

1834 " " " 81,034,162

1835 " " " 101,189,082

1836 " " " 106,916,680

1837 .« " " 95,564,414

1838 " " " 96,033,821

372 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

How rapid the rise just as the weights are removed ! The increase, since
the great reduction in 1833, has nearly doubled the average exports compared
with the average of the seven tariff years preceding 1831, and would have quite
doubled them, had not the expanded and deranged condition of the currency,
and the consequent embarrassment of commerce, prevented it.

But what will appear still more extraordinary to those who have not reflect
ed on the operation of the protective system, is the great increase of the ex
ports of our domestic manufactures, as the duties go off, following, in that re
spect, the same law that regulates the exports of the great agricultural staples.
It is a precious fact that speaks volumes, and which demands the serious con
sideration of the manufacturing portion of the Union. I well remember the
sanguine expectations of the friends of the system, of the great increase of the
exports of domestic manufactures which they believed would follow the tariff
of 1828. Well, we now have the result of experience under that act, and also
under that of a partial approach to free trade, and the result is exactly the re
verse of the anticipations of the friends and advocates of protection. So far
from increasing, under the tariff of 1828, the exports of manufactured articles
actually diminished, while they have rapidly increased just as they have gone
off.

But the table of exports shall speak for itself. During the four years, under
the tariff of 1824, that is, from that year to 1829, when the tariff of 1828 went
into operation, the exports of domestic manufactures gradually declined from
$5,729,797, in the year 1825, to $5,548,354'in the year 1828. From that time
it steadily declined, under the tariff of 1828, each succeeding year showing a
falling off compared with the preceding, till 1833, declining, throughout the pe
riod, from $5,412,320 in 1829, to $5,050,633 in 1832, and showing an aggre
gate falling off, during the whole tariff regime of eight years, from 1825 to 1832,
of nearly $700,000. At this point we enter on the relaxation of the system ;
and there has been an onward move, with but little vibration, throughout the
whole period, till the present time. The last year we have is 1838, when the
exports exceeded any preceding year. They amounted to $8,397,078, being
an increase, during the six years of the reduction of duties, of $3,346,445,
against a falling off, in the preceding eight years of protection, of $700,000 :
an increase of sixty-five per cent, in six years, and this in the midst of all the
embarrassment of commerce, and expansion, and derangement of the currency,
and, let me add, what has been so much dreaded by the friends of manufactures,
the mighty increase of the exports of our great agricultural staples during the
same period : a clear proof that, under the free-trade system, the one does not
interfere with the other. Let no friend of manufactures suppose that this inter
esting result is accidental. It is the operation of fixed laws, steady and immu
table in their course, as I shall hereafter show.

Now, sir, I feel myself, with these facts, warranted in asserting that, if the
deranged state of the currency had not interfered, the great manufacturing in
terest would have gone on in a flourishing condition during the whole period
of the reduction under the Compromise Act, proving thereby, to the satisfaction
of all, the fallacy of the protective system. Any supposed loss, from the re
duction of duties, would have been much more than made up by the increased
ability of the South and West to consume, and the rapidly growing importance
of the foreign market.

But I have not yet done with the system. It has additional and heavy sins
to answer for. The tariff of 1828 is the source in which has originated that
very derangement of the currency which so greatly embarrasses, at this time,
the very interest it was intended to protect, as well as all other branches of in
dustry. Bold as is the assertion-, I am prepared to establish it to the letter.

It has already been proved that the great expansion of the currency in 1829,
1830, and 1831, was the immediate effect of the tariff of 1828. It remains to

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 373

be shown that the cause of the still greater and longer continued expansion
which has terminated in the overthrow of the banking system, and the deep
and almost universal distress of the country, may be clearly traced back to the
same source. To do this, we must return to the year 1832, and trace the chain
of events to this time. In that year the public debt was finally discharged.
The vast revenue which had been poured into the treasury by the tariff' of '1828,
and which had accelerated the payment of the public debt, could, after its dis
charge, no longer be absorbed in the ordinary expenditures of the government,
and a surplus began to accumulate in the treasury. The late Bank of the Uni
ted States was then the fiscal agent of the government, and the depository of its
revenue. Its growing amount, and prospects of great future'increase, began to
• act on the cupidity of many of the leading state banks, arid some of the great
brokers of New- York. Hence their war against that institution ; and hence,
also, the removal of the deposites. The late President I believe to have been
really hostile to the Bank on principle ; but there would have been little or no
motive to remove them, had it not been for their growing importance, and the
hostility which the desire of possessing them had excited. They were remo
ved, and placed in the vaults of certain state banks. To this removal and de-
posite in the state banks, the members over the way are in the habit of attribu
ting all the disorders of the currency which have since followed. Now I ask,
in the first place, Is it not certain, if it had not been for the surplus revenue, the
deposites would not have been removed ? And, in the second, would there
have been a surplus had it not been for the tariff of 1828 ?

Again : Is it not equally cjear that it was the magnitude of the surplus, and
not the removal, of itself, that; caused the after derangement and disorder ? If
the surplus had been but two or three millions, the ordinary sum in deposite, it
would have been of little importance where it was kept, whether in the vaults
of the Bank of the United States, or those of the states ; but involving, as it
did, fifty millions and more, it became a question of the highest importance. I
again ask, To what is this great surplus to be attributed but to the same cause ?
Yes, sir, the tariff of 1828 caused the surplus, and the surplus the removal and all
the subsequent disasters in the currency, aggravated, it is true, by being deposit
ed in the state banks ; but it may be doubted whether the disaster would have been
much less had they not been removed. Be that, however, as it may, it is not
material, as I have shown that that surplus itself was the motive for the removal.
We all remember what occurred after the removal. The surplus poured into
the treasury by millions, in the form of bank-notes. The withdrawal from cir
culation, and locking up in the vaults of the deposite banks, so large an amount,
created an immense vacuum, to be replenished by repeating the issues, which
gave to the banks the means of unbounded accommodations. Speculation now
commenced on a gigantic scale ; prices rose rapidly, and one party, to make
the removal acceptable to the people, urged the new depositories to discount
freely ; while the other side produced the same effect by censuring them for not
affording as extensive accommodations as the Bank of the United States would
have done, had the revenue been left with it. Madness ruled the hour. The
whole community was intoxicated with imaginary prospects of realizing im
mense fortunes. With the increased rise of prices began the gigantic specula
tions in the public domain, the price of which, being fixed by law, could not
partake of the general rise. To enlarge the room for their operations, I know
not how many millions (fifty, I should suppose, at least, of the public revenue)
were sunk in purchasing Indian lands, at their fee simple price nearly, and re
moving tribe after tribe to the West, at enormous cost ; thus subjecting millions
on millions of the choicest public lands to be seized on by the keen and greedy
speculator. The tide now swelled with irresistible force. From the banks
the deposites passed by discounts into the hands of the land speculators ; from
them into the hands of the receivers, and thence to the banks ; and again and

374 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

again repeating the same circle, and at every evolution passing millions of
acres of the public domain from the people into the hands of speculators, for
worthless rags. Had this state of things continued much longer, every acre of
the public lands worth possessing would have passed from the government.
At this stage the alarm took place. The revenue was attempted to be squan
dered by the wildest extravagance ; resolutions passed this body calling on
the departments to know how much they could spend, and much resentment
was felt because they could not spend fast enough. The Deposite Act was
passed and the Treasury Circular issued, but, as far as the currency was con
cerned, in vain. The explosion followed, and the banks fell in convulsions, to be
resuscitated for a moment, but to fall again from a more deadly stroke, under
which they now lie prostrate.

I have now presented, rapidly, the unbroken chain of events up to the prolif
ic source of our disasters, and down to the present time. In addition to the
causes originating directly in the tariff of 1828, there were several collateral
powerful ones, which have contributed to the present prostrated condition of the
currency and the banks, but which would have been comparatively harmless of
themselves. Among these was the important change in the charter of the
Bank of England, at the last renewal, about the time our surplus revenue began
to accumulate, by which its notes were made a legal tender in all cases except
between the Bank and its creditors. The obvious effect of this modification
was to diminish the demand for specie in that great mart of the world, and, in
consequence, must have tended powerfully to keep the exchange with us in an
easy condition while the tide of circulation was rapidly rising to a dangerous
height. But there was another cause which contributed still more powerfully
to the same result : I refer to the great loans negotiated abroad by states and
corporations. To these I add the operation of the United States Bank of
Pennsylvania, the direct object of which, in some of its more prominent trans
actions, was to prevent the exchange from becoming adverse to us.

By the operation of these causes combined, the exchanges were kept easy
for years, notwithstanding the vast expansion which our circulation had attain
ed, from the powerful action of the more direct causes to which I have adverted.
The stroke was delayed, but not averted, and fell but the heavier and more fa
tally because delayed. And where did it fall, when it came, most heavily?
Where the measure which caused it originated — on the heads of its projectors.
Behold how error, folly, and vice, in the ways of an inscrutable Providence,
turn back on their authors.

It is full time for the North, and more especially for New-England, to pause
and ponder. If they would hear the voice of one who has ever wished them
well, 1 would say that the renewal of the protective system would be one of the
greatest calamities that could befall you. Whatever incidental good could be
derived from it, you have already acquired. It would, if .renewed, prove a pure,
unadulterated evil. The very reverse is your true policy. The great question
for you to decide is, how to command the foreign market. The home market,
of itself, is too scanty for your skill, your activity, your energy, your unequalled
inventive powers, your untiring industry, your vastly increased population, and
accumulated capital. Without the foreign market, your unexampled march to
wealth and improvement must come to a stand. How, then, are you to obtain
command of the foreign market? That is the vital question.

The first and indispensable step is a thorough reformation of the currency.
Without a solid, stable, and uniform currency, you never can fully succeed. The
present currency is incurably bad. It is impossible to give it solidity or stabili
ty. A convertible bank currency, however well regulated, is subject to violent
and sudden changes, which must forever unfit it to be the standard of value.
It is by far the most sensitive of all to every change, commercial or political,
foreign or domestic ; as may be readily illustrated by reference to the ordinary

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 375

action of foreign exchanges on such currency. For this purpose, let us assume
that our ordinary circulating medium, when exchanges are easy, amounts to
$100,000,000, consisting, as it does, of convertible bank paper. Let us sup
pose that it is all issued by what are called sound specie-paying banks, with a
circulation of three dollars of paper for one dollar in specie, which is regarded
as constituting safe banking. Next, suppose exchange abroad turns against us,
to the amount of $10,000,000. Is it not clear that, instead of reducing the cir
culation by that amount, that is, to $90,000,000, which it would do if it con
sisted only of specie, it would be reduced three times the amount : that is, to
$70,000,000 ? Let us now suppose the exchange to turn the other way, from
this point of depression, and to be kept flowing in that direction till it came to
be $10,000,000 in our favour, instead of that amount against us. The result
would be. under the operation of the same law, not to increase our circulation
to $110,000,000 only, which would be the case if consisting of specie, but to
$130,000,000; making a difference' between the extreme points of depression
and elevation of $60,000,000 — more than equal to one half of the usual amount of
circulation by supposition, with a corresponding increase of prices — instead of
$20,000,000, equal only to a fifth, and with but a proportional effect on prices.
A change the other way, from the extreme point of elevation to that of extreme
depression, would cause the reverse effect. I hold it certain that no honest
industry, pursued with the view to moderate and steady profit, can be safe in
the midst of such sudden and violent vicissitudes — vicissitudes as if from sum
mer to winter, and from winter to summer, without the intervention of fall or
spring. Such great and sudden changes in the standard of value must be par
ticularly fatal with us, with our moderately accumulated capital, compared to
the effect on the greater accumulation abroad, in older countries. In stating the
case supposed, I have assumed numbers at random, without pretending to ac
curacy as applied to our country, simply to illustrate the principle. The actual
vibration may be greater or less than that supposed, but in every country where
bank circulation prevails it must be greater and greater, just in proportion to
the extent of its prevalence.

For this diseased state of your currency there is but one certain remedy —
to return to the currency of the Constitution. Read that instrument, and hear
what it says. " Congress shall coin money and regulate the value thereof; no
state shall emit bills of credit, or make anything but gold and silver a legal tend
er." Here are positive and negative provisions : a grant of power to Congress,
and a limitation on the power of the states in reference to the currency. Can
you doubt that the object was to give to Congress the control of the currency ?
What else is the meaning " to regulate" the value thereof? Can you doubt that
the currency was intended to be specie ? What else is the meaning " to coin
money ?" Can you doubt, on the other hand, that it was the intention that the
states should not supersede the currency which Congress was authorized to es
tablish 1 What else is the meaning of the provisions that they shall not issue
bills of credit, or make anything but gold and silver a legal tender ? Can we
doubt, finally, that the country is not in the condition that the Constitution in
tended, as far as the currency is concerned ? Does Congress, in point of fact,
regulate the currency ? No. Does it supply a coin circulation 1 No. Do
the states, in fact, regulate it? Yes. Does it consist of paper issued by the
authority of the states ? Yes. Is this paper, in effect, a legal tender? Yes.
It has expelled the currency of the Constitution, and we are compelled to take
it or nothing. Well, then, as the currency is in an unconstitutional condition,
the conclusion is irresistible that the Constitution has failed to effect what it in
tended, as far as the currency is concerned ; but whether it has failed by mis
construction, or the want of adequate provisions, is not yet decided. Thus
much, however, is clear, that it is through the agency of bank paper that it has
failed, and the power intended to be conferred on Congress over the currency

o/O SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

has been superseded. But for that, the power of Congress over the currency
would have been this day in full force, and the currency itself in a constitutional
condition. Nor is it less clear that the Constitution cannot be restored while
the cause which has superseded it remains ; and this presents the great ques
tion, How can it be removed? I do not intend to discuss it on this occasion.
I shall only say that the task is one of great delicacy and difficulty, requiring
much wisdom and caution, and in the execution of which precipitation ought
to be carefully avoided ; but when executed, then, and not till then, shall we
have the solid, stable, and uniform currency intended by the Constitution, and
which is indispensable, not only to the full success of our manufactures, and all
other branches of productive industry, but also to the safety of our free institu
tions.

The next indispensable step to secure to the manufacturers the foreign mar
ket is low duties, and light burdens on productions ; yes, as low and light as
the wants of the government will permit. • The less the burden — the freer and
broader the scope given to the products of our manufactures — the better for
them. Above all, avoid the renewal of the protective system. It would be
fatal, as far as the foreign market is concerned.

Its hostile effects I have already shown from the table of exports, and shall
now, by a few brief remarks, prove that it must be so. Passing by other rea
sons, I shall present but one, but that one is decisive. It has been shown that
the effect of the protective system is to expand the currency in the manufactu
ring sections, until the increased price of production shall become equal to the
duty imposed for protection, when the importation of the protected articles must
again take place ; that is to say, that its effects are to enable foreign manufac
turers to meet ours in our own country, under the disadvantage of paying high
additional duties. How, then, with'that result, would it be possible for our man
ufacturers to meet the foreign fabrics of the same description abroad, where there
can be no duty to protect them ? There can be no answer. The reason is de
cisive.

I do not wish, in what I have said, to be considered the advocate of low wa
ges. I am in favour of high wages ; and agree that, the higher the wages, the
stronger the evidence of prosperity ; provided (and that is the important point)
they are so naturally, by the effectiveness of industry, and not in consequence
of an inflated currency, or any artificial regulation. When I say the effective
ness of industry, I mean to comprehend whatever is calculated to make the la
bour of one country more productive than that of others. I take into consider
ation skill, activity, energy, invention, perfection of instruments and means, me
chanical and chemical ; abundance of capital, natural and acquired ; facility of
intercourse and exchanges, internal and external ; and, in a word, whatever may
add to the productiveness of labour. High wages, when attributable to these,
is the certain evidence of productiveness, and is, on that account, and that only,
the evidence of prosperity. It is easily understood. Just as such labour would
command, when compared with the less productive, a greater number of pounds
of sugar or tea, a greater quantity of clothing or food, in the same proportion
would it command more specie, that is, higher wages for a day's work. But,
sir, here is the important consideration : high wages from such a cause require
no protection — no, not more than the high wages of a man against the low wa
ges of a boy, of man against women, or the skilful and energetic against the
awkward and feeble. On the contrary, the higher such wages, the less the pro
tection required. Others may demand protection against it — not it against oth
ers. The very demand of protection, then, is but a confession of the want of
effectiveness of labour (from soine cause) on the side that makes it ; but, as a
general rule, it will turn out that protection, in most cases, is a mere fallacy ;
certainly so when its effects are an artificial expansions of the currency. So
far are high wages from being the evidence of prosperity in such cases, or, in

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 377

fact, whenever caused by high protection, high taxes, or any other artificial
cause, it is the evidence of the very reverse, and always indicates something
wrong, and a tendency to derangement and decay.

Having arrived at this conclusion, I will now hazard the assertion, that in
no country on earth is labour, taking it all in all, more effective than ours, and
especially in the Northern and Eastern portions. What people can excel our
Northern and New-England brethren in skill, invention, activity, energy, per
severance, and enterprise ? In what portion of the globe will you find a posi
tion more favourable to a free ingress and egress, and facility of intercourse,
external and internal, through the broad limits of our wide-spread country — a
region surpassed by none, taking into consideration extent and fertility ? Where
will you find such an abundant supply of natural capital, the gift of a kind Prov
idence ; lands cheap, plenty, and fertile ; water power unlimited ; and the supply
of fuel, and the most useful of metals, iron, almost without stint ? It is true, in
accumulated capital, the fruits of past labour, through a long succession of ages,
not equal to some other countries, but even in that far from being deficient, and
to whatever extent deficient, would be more than compensated by the absence
of all restrictions, and the lightness of the burden imposed on labour, should our
government, state and general, wisely avail itself of the advantages of our situ
ation. If these views be correct, there is no country where labour, if left to
itself, free from restriction, would be more effective, and where it would com
mand greater abundance of every necessary and comfort, or higher wages ; and
where, of course, protection is less needed. Instead of an advantage, it must,
in fact, prove an impediment. It is high time, then, that the shackles should
be thrown off industry, and its burden lightened, as far as the just wants of the
government may possibly admit. We have arrived at the manhood of our vig
our. Open the way — remove all restraints — take off the swaddling cloth that
bound the limbs of infancy, and let the hardy, intelligent, and enterprising sons
of New-England march forth fearlessly to meet the world in competition, and
she will prove, in a few years, the successful rival of Old England. The for
eign market once commanded, all conflicts between the different sections and
industry of the country would cease. It is better for us and you that our cot
ton should go out in yarn and goods than in the raw state ; and when that is
done, the interests of all the parts of this great confederacy — North, East, South,
and West — with every variety of its pursuits, would be harmonized, but not till
then.

If the course of policy I advocate be wise as applied to manufactures, how
much more strikingly so must it be when to the other two great interests of that
section, commerce and navigation ? I pass the former, and shall conclude what
I intended to say on this point with a few remarks applicable to the latter.
Navigation (I mean that employed in our foreign trade) is essentially our out
side interest, exposed to the open competition of all the world. It has met, and
met successfully, the competition of the lowest wages, not only without protec
tion, but with heavy burdens on almost every article that enters into the outfit,
the rigging, and construction of our noble vessels, the timber excepted. If, with
such onerous burdens, it has met in successful rivalry the navigation of all other
countries, what an impulse it would receive if the load that bears down its
springs were removed! and what immense additions that increased impulse
would give, not only to our wealth, but to the means of national influence and
safety, where only we can be felt, and in the quarter from which only external
danger is to be apprehended !

I have now, Mr. President, concluded what I proposed to say when I rose
to address the Senate. I have limited my remarks to the prominent conse
quences, in a pecuniary and fiscal view, which would result should the scheme
of assumption be adopted. There are higher and still more important conse
quences, which I have not attempted to trace ; I mean the effects, morally and

B B B

378 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

politically, as resulting from those which I have traced, and presented to the Sen
ate. This, I hope, may be done by some other senator in the course of the
discusion. But I have said enough to show that the scheme which these reso
lutions are intended to condemn ought to be avoided, as the most fatal poison
and the most deadly pestilence. It is, in reality, but a scheme of plunder. Let
blood be lapped, and the appetite will be insatiable.

But the states are deeply in debt, and it may be asked, What shall be done ?
I know that they are in debt — deeply in debt. I deplore it. Yes, in debt, 1
am not afraid to assert it, in many instances, for the most idle projects, got up
and pursued in the most thoughtless manner. Nor am I ignorant how deep
pecuniary embarrassments, whether of states or individuals, blunt every feeling
of honest pride and deaden the sense of justice ; but I do trust that there is not
a member of this great and proud confederacy so lost to every feeling of self-
respect and sense of justice as to desire to charge its individual debts on the
common fund of the Union, or to impose them on the shoulders of its more pru
dent associates ; or, let me add, to dishonour itself, and the name of an Ameri
can, by refusing to pay the foreigner what it justly owes. Let the indebted
states remember, in time, that there is but one honest mode of paying its debts —
stop all farther increase, and impose taxes to discharge what they owe. There
is not a state, even the most indebted, with the smallest resources, that has not
ample resources to meet its engagements. For one, I pledge myself; South
Carolina is also in debt. She has spent her thousands in wasteful extrava
gance on one of the most visionary schemes that ever entered into the head of
a thinking man. I dare say this even of her ; I, who on this floor stood up to
defend her almost alone against those who threatened her with fire and sword,
but who now are so squeamish about state rights as to be shocked to hear it
asserted that a state was capable of extravagant and wasteful expenditures.
Yes, I pledge myself that she will pay punctually every dollar she owes, should
it take the last cent, without inquiring whether it was spent wisely or foolishly.
Should I in this be by possibility mistaken — should she tarnish her unsullied
honour, and bring discredit on our common country by refusing to redeem her
plighted faith (which I hold impossible), deep as is my devotion to her, and
mother as she is to me, I would disown her.

xxv.

SPEECH ON HIS RESOLUTIONS IN REFERENCE TO THE CASE OF THE EN
TERPRISE, MARCH 13, 1840.

THE following resolutions, submitted by Mr. Calhoun on the 4th inst., were
taken up for consideration :

" Resolved, That a ship or a vessel on the high seas, in time of peace, en
gaged in a lawful voyage, is, according to the laws of nations, under the exclu
sive jurisdiction of the state to which her flag belongs ; as much so as if con
stituting a part of its own domain.

" Resolved, That if such ship or vessel should be forced, by stress of weather,
or other unavoidable cause, into the port of a friendly power, she would, under
the same laws, lose none of the rights appertaining to her on the high seas ;
but, on the contrary, she, and her cargo and persons on board, with their "prop
erty, and all the rights belonging to their personal relations, as established by
the laws of the state to which they belong, would be placed under the protec
tion which the laws of nations extend to the unfortunate under such circum
stances.

" Resolved, That the brig Enterprise, which was forced unavoidably, by stress

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 379

ot weather, into Port Hamilton, Bermuda Island, while on a lawful voyage on
the high seas, from one port of the Union to another, comes within the princi
ples embraced in the foregoing resolutions ; and that the seizure and detention
of the negroes on board, by the local authority of the island, was an act in vio
lation of the laws of nations, and highly unjust to our own citizens, to whom
they belong."

The resolutions having been read,

Mr. Calhoun said : The case referred to in these resolutions is one of the
three which have been for so long a period a subject of negotiation between our
government and that of Great Britain, without, however, receiving the attention
which, in my opinion, is due to the importance of the principle involved. The
other two were those of the Comet and Encomium. In order to have a clear
understanding of the bearing of these resolutions, and the principles they em
brace, it will be necessary to give a brief narrative of each of these cases.

The Comet is the first in order of time. She sailed from this District in the
latter part of the year 1830, destined for New-Orleans, having, among other
things, a number of negroes on board. Her papers were regular, and her voy
age in all respects lawful. She was stranded on one of the false keys of the
Bahama Islands, opposite to the coast of Florida, and almost in sight of our own
shores. The persons on board, including the negroes, were taken by the
wreckers, against the remonstrance of the captain and owners, into Nassau,
New-Providence, where the negroes were forcibly seized and detained by the
local authorities.

The case of the Encomium is in almost every particular similar. It occurred
in 1834. She sailed from Charleston, destined, also, for New-Orleans, with ne
groes on board, on a voyage in like manner lawful, was stranded near the same
place, taken in the same way, into the same port, where the negroes were also
forcibly seized and detained by the local authorities. It so happens that I am
personally acquainted with the owners of the negroes in this case. They were
citizens of North Carolina, of high respectability, one of them recently presi
dent of the state Senate, and their negroes were shipped for New-Orleans with
the view of emigration and permanent settlement in one of the Southwestern
States.

The other is the case of the Enterprise, referred to in the resolutions. She
sailed, in 1835, from this District, destined for Charleston, South Carolina, and,
like the others, on a lawful voyage, with regular papers. She was forced, un
avoidably, by stress of weather, into Port Hamilton, Bermuda Island, where the
negroes on board were, in like manner, forcibly seized and detained by the lo
cal authorities.

The owners of the negroes, after applying in vain to the local authorities for
their surrender, made application to the government for redress of injury ; and
the result, after ten years' negotiation, is, that the British government has agreed
to compensate the owners of the Comet and Encomium, on the ground that
these cases occurred before the act for the abolition of slavery in her colonies
had gone into operation, and refused compensation in the case of the Enter
prise, because it occurred afterward.

Such are the material facts, drawn from the correspondence itself, and ad
mitted in the course of the negotiation. What I propose, in the first place, is,
to show that the principle on which compensation was allowed in the cases of
the Comet and Encomium, embraces also that of the Enterprise ; that no dis
crimination whatever can be made between them ; and that, in attempting to
make a discrimination, the British minister has assumed the very point in con
troversy, or, to express it in more familiar language, has begged the question.
I shall rest my argument exclusively on the admissions necessarily involved in
the two cases, without looking to any other authority. They will be found, if
I do not greatly mistake, ample of themselves for my purpose.

380 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

What, then, is the principle necessarily involved, in allowing compensation
in those cases ? It will not be necessary to show that the allowance was not a
mere act of gratuity to our citizens. No one will suspect that. It was. on the
contrary, reluctantly yielded, after years of negotiation, only on the conviction
that the rights of our citizens in the negroes could no longer be disputed, and.
of course, the injustice of their seizure and detention. This brings me to a
question of vital importance in this discussion, to which I must ask the Senate
to give me its fixed attention ; and that is, On what did this right of our citizens
to the negroes rest ? Not, certainly, on the British laws, either expressed or
implied. So far otherwise, they expressly prohibited, in the broadest and most
unqualified terms, persons from being brought in or retained as slaves, under
heavy penalty and forfeiture of property ; declared the persons offending to be
felons, and subjected them to be transported beyond sea, or to be confined and
kept at hard labour for a term of years.* But one answer can be given to the
question : that it rested on the laws of their own country. It was only by them
that they could possibly have a right to the negroes. And here we meet the
vital question, How is it that a right resting on our laws should be valid and
respected within the limits of the British dominion, against the express prohibi
tion of an act of Parliament ?

The answer can only be found in the principles embraced in the first and
second of these resolutions. The former affirms the acknowledged principle
that a ship or vessel on the high seas, in time of peace, and engaged in a law
ful voyage, is, by the law of nations, under the exclusive jurisdiction of the state
to which her flag belongs ; and the second, that if forced by stress of weather,
or other unavoidable cause, into a port of a friendly power, she would lose none
of the rights appertaining to her on the high seas ; but, on the contrary, she,
with her cargo and persons on board, including their property, and all the rights
belonging to their personal relations, would be placed under the protection
which the law of nations extends to the unfortunate in such cases.

It is on this solid basis that the rights of our citizens rested. The laws of
nations, by their paramount authority, overruled, in those cases, the municipal
laws of Great Britain, even within her territorial limits ; and it was to their au
thoritative voice that her government yielded obedience in compensating our
citizens for the violation of rights placed under their sacred protection.

Having now established the principle necessarily implied in the allowance
of compensation in the cases of the Comet and Encomium, it will be an easy
task to show that it equally embraces the case of the Enterprise. It is admit
ted by the British minister that there is no other distinction between it and the
other two, except that it occurred after, and the others before the act abolishing
slavery in the colonies went into operation ; and it must, of course, be equally
comprehended in the principles embraced in the first and second resolutions,
in virtue of which compensation was made, as has been shown ; unless, indeed,
that act had the effect of preventing it, which I shall now show it could not, ac
cording to the law of nations.

A simple but decisive view will be sufficient for the purpose. I have just
shown that the act of Parliament for abolishing the slave-trade, although it ex
pressly prohibited the introduction of slaves within the limits of the British ter
ritory, or detaining them in that condition when brought in, so far from overru
ling, were overruled by the principles embraced in these resolutions. If that
act did not overrule the laws of nations in those cases, how, I ask, could the
act for the abolition of slavery in the colonies overrule them in a case in every
essential circumstance acknowledged to be the same ? Can a possible reason
be assigned ? The authority by which the two were enacted is the same, and
the one as directly applicable to the case as the other. If, indeed, there be a

* See act to amend and consolidate the laws relating to the abolition of the slave-trade, 5th sec.,
4c., p. 113, 6 vol., Evan's Statutes.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 381

difference, the one for the abolition of the slave-trade is, of the two, the most
applicable . That act directly prohibits the introduction of slaves within the
British dominion in the most unqualified manner, or the retaining them, when in
troduced, in that condition ; while the object of the act for the abolition of sla
very in the colonies was to emancipate those who were such under the author
ity of the British laws. It is true it abolishes slavery in the British dominions,
but that is no more than had previously been done, as far as slaves brought into
her dominions were concerned, by the act for abolishing the slave-trade. And yet
we see that act was overruled by the law of nations, in the case of the Comet
and Encomium. How, then, is it possible, that of two laws, enacted by the
same authority, both being equally applicable, the one, when applied to the same
case, should be overruled by the law of nations, and the other overrule it ? It is
clear that it is impossible ; and that, if the one cannot divest the rights of our
citizens, neither can the other ; and, of course, that the principle on which com
pensation was allowed in the cases of the Encomium and the Comet, equally
embraces that of the Enterprise. Both acts were, in truth, but municipal laws ;
and, as such, neither could overrule the laws of nations, nor divest our citizens
of their rights in the case under consideration. In the nature of things, the laws
of nations, which have for their object the regulation of the intercourse of states,
must be paramount to municipal laws, where their provisions happen to come
into conflict. If not, they would be without authority. If this be so, there can
be no discrimination between the three cases, and all ought to be allowed ; or,
if not, none ; and, in that case, our citizens would have no just claim for com
pensation in either. It follows that the principle which embraces one embra
ces all. There can be no just distinction between them ; and I shall next pro
ceed to show that, in attempting to make a distinction where there is no differ
ence, the British negotiator has been compelled to assume the very point in
controversy between the two governments. In doing this, I propose to follow
his argument step by step, ahd prove the truth of my assertion at each step.

He sets out with laying down the rule by which he asserts that those claims
should be decided, which, he says, " is, that those claimants must be considered
entitled to compensation who were lawfully in possession of their slaves within
the British territory, and who were disturbed in their legal possession of those
slaves by functionaries of the British government." I object not to the rule.
If our citizens had no right to their slaves at any time after they entered the
British territory — that is, if the mere fact of entering extinguished all right to
them (for that is the amount of the rule) — they could, of course, have no claim
on the British government, for the plain reason that the local authority, in seiz
ing and detaining the negroes, seized and detained what, by supposition, did
not belong to them. That is clear enough ; but let us see the application : it
is given in a few words. He says, " Now the owners of the slaves on board
the Enterprise never were lawfully in possession of those slaves within the
British territory ;" assigning for reason, " that, before the Enterprise arrived at
Bermuda, slavery had been abolished in the British Empire" — an assertion
which I shall show, in a subsequent part of my remarks, to be erroneous. From
that, and that alone, he comes to the conclusion, " that the negroes on board the
Enterprise had, by entering within the British jurisdiction, acquired rights which
the local courts were bound to protect." Such certainly would have been the
case if they had been brought in, or entered voluntarily. He who enters volun
tarily the territory of another state, tacitly submits himself, with all his rights,
to its laws, and is as much bound to submit to them as its citizens or subjects.
No one denies that ; but that is not the present case. They entered not volun
tarily, but from necessity ; and the very point at issue is, whether the British
municipal laws could divest their owners of property in their slaves on entering
British territory, in cases such as the Enterprise, when the vessel has been
forced into their territory by necessity, through an act of Providence, to save

382 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

the lives of those on board. We deny that they can, and maintain the opposite
ground : that the law of nations, in such cases, interposes and protects the ves
sel and those on board, with their rights, against the municipal laws of the state,
to which they have never submitted, and to which it would be cruel and inhu
man, as well as unjust, to subject them. Such is clearly the point at issue be
tween the two governments ; and it is not less clear that it is the very point
assumed by the British negotiator in the controversy.

He felt, in assuming his ground, that the general principle was against him,
according to which, the municipal laws yield to the laws of nations in such
case ; and, in order to take himself out of its operation, he attempted to make a
distinction equally novel and untenable. He asserts " that there is a distinc
tion between laws bearing on the personal liberty of man and laws bearing upon
the property which man may claim in irrational animals or inanimate things ;"
and concedes " that if a ship, containing such animals or things, were driven
by stress of weather into a foreign port, it would be highly unjust that the own
er should be stripped of what belongs to him, through the application of the mu
nicipal law of the state to which he had not voluntarily submitted himself."
Yes, it would be both unjust and inhuman ; and because it would be so, it is
contrary to the law of nations, which is but the rules of justice and humanity
applied to the intercourse of nations ; and therefore it is that it interposes in
cases like the present, and places under its protection the rights of the unfortu
nate, even against the municipal laws of the place.

But he asserts that the principle does not extend to the cases in which rights
of property in persons are concerned (for such must be the meaning, or it is
wholly irrelevant to the question at issue), because " there are three parties to
the transaction — the owner of the cargo, the local authority, and the alleged
slave ; and the third party is no less entitled than the first to appeal to the local
authority for such protection as the law of the land may afford him." This is
the position on which the British negotiator main!/ rests his argument ; and if
this fails, the whole must fall to the ground, it is not difficult to see, from
what he says of two parties appealing to the lo^al authority, that he tacitly puts
aside the law of nations, and assumes the parties to be under the municipal
law of the place ; and, also, that those laws, and not the law of nations, are
the standard by which their rights are to be judged ; but is it not manifest that
this is an assumption, in another form, of the point in controversy ? Against it,
unsustained, and unsustainable, by authority or reason, I shall oppose what, to
him, must be the highest authority — that of the British government itself— in
the cases of the Comet and Encomium, backed by unanswerable reasons.

If the distinction be true at all, between property in persons and properfy in
things, or irrational animals, it was, to the full, as applicable to those cases as
it is to that of the Enterprise. In them the right of property in persons was in
volved, and the three parties included, to the same extent as in that. Nor was
personal liberty less concerned. As far as British laws could affect the rights
of our citizens, the negroes belonging to the Comet and Encomium were as free
as those belonging to the Enterprise. An act of Parliament, as has been shown,
forbade their introduction, and forfeited the rights of their owners, thereby ma
king them free with rights to maintain, as far as British legislation could make
them so ; and yet, after full and mature investigation and reflection for the space
of ten years, it was admitted that the same rule applied to them which, it is con
ceded, would apply in similar cases to property in things or irrational animals.
Now I ask, If the act for the abolition of the slave-trade, which directly forbids
the introduction of negroes as slaves, and forfeits the rights of their owners, did
not, as we have seen, justify the distinction in the cases of the Comet and Enco
mium, now attempted to be made between the two descriptions of property, how
could the act for the abolition of slavery justify it in the case of the Enterprise ?
In the former, there were all the parties, with their respective rights, just the

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 3S3

same as in the latter ; and if the local authorities were not bound to recognise
and protect the negroes in the one case, why, I ask, were they in the other ?
Can a satisfactory answer be given 1 And if not, what becomes of the dis
tinction, with all its consequences, attempted to be deduced from it ?

The British negotiator, as if conscious of the weakness of the position, at
tempts immediately to fortify it. He says, " If, indeed, a municipal law be
made which violates the laws of nations, a question of another kind may arise.
But the municipal law which forbids slavery is no violation of the laws of na
tions. It is, on the contrary, in strict harmony with the laws of nations ; and,
therefore, when slaves are liberated according to such municipal law, there is
no wrong done, and there can be no compensation granted :" a position pregnant
with meaning, as will hereafter appear, but I must say, like all his others, a
mere assumption of the point at issue, expressed in vague and indefinite lan
guage.

If, in asserting that a municipal law abolishing slavery is not a violation of
the laws of nations, it is meant that it is not a violation of those laws for a state
to abolish slavery which exists under its authority, it may be readily admitted,
without prejudice to the rights of our citizens in the case in question, though it
is a little remarkable that the British government allowed compensation to
their own subjects by this very act under which slavery was abolished — author
ity in direct contradiction to the assertion that no compensation can be granted
when the act is applied to the case of our citizens, forced, without their con
sent, into its territory.

But if, instead of that, it be meant that all municipal laws not in violation of
the laws of nations are valid against those laws, when they come in conflict
with them, how can the distinction, attempted to be drawn between the rights
of property in things or irrational animals, and in persons, be justified ? or how
can the allowance of compensation in the cases of the Comet and Encomium
be explained ? I put the question, Was the law for the abolition of the slave-
trade a violation of the laws of nations ? And if not a violation, as it certainly
was not, how came compensation to be granted in those cases ? Can an an
swer be given ? And if not, what becomes of the distinction attempted to be
taken ?

But another meaning may be intended — that it was no violation of the law
of nations to extend the act for the abolition of slavery in the British territories
to cases such as the Enterprise. If that is intended, it would be like all the
other distinctions which have been attempted — but an assumption of the point
in controversy.

I have now stated, in his own words, every argument advanced by the Brit
ish negotiator to sustain the distinction which he has attempted between the
cases of the Comet and Encomium and that of the Enterprise, and have, I trust,
established, beyond controversy, that there is no rational ground whatever for
the distinction. When again pressed on the subject by our minister, who was
not satisfied with his arguments, he assumed the broad ground that Great Brit
ain had the right to forbid the recognition of slavery within her territory ; and
as our claim was inconsistent with such right, it could not be allowed, and on
this closed the correspondence. It is easy to see, if she has such right, in the
broad and unqualified sense in which it is laid down, and applied to the case in
question, it extends to all rights whatever, whether it be right of property in
things and irrational animals, or growing out of personal relations, whether
founded in consent or not. All are either the creatures of positive enactments,
or subject to be regulated and controlled by municipal laws ; and she has just
the same right to prohibit the recognition of any one, or all of those rights with
in her territory, as the one in question. But who can doubt that such prohibi
tion, if extended to cases of distress such as the Enterprise, would be a most
flagrant violation of the laws of nations, as understood and acted on by all civil-

384 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

ized nations, and even as admitted and acted on by herself in the cases of the
Comet and Encomium 1

To us this is not a mere abstract question, nor one simply relating to the free
use of the high seas. It comes nearer home. It is one of free and safe passage
from one port to another of our Union ; as, much so to us as a question touch
ing the free and safe use of the channels between England and Ireland on the
one side, and the opposite coast of the Continent on the other, would be to
Great Britain. To understand its deep importance to us, it must be borne in
mind that the island of Bermuda lies but a short distance off our coast, and that
the channel between the Bahama Islands and Florida is not less than two hun
dred miles in length, and on an average not more than fifty wide ; and that through
this long, narrow, and difficult channel, the immense trade between our ports on
the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic coast must pass, which, at no distant pe
riod, will constitute more than half of the trade of the Union. The principle
set up by the British government, if carried out to its full extent, would do
much to close this all-important channel, by rendering it too hazardous for use.
She has only to give an indefinite extension to the principle applied to the case
of the Enterprise, and the work would be done ; and why has she not as good
a right to apply it to a cargo of sugar or cotton as to the slaves who produced it 1

I have now, I trust, established, to the satisfaction of the Senate, what I pro
posed when I commenced — that the principle on which compensation was al
lowed in the cases of the Comet and Encomium, equally embraces that of the
Enterprise ; that no just distinction can be made between them ; and that the
British, negotiator, in attempting to make a distinction, was forced to assume the
point in controversy. And here I might conclude my remarks, as far as these
resolutions are concerned ; but there are other questions connected with this
subject, not less important, which demand attention, and which I shall now pro
ceed to consider.

It is impossible to read the correspondence between the two governments
without the impression that the question involved in the negotiation was one of
deep embarrassment to the British ministry. The great length of the negotia
tion, considering the simplicity and paucity of the points involved, the long de
lay before an answer could be had at all, and the manifest embarrassment in
making the distinction between the cases allowed and the one rejected, plainly
indicate that there was some secret, unseen difficulty in the way, not directly
belonging to the questions involved in the cases. What was that difficulty ?
If I mistake not, it will be found in the condition of things in England, and es
pecially in reference to those in power. It is my wish to do the ministry am
ple justice, as I believe they were desirous of doing us ; but it is not to be dis
guised that there was no small difficulty in the way, from the state of things
under which they acted, and which I shall next explain.

The present Whig ministry held, and still hold their power, as is well known,
by a precarious tenure. Their party is, in fact, in a minority, arid can only
support themselves against the powerful party in opposition by such adven
titious aid as can be conciliated. Among the subdivisions of party in Great
Britian, the Abolition interest is one of no little power, and it will be seen at
once that the question involved in the negotiation is one in reference to which
they would have no little sensibility. Like all other fanatics, they have little
regard either to reason or justice, where the object of their enthusiasm is con
cerned. To do us justice, without offending such a party, in such a case, was no
easy task ; and to offend them, without losing the ascendency of their party
and the reins of government, was almost impossible. The ministry had to act
under these conflicting considerations ; and I intend no disrespect in saying
that the desire of conciliating so strong a party, and thereby retaining place,
when opposed to the demands of justice, could not be without its weight. The
course, accordingly, taken, was such as might have been anticipated from these

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 385

opposing motives. To satisfy our urgent claim for justice, compensation was
allowed in two of the cases ; arid, to avoid offending a powerful and zealous par
ty, a distinction was taken between them and the other, the effects of which
would be to close the door against future demands of the kind. I mean not to
say that deliberate and intentional injustice was done ; but simply, that these
conflicting causes, which it is obvious, from the circumstances of the case, must
have been in operation, would, by a natural and an unseen bias, lead to that re
sult.

But another question of far greater magnitude, growing out of the foregoing,
presents itself for consideration : To what must that result finally lead, if Great
Britain should persist in the decision which it has made ? I hold it impossible
for her to maintain the position she has taken. She must abandon it as un
tenable, and take one of two other positions : either that her municipal laws are
paramount to the law of nations, when they come into conflict ; or that slavery
— the right of man to hold property in man — is against the law of nations. It
is only on the one or other of these suppositions that the act for abolishing
slavery can have the force she attributes to it.

The former she cannot take, without virtually abolishing the entire system
of international laws. She could not think of assuming that her municipal
laws were paramount, without admitting those of other states also to be so ;
which would be to annul the system, and substitute in its place universal vio
lence, discord, and conflict. This would force her on the other alternative,
which, if it were true, would give her a solid foundation for the rejection of
our claim, on the incontestable principle that the laws of nations would not en
force that which violates themselves. Nor are there wanting indications, in
the correspondence (to some of which I have alluded), that the position she
has taken in reference to the Enterprise is but preliminary to the adoption of
that alternative. There are, however, many difficulties to be got over before
she can openly take it.

It would require, in the first place, no small share of effrontery for a nation
which has been the greatest slave-dealer on earth ; a nation which has dragged
a greater number of Africans from their native shores to people her possessions,,
and to sell to others, and which forced our ancestors to purchase slaves from
her against their remonstrance, while colonies (not, improbably, the ancestors
of the owners of those slaves to purchase the ancestors of the slaves, for which
she now refuses compensation) — it would, I repeat, require no small effrontery
to turn round and declare that she neither had, nor could have, the right to the
property she sold us ; nor could we, without deep crime, retain possession. We
all know what such conduct would be called among individuals, without, indeed,
being followed by a tender back of the purchase money, with ample compen
sation for damages ; and there is no good reason why it should be called by a
less harsh epithet when applied to the conduct of nations.

Sut there is another difficulty. The arowal of the principle would place her
in conflict with all the authorities on the law of nations, and the custom of all
ages, past and present, and would bring her into collision with all nations,
whose institutions would be outlawed by the avowal ; and what, perhaps, she
would most regard, it would put her in conflict with herself. Yes, she wha
refused to compensate our citizens for property unjustly seized and detained
j» under her authority, on the ground that she had forbade the recognition of
slavery in her territory, had then, and has at this day, hundreds of thousands
of slaves in the most wretched condition, held by her subjects in her Eastern
possessions ; and worse, by herself. With all her boast, she is a slaveholder,.
and hires out and receives hire for slaves. I speak on high authority — the
Asiatic Journal for 1838, printed in her own metropolis.

Here the secretary read the following extracts from page 221 :

" GOVERNMENT OF SLAVES IN MALABAR. — We know that there is not a ser-

C cc

3S6 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

vant of government in the South of India who is not intimately acquainted with
the alarming fact, that hundreds of thousands of his fellow-creatures are fettered
down for life to the degraded destiny of slavery. We know that these unfortu
nate beings are not, as is the case in other countries, serfs of the soil, and inca
pable of being transferred, at the pleasure of their owners, from one estate to
another. No : they are daily sold, like cattle, by one proprietor to another ; the
husband is separated from the wife, and the parent from the child. They are
loaded with every indignity ; the utmost possible quantity of labour is exacted
from them, and the most meager fare that human nature can possibly subsist on
is doled out to support them. The slave population is composed of a great
variety of classes : the descendants of those who have been taken prisoners in
time of war, persons who have been kidnapped from the neighbouring states,
people who have been born under such circumstances as that they are consid
ered without the pale of the ordinary castes ; and others who have been smug
gled from the coast of Africa, torn from their country and their kindred, and
destined to a more wretched lot, and, as will be seen, to a more enduring cap
tivity than their brethren of the Western world. Will it be believed, that gov
ernment itself participates in this description of property ; that it actually holds
possession of slaves, and lets them out for hire to the cultivators of the country,
the rent of a whole family being two fanams, or half a rupee per annum ?"

But why dwell on these comparatively few slaves ? The whole of Hindos-
tan, with the adjacent possessions, is one magnificent plantation, peopled by
more than one hundred millions of slaves, belonging to a company of gentlemen
in England, called the East India Company, whose power is far more unlimit
ed and despotic than that of any Southern planter over his slaves : a power
upheld by the sword and bayonet, exacting more, and leaving less, by far, of the
product of their labour to the subject race than is left under our own system,
with much less regard to their comfort in sickness and age. This vast system
of servitude carries with itself the elements of increase : not, it is true, by the
African slave-trade, but by means not less inhuman, that of organizing the sub
ject race into armies, and exhausting their strength and life in reducing all
around to the same state of servitude.

But it may be said, that the East India Company is but a department of the
British government, through which it exercises its control, and holds in sub
jection that vast region. Be it so. I stickle not for nice distinctions. But
how stands the case under this aspect ? If it be contrary to the laws of nature,
or nations, for man to hold man in subjection individually, is it not equally con
trary for a body of men to hold another in subjection ? And if that be true, is
it not as much so for one nation to hold another in subjection ? If man indi
vidually has an absolute right to self-government, have not men aggregated into
states, or nations, an equal right ? If there be a difference, is not the right the
more perfect in a people, or nation, than in the individuals who compose it ?
And is not the subjection of one people to another usually accompanied with
at least as much abuse, cruelty, and oppression, as that of one individual to
another ? Is it possible to make a distinction which shall justify the one and
condemn the other? And if not, what right, then, I ask, has Great Britain to
hold India in subjection, if it be contrary to the laws of nature or nations for
one man to hold another in subjection ? Or, what right to hold Canada, or her
numerous subject colonies, all over the globe ? Or, to come nearer to the point,
in what light does it place her boasted abolition of slavery in the West Indies ?
What has she, in reality, done there, but to break the comparatively mild and
guardian authority of the master, and to substitute in its phce her own direct
and unlimited power? What but to replace the overseer by the army, the
sheriff, the constable, and the tax-collector ? Has she made her slaves free ?
given them the right of self-government ? Is it not mockery to call their pres
ent subject condition freedom ? What would she call it if it were hers — if, by

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 387

some calamity to her and the civilized world, she should fall under similar sub
jection to France, or some other power ? Would she call that freedom, or the
most galling and intolerable slavery ?

But I approach near home. I cross the Atlantic, passing unnoticed subju
gated Ireland, with her eight millions of people, and only ninety thousand vo
ters, and placing myself on the boasted shores of England herself, I ask, How
will the principle work there ?

It was estimated by Burke, if my memory serves me, shortly before the be
ginning of this century, that the British public, estimating as such all who ex
ercised influence over the government, did not exceed 200,000 individuals.
Since then it has, no doubt, greatly increased by the extension of the right of
suffrage and other causes. Say that it has trebled or quadrupled, and, to be
liberal, that it amounts to seven or eight hundred thousand. In this small por
tion, then, is vested the supreme control and dominion over the twenty-five
millions, which constitute the population of the British Isles. If, then, it be
contrary to the laws of nature or nations for man to hold man in subjection,
or one nation another, how can a small part or class of a community hold the
rest? Or on what principle, according to that maxim, can these few hundred
thousands hold so many millions ? If the right of self-government forbids the
subjection of one man to another, does it not equally forbid that of a small por
tion of the community over the residue ? And if so, must not the maxim termi
nate in the utter overthrow of the present political and social system of Great
Britain and the rest of Europe ?

What a picture is presented to the mind in contemplating the present state
of things in England ! We behold a small island in the German Ocean under
the absolute control of a few hundred thousand individuals, holding in unlimited
subjection not less than one hundred and fifty million? of human beings, dis
persed over every part of the globe, making not less than two hundred to each
of the dominant class ; and yet that class propagating a maxim, with more than
missionary zeal, that strikes at the foundation of this mighty power! I would
say to her, and other powers impelled by \&e madness, You are attempting
what will prove impossible. You lay down a maxim which you would limit in
its application, so as to suit your own safety and convenience. Vain hope in
this inquiring and investigating age. You cannot make a monopoly of a principle
so as to vend it for your own benefit. It will be carried oflt to its ultimate re
sults, when its reaction will be terrific on your social and political condition.
Already it begins to show its fruits. The subject mass of your population, un
der the name of Chartists, are now clamouring for the benefit of the maxim, as
applied to themselves. They demand practically, in their case, the benefit of
the principle you propagate at a distance ; and for so doing, are cut down with
out mercy. My object is not to censure the course adopted towards them. It
is not for me to judge what your safety may require. I am simply showing that
the maxim on which you profess to act in relation to the West India colonies,
and which you must apply to our case, in order to sustain your decision, begins
to be applied to your own at home. It is only the beginning. Already it is
passing into a higher and more intellectual class, who are applying it to the
present social and political condition of Europe. A body of men, not incon
siderable either for numbers or talents, on the Continent of Europe, and par
ticularly in France, are busy in making such application. They are men not
of a character to stop short, or be intimidated by final results. Already they
proclaim that social or political slavery — that which results from the subjection
of the great mass of society to the small governing class, is worse than domes
tic slavery — that which exists within the Southern portion of our Union, in its
mildest and most mitigated form. In illustration, I will read an extract from
the Paris correspondent of the National Intelligencer, said to be Mr. Walsh,
taken from the work of the Abbe La Mennais :

,388 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

" The abbe exclaims, ' In good sooth, I am not in the least astonished that
so many, viewing only the material side of things, and the present separated
from the future, should, in the midst of our boasted civilization, regret the an
cient domestic slavery. Thirty-three millions of Frenchmen, true serfs of this
era, crouch igriominiously under the domination of two hundred thousand priv
ileged masters, and supreme dispensers of their lot. Such is the fruit of our
struggles for half a century. Slaves, arise and break your chains ! let them no
longer degrade in you the name of man ! Eighteen centuries of Christianity
have elapsed, and we still live under the pagan system.' "

To this I add another extract, taken from another of the public journals, which
will give some idea what are the fruits of slavery in the form so vehemently de
nounced by the abbe :

" ENGLAND AND IRELAND. — It's enough to make one's heart bleed, if all were
true in the winter pictures drawn of the starved, suffering condition of the peas
antry in the bogs — their cabins inundated with rains and mud — the bodies of
the labourers saturated with wet, sleeping on fireless hearths, and peat at the ex
orbitant price of a penny a sod — too exorbitant to cook the very few potatoes
they may have. Parallel to these scenes, the English operatives are stated to
be reduced to dire extremity ; and around these dark and gloomy spots we have
narratives of the luxurious and voluptuous life led by the favoured few of the
gentry and nobility."

If such is the condition of what the abbe calls " the serfs of this era" in the
most civilized country in Europe, well may our domestic slave, in the midst
of plenty, and under the guardian care of a master, identified with him in inter
est, rejoice at his comparative happy condition. The exaggerated picture drawn
by the most infuriated Abolitionist can find nothing in the whole region of the
South to equal this picture of misery and want ; and yet it is Great Britain,
wherein such a contrast of wretchedness and voluptuousness exists, that wages
such unrelenting hostility against domestic slavery ! She wars against herself.
The maxim she now pushes against others will, in turn, be pushed against her.
She is preparing the way for universal discord within and without. The move
ment began with Wilberforce, and other misguided men like him, who, although
humane and benevolent, looked at the surface of things, with little knowledge
of the springs of human action, or the principles on which the existing social
and political fabric of Europe rests ; and, I may add, like all other enthusiasts,
without much regard as to the means employed in accomplishing a favourite
object.

There never before existed on this globe a nation that presented such a spec
tacle as Great Britain does at this moment. She seems to be actuated by the
most opposite and conflicting motives. While apparently actuated by so much
zeal, on this side of the Cape of Good Hope, in the cause of humanity and lib
erty, she appears to be actuated, on the other side, by a spirit of conquest and
domination not surpassed by Rome in the haughtiest dayb of the Republic.
She has just subjected, and added to her vast empire in the East, the country
between India and Persia ; and is at this moment, if we are to believe recent
accounts, preparing an extensive expedition against the oldest of nations, con
taining a population not less than a fourth of the human race — a nation that
has lived through generations of nations, and which was old and civilized be
fore the governments of Western Europe came into existence ; I need scarcely
say I refer to China. Let me add to her other claims to respect and venera
tion, that, of all despotic governments, it seems to me (judging from the scanty
evidence we have of a people so secluded) it is the wisest and most parental.
And for what, if we may behave report, is Great Britain about to wage war
against this venerable and peaceful people ? To force on them the use of opi
um, the product of her slaves on her Hindu plantation, against the resistance of
the Chinese government. And what is the extent and character of this trade ?

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOCN. 389

It is calculated it would have reached the last year, had it not been interrupted,
forty thousand chests, or more than live millions of pounds, worth about twenty
millions of dollars ; sufficient, by estimate, to supply thirteen or fourteen millions
of opium smokers, and to cause a greater destruction of life annually than the
aggregate number of negroes in the British West India colonies, whose condi
tion has been the cause of so much morbid sympathy. It is against the trade
in this pernicious and poisonous drug, carried on by fraud and smuggling, that
the Chinese government has taken the most energetic and decisive measures,
as it was called to do by the highest consideration of policy and humanity. Of
all deaths, none is more wretched than that occasioned by this seductive, but
fatal drug. The subject slowly expires, with all the powers and functions of
mind and body completely exhausted, a spectacle odious to behold.

Such is the trade which, it is said, the expedition is intended to enforce,
against the decrees of the Chinese government. The rumour, I hope, is ground
less. I hope, for the honour of England, for the honour of modern civilization,
and the Christian name, that its object is far different ; and that, instead of en
forcing a traffic so abominable, it is intended to co-operate with the wise and
humane policy of the Chinese government in suppressing it ; and that, so far
from aiding smugglers and ruffians, it is intended to seize and punish them
as they deserve. If, however, rumour should prove true, what a contrast it
would exhibit between the conduct of Great Britain in that and this quarter of
the globe ! There we find her extending her power and dominion, regardless
of justice or humanity ; while here we find her in the depth of sympathy for a
band of negroes, brought into our ports under a suspicion of murder and piracy,
intermeddling in their behalf with our own and the Spanish governments, and
that, too, at the solicitation of an abolition society of her own subjects ! Strange
sis this may seem, it is true. I hold in my hand evidence of the fact, which I
request the secretary to read.

The secretary then read the following :

_ " Foreign Office, London, December 23, 1839.

" SIR — With reference to the memorial of the Glasgow Emancipation Soci
ety, dated the 25th of October last, on behalf of the negroes who took posses
sion of the Amistad, and were subsequently carried to New-London, in the Uni
ted States of America, I am directed by Viscount Palmerston to state to you,
for the information of the above-mentioned society, that his lordship has direct
ed her majesty's minister at Washington to interpose his good offices in their
behalf, in order that they may be restored to liberty ; and his lordship has far
ther instructed her majesty's charge d'affaires at Madrid to call upon the Span
ish government to issue immediately strict orders to the authorities of Cuba,
that, if the request of the Spanish minister at Washington is complied with, the
negroes in question may be put in possession of their liberties.

" Her majesty's charge d'affaires at Madrid has likewise been instructed to
urge the Spanish government to cause the laws against the slave-trade to be en
forced against Messrs. Ruiz and Montez, and against all other Spanish subjects
concerned in the transaction in question.

" I arn, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

"W. Fox STRANGWAYS.

" WM. P. PATTON, Esq., &c., Glasgow."

Yes, strange ways indeed, if it might be permitted, on so grave an occasion,
to allude to a name. Strange ways — making millions of slaves in one hemi
sphere — forcing, by fire and sword, the poisonous product of their labour on an
old and civilized people, while, in another, interposing, in a flood of sympathy,
in behalf of a band of barbarous slaves, with hands imbrued with blood ! I trust
such officious intermeddling will be met as it deserves. Has it come to this,
that we cannot touch a subject connected with an African without the inter-

390 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

ference of another government, at the solicitation of a foreign society, instiga
ted, no doubt, by a foreign faction among ourselves ? I mean not a faction of
foreigners, but of our own people, who, in their fanatical zeal, have lost every
feeling belonging to an American, and transferred their allegiance to a foreign
power.

In making these remarks, I have not been actuated by feelings of hostility
towards Great Britain. My motive is far different. With all her faults, I ad
mire and esteem her for many and great qualities. My desire is peace. It is
the wish of the civilized world, and I would regard war between the two kin
dred people as among the greatest of calamities. But justice is indispensable
to peace among nations. Our maxim ought to be, neither to do, nor submit to
wrong — to ask for nothing but justice, and to accept nothing less ; but never
disturb peaceful relations till every means of obtaining justice has been tried in
vain. I have, in this case, acted in that spirit. I believe, solemnly, that jus
tice has been withheld. To prove that has been my object. I trust I have
done it to the satisfaction of the Senate. I also believe that justice has been
withheld on grounds utterly untenable, and which, if persisted in, must lead, in
the end, to the avowal of a principle, on the part of Great Britain, that must
strike a fatal blow at the peace of the two countries ; and, in its reaction, on
the social and political condition of Great Britain and the rest of Europe. Thus
believing, I have attempted to point to some of the disastrous consequences
which must follow, with the view of rousing attention to the question at issue
between the two governments in the case under consideration, in order to ob
tain redress of injury. If, in making my remarks, I have assailed her, it is be
cause we have been assailed, as I conceive, in assuming the principle on which
justice has been withheld.

The immediate object I had for introducing these resolutions was to take the
sense of the Senate on the subject to which they refer ; and which embraces
a principle vital to us of the South, and of deep interest to the rest of the Union.
My conviction is strong that we have justice on our side ; and I wish to afford
to our brethren in the other sections an opportunity of exhibiting a proof of their
attachment to the common interest, by sustaining a cause where we are partic
ularly concerned, as we did, at the last session, by sustaining unanimously one
where they were.*

I have no particular wish as to the mode of disposing of the resolutions. All
I desire is a direct vote on them ; but I am indifferent whether they shall be
first referred and reported on, or be discussed and decided on without reference
I leave the Senate to decide which course shall be adopted.

XXVI.

SPEECH ON THE BANKRUPT BILL, JUNE 2, 1840.

MR. CALHOUN said: It was impossible to listen to this discussion without
being struck with the difficulty of the subject, and the number and delicacy of
the questions involved. The relation of creditor and debtor was, indeed, the
all-pervading one in our country, and ought not to be touched without much de
liberation and caution. This bill, and the amendment proposed, taken together,
embrace this universal relation, almost to its utmost extent and minutest rami
fication, and ought to be examined with corresponding care and attention.

I was at first inclined to favour the bill ; but the discussion and reflection have
brought me to the conclusion that it is unconstitutional, and therefore could not
receive my support, if there were no other objection. The power of Congress

* Referring to the case of Maine.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 391

is restricted, by the Constitution, to establishing laws on the subject of bank
ruptcies. That is the limit of its power. It cannot go an inch beyond, on the sub
ject of this bill, without violating the Constitution. Thus far all must be agreed.
After full and deliberate investigation, I cannot regard this bill as one on the
subject of bankruptcy. It relates, in my opinion, to another, but connected, sub
ject, not embraced in the Constitution — that of insolvency, miscalled voluntary
bankruptcy, as I hope to be able to establish.

In order to understand the ground on which my opinion rests, it will be ne
cessary to premise — what none have denied, or can deny — that, at the time of
the formation of the Constitution, there existed, both in this country and in Eng
land, from which we derived our laws, two separate systems of laws, growing
out of the relation of creditor and debtor : the one known as the system of bank
ruptcy, and the other of insolvency. The two systems had existed together in
England for centuries, and in this country from an early period of our colonial
governments. It would be useless to waste the time of the Senate in accumu
lating proof of a fact beyond controversy. This very bill, arid the only one
ever passed by Congress on the subject of bankruptcy, bear internal evidence
of the fact. The decisions of judges recognise the distinction, and elementary
works place them under distinct heads, and in separate chapters. The distinc
tion is one neither of form nor accident. The two systems, in commercial
communities, naturally grow up out of the relation of creditor and debtor, but
originate in different motives, and have different objects, which give different
character and genius to the two.

The system of insolvent laws grew out of the debtor side of the relation, and
originated in motives of humanity for the unfortunate but honest debtor, depri
ved of the means of paying his debts by some of the various unforeseen acci
dents of life, and, in consequence, exposed to the oppression of unfeeling cred
itors. Their object is to relieve him from the power of his creditors, on an
honest surrender of all his property for their benefit.

Very different are the motives and objects in which the laws of bankruptcy
originated. They grew out of the creditor side of the relation, and form a por
tion of the mercantile or commercial code of laws. Their leading object is to
strengthen the system of commercial credit, with the view of invigorating and
extending commercial enterprise ; and we accordingly find that the system
commenced in the commercial Republic of Venice, and has been confined ex
clusively, as far as my knowledge extends, to commercial communities. Though
growing out of the same relation, and to that extent connected, the two are as
different in genius and character as the different aspects of the relation out of
which they grow, The one looks to credit and the creditor interest, and the
other to the debtor, and the obligations of humanity towards him when, with
out demerit on his part, he is utterly deprived of the means of meeting his en
gagements.

It is true, indeed, that the insolvent system, in its humanity for the debtor, is
not unmindful of the interest of the creditor ; and the bankrupt system, in guard
ing the interest of credit and creditors, does not forget that of the debtor. But
this, though it has, to a certain extent, blended the two, and caused some con
fusion in practice, cannot obliterate the essential and broad distinction between
them. Nor is it necessary, with my object, to trace the history of the legisla
tion in relation to them, in this country and England, with the judicial decisions,
in order to show that the two systems, though blended and confounded in part,
have, nevertheless, retained their distinctive features. It is enough for me that
there were, when the Constitution was adopted, two separate systems, known
both to our laws and the English, such as I have described.

I next assert, that the members of the Convention that framed the Constitu
tion could not have been ignorant of the fact that there were two such systems,
known by the names of bankrupt and insolvent laws. The Convention abounded

392 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

with able lawyers, many of whom were among the most distinguished and in
fluential members of the body, and could not but be as perfectly familiar with
the whole subject as we now are, after this long and able discussion.

Now sir, I ask, Is it to be supposed that, if they intended to delegate to Con
gress power over both systems, these able and cautious men, so familiar with
the distinction between them, would not have included both by name ? And is
it not conclusive, that in not doing so, and in limiting the grant to bankruptcy
alone, that it was their intention to grant that only, to the exclusion of insolven
cy ? Do we riot feel that, if we were framing a constitution, with our present
knowledge of the subject, that such would be our course ? If we intended to
grant both, would we not insert both ? And would not the insertion of bank
ruptcy only be intended to exclude insolvency ? The conclusion appears ir
resistible. How is it met ? By admitting (for it cannot be denied) that such
would be the case if the words of the Constitution are to be taken in their le
gal sense ; but it is asserted that our Constitution was made for the people at
large ; and on this assumption it is inferred that it ought to be interpreted, in all
cases, according to the ordinary meaning of the words used, and not in their le
gal sense. Having arrived at this conclusion, it is next contended that, accord
ing to their ordinary sense, bankruptcy and insolvency are convertible terms,
arid of the same meaning ; and it is thence inferred that the framers of the Con
stitution intended to comprehend both under the former.

I might well deny both the premises and conclusion. It might be easily
shown that in many cases the words of the Constitution must, and have been,
constantly taken in their legal sense ; and that, according to the established rules
of construction, they ought to be so taken in this. It might be also shown that
they are not convertible in common use ; that insolvency is the general term,
and includes bankruptcy. But I deem all this unnecessary. I admit, for the
sake of argument, both premises»and conclusion, but deny the application. Ta
ken unconnected with other words, insolvency and bankruptcy may be admitted
to have the same meaning, and that the one may stand for the other ; but, that
is not this case. In the Constitution, bankruptcy stands in connexion with law ;
which, attaching itself to it, fixes its meaning. Now, sir, I assert, however the
terms bankruptcy and insolvency may be confounded, standing alone, no one —
no, not the most uninformed, confounds bankrupt laws with insolvent laws.
They never call the insolvent laws of the states bankrupt laws. They may
not be able to draw the distinction with any precision, but they know that they
are not the same.

But admit that there is doubt. I ask, What is the rule of interpretation to be
applied to the Constitution in case of doubt ? It is a fundamental principle, that
Congress has no right to exercise any power whatever that is not granted by
the Constitution. To do so would be an act of usurpation, and, if knowingly
done, a violation of oath.x Hence, in cases of doubt, it is a just caution to take
the words in their limited sense, and not their broad and comprehensive — a
rule at all times considered as essential to the safety of the Constitution by those
of the State Rights creed. Apply it to this case, 'and the controversy ceas
es. Let me add, that there are few subjects in reference to which it is more
necessary to apply the most rigid rules of construction than to that of the all-
pervading relation of debtor and creditor. It is one on which the slightest en
croachment is dangerous, and might, in its consequences, draw into the vortex
of this government the whole of that vast relation in its fullest extent, and with
it the entire money transactions of the Union, as will be manifest in the sequel.

If, after what has been said, doubts should still exist, they may be removed
by turning to another provision of the Constitution, standing in close connexion
with this. I have said that the bankrupt system grew out of the commercial
policy, and made a part of it. The provision I refer to is that which grants to
Congress the power of regulating commerce. This grant carried with it several

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 393

others, as connected powers ; such as that of coining money and regulating
the value thereof; fixing a uniform standard of weights arfd measures ; and we
accordingly find these, with the power of establishing the laws of bankruptcy,
all grouped together, and following, in close connexion, the parent power of
regulating commerce ; just where we would expect to find it, regarded in the
light I do, but not if taken in the broader and more general sense of insolvency,
in which it would comprehend far more than what relates to trade, and what,
under our system, belongs to the mass of local and particular powers reserved to
the states.

So irresistible does the conclusion at which I have arrived appear to me,
that I have been forced to inquire how it is that any one in favour of a strict
construction of the Constitution could come to a different, and can find but one
explanation. We are in the midst of great pecuniary embarrassment, suddenly
succeeding a period of several years of an opposite character. There are thou
sands who, but a short time since, regarded themselves as rich, now reduced
to poverty, with a weight of debt bearing them down, from which they can never
expect to extricate themselves without the interposition of government. The
prevailing opinion is, that the legislatures of the states can apply no remedy
beyond the discharge of the person, and that there is no other power which
can give a discharge against debts, and relief from the burden, but Congress.
That so large and enterprising a portion of our citizens should be reduced to so
hopeless a condition, makes a strong appeal to our feelings, of which I am far
from being insensible. It is not at all surprising that, under the influence of
such feelings, judgment should yield to sympathy ; and that, under the impres
sion there is no other remedy, one should be sought in a loose and unsafe con
struction of the Constitution ; and hence the broad construction contended for.
I appeal to the candour of my State Rights friend, who differs from me on this
occasion, if what I state is not the true explanation. If I mistake not, it might
be safely asserted that there is not one among them who would yield the power
to this government, if he believed the state legislature could apply a remedy.
I, on my part, neither assert nor deny that they can ; but I do assert that, if
the states cannot discharge the debt, neither can Congress.

I hold it clear, if by discharging the debt be meant releasing the obligation
of a contract, either in whole or in part, that neither this government nor
that of any of the states possesses such a power. The obligation of a contract
belongs not to the civil or political code, but to the moral. It is imposed by an
authority higher than human, and can be discharged by no power under heaven
without the assent of him to whom the obligation is due. It is binding on con
science itself. If a discharged debtor had in his pocket the discharges of every
government on earth, he would not be an honest man should he refuse to pay
his debts, if ever in his power. In this sense, this government is just as pow
erless to discharge a debt as the most inconsiderable state in the Union.

But the subject may be viewed in a different light. It may be meant that
government is not bound to lend its aid to a hard and griping creditor in the
cruel attempt to coerce the honest but unfortunate debtor, who has lost his all,
to pay his debts, when it is utterly beyond his power. Certainly not ; and, in
that sense, every government has the right to discharge the debt, as well as the
person. They both stand on the same ground. It is a question of mere discre
tion when, and in what manner, the government will give its aid to enforce the
demand of the creditor ; but, thus regarded, state legislatures are just as com
petent to discharge the debt, under their insolvent laws, or, in the absence of
our legislation, under their bankrupt laws, as Congress itself. In proof of what
is asserted, I might cite the laws of many of the states, and my own among
others, which discharge the debt, as well as the person, as far as the suing
creditors are concerned — the constitutionality of which, so far as I know, has
never been questioned. It would, indeed, be a violent and unreasonable pre-

DDD

394 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

sumption to suppose that, in granting the right to establish laws of bankruptcy,
the states intended "to leave Congress free to discharge the debt, and, at the
same time, imposed on themselves an obligation to forbear the exercise of the
same power in the case of insolvency or bankruptcy, should Congress decline
to exercise the power granted. Nor can such be the intention of the provision
in the Constitution which prohibits the states from passing laws impairing the
obligation of contracts. The history of the times amply proves that the prohi
bition was intended to apply to stay laws, and others of a similar description,
which state legislatures had been in the habit of passing, in periods like the
present, when a sudden contraction of our always unstable currency had suc
ceeded a wide expansion, and when large portions of the community, with
ample means, found themselves unable to meet their debts, but who, with in
dulgence, would be able to meet all demands. The objects of all these laws
were either to afford time, or to protect the debtor against the hardship of pay
ing the same nominal amount, but in reality a much greater, in consequence of
a change in the standard of value, resulting from a contraction of the currency.
As plausible as was the object, experience had proved it to be destructive of
credit and injurious to the community, and hence the prohibition. To extend
it beyond, and give a construction which would compel the states, whether
they would or not, to lend their aid to the merciless creditor, who would re
duce to despair an innocent, but unfortunate debtor, without benefit to himself,
and thereby to render him a burden to himself and society, would be abhorrent
to every feeling of humanity and principle of sound policy. It is impossible
for me to believe that such was the intention of the Constitution. Nor can I
be reconciled to a construction which must have the effect of enlarging the
power of this government, and contracting those of the states, in relation to the
delicate and all-pervading relation of debtor and creditor, by throwing on the
side of the former the powerful consideration of humanity and sympathy for a
large and unfortunate portion of the community.

Having now established, I trust, satisfactorily, that the framers of the Con
stitution, in restricting the power of Congress to establishing laws of bank
ruptcy, intended to exclude those of insolvency, it remains to be shown that
this bill belongs to the latter class, and is, therefore, unconstitutional. And
here I might shift the burden of proof to the other side, and demand of them
to prove that it is a bankrupt, and not an insolvent bill. They who claim to
exercise a power under this government are bound to exhibit the grant, and to
prove that the power proposed to be exercised is within its limits — to show, in
this case, what a law of bankruptcy is — how far its limits extend — that this bill
does not go beyond ; and, in particular, that it does not cover the ground be
longing to the connected power of insolvency reserved to the states. Till that
is done, they have no right to expect our votes in its favour. The task is im
possible. Every feature of the bill bears the impress of insolvency. The
arguments urged for and against it demonstrate it. Have its advocates utter
ed a word, in urging its passage, in favour of credit or creditors ? On the con
trary, have not their warm and eloquent appeals been in behalf of the unfortu
nate and honest debtors, who have been reduced to hopeless insolvency by the
embarrassment of the times ? And has it not been attacked on the ground that
it would be ruinous to credit, and unjust and oppressive to creditors ? Every
word uttered on either side proves that it belongs to the class of insolvent
laws, and is, therefore, unconstitutional. As such, it cannot receive my sup
port, were it free from other objections.

But as decidedly as I am opposed to the bill. I am still more so to the amend
ment proposed as a substitute by the minority of the committee. It contains a
provision in favour of insolvent debtors similar to that of the bill, and is, of
course, liable to the same objections. But it goes much farther, and provides
for a comprehensive system of compulsory bankruptcy, as it is called ; that is,

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 395

as I understand it, bankruptcy as intended by the Constitution. As far as the
provisions of this portion of the bill are limited to individuals, I admit its consti
tutionality, but object to it on the broad ground of expediency.

It is impossible for any one to doubt, who will examine the history of our
legislation, that there must be some powerful objection to the passage of laws
of bankruptcy by Congress. No other proof is needed than the fact, that
although the government has been in operation for more than half a century,
and the power is unquestionable, yet, in that long period, notwithstanding the
numerous and strenuous efforts that have been made, but a single act has
passed ; and that, though limited to five years, was repealed before the expira
tion of the time. If we inquire into the cause, we shall find it, in part at least,
in the genius of our institutions and the character of our people, which are ab
horrent to whatever is arbitrary or harsh in legislation, than which there is
none, in its wide range, more so than the laws of bankruptcy. They give the
creditors the most summary and efficient process against the debtors, of which
we may be satisfied by looking into the provisions of this amendment. On the
mere suspicion of insolvency or fraud, one or more creditors, to whom not less
than five hundred dollars is due, may take out a process of bankruptcy against
the debtor, by applying to a judge of the Federal Court ; and on his order, with
out jury, he may be divested of his property, and the whole of his estate placed
in the hands of assignees, with authority to wind up and settle his affairs, and
distribute the proceeds among his creditors.

But, as repugnant as a process so summary and arbitrary is to the genius and
character of our institutions and people, there is another objection connected
with our currency still stronger. It has been the misfortune of our country at
all times, with the exception of some short intervals, to be cursed with an
unsound and unstable paper currency, subject to sudden and violent expan
sions and contractions. It belongs to such currency, in the period of its ex
pansion, to excite a universal spirit of enterprise and speculation, particularly
in a country so new and rapidly increasing, and of such vast capacity for in
crease as ours. Universal indebtedness is the result, followed, on the contrac
tion, by wide-spread embarrassment, reducing thousands to hopeless insolvency,
and leaving a still greater number, though possessed of ample property to pay
their debts in ordinary times, without money, or the means of getting it, to meet
the demands against them. What can be imagined more oppressive, unjust, or
cruel, than to place, at such a period, such a power in the hands of hard and
grasping creditors ?

Now, sir, we are in the midst of such a one — a period of almost unexampled
contraction, following one remarkable above all others for the extent and dura
tion of the expansion; for the universality and boldness of speculation, and the
extent and severity of the embarrassment which has followed. Such is the
period selected to arm the creditors against the debtors, with the harsh sum
mary and arbitrary power of a bankrupt law — a period, such as the states in
former times interposed, with stay laws, valuation laws, and others of like
description, to save the debtor struggling against an adverse current, and who,
if allowed time, could save himself and family from poverty. This amendment
proposes to reverse this humane but misguided policy, and, instead of inter
posing in favour of the embarrassed but solvent debtors, to arm their creditors
with more powerful means to crush them. I say misguided policy. I will not
call it unjust. On the contrary, there is a strong principle of justice at the
bottom in favour of interposing at such a period as the present, if it could be
done on principles of sound policy. The condition in which so large a portion
of our people now find themselves, in debt, with ample means of discharging
all they owe if time be allowed, but incapable of immediate payment, is much
less their fault than that of the improvident legislation of the states, counte
nanced by this government, and by which the solid and stable currency of the

396 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

Constitution has been expelled, and an unsound, vacillating one of bank-notes
substituted in its place, incapable of discharging debts. By its sudden, violent,
and unexpected fluctuations, alternately raising and depressing prices, tempting
at the one period to contract debts, and leaving debtors at the other without the
means of paying, the whole country, even the cautious and prudent, has become
involved in debt and embarrassment. To this cause may be traced the present
condition of the country, and the many similar ones through which the country
has of late so frequently passed, in which few are out of debt; and of the in
debted, though few are actually insolvent, but a small portion could pay their
debts, if demanded in legal currency. And shall we, who are, at least in part,
responsible for such a state of things, at such a period, when the debtors are
so much at the mercy of the creditors, reversing the ill-judged but humane
policy wisely prohibited to the states by the Constitution, of interposing in fa
vour of the debtors, arm the creditors with new and extraordinary powers of
enforcing their demands ? Who is there that does not feel that it would be
impolitic, cruel, and unjust ? But it is only at such periods that bankrupt laws
are proposed ; and is it at all wonderful that the instinctive feelings of the com
munity, have so steadily and strongly resisted their adoption?

On 110 occasion has there been stronger cause for resistance than the present,
for on none would such a law be more impolitic and cruel ; and such, if I may
judge from the discussion, is the feeling of this body. Standing alone, and
limited to individuals, I doubt whether the portion of the amendment under im
mediate consideration would receive a single vote, although it is the only part
which is clearly and unquestionably within the limits of the Constitution. It
may, then, well be asked, If it is without supporters, why is it inserted ? But
one answer can be given : because it is felt, as obnoxious as it is, to be indis
pensable to the passage of the provisions connected with it. One portion of
the Senate is so intent on passing the part in favour of insolvent debtors, that
they are willing to take with it the compulsory portion in favour of creditors ;
while another, from a strong desire to include corporations, are willing to com
prehend the other provisions, though they denounce the provisions in favour of
insolvent debtors, standing alone, as fraudulent, unjust, and unconstitutional.
It is thus the two extremes unite in favour of a measure that neither would
support alone ; and a feature of the bill, obnoxious of itself, but constitutional,
is made to buoy up other portions, which, if not clearly unconstitutional, to say
the least, are of doubtful constitutionality.

Let me say to those who represent the portion of the Union where the indebt-
ness is the greatest, and who, on that account, favour the provisions for the re
lief of the insolvent, that the operation of the amendment, should it pass, will
disappoint them. The part in favour of the debtors may, indeed, throw off the
burden from many who are now hopelessly insolvent, and restore their useful
ness to themselves and society ; but the other provisions will reduce a far great
er number to insolvency, who might otherwise struggle through their embar
rassments, with a competency left for the support of themselves and families.
I cannot be mistaken. Should the amendment, as it now stands, become a law,
instead of relieving, it would crush the indebted portion of the Union. In or
der to make good the assertion, I shall now turn to the novel and important pro
vision which places certain corporations, and banks among them, under this
compulsory process.

I am not the apologist of banks or corporations generally, nor am I the advo
cate of chartered privileges. On the contrary, there is not a member of the body
more deeply impressed with the evils of the banking system, as now modified,
or more opposed to grants of privileges to one portion of the community at the
expense of the rest. My opinions on these points have not been recently or
hastily formed. I long since embraced them, after much reflection and obser
vation, and am prepared to assert and maintain them on all proper occasions.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 397

But, sir, I am not to be caught by words : I have too much experience for that.
It is in vain that I am told that this is a contest between corporations and indi
viduals — the artificial, legal person, called a body politic, and the individual
man, as formed by his ^Creator. All this is lost on me. I look not to where
the blow is professedly aimed, but beyond, where it must fall. The corporate
ideal thing at which it is said to be directed is intangible, and without the ca
pacity of hearing, seeing, or feeling ; but there are beneath thousands on thou
sands, not shadows, but real, sensitive human beings, on whom the blow will
fall with vengeance. Before we act, let us look at things as they really are,
and not as we may imagine them in the fervour of debate.

The states have, by an unwise and dangerous legislation, centralized in banks
and other corporations, to a very great extent, the relation of creditor and debt
or. Were I to assert that these central points could not be touched without
touching, at the same time, that wide-spread and all-pervading relation, in its
minutest and remotest ramification, I would scarcely express myself too strong
ly. To subject them to this measure would, then, be to subject to it, in reali
ty, almost the entire relation of creditor and debtor. It would be bankrupting
by wholesale— a prompt and forced settlement of the aggregate indebtedness
of the country, under all the pressue of existing pecuniary embarrassments, made
manifold greater by the measure itself.

In order that the Senate may have some idea how vast and comprehensive
the measure is, I will give a statement from the paper in my hand, which con.
tains the most recent account we have of the number and condition of the banks.

There were, then, by estimation, on the first of January last, upward of nine
hundred banks, including branches, with a capital of upward of three hundred
and fifty millions, having debts due to them of more than four hundred and sixty
millions, and by them of more than two. hundred and seventy millions, making
the aggregate indebtedness, to and by them, upward of seven hundred and ten
millions of dollars, with a supply of specie but little exceeding thirty-three mill
ions. By including the banks, this vast amount of indebtedness, concentrated
in the banking system, would be subject to the operation of the law, should the
measure be adopted. But the amendment extends far beyond, and takes in all
corporations for manufacturing, commercial, insurance, or trading purposes ; or
which issue, pay out, or emit bills, draughts, or obligations, with the intention of
circulating them as a substitute for money ; which would add to the indebted
ness brought within its operations hundreds of millions more. Never was a
scheme of bankruptcy so bold and comprehensive adopted, or even proposed,
before : no, not in England itself, where the power of Parliament is omnipotent,
and where the system has been in operation for three centuries.

Such is the measure proposed to be adopted at such a period as this, when
there is a universal and intense pecuniary embarrassment — when one half of
the banks have suspended payments, and when their available means of meet
ing their debts are so scanty. At such a period, and under such circumstances,
any creditor or creditors, to whom a bank or other corporation may owe not
less than five hundred dollars, may demand payment ; and if not paid in fifteen
days, may take out process of bankruptcy, on application to the federal courts,
and place the corporation, with all its debts, credits, and assets, in the hands
of trustees, to be wound up, and the proceeds distributed among its creditors.
I venture nothing in asserting that one half of the banks, in numbers, and
amount of capital, and a large portion of the other corporations, might be forth
with placed in commission, should the measure be adopted ; which, including
debts, credits, capital, and assets, would amount at least to seven or eight hun
dred millions ; all to be converted into cash, and distributed among those enti
tled to it. How is this to be done ? Where is the cash to be had at such a
period as this, particularly when one half of the banks would be closed, and
their notes, equalling one half of the present scanty supply of currency, would

398 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

cease to circulate ? What sacrifices, what insolvencies, what beggary, what
frauds, what desolation and ruin would follow !

But would the calamity fall with equal vengeance on all the land, or would
there be some favoured, exempted portion, while desolation would overshadow
the residue ? Let the document* which I hold answer. It is a communica
tion from the President, transmitting a report from the Secretary of the Treasury
to this body, dated the 8th of January last, containing a list of the suspended
and non-suspended banks of last year, arranged according to states, beginning
with Maine. I find, on turning to the document, that there are nine hundred
and fifty-nine banks, including branches, in the Union ; of which five hundred
and thirty-eight are in New-England and New-York. Of this number, but sev
en are suspended, if Rhode Island be excepted. Her banks all suspended, but
I understand have since resumed. The senator near me from that state (Mr.
Knight) can answer whether such is the fact.

[Mr. Knight assented.]

There are, then, sir, in New-England and New- York five hundred and thirty-
one banks which are not suspended, and but seven that are. Now, sir, if we
cross the Hudson, and cast our eyes South and West, we shall find the oppo
site state of things. We shall find there four hundred and twenty-one banks, of
which three hundred and sixty-eight suspended in whole or part, and fifty-three
not. It is probable that the present proportion is still more unfavourable.

Can we doubt, with these facts, where the storm will rage with all its deso
lating fury ? Is there any one so credulous as to believe that any one of the
suspended banks throughout that vast region, or many of the non-suspended,
under the panic which the passage of the act would cause, could meet their
debts, and thereby escape the penalties of the act? And, if not, is there any
one here prepared to place at once all the banks south and west of New-York,
with few exceptions, in the hands of assignees, under the jurisdiction and con
trol of the federal courts ? Is there any willing that their doors should be all
at once closed ; their notes cease to circulate ; their affairs wound up ; their
debts to and from them to be forthwith collected ; their property and assets con
verted into money by federal officers, acting under federal authority, and all that
might be left from plunder, fraud, and forced sales, distributed among creditors ?
And how, I ask, is so mighty a concern, amounting, in the aggregate, certainly
to not less than five or six hundred millions of dollars, to be at once wound up ?
Where is the money to be found to pay the debts to and from the banks, and
to purchase the vast amount of property held by them and their debtors, which
must be brought at once under the hammer ? Where found, after their notes
have ceased to circulate (as they would, as soon as process of bankruptcy is ta
ken out against them), and before specie could come in to supply their place ?
Were it possible to carry through the measure, it would spread unheard-of de
struction and desolation through the vast portion of the Union on which the
blow would fall ; such as the marching of hostile armies from one extremity to
another, the sweep of tornadoes, the outpouring of floods, or the withholding
from the parched and thirsty earth the fertilizing droppings of the clouds, would
give but a faint conception. But it would be impossible. If you were to adopt
the measure, you would ordain what would not, could not, be executed. Pub
lic indignation would paralyze the hand of the grasping creditor stretched to
execute it, and sweep your act from the statute-book ere it could be enforced.

I turn now from the immediate effects of the measure, were it possible to
carry it into effect, to inquire what would be its permanent, if adopted. Its first
effect, after the desolating storm had passed over, would be to centralize the
control over all the banks that might be spared, or thereafter chartered, in the
banks located where the public revenue would be principally collected and dis-

* No. 72 of the Senate, present session.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 399

bursed ; and where that would be I need not say. The reason is obvious.
The fiscal action of the government would keep the exchanges steadily and per
manently in its favour. Now, sir, every man of business knows that the banks
located at the point where exchanges are permanently favourable can control
those where they are unfavourable. The reason is obvious. The former can
draw on the latter with profit ; and, through their draughts, command their specie
or notes at pleasure, while the reverse is the case with the latter. Hence, the
consequence would be control on one side and dependance on the other, in
creasing with the increasing amount of collection and disbursements, which,
by their absorbing character, would draw with them the imports and exports,
with an increased control over the exchanges. Add to this the power which
this measure would place in the hands of the banks at the favoured points, and
I hazard nothing in asserting that it would at all times be in their power to crush,
by a sudden and unexpected run, the banks elsewhere, which might incur their
displeasure, with greater ease, and more effectually, than the late United States
Bank, in its most palmy days, ever could.

The next permanent effect would be, to place the whole banking system un
der the control of this government. It would hold over the banks the power
of life and death. The process of bankruptcy against an incorporation is but
another name for its death-warrant. It would givejfcidth the power of destroy
ing, that of regulating them, without regard to their chartered rights. The same
bold construction that would authorize Congress to subject them to a bankrupt
law, would give it the power to determine at pleasure what shall or shall not
constitute acts of bankruptcy ; by which it might limit the extent of their busi
ness, fix the proportion of specie to liability, and make it a condition for one
dollar in circulation, there should be a dollar in their vaults. The possession
of such a power would give Congress more unlimited control over the banks
than that which the states that incorporated them possess, or which you would
possess over a Bank of the United States chartered by yourselves. Your pow
er over such an institution, and the states over their own banks, would be lim
ited by the acts of incorporation ; while yours over the banks of the states, with
the bankrupt power in your hands, would be without any other limitation except
your discretion.

It is easy to see that the complete subjugation of the state banks to your will
would be the result of such unlimited control ; and not less easy that, with their
subjugation, the conflict between this government and the banks would cease, to
be followed by a close and perpetual alliance. It is in the nature of govern
ments to wage war with whatever is opposed to its will, and to take under pro
tection that which it has subdued ; nor would the banks be found to be an ex
ception. They would be forced to conciliate the good-will of the government,
on which both their safety and profit would depend ; and in no way could they
more effectually do that than by upholding its power and authority. They
would be thus forced, by the .strongest appeals to both their fear and hope, into
the political arena, with their immense power and influence, and to take an ac
tive and decided part in all the party strifes of the day, throwing their weight
always on the side which their safety and profit might dictate. The end would
be the very reverse of that for which we, who are in favour of a divorce of gov
ernment and banks, have been contending for the last three years. Instead of
divorce, there would be union ; instead of excluding the banks from the politi
cal struggles of the day, they would be forced to be active and zealous partisans
in self-defence ; and, instead of leaving the banks to the control of the states,
from which they derive their charters, you would assume over them a control
more powerful and unlimited than has ever been before exercised over them by
this government, either through the pet-banks or a National Bank. This control
would be the greatest at the principal points of collection and disbursement —
the very point where that of the local banks would be the greatest over all oth-

400 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

ers. It follows that the government would have the most decisive and complete
control over those that would control all others ; and, by lending their power
ful aid and influence to maintain their control, would, in reality, control the
whole banking system ; thus making, in effect, the banks at the favoured points
the National Bank, and the rest virtually but branches. If to this we add the
control which it would give over the other and powerful corporations enumera
ted in the amendment, it may be safely asserted that the measure, if adopted,
would do more to increase the power of this government, and diminish that of
the states — to strengthen the cause of consolidation, and weaken that of state
rights — than any which has ever been assumed by Congress.

Having pointed out the consequences, I now demand, in the name of the
Constitution, what right has Congress to extend a bankrupt act over the incor
porated institutions of the states, and thereby seize on this immense power?
The burden of proof is on those who claim the right, and not on us, who op
pose it. I repeat, ours is a government of limited powers ; and those who claim
to exercise a power must show the grant — a clear and certain grant, in case
of a power so pregnant with consequences as this.

I ask, then, those who claim this power, On what grounds do they place it ?
Do they rest it on the nature of the power, as being peculiarly applicable to
banks, and the other corpo^tions proposed to be embraced ? If so, frail is the
foundation. Never was power more unsuited to its object — so much so, that
language itself has to be forced and perverted to make it applicable. Taking
corporations in their proper sense, as bodies politic, and there is scarcely a sin
gle portion of the whole process, beginning with the acts of bankruptcy, and
extending to the final discharge, applicable to them. What one of the numer
ous acts of bankruptcy can they commit ? Can they depart from the state, or
be arrested, or be imprisoned, or escape from prison, or, in a word, commit any
one of the acts without which an individual cannot be made a bankrupt ? No ;
but they may stop payment, and thereby subject themselves to the act. True ; but
how is the process to be carried through ? The provision requires the bank
rupt to be sworn : can you swear corporations ? It requires divers acts to be
done by the bankrupt, under the penalty of imprisonment : can you imprison a
corporation ? It directs a discharge to be given to the bankrupt, which ex
empts his person and future acquisitions : can a corporation receive the benefit
of such discharge ? No : the process itself is the dissolution, the death of the
corporation. It is thus that language is forced, strained, and distorted, in order
to bring a power so inapplicable to the subject to bear on corporations. It
would be just as rational to include corporations in insolvent laws, which none
has been, as yet, so absurd as to think of doing.

The right, then, cannot be inferred from the nature of the power. On what,
then, can it stand ? On precedents ? I admit that if, at the period of the adop
tion of the Constitution, it was the practice to include corporations in acts of
bankruptcy, it would go far to establish that it was intended by the Constitution
to include them. But the reverse is the fact. As long as the system has been
in operation, there is not a case where a corporation was ever included, either
in England, this country, or any other, as far as can be ascertained, nor ever
proposed to be. The attempt in this case is a perfect novelty, without prece
dent or example ; and all the force which it is acknowledged the practice of
including them would have given in favour of the right, is thus thrown with a
weight equally decisive against it.

But we have not yet approached the real difficulty. If the power was ever
so appropriate, and the only one that was — if precedents were innumerable — it
would only prove that this government would have the right of applying the
power to incorporations of its own creating. It coiild not go an inch beyond,
and would leave the great difficulty untouched — the right of Congress to include
estate corporations in an act of bankruptcy passed by its authority! Where

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 401

is such a power to be found in the Constitution ? It seems to be forgotten that
this and the state governments are co-ordinate governments, emanating from
the same authority, and making together one complex, but harmonious and beau
tiful system, in which each, within its allotted sphere, is independent and coequal
with the other. If one has a right to create, the other cannot have the right to
destroy. The principle has been carried so far, that in the case of the State
of Maryland and M'Colough, the Supreme Court, after elaborate argument,
decided that a state, in the exercise of its undoubted right of taxing, could not
tax a Branch Bank of the United States, located in its limits, on the ground that
the right of taxing, in such case, involved the right of destroying. Admit, then,
Congress had the right to include corporations of its own creation, still, accord
ing to the principle thus recognised, it could not include those created by the
states, unless, indeed, the fundamental principle of our system, admitted even
by the extreme consolidation school of politics, that each government is co
equal and independent within its sphere, should be denied, and the absolute
sovereignty of this government be assumed. If, then, the states have a right
to create banks, and other corporations enumerated in the amendment, it follows
that Congress has not the right to destroy them ; nor, of course, to include them
in an act of bankruptcy, the very operation of which, when applied to corpora
tions, is to destroy. But whether they have or have not the right, belongs not
to Congress to decide. The right of the separate legislatures of the states to
decide on their reserved powers is as perfect as that of Congress to decide on
the delegated. Each must judge for itself in carrying out its powers. To
deny this, would be virtually to give a veto to Congress over the acts of the
state legislatures — a power directly refused by the Convention, though anxious
ly pressed by the national party in that body.

Such and so conclusive is the argument against the right ; and how has it
been met ? We are told that the states have greatly abused the power of in
corporation. I admit it. • The power has been sadly and dangerously abused.
I stand not here to defend banks or other incorporations-, or to justify the states
in granting charters. No : my object is far different I have risen to defend
the Constitution, and to resist the inroads on the Bights of the states. In the
discharge of that duty, I ask, Can the abuse of tb- right of granting bank or oth
er charters give you the right to destroy or reflate them ? Are, you ready to
admit the same rule, as applied to your own powers ? Have the state legis
latures abused their powers more than Congress has its powers ? Has it not
abused, and grossly abused, its powers of laying taxes and appropriating mon
ey ? And what assurance is there, vrth these examples before us, that Con
gress would not equally abuse the rght of controlling state corporations, which
is so eagerly sought to be vested in it by some ? But we are also told that
bank paper — worthless, irredeemable bank paper — has deranged the currency,
and ought to be suppressed. I admit the fact. I acknowledge the mischief,
but object to the remedy, apd the right of applying it. I go farther. If the evil
could give us the right to apply any of our powers to remedy it, regardless of
the Constitution, the taxing power would be far more simple, efficient, and less
mischievous in its application. It would be applied to the specific evil. That
which has deranged the currency, and defeated the object of the Constitution in
relation to it, is the circulation of bank-notes. There lies the evil, and to divest
f the banks of the right of circulation is to eradicate it. For that purpose, what
remedy could be more simple, safe, and efficacious than the taxing power, were
it constitutional ? By its means, bank-notes might be gradually and quietly sup
pressed, and the banks left in full possession of all their other functions unim
paired. There is but one objection to it, but that a decisive one — its unconsti
tutionally. It would be a perversion of the taxing power, given to raise reve
nue. To apply it to suppress or regulate the circulation of bank-notes would be
to CHANGE ITS NATURE ENTIRELY, from a TAXING to a PENAL power, and is

E E E

402 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

therefore unconstitutional ; but not more so than to include banks and other cor
porations in an act of bankruptcy, as proposed by the amendment, while in every
other respect it would be greatly preferable.

One other ground still remains to be considered. The authority of influen
tial names has been resorted to, in order to supply the defect of argument. The
names of two distinguished individuals, who formerly filled the treasury de
partment, have been introduced — Mr. Dallas and Mr. Crawford — in favour of
the right of including banks. If this was a question to be decided by authority,
it would be easy to show that their opinions, as able as they were, would be
entitled to little weight in this case. It was casually and incidentally given in
a report on another subject, and that calculated to lead them to an erroneous
view in reference to this power. Such an opinion, given under such circum
stances, by the ablest judge, would have little weight in a private case, even in
a court of justice, and ought to have none in this body on a great constitutional
question. Besides, it is well known that the opinion of both was in favour of
the constitutionality of a National Bank, and that, too, after a full and deliberate
consideration of the subject. Now, sir, I put the question to the senators who
have quoted their casual opinion in favour of -the constitutionality of including
banks in a bankrupt law, Are they willing to adopt their well-considered and
solemnly delivered opinion in favour of the right to incorporate a bank ? And
if not, how, on the ground of precedent, can they adopt the one and reject the
other 1 The names of other distinguished individuals have been quoted — Ran
dolph, Macon, White, Smith, and others — but, in my opinion, unfairly quoted.
It is true, they voted in 1827, when the Bankrupt Bill was then before the Sen
ate, in favour of an amendment to include the banks ; but it is equally so, that
the amendment was moved at the end of a loug debate, when the Senate was
exhausted, and that it was but slightly discussed. But, what is of more im
portance, they were opposed to the bill ; and, as the amendment came from a
hostile quarter, and was clearly intended to embarrass- the bill, it is not improb
able that it received tht votes of many with the view of destroying the bill,
without thinking whether *. was constitutional or hot ; just as some, no doubt,
will vote against the opposite amendment, to strike the banks out, now under
consideration, from the belief v^at it is the most effectual means of destroying
this bill. But.if the question is to be decided by weight of names, and the vote
on the occasion to be the test, the weight is clearly on the opposite side. The
vote stood 12 to include the banks, and 35 against ; and among the latter will be
found names not less influential— that of Tazewell, Rowan, Hayne, Berrien,the
present Secretary of the Treasury, and, finally, that of the present chief magis
trate. But why attempt to decide this question by the weight of names, how
ever distinguished ? Do we not know that ail those referred to belonged to the
political school which utterly repudiates the authority of precedents in constru
ing the Constitution, and who, if they were now all alive, and here present as
members of the Senate, would not regard the name of any man in deciding this
important constitutional question ?

I have now presented the result of my reflections on this important measure.
To sum up the whole in a few words, I am of the opinion that the whole proj
ect, including the bill and the amendment, is unconstitutional, except the
provisions embracing compulsory bankruptcy, as it is called, as far as it relates
to individuals ; and that, under existing circumstances, to be highly inexpedient.
Thus thinking, I shall vote, in the first instance, against striking out the bill
aud inserting the amendment ; and, if that succeeds, against the bill itself.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 403

XXVII.

SPEECH ON THE PROSPECTIVE PRE-EMPTION BILL, JANUARY 12, 1841.

THE bill to establish a permanent prospective pre-emption system in
favour of settlers on the public lands, who shall inhabit and cultivate the
same, and raise a log cabin thereon, being the special order of the day,
was taken up, the question being on the proposition by Mr. Crittenden to
recommit the bill, with instructions to report a bill to distribute the pro
ceeds of the sales of the public lands among the states j which Mr. Cal-
houn offered to amend, by substituting a bill to cede the public lands to
the states in which they lie, upon certain conditions.

Mr. Calhoun said : I regard the question of the public lands, next to
that of the currency, the most dangerous and difficult of all which de
mand the attention of the country and the government at this important
juncture of our affairs. I do not except a protective tariff, for I cannot
believe, after what we have experienced, that a measure can again be
adopted which has done more to corrupt the morals of the country, pub
lic and private, to disorder its currency, derange its business, and to
weaken and endanger its free institutions, than any other except the pa
per system, with which it is so intimately allied.

In offering the amendment 1 propose, I do not intend to controvert the
justice of the eulogium which has been so often pronounced on our land
system in the course of this discussion. On the contrary, I believe that
it was admirably adjusted to effect its object, when first adopted ; but it
must be borne in mind that a measure, to be perfect, must be adapted to
circumstances, and that great changes have taken place, in the lapse of
fifty years, since the adoption of our land system. At that time, the vast
region now covered by the new states, which have grown up on the pub
lic domain, belonged to foreign powers, or was occupied by numerous
Indian tribes, with the exception of a few sparse settlements on the in
considerable tracts to which the title of the Indians was at that time ex
tinguished. Since then a mighty change has taken place. Nine states
have sprung up as if by magic, with a population not less, probably, than
two fifths of the old states, and destined to surpass them in a few years
in numbers, power, and influence. That a change so mighty should so
derange a system intended tor: an entirely different condition of things as
to render important changes necessary to adapt it to present circum
stances, is no more than might have been anticipated. It would, indeed,
have been a miracle had it been otherwise ; and we ought not, therefore,
to be surprised that the operation of the system should afford daily evi
dence that it not only deranged, but deeply deranged, and that its derange
ment is followed by a train of evils that threaten disaster, unless a timely
ancl efficient remedy should be applied. I would ask those who think
differently, and who believe the system still continues to work well, Was
it no evil, that session after session, for the last ten or twelve years,
Congress should be engaged in angry and deeply agitating discussions,
growing out of the public lands, in which one side should be denounced
as the friends, and the other as the enemies, of the new states 1 Was the
increasing violence of this agitation from year to year, and threatening
ultimately, not only the loss of the public domain, but the tranquillity and
peace of the country, no evil 1 Is it well that one third of the time of Coiv
gress should be consumed in legislating on subjects directly or indirectly
connected with the public lands, thereby prolonging the sessions proper
tionally, and adding to the expense upward of $200,000 annually 1. Is '

404 . SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

no evil that the government should own half the lands within the limits
of nine members of this Union, and over which they can exercise no au
thority or control 1 Is it nothing that the domain of so many states
should be under the exclusive legislation and guardianship of this govern
ment, contrary to the genius of the Constitution, which, intending to
leave to each state the regulation of its local and peculiar concerns, dele
gated to the Union those only in which all had a common interest 1 If to
all these be added the vast amount of patronage exercised by this govern
ment through the medium of the public lands over the new states, and
through them over the whole Union, and the pernicious influence there
by brought to bear on all other subjects of le'gislation, can it be denied
that many and great evils result from the system as it now operates,
which call aloud for some speedy and efficient remedy 1

But why should I look beyond the question before us to prove, by the
confession of all, that there is some deep disorder in the system 1 There
are now three measures before the Senate, each proposing important
changes, and the one or the other receiving the support of every mem
ber of the body ; even of those who cry out against changes. It is too
late, then, to deny the disordered state of the system. The disease is
admitted, and the only question is, What remedy shall be applied 1

I object both to the bill and the amendment proposed by the senator from
Kentucky (Mr. Crittenden), because, regarded as remedial measures, they
are both inappropriate and inadequate. Neither pre-emption, nor distri
bution of the revenue received from the public lands, can have any pos
sible effect in correcting the disordered action of the system. I put the
question, Would one or the other contribute in the smallest degree to di
minish the patronage of the government, dr the time consumed on ques
tions growing out of the public lands, or shorten the duration of the ses
sions, or withdraw the action of the government over so large a part of
the domain of the new states, and place them and their representatives
here on the same independent footing with the old states and their rep
resentatives, or arrest the angry and agitating discussions which year
after year distract our councils, and threaten so much mischief to the
country 1 Far otherwise would be the effect. It would but increase the
evil, by bringing into more decided conflict the interests of the new and old
states. Of all the ills that could befall them, the former would regard the
distribution as the greatest, while the latter vould look on the pre-emp
tion system, proposed by the bill, as little short of an open system of
plunder, if we may judge from the declarations w^ich we have heard in
the course of the debate.

As, then, neither can correct the disease, the question is, What remedy
can 1 I have given to this question the most deliberate and careful ex
amination, and have come to the conclusion that there is, and can be, no
remedy short of cession — cession to the states respectively within which
the lands are situated. The disease lies in ownership and administration,
and nothing short of parting with both can reach it. Part with them, and
you will at once take away one third of the business of Congress ; shorten
its sessions in the same proportion, with a corresponding saving of ex
pense ; lop off a large and most dangerous portion of the patronage of
the government 5 arrest these angry and agitating discussions, which do
so much to alienate the good feelings of the different portions of the
Union, and disturb the general course of legislation, and endanger, ulti
mately, the loss of the public domain. Retain them, and they must con
tinue, almost without mitigation, apply what palliatives you may. It is
the all-sufficient and only remedy.

Thus far would seem clear. I do not see how it is possible for any

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 405

one to doubt that cession would reach the evil, and that it is the only
remedy that would. If, then, there should be any objection, it can only
be to the terms or conditions of the cession. If these can be so adjusted
as to give assurance that the lands shall be as faithfully managed by the
states as by this government, and that all the interests involved shall be
as well, or better secured than under the existing system, all that could
be desired would be effected, and all objections removed to the final and
quiet settlement of this great, vexed, and dangerous question. In saying
all objections, I hold that the right of disposing of them as proposed,
especially when demanded by high considerations of policy, and when it
can be done without pecuniary loss to the government, as I shall here
after show, cannot be fairly denied. The Constitution gives to Congress
the unlimited right of disposing of the public domain, and, of course,
without any other restrictions than what the nature of that trust and terms
of cession may impose j neither of which forbids their cession in the man
ner proposed.

That the conditions can be so adjusted, I cannot doubt. I have care
fully examined the whole ground, and can perceive no difficulty that can
not be surmounted. I feel assured that all which is wanting is to attract
the attention of the Senate to the vast importance of doing something
that will effectually arrest the great and growing evil, resulting from the
application of the system, as it exists, to that portion of the public do
main lying in the new states. That done, the intelligence and wisdom
of the body will be at no loss to adjust the details in such manner as will
effectually guard every interest, and secure its steady and faithful man
agement.

In the mean time, I have adopted the provisions of the bill introduced
originally by myself, and twice reported on favourably by the Committee
on Public Lands, as the amendment I intend to offer to the amendment
of the senator from Kentucky (Mr. Crittenden), as containing the general
outlines of the conditions and provisions on which the lands may be dis
posed of to the states with safety and advantage to the interest of the
government and the Union, and great benefit to those states. The details
may, no doubt, be greatly improved ; for which I rely on the intelligence
of the body and critical examination of the committee, should the amend
ment be adopted and referred. At the present stage, I regard nothing
but the great principles on which it rests, and its outlines, to be at issue ;
and I do hope that all who may concur with me on principle will give
the amendment their support, whatever imperfection they may suppose to
exist in its modifications. A measure relating to a question so vast and
complicated can be perfected in its details, however sound the principles
on which it rests, or correct its general outlines, only by the joint con
sultation and counsel. With these remarks, it will not be necessary for
me, at this stage, to give more than a general summary of the provisions
of the proposed amendment.

Its object is to instruct the committee so to amend the bill as to dis
pose of all the public lands lying in the states of Alabama, Louisiana, Mis
sissippi, Arkansas, Missouri, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, and Indiana, with
the exception of sites for forts, navy and dock yards, arsenals, magazines,
and other public buildings ; the cession not to take place till after the
30th of June, 1842, and then only on the states respectively agreeing to
the conditions prescribed in the amendment ; that is, to pass acts irrev
ocably to adhere to those conditions, the most prominent of which is to
pay annually, on a day fixed, to the United States sixty-five per cent, of
the gross proceeds of the sales of the lands; that the land laws, as they
BLOW stand, and as proposed to be modified by the amendment, shall re-

406 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

main unchanged, except with the consent of Congress ; that the cession
shall be in full of the five per cent, fund thereafter to accrue to those states ;
that they shall be exclusively liable for the cost of surveys, sales, extinc
tion of Indian titles, and management generally ; that the states may,
within certain prescribed limits, gradually reduce the price of the lands
that may remain unsold after having been offered for sale ten years or
upward ; may grant, for a limited period, the right of pre-emption for
ninety days to the actual settlers, at each step in the reduction of price j
and, finally, that if the conditions of cession be violated by a state in any
particular, all titles or grants to land thereafter sold by the state to be
null and void : thus giving the measure the force and solemnity of a com
pact, and placing the whole under the protection of the courts, which
would pronounce the titles to be void if made after an infraction of the
conditions of the cession.

It is not my intention to go into an investigation of these various con
ditions at this time. On a question of reference, where the principle
only is at issue, it is not necessary. It is sufficient to say that the lead
ing object is to make as little change in the land system, as it now ex
ists, as is consistent with the object in view, and to adopt such provisions
as will enforce the faithful performance of the terms of cession on the
part of the states, with the least compensation for their expense and
trouble, and loss to the government, in a pecuniary point of view, con
sistent with the arrangement. If it can be made to appear that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the states will faithfully comply with
these conditions, and that there will be no pecuniary loss to the govern
ment, compared with the system as it now stands, in consequence of the
proposed disposition, it would seem difficult to conceive what substantial
objection there can be to the measure.

I am thus brought to the great, I might say the only question admitting
a doubt as to the expediency of the measure. Will the states adhere to
their contract 1 or, to express it differently, would there be danger that
the government would lose the land, in consequence of the states refusing
to comply with the conditions of the cession'? And if not, will the pe
cuniary loss to the government be such as to make it inexpedient, even
if there be full assurance that the terms of cession will not be violated!

Before I enter on the discussion of these important points, it will be
proper to make a few remarks on the extent of the interest that would be
embraced in the cession. Without it, there would be but an imperfect
conception of the subject.

The quantity of public lands lying in the new states, and embraced in
the amendment, was estimated to be, on the 1st of January, 1840, about
160,000,000 of acres. It has been reduced since by sales, the exact
quantity not known; but it will not materially vary gthe amount. The
Indian title has been extinguished to nearly the whole, and about three
fourths have been surveyed and platted, of which a larger part has been
long in the market (much more than twenty years), and has been picked
and culled, over and over again, with the view of taking all worth having,
at the present price, even during the great expansion of currency, and
consequent rise in price, and speculation in public lands, in 1835, 1836,
and 1837. If compared in quantity to the remainder of the public do
main, it will be found to be not equal to one sixth part of the whole. In
this respect, it is a far more limited measure than that proposed by the
senator from Kentucky, to which mine is an amendment. That embraces
not only the proceeds of the whole public domain, exceeding 1,000,000,000
acres, but includes, in addition, the large sums drawn from the duties on
imports, which are annually expended on its sales and management, all

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 407

of which he proposes permanently to distribute. It is also more limited
in its application than the original bill, which embraces all the lands to
which the Indian title is extinguished, as well territories as states, which
greatly exceeds the quantity lying in the latter.

Having now shown the object and the character, with the scope of this
measure, I shall next proceed to the great, and I must say, in my opinion,
the only question that admits of controversy, Will the states adhere faith
fully to the terms of the cession ! Or, on the contrary, will they violate
a compact solemnly entered into, on just and liberal principles, mutually
beneficial to both, and which will place them, as to their domain, on the
same independent footing on which the other states stand 1

I would ask, at the outset, Is there anything in their history to justify
a suspicion of a want of good faith 1 Have they been in the habit of vio
lating contracts! If so, point out a single instance1? Instead of giving
ground to excite suspicion, I rejoice to say their history affords many
and striking examples of exact and faithful compliance with their engage
ments. They all have standing compacts with the government, entered
into on their admission into the Union, which impose important limita
tions on what otherwise would be their unquestioned right as independ
ent members of the Union ; and, among others, the important one, not
only of not taxing the vast portion of their domain held by the United
States within their limits, but also, for the period of five years after sale,
the portion held by purchasers. To their honour be it said, that, in the
long period which has elapsed from the admission of the oldest of these
states, there has not been a single instance of a violation on their part of
their plighted faith. With so striking an example of fidelity to engage
ments, with what justice can it be objected that the states will violate
their plighted faith to a contract every way advantageous to them, as well
as to the rest of the Union 1

But I take higher ground, and put the question, With what propriety
can we object to the want of faith on the part of the states to their en
gagements 1 What is our Constitution but a compact between the states 1
and how do we hold seats here but in virtue of that compact! And is it
for us to turn round and question the faith on which our system stands,
and through which we have our political existence; and this, too, when it
is notorious that the state governments have adhered with far more fidelity
than this to the constitutional compact ! Many and great violations are
charged, and truly charged to us, while few, very few, can be justly at
tributed to them.

But, admitting there might be danger of losing the lands, should they
be disposed of as proposed, from the want of good faith on the part of the
states, I boldly assert that the danger of their being lost is far greater if
the present system should, unfortunately, be continued, and that, too,
under circumstances vastly more disastrous to the peace and safety of the
Union. What I have asserted comes from deep and solemn conviction,
resulting from a long and careful examination of this vast and complicated
subject.

Those who have not given special attention to it, and the progress of
our land system, can form no just conception of the danger to which the
public lands are exposed. The danger is twofold : that they will be lost
by the mere progress of settlement, without payment, in consequence of
the vast quantity beyond the wants of the country, to which the Indian
title is extinguished ; and if that should not be the case, they will be from
the growing conflict between the old and new states, in consequence of
the rapid increase of the latter, and the great difference in their respect
ive views of the policy proper to be adopted in reference to them. Both

408 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

causes are operating with powerful effect ; and if they do not speedily
attract the attention of the government and the country, they will cer
tainly terminate before long, either by their separate or joint action, in
the loss of the public domain. Nothing but a full understanding of the
causes of danger, and the application of a prompt and efficient remedy, can
prevent it ; and what I propose is to present a brief sketch of my views
in reference to both.

As important as it is, few have turned the attention it deserves to the
almost miraculous extension of our land system. In the comparatively
short time in which it has been in operation, the Indian title has been ex
tinguished, in round numbers, to 320,000,000 of acres ; of which there has
been sold 81,000,000, and granted away, for various purposes, 12,600,000 ;
leaving in the possession of the government, on the 1st of January, 1840,
226,000,000, a larger portion of which is surveyed, platted, and in the
market : showing that the progress of extinguishing the titles of the In
dians has far outrun the demands of the country for government lands, as
great as it has been. In fact, the reality far exceeds the statement, as
strong as that is j for, of the eighty-one millions of acres sold, upward of
thirty-eight millions were sold in the years 1835, 1836, and 1837, during
the great expansion of the currency and rage for speculation in lands, of
which but a small portion, perhaps not a third, was for settlement ; and
of the residue, a greater part, say twenty millions, is still for sale in the
hands of large purchasers. Making proper allowance for the speculative
operations of those years, the actual sale of the public lands for settle
ment, during the period of fifty years which has elapsed from the begin
ning of the government, would not probably exceed sixty millions of
acres, about one fourth as much as that to which the Indian title is now
extinguished.

But numbers can give but a very imperfect conception of the vast ex
tent of the region to which the Indian title is extinguished, and of which
the government is the sole and exclusive proprietor. To form a correct
idea of its great magnitude, it will be necessary to compare it to portions
of the Union, the extent of which is familiar to all. To enable me to do
that, a friend has furnished me with a statement, from which it appears
that, if all the land now unsold, and to which the Indian title is extinguish
ed, was grouped together, it would be equal in extent to all New-Eng
land, New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia,
and a third of North Carolina. But this falls far short of the vast extent
of the region throughout which it lies dispersed — a region equalling all
the old Atlantic States, taking in all Florida, the states of Alabama and
Mississippi, and half of Tennessee. Into this vast and unoccupied domain,
our people, with a multitude of foreigners, are pouring yearly in one in
cessant tide, by thousands on thousands, seeking new homes : some with
the means of purchasing, who select the best lands ; others with insuffi
cient means, who select their place, and settle, with the hope of pur
chasing in a short time ; and a large class without means, who settle on
spots, without any fixed intention but to remain so long as they are un
disturbed, generally on tracts of inferior quality, having the advantage of
a spring, with a small portion of more fertile land, sufficient for their
limited cultivation, but not sufficient to induce a purchaser to take it at
the government price. This class of settlers has greatly increased, if I
am correctly informed, within the last ten or fifteen years, and is still
rapidly increasing, especially in the West and Southwestern States,
where the proportion of good to inferior land is comparatively small, and
must continue to increase with accelerated rapidity, so long as the pres
ent land system remains as it is.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C- CALHOCN. 409

Those who have had an opportunity of witnessing the effect of such
occupancy on the minds of the settlers, will not be at a loss to anticipate
the consequences which must follow, unless arrested. Occupation long
and undisturbed, accompanied by improvement, however limited, cannot
fail to be associated with the idea of property in the soil. It is that, in
fact, which constitutes the primitive right in land. This will be felt in
common by all the occupants similarly situated — will be sure to create an
esprit de corps, accompanied by mutual respect for each other's rights,
which would not fail to make it dangerous for any one to disturb the
rights of another. This feeling will not be long in showing itself towards
the emigrant intruder, as he would be considered, coming in with the
view of purchase. He would find it not a little hazardous to enter
and purchase a spot held by a mere occupant, or squatter, if you will,
and oust him of his possession. In a short time, no one who regards
his peace and safety will attempt it ; and then, the feeling, which began
with the poorer class, will extend rapidly upward to the more wealthy,
until, finally, none will look to any other title but occupancy and im
provement ; and all, the rich and poor, will become squatters, with a com
mon interest to maintain and defend each other, when the public lands
will be lost, and cease to be any longer a source of revenue, if nothing
be done to stop it. For the truth of the picture, I appeal to the senators
from the new states, especially from the Western and Southwestern. We
have thus presented the difficult question, What is to be done to remedy it 1
It is perfectly natural that the first impression should be, to keep out
intruders on the public lands. The lands belong to the people of the
Union as common property, and it would seem contrary to reason and
justice that any one should be permitted to enter on and appropriate the
use of that to himself, without paying for it, which belongs to all ; and
we accordingly find not a small portion of the Senate who insist on keep
ing out and expelling all intruders as the proper remedy. But in this
case, like many others, we must look beyond mere abstract right. What
seems so plausible would, when tried, prove impracticable. We need no
other proof than the fact that no administration has ever undertaken it,
even when it would have been an easy task, comparatively to what it now
would be. How is it to be done 1 By the marshals and their deputies 1
Can they expel from their homes the vast host of occupants on the pub
lic lands, all hardy and bold men, familiar with the use of the most deadly
of weapons'? Would you employ the army 1 It would be found almost
as impotent as the civil authority. If the whole military was employed
in this, to the neglect of all other service, there would be more than five
hundred and fifty square miles for each officer and soldier, supposing
your establishment to be full. No : were it possible to employ the mili
tary in so odious a service in this free country, you would have to double
your force, at a cost greater than the annual income from the land ; and
the work would be ever beginning, and never ending. If you drive them
away and destroy their improvements, as soon as the force was with
drawn they would return to their possession. I had some experience,
while secretary at war, of the difficulty of expelling and keeping off in
truders ; and I found that the message which brought intelligence of the
withdrawal of the force was immediately followed by that which brought
information that the intruders had returned.

But the senator from Kentucky (Mr. Clay) deems all this as merely
imaginary, and asserts that intruders may readily be kept off the public
lands. I will not attempt to reply to his reason for this opinion. He
and his political friends will soon be in power with a chief of their own
selection, and in whose firmness and energy they express high confidence.

FFF

410 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

In six weeks the time will come round which brings him into power, and
we shall see what will follow. Without pretending to the spirit of proph
ecy, I feel I hazard nothing in predicting that what is deemed so easy to
be done when out of power will be pronounced impracticable when in.
The senator would have too much prudence to give the advice ; but, if
not, the President elect will, I conjecture, have too much discretion to act
on it.

If, however, I should be mistaken, and the attempt should be made to
expel the occupants from the public lands, I hazard nothing in predicting
that the administration will go out of power with ten times the majority
with which it came in, as great as that was. The bitterest enemy could
not give more fatal advice.

If, then, this powerful tide of emigration, which is flowing in on the
public lands, cannot be arrested, what ought, or can be done, to prevent
the loss of the public domain by the action of the causes already explain
ed "? This is the difficult question. In answer, I say, we must do as we
are often compelled to do in our progress through life — accommodate
ourselves to circumstances; to mitigate evils we cannot overcome, and
retard or lessen those we cannot prevent. Such are the laws to which
beings of our limited powers and control over events must necessarily
yield.

Without, then, undertaking the impossible task of arresting the tide of
emigration or expelling the settlers, I would advise the adoption of the
most judicious and efficient measures of converting them into freeholders,
with the least sacrifice consistent with effecting that object. The first
step towards this should be to unite the interests of this government
with that of the states within which the lands lie, so as to combine the
power and influence of the two for their preservation. Without it no
thing can be done. If they should not be united, the necessary conse
quence would be, that the interest of the states would be invariably found
to be opposed' to that of the government, and its weight thrown on the
side of the settlers on all questions between them, of which we have daily
proof in our proceedings. In the end, their united power and influence
would prevail. If this indispensable step be not taken in a short time,
instead of graduation and pre-emption, we shall have a demand, not to be
resisted, for donations and grants to the settlers. A leading inducement
with him to dispose of the lands to the states was to effect this important
union of interest. It is the only way by which it can be accomplished ;
and, to render it sufficiently strong to effect the object intended, I am in
favour of a liberal compensation to the states for the expense and trouble
of their management.

But something more is indispensable to prevent the loss of^the lands ;
and that is, to hold out adequate inducements to the settlers to become
freeholders by purchasing the land. This can be effected with the least
loss to the government, and the greatest advantage to the settlers, by a
judicious system of graduation and pre-emption, and it is with that view
that provisions are made for both in the amendment which I intend to
offer. It provides that the states may, at their discretion, reduce the
price of all lands which have been offered at sale ten years and upward,
to one dollar per acre, after the 30th of June, 1842; and all that may be
in market for fifteen years and upward, to seventy-five cents per acre,
after the 30th of June, 1847; and all that may have been twenty years
and upward, to fifty cents per acre, after the 30th of June, 1852; and all
that have been twenty-five years and upward, to twenty-five cents, after
the 30th of June, 1857 ; and all that have been thirty years and upward,
to twelve cents, after the 30th of June, 1862 ; and all that should remain

9

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 411

unsold five years thereafter to be surrendered to the states; with the right,
also, at their discretion, to allow pre-emption for ninety days to settlers,
at each step in the reduction of the price. It also provides that all lands,
after having been offered for sale in those states, shall, at the expiration
of ten years from the time of being offered, become subject, in like man
ner, to graduation and pre-emption.

The object of these provisions is to hold out inducements to the settlers
to purchase, by bringing the lands, within a reasonable period, to a price
which would not only justify, but hold out strong inducement to them to
purchase. One great difficulty in the way of purchasing, as the system
now stands, is, that the great body of the lands are not worth, in reality,
the price of $1 25, at which they are sold by the government. There ap
pears to be a great mistake on this point, which it is important to correct.
Instead of almost every acre, as is supposed by some gentlemen in de
bate, to be worth that sum, the reverse position is true, that none was
worth it but that which was, at the time, coming in demand by purchasers.
I rest the assertion on the well-established principle that demand and
supply regulate price, and the fact that an article which is in the market
at a fixed price, open to the demand of all, and is not taken, is the best
proof that the price is above the market value at the time. It is in vain
to talk of intrinsic value — a thing wholly different from price. There are
many things of the highest intrinsic value that have no price, as air and
water, while many of but small value would, from their great scarcity,
command a very high one. In the language of business, a thing is worth
what it will sell for, and no one is willing to give more, unless compelled
by some particular reason. The occupants of the public lands partake
of this feeling. They are unwilling to give for the inferior lands, which
for the most part they occupy, $1 25, when a small part only of the best
lands offered for sale would command that, and feel that they have some
thing like justice on their side in not giving so high a price for their pos
sessions.

This feeling must be met, and it is proposed to meet it by the provis
ions for graduation and pre-emption which I have just stated ; a policy
so liberal towards a large, though poor class, not less honest and patriotic
than the rest of the community, could not fail to have a happy effect, not
only in reference to them, but in a more enlarged point of view. One of
the most important would be the great increase of the number of small
freeholders, which, in the hour of danger, would prove of vast importance,
especially in the weakest portion of the Union — in the Southwestern
States — where the provision would have the greatest effect. It would be
the class that would furnish the hardiest and best soldiers, with the ad
vantage of being inured to the climate. Combined and modified as they
would be, they cannot but have a powerful weight in inducing the occu
pants to purchase. It will work a revolution in his character. He will
regard himself, on his little domain, more a freeholder than a squatter ;
and, as the price in the descending scale of graduation approaches the
price that lands such as he occupies would sell for, his industry and econ
omy would be exerted to be prepared with the requisite means to make the
purchase. The liberal character of the policy would impress him with deep
feelings of respect for the justice and care of the government j and the
security it would afford would put an end to the esprit de corps, which
otherwise would be so strong j and all, combined with the influence of
the states on the side of the government, would, I feel confident, guard
effectually against the danger of losing the lands, as far as the occupants
are concerned, in the only way that would be practicable.

The amendment proposes to leave it to the states fro graduate and grant

412 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

pre-emptions or not, at their discretion, within the limits prescribed. The
conditions of the several states are very different in reference to the ex
pediency of exercising the right. In the uniformly fertile region in the
upper portion of the great Valley of the Mississippi, it may not be neces
sary to resort to either, or, if so, to a very limited extent; while in the
Southwestern States, including Arkansas, it would be indispensable ; and
hence the propriety of giving the right, but leaving the exercise to the
discretion of the states. Each state would be the most competent judge
whether it should be exercised or not, and to what extent.

Having considered the provisions intended to guard against the danger
of losing the lands from mere occupancy without payment, I next pro
pose to make some remarks on that of their being lost, in consequence
of the conflicting policy between the new and old states in reference to
them, should the present system be continued. To understand this dan
ger, we must have a just conception of the cause in which it originates,
which I will endeavour first to explain.

In the nature of things, it is impossible that the new and old states can
take the same view of the policy proper to be adopted in reference to
the public domain. Their respective position, interest, and extent of
knowledge in reference to it, are wholly different, which cannot but have
a correspondent effect on their views. The old states stand in reference
to the new somewhat in the light of an absent owner of a large estate, and
not without some degree of his feelings, while the new stand, in some
degree, in the situation of those who occupy and work his estate, with
feelings not a little akin to those which belong to that relation. That
such is the case, and that it leads to diverse views of the policy that
ought to be adopted, and that, again, to conflict between them, the ques
tions now before us, the discussion now going on, the feelings it excites,
and the yearly and violent agitation of those questions for the last eight
or ten years, abundantly prove. Nor is it less clear that they have in
creased, and must increase with the growth and influence of the new
states over the action of the government, till their rapid growth will give
them the ascendency, when they will decide it in their own way, under
the high pretensions and excited feeling of real or supposed injustice,
which must necessarily grow out of a long-continued and violent conflict.
It is, in like manner, clear that the evil originates in the ownership and
administration by the government of the lands lying in the new states,
and constituting a large portion of their territory. If to these considera
tions it be added, that the questions growing out of this great subject
must extend to and embrace, and influence in their bearings, every other
question of public policy, as is illustrated by the amendment for distribu
ting the proceeds of the sales of the lands among the states, which, in its
consequences, takes in the whole circle of our legislation, and that it
must enter into and influence all our political struggles, especially that in
which all others are concentrated — the presidential election — some con
ception may be formed of the distracting influence, the agitation and dan
ger which must grow out of this great question if not speedily settled.

If something be not done, it is not difficult to see that the danger from
these causes and that from occupancy must run together, and that their
combined forces will be altogether irresistible. The occupants on the
public lands lying within the states are voters, with a weight at the polls
equal to the most wealthy, and, of course, an equal influence over the
election of President and Vice-president, members of Congress, and
state governments. I hazard little in asserting that, if they have not al
ready, from their numbers, a decided influence over all the elections in
many of the new states, they will in a very short period, from their rapid

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 413

increase, if nothing should be done to arrest the evil. That influence
would be felt here, and movements would be made to satisfy the demands
of so numerous and powerful a class, till, with their growing influence,
the proposition will be boldly made to give, as has been stated, the land
without purchase ; to which, from the necessity of the case, the govern
ment will be compelled to yield, in order to avoid the danger of being
seized and kept in < ,\ en defiance of its authority.

Against this, the only ground that can be devised, as far as I can see,
is the one I have proposed — to dispose of the land to the states — to
part with ownership and administration, the root of the evil — on fair and
equitable conditions, with the best possible provisions that can be devised
to ensure the faithful performance of the compact. If that, with the pro
visions against the danger from occupancy, cannot prevent the loss of the
public lands, I know not what can. I have as strong confidence as the
nature of the subject will admit, that it will, when perfected in its details
by the wisdom of the Senate, prove all-sufficient, not only to prevent the
loss of the public domain, but to arrest the many and growing evils to
which I have alluded as incident to the system as it now exists. But if in
that it is possible I should err, with all the caution I have taken to come
to a correct conclusion, I feel assured I cannot in asserting that the dan
ger would be far less, under the amendment I intend to propose, than it
would be should the system continue as it now stands ; and that if the
public domain is to be lost, it is far better it should be under the former
than the latter. It would be with far less intermediate hazard, and, in
the end, with less violence and shock to our political fabric. In the one
case we could lose nothing but the value of the land, which I shall pres
ently show is far less than usually estimated, while, in the other, no one
can estimate what the loss may not be.

Having now, I trust, shown, to the satisfaction of the Senate, that no
thing short of disposing of the public lands on just, equitable, and liberal
terms, can remedy the evils, and guard against the dangers incident to
the system under existing circumstances, it only remains to consider
what would be the effects of the measure on the revenue compared with
the present system. Should I be able to prove, as I hope to do, that
even in that respect it will bear a highly advantageous comparison, it
would yield more, and that when most needed, now, when the treasury
will require replenishing, every solid objection to its adoption would, I
trust, be removed.

There was a great and prevalent mistake as to the true value of the
public lands, as I have just intimated. They are estimated as if every*
acre was worth $1 25 paid down, without taking into account that only a
small quantity could be sold annually at that price, and that by far the
greater portion of the income from the sales can only be received through
a long series of years, extending to a very remote period. In estimating
what is their true value, we must not forget that time has the same effect
on value which distance has on magnitude, and that, as the largest ob
jects in the universe dwindle to a point, when removed to the distance of
the stars, so the greatest value, when' it can only be realized at remote
periods, diminishes almost to nothing. It is in consequence of this dif
ference between present and future value, that a sum paid down is worth
twice as much as an equal sum to be paid sixteen years hence, estimated
at 6 per cent, simple interest, and four times as much as a like sum to be
paid at the end of thirty-two years. I do not take fractions of years into
the estimate. The principle is familiar to all who are in the habit of cal
culating the present value of annuities for a given number of years, and
is as applicable to regular annual incomes from land, or any other source,

414 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

as it is from what is usually called an annuity. On the same principle,
discounts are made on payments in advance. But we are in the daily
halbit of overlooking this plain and familiar principle, known to every
business man in the management of his own affairs, in estimating the
value of the public domain. In consequence of such oversight, the
160,000,000 of acres lying in the new states have been estimated to be
worth $200,000,000, at $1 25 per acre — a sum nearly eight times greater
than iit-s real value, supposing that it would give an annual income averaging
$2,500,000, and admitting every acre will be sold at $1 25 — a supposition
far greater than will ever be realized. The Committee on Public Lands,
at the last session, assuming these data, proved incontestably that the
true present value did not exceed twenty-six millions and a half of dol
lars. They showed, in the first place, that a permanent income forever
of $2,500,000 would be worth but a fraction more than forty-one millions
of dollars in hand, as that sum, at six per cent., would give an equal in
come. They next showed, that to derive an income of $2,500,000 from
the one hundred and sixty millions of acres in the new states, would ex
haust every acre in eighty years j and that, of course, instead of being a
permanent income, it would be one only for that period, which would re
duce its value to about thirty-four millions of dollars, which would be its
present value, if there was no expense attending its sales and manage
ment. That is, however, far from being the case. Applying the same
rule of calculation to the annual expense incident to their management,
including what would be saved by the government if the cession should
be made, ascertained to be about $550,000 annually, they find the present
value of the land to be the sum stated ($26,500,000). The result, assuming
the data to be correct, is incontrovertible; and that sum would constitute
the entire amount of the loss under the present system, if the lands were
really to be given away by the proposed cession, as has been most un
fairly charged on the other side of the chamber.

I propose to apply the same principle to the same lands, to show its
present value under the operation of the measure I intend to propose.
Should it be adopted, the whole of the lands in question would be sold, I
assume, in twenty-five years from the time they become subject to the
graduating process — which is much more probable than that the whole
would be sold in eighty years at the present price of $1 25 per acre. I
next assume that equal quantities would be sold during each period of
graduation. I next assume that the portion not yet offered for sale, and
which, according to the amendment, would not be subject to graduation,
and which is estimated, in the report of the Committee on Public Lands,
to amount to a little more than 62,000,000 of acres, would yield an average
revenue during the ten years equal in proportion to what the 160,000,000
of acres are estimated to yield. It is, probably, much less than what they
would, as they will, for the first time, be offered for sale. I also estimate
that the lands that have been offered, and which have not yet run ten
years, and will, of course, be held till then at $1 25, will, with that which
will be sold on the first reduction to $1, average $1 12|. I have also
estimated the whole period, including that which is now in progress to
wards ten years, and the first period of reduction, as one period of fifteen
years, and that the entire amount sold during the entire period will only
equal the average of the other periods of graduation (five years) : an esti
mate greatly under the truth.

On these data I have based the calculations, which have been made
with great care, and I find the present value of the lands would be more
than a third more, under my proposed amendment, than under the exist
ing system ; and that the excess would be sufficient to pay the 35 per

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 415

cent, proposed to be allowed to the new states for their expense and
trouble, leaving the 65 to be received by the government, equal to the
entire present value of the lands under the existing system. Such is the
vast difference between receiving a smaller amount by annual payments,
during half of a long period, and a much larger one, in like manner, during
double of the time.

There are but two of the data on which the calculation is based which
can be supposed to have any material effect on the result, which can
possibly prove to be over-estimated : the one, that all the lands will be
sold during the period of graduation, which, however, is quite as proba
ble, to say the least, as that all will be sold in eighty years at $1 25 ; and
the other, that equal quantities would be sold during each step of the re
duction. It is not improbable this may not prove to be the case, and that
larger quantities would be sold towards the latter stages of the gradua
tion, at low prices, than during the earlier stages, at higher prices, which
affect the result. The other supposition, that equal sums would be re
ceived at each period, would probably be much too low; and the truth
may probably prove to be between them ; but, even on that assumption,
the present value, under the measure I propose, would greatly exceed
that under the present system, so much so as to be quite sufficient to
cover the 13 per cent, proposed to be allowed to the states for their
trouble, above the expense of managing the lands, including the saving
to the government by the cession. I have assumed that additional allow
ance, because it nearly corresponds to that proposed to be given in the bill
for distribution (introduced by the author of the scheme) to the new
states above that allowed to the old. I refer to the bill that passed both
houses, and was vetoed by the President. That allowed 12£ per cent.,
which, for the sake of facility in calculating, I have enlarged to 13 per
cent.

I have, I trust, now successfully met the only two objections which
can, in my opinion, be urged with any plausibility against the measure I
intend to propose, by proving, not only that there would be reasonable
assurance that the states would abide by the terms of the cession, but
that it is the only measure which can be devised to prevent the almost
certain loss of the public domain under the operation of the system as it
now stands ; and that, instead of a loss, there would be a clear pecuniary
gain. If I have succeeded in doing so, I have done all that ought, accord
ing to my conception, to be necessary to obtain the support of the body.
But I cannot be ignorant that there are members from the new states
who prefer supporting this bill to the measure I intend to propose ; not
that they think it better, but because they believe it has the best prospect
of passing. In this I think they are mistaken. It is not probable that
either can pass the present session. It is now but a few weeks to its ter
mination, and it is impossible, in the midst of the crowd of other business,
that any important measure, not indispensable, can get through, especially
a system of pre-emption and graduation which has been so long strug
gling, unsuccessfully, to pass both houses. But if it cannot pass now, there
is little prospect that it can the next four years, against the opposition of
the coming, when it could not with the aid of the present and late
administrations.

With this prospect, I put it to my friends from the new states, Is there
not danger in pressing these isolated measures, which cannot settle the
vexed and dangerous questions of the public lands, and which, at best,
can be pressed on grounds only interesting to those states, that they will
lose not only a favourite measure, but cause the passage of the most ob
noxious to them of all measures, that of distribution ] I ask them, Can

416 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

they hope to oppose successfully a measure so seductive to so many
members of the Union, by a measure so partial in its operation, and
which, so far from appealing to the reason or sympathy of two thirds of
the states, secures but a reluctant vote from any of them ; more from
party feelings and associations than any conviction of its justice or expe
diency 1 Let me tell my friends, that if the struggle is to continue between
this bill and the scheme for distribution, it is, on their part, a desperate
one. Defeat is certain ; and there is no way to avoid it (if it be not already
too late) but to enlarge the issue — to raise it above mere local or pecuni
ary considerations to the broad and elevated ground of a final settlement
of this deep and agitating question, on just and satisfactory principles,
and thereby arrest the countless evils rushing through that channel on the
country. It is only thus that an antagonist of sufficient strength can be
reared up against the dangerous and corrupting scheme of distribution.
A measure seductive to many of the states, unfortunately overwhelmed
by debt, could only be successfully opposed by one which would make a
powerful appeal to truth, justice, and patriotism. As strong as may be
the appeal to the necessity of embarrassed, states, a still stronger may
be made to the higher and more commanding considerations of duty
and patriotism. Such an issue, I believe, the measure I propose would
tender to the country. I solemnly believe it to be founded on truth, and
sustained by justice and high considerations of policy ; and all it needs
to ensure it success, if I mistake not, is the earnest and determined sup
port of the states which not only have the deepest stake, but whose inde
pendence and equality, honour and pride, as members of this proud re
public of states, are involved.

Having now presented my views of the amendment I intend to offer,
with a motion to strike out the amendment of the senator from Kentucky
and insert mine, I shall conclude with a few remarks in reference to the
leading feature of his amendment, the distribution of the proceeds of the
public lands among the states.

It is not my intention to enter on the discussion of a measure which
I cannot but regard as palpably unconstitutional, as well as dangerous
and corrupting in its tendency. I do not deem it necessary, as I ex
pressed my opinion fully on the subject at the last session. I intend, at this
time, to make a few remarks, in order to show that, viewed under every
possible aspect, it must be regarded as either foolish, idle, or unjust.

It is admitted, on all sides, that the treasury is embarrassed, and that
no part of the revenue can be withdrawn without making a corresponding
deficit, which must be supplied by taxes on the people in one form or
another, and that the withdrawal of the revenue from the land would
cause a deficit, so to be supplied, of not less, probably, than $5,000,000
annually. The whole process, then, would consist in giving to the peo
ple of the several states their proportional share of the five millions of
the revenue from the lands, to be collected back from the people of the
United States, in the shape of a tax on imports, or some other subject, to
the same amount. Now, sir, I ask, Is it not clear, if a state should re
ceive by its distributive share a less sum than the people of that state
would have to pay in taxes to supply the deficit, it would be, on their part,
foolish to support the distribution 1 So, again, if they should receive the
same amount they paid instead of a less, would it not be idle 1 And if
more, would it not be unjust 1 Can any one deny these conclusions *
How, then, can a scheme, which implies the one or the other of these
alternatives (laying aside all other weighty objections), have any chance to
be adopted 1 But two answers can be given. The one, that the states
which would receive more from the distribution than their people would

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALIIOUN, 417

have to pay to make up the deficit, can outvote the others, and are pre
pared to act on the principle of the strong plundering- the weak ; and the
other, that a majority of the states want the money to pay their debts or
to spend in favourite schemes, and prefer shifting the responsibility of
taxing to the General Government to assuming it themselves, without re
garding whether their people would contribute more or less than they
may receive. They are afraid to lay taxes, lest the people should see
the sums extracted from their pockets, and turn them out ; and, to avoid
this, would transfer the task to the General Government, because they
can take from the people, through the tax on imports, without \>eing de
tected as to the amount.

I take the opportunity, before I sit down, to tender my thanks for the
honourable, and high-minded suggestion of the senator from Missouri
(Mr. Linn), considering the interior quarter of the Union from which he
comes, to set apart the proceeds of the lands as a permanent fund for the
navy.

[Mr. Linn, in an audible voice : " The navy and the defences of the
country."]

I would rejoice to see such a disposition of it, and do hope that he will
move an amendment to that effect. I wo«M gladly receive it as a modi
fication of my amendment, and would regard it as a great improvement.
The navy, sir, is the right arm of oar defence, and is equally important
to every section — the North and South, the East and West, inland and
seaboard. When I look at the condition of our country, and the world,
I feel that too earnest and too early attention cannot be bestowed on the
arm of defence on which the country must mainly rely, not only for sus
taining its just weight and influence in the scale of nations, but also for
protection.

XXVIII.

SPEECH ON THE BILL TO DISTRIBUTE THE PROCEEDS OF THE PUBLIC LANDS,
JANUARY 23, 1841.

ON the amendment proposed by Mr. Crittenden to the Pre-emption Bill, to
distribute the proceeds of the public lands among the states,

Mr. Calhoun said that the proposition of the senator from Kentucky (Mr.
Crittenden) to distribute the proceeds of the sales of the public lands among
the several states, was no stranger in this chamber. His colleague (Mr. Clay)
had introduced it many years since, when he was in the opposition, and had
often pressed its passage as an opposition measure, and once with success,
while the treasury was groaning under the weight of a surplus revenue, of
which Congress was willing to free it on almost any terms. It was then
vetoed by General Jackson, and has had to contend ever since against the
resistance of his and the present administration.

But it is now, for the first time, introduced under different auspices, not as •
f an opposition, but an administration measure — a measure of the coming ad
ministration, if we may judge from indications that can scarcely deceive. It is
brought in by a senator who, if rumour is to be credited, is selected as a mem
ber of the new cabinet (Mr. Crittenden), backed by another in the same condi
tion (Mr. Webster), supported by a third (Mr. Clay), who, all know, must ex
ercise a controlling influence over that administration. It is, then, fair to pre
sume that it is not only a measure, but a leading measure of General Harrison's
administration, pushed forward in advance of his inauguration by those who .

Go G

418 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

have the right of considering themselves his organs on this floor. Regarded in
this light, it acquires a vastly increased importance — so much so as to demand
the most serious and deliberate consideration. Under this impression, I have
carefully re-examined the measure, and have been confirmed in the opinion pre
viously entertained, that it is perfectly unconstitutional, and pregnant with the
most disastrous consequences ; and what I now propose is to present the re
sult of my reflection under each of these views, beginning with the former.

Whether the government can constitutionally distribute the revenue from the
public lands among the states, must depend on the fact whether they belong
to them in their united Federal character, or individually and separately. If
in the former, it, is manifest that the government, as their common agent or
trustee, can have no right to distribute among them for their individual, separ
ate use, a fund derived from property held in their united and Federal charac
ter, without a special power for that purpose, which is not pretended. A posi
tion so clear of itself, and resting on the established principles of law, when
applied to individuals holding property in like manner, needs no illustration.
If, on the contrary, they belong to the states in their individual and separate
character, then the government would not only have the right, but would be
bound to apply the revenue to the separate use of the states. So far is incon
trovertible ; which presents the question, In which of the two characters are
the lands held by the states ?

To give a satisfactory answer to tins question, it will be necessary to dis
tinguish between the lands that have been ceded by the states, and those that
have been purchased by the government ou\ of the common funds of the
Union.

The principal cessions were made by Virginia and Georgia : the former, of
all the tract of country between the Ohio, the Mississippi, and the lakes, in
cluding the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan, and the Territory
of Wisconsin ; and the latter, of the tract included in Alabama and Mississippi.
I shall begin with the cession of Virginia, as it is on that the advocates for dis
tribution mainly rely to establish the right.

I hold in my hand an extract of all that portion of the Virginia deed of ces
sion which has any bearing on the point at issue, taken from the volume lying
on the table before me, with the place marked, and to which any one desirous
of examining the deed may refer. The cession is " to the United States in
Congress assembled, for the benefit of said states." Every word implies the
states in their united Federal character. That is the meaning of the phrase
United States. It stands in contradistinction to the states, taken separately
and individually; and if there could be, by possibility, any doubt on that point,
it would be removed by the expression " in Congress assembled" — an assem
blage which constituted the very knot that united them. I regard the execu
tion of such a deed, in such an assemblage, to the United States so assembled,
so conclusive that the cession was to them in their united and aggregate char
acter, in contradistinction to their individual and separate character, and, by
necessary consequence, the lands so ceded belonged to them in their former,
and not in their latter character, that I am at a loss for words to make it clear
er. To deny it, would be to deny that there is any truth in language.

But, as strong as this is, it is not all. The deed proceeds, and says that all the
lands so ceded " shall be considered a common fund for the use and benefit of such
of the United States as have become members of the Confederation, or Federal
alliance of said states, Virginia inclusive ;" and concludes by saying. " And shall
be faithfully and bonajide disposed of for that purpose, and for no other use and
purpose whatever." If it were possible to raise a doubt before, these full, clear,
and explicit terms would dispel it. It is impossible for language to be clearer.
To be " considered a common fund," an expression directly in contradistinction
% to separate or individual, and is, by necessary implication, as clear a negative of

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 419

the latter, as if it had been positively expressed. This common fund to " be for
the use and benefit of such of the United States as have become, or shall be
come, members of the Confederation or Federal alliance ;" that is, as clear as
language can express it, for their common use in their united Federal charac
ter, Virginia being included as the grantor, out of abundant caution.

[Here Mr. Clay said, in an audible voice, there were other words not cited.
To which Mr. Calhoun replied :]

I am glad to hear the senator say so, as it shows, not only that he regards
the expressions cited standing alone, as clearly, establishing what I contend
for, but on what he relies to rebut my conclusion, I shall presently show that
the expression to which he refers will utterly fail him. The concluding words
are, " Shall be faithfully and bonafde disposed of for that use, and no other use
and purpose whatever." For that use — that is, the common use of the states,
in their capacity of members of the Confederation or Federal alliance — and no
other ; as positively forbidding to use the fund to be derived from the lands for the
separate use of the states, or to be distributed among them for their separate or
individual use, as proposed by this amendment, as it is possible for words to do.
So far, all doubt would seem to be excluded.

But there are other words to which the senator refers, and on which the ad
vocates of the measure vainly rely to establish the right. After asserting that
it shall be considered a common fund for the use and benefit of the states that
are, or shall become, members of the Confederation or Federal alliance, Virginia
inclusive, it adds, " according to their usual respective proportions in the general
charge and expenditure." Now, I assert, if these words were susceptible of a
construction that the fund was intended for the separate and individual use and
benefit of the states, which I utterly deny, yet it would be contrary to one of
the fundamental rules of construction to give them that meaning. I refer to the
well-known rule, that doubtful expressions, in a grant or other instrument, are
not to be so construed as to contradict what is clearly and plainly expressed, as
would be the case in this instance, if they should be so construed as to mean
the separate and individual use and benefit of the states severally. But they
are not susceptible of such construction. Whatever ambiguity may be supposed
to attach to them, will be readily explained by reference to the history of the
times. The cession was made under the old Articles of Confederation, accord
ing to which the general or common fund of the Union was raised, not by tax
ation on individuals, as at present, but by requisition on the states, proportioned
among them according to the assessed value of their improved lands. An ac
count had, of course, to be kept between each state and the common treasury ; *
and these words were inserted simply to direct that the funds from the ceded
lands were to be credited to states according to the proportion they had to con
tribute to the general or common fund respectively, in order, if not enough
should be received from the lands to meet their contribution, they should be
debited with the deficit ; and, if more than sufficient, credited with the excess
in making the next requisition. The expression can have no other meaning ;
and, so far from countenancing the construction that the common fund from the
lands should be applied to the separate use of the states, it expressly provides
how it shall be credited to the confederated or allied states, in their account
current with the general or common fund of that confederacy. The opposite
interpretation would imply the most palpable contradiction and absurdity.

But it is asked, What would have to be done if there had been a permanent
surplus ? Such a case was scarcely supposable, with the heavy debt of the
Revolution, and the small yield from the land at the time ; but if it had occurred,
it would have been an unforeseen contingency, to be provided for by the United
States, to whom the fund belonged, and not by Congress, as its agent or trus
tee for its management.

That this expression was intended merely to direct how the account should

420 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

be kept, and not to make that the separate property of the states individually
which had been declared, in the most emphatic manner, to belong to them, and
to be used by them as a common fund, in their united Federal character, we
would have the most conclusive proof, if what has been stated already was not
so, in the fact that, in the deeds of cession from all the other states, Massachu
setts, Connecticut, New-York, North Carolina, and South Carolina, these words
are omitted.

As to the cession from Georgia, it is impossible that there should be two
opinions about it. It was made under the present government, and in the very
words of the Virginia cession, excepting the words " according to their usual
respective proportion in the general charge and expenditure." The omission,
while the other portion was exactly copied, is significant. The old system of
requisition on the states to supply the common treasury, under the Articles of
Confederation, had been superseded by taxes laid directly on the people, under
the present government, and it was no longer necessary to provide for the mode
of keeping the account, and for that reason was omitted. But the cession by
Georgia was, in reality, a purchase. The United States has paid full consider
ation for the land, including the expense of extinguishing the Indian titles, and
other charges ; and, of course, the portion of the public domain acquired from
that state may be fairly considered as standing on the same principle, as far as
the present question is concerned, as that purchased from foreign powers.

So undeniable is the conclusion that the lands ceded by the states were ce
ded to them in their united and aggregate character as a Federal community, and
not in their separate and individual, that the senator from Massachusetts was
forced to admit, if I understood him correctly (and if not, I wish to be correct
ed), that they were so ceded in the first instance, but only for the purpose of
paying the public debt ; and that, on its final discharge, the lands became the
separate property of the states. This, sir, is a perfectly gratuitous assumption
on the part of the senator, and is directly opposed by the deeds of cession,
which expressly provide that it shall be a common fund for the use and benefit
of the states in their united and Federal character, without restriction to the pub
lic debt, or limitation in point of time, or any other respect. This bold and un
warranted assertion may be regarded as an implied acknowledgment, on his
part, of the truth of the construction for which I contend, and on which the gov
ernment has ever acted, but now attempted to be changed on a false assumption.
The residue of the public lands, including Florida and all the region beyond
the Mississippi, extending to the Pacific Ocean, and constituting by far the
'greater part, stands on a different footing. They were purchased out of the
common funds of the Union, collected by taxes, and belong, beyond all ques
tion, to the people of the United States, in their Federal and aggregate capacity.
This has not been, and cannot be denied ; and yet it is proposed to distribute
the common fund derived from the sales of these, as well as from the ceded
lands, in direct violation of the admitted principle that the agfcnt or trustee of a
common concern has no right, without express authority, to apply the joint funds
to the separate use and benefit of its individual members.

But, setting aside the constitutional objection, as conclusive as it is, I ask,
What consideration of expediency — what urgent necessity is there for the adop
tion, at this time, of a measure so extraordinary as a surrender to the states, for
their individual use, of the important portion of the revenue derived from the pub
lic domain, which it is probable will not fall short, on an average of the next
ten years, of five millions of dollars ? Is the treasury now burdened with a sur
plus far beyond the wants of the government, for which all are anxious to de
vise some measure of relief, as was the case when the senator introduced and
passed his scheme of distribution formerly? On the contrary, is it not in the
very opposite condition — one of exhaustion, with a deficit, according to the
statement of that senator, and those who act with him, of many millions of

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 421

dollars 1 And is not the revenue still declining, so that in a short time the pres
ent deficit will be doubled ? To take a broader view, I would ask, Is the con
dition of the country less unfavourable to the adoption of the measure than the
state of th£ treasury ? Is there an individual capable of taking a comprehen
sive view of our foreign relations at this moment, who does not see the impe
rious necessity of applying every dollar that can be spared to guard against
coming dangers, more especially on that element where a revolution so extra
ordinary is going on, by the all-powerful agency of steam, both as to the means
of attack and defence ?

If, then, the state of the treasury and the condition of the country so urgent
ly demard the retention of this important branch of revenue for the common
use and objects for which the government was created, what possible motives
can impel those who are shortly to be charged with its administration to bring
forward, at such a period, the extraordinary proposition to take from the neces
sities of the treasury and the country so large a sum, to be distributed among
the states for their separate and individual use ? To this question but one an
swer has been, or can be given — that many of the states want the money. They
have contracted debts for their own individual and local purposes beyond their
ordinary means, and which the dominant party in those states are unwilling to
meet by raising taxes on their own people, for fear of being turned out of pow
er. The result has been a loss of credit, followed by a depreciation of their
bonds, held by rich capitalists at home and abroad. The immediate object of
this scheme is to raise the credit of the indebted states by distributing the rev
enue from the lands ; that is, to surrender about one fourth of the permanent rev
enue of the Union, and that the most certain, to enhance the value of the state
bonds, now greatly depressed, because some of the indebted states do not choose
to raise, by taxes on their own people, the means of paying their own debts.
To have a true conception of the whole case, it must be borne in mind that
these bonds were taken by the capitalists on this arid the other side of the At
lantic on speculation, in the regular course of business, as a profitable invest
ment, and many of them at great depreciation ; and that the demand on the
common treasury is substantially to make good, not only their losses, but to ena
ble them to realize their anticipated profits. Such is the object.

We are thus brought to the question, In what manner is this deficit of at least
five millions to be supplied ? By taxes— additional taxes on the commerce of
the country" preparing the way for still higher by combining the indebted states
with the tariff interest, to impose neavier burdens on that important but oppress
ed branch of industry. Wines and silks are to be selected, under the plea
of taxing luxury ; and much manoeuvring has been resorted to in order to enlist
the tobacco interest in favour of the tax, with, I fear, too much success. They
are, I admit, fair objects of taxation, and ought to bear their due proportion of
the public burden. I am prepared to act on that opinion when the tariff comes
up for revision, as it must at the next session. I go farther : Fix the amount
which the just and necessary wants of government may require, including
the revenue from the lands, and I will cheerfully agree to lay as much on lux
uries as gentlemen will agree to reduce on necessaries. It is my favourite sys
tem, and I am prepared to go as far as any one in that direction. But I shall
not agree to impose a cent on luxuries or necessaries, on the rich or poor, to
pay the debts for which this government is in no way responsible, and which
we cannot pay without a palpable violation of the Constitution, and gross injus
tice to the great body of the community. I was struck with the fact that, while
the senator (Mr. Webster) held out at one moment that the duties on wines and
silks would fall on the consumers, and, by consequence, on the rich, in the very
next he informed us that they would not rise in price in consequence of the du
ties, and, of course, they would entirely escape from them. To prove that they
would not increase in price in consequence of the duties, he assumed as&prin-

422 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

ciple, that where one country is the principal producer of certain articles, as
France was of wines and silks, and another a principal consumer of them, as
the United States were, a duty imposed on them by the latter would have the
effect, not of raising the price in the country where it was laid, byt to reduce
it where they were produced; that is, to reduce it in France, and not to raise
it in the United States.

Now, I put it to the senator whether the loss, taking his own conclusion,
could fall on the French producers of wines and silks, without, in its reac
tion, falling also on the American producers of the products given in exchange
for them — that is, the growers of tobacco, rice, and cotton, which furnish al
most exclusively the means of payment ? Is it not clear, if they cannot sell as
high or as much to us, in consequence of the duties, that we, in turn, cannot
sell as high or as much to them, in consequence of the fall of price on their prod
ucts ? Their loss must be followed by ours ; and it follows, according to the
senator's own reasoning, that the five millions which is proposed to be raised
by duties, to make good the deficit caused by the distribution, would be filched
from the pockets of the honest and industrious producers of our great staples,
and not, as alleged by the senator, from the wealthy consumers of wines and
silks. It is out of their hard earnings that the means must be raised to enhance
the value of the bonds of the states in the hands of foreign capitalists. The sen
ator must surely hold in low estimation the intelligence and spirit of the South
ern planter, in supporting such a proposition.

But I take still stronger grounds. The necessary effect of all duties is to
diminish the imports ; and the consequence of diminishing the imports is to dim
inish, in the same proportion, the exports. Imports and exports are dependant
each on the other. If there can be no imports, there can be no exports ; and
if there be no exports, there can be no imports. The exports pay for the im
ports, and the imports pay for the exports — the one always implies the other. So,
if the imports are limited in amount, the exports must be limited, when fairly
estimated, to the same amount, and vice versa. But the effects of all duties,
whether they fall on the consumers of the articles on which they are laid, or on
the producers, must be to diminish the amount of the imports, and, by conse
quence, of the exports. In a word, duties on imports affect the amount of t^e
exports to the same extent that they do the imports ; and it would have just the
same effect in the end, whether the deficit of five millions which would be caus
ed by the distribution, be raised by a duty on tobacco, rice, and cotton, or on
the wines and silks for which they might be exchanged. The loss would foil
in either case on the same interest, and to the same amount, and those immedi
ately connected with it.

But I rise to higher grounds. As bad as the scheme is in a financial view,
it is far worse in a political. The most deadly enemy of our system could
not, in my opinion, propose a measure better calculated to subvert the Con
stitution and the government. It would necessarily place the state govern
ments in direct antagonist relations with this on all questions except that of col
lecting and distributing the revenue, which would end in defeating all the ob
jects for which it was instituted, and reduce it, ultimately, to the odious capacity
of a mere tax-collector for the state governments. In this there can be no
mistake.

The money to be distributed would go, not to the people of the states indi
vidually, but to the state legislatures ; or, to be more specific, to the majority,
or, rather, to the dominant portion of the majority, which for the time might have
the control. Trny, and their friends and supporters, would profit by the scheme.
The money distributed would be applied in the moit effective way to secure
their ascendensy, and to give them the lion's share of the profit. The domi
nant party in the states would thus be enlisted to continue "and enlarge the dis
tribution ; and when it is added, that the sums expended in the states would

« SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALIIOUN. 423

embrace powerful local interests, which would be seen and felt in its effects by
large portions of the people, while the expenditures of the government would
be on objects of a general character, connected, for the most part, with the de
fence of the country against foreign danger, which would be little felt or regard
ed by the great body of the community, except in war, or on the eve of hostil
ities, I hazard nothing in asserting, that the interests in favour of distributing
the revenue would overpower that of expenditures by the General Government,
even on the most necessary objects, the consequence of which would be such
as has been stated. Be assured that the system, once fairly commenced, would
go on ancJ enlarge itself, till every branch of revenue would be absorbed, when
the government, divested of all its constitutional functions, would expire, under
universal scorn and contempt. Such must be the end of this most dangerous
and unconstitutional measure, should it ever be adopted.

But the senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster), and others, allege that
the cession of the lands to the new states is itself but a mode of distribution,
with a view, doubtless, to weaken the force of my objections to this amendment.
If it be so, I can only say that it is not intended ; and if I can be satisfied that
it is, I would be the first to denounce it. Its object is to remedy what I believe
to be great and growing disorders in the operation of our land system, as it now
exists ; but as dangerous as I regard them, I would never consent to remedy
them by a measure which I regard as vastly more dangerous. But the senator
will, if I mistake not, find it far more easy to call it a scheme of distribution
than to prove it to be so, or even that it is in the slightest degree analogous to
it in any particular, as I hope to prove in some subsequent stage of this discus
sion.

I have heard, Mr. President, with pleasure, the deep denunciations levelled
against the whole scheme of distribution, whether applied to the revenue from
lands or taxes. It strengthens my confidence in the force of truth, and the
conviction that, if one has the courage to do his duty, regardless of defeat for
the time, he may hope to outlive error and misrepresentation. Let me add, if
any of the denunciations were aimed at me, they passed harmless over me,
and fell on another, against whom I would be the last to utter a censure in his
retirement and declining years, however opposed to him while in power. The
Senate will understand that I refer to General Jackson. It is far from agree
able to me to introduce his name here, or to speak of myself; but I am com
pelled, from the remarks made in a certain quarter, to do so, not from any feel
ing of egotism (for I am too inconsiderable to involve what concerns me indi
vidually in the discussion of so grave a subject), but that I may not be weaken
ed, as the opponent of this most dangerous measure, by any misconception of
my past course in relation to the scheme of distribution.

It has, sir, been my fortune to be opposed to the scheme from the beginning.
It originated with a former member of this body, Mr. Dickerson, of New- Jersey,
and recently Secretary of the Navy, as far back as the year 1827. His pro
posed object was to strengthen 'the protective tariff interest, by distributing part
of its proceeds (if I remember correctly, five millions of dollars) annually
among the states, in the manner proposed by this amendment. I took my
stand against it, promptly and decidedly, on its first agitation, as a measure
dangerous and unconstitutional, and well calculated to fix the protective system
permanently on the country. The next year, the oppressive tariff of 1828 was
passed, and the year afterward General Jackson was electe'd President, with
the expectation, as far as South Carolina supported him, that he would use his
patronage and influence to repeal that obnoxious act, or at least greatly reduce
the burden it imposed.

But it was the misfortune of General Jackson and the country, that when he
arrived here to assume the reins of government, he was strongly prepossessed
in favour of the plan of distributing the surplus revenue, after the final payment

424 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. «

of the public debt, under the impression that it would be impossible to repeal
that act, or reduce the duties it imposed. How he received so dangerous an
impression, I have never understood ; but so it was. I speak not from my own
knowledge, but from information that is unquestionable, that his inaugural ad
dress contained a passage in favour of the distribution, when it was laid before
those whom he had selected for his first cabinet ; and that it was with difficul
ty he assented to omit it, so strongly was he impressed in its favour — no doubt
honestly and sincerely impressed. His first message to Congress, in Decem
ber, 1829, contained a strong recommendation of that scheme, which was re
peated, with additional arguments in its favour, in his second messagfe the suc
ceeding year. A recommendation from so high and influential a quarter could
not but have a powerful effect on public opinion. The governors of two great
states, Pennsylvania and New- York, recommended it to their legislatures, who
adopted resolutions in its favour. That the views which he then entertained
may be fully understood, I ask the secretary to read the portions of the two
messages, which he will find marked in the volumes on his table, in the order
of their respective dates.

[The secretary read the following extracts from President Jackson's mes
sages, 1st and 2d sessions, 26th Congress :

" First Session, Twenty-sixth Congress.

" After the extinction of the public debt, it is not probable that any adjust
ment of the tariff, upon principles satisfactory to the people of the Union, will,
until a remote period, if ever, leave the government without a considerable sur
plus in the treasury beyond what may be required for its current service. As
then the period approaches when the application of the revenue to the payment
of debt will cease, the disposition of the surplus will present a subject for the
serious deliberation of Congress, and it may be fortunate for the country that
it is yet to be decided. Considered in connexion with the difficulties which
have heretofore attended appropriations for purposes of internal improvement,
and with those which this experience tells us will certainly arise whenever
power over such subjects may be exercised by the General Government, it is
hoped that it may lead to the adoption of some plan which will reconcile the
diversified interests of the states, and strengthen the bonds which unite them.
Every member of the Union, in peace and in war, will be benefited by the im
provement of inland navigation and the construction of highways in the several
states. Let us, then, endeavour to attain this benefit in a mode which will be
satisfactory to all. That hitherto adopted has, by many of our fellow-citizens,
been deprecated as an infraction of the Constitution, while by others it has
been viewed as inexpedient. All feel that it has been employed at the expense
of harmony in the legislative councils.

" To avoid these evils, it appears to me that the most safe, just, and federal
disposition which could be made of the surplus revenue, would be its apportion
ment among the several states, according to their ratio of representation ; and,
should this measure not be found warranted by the Constitution, that it would
be expedient to propose to the states an amendment authorizing it. I regard
an appeal to the source of power, in cases of real doubt, and where its exercise
is deemed indispensable to the general welfare, as among the most sacred of
all our obligations.

" Second Session, Twenty-sixth Congress.

" 1 have heretofore felt it my duty to recommend the adoption of some plan
for the distribution of the surplus funds which may at any time remain in the
treasury after the national debt shall have been paid, among the states, in pro
portion to the number of their representatives, to be applied by them to objects
of internal improvement.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 425

" Although this plan has met with favour in some portions of the Union, it has
also elicited objections which merit deliberate consideration. A brief notice of
these objections here will not, therefore, I trust, be regarded as out of place.

" They rest, as far as they have come to my knowledge, on the following
grounds: 1st. An objection to the ratio of distribution; 2d. An apprehension
that the existence of such a regulation would produce improvident and oppres
sive taxation to raise the funds for distribution ; 3d. That the mode proposed
would lead to the construction of works of a local nature, to the exclusion of
such as are general, and as would, consequently, be of a more useful character ;
and, last, that it would create a discreditable and injurious dependance on the
part of the state governments upon the Federal power. Of those who object to
the ratio of representation as the basis of distribution, some insist that the im
portations of the respective states would constitute one that would be more equi
table ; and others, again, that the extent of their respective territories would
furnish a standard which would be more expedient, and sufficiently equitable.
The ratio of representation presented itself to my mind, and it still does, as one
of obvious equity, because of its being the ratio of contribution, whether the
funds to be distributed be derived from the customs or from direct taxation. • It
does not follow, however, that its adoption is indispensable to the establishment
of the system proposed. There may be considerations appertaining to the sub
ject which would render a departure, to some extent, from the rule of contribu
tion proper. Nor is it absolutely necessary that the basis of distribution be
confined to one ground. It may, if, in the judgment of those whose right it is
to fix it, it be deemed politic and just to give it their character, have regard
to several.

" In my first message, I stated it to be my opinion, that * it is not probable that
any adjustment of the tariff, upon principles satisfactory to the people of the
Union, will, until a remote period, if ever, leave the government without a con
siderable surplus in the treasury beyond what may be required for its current
service.' I have had no cause to change that opinion, but much to confirm it.
Should these expectations be realized, a suitable fund would thus be produced
for the plan under consideration to operate upon ; and if there be no such fund,
its adoption will, in my opinion, work no injury to any interest ; for I cannot
assent to the justness of the apprehension that the establishment of the propo
sed system would tend to the encouragement of improvident legislation of the
character supposed. Whatever the proper authority, in the exercise of constitu
tional power, shall, at any time hereafter, decide to be for the general good,
will in that, as in other respects, deserve and receive the acquiescence and
support of the whole country ; and we have ample security that every abuse of
power in that regard, by agents of the people, will receive a speedy and effect
ual corrective at their hands. The views which I take of the future, founded
on the obvious and increasing improvement of all classes of our fellow-citizens,
in intelligence, and in public and private virtue, leave me without much appre
hension on that head.

" 1 do not doubt that those who come after us will be as much alive as we are
to the obligation upon all the trustees of political power to exempt those for whom
they a$t from all unnecessary burdens ; and as sensible of the great truth, that
the resources of the nation beyond those required for immediate and necessary
purposes of government, can nowhere be so well deposited as in the pockets of
the people."]

Such, I repeat, were, unfortunately, the opinions which General Jackson en
tertained on this all-important question when he came into power. I saw the
danger in its full extent, and did not hesitate to take an open and decided stand
against the measure which he so earnestly recommended ; and that was the
first question on which we separated. In placing myself in opposition to him

H H H

426 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALIIOUN.

on a measure so vital, I \yas not ignorant of the hazard to which I exposed my
self, but the sense of duty outweighed all other considerations. I clearly saw
that there would be an increased surplus revenue after the final payment 'of the
public debt, a period then rapidly approaching ; and that, if it was once distribu
ted to the states, it would rivet on the country the tariff of 1828, to be followed
by countless disasters from the combined effects of the two measures. Had it
been adopted, the last ray of hope of repealing or reducing that oppressive and
ruinous nleasure would have vanished. It would, by its seductive influence,
have drawn over to its support the very states whose prosperity it was crushing,
not excepting South Carolina itself. The process is not difficult to explain.

For that purpose, I will take the case of South Carolina, and will assume
that her citizens paid, under the tariff of 1828, four millions of dollars into the
treasury of the Union, which is probably not far from the truth, and would have
received back under the proposed distribution of the surplus but one fourth, ma
king one million. The sum to be distributed, as has already been stated, would
not have been returned to the people, but to the treasury of the state, to be
disposed of by the Legislature ; or, to speak more specifically, by the small
portion which, for the time, would have had control over the dominant majori
ty of the Legislature. All who have experience in the affairs of government,
will readily understand that no disposition would have been made of it but what
they, and their friends and supporters, would have had a full share of the profits
and political advantages to be derived from its administration and expenditure.
Thus an interest would be created on the part of the controlling influence in
the state for the time, adverse to it — an interest to sustain the tariff, as the means
of sustaining the distribution ; and that for the plain reason, that they would re
ceive more from the former than they would pay, as citizens, under the duties.

Now, sir, when we reflect that the amount taken by the duties out of the
pockets of the people was extracted in so round-about and concealed a manner,
that no one — no, not the best informed and shrewdest calculator, could ascertain
with precision what he paid, while that received back from distribution would
have been seen and felt by those into whose hands it would have passed, it will
be readily understood, not only how those who participated directly in its ad
vantages, but the people themselves, would have been so deluded as to believe
that they gained more by the distribution than what they lost by the tariff, es
pecially when the dominant influence in the state would have been interested
in creating and keeping up the delusion.

It is thus that the result of the scheme would have been to combine and unite
into one compact mass the dominant interests of all the states, with the great
dominant interest of the Union, to perpetuate a system of plundering the people
of the products of their labour, especially the South, to be divided among those,
with their partisans, who could control the politics of the country. It was
against this daring and profligate scheme that South Carolina interposed her sov
ereign authority, and by that interposition, as I solemnly believe, saved the Con
stitution and the liberty of the country.

But that step, as bold and decisive as it was, could not accomplish all. To
save the manufacturing interest, and avoid the hazard of reaction, it was neces
sary to reduce the duties on the protected articles gradually and slowly. The
consequence was a continued overflow of the treasury, notwithstanding the duty
on every article not produced in the country was repealed, amounting in val
ue to one half of the whole, to such an enormous extent had the protective du
ties been raised. A remedy had to be applied to meet the corrupting and dan
gerous influence of this temporary surplus, till the gradual reduction of the pro
tective duties under the Compromise Act would bring them to the ordinary wants
of the government. There was but one remedy, and that was to take it from
the treasury. The flow was too great for the most lavish expenditures to keep
down. I saw, in advance, that such would be the case ; and, with the design

SPEECHES OP JOHN C. CALHOUN.

of devising a remedy beforehand, moved for a special committee, with the view
mainly of freeing the treasury of its surplus, as the great source of executive
influence and power. The committee, concurring in that opinion, recommend
ed that the Constitution should be so amended as to enable Congress to make
a temporary distribution. The report fully explains the reasons for believing
there would be a large and corrupting surplus, and why, under the peculiar cir
cumstances of the case, the distribution as proposed was the only remedy. I
have marked a portion of it that will show the opinion I then entertained in ref
erence to distribution, and which I ask the secretary to read.

[" Second Session, Twenty-third Congress.

" Your committee are fully aware of the many and fatal objections to the dis
tribution of the surplus revenue among the states, considered as a part of the
ordinary and regular system of this government. They admit them to be as
great as can be well imagined. The proposition itself, that the government
should collect money for the purpose of such distribution, or should distribute a
surplus for the purpose of perpetuating taxes, is too absurd to require refutation ;
and yet what would be when applied, as supposed, so absurd and pernicious,
is, in the opinion of your committee, in the present extraordinary and deeply
disordered state of our affairs, not only useful and salutary, but indispensable to
the restoration of the body politic to a sound condition ; just as some potent
medicine, which it would be dangerous and absurd to prescribe to the healthy,
may, to the diseased, be the only means of arresting the hand of death. Dis
tribution, as proposed, is not for the preposterous and dangerous purpose of rais
ing a revenue for distribution, or of distributing the surplus as a means of per
petuating a system of duties or taxes, but a temporary measure to dispose of an
unavoidable surplus while the revenue is in the course of reduction, and which
cannot be otherwise disposed of without greatly aggravating a disease that
threatens the most dangerous consequences, and which holds out the hope, not
only of arresting its farther progress, but also of restoring the body politic to a
state of health and vigour. The truth of this assertion a few observations will

suffice to illustrate.

******

" It may, perhaps, be thought by some that the power which the distribution
among the states would bring to bear against the expenditure, and its consequent
tendency to retrench the disbursements of the government, would be so strong
as not only to curtail useless or improper expenditure, but also the useful and
necessary. Such, undoubtedly, would be the consequence, if the process were
too long continued ; but, in the present irregular and excessive action of the
system, when its centripetal force threatens to concentrate all its powers in a
single department, the fear that the action of this government will be too much
reduced by the measure under consideration, in the short period to which it is
proposed to limit its operation, is without just foundation. On the contrary, if
the proposed measure should be applied in the present diseased state of the gov
ernment, its effect would be like that of some powerful alterative medicine, op
erating just long enough to change the present morbid action, but not sufficient
ly long to superinduce another of an opposite character."]

The measure recommended was not adopted. It was denied, and violently
denied, that there would be a surplus, and I left it to time to decide which opin
ion was correct. A year rolled round, and conclusively decided the point. In
stead of overrating, experience proved I had greatly under-estimated the surplus,
as I felt confident at the time I had. It more than doubled even my calcula
tion. I again revived the measure ; but before it could be acted on, instructions
from state legislatures, with intervening elections, turned the majority in the
Senate, which had been opposed to the administration, into a minority. I ac-

423 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

quiesced, and gave notice that I would not press the measure I had introduced,
and would leave the responsibility with the majority, to devise a remedy for
what was at last acknowledged to be a great and dangerous evil. All felt that
something must be done, and that promptly. In the greatly expande'd state of
the currency, the enormous surplus had flowed off in the direction of the pub
lic lands, and, by a sort of rotary motion, from the deposite banks to the spec
ulators, and from them to the receivers, and back again to the banks, to per
form the same round again, rapidly absorbing every acre of the public lands.
No one saw more clearly than the senator from New- York (Mr. Wright), that
an effectual and speedy remedy was indispensable to prevent an overwhelming
catastrophe ; and he promptly proposed to vest the surplus in the stocks of the
states, to which I moved an amendment to deposite it in their treasuries, as be
ing more equal and appropriate. These were acknowledged to be the only al
ternatives to leaving it in the deposite banks. Mine succeeded, and the pas
sage of the Deposite Act, which is now unjustly denounced in a certain quarter
as distribution, and not as deposite, as it really is, followed.

As far as I am concerned, the denunciation is utterly unfounded. I regard
ed it then, and still do, as simply a deposite — a deposite, to say the least, as
constitutional as that in state banks, or state stocks held by speculators and
stock-jobbers on both sides of the Atlantic, and far more just and appropriate
than either. But while I regard it as a deposite, I did then, and now do, believe
that it should never be withdrawn but in the event of war, when it would be
found a valuable resource.

But had it been in reality a distribution, it would be, in my opinion, if not al
together, in a great measure justified, under the peculiar circumstances of the
case. The surplus was not lawfully collected. Congress has no right to take a
cent from the people but for the just and constitutional wants of the country.
To take more, or for other purposes, as in this case, is neither more nor less
than robbery — more criminal for being perpetrated by a trustee appointed to
guard their interest. It in fact belonged to those from whom it was unjustly
plundered ; and if the individuals, and the share of each, could have been as
certained, it ought, on every principle of justice, to have been returned to them.
But as that was impossible, the nearest practicable approach to justice was to
return it proportionably, as it was, to the states, as a deposite, till wanted for the
use of the people from whom it was unjustly taken, instead of leaving it with
the banks, for their use, which had no claims whatever to it, or vesting it in
state stocks, for the benefit of speculators and stock-jobbers.

As brief as this narrative is, I trust it is sufficient to show that the advocates
of this amendment can find nothing in my former opinion or course to weaken
my resistance to it. or to form the show of a precedent for the extraordinary
measure which it proposes. So far from it, the Deposite Act, whether viewed
in the causes which led to it. or its object and effect, stands in direct contrast
with it.

We stand, sir, in the midst of a remarkable juncture in our affairs ; the most
remarkable, in many respects, that has occurred since the foundation of the gov
ernment ; nor is it probable that a similar one will ever again occur. This gov
ernment is now left as free to shape its policy, unembarrassed by existing engage
ments or past legislation, as it was when it first went into operation, and even more
so. The entire system of policy originating in the Federal consolidation school
has fallen prostrate. We have now no funded debt, no National Bank, no con
nexion with the banking system, no protective tariff. In a word, the paper sys
tern, with all its corrupt and corrupting progeny, has, as far as this government
is concerned, vanished, leaving nothing but its bitter fruits behind. The great
and solemn question now to be decided is, Shall we again return and repeat the
same system of policy, with all its disastrous effects before us, and under which
the country is now suffering, to be again followed with tenfold aggravation ;

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 429

or, profiting by past experience, seize the precious opportunity to take the only
course which can save the Constitution and liberty of the country — that of the
old State Rights Republican policy of 1798 ? Such is the question submitted
for our decision at this deeply important juncture ; and on that decision hangs
the destiny of our country. A few years must determine. Much, very much
will depend on the President elect. If he should rest his policy on the broad
and solid principles maintained by his native state, in her purest and proudest
days, his name will go down to posterity as one of the distinguished benefactors
of the country ; but, on the contrary, if he should adopt the policy indicated by
the amendment, and advocated by his prominent supporters in this chamber, and
attempt to erect anew the fallen temple of consolidation, his overthrow, or that
of his country, must be the inevitable consequence.

XXIX.

SPEECH IN REPLY TO THE SPEECHES OF MR. WEBSTER AND MR. CLAY, ON MR.
CRITTENDEN'S AMENDMENT TO THE PRE-EMPTION BILL, JTANUARY 30, 1841.

MR. CALHOUN said : No one who had attended to this debate could doubt
that the cession of Virginia, on which the right to distribute the revenue from
the public lands had heretofore been placed, was altogether too narrow to sup
port that measure. The portion of the public domain ceded by her is small in
amount when compared with the whole, and by far the better portion of it had
already been disposed of, leaving a residue altogether too inconsiderable to ef
fect the object intended by the distribution. The other, and much the larger
portion of the public domain, consisting of Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, and
the entire region west of the Mississippi River, was purchased out of the com
mon fund of the Union, and no construction which could be put on the deed of
cession from Virginia could possibly apply to it. This was seen and felt by
the two leading advocates of this amendment on the other side of the chamber
(Mr. Clay and Mr. Webtfer), and they, accordingly, endeavoured to find some
other ground on which to jslace the right, broad enough to support the whole ;
and found it, as they supposfed, in the provision of the Constitution which gives
to Congress the power to dispose of the territories and other property belonging
to the United States. In this they both concurred, so far as the revenue deri
ved from the lands was concerned. But the senator from Massachusetts, with
bolder views than his associate, extended the right of distributing, as I under
stood him, to the entire revenue — comprehending as well that received from
taxes as from lands.

[Mr. Webster interposed, and denied that he had said so.]
I stand corrected, and am happy to hear the denial of the gentleman. I had
so understood him, and am gratified that he had so restricted the right as to ex
clude the revenue from taxes. But I cannot be mistaken in asserting that both
of the senators concur in regarding the power conferred, in the provision refer
red to, as having no limitation whatever but the discretion of Congress. If such
be the true construction, it would, of course, give the right of making the pro
posed distribution ; which presents the question, Has Congress the right of dis
posing of the public domain, and all the other property belonging to the Union,
and the revenue derived therefrom, as it pleases, without any constitutional re
strictions whatever 1

Before I proceed to discuss that question, it will be well to ascertain what
is the extent and value of the property embraced. The public domain, as has
been frequently stated in the course of the debate, embraces more than one
thousand millions of acres ; and the other property includes the public build-

430 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

ings, dock and navy yards, forts, arsenals, magazines, ships of war, cannon,
arms of all descriptions, naval stores, and munitions of war. It is difficult to
estimate the value of the whole. The public domain alone, according to the
estimate of the gentlemen (not mine), at $1 25 per acre, is worth upward of
$1,200,000,000; and, including the value of the other property, the whole, at
the lowest estimate, must far exceed $1,500,000,000, and probably would equal
not less than $2,000,000,000. Such is the extent and value of the property-
over which the two senators claim for Congress unlimited and absolute right to
dispose of at its good-will and pleasure. And the question recurs, Have they
such right ? A graver question has never been presented for our consideration,
whether we regard the principles, the amount of property, or the consequences
involved.

Now, sir, in order to test the right, it is my intention to propound a few questions
to the senators, to which I hope they will give explicit answers. Suppose, then,
in the progress of time, an administration should come in (I make no allusion
to the next) which should think an established church indispensable to uphold
the morals, the religion, and the political institutions of the country : would it
have the right to select some one of the religious sects — say the Methodist,,
Baptist, Presbyterian^ Episcopalian, or Catholic — and erect it into a splendid
hierarchy, by endowing it out of this ample fund ?

[Mr. Webster : " The Constitution expressly prohibits it."]

I hear the answer with pleasure. It assigns the true reason. Here, then,
we have a limitation in the Constitution, by the confession of the senator ; and.,
of course, there is one restriction, at least, on the unlimited right which he arid
his friend claimed for Congress over this vast fund. Having made good this
step, I proceed to take another.

Suppose, then, that such an administration should undertake to colonize
Africa, with the view of Christianizing and civilizing it, and, for that pur
pose, should propose to vest this vast fund, or a portion of it, in the Coloni
zation Society : would Congress have the right of doing so ? Or, to take a
still stronger case, suppose a majority of Congress should become abolition
ists : would it have the right to distribute this vast sum among the various abo
lition societies, to enable them to carry out their fanatical schemes 1 The sena
tor is silent. I did not anticipate an answer. He cannot say yes ; and to say
no would be to surrender the whole ground. Nor can he say, as he did, that
it is prohibited by the Constitution. I will relieve the senator. I answer for
him : Congress has no such right, and cannot exercise it without violation of
the Constitution. But why not ? The answer is simple, but decisive : because
Congress has not the right to exercise any power except what is expressly
granted by the Constitution, or may be necessary to execute the granted pow
ers ; and that in question is neither granted, nor necessary to execute a granted
power.

Having gained this important point,! next ask the senators, Would Congress
have the right to appropriate the whole, or part, of this vast fund to be drawn
directly from the treasury, in payment of the principal or interest of the state
bonds ? And if not (as they certainly would not, for the reason already assign
ed), has it the right to give it to the states to be so applied ? Can it do that in
directly by an agent, which it cannot constitutionally do directly by itself ? If
so, I would be glad to hear the reason. I might proceed and propound ques
tion after question, equally embarrassing ; but abstain, lest I should exhaust the
patience of the Senate.

But there is one question of a different character which I must propound, and
to which I would be glad to have the answers of the two ingenious and learned
senators. They are both agreed, as I now understand the senator from Massa
chusetts, that the revenue from taxes can be applied only to the objects specif
ically enumerated in the Constitution, and in repudiating the general welfare

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 431

principle, as applied to the money power, as far as the revenue may be derived
from that source. To this extent, they profess to be good State Rights Jeffer-
sonian Republicans. Now, sir, I would be happy to be informed by either of
the able senators — I regret that one (Mr. Clay) is not in his seat — by what po
litical alchymy the revenue from taxes, by being vested in land or other proper
ty, can, when again turned into revenue by sales, be entirely freed from all the
constitutional restrictions to which they were liable before the investment, ac
cording to their own confessions ? A satisfactory explanation of so curious and
apparently incomprehensible a process would be a treat.

The senator from Kentucky (Mr. Clay) failing to find any argument to sus
tain the broad and unqualified right of distributing the revenue from the public
lands as Congress might think proper, sought to establish it by precedent. For
that purpose he cited, as a precedent, the distribution of arms among the stites ;
which, he contended, sanctioned also the distribution of the revenue from the
lands among them. The senator forgot that it is made the duty of Congress,
under an express provision of the Constitution, " to provide for arming the mili
tia ;" and that the militia force belongs to the states, and not to the Union ; and,
of course, that, in distributing arms among the states with the view of arming
them, Congress but fulfil a duty enjoined on them by the Constitution.

The palpable misconception, as I must consider it, into which the two sena
tors have fallen in reference to this important question, originates, as I con
ceive, in overlooking other provisions of the Constitution. They seem not to
advert to the fact that the lands belong to the United States — that is, to the states
in their united and Federal character ; and that the government, instead of being
the absolute proprietor, is but an agent appointed to manage the joint concern.
They overlook a still more important consideration — that the United States, in
their united and Federal character, are restricted to the express grants of pow
ers contained in the Constitution, which says " that the powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are
reserved to the states respectively, or- to the people ;" and, also, that the Con
gress of the United States, as the common agent, is restricted expressly, in the
exercise of its powers, to the objects specified in the instrument, and passing
such laws only as may be necessary and proper for carrying them into execu
tion. It follows that Congress can have no right to make the proposed distri
bution, or use its powers to effect any other object, except such as are express
ly authorized, without violating and transcending the limits prescribed by the
Constitution.

It is thus the whole fabric erected by the arguments of the two senators falls
to the ground by the giving way of the foundation on which they rest, except
the small portion of lands embraced in the Virginia cession ; which I will next
proceed to show stands on ground not more solid. It will not be necessary,
for that purpose, to travel over the arguments which I offered, when last up,
against the right to make the distribution, attempted to be deduced from that
cession, and which have been so much enlarged and strengthened by the able
and lucid speech of the senator from New-York (Mr. Wright). I propose sim
ply to reply, in this connexion, to the arguments of the senator from Kentucky
(Mr. Clay), who I again have to regret is not in his place.

His first position was, that the resolution of the old Congress, which recom
mended to the states to cede the land to the Union, held out, as motives, the
payment of the debt contracted in the Revolution, and the inducement it offer
ed to the states to adopt the Articles of Confederation. From this he inferred
that these constituted the sole objects of the cession. I admit that, if there was
any ambiguity in the deeds of cession as it respects the objects of the cession,
a reference to the resolution which proposed it might be fairly made, in order
to ascertain the intention of the parties ; but that is not the case. The deeds
are couched in the broadest and most comprehensive terms, and make an abso-

432 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

lute cession of the lands to the United States, as a common fund, without lim
itation as to the objects.

But the argument on which he mainly relied was, that, although the cession
is to the United States in their united and Federal character, to be administered
by Congress as a common agent, the use is for the states in their separate and
individual character. If the fact were so, the argument would be strong ; but
it happens to be the very reverse. It is expressly provided in the Virginia ces
sion, that the land should be considered a common fund, for the use and benefit
of the states, as members of the Confederation or Federal alliance, and for no other
Use or purpose whatever. The senator will not venture to deny that common is
the very opposite of separate ; and, of course, the distinction on which he so
much relied, that the use was separate, falls to the ground.

His next position rested on the expression in the deed of cession, " according
to their usual respective proportion in the general charge and expenditure,"
which has been bandied about so often in this and former discussions on this sub
ject, that I will not go over the argument again, as conclusive as I consider it, as
*I am sure the Senate must be surfeited to nausea with those words. I take
higher ground, which I regard as conclusive, be their meaning what they may.

It will not be denied that the Constitution must override the deeds of cession,
and that of Virginia among the rest, whenever they come in conflict ; and that,
for the plain reason that the parties to both were the same, and had, of course,
a right, in adopting the Constitution, to change or modify the previous acts of
cession as they pleased. Now, sir, I repeat, without fear of contradiction, that
the Constitution, in superseding the old system of requisition on the states, as
the mode of raising the common supplies of the Union, by the system of taxing
the people directly, superseded this particular provision, which all admit had
reference to the former system of requisition. The senator himself in reality
admits such to be the fact, by proposing to distribute the revenue from the lands
according to federal numbers — the rule of imposing direct taxes under the Con
stitution — instead of the assessed value of improved lands — the rule of making
requisitions under the old confederation. This provision, then, being thus su
perseded, the lands are left as the property of the Union, for the common use
of the states which compose it, freed from these disputed words, and without
the semblance of a doubt ; and the Constitution, accordingly, speaks of the pub
lic lands, in broad and unqualified terms, as belonging to the United States.

The last ground assumed by the senator was, that, as the lands are common
property, it is competent for Congress, as the common agent, to divide their
proceeds among the United States, as joint-owners. It might be true in the
case of individuals owning a joint-farm, to be worked in common, as supposed
by the senator ; but that is not analogous to the case of the United States,
where there is a joint concern, for specific objects, with a common agent to
carry it into effect, for the joint interest of the concern, without any authority to
distribute the profits. In such a case, it would be contrary to the plainest dic
tates of reason, and the established principles of law, for the j.gent to undertake
to apply to the separate and individual use of the partners what was intended
by them for the joint concern. It would be to make that separate which his
principals intended to be common.

When I look, Mr. President, to what induced the states, and especially Vir
ginia, to make this magnificent cession to the Union, and the high and patriotic
motives urged by the old Congress to induce them to do it, and turn to what is
now proposed, I am struck with the contrast, and the great mutation to which
human affairs are subject. The great and patriotic men of former times re
garded it as essential to the consummation of the Union, and the preservation
of the public faith, that the lands should be ceded as a common fund ; but now,
men distinguished for their ability and influence, and who are about to assume
the high trust of administering the government, are striving with all their might

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 433

(and that, too, when this fund is most needed) to undo their holy work. Yes,
sir : distribution and cession are the very reverse in character and effect ; the
tendency of one is to union, and the other to disunion. The wisest of modern
statesmen, and who had the keenest and deepest glance into futurity (Edmund
Burke), truly said that the revenue is the state ; to which I add, that to dis
tribute the revenue in a confederated community among its members is to dis
solve the community — that is, with us, the Union ; as time will prove, if ever
this fatal measure should be adopted.

There is another contrast, not less striking. The states composing the old
confederation, in their extreme jealousy of power, adopted the system of requi
sition as the means of supplying the common treasury ; but that proving insuf
ficient, it was changed, with the adoption of the present Constitution, into the
system of laying taxes directly on individuals. But now, it is proposed to re
store virtually the exploded system of requisition, but in the reverse order —
requisitions of the states on the Union, instead of the Union on the states ; and
thereby reversing the relation which the wise and patriotic founders of our po
litical institutions regarded as essential to liberty. They regarded it as a
fundamental principle, that the people should grant the supplies to the govern
ment, in order to keep it dependant on them. But now this is to be reversed ;
and the government, in the shape of distribution, is to grant supplies to the peo
ple. How is this to be done ? How can the government, which, with all its
legislation, does not produce a cent, grant supplies to those who are the pro
ducers of all ? I will tell you : the supplies to be distributed to the states are
to be collected in a roundabout, concealed manner, under the plausible pretext
of taxing luxuries (wines and silks), to be paid by the rich, or nobody, as we
are told, to meet the requisitions of the governments of the states, lest their
constituents should turn them out for taxing them directly and openly. Yes :
$e are plainly told that the states have surrendered the right of taxing imports,
the most easy and convenient mode of raising a revenue — that is, the most con
cealed and ingenious way to the pockets of the people ; and that it is the duty
of this government, to which this convenient contrivance is intrusted, to raise
supplies by its use, not only to meet its own wants, but also to meet those of
the states. What monstrous and dangerous perversion !

If (continued Mr. Calhoun) I have been successful in demonstrating the
utter unconstitutionally of this dangerous scheme, as I trust I have, the Sen
ate will not expect me to follow the senator from Kentucky (Mr. Clay) in his
excursive flights in favour of the expediency of this, his favourite and cherished
scheme. If Congress has no right to adopt it, there is an end of the whole
affair ; but there is one of the good effects he imputes to it that I cannot pass
in silence. He asserted that it would finally settle the disputes and agitations
growing out of questions connected with the public lands, by reconciling and
harmonizing all conflicting interests, and restoring kind feelings in relation to
them between the old and new states. Such are his anticipations ; but will
they be realized ? Let the tone with which the senators from Missouri (Mr.
Linn) and Arkansas (Mr. Sevier) denounced his scheme, answer. Does he
not know that every senator from the new states, with the exception of those
from Indiana, are opposed to his measure 1 Can he, in the face of such facts,
really hope for a final settlement of the vexed question of the public lands, or a
? restoration of harmony between the old and new states in relation to them?
On the contrary, will it not imbitter the feelings on both sides ? Can he ex
pect that the new states would see with favour a mortgage laid on that portion
of the public domain lying within their limits, for the security of the holders of
state bonds ? Such, virtually, would be the case should the distribution be
made. The holders would regard it as a pledge ; and to withhold it, when
once made, as a violation of faith.

Would it conciliate the staple states — the growers of rice, cotton, and

III

434 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

tobacco — on which the tax to make good the deficiency caused by the distribu
tion must principally fall ? It is in vain you tell them that the duties on wines
and silks would fall on the consumers, or on the producers of those articles
abroad. They know, by woful experience, that it matters little to them
whether the duty be laid on the export of the staples they produce, or the im
portation of products received in exchange ; whether the duties be paid on
their products going out of port, or the return cargo coming in. Viewing it in
that light, the people of those states will regard the measure as a cunningly-
devised scheme to pay the debts of others at their expense.

Would it, I again ask, reconcile the states free from debt ? Will they be
satisfied to be taxed to pay the debts of the states which have been less cau
tious in their engagements than themselves 1 I ask the senators from New-
Hampshire, Would their state, happily free from all debt, be satisfied ?

Instead of the final settlement of the question, or the restoration of harmony,
it would unsettle the whole subject of the public lands, and throw the apple of
discord among the states.

Having now said what I intended on the immediate question under consider
ation, I avail myself of the opportunity to reply to the objections which have
been made to the proposition I offered in an earlier stage of this discussion,
to cede to the new states the lands lying within their respective limits, on just
and equitable conditions. The Senate will recollect that the debate on that
measure terminated unexpectedly, and without affording me an opportunity of
answering the objections against it. As there will probably be no other oppor
tunity of meeting them, I trust it will be a sufficient apology for doing so on.
this occasion.

I begin with what, to me, would be the most formidable objection — that, un
der the garb of a cession, the measure is, in fact, but a mode of distribution. I
reply, as on a former occasion, Prove it, and I shall renounce it at once, ana
forever. But I cannot take assertion for proof, however boldly made. Until it
is proved, I shall regard the charge of distribution, coming as it does from the
open advocates of that measure, as originating in a conscious feeling that, so far
from being popular, the scheme has no hold on the affections of the people.
If they believed it to be popular, those who so warmly oppose cession would
be the last to call it distribution.

It is next objected that it is a gift of the lands to the new states. Be it so.
I would infinitely rather make a gift of the whole than to adopt the fatal policy
of distribution ; and, if it should be necessary to defeat it, I would regard a sur
render of the whole as a cheap sacrifice. I go farther, and hold that if the
lands, instead of being regarded as the property of the Union, should be regard
ed as the property of the states separately, the new states would have the best
right to the portion within their limits. They possess, unquestionably, the
eminent domain, which would have carried with it the property in the public
lands within their borders respectively, had they not surrendered it by special
agreement on their admission into the Union. But that agreement was with
the United States, and the surrender of the property in the lands was to them ;
and it may be fairly questioned how far the agreement, on their admission,
would be binding on them, should the revenue from the lands be perverted from
the use of the United States to that of the states separately, as is proposed by
this scheme of distribution.

But is the cession a gift ? Does it propose a surrender of the land for no
thing ? Is 65 per cent, of the gross proceeds to be paid into the treasury no
thing ? Is it nothing to put an end to the angry and agitating debates which
we witness session after session, constantly increasing in violence ? Nothing
to «s,ve the time, and labour, and expense of Congress ? Nothing to curtail
one fourth of the patronage of the government, and that of the most dangerous
character ? Nothing to raise the new states to a level with the old ? Nothing

•

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 435

to 'remove this great disturbing cause, which so injuriously influences our legis
lation ? Is it nothing, finally, to substitute a system in lieu of the present, as
far as the lands lying within the new states are concerned, which, in addition
to all these considerations, proposes the only practical method of preventing the
loss of the lands, and which, so far from a pecuniary loss, will bring more into
the treasury than the present system ? I boldly assert that such would be the
case ; as I may well do now, as no one opposed to the measure has ventured
to question the correctness of the calculation, or the data on which it rests.

But the senator from Kentucky (Mr. Clay) says it is a gift, because 35 per
cent, is too high a compensation to the states for their expense and trouble in
managing the land. He estimates the actual expense, all things included, at
2i per cent, on the gross receipts, and says that all beyond that is a gift to the
states. He has ventured this assertion with the report of the Committee on the
Public Lands at the last session before him, containing in detail, from the
proper departments, an estimate of the expense which, on a supposition that
the average annual sale of the portion of the land in question would average two
and a half millions, would amount to 22 per cent. The senator has omitted all
the expenses except that of selling the lands, when, by turning to the tables,
he will find that nearly one third is yet to be surveyed and platted ; that a large
amount must be paid for extinguishing Indian titles, and removing Indians to
the West. He also overlooks that the 5 per cent, fund is to be surrendered by
those states : a sum of itself equal to double the amount which he has estima
ted as the entire expense to which the states would be subject.

To these large items must be added donations, which, instead of being made,
as they have heretofore been, by Congress, are, if made by the states, to be paid
for by them at the selling price of the land at the time, allowing them 35 per
cent. ; and also the sums spent on internal improvement, which, with the excep
tion of the portion spent on the Mississippi and Ohio, are to terminate ; and, final
ly, the saving of expense in our legislation, and in the General Land Office, in
consequence of the cession. All of which the senator has omitted — omitted,
notwithstanding they are to be found in the report before him, and to which he
has referred in the debate. These, as I have stated, amount to 22 per cent, on
the gross amount of the sales ; to which the committee has added 13 per cent.,
making the 35 — not as a gratuity, but on the ground of liberal compensation be
yond mere expense and saving to this government, as being right of itself, and
necessary to ensure the hearty co-operation of the states in carrying out a
measure that would be highly beneficial to the whole Union, arid which could
not be successfully carried out without such co-operation on the part of the
states. Not a cent has been proposed to be allowed which could be avoided,
with just regard to sound policy.

But the senator was not content with holding out the difference of what he
was pleased to regard the actual expense, and the 35 per cent, as a gift. He
took stronger grounds, and pronounced it to be a gift of all the public lands, on
the assumption that the cession would be extended to the states hereafter to
come in, on their admission ; and, next, to the territories ; and, finally, to tire
whole of the public domain. I will not undertake to reply to a mere assump
tion without proof, farther than to say, that every measure of sound policy may
be in like manner condemned, if it is to be assumed that what we have wisely
done, under all the circumstances of the case, may form a precedent for others
to do under dissimilar circumstances, and without regard to the principle on
which we acted. In proposing the measure I have, I yield to the necessity of
remedying a great and growing evil, originating in the fact that this govern
ment is the owner and administrator of a large portion of the territories of nine
states of this Union, and which cannot be remedied so long as their ownership
and administratorship continue. It is the number and influence of the states in
which they exist that give such magnitude and danger to the evil ; and what

436 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

Ave may do now, under such circumstances, cannot constitute a precedent, to be
extended in the manner which the senator supposes it will be. On the con
trary, by adopting the measure, we would enlist .the new states, now opposed to
the old on almost all questions growing out of the public lands, to aid in vigi
lantly guarding the residue of the public domain.

The senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster) took different grounds. He
insisted that cession necessarily implies gift ; and therefore, as I suppose,
the one I have proposed is a gift, in spite of the many valuable considerations
inducing to it. I do not attach the same meaning to the word which he does ;
but, as I have no taste for verbal criticism, I have assented to the request of a
friend to change "cession" to "dispose of" — the words used in the Constitu
tion, and which, on the authority of the two senators, are of such comprehen
sive meaning as to confer on Congress unlimited power to do as they please
with the public lands.

But it seems that, so soon as I had availed myself of this comprehensive
term, it forthwith contracted to the narrowest limits. 1 was told the lands could
not be disposed of to the states. Why not ? They can be disposed of to indi
viduals, and to companies of individuals ; and why not to that company or com
munity of individuals which constitutes a state ? Can any good reason be as
signed ?

I am next told that we may dispose of them absolutely, but not conditionally.
I again repeat the question, Why not ? What is it that limits our power ? We
can dispose of the lands to individuals on condition, of which there are striking
instances in lands containing lead mines. They are leased for a term of years,
on condition that one tenth of the lead be paid to the government in kind. If
this can be done for a term of years, what is to prevent it from being done for
ever, on the same condition ? And, if so, why may we not prescribe the rules
on which the mines shall be worked ? If all this can be done in the case of
individuals, what is to prevent it from disposing of the public lands to the states
on the conditions proposed, and to prescribe the rules to be observed by them
in the sales and management ; that is, to adopt the measure I have proposed ?

It is next objected, that it is not a disposition of the lands, but merely a trans
fer of the administration of them to the states. I deny the fact. It is intended,
and is, in reality, a conditional disposition or sale to the states. But if it were
otherwise, and as supposed, I ask, What is there to prevent Congress from dis
posing of the lands by an agency, or to employ the states as the agent, and pre
scribe the rules by which they shall be disposed of? I can see no solid objec
tion to such arrangement, but do not deem it necessary to discuss the point,
because the fact is not as is supposed.

Then follows the objection, that it would create the relation of creditor and
debtor between this government and the states. Admit it to be the fact : I ask,
Is that relation more objectionable, or as much so, as that which now exists of
landlord and tenant, growing out of ownership and administration in this gov
ernment of so large a part of the domain of these states — a relation which is the
par-ent of so many evils, both to them and us ? But, to put an end to the objec
tion, I have, on the suggestion of some of the members from the new states, so
modified my proposition as to provide that the 65 per cent, of the proceeds of
the sales coming to the government shall be paid directly to its own officers —
say the marshals in each of the states. Now I ask the opponents of the meas
ure to join me, and, by the cession, to put an end, in the only way it can be
done, to the still more objectionable relation of landlord and tenant between this
government and the states.

It is farther objected, that it would not settle the question. It is said, if we
cede the lands, the next demand would be to relinquish that portion of the pro
ceeds of their sales which is to be paid to the government ; that concession
would have to follow concession, till the whole would be lost. This, sir, is the

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 437

old answer which the advocates of existing abuses are ever ready to give those
who complain. It is the answer of Lord North in the controversy which led
to our Revolution. He refused to yield the disputed right of taxing the colo
nies, on the ground that to yield would not satisfy them. If taxation was sur
rendered, he said it would not settle the question ; that their next demand
would be to surrender the right of regulating their commerce. The result of
'such blind obstinacy was the dismemberment of the British Empire.

There is not a feature which more strongly distinguishes the firm and en
lightened statesman from the obstinate or weak than that of knowing when it
is proper to make concessions, as the means of avoiding, in the end, the humil
iation of submission on the one hand, or the modification of defeat on the other ;
and never was there an occasion or a question when it was more politic than
at this time, and on this question. It may now be made with dignity. The
question may now be adjusted on just and honourable terms ; but, if it be de
layed, the new states will decide it, in a few years, in their own way, without ask
ing our leave, by their rapid relative increase in population and political weight.

They are now anxious for a fair adjustment, and we may satisfy them with
out making any real sacrifice on our part ; and it is doing injustice to them to
suppose that, after soliciting a measure so liberal, and from which they would
derive such advantages, they would suddenly turn round and condemn what
they had solicited, and make the palpably unjust demand, that we should sur
render the portion of the proceeds coming to the government. There is no
thing in their past history that would warrant such an imputation on their char
acter.

It was next objected, that the measure was unequal; and, to prove it so, the
case of Ohio, which has but a small amount of public lands within its limits to
be disposed of, was contrasted with that of Illinois, which has a large amount ;
and, because the portion of the proceeds to be allowed to the states (35 per
cent, of the gross amount) would be small in the case of the former when com
pared with that of the latter, the measure is pronounced unequal and unjust. If
it were a scheme of distribution, as has been erroneously alleged, such might
be the fact ; but as, instead of that, it is a mere compensation or commission
for trouble, expense, responsibilities to be incurred, and services rendered, so
far from being unequal, because the amount to be received in the one case was
not equal to that in the other, it is precisely the reverse. Equality of compen
sation for equal expense and service is equal, but equality for unequal expense
and service would be glaringly unequal ; and, had I proposed to allow Ohio
the same amount of compensation for the expense and trouble of managing the
small portion of the public domain in her limits as that to be allowed to Illinois
for the management of the large portion within hers, instead of allowing a com
pensation to each proportioned to their respective expenses and services, it
would, so far from being equal, have been grossly unequal, and would have
been so pronounced by those who now make this objection.

In this connexion, I must say that I cannot but regret that the senator from
Ohio (Mr. Allen), in answer to the senator from Kentucky (Mr. Clay) on this
alleged inequality between Ohio and Illinois, did not meet him by denying the
truth of his allegation, instead of the manner he did ; which had, to say the least,
the appearance of sustaining the side to which he is most opposed, against that
to which he is less.

(Mr. Allen rose to explain. Mr. Calhoun said he did not doubt that the sen
ator gave the true explanation of his vote, but did not think it was called for at
the time, and that the effect was as he had stated.)

Another objection was, that it did not extend to the territories. This objec
tion had the advantage (what few others had) of being founded in fact, but was
unfounded in reason. Had it been extended to them, it would have gone be
yond the mischief, and would have been wholly improper. The evil, I repeat,

438 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

originates in the fact of the government being the owner and administrator of
so large a portion of the domain of nine states of the Union (being more than
one third of the whole) ; and must increase, so long as it remains, with the in
creased number and relative weight of the new states. They will soon be in
creased to twelve, by the admission of the three territories, with a correspond
ing increase of weight in the government. The territories, on the contrary,
are without political weight ; and, of course, with the object in view, it would
have been preposterous to have included them.

As little force is there in the objection, that some of the states would not ac
cept of the cession. It is possible that Ohio and Indiana might not, but not
probable, as the amount of public land within their borders is inconsiderable.
But what of that ? Should it prove to be the case, what possible injury could
result ? The fact of not accepting would be proof conclusive that the evil to be
removed acted with but little relative force in either, and that the old system
might be left to go on quietly in both, until the land within their limits was all
disposed of. But the case is very different in the other seven. In them it is
in active operation ; and they would gladly accept of the cession, as the only
remedy that can reach the disease, consistently with the interests of all con
cerned.

I come now to the final objection — that the land system is working well, and
that we ought to adhere to the old maxim, " Let well enough alone." I say
the final, as it is the last I recollect. If (as is possible — I took no notes) I
have omitted to notice any objection made by the opponents of the measure, I
call on them to name it now, that I may answer it before I proceed to notice
the one just stated.

When I first addressed the Senate on this subject, at the opening of the dis
cussion, I admitted that the system worked well at first ; but I must limit the
admission to its earliest stages. From the beginning it contained within itself
the seeds of mighty disorders, and of great evils to the country, if nothing
should be done to avert them. If I do not greatly mistake the tendency of the
system as it stands, it is to extinguish the Indian titles far more rapidly than the
demands of our increasing population require, and to disperse our population
over a larger space than is desirable for the good of the country. That the for
mer of these evils exists in reality, the proof is conclusive ; and that it is al
ready the cause of much difficulty and danger, and that both are rapidly on th'e
increase, so as to threaten the loss of the lands themselves, I have, I trust, con
clusively shown in my former remarks. It is sufficient here to repeat, in order
to show that the Indian title has been too rapidly extinguished, that the govern
ment has sold, from the beginning of the system (now almost half a century),
but little more than eighty millions of acres ; and that not less than twenty mill
ions, probably, are held by large holders, who purchased on speculation to sell
again ; making the actual demand for land for settlement not exceeding, prob
ably, sixty millions in that long period of time. But during the same period
the Indian litle has been extinguished to about three hundred and twenty mill
ions of acres, of which about two hundred and twenty-six millions remain un
sold — exceeding fourfold the demand for lands in consequence of the increase
of our population. Such is the fact. To what cause is it to be attributed ? I
feel confident it will be principally found in the land system itself, which has
been so indiscriminately praised during the discussion.

But, before I proceed to assign my reasons, it will be proper to pause and re
flect on the influence that the occupation of the aborigines whom we are so ra
pidly expelling has had, through the mysterious dispensation of Providence, on
the prosperity and greatness of our country. They were precisely in the con
dition most favourable to that mode of settlement which was best calculated to
secure liberty, civilization, and prosperity. Had they been more numerous or
powerful, the settlement of our country would either not have been made at all,

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 439

or would have been by the immediate agency and superintendence of the gov
ernment, with a force not only sufficient to expel or subjugate the aborigines
(as in Mexico by the Spaniards, and Hindostan by the English), but also suffi
cient to keep the colonies in subjection. How great a change such a mode of
settlement would have made in the destiny of our country is not necessary to
be explained on this occasion. But as it was, they were not too strong to pre
vent settlement by hardy and enterprising emigrants, inspired, in some instances,
with a holy zeal to preserve their religious faith in its purity ; in others, by the
love of adventure and gain ; and in all, with a devotion to liberty. It is to set
tlements formed by individuals so influenced, and thrown, from the beginning, on
their own resources almost exclusively, that we owe our enterprise, energy, love
of liberty, and capacity for self-government.

But there is another consideration not less important connected with the oc
cupancy and condition of the aborigines. Had they not existed at all, or been
too weak to prevent our people from spreading out over the vast extent of the
continent without resistance, or resistance too feeble to keep them within mod
erate limits, in the rapid and wide outspread after game, pasturage, or choice
spots on which to settle down, the far larger portion would have lost all the arts
of civilized life, and become fierce herdsmen and barbarians, like our ancestors ;
and like them, in their frequent inundations over Southern Asia and Europe,
would have overflowed and desolated the civilized agricultural and commercial
settlements along the coast, excepting such as might be protected by walls and
fortifications.

It is to this fortunate combination of facts connected with the aboriginal pop
ulation — that they were not strong enough to prevent settlements in the manner
they were actually formed, while they were sufficiently strong to prevent the
too rapid spread of our population over the continent — that we owe, in a great
measure, our wonderful success. A change in either the one or the other would
have changed entirely, in all probability, the destiny of our country.

The bearing of this digression on the point under consideration will be
readily perceived. We have grown, indeed, to be so powerful, that the abo
rigines can no longer resist us by force, and when there is no danger that the
arts of civilized life would be lost by the spreading out of our population ; but
the aboriginal population would not, therefore, cease to perform an important
function in our future growth and prosperity, if properly treated. They are the
land-wardens or keepers of our public domain, until our growth and increase
of population require it, as the means of new settlements. But till then, our
interests, no less than justice to them, require that their occupancy should con
tinue ; and if the extinguishment of 'their title should continue to outrun the
regular demand of our population for settlement as rapidly in proportion here
after as it has heretofore, it is difficult to conceive the confusion and difficulty
which must follow. Those we now experience are nothing to those which
would come. That such must, however, prove to be the case to a great ex
tent, if our land system continue as it is, I hold to be certain. The cause, as
I have said, is inherent in the system as it exists ; and, if not corrected, will
impel our population, by its necessary operation, from the states to the terri
tories, and from them to the Indian possessions ; which I shall now proceed
to explain.

The system, as it now stands, embraces three powerful causes, all of which
conspire to produce these results : pre-emption, as proposed by this bill, before
survey and sale ; the auction system, under its actual operation ; and a fixed
minimum for all the lands, be the quality or the time which they have been
offered for sale what they may. They act together, and jointly contribute to
the results I have attributed to them.

My friends from the new states, who are so much attached to pre-emption
as proposed by this bill, must excuse me for speaking my opinion freely of

440 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALIIOUN.

their favourite measure. The consequences involved are too important to
keep silence.

What, then, is this pre-emption principle ? and how does it operate as a part
of the existing land system ? It is neither more nor less than to say to every
one, when the Indian title is extinguished to a new portion of the public do
main, that you may go, and search, and take all the choice parts, the fertile
spots, the favourable localities, the town sites, or whatever other advantages
any portion may possess, at $1 25 per acre ; and that not to be paid till the
lands are offered at auction, which may be many years thereafter. What,
then, is its operation, but to give pick and choice of the public domain to the
active and enterprising, who are best acquainted with the tract of country to
which the Indian title is extinguished, with the speculating capitalists, who
may choose to associate with them ? It is like spreading out a large table,
having a few choice and costly dishes intermixed with ordinary fare, and open
ing the door to the strong, and the few that may be nearest, to rush in and select
the best dishes for themselves, before the others at a distance can enter and
participate. And can we wonder, with such advantages, that there should be
an active and powerful interest constantly at work to extinguish the titles of
the Indians in rapid succession, without regard to the demand of our increasing
population ; to spread out table after table, that they may gorge their appetites
on the choicest dishes, and slake their thirst with the most costly wines ; leav
ing the ordinary fare, with the crumbs and bones, to the rest of the commu
nity?

But this is not all. After this picking and choosing, under the pre-emption,
as it has heretofore operated, and which it is now proposed to make prospective
and perpetual, comes the auction system ; that is, the sales of the lands at ven-
due to the highest bidder. Nothing could be more just and equal, if fairly car
ried out ; but it is notorious that the very opposite is the case under its actual
operation. Instead of leaving the lands to be disposed of to the bids of indi
viduals, according to their conception of the value of each tract, the whole is
arranged beforehand, by combinations of powerful and wealthy individuals, to
take the choice of the lands left by the pre-emptioners, and to nm down all
individual competition, so that no one can obtain what he wants without join
ing them ; and thus another powerful interest is united with the former, to ex
tinguish the Indian title — to spread out another table.

The next feature of the system so much lauded operates the same way — I
refer to what is called the minimum price ; that is, of fixing one invariable
price of $1 25 an acre for all lands not sold at auction, without regard, as has
been said, to quality, or the time it has been in market. The effect of this,
with a quantity on hand to which the Indian title is extinguished, so far ex
ceeding the demand of the community, is to sink the value of all the unsold
land which has not been offered at auction to a price below the minimum, ex
cept a small portion of the best, which is annually purchased. Taking the ag
gregate of the whole of the lands in the new states, it would, according to its
estimated present value by the Committee on the Public Lands, not be worth,
on an average, more than 16i cents per acre. The result is, that no one is
willing to give the minimum for the inferior or less valuable portion. Hence
comes that great and growing evil, of occupancy without purchasing ; which
threatens the loss of the public domain, unless 'arrested by some speedy and
decisive remedy. It has already extended far beyond what is thought of by
those who have not looked into the subject, and is still rapidly progressing. I
have taken some pains to ascertain to what extent it has extended in two of the
states — Illinois and Alabama. It is probable that there are not less than thirty
thousand voters in those states, residing on public lands as mere occupants,
without title. In a single congressional district in Alabama, there are, by esti
mate, six thousand voters. But, as great as this evil is, it is not all. The fixed

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 441

minimum price co-operates with the pre-emption and auction systems to impel
emigrants, especially of the more wealthy class, to turn from the states to the
territories, where the land has been less culled over ; and from the territories
to the Indian lands, for the same reason ; thus urging forward our population
farther and farther, and driving before them the Indian tribes, unmindful of the
dispensation of a kind Providence, which placed them as a restraint on the too
rapid dispersion of our population.

There is another and powerful cause co-operating to the same result, which
must not be passed unnoticed. I refer to the vast expenditures in the last
twelve or fifteen years, in holding treaties with the Indians, and in extinguish
ing their titles, including reservations, and removing them to the West ; equal
ling, in some instances, the fee-simple value of the lands, and in many others
not much less. These immense expenditures, amounting, in the period speci
fied, I know not to how many millions (not less, certainly, than forty or fifty),
have made such treaties a great money-making affair, the profits of which have
been divided between influential Indian chieftains and their white associates,
and have greatly contributed not only to increase the force of the other causes
in the too rapid extinguishment of Indian titles, but to diffuse widely the bane
ful spirit of speculation.

Such are the inherent defects of the system, and the results to which they
have led, and must continue to lead, so long as it can find subjects on which to
operate, if not remedied. The measure I have proposed would apply an effi
cient remedy, as far as the public lands in the new states are concerned. The
combined action of graduation and pre-emption applied to lands which have
been offered for sale, as provided for by the amendment I offered, would, in a
few years, convert the occupants without title into freeholders ; while, at the
same time, it would tend powerfully to prevent the population of the new states
from emigrating, and turn towards those the tide of emigration from the old
states, and, to the same extent, counteract the too rapid spreading out of our
population, and extinguishment of the titles of the Indians. But nothing can
effectually remedy the defects of the system but a radical change. What that
ought to be, would require much reflection to determine satisfactorily ; but it
seems to me, on the best reflection I can give it, that if, in lieu of public sales
at auction, a system of graduation and pre-emption had been introduced from
the first, fixing a maximum price sufficiently high when the lands are first of
fered for sale, and descending gradually, at short intervals of one or two years,
to the present minimum price, and then, in the manner proposed in the measure
which I have brought forward, giving the right of pre-emption at every stage,
from first to last, to the settlers, it would have averted most of the evils incident
to the present system, and, at the same time, have increased the revenue from
the lands. It would have checked the spirit of speculation, concentrated our
population within the proper limits, prevented the too rapid extinguishment of
Indian titles, and terminated our ownership and administration of the lands in
the new states, by disposing of them within a moderate period of time, and
prevented most of the mischievous consequences which have been experienced.
The introduction of such a change, or some such, founded on the same prin
ciples, in reference to lands not yet offered for sale in the territories, and the
portion of the public domain lying beyond, and to which the Indian title is not
yet extinguished, would, in combination with the measure I have proposed, go
far to restore the system to a healthy action, and put a stop to the farther prog
ress of the evil, and remedy, in a great measure, those already caused. I
throw out these suggestions for reflection, without intending to propose any
other measure, except the one I have already.

K K K

412 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

XXX.

SPEECH ON THE CASE OF MeLEOD, JUNE 11, 1841.

THE business before the Senate being the motion of Mr. Rives to refer
so much of the President's Message as relates to our foreign affairs to
the Committee on Foreign Affairs,

Mr. Calhoun said : I rise with the intention of stating, very briefly, the
conclusion to which my reflections have brought me on the question
before us.

Permit me, at the outset, to premise, that I heartily approve of the
principle so often repeated in this discussion, that our true policy, in
connexion with our foreign relations, is neither to do nor to suffer wrong,
not only because the principle is right of itself, but because it is, in its
application to us, wise and politic, as well as right. Peace is pre-emi
nently our policy. Our road to greatness lies not over the ruins of others,
but in the quiet and peaceful development of our immeasurably great in
ternal resources — in subduing our vast forests, perfecting the means of
internal intercourse throughout our widely-extended country, and in
drawing forth its unbounded agricultural, manufacturing, mineral, and
commercial resources. In this ample field all the industry, ingenuity, enter
prise, and energy of our people may find full employment for centuries to
come ; and through its successful cultivation we may hope to rise, not only
to a state of prosperity, but to that of greatness and influence over the
destiny of the human race, higher than has ever been attained by arms by
the most renowned nations of ancient or modern times. War, so far
from accelerating, can but retard our march to greatness. It is, then, not
only our duty, but our policy to avoid it, as long as it can be, with honour
and a just regard to our right ; and, as one cf the most certain means of avoid
ing war, we ought to observe strict justice in our intercourse with others.
But that is not of itself sufficient. We must exact justice as well as ren
der justice, and be prepared to do so; for where is there an example to
be found of either individual or nation that has preserved peace by
yielding to unjust demands !

It is in the spirit of these remarks that I have investigated the subject
before us, without the slightest party feelings, but with an anxious desire
not to embarrass existing negotiations between the two governments, or
influence, in any degree, pending judicial proceedings. My sole object
is to ascertain whether the principle already stated, and which all ac
knowledge to be fundamental in our foreign policy, has, in fact, been re
spected in the present case. I regret to state that the result of my inves
tigation is a conviction that it has not. I have been forced to the con
clusion that the Secretary of State has not met the peremptory demand of
the British government for the immediate release of M'Leod as he ought ;
the reasons for which, without farther remark, I will now proceed to
state.

That demand, as stated in the letter, rests on the alleged facts, that the
transaction for which M'Leod was arrested is a public one ; that it was
undertaken by the order of the colonial authorities, who were invested
with unlimited power to defend the colony ; and that the government at
home has sanctioned both the order and its execution. On this allega
tion the British minister, acting directly under the orders of his govern
ment, demanded his immediate release, on the broad ground that he, as
well as others engaged with him, was " performing an act of public duty,
for which he cannot be made personally and individually responsible to

or.uECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 44>

the laws and tribunals of any foreign country ;" thus assuming, as a uni
versal principle of international law, that where a government authorizes
or approves of an act of an individual, it makes it the act of the govern
ment, and thereby exempts the individual from all responsibility to the
injured country. To this demand, resting on this broad and universal
principle, our Secretary of State assented, and, in conformity, gave the
instruction to the attorney-general which is attached to the correspond
ence ; and we have thus presented for our consideration the grave question,
Do the laws of nations recognise any such principle 1

I feel that I hazard nothing in saying they do not. No authority has
been cited to sanction it, nor do I believe that any can be. It would be
no less vain to look to reason than to authority for a sanction. The laws
of nations are but the laws and morals, as applicable to individuals, so far
modified, and no farther, as reason may make necessary in their applica
tion to nations. Now there can be no doubt that the analogous rule, when
applied to individuals, is, that both principal and agents, or, if you will,
instruments, are responsible in criminal cases ; directly the reverse of the
rule on which the demand for the release of M'Leod is made. Why, I
ask, should the rule in this case be reversed when applied to nations,
which is universally admitted to be true in the case of individuals 1 Can
any good reason be assigned! To reverse it when applied to individ
uals, all must see, would lead to the worst of consequences, and, if I do
not greatly mistake, must in like manner, if reversed when applied to
nations. Let us see how it would act when brought to the test of par
ticular cases.

Suppose, then, that the British, or any other government, in contempla
tion of war, should send out emissaries to blow up the fortifications
erected at such vast expense for the defence of our great commercial
marts — New-York and others — and that the band employed to blow up
Fort Hamilton, or any other of the fortresses for the defence of New-
York, should be detected in the very act of firing the train : would the
production of the most authentic papers, signed by all the authorities of
the British government, make it a public transaction, and exempt the vil
lains from all responsibility to our laws and tribunals ! Or would that
government dare make a demand for their immediate release 1 Or, if
made, would ours dare yield to it, and release them 1 The supposition,
I know, is altogether improbable, but it is not the less, on that account,
calculated to test the principle.

But I shall next select one that may possibly occur. Suppose, then, in
contemplation of the same event, black emissaries should be sent from
Jamaica to tamper with our slaves in the South, and that they should be
detected at midnight in an assembly of slaves, where they were urging
them to rise in rebellion against their masters, and that they should
produce the authority of the home government, in the most solemn form,
authorizing them in what they did: ought that to exempt the cut-throats
from all responsibility to our laws and tribunals 1 Or, if arrested, ought
our government to release them on a peremptory demand to do so]
And if that could not be done forthwith, from the embarrassment of state
laws and state authorities, ought this government to employ counsel and
to use its authority and influence to effect it! And if that could not ac
complish its object, would it be justified in taking the case into their own
tribunals, with the view of entering a nolle prosequi '<

But, setting aside all suppositions cases, I shall take one that actually
occurred — that of the notorious Henry, employed by the colonial author
ity of Canada to tamper with a portion of our people, prior to the late
war5 with the intention of alienating them from the government, and ef-

444 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

fecting a disunion in the event of hostilities. Suppose he had been de
tected and arrested for his treasonable conduct, and that the British gov
ernment had made the like demand for his release, on the ground that he
was executing the orders of his government, and was not, therefore, lia
ble, personally or individually, to our laws and tribunals: I ask, Would
our government be bound to comply with the demand 1

To all these questions, and thousands of others that might be asked,
no right-minded man can hesitate for a moment to answer in the nega
tive. The rule, then, if it does exist, must be far from universal. But
does it exist at all ! Does it even in a state of war, when, if ever, if we
may judge from the remarks of gentlemen on the opposite side, it must!
They seemed to consider nothing more was necessary to establish the
principle for which they contend but to show that this, and all other cases
of armed violence on the part of one nation or its citizens against another,
is, in fact, war ; informal war, as they call it, in contradistinction from one
preceded by a declaration in due form.

Well, then, let us inquire if the principle for which they contend, that
the authority or the sanction of his government exempts an individual
from all responsibility to the injured government, exists even in case
of war.

Turning, then, from a state of peace to that of war, we find, at the very
threshold, a very important exception to the rule, if it exists at all, in the
case of spies. None can doubt that, if a spy is detected and arrested, he
is individually and personally responsible, though his pockets should be
filled with all the authority the country which employed him could give.

But is the case of spies the only exception 1 Are they alone person
ally and individually responsible 1 Far otherwise. The war may be de
clared in the most solemn manner ; the invaders may carry with them the
highest authority of their government ; and yet, so far from exempting
them individually, officers, men, and all, maybe slaughtered and destroyed
in almost every possible manner, not only without the violation of inter
national laws, but with rich honour and glory to their destroyers. Talk
of the responsibility of the government exempting their instruments from
responsibility! How, let me ask, can the government be made responsi
ble but through its agents or instruments ] Separate the government
from them, and what is it but an ideal, intangible thing 1 True it is,
when an invading enemy is captured or surrenders, his life is protected
by the laws of nations as they now stand j but not because the authority
of his government protects it, or that he is not responsible to the invaded
country. It is to be traced to a different and higher source — the prog
ress of civilization, which has mitigated the laws of war. Originally it
was different. The life of an invader might be taken, whether armed or
disarmed. He who captured an enemy had a right to take his life. The
older writers on the laws of nations traced the lawfulness of making a
slave of a prisoner to the fact that he who captured him had a right to
take his life ; and, if he spared it, a right to his service. To commute
death unto servitude was the first step in mitigating the horrors of war.
That has been followed by a farther mitigation, which spares the life of a
prisoner, excepting the cases of spies, to whom the laws of war, as they
stood originally, are still in force. But, because their lives are spared,
prisoners do not cease to be individually responsible to the invaded coun
try. Their liberty, for the time, is forfeited to it. Should they attempt
to escape, or if there be danger of their being released by superior force,
their lives may be still taken, without regard to the fact that they acted
under the authority of their country. A demand on the part of their gov
ernment for an immediate release, on the ground assumed in this case,
would be regarded as an act of insanity.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 445

Now, sir, if the senators from Virginia and Massachusetts (Mr. Rives
and Mr. Choate) could succeed in making the case of the attack on the
Caroline to be an act of war, it would avail them nothing in their attempt
to defend the demand of Mr. Fox or the concession of Mr. Webster.
M'Leod, if it be war, would be a prisoner of war, which, if it protected his
life, would forfeit his liberty. In that character, so far from his government
having a right to demand his immediate release under a threat of war, our
government would have the unquestionable right to detain him till there was
a satisfactory termination of the war by the adjustment of the question.

To place this result in a stronger view, suppose, after the destruction
of the Caroline, the armed band which perpetrated the act had been cap
tured, on their retreat, by an armed force of our citizens, would they not,
if the transaction is to be regarded as war, justly have been considered
as prisoners of war, to be held as such in actual confinement, if our gov
ernment thought proper, till the question was amicably settled'? And
would not the demand for their immediate release, in such a case, be re
garded as one of the most insolent ever made by one independent coun
try on another 1 And can the fact that one of tae band has come into our
possession as M'Leod has, if it is to be considered as war, vary the case
in the least 1 Viewed in this light, the authority or sanction of the British
government would be a good defence against th? charge of murder or
arson, but it would be no less so against his release.

But this is not a case of war, formal or informal, taking the latter in the
broadest sense. It has not been thought so, nor so treated, by either
government ; and Mr. Webster himself, in his reply to Mr. Fox, which has
been so lauded by the two senators, speaks of ft as "a hostile intrusion
into the territory of a power at peace." The transaction comes under a
class of cases fully recognised by writers on international law as distinct
from war — that of belligerants entering with force the territories of neu
trals ; and it only remains to determine whether, when viewed in this, its
true light, our secretary has taken the grounds which our rights and honour
required against the demand of the British minister.

Thus regarded, the first point presented for consideration is, whether
Great Britain, as a belligerant, was justified in entering our territory
under the circumstances she did. And here let me remark, that it is a
fundamental principle in the laws of nations, that every state or nation
has full and complete jurisdiction over its own territory, to the exclusion
of all others — a principle essential to independence, and, therefore, held
most sacred. It is accordingly laid down by all writers on those laws
who treat of the subject, that nothing short of extreme necessity can justify
a belligerant in entering, with an armed force, on the territory of a neu
tral power, and, when entered, in doing any act which is not forced
on them by the like necessity which justified the entering. In both of
the positions I am held out by the secretary himself. The next point to
be considered is, Did Great Britain enter our territory in this case under
any such necessity I and, if she did, were her acts limited by such neces
sity 1 Here, again, I may rely on the authority of the secretary, and, if it
had not already been quoted by both of the senators on the other side
who preceded me, I would read the eloquent passage towards the close
of his letter to Mr. Fox, which they did with so much applause. With
this high authority, I may then assume that the government of Great
Britain, in this case, had no authority under the laws of nations, either to
enter our territory, or to do what was done in the destruction of the Car
oline, after it was entered.

Now, sir, I ask, under this statement of the case, What ought to have
been our reply when the peremptory demand was made for the immediate

446 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

release of M'Leod 1 Ought not our Secretary of State to have told
Mr. Fox that we regarded the hostile entry into our territory, and what
was perpetrated after the entry, as without warrant under the laws of
nations] That the fact had been made known to his government Ion""
since, immediately after the transaction 1 That we had received no
explanation or answer 1 That we had no reason for believing that his
government had sanctioned the act 1 That M'Leod had been arrested
and indicted under the local authority of New- York, without possibility
of knowing that the transaction had been sanctioned by it 1 That we
still regarded the transaction in the light we originally did, and could not
even consider the demand till the conduct of which we had complained was
explained 1 But, in the mean time, that M'Leod might have the benefit
of the fact on his trial, that the transaction was sanctioned by his govern
ment, it would be transmitted, in due form, to those who had charge of
his defence 1

Here let me say that I entirely concur with Mr. Forsyth, that the ap
proval of the British government of the transaction in question was an
important fact in the trial of M'Leod, without, however, pretending to
offer an opinion whether it would be a valid reason against a charge of
murder, of which the essence was killing with malice prepense. It is a
point for the court and jury, and not for us, to decide. Nor do I intend
to venture an opinion whether, if found guilty, with the knowledge of the
fact that his government approved of his conduct, it ought not to be good
cause for his pardon, on high considerations of humanity and policy. I
leave both questions, without remark, to those to whom the decision
properly belongs, except fco express my conviction that there is not,. and
has not been, the least danger that any step would be taken towards him
not* fully sustained by justice, humanity, and sound policy. Any step
which did not strictly comport with these would shock the whole com
munity.

Having taken the ground, I have indicated that we ought to have re
ceived explanation before we responded to a peremptory demand ; there
we ought to have rested till we had first received explanation. It is a
maxim, that he who seeks equity must do equity ; and, on the same
principle, a government that seeks to enforce the laws of nations in a
particular case against another, ought to show that it has first observed
them, on its own part, in the same transaction, or at least show plausible
reasons fop thinking that it had. None but a proud and haughty nation
like England would think of making the demand she has without even
deigning 1o notice our complaints against her conduct in connexion with
the same (transaction ; and I cannot but think that, in yielding to her de
mand uncjer such circumstances, the secretary has not only failed to ex
act what is due to our rights and honour as an independent people, but
has, as far as the influence of the example may effect it, made a danger
ous innovation on the code of international laws. I cannot but think the
principle in which the demand to which he yielded was made is highly
adverse to the weaker power, which we must admit ourselves yet to be
when compared to Great Britain. Aggressions are rarely by the weak
against the stronger power, but the reverse ; and the practical effect of
the principle, if admitted, would be to change the responsibility of de
claring war from the aggressor, the stronger power, to the aggrieved,
the weaker ; a disadvantage so great, that the alternative of abandoning
the demand of redress for the aggression would almost invariably be
forced on the weaker, rather than to appeal to arms. This case itself will
furnish an illustration. We have been told again and again, in this dis
cussion, that, in yielding to the demand to release M'Leod, we do not sur-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 447

tender our right to hold Great Britain responsible ; that we have the
power and will to exact justice by arms. This may be so ; but is it not
felt on all sides that this is, I will not say empty boasting, but that it is
all talk! After yielding to the peremptory demand for his immediate re
lease ; after sending the attorney-general to look after his safety, and
employing able counsel to defend him against the laws of the state, the
public feeling must be too much let down to think of taking so bold and
responsible a measure as that of declaring war. The only hope we could
ever have had for redress for the aggression would have been to demand
justice of the British government before we answered her demand on us ;
and I accordingly regard the acquiescence in the demand for release,
without making a demand of redress on our part, as settling all questions
connected with the transaction. Thus regarding it, I must say that,
though I am ready to concede to Mr. Webster's letter in reply to Mr.
Fox all the excellences which his friends claim for it, the feeling that it
was out of place destroyed all its beauties in my eyes. Its lofty senti
ments and strong condemnation of the act would have shown to advan
tage in a letter claiming redress on our part before yielding to a per
emptory demand ; but, afterward, it looked too much like putting on
uirs when it was too late, after having made an apology, and virtually con
ceded the point at issue. In truth, the letter indicates that Mr. Webster
was not entirely satisfied with his ready compliance with Mr. Fox's de
mand, of which the part where he says he is not certain that he correctly
understood him 'in demanding an immediate release furnishes «a striking
instance.

There could be but little doubt as to what was meant ; but the assump
tion of one afforded a convenient opportunity of modifying the ground
he first took.

XXXI.

SPEECH ON THE DISTRIBUTION BILL, AUGUST 24, 1841.

MR. CALHOUN said : If this bill should become a law, it would make a wi
der breach in the Constitution, and be followed by changes more disastrous,
than any one measure which has ever been Adopted. It would, in its violation
of the Constitution, go far beyond the general-welfare doctrine of former days,
which stretched the power of the government as far as it was then supposed
was possible by construction, however bold. But, as wide as were the limits
which it assigned to the powers of the government, it admitted by implication
that there were limits ; while this bill, as I shall show, rests on principles which,
if admitted, would supersede all limits.

According to the general-welfare doctrine, Congress had power to raise
money, and appropriate it to all objects which it might deem calculated to pro
mote th^e general welfare — that is, the prosperity of the states, regarded in their
aggregate character as members of the Union, or, to express it more briefly,
and in language once so common, to national objects ; thus excluding, by ne
cessary implication, all that were not national, as falling within the spheres of
the separate states. As wide as are these limits, they are too narrow for this
bill. It takes in what is excluded under the general-welfare doctrine, and as
sumes for Congress the right to raise money to give, by distribution, to the
states ; that is, to be applied by them to those very local state objects to which
that doctrine, by necessary implication, denied that Congress had a right to ap
propriate money ; and thus superseding all the limits of the "Constitution, as far.

448 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALI10UN.

at least, as the money power is concerned. The advocates of this extraordi
nary doctrine have, indeed, attempted to restrict it, in their argument, to revenue
derived from the public lands ; but facts speak louder than words. To test the
sincerity of their argument, amendments after amendments have been offered to
limit the operation of the bill exclusively to the revenue derived from that
source, but which, as often as offered, have been steadily voted down by their
united votes. But I take higher ground. The aid of those test votes, as'strong-
as they are, is not needed to make good the assumption that Congress has the
right to lay and collect taxes for the separate use of the states. The circum
stances under which it is attempted to force this bill through speak, of them
selves, a language too distinct to be misunderstood.

The treasury is exhausted ; the revenues from the public lands cannot be
spared ; they are needed*for the pressing and necessary wants of the govern
ment. For every dollar withdrawn from the treasury and given to the states,
a dollar must be raised from the customs to supply its place : that is admitted.
Now, I put it to the advocates of this bill, Is there, can there be, any real dif
ference, either in principle or effect, between raising money from custom? to
be divided among the states, and raising the same amount from them to supply
the place of an equal sum withdrawn from the treasury to be divided among the
states 1 If there be a difference, my faculties are not acute enough to perceive
it, and I would thank any one who can to point it out. But, if this difficulty could
be surmounted, it would avail nothing, unless another, not inferior, can also be
got over. The land from which the revenue proposed to be divided is derived
was purchased (with the exception of the small portion, comparatively, lying
between the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers) out of the common funds of the Union,
and with money derived, for the most part, from customs. I do not exempt the
portion acquired from Georgia, which was purchased at its full value, and cost
as much, in proportion, as Florida purchased from Spain, or Louisiana from
France.

If money cannot be raised from customs or other sources for distribution, I
ask, How can money, derived from the sales of land purchased with money rais
ed from the customs or other sources, be distributed among the states 1 If the
money could not be distributed before it was rested in land, on what principle
can it be Avhen it is converted back again into money by the sales of the land 1
If, prior to the purchase, it was subject, in making appropriations, to the limits
prescribed by the Constitution, how can it, after having been converted back
again into money by the sale of the lane?, be freed from those limits 1 By what
art, what political alchymy, could the ciere passage of the money through the
lands free it from the constitutional fliackles to which it was previously subject ?

But if this difficulty, also, could be surmounted, there is another, not less
formidable and more comprehensive, still to be overcome. If the lands belong
to the states at all, they must belong to them in one of two capacities — either
in their federative character, as members of a common Union, or in their separ
ate, as distinct and independent communities. If the former, this government,
which was created as a common agent to carry into effect the objects for which
the Union was formed, holds the lands, as it does all its other delegated pow
ers, as a trustee for the states in their Federal character, for the execution of
those objects, and no other purpose whatever ; and can, of course, under the
grant of the Constitution " to dispose of the territories or other property belong
ing to the United States," dispose of the lands only under its trust powers, and
in execution of the objects for which they were granted by the Constitution.
When, then, the lands, or other property of the United States, are disposed of
by sale — that is, converted into money — the trust, with all its limitations, at
taches as fully to the money as it did to the lands or property of which it is
the proceeds. Nor would the government have any more right to divide the
land or the money among the states — that is, to surrender it to them— than it

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALIIOUN. 449

would have to surrender any other of its delegated powers. If it may surren
der either to the states, it may also surrender the power of declaring war, lay
ing duties, or coining money. They are all delegated by the same parties, held
under the same instrument, and in trust, for the execution of the same objects.
The assumption of such a right is neither more nor less than the assumption of
a right paramount to the Constitution itself — the right on the part of the gov
ernment to destroy the instrument and dissolve the Union, from which it derives
its existence. To such monstrous results must the principle on which this bill
rests lead, on the supposition that the lands — that is, the territories — belong to
the United States, as they are expressly declared to do by the Constitution.

But the difficulty would not be less if they should be considered as belong
ing to the states in their individual and separate character. So considered,
what right can this government possibly have over them ? It is the agent or
trustee for the United States ; the states as members of a common Union, and
not of the states individually, each of which has a separate government of its
own to represent it in that capacity. For this government to assume to repre
sent them in both capacities would be to assume all power — to centralize the
whole system in itself. But, admitting this bold assumption, on what princi
ple of right or justice, if the lands really belong to the states — or, which is the
same thing, if the revenue from the lands belong to them — can this government
impose the various limitations prescribed in the bill ? What right has it, on that
supposition, to appropriate funds belonging to the states separately to the use
of the Union, in the event of war, or in case the price of the lands should be
increased above a dollar and a quarter an acre, or any article of the tariff.above
twenty per centum ad valorem ?

Such, and so overwhelming, are the constitutional difficulties which beset
this measure. No one who can overcome them — who can bring himself to
vote for this bill — need trouble himself about constitutional scruples hereafter.
He may swallow without hesitation, bank, tariff, and every other unconstitu
tional measure which has ever been adopted or proposed. Yes : it would be
easier to make a plausible argument for the constitutionality of the most mon
strous of the measures proposed by the Abolitionists — for abolition itself — than
for this detestable bill ; -and yet we find senators from slaveholding states, the
very safety of whose constituents depends on a strict construction of the Con
stitution, recording their names in favour of a measure from which they have
nothing to hope and everything to fear. To what is a course so blind to be at
tributed, but to that fanaticism of party zeal, openly avowed on this floor, which
regards the preservation of the power of the Whig party as the paramount con
sideration ? It has staked its existence on the passage of this and the other meas
ures for which this extraordinary session was called ; and when it is brought to
the alternative of their defeat or success, in the anxiety to avoid the one and
secure the other, constituents, Constitution, duty, arid country — all are forgotten.
A measure which would make so wide and fatal a breach in the Constitu
tion could not but involve in its consequences many and disastrous changes in
our political system, too numerous to be traced in a speech. It would require
a volume to do them justice. As many as may fall within the scope of my re
marks, I shall touch in their proper place. Suffice it for the present to say,
that such and so great would they be, as to disturb and confound the relations of
fall the constituent parts of our beautiful but complex system — of that between
this and the co-ordinate governments of the states, and between them and their
respective constituency. Let the principle of the distribution of the revenue,
on which this bill rests, be established, and it would follow, as certainly as it is
now before us, that this government and those of the states would be placed in
antagonist relations on all subjects except the collection and distribution of rev
enue ; which would end, in time, in converting this into a mere machine of
collection and distribution for those of the states, to the utter neglect of all the

L L L

450 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

functions for which it was created. Then the^ proper responsibility of each to
their respective constituency would be destroyed ; then would succeed a scene
of plunder and corruption without parallel, to be followed by dissolution, or an
entire change of system. Yes : if any one measure can dissolve this Union,
this is that measure. The revenue is the state, said the great British states
man, Burke. With us, to divide the revenue among its members is to divide
the Union. This bill proposes to divide that from the lands. Take one step
more, to which this will lead if not arrested — divide the revenue from the cus
toms, and what of union would be left? I touched more fully on this, and
other important points connected with this detestable measure, during the dis
cussions of the last session, and shall not now repeat what I then said.

What I now propose is, to trace the change it would make in our financial
system, with its bearings on what ought to be the policy of the government. I
have selected it, not because it is the most important, but because it is that
which has heretofore received the least attention.

This government has heretofore been supported almost exclusively from two
sources of revenue — the lands and the customs ; excepting a short period at its
commencement, and during the late war, when it drew a great portion of its
means from internal taxes. The revenue from lands has been constantly and
steadily increasing with the increase of population, and may, for the next ten
years, be safely estimated to yield an annual average income of $5,000,000, if
they should be properly administered : a sum equal to more than a fourth of
what the entire expenditures of the government ought to be with due economy,
and restricted to the objects for which it was instituted.

This bill proposes to withdraw this large, permanent, and growing source of
revenue from the treasury of the Union, and to distribute it among the several
states ; and the question is, Would it be wise to do so,, viewed as a financial
measure, in reference to what ought to be the policy of the government ? which
brings up the previous question. WThat ought that policy to be ? In the order of
things, the question of policy precedes that of finance. The latter has refer
ence to, and is dependant on, the former. It must first be determined what
ought to be done, before it can be ascertained how much revenue will be re
quired, and on what it ought to be raised.

To the question, then,. What ought to V>e the policy of the government ? the
shortest and most comprehensive answer whicK I can give is, that it ought to
be the very opposite of that for which this extraordinary session was called, and
of which this measure forms so prominent a part. The effect of these measuros
is to divide and distract the country within, and to weaken it without ; the very
reverse of the objects for which the government was instituted — which was to
give peace, tranquillity, and harmony within, and power, security, and respect
ability without. We find, accordingly, that without, where strength was re
quired, its powers are undivided. In its exterior relations — abroad, this gov
ernment is the sole and exclusive representative of the united majesty, sover
eignty, and power of the states constituting this great and glorious Union. To
the rest of the world we are one. Neither state nor state government is
known beyond our borders. Within it is different. There we form twenty-
six distinct, independent, and sovereign communities, each with its separate
government, whose powers are as exclusive within as that of this government
is without, with the exception of three classes of powers which are delegated
to it. The first is, those that were necessary to the discharge of its exterior
functions — such as declaring war, raising armies, providing a navy, and raising
revenue. The reason for delegating these requires no explanation. The next
class consists of those powers that were necessary to regulate the exterior or
international relations of the states among themselves, considered as distinct
communities — powers that could not be exercised by the states separately, and
the regulation of which was necessary to their peace, tranquillity, and that free

451

intercourse, social and commercial, which ought to exist between confederated
states. Such are those of regulating commerce between the states, coming
money, and fixing the value thereof, and the standard of weights and measures.
The remaining class consists of those powers which, though not belonging to
the exterior relations of the states, are of such nature that they could not be ex
ercised by states separately without one injuring the other — such as imposing
duties on imports ; in exercising which, the maritime states, having the ad
vantage of good ports, would tax those who would have to draw their supply
through them. In asserting that, with these exceptions, the powers of the states
are exclusive within, I speak in general terms. There are, indeed, others not
reducible to either of these classes, but they are too few and inconsiderable to
be regarded as exceptions.

On the moderate and prudent exercise of these, its interior powers, the suc
cess of the government, and with it our entire political system, mainly depend.
If the government should be restricted in their exercise to the objects for which
they are delegated, peace, harmony, and tranquillity would reign within ; and
the attention of the government, unabsorbed by distracting questions within, and
its entire resources unwasted by expenditures on objects foreign to its duties,
would be directed with all its energy to guard against danger from without, to
give security to our vast commercial and navigating interest, and to acquire that
weight and respectability for our name in the family of nations which ought to
belong to the freest, most enterprising, arid most growing people on the globe.
If thus restricted in the exercise of these, the most delicate of its powers, and
in the exercise of which only it can come in conflict with the governments of
the states, or interfere with their interior policy and interest, this government,
with our whole political system, would work like a charm, and become the ad
miration of the world. The states, left undisturbed within their separate spheres,
and each in the full possession of its resources, would, with that generous ri
valry which always takes place between clusters of free states of the same or
igin and language, and which gives the greatest possible impulse to improve
ment, carry excellence in all that is desirable beyond any former example.

But if, instead of restricting these powers to their proper objects, they should
be perverted to those never intended ; if, for example, that of raising revenue
should be perverted into that of protecting one branch of industry at the expense
of others ; that of collecting and disbursing the revenue into that of incorpora
ting a great central bank, to be located at some favoured point, and placed under
local control ; and that of making appropriations for specified objects, into that
of expending money on whatever Congress should think proper — all this would
be reversed. Instead of harmony and tranquillity within, there would be dis
cord, distraction, and conflict, followed by the absorption of the attention of the
government, and exhaustion of its means and energy on objects never intended
to be placed under its control, to the utter neglect of the duties belonging to the
exterior relations of the government, and which are exclusively confided to its
charge. Such has been, and ever must be, the effect of perverting these pow
ers to objects foreign to the Constitution. When thus perverted, they become
unequal in their action, operating to the benefit of one part or class to the inju
ry of another part or class — to the benefit of the manufacturing against the ag
ricultural and commercial portions, or of the non-productive against the produ
cing class. The more extensive the country, the greater would be the inequali
ty and oppression. In ours, stretching over two thousand square mile% they
become intolerable when pushed beyond moderate limits. It is then conflicts
take place, from the struggle on the part of those who are benefited by the op
eration of an unequal system of legislation to retain their advantage, and on the
part of the oppressed to resist it. When this state of things occurs, it is nei
ther more nor less than a state of hostility between the oppressor and oppressed
— war waged not by armies, but by laws ; acts and sections of acts are sent by

452 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOTJN.

the stronger party on a plundering expedition, instead of divisions and brigades,
which often return more richly laden with spoils than a plundering expedition
after the most successful foray.

That such must be the effect of the system of measures now attempted to be
forced on the government by the perversion of its interior powers, I appeal to
the voice of experience in aid of the dictates of reason. I go back to the be
ginning of the government, and ask, What, at its outset, but this very system of
measures caused the great struggle which continued down to 1828, when the
system reached its full growth in the tariff of that year ? And what, from that
period to the termination of the late election which brought the present party
into power, has disturbed the harmony and tranquillity of the country, deranged
its currency, interrupted its business, endangered its liberty and institutions, but
a struggle on one side to overthrow, and on the other to uphold the system ?
In that struggle it fell prostrate : and what now agitates the country, what caus
es this extraordinary session, with all its excitement, but the struggle on the
part of those in power to restore the system ; to incorporate a bank ; to re-enact
a protective tariff'; to distribute the revenue from the lands ; to originate anoth
er debt, and renew the system of wasteful expenditures ; and the resistance on
the part of the opposition to prevent it ? Gentlemen talk of settling these ques
tions : they deceive themselves. They cry peace, peace, when there is no
peace. There never can be peace till they are abandoned, or till our free and
popular institutions are succeeded by the calm of despotism ; and that not till
the spirit of our patriotic and immortal ancestors, who achieved our independ
ence and established our glorious political system, shall become extinct, and their
descendants a base and sordid rabble. Till then, or till our opponents shall be
expelled from power, and their hope of restoring and maintaining their system
of measures is blasted, the struggle will be continued, the tranquillity and har
mony of the country be disturbed, and the strength and resources of the govern
ment be wasted within, and its duties neglected without.

But, of all the measures which constitute this pernicious system, there is not
one more subversive of the objects for which the government was instituted,
none more destructive of harmony within and security without, than that now
under consideration. Its direct tendency is to universal discord and distraction ;
to array the new states against the old, the non-indebted against the indebted,
the staple against the manufacturing ; one class against another ; and, finally,
the people against the government. But I pass these. My object is not to
trace political consequences, but to discuss the financial bearings of this meas
ure, regarded in reference to what ought to be the policy of the government ;
which, I trust, I have satisfactorily shown ought to be, to turn its attention, en
ergy, and resources from within to without, to its appropriate and exclusive
sphere, that of guarding against danger from abroad ; giving free scope and pro
tection to our commerce and navigation, and that elevated standing to the coun
try to which it is so fairly entitled in the family of nations. It becomes neces
sary to repeat, preparatory to what I propose, that the object of this measure is
to Avithdraw the revenue from the public lands from the treasury of the Union,
to be divided among the states ; that the probable annual amount that would be
so drawn would average the next ten years not less than five millions of dol
lars ; and that, to make up the deficit, an equal sum must be laid on the imports.
Such is the measure, regarded as one of finance ; and the question is, Would
it be jiist, wise, expedient, considered in its bearings on what ought to be the
policy of the government ?

The measure, on its face, is but a surrender of one of the two sources of rev
enue to the states, to be divided among them in proportion to their joint delega
tion in the two houses of Congress, and to impose a burden to an equal amount
on the imports ; that is, on the foreign commerce of the country. In every view
I cnn t?Jie, it is preposterous, unequal, and unjust. Regarded in its most fa-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 453

vourable aspect — that is, on the supposition that the people of each state would
pay back to the treasury of the Union, through the tax on the imports, in order
to make up the deficit, a sum equal to that received by the state as its distribu
tive share ; and that each individual would receive of that sum an amount equal
in proportion to what he paid of the taxes — what would that be but the folly of
giving with one hand and taking back with the other ? It would, in fact, be
worse. Giving and taking back must be paid for, which, in this case, would
be not a little expensive and troublesome. The expense of collecting the
duties on imports is known to be about ten per cent. ; to which must be
added the expense and trouble of distribution, with the loss of the use of the
money while the process is going on, which may be fairly estimated at two
per cent, additional ; making, in all, twelve per cent, for the cost of the pro
cess. It follows that the people of the state, in order to return back to the
treasury of the Union an amount equal to the sum received by distribution, would
have each to pay, by the supposition, twelve per cent, more of taxes than his
share of the sum distributed. That sum (equal to six hundred thousand dollars
on five millions) would go to the collectors of the taxes — the custom-house of
ficers — for their share of the public spoils.

But it is still worse. It is unequal and unjust, as well as foolish and absurd.
The case supposed would not be the real state of the facts. It would be scarce
ly possible so to arrange a system of taxes under which the people of each state
would pay back a sum just equal to that received ; much less that the taxes
should fall on each individual in the state in the same proportion that he would
receive of the sum distributed to the state. But, if this be possible, it is certain
that no system of taxes on imports — especially the bill sent from the other house
— can make such equalization. So far from that, I hazard nothing in asserting
that the staple states would pay into the treasury, under its operation, three
times as much as they would receive on an average by the distribution, and
some of them far more ; while to the manufacturing states, if we are to judge
from their zeal in favour of the bill, the duties it proposes to impose would be
bounties, not taxes. If judged by their acts, both measures — the distribution
and the duties — would favour their pockets. They would be gainers, let who
may be losers in this financial game.

But be the inequality greater or less than my estimate, what could be more
unjust than to distribute a common fund in a certain proportion among the states,
and to compel the people of the states to make up the deficit in a different pro
portion ; so that some shall pay more, and others less, than what they respect
ively received ? What is it but a cunningly-devised scheme to take from one
state and to give to another — to replenish the treasuries of some of the states
from the pockets of the people of the others ; in reality, to make them support
the governments and pay the debts of other states, as well as their own 1 Such
must be the necessary result, as between the states which may pay more than
they receive, and those which may receive more than they pay ; the injustice
and inequality will increase or decrease, just in proportion to the respective ex
cess or deficit between receipts and payments, under this flagitious contrivance
for plunder.

But I have not yet reached the reality of this profligate and wicked scheme.
As unequal and unjust as it would be between state and state, it is still more so
regarded in its operation between individuals. It is between them its true
character and hideous features fully disclose themselves. The money to be
distributed would riot go to the people, but to the legislatures of the states ;
while that to be paid in taxes to make up the deficiency would be taken from
them individually. A small portion of that which would go to the legislatures
would ever reach the pockets of the people. It would be under the control and
management of the dominant party of the Legislature, and they under the con
trol and management of the leaders of the party. That it would be administer-

454 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

ed to the advantage of themselves, and their friends and partisans ; and that they
would profit more by their use and management of an irresponsible fund, taken
from nobody knows who, than they would lose as payers of the taxes to supply
its place, will not be doubted by any one who knows how such things are man
aged. What would be the result ? The whole of the revenue from the im
mense public domain would, if this wicked measure should become the settled
policy, go to the profit and aggrandizement of the leaders, for the time, of the
dominant party in the twenty-six state legislatures, and their partisans and sup
porters ; that is, to the most influential, if not the most wealthy clique, for the
time, in the respective states ; while the deficiency would be supplied from the
pockets of the great mass of the community, by taxes on tea, coffee, salt, iron,
coarse woollens, and, for the most part, other necessaries of life. And what is
that but taking from the many and giving to the few — from those who look to
their own means and industry for the support of themselves and families, and
giving to those who look to the government for support, to increase the profit
and influence of political managers and their partisans, and diminish that of the
people? When it is added that the dominant party in each state for the time
would have a direct interest in keeping up and enlarging this pernicious fund,
and that their combined influence must for the time be irresistible, it is difficult
to see by what means the country can ever extricate itself from this measure,
should it be once established, or what limits can be prescribed to its growth,
or the extent of the disasters which must follow. It contains the germe of
mighty and fearful changes, if it be once permitted to shoot its roots into our
political fabric, unless, indeed, it should be speedily eradicated.

In what manner the share that would fall to the states would, in the first in
stance, be applied, may, for the most part, be anticipated. The indebted states
would probably pledge it to the payment of their debts ; the effect of which
would be to enhance their value in the hands of the holders — the Rothschilds,
the Barings, the Hopes, on the other side of the Atlantic, with wealthy brokers
and stock-jobbers on this. Were this done at the expense of the indebted states,
none could object. But far different is the case when at the expense of the
Union, by the sacrifice of the noble inheritance left by our ancestors, and when
the loss of this great and permanent fund must be supplied from the industry
and property of a large portion of the community, who had no agency or respon
sibility in contracting the debts, or benefit from the objects on which the funds
were expended. On what principle of justice, honour, or Constitution, can this
government interfere, and take from their pockets to increase the profit of the
most wealthy individuals in the world ?

The portion that might fall to the states not indebted, or those not deeply so,
would probably, for the most part, be pledged as a fund on which to make new-
loans for new schemes similar to those for which the existing state debts were
contracted. It may not be applied so at first ; but such would most likely be
the application on the first swell of the tide of expansion. Supposing one
half of the whole sum to be derived from the lands should be so applied : esti
mating the income from that source at five millions, the half would furnish the
basis of a new debt of forty or fifty millions. Stock to that amount would be
created — would find its way to foreign markets, and would return, as other
stocks of like kind have, in swelling the tide of imports in the first instance,
but in the end by diminishing them to an amount equal to the interest on the
sum borrowed, and cutting off in the same proportion the permanent revenue
from the customs ; and this, when the whole support of the government is about
to be thrown exclusively on the foreign commerce of the country. So much
for the permanent effects, in a firancial view, of this measure.

The swelling of the tide of imports, in the first instance, from the loans,
would lead to a corresponding flush of revenue, and that to extravagant ex
penditures, to be followed by embarrassment of the treasury, and a glut of

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 455

goods, which would bring on a corresponding pressure on the manufacturers ;
when my friend from Massachusetts (Mr. Bates), and other senators from that
quarter, would cry out for additional protection, to guard against the necessary
consequences of the very measure they are now so urgently pressing through
the Senate. Such would be the consequences of this measure, regarded as one
of finance, and in reference to its internal operation. It is not possible but that
such a measure, so unequal and unjust between state and state, section and
section — between those who live by their own means and industry, and those
who live or expect to live on the public crib — would add greatly to that discord
and strife within, and weakness without, which are necessarily consequent on
the Entire system of measures of which it forms a part.

But its mischievous effects on the exterior relations of the country would not
be limited to its indirect consequences. There it would strike a direct and
deadly blow, by withdrawing entirely from the defences of the country one of
the only two sources of our revenue, and that much the most permanent and
growing. It is now in the power of Congress to pledge permanently this great
and increasing fund to that important object — to completing the system of forti
fications, and building, equipping, and maintaining a gallant navy. It was pro
posed to strike out the whole bill ; to expunge the detestable project of distri
bution, and to substitute in its place the revenue from the public lands, as a
permanent fund, sacred to the defences of the country. And from what quar
ter did this patriotic and truly statesmanlike proposition come ? From the far
and gallant West ; from a senator (Mr. Linn) of a state the most remote from
the ocean, and secure from danger. And by whom was it voted down ? Strange
to tell, by senators from maritime states — states most exposed, and having the
deepest interest in the measure defeated by their representatives on this floor.
Wonderful as it may seem, Louisiana, Mississippi, Georgia, and South Caro
lina, each gave a vote against it. North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, Dela
ware, and New- Jersey, gave each two votes against it. New-York gave one ;
and every vote^rom New-England, but two from New-Hampshire and one from
Maine, was cast against it. Be it remembered in all after times, that these
votes from states so exposed, and having so deep a stake in the defence of the
country, were cast in favour of distribution — of giving gratuitously a large por
tion of the fund from the public domain to wealthy British capitalists, and
against the proposition for applying it permanently to the sacred purpose of de
fending their own shores from insult and danger. How strange that New-
York and New-England, with their hundreds of millions of property, and so
many thousands of hardy and enterprising sailors annually afloat, should give
so large a vote for a measure above all others best calculated to withdraw pro
tection from both, and so small a vote against one best calculated to afford them
protection ! But, strange as that may be, it is still more strange that the staple
states — the states that will receive so little from distribution, and which must
pay so much to make up the deficiency it will cause — states so defenceless on
their maritime frontier — should cast so large a vote for their own oppression,
and against their own defence ! Can folly, can party infatuation, be the cause
one or both, go farther ?

Let me say to the senators from the commercial and navigating states, in all
soberness, that there is now a warm and generous feeling diffused throughout
the entire Union in favour of the arm of defence with which your interest and
glory are so closely identified. Is it wise, by any act of yours, to weaken or
alienate such feelings ? And could you do an act more directly calculated to
do so ? Remember, it is a deep principle of our nature not to regard the safety
of those who do not regard their own. If you are indifferent to your own
safety, you must not be surprised if those less interested should become still
more so.

But as much as the defences of the country would be weakened directly by

456 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALIIOUN.

the withdrawal of so large a fund, the blow would be by no means so heavy as
that which, in its consequences, would fall on them. That -would paralyze the
right arm of our power. To understand fully how it would have that effect, we
must look not only to the amount of the sum to be withdrawn, but also on what
the burden would fall to make up the deficiency. It would fall on the com
merce of the country, exactly where it would do most to cripple the means of
defence. To illustrate the truth of what I state, it will be necessary to inquire
what would be our best system of defence. And that would involve the prior
question, From what quarter are we most exposed to danger ? With that I shall
accordingly begin.

There is but one nation on the globe from which we have anything serious
to apprehend, but that is the most powerful that now exists or ever did exist.
I refer to Great Britain. She is, in effect, our near neighbour, though the wide
Atlantic divides us. Her colonial possessions stretch along the whole extent
of our Eastern and Northern borders, from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean.
Her power and influence extend over the numerous Indian tribes scattered
along our Western border, from our Northern boundary to the infant Republic
of Texas. But it is on our maritime frontier, extending from the mouth of the
Sabine to that of St. Croix — a distance, with the undulations of the coast, of
thousands of miles, deeply indented with bays and navigable rivers, and studded
with our great commercial emporiums ; it is there, on that long line of frontier,
that she is the most powerful, and we the weakest and most vulnerable. It is
there she stands ready, with her powerful navy, sheltered in the commanding
positions of Halifax, Bermuda, and the Bahamas, to strike a blow at any point
she may select on this long line of coast. Such is the quarter from which only
we have danger to apprehend ; and the important inquiry which next presents
itself is, How can we best defend ourselves against a power so formidable, thus
touching us on all points, excepting the small portion of our boundary along
which Texas joins us ?

Every portion of our extended frontier demands attention, mland as well as
maritime ; but with this striking difference : that on the former, our power is
as much greater than hers as hers is greater than ours on the maritime. There
we would be the assailant, and whatever works may be erected there ought to
have reference to that fact, and look mainly to protecting important points from
sudden seizure and devastation, rather than to guard against any permanent
lodgment of a force within our borders.

The difficult problem is the defence of our maritime frontier. That, of course,
must consist of fortifications and a navy -, but the question is, Which ought to
be mainly relied on, and to what extent may the one be considered as superse
ding the other ? On both points I propose to make a few remarks.

Fortifications, as the means of defence, are liable to two formidable objec
tions, either of which is decisive against them as an exclusive system of de
fence. The first is, that they are purely defensive. Let the system be ever
so perfect, the works located to the greatest advantage, and planned and con
structed in the best manner, and all they can do is to repel attack. They can-
riot assail. They are like a shield without a sword. If they should be regard
ed as sufficient to defend o*ur maritime cities, still they cannot command re
spect, or give security to our widely-spread and important commercial and nav
igating interests.

But regarded simply as the means of defence, they are defective. Fortifica
tions are nothing without men to garrison them ; and if we should have no oth
er means of defence, Great Britain could compel us. with a moderate fleet sta
tioned at the points mentioned, and with but a small portion of her large milita
ry establishment, to keep up on our part, to guard our coast, ten times the force,
at many times the cost, to garrison our numerous forts. Aided by the swiftness
of steam, she could menace at the same time every point of our coast ; while

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALlIOUtf. 457

we, ignorant of the time or point where the blow might fall, would have to stand
prepared, at every moment and at every point, to repel her attack. A hundred
thousand men constantly under arms would be insufficient for the purpose ; and
we would be compelled to yield, in the end, ingloriously, without striking a
blow, simply from the exhaustion of our means.

Some other mode of defence, then, must be sought. There is none other but
a navy. I, of course, include steam as well as sails. If we want to defend
our coast and protect our rights abroad, it is absolutely necessary. The only
questions are, How far ought our naval force to be carried ? and to what extent
would it supersede the system of fortification ?

Before I enter on the consideration of this important point, I owe it to my
self and the subject to premise that my policy is peace, and that I look to the
navy but as the right arm of defence, not as an instrument of conquest or aggran
dizement. Our road to greatness, as I said on a late occasion, lies not over the
ruins of others. Providence has bestowed on us a new and vast region, abound
ing in resources beyond any country of the same extent on the globe. Ours
is a peaceful task — to improve this rich inheritance ; to level its forests ; cul
tivate its fertile soil ; develop its vast mineral resources ; give the greatest r£-
pidity and facility of intercourse between its widely-extended parts ; stud its
wide surface with flourishing cities, towns, and villages ; and spread over it
richly-cultivated fields. So vast is our country, that generations after genera
tions may pass away in executing this task, during the whole of which time we
would be rising more surely and rapidly in numbers, wealth, greatness, and in
fluence, than any other people have ever done by arras. But, to carry out suc
cessfully this, our true plan of acquiring greatness and happiness, it is not of
itself sufficient to have peace and tranquillity within. These are, indeed, neces
sary, in order to leave the states and their citizens in the full and undisturbed
possession of their resources and energy, by which to work out, in generous
rivalry, the high destiny which certainly awaits our country if we should be but
true to ourselves. But, as important as they may be, it is not much less so to
have safety against external danger, and the influence and respectability abroad
necessary to secure our exterior interests and rights (so important to our pros
perity) against aggression. I look to a navy for these objects, and it is within
the limits they assign I would confine its growth. To what extent, then, with
these views, ought our navy to be carried ? In my opinion, any navy less than
that which would give us the habitual command of our own coast and seas,
would be little short of useless. One that could be driven from sea and kept
in harbour by the force which Great Britain could safely and constantly allot
to our coast, would be of little more service than an auxiliary aid to our fortifi
cations in defending our harbours and maritime cities. It would be almost as
passive as they are, and would do nothing to diminish the expense, which I have
shown would be so exhausting, to defend the coast exclusively by fortifications.

But the difficult question still remains to be solved : What naval force would
be sufficient for that purpose ? It will not be expected that I should give more
than a conjectural answer to such a question. I have neither the data nor the
knowledge of naval warfare to speak with anything like precision, but I feel
assured that the force required would be far less than what would be thought
when the question is first propounded. The very idea of defending ourselves
on the ocean against the immense power of Great Britain on that element has
something startling at the first blush. But, as greatly as she outnumbers us in
ships and naval resources, we have advantages that countervail that, in refer
ence to the subject hi hand. If she has many ships, she has also many points
to guard, and these as widely separated as are the parts of her widely-extended
empire. She is forced to keep a home fleet in the Channel, another in the Bal
tic, another in the Mediterranean, one beyond the Cape of Good Hope, to guard
her important possessions in the East, and another in the Pacific. Our situa-

MM M

458 SPEECHES OF JOHN c. CALHOUN.

tion is the reverse. We have no foreign possessions, and not a point to guard
beyond our own maritime frontier. There our whole force may be concentra
ted, ready to strike whenever a vulnerable point is exposed. If to these advan
tages be added, that both France and Russia have large naval forces ; that be
tween us and them there is no point of conflict ; that they both watch the naval
supremacy of Great Britain with jealousy ; and that nothing is more easy than
for us to keep on good terms with both powers, especially with a respectable
naval force at our command, it will be readily perceived that a force far short
of that of Great Britain would effect what I contemplate. I would say a force
equal to one third of hers would suffice ; but if not, certainly less than half would.
And if so, a naval force of that size would enable us to dispense with all forti
fications, except at important points, and such as might be necessary in refer
ence to the navy itself, to the great relief of the treasury, and saving of means
to be applied to the navy, where it would be far more efficient. The less con
siderable points might be safely left to the defence of cheap works, sufficient to
repel plundering attacks ; as no large fleet, such as would be able to meet us,
with such a naval force as that proposed, would ever think of disgracing itself
by attacking places so inconsiderable.

Assuming, then, that a navy is indispensable to our defence, and that one less
than that supposed would be in a great measure useless, we are naturally led to
look into the sources of our naval power preparatory to the consideration of the
question how they will be affected by imposing on commerce the additional
burden this bill would make necessary.

Two elements are necessary to naval power — sailors and money. A navy
is an expensive force, and is only formidable when manned with regularly-bred
sailors. In our case, both of these depend on commerce. Commerce is indis
pensable to form a commercial marine, arid that to form a naval marine ; while
commerce is with us, if this bill should pass, the only source of revenue. A
flourishing commerce is, then, in every respect, the basis of our naval power ;
and to cripple commerce is to cripple that power — to paralyze the right arm of
our defence. But the imposition of onerous duties on commerce is the most
certain way to cripple it. Hence this detestable and mischievous measure,
which surrenders the only other source of revenue, and throws the whole bur
den of supporting the government exclusively on commerce, aims a deadly blow
at the vitals of our power.

The fatal effect of high duties on commerce is no longer a matter of specula
tion. The country has passed recently through two periods — one of protective
tariffs and high duties, and the other of a reduction of duties ; and we have the
effects of each in our official tables, both as it regards our tonnage and com
merce. They speak a language not to be mistaken, and far stronger than any
one could anticipate who has not looked into the tables, or made himself well
acquainted with the powerful operation of low duties in extending navigation
and commerce. As much as I had anticipated from their effects, the reduction
of the duties — the lightening of the burdens of commerce — have greatly ex
ceeded my most sanguine expectation.

I shall begin with the 'tonnage, as more immediately connected with naval
power ; and, in order to show the relative effects of high duties and low on our
navigation, I shall compare the period from 1824, when the first great increase
.. of protective duties took place, to 1830 inclusive, when the first reduction of
duties commenced. During these seven years, which include the operation of
the two protective tariffs of 1824 and 1828 — that is, the reign of the high pro
tective tariff system — our foreign tonnage fell off from 639,972 tons to 576,475,
equal to 61,497; our coasting tonnage from 719,190 to 615,310, equal to
103,880 tons — making the falling off in both equal to 165,370 tons. Yes ; to
that extent (103,880) did our coasting tonnage decline — the very tonnage, the
increase of which, it was confidently predicted by the protective party, would

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 459

make up for every possible loss in our foreign tonnage from their miserable
quack system. Instead of that, the falling oft* in the coasting trade is even
greater than in the foreign ; proving clearly that high duties are not less inju
rious to the home than to the foreign trade.

I pass now to the period (I will not say of free trade — it is far short of that)
of reduction of high protective duties ; and now mark the contrast between the
two. I begin with the year 1831, the first after the reduction was made on a few
articles (principally coffee and tea), and will take in the entire period down to
the last returns — that of 1840 — making a period of ten years. This period in
cludes the great reduction under the Compromise Act, which is not yet com
pleted, and which, in its farther progress, would add greatly to the increase, if
permitted to go through undisturbed. The tonnage in the foreign trade increas
ed during that period from 576,475 tons to 899,764, equal to 323,288 tons— not
much less than two thirds of the whole amount at the commencement of the pe
riod ; and the coasting for the same period increased from 615,310 to 1,280,999,
equal to 665,699 tons — more than double ; and this, too, when, according to the
high tariff doctrine, our coasting trade ought to have fallen off instead of in
creasing (in consequence of the reduction of the duties), and thus incontestably
proving that low duties are not less favourable to our domestic than to our for
eign trade. The aggregate tonnage for the period has increased from 1,191,776
to 2,180,763 — nearly doubled. Such, and so favourable to low duties in refer
ence to tonnage, is the result of the comparison between the two periods.

The comparison in reference to commerce will prove not less so. In ma
king the comparison, I shall confine myself to the export trade, not because it
gives results more favourable — for the reverse is the fact — but because the
heavy loans contracted by the states during the latter period (between 1830
and 1841) gave a factitious increase to the imports, which would make the
comparison appear more favourable than it ought in reality to be. Their effects
were different on the exports. They tended to decrease rather than increase '
their amount. Of the exports, I shall select domestic articles only, because
they only are affected by the rate of the duties, as the duties on foreign articles,
paid or secured by bond on their importation, are returned on reshipment.
With these explanatory remarks, I shall now proceed to the comparison.

The amount in value of domestic articles exported for 1825 was $66,944,745,
and in the year 1830, $59,462,029 ; making a falling off, under the high tariff
system, during that period, of $7,482,718. Divide the period into two equal
parts of three years each, and it will be found that the falling off in the aggre
gate of the latter part, compared to the former, is $13,090,255 ; showing an
average annual decrease of 84, 963,418 during the latter part, compared with
the former.

The result will be found very different on turning to the period from 1830,
when the reduction of the duties commenced, to 1840, during the whole of
which the reduction has been going on. The value of domestic exports for
1831 was $61,277,057, and for 1840, $113,895,634; making a difference of
$52,618,577, equal to eighty-three per cent, (omitting fractions) for the ten
years. If the period be divided into two equal parts of five years each, the
increase of the latter, compared to the former, will be found to be $139,089,371 ;
making an average annual increase for the latter period (from 1835 to 1840) of
$27,817,654. This rapid increase began with the great reduction under the
Compromise Act of 1833. The very next year after it passed, the domestic
exports rose from $81,034,162 to $101,189,082— just like the recoil which
takes place when the weight is removed from the spring.

But my friends from the manufacturing states will doubtless say that 'this
vast increase of exports from reduction of duties was confined to the great ag
ricultural staples, and that the effects were the reverse as to the export of do
mestic manufactures. With their notion of protection, they cannot be prepared

460 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

to believe that low duties are favourable to them. I ask them to give me their
attention while I show how great their error is. So far from not partaking of
this mighty impulse from reduction, they felt it more powerfully than other ar
ticles of domestic exports, as I shall now proceed to show from the tables.

The exports of domestic manufactures during the period from 1824 to 1832
inclusive — that is, the period of the high protective duties under the tariffs of
1824 and 1828— fell from $5,729,797 to $5,050,633, making a decline of
$679,133 during that period. This decline was progressive, and nearly uni
form, from year to year, through the whole period. In 1833 the Compromise
Act was passed, which reduced the duties at once nearly half, and has since
made very considerable progressive reduction. The exports of domestic man
ufactures suddenly, as if by magic, sprung forward, and have been rapidly and
uniformly increasing ever since ; having risen, in the eight years, from 1832 to
1840, from $505,633 to $12,108,538, a third more than double in that short
period, and that immediately following a great decline in the preceding period
of eight years, under high duties.

Such were the blighting effects of high duties on the tonnage and the com
merce of the country, and such the invigorating effects of their reduction.
There can be no mistake. The documents from which the statements are
taken are among the public records, and open to the inspection of all. The re
sults are based on the operations of a series of years, showing them to be the
consequence of fixed and steady causes, and not accidental circumstances ;
while the immediate and progressive decrease and increase of tonnage, both
coastwise and foreign, and of exports, including manufactured as well as other
articles, with the laying on of high duties, and the commencement and progress
of their reduction, point out, beyond all controversy, high duties jo be the cause
of one, and reduction — low duties — that of the other.

It will be in vain for the advocates of high duties to seek for a different ex
planation of the cause of these striking and convincing facts in the history of
the two periods. The first of these, from 1824 to 1832, is the very period when
the late Bank of the United States was in the fullest and most successful oper
ation ; when exchanges, according to their own showing, were the lowest and
most steady, and the currency the most uniform and sound ; and yet, with all
these favourable circumstances, which they estimate so highly, and with no
hostile cause operating from abroad, our tonnage and commerce, in every branch
on which the duties could operate, fell off: on the contrary, during the latter
period, when all the hostile causes which they are in the habit of daily denoun
cing on this floor, and of whose disastrous consequences we have heard so many
eloquent lamentations ; yes, in spite of contractions and expansions ; in spite of
tampering with the currency, and the removal of the deposites ; in spite of the
disordered state of the whole machinery of commerce ; the deranged state of the
currency, both at home and abroad ; in spite of the state of the exchanges, and
of what we are constantly told of the agony of the country, both have increas
ed* — rapidly increased — increased beyond all former example ! Such is the
overpowering effect of removing weights from the springs of industry, and stri
king off shackles from the free exchange of products, as to overcome all adverse
causes.

Let me add, Mr. President, that of this highly prosperous period to industry
(however disastrous to those who have over-speculated, or invested their funds
in rotten and swindling institutions), the most prosperous of the whole, as the
tables will show, is that during the operation of the Sub-treasury — a period
when some progress was made towards the restoration of the currency of the
Constitution. In spite of the many difficulties and embarrassments of that try
ing period, the progressive reduction of the duties, and the gradual introduction
of a sounder currency, gave so vigorous a spring to our industry as to overcome
them all ; showing clearly, if the country was blessed with the full and stead-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. C.ALHOUN. 461

operation of the two, under favourable circumstances, that it would enjoy a de
gree of prosperity exceeding what even the friends of that measure anticipated.

Having now shown that the navy is the right arm of our defence ; that it de
pends on commerce for its resources, both as to men and means ; and that high
duties destroy the growth of our commerce, including navigation and tonnage,
I have, I trust, satisfactorily established the position which I laid down — that
this measure, which would place the entire burden of supporting the govern
ment on commerce, would paralyze the right arm of our power. Vote it down,
and leave commerce as free as possible, and it will furnish ample resources,
skilful and gallant sailors, and an overflowing treasury, to repel danger far from
our shores, and maintain our rights and dignity in our external relations. With
the aid of the revenue from land, and proper economy, we might soon have
ample means to enlarge our navy to that of a third of the British, with duties
far below the limits of 20 per cent, prescribed by the Compromise Act. The
annual appropriation, or cost of the British navy, is about $30,000,000. Ours,
with the addition of the appropriation for the home squadron made this session,
is (say) $6,000,000 ; requiring only the addition of four millions to make it
equal to a third of that of Great Britain, provided that we can build, equip, man,
and maintain ours as cheaply as she can hers. That we can, with proper
management, can scarcely be doubted, when we reflect that our navigation,
which involves almost all the elements of expense that a navy does, success
fully competes with hers over the world. Nor are we deficient in men — gal
lant and hardy sailors — to man a navy on as large a scale as is suggested. Al
ready our tonnage is two thirds of that of Great Britain, and will, in a short
time, approach an equality with hers, if our commerce should be fairly treated.
Leave, then, in the treasury the funds proposed to be withdrawn by this de
testable bill ; apply it to the navy and defences of the country ; and even at its
present amount, with small additional aid from the impost, it will give the
means of raising it, with the existing appropriation, to the point suggested ;
and, with the steady increase of the fund from the increased sales of lands,
keeping pace with the increase of our population, and the like increase of com
merce under a system of light and equal duties, we may, with proper economy
in the collection and disbursements of the revenue, raise our navy steadily,
without feeling the burden, to half the size of the British, or more, if more be
needed for defence and the maintenance of our rights. Beyond that we ought
never to aim.

I have (said Mr. C.) concluded what I proposed to say. I have passed over
many and weighty objections to this measure, which I could not bring within
the scope of my remarks without exhausting the patience of the body. And
now, senators, in conclusion, let me entreat you in the name of all that is good
and patriotic — in the name of our common country, and the immortal fathers of
our Revolution and founders of our government — to reject this dangerous bill.
I implore you to pause, and ponder before you give your final vote for a meas
ure which, if it should pass and become a permanent law, would do more to
defeat the ends for which this government was instituted, and to subvert the
Constitution, and destroy the liberty of the country, than any which has ever
been proposed.

462 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

XXXII.

SPEECH ON THE TREASURY ~NOTE BILL, JANUARY 25, 1842.

MR. CALHOUN said: There is no measure that requires greater caution,
or more severe scrutiny, than one to impose taxes or raise a loan, be the
form what it may. I hold that government has no right to do either ex
cept when the public service makes it imperiously necessary, and then
only to the extent that it requires. I also hold that the expenditures can
only be limited by limiting the supplies. If money is granted, it is sure
to be expended. Thus thinking, it is a fundamental rule with me not to
vote for a loan or tax bill till I am satisfied it is necessary for the public
service, and then not, if the deficiency can be avoided by lopping off un
necessary objects of expenditure, or the enforcement of an exact and ju
dicious economy in the public disbursements. Entertaining these opin
ions, it was in vain that the chairman of the Finance Committee pointed
to the estimates of the year as a sufficient reason for the passage of this
bill as amended. Estimates are too much a matter of course to satisfy
me in a case like this. I have some practical knowledge of the subject,
and know too well how readily old items are put down, from year to year,
without much inquiry whether they can be dispensed with or reduced,
and new ones inserted, without much more reflection, to put much reli
ance on them. To satisfy me, the chairman must do what he has not
even attempted: he must state satisfactorily the reasons for every new
item, and the increase of every old one, and show that the deficiency to
meet the revenue cannot be avoided by retrenchment and economy.
Until he does that, he has no right to call on us to vote this heavy addi
tional charge of five millions of dollars on the people, especially at a
period 'of such unexampled pecuniary embarrassment. Having omitted
to perform this duty, I have been constrained to examine for myself the
estimates in a very hasty manner, with imperfect documents, and no op
portunity of deriving information from the respective departments. But,
with all these disadvantages, I have satisfied myself that this loan is un
necessary 5 that its place may be supplied, and more than supplied, by
retrenchment and economy, and the command of resources in the power
of the government, without materially impairing the efficiency of the
public service $ my reasons for which I shall now proceed to state.

The estimates of the Secretary of the Treasury for the expenditures of
the year are $32,997,258, or, in round numbers, thirty-three millions, em
braced under the following heads : the civil list, including foreign inter
course and miscellaneous, amounting to $4,000,987 37 j military, in all
its branches, $11,717,791 83 ; navy, $8,705,579 83 ; permanent appropri
ations, applicable to the service of the year, $1,572,906; and treasury
notes to be redeemed, $7,000,000.

Among the objects of retrenchment, I place at the head the great in
crease that is proposed to be made to the expenditures of the navy, com
pared with that of last year. It is no less than $2,508,032 13, taking
the expenditure of last year from the annual report of the secretary. I
see no sufficient reason, at this time, and in the present embarrassed
condition of the treasury, for this great increase. I have looked over
the report of the secretary hastily, and find none assigned, except general
reasons for an increased navy, which I am not disposed to controvert.
But I am decidedly of the opinion that the commencement ought to be
postponed till some systematic plan is matured, both as to the ratio of in-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 463

crease and the description of force of which the addition should consist,
and till the department is properly organized and in a condition to enforce
exact responsibility and economy in its disbursements. That the depart
ment is not now properly organized and in that condition, we have the
authority of the secretary himself, in which I concur. I am satisfied that
its administration cannot be made effective under the present organiza
tion, particularly as it regards its expenditures. I have very great respect
for the head of the department, and confidence in his ability and integ
rity. If he would hear the voice of one who wishes him well, and who
takes the deepest interest in the branch of service of which he is the
chief, my advice would be, to take time ; to look about ; to reorganize
the department in the most efficient manner, on the staff principle ; and to
establish the most rigid accountability and economy in the disbursements
before the great work of a systematic increase is commenced. Till that
is done, add not a dollar to the expenditure. Make sure of the foundation
before you begin to rear the superstructure. I am aware that there will
be a considerable increase this year in the navy, compared to the expen
diture of last year, in consequence of the acts of the extraordinary ses
sion. This may deduct several hundred thousand dollars from the amount
I propose to retrench ; but I cannot doubt that an improved administra
tion of the moneyed affairs of the department, with the very great reduc
tion in prices and wages, at saving may be made more than sufficient to
make up for that deduction. In speaking of improved administration, I
comprehend the marine corps. And here I deem it my duty to remark,
that the estimates for that branch of the service appear to me to be very
large. The corps is estimated at one thousand privates, and its aggre
gate expense at $502,292. This strikes me to be far too large for so
small a corps, of long standing, stationed at convenient and cheap points,
and at a period when the price of provisions, clothing, and all other arti
cles of supply is low. A large portion, I observe, is for barracks, which,
if proper at all, surely may be postponed till the finances are placed in
better condition.

I shall now pass from the naval to the military department ; and here I
find an estimate of $1,508,032 13 for harbours, creeks, and the like. I
must say that I am surprised at this estimate. All who have been members
of the Senate for the last eight or ten years must be familiar with the
history of this item of expenditure. It is one of the branches of the old,
exploded American System, and almost the only one which remains. It
has never been acquiesced in, and was scarcely tolerated when the treas
ury was full to overflowing with the surplus revenue. Of all the extrav
agant and lawless appropriations of the worst of times, I have ever re
garded it as the most objectionable — unconstitutional, local in its charac
ter, and unequal and unjust in its operation. Little did I anticipate that
such an item, and of so large an amount, would at this time be found in
the estimates, when the treasury is deeply embarrassed, the credit of
the government impaired, and the revenue from the lands surrendered to
the states and territories. Such an item, at such a period, looks like in
fatuation ; and I hope the Committee on Finance, when it comes to take
up the estimates, will strike it out. It certainly ought to be expunged,
and I shall, accordingly, place it among the items that ought to be
retrenched.

Passing to the treasury department, I observe an estimate of $43,932
for surveys of public lands ; and, under the head of " balances of appro
priations on the 31st of December, 1841, required to be expended in 1842,"
$200,000 for the same object: making together $243,932, which ought
either not to be in the estimajf s, or, if put there, ought to be credited in the

464 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOT7N.

receipts of the year. The reason will be apparent when it is stated that
the Distribution Act deducts the expenses incident to the administration
of the public lands, and, among others, that for surveying ; and, of course,
it must be deducted from the revenue from the lands, before it is distrib
uted among the states, and brought to the credit of the treasury. It is,
in fact, but an advance out of the land fund, to be deducted from it before
it is distributed. There are several other items in the estimates con
nected with the expenses incident to the administration of the public
lands to which the same remarks are applicable, and which would make
an additional deduction of many thousand dollars, but the exact amount
of which I have not had time to ascertain. These several items, taken
together, make the sum of $4,317,322 25, that may fairly be struck from
the estimates. To these there are, doubtless, many others of consider
able amount that might be added, had I the time and means for full in
vestigation. Among them, I would call the attention of the chairman to
an item of $158,627 17, under the name of " patent fund," and comprised
among the balances of appropriations on the 31st of December last, and
which will be required for this year. I have not had time to investigate
it, and am uninformed of its nature. I must ask the chairmain to explain.
Does it mean receipts of money derived from payments for patents 1 If
so, it ought to be passed to the treasury, and classed under the receipts
of the year, and not the appropriations, unless, indeed, there be some act
of Congress which has ordered otherwise. If it be an appropriation, I
would ask, To what is it appropriated, and to what particular objects is it
to be applied this year 1 The chairman will find it in page 40 of the docu
ment containing the estimates.

I would ask the chairman, also, whether the interest on the trust funds,
including both the Smithsonian and Indian, which may not be applied to
the object of the trusts during the year, have been comprehended in the
receipts of the year 1 We pay interest on them, and have the right, of
course, to their use till required to be paid over. The interest must be
considerable. That of the former alone is about $30,000 annually.

I would also call his attention to the pension list. I observe the dimi
nution of the number of pensioners for the last year is very considerable,
and, from the extreme age of the revolutionary portion, there must be a
rapid diminution till the list is finally closed. I have not had time to in
vestigate the subject sufficiently to say to what amount the treasury may
be relieved from that source, but I am informed, by a friend who is fa
miliar with the subject, that a very great reduction of expenditure, say
$300,000 annually, for some years, may be expected under that head.
Under these various heads, and others, which a careful examination might
designate, I feel confident that a reduction might be made by retrench
ment in the estimates to the amount of the sum proposed to be borrowed
by this bill, as amended, without materially impairing the efficiency of
the government.

I shall next proceed to examine what reduction may be made by strict
economy in the public disbursements ; by which I mean, not parsimony,
but that careful and efficient administration of the moneyed affairs of the
government which guards against all abuse and waste, and applies every
dollar to the object of appropriations, and that in the manner best calcu
lated to produce the greatest result. This high duty properly appertains
to the functions of the executive, and Congress can do but little more than
to urge on and sustain that department of the government to which it be-
^ongs in discharging it, and which must take the lead in the work of
economy and reform. My object is to show that there is ample room for
the work, and that great reduction may be mfde in the expenditures by

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 465

such an administration of the moneyed affairs of the government as I have
described. But ho\v is this to be made apparent 1 Can it be done by
minute examination of the various items of the estimates and expendi
tures 1 Can a general state of looseness, of abuses, or extravagance in
the disbursements, be detected and exposed by such examination 1 All
attempts of the kind have failed, and must continue to do so. It would
be impracticable to extend such an inquiry through the various heads of
expenditures. A single account might be selected, that would occupy a
committee a large portion of a session ; and, after all their labour, it
would be more than an even chance that they would fail to detect abuses
and mismanagement, if they abounded ever so much. They lie beyond
the accounts, and can only be reached by the searching and scrutinizing
eyes of faithful and vigilant officers charged with the administrative
supervision.

There is but one way in which Congress can act with effect in testing
whether the public funds have been judiciously and economically applied
to the objects for which they were appropriated, and, if not, of holding
those charged with their administration responsible ; and that is, by com
paring the present expenditures with those of past periods of acknowl
edged economy, or foreign contemporaneous service of like kind. If, on
such comparison, the differences should be much greater than they should
be, after making due allowance, those who have the control should be
held responsible to reduce them to a proper level, or to give satisfactory
reasons for not doing it ; and that is the course which I intend to pursue.
They who now have the control, both of Congress and the executive de
partment, came into power on a solemn pledge of reform ; and it is but
fair that they should be held responsible for the reformation of the abuses
and mismanagement which they declared to exist, and the great reduction
of expenses which they pledged themselves to make if the people should
raise them to power.

But I am not so unreasonable as to expect that reform can be the work
of a day. I know too well the labour and the time it requires to entertain
any such opinion. All I ask is, that the work shall be early, seriously, and
systematically commenced. It is to be regretted that it has not already
commenced, and that there is so little apparent inclination to begin. We
had a right to expect that the chairman of the Committee on Finance, in
bringing forward a new loan of $5,000,000, would have at least under
taken to inform us, after a full survey of the estimates and expenditures,
whether any reduction could be made, and, if any, to what amount, before
he asked for a vote making so great an addition to the public debt. I can
not but regard the omission as a bad omen. It looks like repudiation of
solemn pledges. But what he has failed to do I shall attempt, but in a
much less full and satisfactory manner than he might have done, with all
his advantages as the head of the committee. For the purpose of com
paring, I shall select the years 1823 and 1840. I select the former be
cause it is one of the years of the second term of Mr. Monroe's adminis
tration, and which, it is admitted now, administered the moneyed affairs
of the government with a reasonable regard to economy ; but at that time
it was thought by all to be liberal in its expenditures, and by some even
profuse, as several senators whom I now see, and who were then members of
Congress, will bear witness. But I select it for a still stronger reason.
It is the year which immediately preceded the first act professedly passed
on the principles of the protective policy. The intervening time between
the two periods comprehends the two acts of 1824 and 1828, by which that
policy was carried to such great extremes. To those acts, connected with
the banking system, and the connexion of the banks with the government, is

N N N

466 SPEECHES OP JOHN C. CALHOUN.

to be attributed that train of events which has involved the country and
the government in so many difficulties j and, among others that vast in
crease of expenditures which has taken place since 1823, as will be shown
by the comparison I am about to make.

The disbursements of the government are comprised under three great
heads: the civil list, including foreign intercourse and miscellaneous j the
military ; and the navy. I propose to begin with the first, and take them
in the order in which they stand.

The expenditures under the first head have increased since 1823, when
they were $2,022,093, to $5,492,030 98, the amount in 1840; showing an
increase, in seventeen years, of 2^ to 1, while the population has increas
ed only about -£ to 1, that is, about 75 per cent. ; making the increase of ex
penditures, compared to the increase of population, about 3^ to 1. This
enormous increase has taken place although a large portion of the expendi
tures under this head, consisting of salaries to officers and the pay of mem
bers of Congress, have remained unchanged. The next year, in 1841, the
expenditure rose to $6,196,560. I am, however, happy to perceive a con
siderable reduction in the estimates for this year compared with the last
and several preceding years; but still leaving room for great additional
reduction to bring the increase of expenditures to the same ratio with the
increase of population, as liberal as that standard of increase would be.

That the Senate may form some conception, in detail, of this enormous
increase, I propose to go more into particulars in reference to two items —
the contingent expenses of the two houses of Congress, and that of col
lecting the duties on imports. The latter, though of a character belong
ing to the civil list, is not included in it, or either of the other heads, as
the expenses incident to collecting the customs are deducted from the
receipts before the money is paid into the treasury.

The contingent expenses (they exclude the pay and mileage of mem
bers) of the Senate, in 1823, were $12,841 07, of which the printing cost
$6349 56, and stationary $1631 51 ; and that of the House $37,848 95,
of which the printing cost $22,314 41, and the stationary $3877 71. In
1840, the contingent expenses of the Senate were $77,447 22, of which
the printing cost $31,285 32, and the stationary $7061 77; and that of
the House $199,219 57, of which the printing cost $65,086 46, and the
stationary $36,352 99. The aggregate expenses of the two houses to
gether rose from $50,690 02 to $276,666, being an actual increase of
5r4^ to 1, and an increase, in proportion to population, of about 7T2ir to 1.
But, as enormous as this increase is, the fact that the number of mem
bers had increased not more than about ten per cent, from 1823 to 1840,
is calculated to make it still more strikingly so. Had the increase kept
pace with the increase of members (and there is no good reason why it
should greatly exceed it), the expenditures would have risen from $50,690
to $55,759 only, making an increase of but $5069 ; bitf, instead of that,
it rose to $276,666, making an increase of $225,970. To place the subject
in a still more striking view, the contingent expenses in 1823 were at the
rate of $144 per member, which one would suppose was ample, and in
1840, $942. This vast increase took place under the immediate eyes of
Congress ; and yet we were told at the extra session, by the present chair
man of the Finance Committee, that there was no room for economy, and
that no reduction could be made ; and even in this discussion he has in
timated that little can be done. As enormous as are the contingent ex
penses of the two houses, I infer, from the very great increase of expen
ditures under the head of civil list generally, when so large a portion is
for fixed salaries, which have not been materially increased for the last
seventeen years, that they are not much less so throughout the whole
range of this branch of the public service.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 467

I shall now proceed to the other item, which I have selected for more
particular examination, the increased expenses of collecting the duties on
imports. In 1823 it was $766,699, equal to 3T3^. per cent, on the amount
collected, and T9/ff on the aggregate amount of imports ; and in 1840 it
had increased to $1,542,319 24, equal to 14rVg- per cent, on the amount
collected, and to l/^- on the aggregate amount of the imports, being an
actual increase of nearly a million, and considerably more than double
the amount of 1823. In 1839 it rose to $1,714,515.

From these facts, there can be little doubt that more than a million
annually may be saved under the two items of contingent expenses of
Congress and the collection of the customs, without touching the other
great items comprised under the civil list, the executive and judicial de
partments, the foreign intercourse, lighthouses, and miscellaneous. It
would be safe to put down a saving of at least half a million for them.

I shall now pass to the military, with which I am more familiar. I pro
pose to confine my remarks almost entirely to the army proper, including
the Military Academy, in reference to which the information is more full
and minute. I exclude the expenses incident to the Florida war, and the
expenditures for the ordnance, the engineer, the topographical, the In
dian, and the pension bureaus. Instead of 1823, for which there is no
official and exact statement of the expenses of the army, I shall take 1821,
for which there is one made by myself, as secretary of war, and for the
minute correctness of which I can vouch. It is contained in a report
made under a call of the House of Representatives, and comprises a com
parative statement of the expenses of the army proper for the years
1818, 1819, 1820, 1821, respectively, and an estimate of the expense of
1822. It may be proper to add, which I can with confidence, that the
comparative expense of 1823, if it could be ascertained, would be found
to be not less favourable than 1821. It would, probably, be something
more so.

With these remarks, I shall begin with a comparison, in the first place,
between 1821 and the. estimate for the army proper for this year. The
average aggregate strength of the army in the year 1821, including offi
cers, professors, cadets, and soldiers, was 8109, and the proportion of
officers, including the professors of the Military Academy, to the sol
diers, including cadets, was 1 to 12TV8oi and the expenditure $2,180,093
53,* equal to $263 91 for each individual. The estimate for the army
proper, for the year 1842, including- the Military Academy, is $4,453,370
16. The actual strength of the army, according to the return accompa
nying the message at the opening of the session, was $11,169. Assuming
this to be the average strength for this year, and adding for the average
number of the academy, professors and cadets, 300, it will give, within a
very small fraction, $390 for each individual, making a difference of
$136 in favour of JS21. How far the increase of pay, and the additional
expense of two regiments of dragoons, compared to other descriptions of
troops, would justify this increase, I am not prepared to say. In other
respects, I should suppose, there ought to be a decrease rather than an
increase, as the price of clothing, provisions, forage, and other articles of
supply, as well as transportation, is, I presume, cheaper than in 1821.
The proportion of officers to soldiers I would suppose to be less in 1842
than 1821, and, of course, as far as that has influence, the expense of the
former ought to be less per man than the latter. With this brief and im
perfect comparison between the expense of 1821 and the estimates for
this year, I shall proceed to a more minute and full comparison between the
former and the year 1837. I select that year, because the strength of the
* See Document 33 (H. R.), 1st Session, 17th Congress.

E

468 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALIIOUN.

army, and the proportion of officers to men (a very material point as it
relates to the expenditure), are almost exactly the same.

On turning to document 165 (H. R., 2d sess., 26th Con.), a letter will be
found from the then secretary of war (Mr. Poinsett), giving a comparative
statement, in detail, of the expense of the army proper, including the Mil
itary Academy, for the years 1837, 1838, 1839, and 1840. The strength
of the army for the first of these years, including officers, professors,
cadets, and soldiers, was 8107, being two less than in 1821. The pro
portion of officers and professors to the cadets and soldiers ll^/¥, be
ing _7_&_ more than 1821. The expenditure for 1837, $3,308,011, being
$1,127,918 more than 1821. The cost per man, including officers, pro
fessors, cadets, and soldiers, was, in 1837, $408 03, exceeding that of
1821 $144 12 per man. It appears, by the letter of the secretary, that
the expense per man rose, in 1838, to $464 35 ; but it is due to the head
of the department at the time to say, that it declined under his adminis
tration, the next year, to $381 65, and, in the subsequent, to $380 63.
There is no statement for the year 1841, but, as there has been a falling
off in prices, there ought to be a proportionate reduction in the cost, es
pecially during the present year, when there is a prospect of so great a
decline in almost every article which enters into the consumption of the
army. Assuming that the average strength of the army will be kept equal
to the return accompanying the President's message, and that the expen
diture of the year should be reduced to the standard of 1821, the expense
of the army would not exceed $2,895,686, making a difference, compared
with the estimates, of $1,557,684 j but that, from the increase of pay, and
the greater expense of the dragoons, cannot be expected. Having no
certain information how much the expenses are necessarily increased
from those causes, I am not prepared to say what ought to be the actual
reductions, but, unless the increase of pay, and the increased cost, because
of the dragoons, are very great, it ought to be very considerable.

I found the expense of the army in 1818 including the Military Acad
emy, to be $3,702,495, at a cost of $451 57 per man, including officers,
professors, cadets, and soldiers, and reduced it, in 1821, to $2,180,098, at
a cost of $263 91, and making a difference between the two years, in
the aggregate expenses of the army, of $1,522,397, and $185 66 per man.
There was, it is true, a great fall of prices in the interval ; but allowing
for that, by adding to the price of every article entering into the supplies
of the army a sum sufficient to raise it to the price of 1818, there was
still a difference in the cost per man of $163 95. This great reduc
tion was effected without stinting the service or diminishing the supplies,
either in quantity or quality. They were, on the contrary, increased in
both, especially the latter. It was effected through an efficient organiza
tion of the staff, and the co-operation of the able officers placed at the
head of each of its divisions. The cause of the great expense at the
former period was found to be principally in the neglect of public prop
erty, and the application of it to uses not warranted by law. There is
less scope, doubtless, for reformation in the army now. I cannot doubt,
however, but that the universal extravagance which pervaded the country
for so many years, and which increased so greatly the expenses both of
government and individuals, has left much room for reform in this as well
as other branches of the service.

In addition to the army, there are many other and heavy branches of
expenditure embraced under the military head — fortifications, ordnance,
Indians, and pensions — the expenditures of which, taken in the aggregate,
greatly exceed the army ; the expenses of all of which, for the reason to
which I have alluded, may, doubtless, be much reduced.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 469

In turning to the navy, I have not been able to obtain information
which would enable me to make a similar comparison between the two
periods in reference to that important arm ; but I hope, when the infor
mation is received which has been called for by the senator from Maine
(Mr. Williams), ample data will be obtained to enable me to do so on
some future occasion. In place of it, I propose to give a comparative
statement of the expense of the British navy and ours for the year 1840.
The information in reference to the former is taken from a work of
authority, the Penny Cyclopaedia, under the head of " Navy."

The aggregate expense of the British navy in the year 1840 amounted
to 4,980,353 pounds sterling, deducting the expense of transport for troops
and convicts, which does not properly belong to the navy. That sum, at
$4 80 to the pound sterling, is equal to $23,905,694 46. The navy was
composed of 392 vessels of war of all descriptions, leaving out 36 steam-
vessels in tHte packet-service, and 23 sloops fitted for foreign packets.
Of the 392, 98 were line-of-battle ships, of which 19 were building; 116
frigates, of which 14 were building ; 68 sloops, of which 13 were build
ing ; 44 steam-vessels, of which 16 were building ; and 66 gun-brigs,
schooners, and cutters, of which 12 were building.

The effective force of the year, that which was in actual service, con
sisted of 3400 officers, 3998 petty officers, 12,846 seamen, and 9000 ma
rines, making an aggregate of 29,244. The number of vessels in actual
service was 175, of which 24 were line-of-battle ships, 31 frigates, 30
steam-vessels, and 45 gun-brigs, schooners, and cutters, not including the
30 steamers and 24 sloops in the packet-service, at an average expendi
ture of $573 for each individual, including officers, petty officers, seamen,
and marines.

Our navy is composed at present, according to the report of the secre
tary accompanying the President's message, of 67 vessels, of which 11 are
line-of-battle ships, 17 frigates, 18 sloops of war, 2 brigs, 4 schooners, 4
steamers, 3 store ships, 3 receiving vessels, and 5 small schooners. The
estimates for the year are made on the assumption that there will be in
service, during the year, 2 ships of the line, 1 razee, 6 frigates, 20 sloops,
11 brigs and schooners, 3 steamers, 3 store ships, and 8 small vessels,
making in the aggregate 53 vessels. The estimates for the year, for the
navy and marine corps, as has been stated, is $8,705,579 83, considerably
exceeding one third of the entire expenditures of the British navy for
1840. I am aware that there is probably a much larger expenditure ap
plied to the increase of the navy in our service than in the British, in pro
portion to the respective forces ; and I greatly regret that I have not the
materials to ascertain the difference, or to compare the expenses of the
two navies in the various items of building, outfit, and pay, and the rela
tive expenses of the two per man, per gun, and per ton. The comparison
would be highly interesting, and would throw much light on the subject
of these remarks. We know our commercial marine meets successfully
the British in fair competition ; and, as the elements of the expenses of
the commercial and naval marine are substantially the same in time of
peace, when impressment is disused in the British service, our navy ought
not to bear an unfavourable comparison with theirs on the score of ex
pense. Whether it does, in fact, I am not prepared to say, with the ma
terials I have been able to collect; but it does seem to me, when I com
pare the great magnitude of their naval establishment with the small-
ness of ours, and the aggregate expense of the two, that ours, on a full
comparison, will be found to exceed theirs by far in expense, however
viewed.

I hope what I have stated will excite inquiry. It is a point of vast im*

A. X

470 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

portance. If we can bring our expenditures to an equality, or nearly so,
with hers, we may then look forward with confidence to the time, as not
far distant, when, with our vast commercial marine (more than two thirds
of the British), we may, with proper economy in our disbursement, and
by limiting the objects of our expenditures to those which properly be-
loncr to this government under the Constitution, place a navy on the
ocean, without increase of burden on the people, that will give complete
protection to our coast and command the respect of the world. But if
that cannot be done — if our expenses must necessarily greatly exceed in
proportion that of the first maritime power in the world, it is well it should
be known at once, that we may look to other means of defence, and give
up what, in that case, would be a hopeless struggle. I do not believe that it
will be found to be the case. On the contrary, I am impressed with the
belief that our naval force ought riot to cost more in proportion than the
British. In some things they may have the advantage, tfut we shall be
found to have equally great in others.

From these statements it may be fairly inferred that there is great room
for economy, under every head of expenditure. I am by no means pre
pared to say what reduction may be effected by it. It would require
much more time and minute examination to determine with precision
anything like the exact amount ; but it is certain that millions may be
saved, simply by a judicious and strict system of economy, without im
pairing in any degree the efficiency of the government. But in order to
form a more definite conception as to the amount of that reduction, I pro
pose to add to the aggregate expense of 1823 seventy-five per cent. — the
estimated increase of the population of the United States since then,
which will give the amount that ought to have been the estimated ex
penditures for this year, on the supposition that the expense of the gov
ernment ought not, in ordinary times, to increase faster than the popula
tion ; and which, deducted from the actual estimates of the year, will
show, on that supposition, to what amount they ought to have been re
duced. But in making this supposition, I wish it to be understood I do
not admit that the expenditures of the government ought to keep pace
with our rapidly increasing population. There are many branches of the
public service which ought not to be, and have not, in fact, been much
increased with the increase of population, and are now, in point of ex
pansion, very nearly what they were in 1823. Others are more enlarged,
but it is believed that there are but few whose growth have been greater,
or as great, as that of our population. It would, in truth, not be difficult to
show that an increase of revenue and expenditures, and, consequently, of
patronage and influence, equal to our rapidly growing population, must
almost necessarily end in making the government despotic. It is known
that it takes a much less military force in proportion to subject a large
country with a numerous population, than a small one with an inconsider
able one ; and in like manner, and for similar reasons, it takes much less
patronage and influence in proportion to control the former than the lat
ter. So true is it, that I regard it as an axiom, that the purity and dura
tion of our free and popular institutions, looking to the vast extent of
country and its great and growing population, depend on restricting its
revenues and expenditures, and thereby its patronage and influence, to the
smallest amount consistent with the proper discharge of the few great
duties for which it was instituted. To a departure from it may be attrib
uted, in a great measure, the existing disorders. With these remarks, I
shall now proceed to give the result of the proposed calculation.

The actual expenditures of 1823, all included, except payments on ac
count of the public debt, amounted to $9,827,832. That sum multv^lied

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 471

by 75 per cent., the estimated ratio of increase of population from 1823
to 1840, gives $17,198,681, which, on the assumption that the expendi
tures should not increase more rapidly than the population, ought to be
the extreme limits of the expenditures of this year. But the estimates
for the year, deducting payment on account of the debt, are, as has been
stated, $25,997,258, being an excess of $8,498,577 beyond what the ex
penditures ought to be on the liberal scale assumed. The increase, in
stead of being at the rate of the population, is equal to 2T\8g- to 1, com
pared with the expenditures of 1823, and 3| nearly, compared with the
ratio of the increase of population. Had the ratio of increase not ex
ceeded that of the population, the whole expenditure of the year, inclu-
dino-the sum of $7,000,000 for the debt, would have been but $24,198,681,
instead of $32,997,258.

But as great as this reduction is, it by no means represents the saving
that would be made on the data assumed. The expense of collecting the
revenue (of which a statement has already been made as it relates to
the customs), as well as several other items, less important, are not in
cluded in the expenditures, and must Ve added, to get the true amount
that would be saved. The addition, at the lowest calculation, would be
a million of dollars j which, added to the $8,498,577, would make the sum
of $9,498,577, and would reduce what ought to be the estimates of the
year, on the ground assumed, to $16,198,681. The saving is great j but,
I feel confident, not greater than what, with a judicious and efficient sys
tem of administration, might be effected, and that not only without im
pairing, but actually increasing the efficiency of the government. To
make so great a reduction, would take much time and labour ; but if those
who have the power, and stand pledged, would begin the good work,
much, very much, might be done during the present session. But if this
bill, as it now stands, should become a law, I should despair for the pres
ent. I see in the amendment a deliberate and fixed determination to
keep up the expenditures, regardless of pledges and consequences.

Having now shown how greatly the public expenditures have increased
since 1823, I next propose to make some remarks on the causes that have
produced it. In the front rank I place the protective tariff. I selected
the year 1823, as I stated in the early stages of my remarks, in part to
illustrate the effects of that pernicious system in this connexion. It is
curious to look over the columns of expenditures, under their various
heads, in the table I hold in my hand, and note how suddenly they rose
under every head, after each of the tariff acts of 182*4 and 1828, until they
reached the present point. [Here Mr. C. read from the table of the ex
penditures under each head, year by year, from 1823 to 1840, in illustra
tion of his remarks]. Nor is it wonderful that such should be the effect
of the protective policy. How could it be otherwise 1 Duties were laid,
not for revenue, but for protection. Money was not the object. It was
but an incident, and the party in favour of the system (a majority in both
houses during the whole period) cared not how it was wasted. During
that wasteful period, I have heard members of Congress of high intelli
gence declare that it was better that the money should be burned or
thrown into the ocean than not collected 5 and they* spoke in the true
genius of that corrupting and oppressive system. In fact, after it was
collected, there was a sort of necessity that it should be spent. The col
lection was in bank-notes ; and of all absurdities, one of the greatest is, an
accumulation of such an article in the public treasury, whether we regard
the thing itself, or its effects on the community and the banks. When
pushed to a great extent, it must prove ruinous to all ; and to such an ac
cumulation, in spite of the most wasteful extravagance in the expendi-

472 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

tures, may be attributed, in a great degree, the overthrow of the banks,
and the embarrassments of the government and country. But so blind
were the banks, for the most part, to their fate, that they were among the
foremost to urge on the course of policy destined to hasten so greatly
their overthrow. All resistance on the part of the minority in Congress
opposed to the system was in vain. If the money was saved from one
objectionable object, it was sure to be applied to some other, and perhaps
even more objectionable ; if the sluice of expenditures was stopped in one
place, it was certain to burst through another. Under the conviction
that the struggle was in vain so long as the cause remained, I ceased in
a great measure resistance to appropriations, and turned my efforts against
the cause — a treasury overflowing with bank-notes — to exhaust which was
the only means left of staying the evil. It is not my intention to cast
the blame on either party. The fault lay in the system — the policy of
imposing duties when the money was not needed, and collecting it in a
currency, which, to keep, would have been more wasteful and ruinous, if
possible, than to spend, however extravagantly. It is due, in justice to the
late administration, to say, that 'they had commenced, in good earnest,
the work of reform, and that with so much success, as to have made a
very considerable reduction in the expenditures, towards which no one
exerted himself with more zeal or greater effect than the senator behind
me (Mr. Woodbury), then at the head of the treasury department. It is
to be deeply regretted that what was then so well begun has not been
continued by those who have succeeded.

It is admitted on all sides that we must equalize the revenue and ex
penditures. The scheme of borrowing to make up an increasing deficit
must in the end, if continued, prove ruinous. Already is our credit
greatly impaired. It is impossible to borrow at home, in the present state
of things, at the usual rate of interest. The six per cent, stock authorized
at the late session is now several per cent, below par ; and, if we would
borrow in the home market, it would endanger the solvent banks. It is
admitted that a loan of two millions in Boston has caused the present
intense pressure there in the money market. Nor can the foreign market
be relied on till our finances are put in a better condition. Who, in their
present condition, would think of jeoparding our credit by appearing in
the European market with United States stocks'? It is certain that no
negotiation could be effected there but at usurious interest, and on a con
siderable extension of the time for redemption j the tendency of which
would be to depress the state stocks, and lay the foundation of a perma
nent funded debt. There remains another objection, which should not be
overlooked: the loan would be returned in merchandise, with the usual
injurious and embarrassing effects of stimulating the consumption of the
country, for the time, beyond what its exports would permanently sustain.

Nor is the prospect much better for the additional issue of treasury-
notes proposed by the bill as amended in the Senate. They are now be
low par, and this must still add to their depression ; perhaps to the same
extent to which the six per cents, are now depressed. The reason is ob
vious. The only advantage which they have over stocks in raising a loan
is, that they are receivable in the dues of the government, which gives
them, to a certain extent, the character of currency ; but that advantage
is not peculiar to them. As the law now stands, notes of solvent banks
are also receivable in the public dues. They are, in fact, treasury-notes,
as far as it depends on receivability ; as much so as if each one was en^
dorsed to be received in the dues of the government by an authorized
agent. Now, so long as the government receives bank-notes at par with
their own, and the banks (as is now the case) refuse to receive them at par

-• SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 473

with bank-notes, treasury-notes will be depressed compared with bank-notes ;
for the plain reason that the latter can pay the debts both of the banks and the
government, while the former can pay only the debts of the government.

In such a state of things, only a very small amount of treasury-notes can be
used for currency without depressing them below par ; and when that amount
is much exceeded, they witl sink rapidly to the depression of stock bearing the
same rate of interest. Very different would be the fact if the sub-treasury had
not been repealed. Under its operation, the government could at any time hav£
issued what amount it pleased to meet a temporary deficit of the treasury, at a
mere nominal rate of interest, or none at all. The provision that nothing but
gold and silver, and the paper issued on the credit of the government, should
be received in the public dues, would have kept them at par. But as things
now are, it must be obvious that neither loans in the usual way, nor treasury-
notes, can be relied on to make up the deficit, without ruinous consequences.
And here let me inform the senators on the other side that they are labouring
under a great mistake in supposing that we, who prefer treasury-notes to loans
to meet the temporary wants of the treasury, are anxious to force the use of
them on you. The fact is far otherwise. We deeply regret to see you re
duced to the necessity of using them. We believe them to be very useful and
convenient, much cheaper, and more safe, than loans, to meet the occasional
wants of the government, and see, with regret, a resort to them under circum
stances so well calculated to discredit them in the public estimation, and when
they cannot be used but at the expense of the public creditors.

We have, then, arrived at the point thai we must increase the duties or cur
tail expenditures ; and the question is, Which shall we choose ? That question
will be decided by the vote we are about to give. There is no mistake. Those
who have changed this bill into a loan bill of $5,000,000 tell us, in language
too intelligible to be mistaken, that they intend to fix the permanent expenses
of the government at about $25,000,000 ; for it will take that sum, at least, to
meet what they tell us is the lowest amount to which the expenditures can be
reduced, and to discharge the interest and principal of the debt already con
tracted or authorized. Now, sir, it is clear that so large a sum cannot be de
rived from the present tariff, as high as it has been raised. I agree with the
chairman that, with our present export trade, the heavy interest to be paid on
debts abroad, and the large list of free articles, that it is not safe to estimate
the consumption of the country of dutiable articles at more than $85,000,000,
which, at 20 per cent, round, would give but $17,000,000 gross, and a nett
revenue, according to the present expense of collectten, of not more than
$15,000,000 at the outside ; leaving $10,000,000 annually to be raised by ad
ditional duties on imports, or a corresponding reduction in the expenses of the
government. Which shall we choose ? That the reduction may be made, and
the deficit met, aided by the repeal of the Distribution Bill, without impairing
the efficiency of the government, I trust I have satisfactorily shown ; not all at
once, but enough and more, this year, to avoid this loan, and gradually, by a vig
orous system of economy, to arrest all farther loans, and to discharge those
that have been contracted or authorized. Why not, then, adopt the alternative
of curtailing expenses ? I put the question in all soberness to those who are
in power and responsible. You stand pledged, solemnly pledged to reform —
you told the people that the expenses of the government were extravagant ; that
they could be reduced to a point lower than I have assigned ; and why not re
deem your pledge, when I have proved that there is such ample room to do so ?
We, on this side, are anxious to co-operate with you, and to carry out with
vigour the good work which had been commenced before you came into powder.
Why, instead of carrying on with still greater vigour what had been commenced,
do you halt ? No : it is not strong enough. Why do you now go for increase,
instead of reduction ? Why falsify all your solemn promises, and prove, now

0 o o

474 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.*

that you are in power, that you are as zealous for debts, duties, and increase
of expenditures, as you exhibited zeal for reform while you were seeking
power ?

But one answer can be given — from deep solicitude for another protective
tariff. Yes, that same pernicious system, which Dwelled the expenditures to
their present vast amount, is the real impediment to their reduction. It is that
which has made you forget all your promises, and which now seeks to keep up
the expenditures as a pretext for imposing duties, not for revenue, but, in reality,
for protection. It is that which is striving to force government to return to the
old and disastrous policy which has brought such calamity on the country, and
done so much to corrupt its morals and politics ; and which is now forcing it to
resort to loans and treasury-notes, at the hazard of its credit, when it is so
necessary, in the midst of the wrecks of that of so many of the -states, that the
credit of the Union should stand above suspicion. It is that which passed the
Distribution Bill, and now resists its repeal, when it is clear that the revenue
from the lands is indispensable to meet the demands on the government, and to
preserve its credit. Put that corrupt and corrupting system out of the way, and
every difficulty connected with our finances would vanish ; the Distribution
Act would be repealed, the revenue from the public domain restored to the
Union, and economy and retrenchment would save their millions. Every
voice would be raised in their favour, and the expenditure would be speedily
equalized with the revenue. Were this done, we would hear no more of an
empty treasury — of loans, of treasury-notes and prostrated credit ; no more of
additional duties. Instead of increase, we should hear the cheerful note of re
duction — repeal of taxes — striking shackles from commerce and navigation —
and lightening the burden of labour. I hazard nothing in asserting that, with
a thorough reform in the fiscal action of the government, and a repeal of the
Distribution Act, that a revenue of thirteen millions from the customs would be
sufficient — amply sufficient for carrying on the government efficiently. Such
would be the happy effects of equalizing the revenue and expenditures by a
judicious system of economy and retrenchment, aided by the restoration of the
revenue from the lands.

Let me now ask gentlemen if they have reflected on the consequences which
must result from the other alternative, that of raising the revenue to the standard
of the expenditures. What has already been the effects of that policy ? What
is the immediate cause of the present embarrassment ? What has emptied the
treasury, prostrated the credit of the government, and imposed high additional
taxes on the commerce and labour of the country ? What but the policy com
menced at the extra session, of keeping up the expenditures to the present high
standard, and which, if we may judge by this measure, and the declaration of
the chairman of the Committee on Finance, it is determined to adhere to? Can
any one doubt that if there had been no change of policy — if that so earnestly
pressed by my friend behind me, of reducing the expenditures, had been con
tinued, but that the existing embarrassments would have been avoided ? On
you, who have reversed the wise and judicious course then commenced, rests
the responsibility. It is you who have emptied the treasury ; you who have
destroyed the credit of the government, and caused the present embarrassments.

But you are only at the beginning of your difficulties. Those that are to
come, unless you change your course, are still more formidable. The power
of borrowing, in every form, short of usurious and ruinous interest, is gone, and
can you expect to raise from commerce alone the means of meeting the expen
ditures at the present high standard ? I pronounce it to be beyond your power
to raise twenty-five millions annaally from the customs. So large a sum can
not be extorted from commerce in the present state of things. A nett revenue
to that amount would require a gross revenue, at the present extravagant rate
of collection, of at least twenty-seven millions of dollars. Our present exports

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 475

will not pay for an importation of more than $125,000,000, allowing for the or
dinary profits of trade. From this must be deducted $10,000,000 for the inter
est of debt abroad, which would reduce the imports to $115,000,000. Deduct
$10,000,000 more for free articles, immediately connected with the manufac
turing operations of the country, and it would reduce the dutiable articles con
sumed in the country annually to $105,000,000. In the free articles I do not
include tea and coffee, which are now so. It would take an average duty of
26 per cent, to raise $27,000,000 on $105,000,000. Can you, in the present
state of things, raise your duties to that high standard ?

I pass over the effects of such a duty in repressing the export trade, on
which the import depends. Between them there is the most intimate relation.
Each limits the amount of the other. •. In the long run, it is acknowledged that
the imports cannot, on a fair valuation, exceed the exports. It is not less cer
tain that the same rule applies to the exports, which, in the long run, cannot ex
ceed the imports. And hence, duties on imports as effectually restrict arid limit
the amount of the exports as if directly imposed on the latter. To repress the
one is to repress the other. But, setting aside all considerations of the kind, I
directly meet the question, and say that you cannot extort from commerce the
amount you propose.

He who would reason from the past on this subject will be greatly deceived.
High duties now will not give the revenue they once did. The smuggler for
bids. The standard of morals is greatly lowered. The paper system and the
protective policy have worked a great and melancholy change in that respect.
The country is filled with energetic and enterprising men, rendered desperate
by being reduced from affluence to poverty through the vicissitudes of the times.
They will give an impulse to smuggling unknown to the country heretofore. The
profits of regular business, in the new state of things in which the country is
placed, must be low and slow. Fortunes can no longer be made by a single
bold stroke ; and the impatience and necessities of the large class to which 1
have alluded, and whose debts will be sponged by the Bankrupt Act, will not
submit to recovering their former condition by so slow a process. With high
duties, smuggling, then, will open too tempting a field to restore their broken
fortunes, not to be entered by many of the large class to which I refer, to which
many will be added from the lowered standard of morals, who cannot plead the
same necessity. If to this be added the great increased facility for smuggling,
both on our Northern, and Eastern, and Southwestern frontiers, it will be in vain
to expect to raise the sum proposed from commerce. Not only has the line of
frontier along the lakes been greatly lengthened, but the facility of intercourse
with them, both by canals and roads, have been increased in a still greater de
gree. How is smuggling to be prevented along so extended a frontier, with
such unlimited facility for practising it ? Nor will the supply of smuggled goods
be confined to the immediate neighbourhood of the frontier. They will pene
trate through the numerous roads and canals leading to the lakes, far inland, and
compete successfully with the regular trade in the heart of the country. Nor
is it to be doubted but that the British authorities will connive at this illicit trade.
Look at the immense interest which they have to turn the trade of our country,
as far as possible, through the channel of the St. Lawrence. It will give to
Great Britain the entire tonnage to whatever portion of our trade may be turned
through that channel — a point so important to her naval supremacy, to which
she is ever so attentive. Already great facility is afforded for turning the pro
vision trade, both for the home market and the supply of the West Indies, through
it, and with much success.

I was surprised to learn, since the commencement of the session, as I have
no doubt most of those who hear me will be, that a place on the St. Lawrence,
almost unknown, is already the fourth town in the Union, as to the number of
vessels that enter and depart in the year. I refer to St. Vincent, at the outlet

476 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

of Lake Ontario. It is the depot for the British trade which descends the St.
Lawrence from our side. To give life and vigour to a vast trade, which gives
her the entire tonnage of the outward and inward voyage, is too important to
be neglected, particularly as it would so powerfully counteract our high duties,
and so greatly widen the field of consumption for her manufactures. Turning
to the frontier at the other end of the Union, we shall find a great increase of
facility for smuggling in that quarter ; but I abstain from enlarging on it for the
present.

Taking all these causes together, it cannot be doubted but that smuggling
will commence at a much more lower point of duties than it ever has heretofore,
and that all calculations of increase of revenue from increase of duties founded
on trfe past will fail. It is the opinion pf good judges that it would commence
with duties as low as 12 per cent, on such articles as linen and silks ; but be that
as it may, it may be safely predicted that the scheme of raising the standard of
revenue to the present expenditures will fail. I pass over the violation of the
compromise, which such a policy necessarily involves, its ruinous effects on the
great staples of the country, now suffering under the greatest depression, and that
deep discontent which must follow in the quarter that produces them. I shall
confine myself simply to the financial question. Regarded in that light, I tell gen
tlemen that the line of policy they propose will fail. They will have io aban
don it, or resort to internal taxes to supply the deficit from commerce. Yes,
you must restore the revenue from the lands, economize and retrench, or be for
ced to resort to internal taxes in the end. Are you prepared for that? I ask
those who represent the great sections to the North and East of this, if they have
reflected how that portion of the Union would be affected by internal taxes. I
refer not to direct taxes, for that, according to the mode prescribed in the Con
stitution, can never be pushed to any oppressive extreme, but to excises. If
you have not, it is time you should ; for in the way you are now going, you will
soon have to learn experimentally how it will operate.

There never has been a civilized country within my knowledge whose mon
eyed affairs have been worse managed than ours for the last dozen of years.
In 1828 we raised the duties, on an average, to nearly fifty per cent, when the
debt was on the eve of being discharged, and thereby flooded the country with
a revenue, when discharged, which could not be absorbed by the most lavish
expenditures. Hence the double affliction of an accumulating surplus of mill
ions on millions, and of the most wasteful expenditures at the same time. Then
came the Compromise Act, which entirely exempted one half of the imports
from duties, in order to escape the growing evil of such a surplus, and reduced
the one tenth, every two years, on all the duties above twenty per cent., in or
der to get clear of the protective policy. Under their operation, aided by the
Deposite Act, the surplus was absorbed, arid the revenue gradually brought down
to the proper level ; to meet the descending revenue, a reduction of expendi
tures was commenced, with the intention of equalizing the revenue and expen
ditures. Then a change of party took place, the one coming in professing a
greater love for economy and retrenchment than the one going out ; but, instead
of fulfilling their promises, the public expenditures have been increased by mill
ions — debts contracted — revenue from the lands squandered — and all this when
the income was reduced to the least possible depression. Take all in all, can
folly, can inmtuation, go farther ?

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 477

XXXIII.

SPEECH IN SUPPOPvT OF THE VETO POWER, FEB. 28, 1842.

MR. CALHOUN said : The senator from Kentucky, in support of his amend
ment, maintained that the people of these states constitute a nation ; that the
nation has a will of its own ; that the numerical majority of the whole was the
appropriate organ of its voice ; and that whatever derogated from it, to that ex
tent departed from the genius of the government, and set up the will of the mi
nority against the majority. We have thus presented, at the very threshold of
the discussion, a question of the deepest import, not only as it regards the sub
ject under consideration, but the nature and character of our government ; and
that question is, Are these propositions of the senator true ?* If they be, then
he admitted the argument against the veto would be conclusive ; not, however,
for the reason assigned by him, that it would make the voice of a single func
tionary of the government (the President) equivalent to that of some six sen
ators and forty members of the other house ; but for the far more decisive
reason, according to his theory, that the President is not chosen by the voice
of the numerical majority, and does not, therefore, according to his principle,
represent truly the will of the nation.

It is a great mistake to suppose that he is elected simply on the principle of
numbers. They constitute, it is true, the principal element in his election, but
not the exclusive. Each state is, indeed, entitled to as many votes in his elec
tion as it is to representatives in the other house — that is, to its federal popu
lation ; but to these, two others are added, having no regard to numbers for
their representation in the Senate, which greatly increases the relative influ
ence of the small states, compared to the large, in the presidential election.
What effect this latter element may have on the numbers necessary to elect a
president, may be made apparent by a very short and simple calculation.

The population of the United States, in federal numbers, by the late census,
is 15,908,376. Assuming that sixty-eight thousand, the number reported by
the committee of the other house, will be fixed on for the ratio of representation
there, it will give, according to the calculation of the committee, two hundred
and twenty-four members to the other house. Add fifty-two, the number of the
senators, and the electoral college will be found to consist of two hundred and
seventy-six, of which one hundred and thirty-nine is a majority. If nineteen
of the smaller states, excluding Maryland, be taken, beginning with Delaware
and ending with Kentucky inclusive, they will be found to be entitled to one
hundred and forty votes, one more than a majority, *with a federal population
of only 7,227,869 ; while the seven other states, with a population of 8,680,507,
would be entitled to but one hundred and thirty-six votes, three less than a ma
jority, with a population of almost a million and a half greater than the others.
Of the one hundred and forty electoral votes of the smaller states, thirty-eight
would be on account of the addition of two to each state, for their representa
tion in this body, while of the larger there would be but fourteen on that ac
count ; making a difference of twenty-four votes on that account, being two
more than the entire electoral votes of Ohio, the third state in point of numbers
in the Union.

* Mr. Clay here interrupted Mr. Calhoun, and said that he meant a majority according to the
forms of the Constitution.

Mr. Calhoun, in return, said he had taken down the words of the senator at the time, and would
vouch for the correctness of his statement. The senator not only laid down the propositions as
stated, but he drew conclusions from them against the President's veto, which could only be sus
tained on the principle of the numerical majority. In fact, his course at the extra session, and the
grounds assumed both by him and his colleague, in this discussion, had their origin in the doctrines
embraced in that proposition.

478 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

The senator from Kentucky, with these facts, but acts in strict conformity to
his theory of the government, in proposing the limitation he has on the veto
power ; but as much cannot be said in favour cf the substitute he has offered.
The argument is as conclusive against the one as the other, or any other modi
fication of the veto that could possibly be devised. It goes farther, and is con
clusive against the executive department itself, as elected ; for there can be no
good reason offered why the will of the nation, if there be one, should not be
as fully and perfectly represented in that department as in the legislative.

But it does not stop there. It would be still more conclusive, if possible,
against this branch of the government. In constituting the Senate, numbers
are totally disregarded. The smallest state stands on a perfect equality with
the largest — Delaware, with her seventy-seven thousand, with New- York, with
her two millions and a half. Here a majority of states control, without regard
to population ; and fourteen of the smallest states, with a federal population of
but 4,064,457, little less than a fourth of the whole, can, if they unite, overrule
the twelve others, with a population of 11,844,919. Nay, more: they could
virtually destroy the government, and put a veto on the whole system, by re
fusing to elect senators ; and yet this equality among states, without regard to
numbers, including the branch where it prevails, would seem to be the favour
ite with the Constitution. It cannot be altered without the consent of every
state ; arid this branch of the government, where it prevails, is the only one
that participates in the powers of all the others. As a part of the legislative
department, it has full participation with the other in all matters of legislation,
except originating money bills ; while it participates with the executive in two of
its highest functions, that of appointing to office and making treaties ; and in that
of the judiciary, in being the high court before which all impeachments are tried.
But we have not yet got to the end of the consequences. The argument
would be as conclusive against the judiciary as against the Senate, or the ex
ecutive and his veto. The judges receive their appointments from the execu
tive and the Senate ; the one nominating, and the other consenting to and ad
vising the appointment; neither of which departments, as has been shown, is
chosen by the numerical majority. In addition, they hold their office during
good behaviour, and can only be turned out by impeachment ; and yet they
have the power, in all cases in law and equity brought before them, in which
an act of Congress is involved, to decide on its constitutionality — that is, in
effect, to pronounce an absolute veto.

If, then, the senator's theory be correct, its clear and certain result, if carried
out in practice, would be to sweep away, not only the veto, but the executive,
the Senate, and the judiciary, as now constituted ; and to leave nothing stand
ing in the midst of the ruins but the House of Representatives, where only, in
the whole range of the government, numbers exclusively prevail. But, as deso
lating as would be its sweep in passing over the government, it would be far
more destructive in its whirl over the Constitution. There it would not leave
a fragment standing amid the ruin in its rear.

In approaching this topic, let me premise (what all will readily admit), that
if the voice of the people may be sought for anywhere with confidence, it may
be in the Constitution, which is conceded by all to be the fundamental and para
mount law of the land. If, then, the people of these states do really constitute
a nation, as the senator supposes ; if the nation has a will of its own, and if the
numerical majority of the whole is the only appropriate and true organ of that
will, we may fairly expect to find that will, pronounced through the absolute
majority, pervading every part of that instrument, and stamping its authority on
the whole. Is such the fact? The very reverse. Throughout the whole —
from first to last — from beginning to end— in its formation, adoption, and amend
ment, there is not the slightest evidence, trace, or vestige of the existence of
the facts on which the senator's theory rests ; neither of the nation, nor its will,

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 479

nor of the numerical majority of the whole, as its organ, as I shall next proceed
to show.

The Convention which formed it was called by a portion of the states ; its
members were all appointed by the states ; received their authority from their
separate states ; voted by states in forming the Constitution ; agreed to it, when
formed, by states ; transmitted it to Congress to be submitted to the states for
their ratification ; it was ratified by the people of each state in convention, each
ratifying by itself, for itself, and bound exclusively by its own ratification ; and
by express provision it was not to go into operation unless nine out of the
twelve states should ratify, and then to be binding only between the states rati
fying. It was thus put in the power of any four states, large or small, without
regard to numbers, to defeat its adoption ; which might have been done by a
very small proportion of the whole, as will appear by reference to the first cen
sus That census was taken very shortly after the adoption of the Constitution,
at which time the federal population of the then twelve states was 3,462,279 ;
of which the four smallest, Delaware, Rhode Island, Georgia, and New-
Hampshire, with a population of only 241,490 (something more than the four
teenth part of th<a whole), could have defeated the ratification. Such was the
total disregard of peculation in the adoption and formation of the Constitution.

It may, however, bt, said, it is true, that the Constitution is the work of the
states, and that there wan no nation prior to its adoption ; but that its adoption
fused the people of the states into one, so as to make a nation of what before
constituted separate and independent sovereignties. Such an assertion would
be directly in the teeth of the Constitution, which says that, when ratified, " it
should be binding" (not over the states ratifying, for that would imply that it
was imposed by some higher authority ; nor between the individuals composing
the states, for that would imply that they were all merged in one ; but) " be
tween the states ratifying the same ;" and thus, by the strongest implication,
recognising them as the parties to the instrument, and as maintaining their
separate and independent existence H.S states after its adoption. But let that
pass. I need it not to rebut the senator's theory — to test the truth of the asser
tion, that the Constitution has formed a nation of the people of these states. I
go back to the grounds already taken : tha\ if such be the fact — if they really
form a nation since the adoption of the Consiitwion, and the nation has a will,
and the numerical majority is its only proper organ, in that case the mode pre
scribed for the amendment of the Constitution would furnish abundant and con
clusive evidence of the fact. But here again, as in its formation and adoption,
there is not the slightest trace or evidence that such is the fact ; on the con
trary, most conclusive to sustain the very opposite opinion.

There are two modes in which amendments to the Constitution may be pro
posed. The one, such as that now proposed, by a resolution to be passed by
two thirds of both houses ; and the other, by a call of a convention by Con
gress, to propose amendments, on the application of two thirds of the states,
neither of which gives the least countenance to the theory of the senator. In
both cases, the mode of ratification, which is the material point, is the same,
and requires the concurring assent of three fourths of the states, regardless of
population, to ratify an amendment. Let us now pause for a moment to trace
the effects of this provision.

There are now twenty-six states, and the concurring assent, of course, Of
twenty states is sufficient to ratify an amendment. It then results that twenty
of the smaller states, of which Kentucky would be the largest, are sufficient for
that purpose, with a population, in federal numbers, of only 7,652,097, less by
several hundred thousand than the numerical majority of the whole, against the
united voice of the other six, with a population of 8,216,279, exceeding the
former by more than half a million. And yet this minority, under the amend
ing power, may change, alter, modify, or destroy every part of the Constitution,

480 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

except that which provides for an equality of representation of the states in the
Senate ; while, as if in mockery and derision of the senator's theory, nineteen
of the larger states, with a population, in federal numbers, of 14,526,073, can
not, even if united to a man, alter a letter in the Constitution, against the seven
others, with a population of only 1,382,303; and this, too, under the existing
Constitution, which is supposed to form the people of these states into a nation.
Finally, Delaware, with a population of little more than 77,000, can put her
veto on all the other states, on a proposition to destroy the equality of the states
in the Senate. Can facts more clearly illustrate the total disregard of the nu
merical majority, as well in the process of amending, as in that of forming and
adopting the Constitution ?

All this must appear anomalous, strange, and unaccountable, on the theory of
the senator, but harmonious and easily explained on the opposite ; that ours is
a union, not of individuals, united by what is called a social compact, for 'flat
would make it a nation ; nor of governments, for that would have formed * mere
confederacy, like the one superseded by the present Constitution ; bu* a union
of states, founded on a written, positive compact, forming a Federal Republic,
with the same equality of rights among the states composing" tne union as
among the citizens composing the states themselves. Inst-ad of a nation we
are, in reality, an assemblage of nations, or peoples (if t^e plural noun may be
used where the language affords none), united in thei» sovereign character im
mediately and directly by their own act, but without losing their separate and
independent existence.

It results from all that has been stated, that either the theory of the senator
is wrong, or that our political system is throughout a profound and radical error.
If the latter be the case, then that complex system of ours, consisting of so many
parts, but blended, as was supposed, into one harmonious and sublime whole,
raising its front on high and challenging the admiration of the world, is but a
misshapen and disproportionate structure, that ought to be demolished to the
ground, with the single exception of the apartment allotted to the House of Rep
resentatives. Is the senator prepared t<? commence the work of demolition ?
Does he believe that all other parts of 'his complex structure are irregular and
deformed appendages ; and that if they were taken down, and the government
erected exclusively on the will o^the numercial majority, it would effect as well,
or better, the great objects for which it was instituted : " to establish justice ;
ensure domestic tranquillity ; provide for the common defence ; promote the
general welfare ; and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our pos
terity ?" Will the .senator — will any one — can any one — venture to assert that ?
And if not, whv not ? There is the question, on the proper solution of which
hangs not only the explanation of the veto, but that of the real nature and char
acter of our complex, but beautiful and harmonious system of government. To
give a full and systematic solution, it would be necessary to descend to the ele
ments of political science, and discuss principles little suited to a discussion in
a deliberative assembly. I waive the attempt, and shall content myself with
giving a much more matter-of-fact solution.

It is sufficient, for that purpose, to point to the actual operation of the gov
ernment through all the stages of its existence, and the many and important
measures which have agitated it from the beginning ; the success of which one
portion of the people regarded as essential to their prosperity and happiness,
while other portions have viewed them as destructive of both. What does this
imply but a deep conflict of interests, real or supposed, between the different
portions of the community, on subjects of the first magnitude — the currency, the
finances, including taxation and disbursements ; the Bank, the protective tariff,
distribution, and many others ; on all of which the most opposite and conflict
ing views have prevailed ? And what would be the effect of placing the pow
ers of the government under the exclusive control of the numercial majority —

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 481

of 8,000,000 over 7,900,000 ; of six states over all the rest— but to give the
dominant interest, or combination of interests, an unlimited and despotic con
trol over all others ? What, but to vest it with the power to administer the gov
ernment for its exclusive benefit, regardless of all others, and indifferent to their
oppression and wretchedness ? And what, in a country of such vast extent and
diversity of condition, institutions, industry, and productions, would that be but
to subject the rest to the most grinding despotism and oppression ? But what is
the remedy ? It would be but to increase the evil to transfer the power to a mi
nority, to abolish the House of Representatives, and place the control exclusive
ly in the hands of the Senate — in that of the four millions instead of the eight.
If one must be sacrificed to the other, it is better that the few should be to the
many, than the many to the few.

What, then, is to be done, if neither the majority nor the minority, the greater
nor less part, can be safely trusted with the exclusive control ? What but to
vest the powers of the government in the whole — the entire people; to make
it in truth and reality the government of the people, instead of the government
of a dominant over a subject part, be it the greater or less — of the whole peo
ple — self-government ; and if this should prove impossible in practice, then to
make the nearest approach to it, by requiring the concurrence, in the action of
the government, of the greatest possible number consistent with the great ends
for which government was instituted — justice and security, within and without.
But how is that to be effected ? Not, certainly, by considering the whole com
munity as one, and taking its sense as a whole by a single process, which, in
stead of giving the voice of all, can but give that of a part. There is but one
way by which it can possibly be accomplished ; and that is by a judicious and
wise division and organization of the government and community, with refer
ence to its different conflicting interests, and by taking the sense of each part
separately, and the concurrence of all as the voice of the whole. Each may
be imperfect of itself; but if the construction be good, and all the keys skilfully
touched, there will be given out, in one blended and harmonious whole, the true
and perfect voice of the people.

But on what principle is such a division and organization to be made to effect
this great object, without which it is impossible to preserve free and popular in
stitutions ? To this no general answer can be given. It is the work of the
wise and experienced, having full and perfect knowledge of the country and
the people in every particular for whom the government is intended. It must
be made to fit ; and when it does, it will fit no other, and will be incapable of
being imitated or borrowed. Without, then, attempting to do what cannot be
done, I propose to point out how that which I have stated has been accomplish
ed in our system of government, and the agency the veto is intended to have in
effecting it.

I begin with the House of Representatives. There each state has a repre
sentation according to its federal numbers, and, when met, a majority of die
whole number of members controls its proceedings ; thus giving to the numeri
cal majority the exclusive control throughout. The effect is to place its pro
ceedings in the power of eight millions of people over all the rest, and six of
the largest states, if united, over the other twenty ; and the consequence, if the
house was the exclusive organ of the voice of the people, would be the domi-
nation of the stronger over the weaker interests of the community, and the es
tablishment of an intolerable and oppressive despotism. To find the remedy
against what would be so great an evil, we must turn to this body. Here an
entirely different process is adopted to take the sense of the community. Pop
ulation is entirely disregarded, and states, without reference to the number of
people, are made the basis of representation ; the effect of which is to place the
control here in a majority of the states, which, had they the exclusive power,

PPP

4S2 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

would exercise it as despotically and oppressively as would the House of Rep
resentatives.

Regarded, then, separately, neither truly represents the sense of the commu
nity, and each is imperfect of itself; but, when united, and the concurring voice
of each is made necessary to enact laws, the one corrects the defects of the oth
er ; and, instead of the less popular derogating from the more popular, as is sup
posed by the senator, the two together give a more full and perfect utterance to
the voice of the people than either could separately. Taken separately, six
states might control the house, and a little upward of four millions might con
trol the Senate, by a combination of the fourteen smaller states ; but, by requi
ring the concurrent votes of the two, the six largest states must add eight others
to have the control in both bodies. Suppose, for illustration, they should unite
with the eight smallest, which would give the least number by which an act
could pass both, houses : it will be found, by adding the population, in federal
numbers, of the six largest to the eight smallest states, that the least number by
which an act can pass both houses, if the members should be true to those
they represent, would be 9,788,570 against a minority of 6,119,797, instead of
8,000,000 against 7,900,000, if the assent of the most popular branch alone were
required.

This more full and perfect expression of the voice of the people by the con
currence of the two, compared to either separately, is a great advance towards
a full and perfect expression of their voice ; but great as it is, it falls far short,
and the framers of the Constitution were, accordingly, not satisfied with it. To
render it still more perfect, their next step was to require the assent of the Pres
ident before an act of Congress could become a law ; and, if he disapproved,
to require two thirds of both houses to overrule his veto. We are thus brought
to the point immediately under discussion, and which, on that account, claims
a full and careful examination.

One of the leading motives for vesting the President with this high power
was, undoubtedly, to give him the means of protecting the portion of the powers
allotted to him by the Constitution against the encroachment of Congress. To
make a division of power effectual, a veto in one form or another is indipensa-
ble. The right of each to judge for itself of the extent of the power allotted to
its share, and to protect itself in its exercise, is what in reality is meant by a
division of power. Without it, the allotment to each department would be a
mere partition, and no division at all. Acting under this impression, the fra
mers of the Constitution have carefully provided that his approval shall be ne
cessary, not only to the acts of Congress, but to every resolution, vote, or order
requiring the consent of the two houses, so as to render it impossible to elude
it by any conceivable device. This of itself was an adequate motive for the
provision ; and, were there no other, ought to be a sufficient reason for the re
jection of this resolution. Without it, the division of power between the legis
lative und executive departments would have been merely nominal.

But it is not the only motive. There is another and deeper, to which the di
vision itself of the government into departments is subordinate — to enlarge the
'popular basis, by increasing the number of voices necessary to its action. As
numerous as are the voices required to obtain the assent of the people through
the Senate and the house to an act, it was not thought by the framers of the
Constitution sufficient for the action of the government in all cases. Nine thou
sand eight hundred, as large as is the number, were regarded as still too few,
and six thousand one hundred too many, to remove all motives for oppression ;
the latter being not too few to be plundered, and the former not too large to di
vide the spoils of plunder among. Till the increase of numbers on one side,
and the decrease on the other, reaches that point, there is no security for the
weaker against the stronger, especially in so extensive a country as ours. Act
ing in the spirit of these remarks, the authors of the Constitution, although they

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 483

deemed the concurrence of the Senate and the house as sufficient, with the ap
proval of the President, to the enactment of laws in ordinary cases ; yet, when
he dissented, they deemed it a sufficient presumption against the measure to re
quire a still greater enlargement of the popular basis for its enactment. With
this view, the assent of two thirds of both houses was required to overrule his
veto — that is, eighteen states in the Senate, and a constituency of ten million
six hundred thousand in the other house.

But it may be said that nothing is gained towards enlarging the popular basis
of the government by the veto power, because the number necessary to elect a
majority to the two houses, without which the act could, not pass, would be suf
ficient to elect him. That is true. But he may have been elected by a differ
ent portion of the people, or, if not, great changes may take place during his
four years, both in the Senate and the house, which may change the majority
that brought him into power, and with it the measures and policy to be pursued.
In either case, he might find it necessary to interpose his veto, to maintain his
views of the Constitution, or the policy of the party of which he is at the head,
and which elevated him to power.

But a still stronger consideration for vesting him with the power may be found
in the difference of the manner of his election, compared with that of the mem
bers of either house. The senators are elected by the vote of the legislatures
of the respective states ; and the members of the house by the people, who, in
almost all the states, elect by districts. In neither is there the least responsi
bility of the members of any one state to the Legislature or people of any other
state. They are, as far as their responsibility may be concerned, solely and
exclusively under the influence of the states and people who respectively elect
them. Not so the President. The votes of the whole are counted in his elec
tion, which makes him more or less responsible to every part — to thoss who
voted against him, as well as those to whom he owes his election ; which he
must feel sensibly. If he should be an aspirant for a re-election, he will de
sire to gain the favourable opinion of states that opposed him, as well as to re
tain that of those which voted for him. Even if he should not be a candidate
for re-election, the desire of having a favourite elected, or maintaining the as
cendency of his party, may have, to a considerable extent, the same influence
over him. The effect, in either case, would be to make him look more to the
interest of the whole — to soften sectional feelings and asperity — to be more of a
patriot, than the partisan of any particular interest ; and, through the influence
of these causes, to give a more general character to the politics of the country,
and thereby render the collision between sectional interests less fierce than it
would be if legislation depended solely on the members of the two houses, who
owe no responsibility but to those who elected therq. The same influence acts
even on the aspirants for the presidency, and is followed to a very considerable
extent by the same softening and generalizing effects. In the case of the Pres
ident, it may lead to the interposing of his veto against oppressive and danger
ous sectional measures, even when supported by those to whom he owes his
election. But, be the cause of interposing his veto what it may, its effect, in
all cases, is to require a greater body of constituency, through the legislative
organs, to put the government in action against it — to require another key to be
struck, and to bring out a more full and perfect response from the voice of the
people.

There is still another impediment, if not to the enactment of laws, to their
execution, to be found in the judiciary department. I refer to the right of the
courts, in all cases coming before them in law or equity, where an act of Con
gress comes in question, to decide on its unconstitutionality ; which, if decided
against the law in the Supreme Court, is, in effect, a permanent veto. But here
a difference must be made between a decision against the constitutionality of

484 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

a law of Congress and that of states. The former acts as a restriction on the
powers of this government, but the latter as an enlargement.

Such are the various processes of taking the sense of the people through the
divisions and organization of the different departments of the government ; all
of which, acting through their appropriate organs, are intended to widen its basis,
and render it more popular, instead of less, by increasing the number necessary
to put it in action, and having for their object to prevent one portion of the com
munity from aggrandizing or enriching itself at the expense of the other, and to
restrict the whole to the sphere intended by the framers of the Constitution.
Has it effected these objects ? Has it prevented oppression and usurpation on
the part of the government ? Has it accomplished the objects for which the
government was ordained, as enumerated in the preamble of the Constitution ?
Much, very much, certainly, has been done, but not all. Many instances might
be enumerated, in the history of the government, of the violation of the Consti
tution — of the assumption of powers not delegated to it — of the perversion of
those delegated to uses never intended — and of their being wielded by the
dominant interest, for the time, for its aggrandizement, at the expense of the
rest of the community — instances that may be found in every period of its ex
istence, from the earliest to the latest, beginning with the bank and bank con
nexion at its outset, and ending with the Distribution Act, at its late extraordi
nary session. How is this to be accounted for ? What is the cause ?

The explanation and cause will be found in the fact that, as fully as the sense
of the people is taken in the action of the government, it is not taken fully
enough. For, after all that has been accomplished in that respect, there are
but two organs through which the voice of the community acts directly on the
government, and which, taken separately, or in combination, constitute the ele
ments of which it is composed : the one is the majority of the states regarded
in their corporate character as bodies politic, which, in its simple form, consti
tutes the Senate ; and the other is the majority of the people of the states, of
which, in its simple form, the House of Representatives is composed. These,
combined in the proportions already stated, constitute the executive department ;
and that department and the Senate appoint the judges who constitute the judi
ciary. But it is only in their simple form in the Senate and the other house
that they have a steady and habitual control over the legislative acts of the
government. The veto of the executive is rarely interposed — not more than
about twenty times during the period of more than fifty years that the govern
ment has existed. Their effects have been beneficially felt, but only casualty,
at long intervals, and without steady and habitual influence over the action of
the government. The same remarks are substantially applicable to what, for
the sake of brevity, may be Called the veto of the judiciary ; the right of nega
tiving a law for the want of constitutionality, when it comes in question, in a
case before the courts.

The government, then, of the Union being under no other habitual and steady
control but these two majorities, acting through this and the other house, is, in
fact, placed substantially under the control of the portion of the community
which the united majorities of the two houses represent for the time, and which
may consist of but fourteen states, with a federal population of less than ten
millions against a little more than six, as has been already explained. But, as
large as is the former, and as small as is the latter, the one is not large enough,
in proportion, to prevent it from plundering, under the forms of law, and the
other small enough from being plundered ; and hence the many instances ol
violation of the Constitution, of usurpation, of powers perverted and wielded for
selfish purposes, which the history of the government affords. They furnish
proof conclusive that the principle of plunder, so deeply implanted in all gov
ernments, has not been eradicated in ours by all the precaution taken by its
framers against it.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 485

But in estimating the number of the constituency necessary to control the ma
jority in the two houses of Congress at something less than ten millions, I have
estimated it altogether too high, regarding the practical operation of the govern
ment. To form a correct conception of its practical operation in this respect,
another element, which has in practice an important influence, must be taken
into the estimate, and which I shall next proceed to explain.

Of the two majorities, which, acting either separately or in combination, con
trol the government, the numerical majority is by far the most influential. It
has the exclusive control in the House of Representatives, and preponderates
more than five to one in the choice of the President, assuming that the ratio of
representation will be fixed at sixty-eight thousand under the late census. It
also greatly preponderates in appointment of the judges, the right of nominating
having much greater influence in making appointments than that of advising
and consenting. From these facts, it must be apparent that the leaning of the
President will be to that element of power to which he mainly owes his eleva
tion, and on which he must principally rely to secure his re-election, or main
tain the ascendency of the party and its policy, the head of which he usually is.
This leaning of his must have a powerful effect on the inclination and tendency
of the whole government. In his hands are placed, substantially, all the hon
ours and emoluments of the government ; and these, when greatly increased, as
they are, and ever must be when the powers of the government are greatly
stretched and increased, must give the President a corresponding influence over
not only the members of both houses, but also public opinion, and, through
that, a still more powerful indirect influence over them ; and thus they may be
brought to sustain or oppose, through his influence, measures which otherwise
they would have opposed or sustained, and the whole government be made to
lean in the same direction with the executive.

From these causes, the government, in all of its departments, gravitates steadi
ly towards the numerical majority, and has been moving slowly towards it from
the beginning ; sometimes, indeed, retarded, or even stopped or thrown back,
but, taking any considerable period of time, always advancing towards it. That
it begins to make near approach to that fatal point, ample proof may be found
in the oft-repeated declaration of the mover of this resolution, and of many of
his supporters at the extraordinary session — that the late pesidential election
decided all the great measures which he so ardently pressed through the Sen
ate. Yes, even here, in this chamber, in the Senate, which is composed of the
opposing element, and on which the only effectual resistance to this fatal ten
dency exists that is to be found in the government, we are told that the popular
will, as expressed in the presidential election, is to decide not only the elec
tion, but every measure which may be agitated in the canvass in order to influ
ence the result. When what was thus boldly insisted on comes to be an es
tablished principle of action, the end will be near.

As the government approaches nearer and nearer to the one absolute and single
power, the will of the greater number, its action will become more and more
disturbed and irregular ; faction, corruption, and anarchy will more and more
abound ; patriotism will daily decay, and affection and reverence for the gov
ernment grow weaker and weaker, until the final shock occurs, when the system
will rush to ruin, and the sword take the place of law and Constitution.

Let me not be misunderstood. I object not to that structure of the govern
ment which makes the numerical majority the predominant element : it is, per
haps, necessary that it should be so in all popular constitutional governments
like ours, which excludes classes. It is necessarily the exponent of the strong
est interest, or combination of interests, in the community ; and it would seem
to be necessary to give it the preponderance, in order to infuse into the govern
ment the necessary energy to accomplish the ends for which it was instituted.
The great question is, How is due preponderance to be given to it, without sub-

486 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

jecting the whole, in time, to its unlimited sway ? Which brings up the ques
tion, Is there anywhere in our complex system of government, a guard, check,
or contrivance, sufficiently strong to arrest so fearful a tendency of the govern
ment ? Or, to express it in more direct and intelligible language, Is there any
where in the system a more full and perfect expression of the voice of the peo
ple of the states calculated to counteract this tendency to the concentration of
all the powers of the government in the will of the numerical majority, resulting
from the partial and imperfect expression of their voice through its organs ?

Yes, fortunately, doubly fortunately, there is ; not only a more full and per
fect, but a full and perfect expression to be found in the Constitution, acknowl
edged by all to be the fundamental and supreme law of the land. It is full
arid perfect, because it is the expression of the voice of each state, adopted by
the separate assent of each, by itself, and for itself; and is the voice of all, by
being that of each component part, united and blended into one harmonious
whole. But it is not only full and perfect, but as just as it is full and perfect ;
for, combining the sense of each, and therefore all, there is nothing left on
which injustice, or oppression, or usurpation can operate. And, finally, it is as
supreme as it is just ; because, comprehending the will of all, by uniting that
of each of the parts, there is nothing within or above to control it. It is, in
deed, the vox populi iwx Dei — the creating voice that called the system into
existence, and of which the government itself is but a creature, clothed with
delegated powers to execute its high behests.

We are thus brought to a question of the deepest import, and on which the
fate of the system depends. How can this full, perfect, just, and supreme
voice of the people, imbodied in the Constitution, be brought to bear habitually
and steadily in counteracting the fatal tendency of the government to the abso
lute and despotic control of the numerical majority ? Or — if I may be permit
ted to use so bold an expression — How is this, the deity of our political system,
to be successfully invoked, to interpose its all-powerful creating voice to save
from perdition the creature of its will and the work of its hand ? If it cannot
be done, ours, like all free governments preceding it, must go the way of all
flesh ; but if it can be, its duration may be from generation to generation, to the
latest posterity. To this all-important question I will not attempt a reply at this
time. It would lead me far beyond the limits properly belonging to this discus
sion. I descend from the digression nearer to the subject immediately at is
sue, in order to reply to an objection to the veto power taken by the senator
from Virginia on this side the chamber (Mr. Archer).

He rests his support of this resolution on the ground that the object intended
to be effected by the veto has failed ; that the framers of the Constitution regarded
the legislative department of the government as the one most to be dreaded ; and
that their motive for vesting the executive with the veto was to check its en
croachments on the other departments; but that the executive, and not the
Legislature, had proved to be the most dangerous ; and that the veto had become
either useless or mischievous, by being converted into a sword to attack, instead
of a shield to defend, as was originally intended.

I make no issue with the senator as to the correctness of his statement. I
assume the facts to be as he supposes ; not because I agree with him, but sim
ply with the view of making my reply more brief.

Assuming, then, that the executive department has proved to be the more
formidable, and that it requires to be checked rather than to have the power of
checking others, the first inquiry, on that assumption, should be into the cause
of its increase of power, in order to ascertain the seat and the nature of the dan
ger ; and the next, whether the measure proposed — that of divesting it of the
veto, or modifying it as proposed — would guard against the danger apprehended.

1 begin with the first ; and in entering on it, assert with confidence, that if
the executive has become formidable to the liberty or safety of the country, or

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 487

other departments of the government, the cause is not in the Constitution, but
in the acts and omissions of Congress itself. .

According to my conception, the powers vested in the President by the Con
stitution are few and effectually guarded, and are not of themselves at all formi
dable. In order to have a just conception of the extent of his powers, it must
be borne in mind that there are but two classes of power known to the Consti
tution ; and they are powers that are expressly granted, and those that are ne
cessary to carry the granted powers into execution. Now, by a positive pro
vision of the Constitution, all powers necessary to the execution of the granted
powers are expressly delegated to Congress, be they powers granted to the
legislative, executive, or judicial department ; and can only be exercised by the
authority of Congress, and^in the manner prescribed by law. This provision
will be found in what is called the residuary clause, which declares that Con
gress shall have power " to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper
to carry into execution the foregoing powers" (those granted to Congress),
" and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the
United States, or in any department or officer thereof." A more comprehensive
provision cannot be imagined. It carries with it all powers necessary and
proper to the execution of the granted powers, be they lodged where they may,
and vests the whole, in terms not less explicit, in Congress ; and here let me
add, in passing, that the provision is as wise as it is comprehensive. It depos-
ites the right of deciding what powers are necessary for the execution of the
granted powers where, and where only, it can be lodged with safety — in the
hands of the law-making power ; and forbids any department or officer of the
government from exercising any power not expressly authorized by the Con
stitution or the laws, thus making ours emphatically a government of law and
Constitution.

Having now shown that the President is restricted by the Constitution to
powers expressly granted to him, and that if any of his granted powers be such
that they require other powers to execute them, he cannot exercise them with
out the authority of Congress, I shall now show that there is not one power
vested in him that is any way dangerous, unless made so by the acts or per
mission of Congress. I shall take them in the order they stand in the Consti
tution.

He is, in the first place, made commander-in-chief of the army and navy of
the United States, and the militia when called into actual service. Large and
expensive military and naval establishments, and numerous corps of militia,
called into service, would, no doubt, increase very dangerously the power and
patronage of the President ; but neither can take place but by the action of
Congress. Not a soldier can be enlisted, a ship of war built, nor a militiaman
called into service, without its authority ; ar.d, very fortunately, our situation is
such that there is no necessity, and probably will be none, why his power and
patronage should be dangerously increased by either of those means.

He is next vested with the power to make treaties and to appoint officers,
with the advice and consent of the Senate ; and here, again, his power can only
be made dangerous by the action of one or both houses of Congress. In the
formation of treaties, two thirds of the Senate must concur ; and it is difficult
to conceive of a treaty that could materially enlarge his powers, that would not
require an act of Congress to carry it into effect. The appointing power may,
indeed, dangerously increase his patronage, if officers be uselessly multiplied
and too highly paid ; but if such should be the case, the fault would be in Con
gress, by whose authority exclusively they can be created or their compensa
tion regulated.

But much is said in this connexion of the power of removal, justly accompa
nied by severe condemnation of the many and abusive instances of the use of
the power, and the dangerous influence it gives the President ; in all of which

468 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALIIOUN.

I fully concur. It is, indeed, a corrupting and dangerous power, when officers
are greatly multiplied and highly paid, and when it is perverted from its legiti
mate object to the advancement of personal or party purposes. But 1 find no
such power in the list of powers granted to the executive, which is proof con
clusive that it belongs to the class necessary and proper to execute some other
power, if it exists at all, which none can doubt ; and, for reasons already as
signed, cannot be exercised without authority of law. If, then, it has been
abused, it must be because Congress has not done its duty in permitting it to
be exercised by the President without the sanction of law authorizing its exer
cise, and guarding against the abuses to which it is so liable.

The residue of the list are rather duties than rights — that of recommending
to Congress such measures as he may deem expedient ; of convening both
houses on extraordinary occasions ; of adjourning them when they cannot agree
on the time ; of receiving ambassadors and other ministers ; of taking care that
the laws be faithfully executed, and commissioning the officers of the United
States. Of all these, there is but one which claims particular notice, in connex
ion with the point immediately under consideration ; and that is, his power as
the administrator of the laws. But whatever power he may have in that capa
city depends on the action of Congress. If Congress should limit its legisla
tion to the few great subjects confided to it ; so frame its laws as to leave as
little as possible to discretion, and take care to see that they are duly and faith
fully executed, the administrative powers of the President would be proportion
ally limited, and divested of all danger. But if, on the contrary, it should ex
tend its legislation in every direction ; draw within its action subjects never
contemplated by the Constitution ; multiply its acts, create numerous offices,
and increase the revenue and expenditures proportionally, and, at the same
time, frame its laws vaguely and loosely, and withdraw, in a great measure, its
supervising care over their execution, his power would indeed become truly
formidable and alarming. Now I appeal to the senator and his friend, the au
thor of this resolution, whether the growth of executive power has not been the
result of such a course on the part of Congress. I ask them whether his pow
er has not, in fact, increased or decreased just in proportion to the increase
and decrease of the system of legislation, such as has been described ? What
was the period of its maximum increase, but the very period which they have
so frequently and loudly denounced as the one most distinguished for the prev
alence of executive power and usurpation ? Much of that power certainly de
pended on the remarkable man then at the head of that department ; but much
— far more — on the system of legislation which the author of this resolution
had built up with so much zeal and labour, and which carried the powers of
the government to a point beyond that to which it had ever before attained,
drawing many and important powers into its vortex, of which the framers of the
Constitution never dreamed. And here let me say to both of the senators, and
the party of which they are prominent members, that they labour in vain to
bring down executive power, while they support the system they so zealously
advocate. The power they complain of is but its necessary fruit. Be assured
that, as certain as Congress transcends its assigned limits, and usurps powers
never conferred, or stretches those conferred beyond the proper limits, so sure
ly will the fruits of its usurpation pass into the hands of the executive. In
seeking to become master, it but makes a master in the person of the President.
It is only by confining itself to its allotted sphere, and a discreet use of its ac
knowledged powers, that it can retain that ascendency in the government which
the Constitution intended to confer on it.

Having now pointed out the cause of the great increase of the executive
power on which the senator rested his objection to the veto power, and having
satisfactorily shown, as I trust I have, that, if it has proved dangerous in fact,
the fault is not in the Constitution, but in Congress, I would next ask him, In

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 489

what possible way could the divesting the President of his veto, or modifying
it as he proposes, limit his power ? Is it not clear that, so far from the veto
being the cause of the increase of his power, it would have acted as a limita
tion on it if it had been more freely and frequently used ? If the President had
vetoed the original Bank — the connexion with the banking system — the tariffs
of 1824 and 1828, and the numerous acts appropriating money for roads,
canals, harbours, and a long list of other measures not less unconstitutional,
would his power have been half as great as it now is ? He has grown great
and powerful, not because he used his veto, but because he abstained from using
it. In fact, it is difficult to imagine a case in which its application can tend to
enlarge his power, except it be the case of an act intended to repeal a law
calculated to increase his power, or to restore the authority of one which, by an
arbitrary construction of his power, he has set aside.

Now let me add, in conclusion, that this is a question, in its bearings, of vital
importance to that wonderful and sublime system of government which our
patriotic ancestors established, not so much by their wisdom, wise and experi
enced as they were, as by the guidance of a kind Providence, who, in his di
vine dispensations, so disposed events as to lead to the establishment of a system
of government wiser than those who framed it. The veto of itself, as important
as it is, sinks into nothing compared to the principle involved. It is but one, and
that by no means the most considerable, of those many devices which I have at
tempted to explain, and which were intended to strengthen the popular basis
of our government, and resist its tendency to fall under the control of the domi
nant interest, acting through the mere numerical majority. The introduction of
this resolution may be regarded as one of the many symptoms of that fatal ten
dency, and of which we had such fearful indications in the bold attempt at the
late extraordinary session, of forcing through a whole system of measures of the
most threatening and alarming character, in the space of a few weeks, on the
ground that they were all decided in the election of the late President ; thus
attempting to substitute the will of a majority of the people, in the choice of a
chief magistrate, as the legislative authority of the Union, in lieu of the beauti
ful and profound system established by the Constitution.

XXXIV.

AND EXPENDITURES OF THE GOVERNMENT, MARCH 16, 1842.

MR. CALHOUN said : These resolutions are of a very mixed and contradictory
character. They contain much that I approve, and much that I condemn. I
approve of them, in the first place, because they recognise the Compromise Act,
and profess to respect its provisions. I still more heartily approve of them be-
$ause they assert that no duty ought to be laid but for revenue, and no revenue
raised but what may be necessary for the economical administration of the gov
ernment, and, by consequence, abandon the protective policy. I very decided
ly approve of the prefe-rence which they give to the ad valorem over specific
duties, and the effective argument of the senator (Mr. Clay) in support of that
preference. And, finally, I approve of the principle that the government ought
not to rely on loans or treasury-notes as a part of their ways and means in time
of peace, except to meet a temporary deficit.

Having approved of so much, it may be asked, For what do I condemn them ?
1 do it for this : that they do not propose to carry out in practice what they pro
fess in principle ; that, while they profess to respect the Compromise Act, they
violate it in every essential particular but one^the ad valorem principle; and

QQQ

490 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

even that, I fear, it is intended to set aside by the juggle of home valuation. If
there be any part of that act more sacred than another, it is that which provides
that there shall be no duty imposed after the 30th of June next except for rev
enue, and no revenue raised but what may be necessary to the economical ad
ministration of the government. It was for that the act was passed, and with
out which it would not have existed. If that was not apparent on the face of
the act itself, the causes which led to its adoption would clearly prove it. It
is sufficient, in this connexion, to remind the Senate that the object of the act
was to terminate the controversy between the State of South Carolina and this
government, growing out of the tariff of 1828. The object of the state, as far
as it was individually concerned, was twofold — to put down the protective pol
icy, and to protect herself against high duties, even for revenue, when it could
be avoided by due regard to economy. To secure the former, the provision
was inserted that no duty should be laid but for revenue ; and the latter, that no
revenue should be raised but what was necessary for the economical adminis
tration of the government. Without these provisions, I, as her representative
on this floor, would never have given my assent to the act ; and, if I had, the
state would never have acquiesced in it. I speak with perfect confidence, for
even with these important provisions, she reluctantly assented to the compromise.

Besides these, there was another object, in which the whole Union was deep
ly concerned, which influenced her in the step she then took ; and that was to
guard against the dangerous consequences of an accumulation of a large surplus
revenue in the treasury after the payment of the public debt. While defending her
self, and the portion of the Union in which her lot is cast, against an unconstitu
tional and oppressive measure, she was not unmindful of her Federal duties and
obligations, nor did she permit her fidelity to the Union and the government to be
impaired in her resistance to oppression. She had the sagacity to see, long in
advance, the corrupting and dangerous consequences of a large and permanent
surplus, of which experience has since given such calamitous evidence ; and has
the merit of taking the most intrepid stand against it, while others were unheed
ing, or indifferent to consequences. To guard against this danger, every article
imported that did not come in conflict with the protective policy was made, by the
Compromise Act, duty free to the 30th of June next, which, in the aggregate,
equalled in value those on which the duties were retained ; that is, one half
the duties were forthwith repealed ; but to prevent the possibility of abuse, and
to guard in the most effectual manner the two leading provisions of the act, it
was expressly provided that, after that time, all articles of imports, except a
small list contained in the 5th section, should be subject to duty, and that no
duty should thereafter exceed 20 per cent, ad valorem. The intention of the
former provision was to prevent the enlargement of the free list, and thereby
raising the duties proportionally higher on the dutied articles ; and of the latter,
that, under no pretext whatever, for protection or revenue, should duties be rais
ed above 20 per cent., which was regarded as the extreme limits to which they
ought ever to be carried for revenue. These were the guards on which I re
lied to prevent a return to the protective policy, or the raising of the revenue
beyond what the necessary and economical wants of the government might re
quire ; and which, if they should be respected, will prove all-sufficient for the
purpose intended.

Having secured these essential points, as far as the state and the Union at
large were concerned, the next object was so to reduce the duties on the pro
tected articles as to prevent any shock to the manufacturing interests. The
'state waged no war against them. Her opposition was to the unconstitutional
and oppressive means by which it was sought to promote them at the expense
of the other great interests of the community. She wished the manufacturers
well ; and, in proposing to bring down the duties gradually, through a slow pro
cess of many years, to the revenue point, I but faithfully represented her feel-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 491

ings. My first proposition was to allow seven years, and to take one seventh
annually off; but, finally, I acquiesced in extending the time two years more,
and to reduce the duties as provided for by the act. So far from being an op
ponent to manufacturing industry, there is not one within the reach of my voice
who puts a higher estimate on those arts, mechanical and chemical, by which
matter is subjected to the dominion of mind. I regard them as the very basis
of civilization, and the principal means designed by Providence for the future
progress and improvement of our race. They will be found in progress to re
act on the moral and political world, and thereby producing greater and more
salutary changes in both than all other causes combined.

Such are the leading objects of the Compromise Act. It is admitted, on all
hands, that the provisions in favour of the manufacturing interests have been
faithfully observed on our part. We have patiently waited the nine years of
slow reduction, and resisted every attempt to make changes against the manu
facturing interest, even when they would have operated in our favour, and for
which we have received the thanks of those who represented it on this floor.
And now, when the time has arrived when it is our turn to enjoy its benefits,
they who called on us to adhere to the act when the interest of the manufac
turers was at stake, and commended us for our fidelity to the compromise, turn
round, when it suits their interest, and coolly and openly violate every provis
ion in our favour, with the single exception already noticed, as I shall next pro
ceed to show.

For that purpose it will be necessary to go back to the extraordinary session,
for then the violation commenced. Going, then, back, and passing over minor
points, I charge upon the senator and his friends, in the first place, a palpable
infraction of the compromise, in raising the duties without making the least ef
fort to reduce the expenditures of the government to what was necessary to its
economical administration. The act is positive, that no more^re venue should
be raised than what such administration might require : a provreion just as es
sential as that which requires that no duty should be imposed but for revenue.
Acting, then, in the spirit of the act, the first step towards a revision of the du
ties should have been to ascertain what amount of revenue would be required
for the economical administration of the government. Was that done ? No
thing like it ; but the very reverse. Not an effort was made to ascertain what
the wants of the treasury required — not one to reduce the expenditures, although
the senator and his party had come in on a solemn pledge to make a great re
duction. Instead of that, every effort was made to increase the expenditures
and add to the loans, forgetful alike of the compromise and pledges to the peo
ple, and, at the same time, to reduce the revenue by giving away the income from
the lands, with the intention of increasing the duties on the imports.

The next charge I make is, a great enlargement of the list of free articles by
the act increasing the duties, passed at the same session, in direct violation of
the fifth section of the Compromise Act. Foreseeing that the protective system
might again be renewed, and high duties imposed, simply by extending the list
of free articles, and throwing the whole burden of supporting the government
on the articles selected for protection, that section enumerates a short list of
articles which should be duty free after the 30th of June next, and provided that
all which were not enumerated should be subject to duties after that period, in
order to guard against such abuses. In the face of this provision, the act al
luded to increased the list of free articles manifold, taking the amount stated by
the senator, as contained in that list, to be correct.

Such were the infractions of the act during that session ; and it is now pro
posed by these resolutions to give the finishing blow by raising the duties, on
an average, to 30 per centum on all articles not made free, in express violation
of the main provision in the compromise, that no duty should be laid above 20
per cent, after the 30th of June next. The senator admits this to be an infrac-

492 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

tion, but pleads necessity. Now, sir, I admit, if there be indeed a necessity —
if, after reducing the expenditures of the government to its just and economical
warits, and the list of free articles to that provided for in the act, and returning
the revenue from the lands to the treasury, there should be a deficit which could
not be met without going beyond the 20 per cent., a case would be made that
might justify it. But I utterly deny, in the first place, that, if all had been done
that ought to have been, there would be any such necessity ; and, in the next,
the right to plead a necessity of his own creating. I go farther, and call on
him to explain how he can, in fairness or honour, after what occurred at the ex
traordinary session, propose, as he has in these resolutions, to repeal the pro
vision in the Distribution Act which makes it void if the duties should be raised
above 20 per cent. It is well known to all that it could not have passed with
out the insertion of that provision, and that on its passage depended that of the
Bankrupt Bill. Now I ask him how, after having secured the passage of two
such important measures, can he reconcile it with what is fair or honourable, to
turn round and propose to repeal the very provision by which their passage was
effected ?

But the senator denies that the necessity is of his creating, and insists that,
if the revenue from the land were restored, rigid economy enforced, and all the
provisions of the compromise respected, there would not be sufficient income to
meet the necessary and economical wants of the government. I take issue with
him on the fact, and shall now proceed to show that, even on his own data,
there would be ample revenue without raising the duties above 20 per cent.

According to the estimates of the senator, the whole amount of appropriations,
excluding public debt, required for the service of the year, permanent and cur
rent, under the various heads of civil list and miscellaneous, army and navy in
all their branches, is twenty millions five hundred thousand dollars. To which
he adds for other appropriations, not included in these, one million five hundred
thousand doll^s, which can mean nothing but contingent, unforeseen expendi
tures, and for the debt, two millions of dollars ; making, in the aggregate, twenty-
four millions of dollars. To this he proposes to add two millions more annual
ly, as a reserved fund to meet contingencies ; to which I object, on the ground
that the object is already provided for by the one million five hundred thousand dol
lars for appropriations riot included in the twenty millions five hundred thousand.
There can be no demand on the treasury but through appropriations, and there
caft be no meaning attached to contingent appropriations but such unforeseen ex
penditures as are not usually included under the various heads of civil list, mis
cellaneous, army, and navy. The senator has clearly attempted to make a dis
tinction that does not exist, and, in consequence, made a double provision for
the same object. Of the two, I take the less sum, as I regard it ample as a
permanent contingent fund, which will make his estimate for the year, thus cor
rected, to be twenty-four millions of dollars — a sum surely amply large.

Let us now turn to the ways and means to meet this large demand on the
treasury. The first item is the revenue from the land, which ought to yield,
under proper management, an average of at least three millions five hundred
thousand dollars for the next five years, and which would reduce the amount to
be provided for from the imposts to twenty millions five hundred thousand dollars.
From this there ought to be deducted at least five hundred thousand dollars from
the saving that may be made in the collection of the customs, which the sen
ator estimates at one million six hundred thousand. I find, taking a series of
years, under the tariff of 1828, with its exorbitant duties, and the consequent
great increase of expenditures to guard against smuggling and frauds, that the
collection of about an equal sum cost 4| per cent. Allowing the same rate un
der the more simple and moderate system of duties, according even to the
scheme of the senator, and the cost of collection, instead of the sum proposed,
would be about eight hundred and fifty thousand dollars, making a difference

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 493

of seven hundred and fifty thousand ; but, for the facility of counting, and to be
liberal, I allow but half a million for saving. That would reduce the sum to
be provided for by duties to twenty millions of dollars ; and the next question
is, What rate of duty will be necessary to meet that amount ?

Here, again, I take the estimate of the senator as the basis of my calcu
lation. He bases his estimates of the imports on the probable amount of the
exports, adding fifteen per cent, to the former for the profits of freight and trade.
On this basis he estimates the probable amount of imports at one hundred and
nineteen millions of dollars, a sum probably too low, taking the average of die
next five years, provided the duties shall be moderate, and no adverse unfore
seen cause should intervene. From this sum he deducted ten millions to meet
the interest abroad, on account of the debts of the states : a sum, for the reason
assigned by the senator from New-Hampshire behind me, too large, at least by
three millions of dollars. Deduct seven millions on that, account, and there
would be left one hundred and twelve millions. The senator next deducted
eighteen millions for articles made free by the act of the extra session, not in
cluding coffee and tea, which he estimates at twelve millions. I cannot assent
to the deduction to the extent stated, as it is clearly against the provisions of
the Compromise Act, as beyond the permanent free list provided for by that act.
What would be the amount within its limits I have not been able to ascertain ;
but on the best data I have been able to obtain, I would not suppose that it
would much, if any, exceed three millions five hundred thousand dollars, not in
cluding gold and silver. I exclude them because they are constantly flowing
in and out, according to the demands of trade, the imports of one year becoming
the exports of the next, and the reverse, except the small amount that may be
permanently added to the circulation or be used in the country. The sum of
three millions five hundred thousand dollars deducted from the hundred and
twelve millions would leave, on the data assumed, a hundred and eight millions
five hundred thousand as the probable annual amount of dutiable articles that
would be imported for home consumption. Twenty per cent, on that sum
would give twenty-one millions seven hundred thousand dollars, a sum ample to
meet the amount estimated, and cover the necessary expenses of collection, and
pay the bounties and premiums properly chargeable on the treasury.

But, in making these calculations, I by no means wish to be understood as
acquiescing in the estimates which the senator has made of what ought to be
the expenditures of the government. I hold them much too high. With an
efficient system of administration, actuated by a true spirit of economy, seven
teen millions would be ample to meet all expenses, without impairing the effi
ciency of the government, as I have shown on a former occasion ; to raise
which, an average duty of twelve or fifteen per cent., instead of twenty, would,
•with the aid of the revenue from the lands, be abundantly sufficient.

Having now shown that, while the senator professes to respect the compro
mise, he has in fact violated, or proposes to violate, all the essential provisions
of the act, and that his plea of necessity for the proposing to raise the duties
above the twenty per cent, utterly fails him, it may be asked, How is this con
tradiction in his course to be explained ? Is he deluded, or does he intend to
delude others ? To suppose the latter would impeach his sincerity, which I
do not intend to question. But how is his delusion to be accounted for ? It re
sults from his position.

He is a tariff man, decidedly opposed to free trade. We have his own au
thority for the assertion. According to his views, free trade is among the
greatest curses that could befall the country, and a high protective tariff among
the greatest blessings. While he thus thinks and feels, circumstances, not ne
cessary to be explained, have placed him in such relation to the Compromise
Act, that he is sincerely desirous of respecting its provisions ; but the misfor
tune is, that his respect for it is not compatible with his strong attachment to

494 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

his long-cherished system of policy. There is no estimating the force of self-
delusion in a position so contradictory, of which the course of the senator on
this occasion furnishes a striking illustration. Entertaining the opinion he
does, it is natural that he should desire to carry out in practice his high restrict
ive notions on one side and opposition to free trade on the other ; nor is it to
be wondered at that his respect for the Compromise Act should have to yield as
far as they stand in the way of his favourite system ; especially as he has persua
ded himself that the experiment, as he chooses to call it, of free trade has utterly
failed on trial. Under that impression, he boldly asserted that the reduction of
the)*duties had impaired the productive energy of the country, and has proved a
curse not only to the portion of the country which so strongly advocated it, but
to the very state by whose efforts the protective policy was overthrown.

Here, again, I take issue on the fact with the senator. I deny, in the first
place, that we hare had free trade, or anything that comes near to it. It is
true that about one half of the articles were made duty free, but on the resi
due, and they the most important, but a small reduction of duties, comparatively
speaking, was made prior to the 1st of January last. Till then, the duty on
most of the articles was at a high protective rate. But while I deny that we
have had free trade, I equally deny that the reduction which has taken place
has in any degree impaired the productive energies of the country, or proved a
curse to the staple states. On the contrary, I assert, and shall prove, that its
effects has equalled the most sanguine expectation of the friends of free trade,
notwithstanding the highly adverse circumstances under which it has taken
place ; that of a currency fluctuating and deranged, credit universally impaired,
the machinery of commerce broken, and our principal customer, on whom we
mainly depend for the sales of our produce abroad, and the purchase of our
supplies, in a state of the greatest commercial embarrassment. In the midst
of all these opposing and formidable difficulties, the productive energies of the
country have advanced beyond all former example, under the wholesome stimu
lus of reduction of duties, as I shall next proceed to show.

I shall draw my facts principally from the annual commercial document from
the treasury department, which gives full and authentic information of the com
merce and navigation of the year, in all their relations, and shall begin with that
portion of our domestic products which is shipped abroad, and which constitutes
the basis of our commerce and navigation. I shall not include the imports, not
because they would give a less favourable view of our industrial pursuits, but
because they would give one that was apparently too favourable during the last
four years, owing to the vast extent of loans contracted abroad by many of the
states, and which were principally returned in merchandise of various descrip
tions. Nor shall I include the carrying trade, because it is little affected by
the rate of the duties, as they are returned in the shape of drawbacks on reship-
ment of the imported articles.

In order to have a full and satisfactory view of the relative effects of increas
ing and reducing the duties on our export trade, I have arranged in table A the
aggregate amount of all our domestic exports, including manufactures, for six
teen years, beginning with 1825, the first year under the first tariff laid pro
fessedly for protection, and ending with 1840, divided into two equal periods
of eight years each ; the first ending with 1832, and comprehending the period
of the two protective tariffs of 1824 and 1828, and the last extending from the
termination of the first to 1840 inclusive. I have not included 1841, because it
would impede the facility of comparing the two periods, by making one longer
than the other, and not because it would be less favourable than the other years,
since the commencement of the rsduction. I have extended the first to 1833,
notwithstanding the reduction 'of the duties on coffee, tea, and some other arti
cles began in 1830, and which, as a reference to the table will show, gave a
considerable impulse to our export trade in 1831 and 1832, and a corresponding

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 495

increase of the exports to the period of high protective duties, which fairly be
longs to that of reduction. The great reduction took place in March, 1833, un
der the Compromise Act, and with that year, accordingly, I commence the pe
riod of reduction, to the effects of which the senator attributes such disastrous
results to the industry of the country. With these remarks I shall now pro
ceed to compare the two periods, in order to ascertain how far facts will sus
tain or refute his bold declamatory assertions.

The aggregate amount of the value of the exports, in the first series of years,
from 1824 to 1833, the period when the protective policy was in its greatest
vigour, was $469,198,564, making an average of $57,399,945 per annum,
throughout the period ; while the aggregate amount bf value in the last, the
period of reduction under the compromise, was $768,352,365, giving an aver
age of $96,442,795, and making an aggregate gain, in the period of reduc
tion, over that of protection, of $299,174,791, and an average annual gain of
$38,646,855, being rather more than 65 per cent, on the average of the former
period : an increase without example in any former period of the history of our
commerce. This vast increase has had a corresponding effect on our tonnage
in the foreign and coasting trade, as will appear by reference to table B, which
contains a statement of our tonnage for the two periods. The aggregate
amount of the foreign tonnage at the close of the first period was, in the foreign,
686,989, and the coasting, 752,456 tons, making the aggregate 1,439,450 tons,
against the last, in the foreign trade, of 896,646, and the coasting, 1,280,999 ;
making, in the aggregate, 2,180,763, and an increase during the period of re
duction of duties, over that of protection, of 741,303 tons; while, during the
first, there was an actual falling off in the tonnage, as the table will show.

But it will no doubt be objected, that this mighty impulse from reduction,
which has so vastly increased our exports and tonnage, was confined to the
great agricultural staples ; and that the effects will be found to be the reverse
on the manufacturing industry of the country. The very opposite is the fact ;
so far from falling off, it is the very branch of our exports that has received the
greatest impulse, as will be apparent by reference to table C, in which the ex
ports in value of domestic manufactures are arranged in tabular form, divided
into the same periods. It will appear, by reference to it, tl^it the whole value
of the exports of domestic manufactures, during the period of high protective
duties, was but $43,180,755. So farjrom increasing, there was an actual fall
ing off, comparing the last with the first year of the series, of $505,633. Now
turn to the period of reduction of duties, and mark the contrast. Instead of
falling off, the exports increased to $65,917,018 during the period ; and, com
paring the last year of the series with the last of that of high protective duties,
the increase will be found to be $7,798,207, greater than the former year by
nearly three millions of dollars. This vast increase of the exports of domestic
manufactures, even beyond the other branches of exports, is attributable mainly
to the fact that a large portion of the articles for which they were exchanged
were made duty free during the period under the compromise, while the greater
part of those for which the great agricultural staples were exchanged were still
subject to high duties.

But it has been said that this vast increase has resulted from the embarrassed
state of the home market, which forced the manufacturers to go abroad to find
purchasers, and that it is rather an evidence of their depression than their
prosperity. To test the truth of this objection, I propose to select the manufac
ture of cotton, which furnishes the largest item in the exports of domestic manu
factures, and shall show conclusively that the increase of exports under the re
duction of duties, so far from being produced by the cause assigned, is but the
natural result of the healthy and flourishing condition of that important branch
of our industry. I shall go to its headquarters, Lowell and Boston, for my
r roof, as affording the best possible evidence of its actual condition throughout

496 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALI1OUX.

the manufacturing region. I shall begin at the former place, and, in the absence
of all official documents, shall draw from a highly respectable source, the writer
of the money articles in the New-York Herald, who appears to have drawn
from some authentic source, if we may judge from the minuteness of his state
ment.

According to his statement, the entire amount of cotton goods made at Low
ell, in 1839, was 58,263,400 yards ; and in 1840, 73,853,400 yards ; making an
increase, in a single year, of 15,590,000 yards, more than 25 per cent, on the
entire growth in that branch in that flourishing town, from its foundation to the
beginning of the year 1840 ! But as great as that is, it is not equal, in propor
tion, to the quantity of the raw article consumed, which in the former year was
19,258,600 pounds, and the latter 28,764,000 — increase 9,509,600 — more than
50 per cent, in one year, on the entire increase of the consumption, up to the
commencement of the year ! What makes it the more striking, is the fact that
this great increase took place under a very great fall of price, averaging fully
22 per cent. ; but, notwithstanding this great fall, the aggregate gain from the
fall in the price of the raw material and extension of the operations exceeded
that of 1839 by $195,922 ; affording conclusive proof that low prices and in
creased gain may be reconciled in manufacturing industry.

But it may be said that the gain is not in proportion to the extension of the
operation, and that, so far from indicating a prosperous condition, it is indicative
of the reverse. To this I reply, that if the fact be as supposed — if the year
1840 wa? really a bad instead of a good year for the manufacture of cotton in
Massachusetts and the adjacent region — the proof will be found in the falling
off of their operations the next year. But, so far from that being the case, I
shall show, by conclusive evidence, that their increase in 1841 exceeded all
preceding years, if we may judge from the quantity of the raw material requi
red, than which there can be nothing safer by which to judge.

I hold in my hand a statement of the amount of cotton imported into Boston
from 1835 to 1840 inclusive ; and from the 1st of January, 1841, to the 25th of
May, of the same year, being rather less than five months, taken from the Bos
ton Atlas, which may be regarded as good authority on the subject. Now as
suming, as I safely may, that the cotton imported into Boston is almost exclu
sively for domestic use, and. is consumed by that large portion of our cotton man
ufacturers which draw their supply from there, we will have in the quantity
imported very nearly the quantity consumed ; and in that consumed the extent
of the manufacturing operations in the entire circle which draws its supplies
from Boston. Now, what says the statement? In 1835 there were imported,
in round numbers, into Boston, 80,000 bales ; in 1836, 82,000 ; in 1837, 82,000 ;
in 1838,96,000; in 1839, 94,000; in 1840, 136,000; and from the 1st of Jan
uary to the 26th of May, 1841, 93,000 ; and for the year, as estimated by the
editor of the Atlas, 150,000 ; almost double the consumption, as compared to
1835, in the short space of eight years, and increasing more and more rapidly
with the reduction of duties, and the most rapidly just as the period of the final
great reduction is about to take place. I rejoice at all this. I rejoice, because
it is proof conclusive of the great prosperity, up to that period, of this important
branch of our industry ; because it is proof of the beneficial and stimulating ef
fect of decreasing duties ; because I see in such results that the great staple
interest of the South, and the great manufacturing interest of the North, may be
reconciled, and that each will find, on fair trial, their mutual interest in low du
ties and a sound currency, as the only safe and solid protection. This great
and striking result is not, be assured, accidental. It comes from fixed laws,
which only require to be known and to be acted on to give unbounded prosper
ity to the country. But I had almost forgotten to ask, How can this vast in
crease of 1841, compared with that of 1840, be reconciled with the supposed
unproductive condition of the manufacture of cotton in the latter year ? Have

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 497

our New-England brethren forgotten their sagacity and prudence, and gone on
rapidly extending their operations, in spite of a decaying business ?

But I have not yet exhausted the proof of the great and beneficial effects re
sulting from the reduction of the duties. It has been alleged, as a conclusive
objection against the reduction of duties, that it would inundate the country with
imports of foreign production, the belief of which has spread great alarm among
the manufacturing interest of the country. I admit that the injudicious and sud
den reduction at the beginning of this year, and which is to take place on the
30th of June next, may, to a considerable extent, have the temporary effect ap
prehended. I was opposed to throwing so great a reduction on the termination
of the series of years of reduction fixed by the compromise, and that for the
reason that it would have that effect. Had the reduction been equally distribu
ted over the whole period, as I proposed, or had the offer I made at the extra
ordinary session been accepted, of bringing down the duties above 20 per cent,
on the protected articles gradually, and raising those 0:1 the free in the same
way, the evil would have been wholly avoided ; but other counsel prevailed.
The mischief is now done, and must'be endured. It is, however, some conso
lation to think it will be but temporary. Low duties and a sound currency will
prove the most effective preventive to over-importation, and the alarm, in the
end, will prove unfounded. That reduction of duties has not been followed by
the evil apprehended, we have strong proof in the fact that it has not been the
case under the regular and gradual reduction provided by the compromise, quite
down to the last great reduction. In 1939, the importation of cotton goods,
of all descriptions, amounted in value to $13,913,393, and in 1840 to but
$6,594,484 ; making a reduction in one year, under the increasing reduction
of duties, of $7,408,909 ; more than eqi*il to the whole amount of the importa
tion of the year ; and yet, with all the*e decisive proofs of their great and grow
ing prosperity, the cotton and other manufacturing interests are pouring in pe
titions day after day by thousand crying out for relief, and asking for high
and oppressive duties on almos' every article of consumption, for their benefit,
at the expense of the rest of *le community ; and that, too, when the great sta
ple exporting interest, if w are to believe the members representing these pe
titioners on this floor, is ^ tne same time in the most depressed and embarrass
ed condition.

But it is attempt to explain these striking proofs of prosperity, which
cannot be denied oy stating that they occurred under high protective duties,
as only four te«ths of the duties above 20 per cent, on protected articles
had been take-i off prior to the 1st of January last, and that what remained was
ample for protection ; and that it is to that, not the reduction of the duties, that
this g-reat increase of the manufacture of cotton is to be attributed. In reply, I
ask. if protection, and not reduction of duties, be in fact the cause, how is it to
be explained that so little progress was made by the cotton manufactories du
ring the high protective duties of the tariffs of 1824 and 1828 ? And how, that
the progress has been more and more rapid, just in proportion as the duties have
been reduced under the compromise, as the vast increase of the importation of
the raw material into the port of Boston clearly indicates ? These facts prove,
beyond controversy, that the great increase in question did not depend on the
protective policy, but the reverse, the reduction of duties, and may be fairly
attributed to the effect which the repeal and the reduction of duties under that
act have had in cheapening the cost of production at home, and enlarging the mar
ket for the product of our labour abroad, by removing so many and such oppressive
burdens from our foreign exchanges.

Having now shown the relative effects of protection and reduction of duties
on the export trade generally, and on the tonnage, foreign and coasting, and the
manufacture and consumption of cotton, I shall now proceed to trace their com
parative effects on the three great agricultural staples, cotton, rice, and tobacco,

RRR

498 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

all of which are the product of that portion of the Union which the senator and
his friends would persuade us has suffered so much from the reduction of the
duties. I shall begin with 1820 and conclude with 1840, making twenty-one
years, which I shall divide into three equal periods of seven years each; the
first to extend to 1826 inclusive, the second to 1833 inclusive, and the last to
1841. The first will conclude with the period which fairly represents the ef
fects of the high duties under the act of 1816, with one or two supplemental acts
passed at the close of the late war ; the second, that under the protective tariffs
of 1824 and 1828 ; and the last, that under the compromise or reduction of du
ties. I have commenced the periods of protection and reduction at a little later
period than in making out the table of exports generally, because the agricultu
ral staples are sol\and shipped in the fiscal year subsequent to their produc
tion, and are not ma\erially affected by a change of duty till the succeeding
year. It has also the advantage of being divisible into three equal parts, nearly
coinciding with thoso marked and dissimilar periods of legislation in reference
to the duties on impoirts. The disturbing effects of the late war on the com
merce of the country h*d in a great measure ceased at the date of the com
mencement of the first penod. With these explanatory remarks, I shall begin
with cotton, the leading article, and shall draw my facts from official documents,
unless otherwise stated.

The table marked D contains a statement of the value of the exports of cotton
for each year during this long period, divided, as already stated, into periods of
seven years ; by reference to which it will be seen that the aggregate value of
the exports for the first period of seven years, from 1819 to 1826 inclusive, was
$170,765,993. That period was one of severe contraction of the currency, fol
lowing the great expansion in consequerce of the universal suspension of all the
banks south of New-England, from 1 81 J. to 1817, and was marked by great
commercial and pecuniary embarrassment.

The aggregate exports in value for the nexir>erioa of seven years, from the
termination of the first to 1833 inclusive, was $*H ,302,247 (see same table)—
a period throughout of high protective duties, with-»ut relaxation, excepting the
last two years, when the duties on coffee, tea, and SOme other articles were
greatly reduced, and which, as will be seen by refer^ce to the table, had a
very sensible effect in increasing the exports of those yea*,. The increase of
the exports in the whole of this period, compared with t«e former, was but
$31,536,254, about 1 *. per cent., being a rate per cent, compart/I to the increase
of population of about Tlj only. But even this inconsiderable in«Tease, in a pe
riod marked by no extraordinary vicissitude or embarrassment in tVe commerce
or currency of the country, over one of severe contraction and embarrassment,
occurred principally during the last two years of the series, after the reduction
of the duties already alluded to, and to which it may be fairly attributed.

The aggregate increase for the last period of seven years, from 1833, the
year of the compromise, to 1841, was $435,300,830 (see same table) — a period
throughout of reduction, making an increase of $233,998,583 ; equal to about 115
per cent, compared to the aggregate value of the period of high protective tariff,
and four times greater than the average increase of our population for the same
period, and this for a large portion of the time of unexampled derangement of
the currency and pecuniary and commercial embarrassment.

1 shall now pass to the next most important of our great agricultural staples,
tobacco, referring for a detailed view to table marked E, and for explanation as
to each period, the remarks made in reference to cotton.

The aggregate export in value of tobacco for the first period was $43,441,569 ;
and of the second, $39,983,570; being an actual falling off under the high, in
creased protective duties of the acts of 1824 and 1828, compared to the lower,
but still high duties of the former period, of $3,557,899, and that, too, in the
absence of all adverse causes except the high, oppressive duties during the pe
riod.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALIIOUN. 499

Turn now to the period of reduction, and witness the result, notwithstanding
all its embarrassments. The aggregate export of tobacco during that period
increased to $57,809,098 — an increase, compared to the period of protection,
of $17,945,528, equal to about 43 per cent, on the former, and nearly double
compared to the increase of population. And yet, with this striking fact, taken
from official documents, there are those residing in the tobacco region who, not
content with this vast and rapid increase, would resort to retaliatory duties on
silks, linens, wines, and the other articles made free of duty by the Compromise
Act, in order to increase still more the tobacco trade ; that is, they would lay
heavy duties on the very articles, the exception of which from duties has given
it this mighty increase, in the hopeless struggle of compelling a change in the
long-established system of finance by which tobacco has been subject to high
duties in the old nations of Europe. If what is aimed at could be accomplish
ed, it would be well, though I doubt whether it would be to the advantage of
our tobacco trade, even if it could be done ; but if it should fail, the loss would
be certain and incalculable to the tobacco growers. The trade would be sacri
ficed in the attempt. The duty already imposed, at the extra session, of 20
per cent., will do much to cripple the trade.

I shall next proceed to the least considerable of the three staples, rice, refer
ring for detailed information to the table F ; and here we have tie only unfa
vourable result which any of the items of exports I have exam^ed give. The
aggregate exports of rice, in value, during the first period, v^re $12,334,369 ,
and in the second, $16,308,842. showing a gain of $3,974^/3 5 and in the third,
of $15,314,739, showing a falling off of $994,103 in tne exports, probably
caused by the greater consumption at home, in consec^61106 °f opening the in
terior to its use by means of railroads and canals, ar1 tne drawing off of hands
engaged in the culture of rice to be employed in tlat °f cotton.

By combining the whole, it will appear that tle aggregate gain on the three
staples in the second period, that of high proactive duties, compared with the
first, that of lower, but still high duties ar1 great commercial and pecuniary
embarrassment, deducting the falling offon tobacco, and adding the gain on
rice, is only $31.953,828 in seven ye^rs, on an aggregate export, during the
first period, of $226,538,201, less tb*n If per cent, for the whole period, being
an increase, compared to that of tie prpulation for the time, of about one six
teenth only ; while the aggreg^e gain of the last period (that of reduction of
duties) on the three staples combined, deducting the loss on rice, and adding
the gain on tobacco, is, compared to the second, that of high protective duties,
$250,950,958 in the sev^n ye?rs ; being an increase greater than the whole
amount of the aggregate exports of the preceding period, and greater than the
ratio of the increase °f population for the time, by more than 3£ to one.

Such is the mighty impulse which (I will not say free trade, for we are
still far from it) <* reduction of duties has given to the export trade of our great
agricultural supl^j fr°m which the commerce and navigation of the country
derive their ma^n support. There can be no mistake. The facts are drawn
from official sources, and do not admit of any error which can materially vary the
result.

But I admit that there is great pecuniary embarrassment and distress through
out the whole staple region, notwithstanding this vast increase of the produc-
f tion anJ value of their great staples. The fact being admitted, the question is,
What is the cause 1 The senator and his friends attribute it to the reduction
of the duties. I deny it. The official documents deny it ; for nothing is more
certain than that the income of the staple states, taken as a whole, never has
been so great ; no, nothing like it in proportion to its population, as it has been
during the period since the adoption of the compromise. Be, then, the cause
what it may, it is certain that it is not the reduction of duties ; and th%f, so far
from that, it has taken place in spite of, and not in consequence of reduction.

500 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

What, then, is it ? I will tell you : indebtedness — universal, deep indebtedness
of states, corporations, and individuals, followed by a forced and sudden liqui
dation. That is the obvious and unquestionable cause. And what has caused
that ? What but a vast and long-continued expansion of the currency, which
raised prices beyond all former rates, and which*, by its delusive effects, turned
the whole community into a body of speculators, in the eager expectation of
amassing sudden fortunes ? And what caused this great and disastrous expan
sion ? The banks, combined with the high and oppressive duties imposed by
the tariff of 1828. It was that measure, which, by its necessary operation,
turned exchanges in favour of this country, and, by necessary consequence, as
I have proved on a former occasion,* caused the great expansion which follow
ed the passage of that act, and which, by a series of causes, explained on the
same occasion, continued to keep exchanges either in our favour, or about par,
to the suspension in 1837. Another powerful cause for this expansion, result
ing from high duties and springing from the same act, was the vast surplus
revenue which it accumulated in the treasury, or rather in the banks, as its de
positories, and which became, in fact, bank capital in its worst and most cor
rupting form, and did more to overthrow them, and cause the present embar
rassed state of the government and the country, than all other causes combined.
It was the proximate cause of the then suspension ; and, in turn, of their present
ruined condition an(j tnat of tne forced liquidation under which the country is
suffering. These causes, with the bankrupt law and the return of stocks from
abroad, followed by > drain of specie, have produced that universal and intense
pecuniary embarrassrr*nt an(j distress of which we hear such complaint. They
belong to the banking .n(j tariff system, and not to the reduction of duties,
which, so far from being ue cause, has done much to mitigate the evil, by the
vast addition it has made totne income of the country, as has been shown.
But, in addition to these, the ^eai staple region, especially the cotton region
of the Southwest, have had great ana peculiar difficulties of their own. The
rapid extinction of the Indian title v, a vast and fertile territory in that quarter,
with a climate and soil more congenial to the growth of cotton than any of the
Atlantic states, which, in combination vtfth the expanded state of the currency,
led to bold and reckless speculation, on aareat scale, at the highest prices in
land arid negroes, and which have ovei whelmed the Southwestern States with
debt, and, notwithstanding the vast increase ol their income, have left them in
their present embarrassed condition.

These, I repeat, are the great causes of the distils and embarrassments of
the staple states, and, I may add, through them, of tht Union. They come not
from free trade, as the senator would have us befteve, bat from his own favour
ite system of banks and tariffs, to which he so earnestly invites the country
again to return. His is the stimulating treatment. The Buffering patient is
trembling in every joint, and almost ready to sink from h\s la*e debaucheries ;
his prescription is to return again to the bottle — to drink fon, the same de
ceitful bowl, instead of honestly prescribing total abstinence at the only effect
ual remedy.

But to return to the documents, which I have not exhausted. The senator
asserted 'that the price of cotton has been lower during the period of reduction
than under his old and cherished system of protection ; and here, again, I meet
him on the fact. In order to test the truth of his assertion, I have formed a tab
ular statement of the quantity and price of cotton for each year, from 18 1Q to
1841, divided, as in the case of the exports, into three parts, of seven years
each, corresponding with the fcrmer. The table will be found in the appendix,
marked G. The statement from 1819 to 1836 is taken from a laborious and
carefully-compiled report of the senator from New-Hampshire (Mr. Woodbury),
made while he was Secretary of the Treasury, and which contains a great deal
* Speech on the Assumption of State Debts.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 501

of valuable information in relation to that important staple. The price for the
remaining portions of the period is from a monthly statement of the prices of
cotton at New-Orleans, taking the average between the highest and lowest
price each month, and the quantity from several sources, but principally from a
careiuily-drawn statement, apparently oy one well informed, and published in
the Southern Banner.

By reference to the table, it will be seen that the aggregate quantity produced
in the first part of the period, from 1819 to 1826 inclusive, was 1555 millions
of pounds ; that the average price was 15^ cents per pound, and the value
$234,675,000; and that in the second, from 1826 to 1834, the quantity was
2530 millions of pounds, the average price 10 cents, arid the value $263,387,500 ;
showing a falling off in the average price of rather more than one third, and an
aggregate increase of value of only $28,712,500 in the whole seven years.
Now note the difference under the influence of the reduction of the duties.
The aggregate quantity increased to 3777 millions of pounds, the price in
creased to an average of 13*- cents per pound, and the aggregate value to
$496,516,500, making an increase for the seven years of $223,730,000. But
as great and striking as this result is, there is reason to believe that it is below
the reality. Having the average price for the respective periods, and the value
of the exports for the same, it is easy to ascertain the quantity shipped to for
eign countries on those data, which, if deducted from the whole quantity pro
duced, will give what would be left for home consumption. By applying this
calculation to the respective periods, it will be found that in the two former pe
riods a considerably greater amount is left for home consumption than what
the home market is usually estimated to require during those periods, and in
the last considerably less. That would indicate a corresponding error either
in the price or the quantity, in favour of the first two, against the last period ;
which may in part be accounted for from the fact that, in making up the esti
mate of the price prior to 1835, the Secretary of the Treasury took the aggregate
value, including Sea Island as well as the short staple, and which, of course,
would considerably increase the average price of the whole, at a period when
the former bore a larger proportion to the whole than at present. The prices in
the table, since 1835, are taken exclusively from the short staple. But, be the
cause what it may, it is probable, on the data already stated, the value during
the last period, that of reduction, ought to be raised not less than twenty mill
ions, or those of the preceding reduced that amount.

And here I deem it proper to notice the triumphant air with which the sena
tor noticed the present low price of cotton, which he asserted to be lower than
it has been since the late war. It is indeed low, very low — too much so to
bear the burden of high protective duties ; but as low as it is, it is not lower
than it was in 1831, under the operation of his favourite system, and to which
he invites us to return. But the senator seems to forget that price is not the
only element by which the prosperity of cotton, or any other product, is to be
estimated. Quantity is fully as important as price itself in estimating the in
come of those engaged in the production. Now, sir, let us take into the calcu
lation both these elements, in estimating the income of the cotton planters from
the crop of 1830, sold in 1831, and that of 1841, sold this year, estimated at
the same price, say an average of 9 cents, or any other amount. The crop of
1830 is put down at 350 millions of pounds, which, at 9 cents, would gire
$31,500,000; and that of 1841 estimated at one million seven hundred thou
sand bales, say four hundred pounds to the bale, would give 680 millions of
pounds, which, at nine cents, would give $61,200,000; making a difference of
$29,700,000 in favour of the latter, nearly double the former. It is this great
increase in quantity, produced under the stimulus of low duties, which, if we
were permitted to enjoy its advantages, would add so greatly to the prosperity
of the cotton interest.

502 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

Such are the facts, drawn almost exclusively from official documents, and
such the results, proving beyond all doubt the deadening effects of high pro
tective duties on the productive energy of the country, anti the vivifying effects
of a reduction from duties. Proof more conclusive of the one and the other
cannot be offered ; but it would be vain to expect it to make the slighest im
pression on the party which now controls the government. The leading inter
ests—those which control all their actions — are banks, tariffs, stocks, paper, mo
nopolies, and, above all, that misletoe interest which lives on the government
itself, and flourishes most when its exactions are the greatest, and its expendi
tures the most profuse. High duties are the life-blood of this powerful combina
tion ; and be the proof of its pernicious effects on the community at large ever
so clear— as clear as the sun at noon, it would make no impression on them.
It is to politics, and not to political economy, they look ; and they would readily
sacrifice the manufactures themselves to save their party and its political ascen
dency. But I say to them, that it is in vain you resist light and reason. The
freedom of trade has its foundation in the deep and durable foundation of truth,
and will vindicate itself. It draws its origin from on high. It emanates from
the Divine will, and is designed in its dispensation to perform an important part
in binding together in concord and peace the nations of the earth, and in ex
tending far and wide the blessings of civilization. In fulfilment of this high de
sign, severe penalties are annexed to a departure from its laws. But this is
not the proper occasion to enter on these higher considerations. I hope an op
portunity will be afforded when the bill comes up for the revision of the duties
for which these resolutions are, I suppose, intended to prepare the way. When
it comes to be acted on, I intend to embrace the opportunity to trace the laws
of which the facts and results, which I have stated from official sources, are but
consequences — laws as fixed and immutable as those which govern the mate
rial world.

As great and striking as these results are, it must be borne in mind that they
are but the effects of the reduction of duties, and that, too, under the greatest
embarrassment and disadvantages, growing out of the protective system, and not
the full and mature fruit of free trade. What has as yet been experienced af
fords but a faint conception of the wide and general prosperity which would be
diffused throughout the whole community by low duties, sound currency, and
exemption from the debts and embarrassments of a false and pernicious system.
If gentlemen could be persuaded to abstain from their prescriptions — leave off
their nostrums — restore the revenue from the lands — economize and retrench
expenditures — the youthful vigour of the patient would soon do the rest. Full
and robust health would soon be restored, and a few years' experience under the
benign effects of a truer and better system would in a short time obliterate the
recollection of present suffering.

Before I conclude, I feel called on to notice the frequent allusion made to
South Carolina during the course of this discussion. Every one who has lis
tened to what has been said must have been struck with the bold assertions of
the senator, and others who have taken the same side, in reference to her de
pression and difficulties. It has been solemnly asserted that no one could ven
ture to say that she has realized any of the anticipated advantages from reduc
tion of the duties. I propose to answer these bold and declamatory assertions,
as I have others of like kind, by appealing to facts, resting on official docu
ments. For this purpose, I have selected the same period of twenty-one years,
from 1819 to 1841, divided into the same divisions of seven years each, and
have formed a table marked H, giving the exports from the state for each year,
and the aggregate exports for each division. Reference to it will show that
the aggregate exports in value from the state during the first period, from 1819
to 1826 inclusive, was $55,545,572 ; and that from the next, terminating with
1833, under the operation of the two high tariffs of 1824 and 1828, the aggre-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 503

gate exports decreased to $52,965,513, showing a falling off of a million and
a half, under high duties. Turning, then, to the period of reduction, the period
depicted by gentlemen as so disastrous to the state, we shall find, instead of a
decrease, the aggregate exports of the period swelled to $78,338,594, being an
increase of $25,375,081, compared to the preceding period of high duties. The
effect on the imports is still more striking, both in the falling off' during the pe
riod of high duties and recovering under that of reduction.

But it has been attempted to explain this rapid increase of exports on the
ground that a large portion are the products of Georgia, drawn to the port of
Charleston by the railroad to Hamburg, opposite to Augusta. It is probable
that there was a greater amount from Georgia during the last period, compared
with the preceding, from that cause, but nothing like sufficient to account for
the increase, as would be manifest by turning to the exports and imports of
Georgia for the same period. I find, on examining them, that they have fol
lowed the same laws in the two* periods, the exports remaining about stationary
during the period of high duties, and the imports regularly falling off, and both
immediately and regularly increasing throughout that of the reduction ; with
this difference, that Georgia has increased in both even more rapidly than Car
olina, probably because of her increased population. But be that as it may, it
clearly shows that the great increase of Carolina is not owing to the cause to
which it is attempted to attribute it.

But as great as the impulse is which has been given to her export trade, I
do not deny that South Carolina, like all the other states, is suffering under
great pecuniary and commercial embarrassments ; not, however, in consequence
of reduction of duties, but in spite of it. Her suffering is from the same gen
eral causes already explained, with the addition of several peculiar to herself.
Short crops from bad seasons for the last two years ; a destructive fire in the
heart of her commercial capital, which destroyed a large portion of that city ;
a heavy loss, estimated at about three millions of dollars, from the insolvency
of the United States Bank of Pennsylvania ; a large expenditure on a railroad
project, which has been found impracticable ; and the deranged state of the
currency in the surrounding states, which has done much to embarrass her com
merce. But, in the midst of all difficulties, she stands erect, with a sound cur
rency and unimpeached credit, and as likely to ride out the storm as any other
state. Gentlemen greatly mistake if they suppose she is so ignorant and stupid
as to confound the cause of her difficulties with what has done so much to aug
ment her means, and to enable her to bear up successfully under her difficulties.
Having finished my remarks as far as they relate to these resolutions, 1 pro
pose to advert, in conclusion, to a topic which has been drawn into this discus
sion by almost every one who has spoken on the opposite side. It would seem
that there has sprung up, all at once, among our manufacturing friends, a great
solicitude about us of the South, and our great staple. They look on our ruin
as certain, unless something should be done to prevent it, and are ready to shed
tears at the distress about to overwhelm us. They see in Hindostan a great
and successful rival, about to drive us entirely out of the cotton market of the
world ; against which, according to their opinion, there is but one refuge, the
home market, to be secured by high protective duties. To this panacea they
resort for every disease that can afflict the body politic. But admit the danger :
I ask, Of what service would the home market be to us if we lose the foreign ?
We have already possession, substantially, of the home market. The whole
amount of cotton goods imported for consumption in 1840 was but little more
than six millions of dollars, about one eighth in value compared with that man
ufactured at home. Of the imported, by far the larger proportion are fine arid
light articles, which would require but a small quantity of the raw material to
manufacture them ; not more at the outside, I should suppose, than thirty thou
sand bales ; so that, if every yard of cotton goods consumed in the country was

504 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

made at home, it would only make that addition to the quantity of cotton al
ready consumed by our own manufactures. What, I ask, is to be done with
the residue, which is five or six times greater, and now finds its market abroad ?
Do you suppose that we are such simpletons as to assent to high duties on all
we consume — to be highly taxed in all that we eat, drink, or wear, for such pal
try consideration ? But suppose we should be simple enough to be gulled by
so shallow a device, what security have we, if the East India cotton should
prove to be cheaper than ours, as you allege it will, that the duty which would
be laid on it might riot be repealed, just as you have repealed that on indigo,
raw hides, and many other articles, which might be supplied from our own soil I
You must pardon me. I cannot take your word, after the ingenuity you have
shown in construing away the Compromise Act. You must excuse me if 1 am
a little suspicious and jealous after what I have witnessed. You must redeem
the existing pledges before you ask me to accept of another.

But is the danger really so great as gentlemen represent ? Are we in reali
ty about to find a successful rival in the cultivation of cotton ? If such be the
fact — ^ the cultivation of cotton is to be lost, we shall have at least the poor
consolation that we will not be the only sufferer. It would work a revolution
in all our industrial pursuits. What would become of our foreign and domestic
commerce ? What of our tonnage and navigation ? What of our finances ?
What of the great internal exchanges of the country ? I will not undertake to
offer an opinion on the capacity of Hindostan to produce cotton. The region is
large, and the soil and climate various. The population great, and wages low ;
but I must be permitted to doubt the success of the experiment of driving us out
of the market, though backed and patronised by English capital and energy.
Nor am I alone in doubting. I have taken from a late English paper (The
Manchester Guardian) an article which 'speaks with great confidence that the
experiment has proved a failure. I will thank the secretary to read it :

" CULTIVATION OF COTTON IN INDIA. — Since the publication1 of the letter on
this subject, addressed by the Bombay Chamber of Commerce to the Indian
government, we have learned, through the medium of letters received by the
last overland mail, that the efforts of the American planters who went to the
westerly side of India have so far entirely failed. Indeed, so far as we can
learn, there has been very great neglect and mismanagement on almost every
point connected with their operations. It would seem as if the directors of the
East India Company had thought it was quite enough to send them to India,
and that all farther care about them was quite unnecessary ; for, on their arri
val in that country, they found that no direction respecting them had been giv
en ; and they were absolutely losing their time for two or three months, until
instructions could be received from the government. Then, instead of letting
them survey the country, and choose the situation and soil which appeared best
adapted for the culture of cotton, when instructions were received, they were
taken at once to Broach, and there placed under the direction of a gentleman
who felt no interest in the matter, but who took upon him to choose soil and
situation for them. He allotted them what was considered very good cotton
land — that is, land of a strong and tenacious quality, exceedingly well adapted
for the growth of the native cotton, but which former experiments had shown
to be very unfavourable to the American plant, which has a large tap root, and
thrives as badly in the stiff black soil in which the native cotton is grown, as
carrots would thrive in a stiff clay in this country. As a matter of course, their
crop of upland cotton has failed, with the exception of a very small patch which
they had planted on a piece of light sandy soil, which the tap roots of the cot
ton were able to penetrate, and on which the plants were exceedingly luxu
riant, and covered with large pods of cotton. From the strong black soil, it was
not supposed that they would be able to pick a pound per acre of good cotton. So
far, therefore, the cultivation of American cotton in Upper India has made no

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 505

progress ; nor do we imagine that it is very likely to do so hereafter. Fron«
all we have read upon the subject of Indian cotton cultivation, it seems to us
that the best chance of success is to be found in a careful and discriminating
growth of native varieties, and a careful gathering and cleaning of the produce.
This was one of the objects towards which the attention of the American plant
ers was to be directed, but hitherto we find very little has been done. At the
date of the latest advices from Broach (the 24th of November), they were put
ting up a ginhouse for ginning native cotton ; but, owing to the great number
of obstacles necessarily experienced in such a country as India, they made very
slow progress with their work, and it was feared that the growing crop would
be entirely over before their gins were ready. Up to the date mentioned, no
satisfactory experiments had been made as to the capability of the native cotton
to stand ginning. Some trials were about to be made with a hand-gin, which,
one would suppose, ought to have been the first step taken, before incurring a
large expense in erecting machinery, which may prove useless. On the whole,
we fear the prospect of receiving any large supply of superior cotton from In
dia is not at present very flattering. In order to overcome the difficulties pre
sented by the habits of the people, and by other causes, great energy and per
severance on the part of the agents of the Indian government intrusted with
the control of the experiments are absolutely necessary ; and those qualities can
not be expected from parties who do not feel a strong interest in their success.
Hitherto, we believe, the government agents have lent but a cold and indiffer
ent aid to the experiments ; and it is, therefore, to be feared that, unless the
matter should be put into other hands, there does not seem to be much chance
of any good result from experiments from which so much was expected." — Man
chester Guardian.

In confirmation of the opinion of the writer of the article, that of intelligent
individuals, well acquainted with the country, might be added, who speak with
confidence that, taking price and quality into consideration, we have nothing se
rious to apprehend. We might, indeed, have something to fear during the con
tinuance of the Chinese war. That country is the principal market for the cot
ton of Hindostan, and while it remains closed, the cotton intended for its mar
ket may be thrown in such quantities on the European as may materially de
press the price. But the present relation between Great Britain and China can
not long continue. It can scarcely be doubted that the former will at last suc
ceed in opening the market of China to the commerce of the world to a much
greater extent than it has ever been heretofore ; when, so far from competing
with us, the totton of Hindostan will not be sufficient to supply the demands
of that great market.

But 1 am not ignorant that we must rely for holding the cotton market on
our superior skill, industry, and capacity for producing the article. Nearly, if
not altogether, one half of the solid contents of the globe is capable of producing
cotton ; and that, too, in the portion the most populous, and where labour is the
cheapest. We may have rivals everywhere in a belt of 70 degrees at least,
lying on each side of the equator, and extending around the globe. Not only
the far East, but all Western Asia, quite to the 35th, or even the 40th degree
of latitude, a large portion of Europe, almost all Africa, and a large portion of
this continent, may be said to be a cotton-producing region. When the price
of cotton rises high, a large portion of that immense region becomes our com
petitors in its production, which invariably results in a great fall of price, when
a struggle follows for the market. In that struggle we have ever, heretofore,
succeeded, and I have no fear, with fair play on the part of our own govern
ment, we will continue to be successful against the world. We have the ele
ments of success within us. A favourable soil and climate, a plenty of cheap
land, held in fee simple, without rent, tithes, or poor rates. But, above all, we
have a cheap and efficient body of labourers, the best fed, clothed, trained, and

S s s

506 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

provided for of any in the whole cotton-growing region, for whose labour we
have paid in advance. I say paid for in advance, for our property in our slaves
is but wages purchased in advance, including the support and supplies of the la
bourers, which is usually very liberal. With these advantages, we may bid de
fiance to Hindu or Egyptian labour, at its two or three cents a day. Ours be
ing already paid for, is, as far as the question of competition is concerned, still
cheaper, to say nothing of its superior efficiency, its better and more skilful di
rection, under the immediate eye of intelligent proprietors, of cheap, unencum
bered land, favourable soil and climate, and greater facility and cheapness of
transportation to the great markets of the world. But this is not all. We have
another and great advantage. There is not a people on earth who can so well
bear the curtailing of profits as the Southern planters, when out of debt. A
plantation is a little community of itself, which, when hard pressed, can furnish
within itself almost all of its supplies. Ours is a fine provision country, and,
when needs be, can furnish most of its supplies of food and clothing from its
own resources. In prosperous times, when the price of our staples is high, our
labour is almost exclusively directed to their production ; and then we freely and
liberally part with their proceeds in exchange for horses, mules, cattle, hogs,
and provisions of all description from the West, and clothing and all the products
of the arts with the North and East ; but when prices fall and pressure comes,
we gradually retire on our own means, and draw our own supplies from within.
With these great advantages, it is not wonderful that in all the great strug
gles that we have had for the cotton market (they have been many and great),
we have ever come off successful. It is incident to that great staple article,
cotton, the first in the whole circle of commerce, to be subject to extraordinary
vibrations of price from the causes to which I have alluded. At one time prices
are high and profits great, and at another low and the profits small. It can be
permanently cultivated only by those who can best go through these great vi
brations. We are willing to hold it on that condition, and feel confident we
can, with justice from this government. We dread not the competition of Hin-
dostan ; but your unequal, unconstitutional, and oppressive legislation — that le
gislation which pushes the expenditures of the government to the most extrav
agant extent, and which places the burden of supporting the government almost
exclusively on the exchanges of our products with the rest of the world. Every
dollar of tax, imposed on our exchanges in the shape of duties, impairs to that
extent our capacity to meet the severe competition to which we are exposed ;
and nothing but a system of high protective duties, long continued, can prevent
us from meeting it successfully. It is that which we have to fear. Let the
planters avoid banks, keep out of debt, and have a sound currency and low du
ties, and they may bid defiance to competition, come from what quarter it may,
and look forward with confidence to a prosperity greater than they have ever
yet experienced.

APPENDIX.

TABLE A.— DOMESTIC EXPORTS.

Years.

Domestic Exports.

4»

Years.

Domestic Exports.

1825

$66, 94 1,74-5

1833

$70,317,698

1826

53,055,710

1834

81,034,162

1827

58,921,691

1835

101,189,082

1828

50,669,669

1836

106,916,680

1829

55,700,193

1837

95,564,414

1830

59,462,029

1838

96,033,821

1831

6-1,277,057

1839

103,533,891

1832

63,137,4-70

1840

113,762,617

$469,198,564

$768,352,365

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. C \LIIOUN.

507

TABLE B -AMERICAN TONNAGE.

Years.

Registered

Enrolled
and

Total.

Years.

Registered

Enrolled
and

Total.

Licensed.

Licensed.

1825

700,787

722,323 1423,111

1833

750,026

856,122

1,606,149

1826

737,9781796,212 1,534,190

1834 857,438

901,4681,758,906

1827

747,170873,4371,620,607

1835

885,821

939,118^1,824,939

1828

812,619

928,772 ,741,391

1836

897,774

984,328 1,892,202

1829

650,142

610,654

,260,977

1837

810,447

1,086,238

1,896,685

1830

576,475

615,301

,191,776

1838

822,591

1,173,0471,995,638

1831

620,451

647,394 ,267,846

1839

834,244 1,262,234 2,096,478

1832

686,989

752,459

,439,450

1840

899,764

1,280,999

2,180,763

TABLE C.— MANUFACTURES.

Years.

Amount in each year. ,

Years.

Arnjnnt in each year.

1825

$5,729,797

1833

$6,557,080

1826

5,495,130

1834

6,247,893

1827

5,536,651

1835

7,694,073

1828

5,548,354

1836

6,107,528

1829

5,412,320

1837

7,136,997

1830

5.320,980

1838

8,397,078

1831

5,086,890

1839

10.927,529

1332

5,050,633

1840

12,848,840

$43,180,755

$65,917,018

TABLE D.— EXPORTS.

Years

Cotton.

Years.

Cotton.

• Years.

Cotton.

1820

22,308,667

1827

29,359,545

1834

49,448,402

1821

20,157,484

1828

22,487,229

1835

64,661,302

1822

24,035,058

1829

26,575,311

1836

71,284,925

1823

20,445,520

1830

29,674,883

1837

63,240,102

1824

21,947,401

1831

25,289,492

1838

61,556,811

1825

36,846,649

1832

31,724,682

1839

61,238,982

1826

25,025,214

1833

36,191,105

1840

63,870,307

170,765,993

201,302,247

435,300,831

TABLE E.— EXPORTS.

Years.

Tobacco.

\ ears.

Tobacco.

Years.

T. bare...

1820

1821

1822
1823
1824
1825

1826

7,968,600
5,648,962
6,222,838
6,282,672
4,855,566
6,115,623
5,347,208

1827
1828
1829
1830
1831
1832
1833

6,816,146

5,840,707
5,185,370
5,833,112
4,892,388
5,999,769
5,755,968

1834
1835
1836
1837
1838
1839
1840

6,595,305

8,250,577
10,058,640
5,795,647
7,392,029
9,832,943
9,883,957

43,441,469

39,963,460

57,809,098

TABLE F.— EXPORTS.

Years.

Rice. 1 1 Years.

Biice.

Years.

Rice.

1820

1821

1822
1823
1824
1825

1826

1,714,923
1,494,307
1,563,482
1,820,985
1,882,982
1,925,245
1,917,445

1827

1828
1829
1830
1831
1832
1833

2,343,908
2,620,696
2,514,370
1,986,824
2,016,267
2,152,361
2,774,418

1834
1835
1836
1837

1838
1839
1840

2,122,292
2,210,331
2,548,750
2,309,279
1,721,819
2,460,198
1,942,076

12,319,369

16,408^44

15,314,745

508

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

TABLE G.

Statement showing the quantity, price, and value of the Cotton grown in the
United States from 1819 to 1840.

Year.

Ibs. millions.

Price }icr ib.
cents.

Value.

Increase.

1820

160

17

$27,200,000

1821

180

16

28,800,000

1822

210

16}

34,650,000

1823

185

11

20,350,000

1824

215

15

32,250,000

1825

255

21

53,550,000

1826

350

11

38,500,000

1555

15!

$234,675,000

1827

270

9J

27,700,000

1828

325

ioj

40,625,000

1829

365

10

36,500,000

1830

350

10

35,000,000

1831

385

9*

35,612,500

1832

390

10

39,000,000

1833

445

11

48,950,000

2530

10

$263,387,500

$28,712,500

1834

460

13

59,800,000

1835

416

i*f

68,640,000

1836

445 '

151

67,862,500

1837

485

151

73,962,500

1838

525

101

53,812,500

1839

566

14

79,240,000

1840

880

9*

83,600,000

3777

131

$487,117,500

$223,730,000

The quantity of cotton received at the port of Boston from October,
1839, to October, 1840, was :

Receipts in 1835

do.
do.
do.
do.
do.

1836
1837

1838
1839
1840

Estimate for 1841

- 80,709 bales.

- 82,885 «

- 82,664 "

- 96,636 "

- 94,350 "

- 136,357 "
150,000

Since January 1st, 1841, there was received to this, the 26th of May,
less than five months, 93,057 bales, and the quantity received this year
will probably be 150,000 bales. — Boston Atlas.

TABLE H.— DOMESTIC EXPORTS OF SOUTH CAROLINA FROM 1819 TO 1841.

Years.

Exports.

Years.

Exports.

Years.

Exports.

1820
1821
1822
1823
1824
1825
1826

8,690,539
6,867,515
7,136,366
6,671,998
7,833,713
10,876,475
7,468,966

1827
1828
1829
1830
1831
1832
1833

8,189,496
6,508,570
8,134,676
7,580,821
6,528,605
7,685,833
8,337,512
52,965,513

1834
1835
1836
1837

1838
1839
1840

11,119,565
11,224,298
13,482,757
11,138,992
11,017,391
10,318,822
10,036,769

55,545,572

78,338,594

Gain in last seven years, 25,373,081.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 509

XXXV.

SPEECH ON THE LOAN BILL, APRIL 12, 1842.

THE question being put on the passage of the bill, and the yeas and
nays having been ordered,

Mr. Calhoun said, that it was not his object, in rising at this late stage
of the question, to discuss the provisions of this bill. That had been
done so fully and ably by those who had preceded in the debate on the
same side, that he had nothing to add. But, in order to have a full and clear
understanding of the bearing of this measure on the finances of the gov
ernment, we must look beyond the provisions of the bill. It was not a
lone measure, unconnected with those which preceded it, or would suc
ceed it, but quite the reverse. It was a link in the sytem of policy com
menced at the special session, and which had hitherto been perseveringly
followed up, and, if he was not greatly deceived, would be persisted in so
long as those who now have the control held power. Already has the
system contributed greatly to depress the credit of the government, and
it is to be feared, if it be not arrested, that it will sink it far below its
present level. What he proposed, in the remarks which he was about
to offer, was to trace the consequences of the system in its bearings on
the finances and credit of the government.

That the credit of the government is greatly impaired of late, will not
be denied. It is but a short time since the very committee which re
ported this loan bill reported another for about the same amount, which
became a law. At that time, so high did the credit of the government
stand, that it was expressly provided that not more than six per cent, in
terest should be allowed, and that the loan shoul.d be redeemable in three
years. As short as was the period, it was confidently predicted that it
would be taken at five per cent. ; and the Secretary of the Treasury
commenced his negotiation for the loan with that expectation, and actu
ally obtained a considerable portion of it under six per cent. The bill
passed late in July last ; and, in the period of nine short months, the very
same committee reported this bill, which proposes to send the public
credit into the market to be sold for what it will bring ; and that, too, for
twenty years, a period nearly seven times longer than the term prescribed
in the former bill.

The conditions offered for a loan may fairly be regarded as indicating
the value which the government stamps on its own credit ; and we may
be assured that the keensighted race who have money to lend will rarely
affix a higher value than what that stamp indicates. Judged by that stand
ard, the credit of the government has never before been as low j no, not in
the late war with England—a war with one of the greatest, if not the
greatest power on earth — commenced with a remnant of an old debt of
more than forty millions of dollars, and at the very beginning of which
there was a universal suspension of payments by all the banks south of
New-England. Even in that great struggle, under all its embarrassments,
no secretary of the treasury or committee ever dared to put the credit of
the government into market under such disadvantageous terms as is pro
posed in this bill. The longest period for the redemption of any loan
contracted during the war, if his memory served him, was but twelve
years — a period not much exceeding half the time allowed by this
bill. Such and so great has been the decay of the public credit in the
short space of a few months! And here the question is presented, What

510 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

has caused this unexampled and rapid decay of the credit of the govern
ment in a period of peace, when the resources of the country are more
than doubled, and with a public debt comparatively so small 1

The chairman of the Finance Committee felt the force of this question j
and, if we are to believe him, the extraordinary offer which the Secretary
of the ireasury is authorized to make for this loan is to be explained, not
on the ground that the credit of the government is impaired, but from the
scarcity of money. He says that there is an extraordinary demand for
money, and that a higher interest, in consequence, must be paid for
its use j and that the government, like individuals, can get it only by
giving its market value. Unfortunately for him, the fact does not accord
with liis explanation. Interest is now lower in the general market of the
world than when the former loan bill passed. The best index of that
market is the rate of interest at which the Bank of England discounts.
Judging by that, there has been a very great reduction of interest within
the last few months — from tive to four per cent. Even in our own country,
where confidence is imperfect, interest is far from being high. It was but
the other day stated, in a debate on this bill, that the stocks of the State of
Maine and the city of Philadelphia, bearing six per cent, interest, are at
par j and that of his own state, in its own market, is, he is informed, some
thing above par. But the senator himself may be quoted against his own
explanation. Forgetful of the ground that he had taken, he mentioned it
as a remarkable fact, that exchange with England at this time is very
low — several per cent, below par. From this he inferred that money was
plenty — not, indeed, from increase of quantity, but from the diminution
of business. Like everything else, its price (if he might use the expres
sion as applied to money) followed the great law of demand and supply j
and it might be lowered, as well by diminishing the demand as by increas
ing the supply ; and, in either case, a favourable state of the market would
exist for the negotiation of loans on good terms, where the credit of the
borrower was above suspicion.

The senator from Rhode Island (Mr. Simmons), taking a more correct
view of the fact, admitted that the difficulty of negotiating a loan on fa
vourable terms was the loss of credit ; but he attributed the loss of credit
on the part of this government to the loss of credit by so many of the states
of the Union. He said that there was a mutual sympathy between the
credit of this government and that of the states, and that when the one
was impaired it necessarily impaired the other. He (Mr. C.) did riot ad
mit that there was any such dependance j and, for proof, he referred to
the fact that a few months since, when the former loan bill passed, the
credit of this government stood high — never higher, although that of
many of the states was then greatly depressed.' But, while he denied the
dependance, he readily admitted that there was so much connexion be
tween the two, that, when the credit of the states was greatly impaired,
great prudence, much caution, and careful management were necessary
to prevent that of this government from being depressed. It was the mo
ment when the money-lenders would view the conduct of this government
with the keenest jealousy, and when any mismanagement of its finances
would be sure to be followed with the worst effect on its credit ; but, with
proper management, its credit would not be affected by the discredit of
the states.

If, then, neither the state of the money market, nor the discredit of so
many of the states, can explain the necessity for the extraordinary terms
to be offered for this loan, to what is it to be attributed'? It was no time
for vague or gentle language. He intended to express himself plainly and
strongly, but without the least intention of offending. It is, then, to be

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 511

attributed to the loss of credit on the part of the government — a rapid
and great loss — and which, he feared, was still in progress. And to what
is that to be attributed ( To your conduct, gentlemen. It is you who
have impaired the public credit. You are the responsible party. You
have destroyed the equilibrium between income and expenditure, on which
the credit of governments, as well as individuals, must ultimately depend.
You have reduced the income of the government below its expenditures:
in the first place, by giving away a portion of the revenue from the pub
lic lands — a portion by far the most permanent and growing ; and, in the
next, by greatly increasing its expenditures. To this you added a heavy loan
of $ 12,000,000, making an annual charge for interest of upward of seven
hundred thousand dollars. And, to cap the climax, you proposed, in the
face of all this, to raise the permanent expenditures to nearly thirty mill
ions of dollars, without making any adequate provision to meet it. It
was thus that the equilibrium between the income and expenditure of the
government was destroyed ; and the want of menns to meet its engage
ments followed as a matter of course.

But what you did was not so fatal to the public credit, as bad as it was,
as the circumstances under which you did it. What were they 1 You
did it when you knew that the credit of many states was deeply impaired,
and threatened to be still more so. You knew that there was hazard that
their discredit might react and cast suspicion on the credit of the Union,
and impair that of this government, as well as that of the states which still
preserved theirs, without great prudence and caution in the management
of our finances. Nor were you ignorant that the financial condition of
the government was in other respects highly critical. That you were
fully apprized of the fact, I will prove from your own words. How often
have you declared that there was a heavy deficit when you came into
power ; that the revenue was rapidly declining under the Compromise
Act j and that those who preceded you had neglected to make provision
to meet the growing deficit j and, finally, that there was great waste in
the collection and disbursement of the revenue 1 You stated all this to
prove that the blame lay not at your door. Admitting all you said, can
you exempt yourselves from blame 1 Power was not forced on you. You
sought it — eagerly sought it — and that by the most objectionable means.
You got it under the promise of reform, and thus placed yourselves un
der the most solemn obligation to administer the finances with the utmost
care and skill. And yet it was under these circumstances, and in the
extremely critical condition, according to your own admission, of the
finances of the government, that you reduced the income, increased the
expenditures, added a large amount of debt, and proclaimed your inten
tion to raise the permanent expenditures far above the then existing scale,
Avithout providing anything like adequate means to meet such increase.
Can it, then, be a matter of surprise that such conduct should be followed
by that rapid and deep decay of credit by which it has been sunk, in the
short space of a few months (if we may judge by the terms of this bill),
to a point of depression far below what it ever has been at any other pe
riod, in peace or war 1 Be assured that the keen and vigilant class who
have money to lend watch your course with ceaseless attention ; and that
not a false step has been taken in the management of the finances, nor an
act been done that may indicate a want of due care or regard to the pub
lic faith on your part, that has not contributed to impair the credit of the
government, especially at so critical a period as that through which we
are now passing.

Having now shown that it is the course you have pursued which has
prostrated the credit of the government, the question next presented is,

512 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

What impelled you to pursue a course so disastrous to the public credit'?
Why did you surrender the revenue from the land 1 Why so greatly in
crease the expenditures at the same time 1 Why propose to raise the
permanent expenses to so high a standard! Were you ignorant of con
sequences 1 Did you not see that it would destroy the equilibrium be
tween income and expenditures'? You cannot plead ignorance ; you did
it with your eyes open. The loan bill of the special session proves that
your measures had created a deficit ; and the declaration of your distin
guished leader, whose authority is so high with you, at the close of the
extra session, that there would be a deficit in the revenue for this year of
at least ten millions of dollars, conclusively shows that the deficit then
created was known to be not of a temporary character. And here we
have a still more important and searching question presented : What im
pelled you, at so critical a moment, when the credit of the government
required the most careful and vigilant nursing, knowingly to destroy —
not for the moment only, but for the future— the equilibrium between its in
come and its expenditures] To this there can be but one answer : it was
your system of policy that impelled you — a system deliberately adopted
at the special session, steadily pursued since, and, it is to be feared, will
be pursued, regardless of consequences to government and country, as
long as you can retain power.

What that policy is, is not a matter of inference or conjecture. You
have openly, boldly, and manfully avowed, that the great and leading ob
jects of your policy were bank and tariff — a National Bank and high pro
tective tariff 5 that without the one there never could be a sound curren
cy, nor prosperous industry without the other. Your great leader has,
over and over again, proclaimed them to be the great objects of your pol
icy j and the report of the minority of the committee on the exchequer
in the other house, from the pen of a distinguished member of your party,
openly asserts that the one is indispensable to the other, and that without
Loth there can be no relief for the currency and industry of the country.
There is, indeed, a mysterious connexion between them ; and he (Mr. C.)
would admit that, without their joint action, there never could be such an
inflation of the currency, and fictitious and delusive state of prosperity, as
that through which we have recently passed. Their united action might,
indeed, again restore a like state ; but it would be of short duration, and
would be suddenly followed by disasters still greater than the present;
just as each succeeding debauch of the drunkard leaves him in a worse
condition than that which preceded.

In pursuing these, the acknowledged great and leading objects of your
system of policy, to which all others are subordinate, you commenced at
the extra session with the bank ; justly believing that, once established, all
others would follow as a matter course. The Bank Bill fell under the
veto, and a new tack became necessary, in which its associated measure,
a high tariff, became the primary object, in the hope (not badly founded),
if it could be adopted and be made permanent, that it would, in the end,
carry the bank as certainly as the bank would the tariff. Since then, your
whole energy has been directed to establishing a high tariff. How was
that to be done 1

The Compromise Act stood in the way. Under its provisions a pro
tective tariff, by name, was out of the question. Your distinguished leader
stood openly pledged against it, and the whole Southern wing of your
party, with one or two exceptions (besides being pledged against it), repre
sented constituents who were utterly opposed to the system. In this di
lemma there was but one expedient left — to bring about such a condition
of the treasury as would compel a resort to high duties for revenue, and

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 513

thereby accomplish indirectly what could not be effected directly. This
is the key of your whole policy. It explains everything. For this the
revenue from the land was surrendered \ the expenses increased ; loans
contracted ; a high and permanent rate of expenditures proposed ; the
pledge to reform, to economize, and retrench, left unredeemed j and, finally,
the credit of the government prostrated at a moment so hazardous. That
very prostration, this very bill, with all the enormity of its provisions, is
part of the ways and means by which you hope to accomplish your cher
ished object.

Gentlemen (said Mr. C., addressing the opposite side of the chamber),
I must speak freely. The critical state of the public credit, and the dan
gerous condition of the government and country, demand it. There is
one fatal principle pervading your policy, not now only, but at all times,
which has wellnigh brought the government to destruction. You lay
duties, not for revenue, but for protection. Revenue, with you, in laying
duties, is a mere incident, which claims but little of your care or atten
tion. Your primary object is protection ; that is, so to impose the duties
as to convert them into actual bounties to certain portions of the capital
and industry of the country, without regard to their effect on the residue.
It is the bounty, and not the revenue, that you regard; and hence duties are
imposed, either as to time, amount, and manner, with little or no regard
to revenue.

Of the truth of this, we have a remarkable illustration when you were
last in power, under the younger Adams, in 1828. At that time the rev
enue — as was acknowledged on all sides — was ample to meet the expen
ditures of the government, including the payment of the public debt,
which was then nearly discharged. A few millions only remained then
to be paid off, when a large portion of the revenue — nearly one half —
would no longer be required for the use of the government. On revenue
principles, it was clearly the time, not for the increase, but the reduction of
duties. And yet it was at that very period, when you, acting under (he false
and dangerous system which guides you in all your acts, regardless of
consequences, passed the tariff of 1828, which nearly doubled the duties,
and so increased the revenue as suddenly to pay off the public debt.
Then followed the surplus revenue ; expansion of the currency ; the pet-
bank system, and all the corrupting and disastrous consequences which
have since caused such calamity. The Compromise Act put an end to the
tariff of 1828. Then followed an opposite train of consequences : a grad
ually decreasing revenue, with the high rate of expenditures caused by
the surplus revenue. Under its mischievous influence, the expenditures
had nearly trebled in a few years, accompanied by a looseness and waste
unknown before in the collection and disbursements of the government.
It required but little sagacity to see that, if something decisive was not
done to bring down the expenditures with the decrease of revenue, a crash
must follow. I was not silent. I saw the danger, and proclaimed it; and
those in power began to exert themselves with effect to meet it. At this
critical period, you succeeded in obtaining power ; but, as experience has
proved, with no abatement in your attachment to the fatal policy which
led to the disastrous act of 1828.

You then committed, under the influence of that policy, the monstrous
folly and injustice of raising the revenue, when it ought to have been re
duced ; of destroying the equilibrium between income and expenditures,
by raising the latter far beyond the former; and now, under the same per
nicious influence, you commit the reverse error, of sinking the income
below the expenditures, by throwing away the revenue from the lands,
and increasing expenditures, to be followed, I fear, by disasters still more

TTT

514 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

fatal. It is difficult to imagine an error calculated to cause greater mis
chief, in the present condition of things, than that of making revenue a
subordinate consideration in the imposition of duties. The revenue is,
emphatically, the state ; and the imposition of burdens on the people to
raise what may be necessary for the wants of the government is the act,
above all others, which requires the highest caution and skill so to be per
formed as to extract the greatest amount of revenue with the least burden,
and the greatest equality and justice among the members of the com
munity. But when the great and primary object is forgotten — when
duties are imposed as to time, manner, and amount, without regard to
revenue, or equality, or justice, the result must be such as we have wit
nessed — the treasury overflowing, and exhausted in rapid succession; and
distrust, jealousy, and discord pervading the whole community. Alter
nation of income and expenditures, as rapid as the government has ex
perienced under the influence of this radical and pernicious error, would
prove ruinous in private life. Take, for illustration, an ordinary family
of half a dozen sons and daughters, in independent but moderate circum
stances, having (say) an annual income of two thousand dollars, and living
in decent frugality within their income. Few conditions of life would be
more propitious to happiness than this. Now, suppose that their income
should be suddenly raised to twenty thousand dollars annually, and con
tinue so for eight or nine years, till the habit of the family should become
completely changed — a fine mansion to rise not far from their former
snug residence, furnished with rich furniture, splendid carriages and
horses to take the place of the plain gig and horse, and the sons and
daughters to enter into all the fashionable and extravagant amusements
and expenses of the higher circles. And then suppose the income of the
family to be reduced suddenly to its former standard of two thousand dol
lars; and who does not see that it would require the greatest resolution
and prudence on the part of its head to save the family from ruin — the
most careful nursing of income, severest lopping off of expenditures, and
rigid economy in all things 1 But if, instead of that, they should endeav
our to keep up or increase expenses and their style of living, and should
ostentatiously give away a large portion of their reduced revenue, their
discredit would be certain, and the ruin of the family inevitable. And
such must be the fate of the government, if the folly of your course be
persisted in.

I feel, Mr. President, how vain it is to urge arguments against the fixed
determination of a party resolved to carry through their favourite system
of policy, however ruinous it may prove to both the government and the
country. That its determination is fixed, has been evinced on so many
and striking occasions, that I am forced to surrender the hope of over
coming it so long as the party can retain a majority in either house. It
is true, there have been some signs, occasionally, of yielding as to the
revenue from the lands. We have been told by a member on that side,
in this discussion, that the policy of giving up the revenue from the land
was a great mistake, and that it must be reversed ; and that the party
would be forced to do it, whether it wished or not. I have no such an
ticipation : not that I doubt but the pressure on the public treasury will
be great, and the discredit of the government ruinous; but 1 see little
hope that anything of the kind can force the party to relax. They have
staked their all on the tariff and the bank, and are resolved to play out
the game to the last cent. When the question of repeal comes up, we
shall find that the Distribution Act will be clung to, should credit perish
and the treasury be bankrupt, because the policy of the party requires it
But we are told that the act will be repealed by its own provisions ; that

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 515

the duties must be raised above 20 per cent., in order to meet the wants
of the government ; and that the fact of so raising them will, by one of iis
provisions, repeal the act. Such is, indeed, the provision ; and it is ao
less true that its insertion was necessary to secure the passage of the act,
and its passage that of the Bankrupt Act. Such being the tact, honour
and good faith forbid the repeal of the proviso. But will they be re
spected] I would be happy to think so, but am incredulous, because the
policy of the party stands in the way. Yes ; to restore the land fund
would raise the income some three or four millions of dollars annually.
That would reduce th'e necessity of raising the duties proportionally ; and
that would be inconsistent with the policy of the party, to which every
thing must yield.

The same cogent argument will prevent all serious efforts in favour of
economy and retrenchment. We have been told by gentlemen that there
was great waste, extravagance, and fraud in the public disbursements ;
and able committees have been appointed in both houses to detect abuses,
and reduce the expenditures of the government. Well : I am one of those
who believe that there are, and have been, great abuses in the disburse
ments j who never doubted that the surplus revenue would lead, and has
led, to frauds, waste, and extravagance j but I have little hope of seeing
them corrected, or of witnessing any considerable reduction in the ex
penses of the government, while you, gentlemen, shall retain power. I
doubt not the committees will be vigilant in hunting out fraud and mal
administration : that is something. 1 wish every instance may be detect
ed and brought to light, fall the blame where it may. But as to any sub
stantial reform, either by economy or retrenchment, I expect none ; and
that for the all-powerful reason — your system of policy forbids. So far
from looking for either, I anticipate the very reverse from this bill. If
the negotiation for the loan should be successful, it will but replenish the
treasury, to be wasted in extravagant appropriations j raising still higher
the standard of expenditures, and creating new demands on the treasury,
to be supplied by what is so desired by you — still higher duties. The re
sult must be, that the credit of the government,.instead of improving, will
be worse a year hence than at present.

I (said Mr. G.) regard this bill, not only as the offspring of the fixed
policy of gentlemen, but as intended as one of means of perpetuating
it. The great length of time which the proposed loan would have to
run, and the decisive vote against the amendment offered by the senator
from Mississippi (Mr. Walker), to pledge the revenue from the Jauds to
pay its interest and redeem the principal, leave but little doubt on that
point. Thus regarding it, I cannot look forward without the apprehen
sion of the most disastrous results to the credit and finances of the gov
ernment. If persisted in, it must ultimately prostrate public credit, or
force the government to an entire change of its system of finance. It
will not only throw the entire burden of supporting the government on
duties on imports, but will lead to an imposition of them the most u. just
and unequal, and, at the same time, least favourable, it? proportion to the
burden imposed, to a productive revenue. The rery spirit of the system,
which leads to the imposition of the whole burden ot supporting the gov
ernment on the imports, will as surely lead to such an imposition of the
duties as may be regarded the most favourable to the protective policy,
without regard either to revenue, or justice, or equality.

Acting in the spirit of the system, it is easy to see that those who have
the control will lay the highest rate of duties on all articles which can be
manufactured at home, with the view of excluding entirely foreign arti
cles of a similar description. That is the professed object of the system.

516 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

But the effect of such duties would be, to a vast extent, in the present
state of things, to lop off almost entirely what might be a great and pro
ductive source of income under a moderate and judicious system of duties
laid expressly for revenue.

Under the influence of the same policy, there will, no doubt, be a large
list of articles entirely exempt from duties. The chairman of the Com
mittee on Finance (if I did not mistake him) estimated the amount of the
free articles under the tariff to be established, at thirty millions of dollars.
[Mr. Evans said, " That is the amount now, as the law stands."]
Yes (replied Mr. C.), and is intended to be the amount after it is modi
fied to suit the wishes of the party. It is no conjecture.

I hold the proof in my hand — a bill reported to the other house by a
member from Massachusetts (Mr. Saltonstall), chairman of the Committee
on Manufactures, and a gentleman deep in the confidence of his party.
It proposes a free list of at least thirty millions, and a system of duties
not much, if any, less odious and oppressive than the tariff of 1828. This
long and heavy list is made up of articles of a description not produced
in the country, and which, for the most part, are consumed in the manu
facturing region, or for which manufactures are given in exchange abroad.
If revenue was the principal object, the very principle on which they are
to be excepted would make them the most legitimate objects of high
duties. They are the very articles that could be taxed highest, without
danger of being superseded by home articles of a similar description, and
which, for the same reason, would throw the burden equally on the con.
surners. But revenue is not the object; and they must be exempted, be
the inequality or the effect on the revenue and credit of the government
what it may. If to the probable amount of free articles be added the
amount required to meet the interest of the debt abroad — say seven
millions; and if to that be added the very great reduction which the high
duties to be laid on the protected articles must make in their importa
tion, some conception may be formed of the narrow basis on which the
revenue of the government must stand, if the system of policy of the
party should be carried out in its spirit, as it is intended to be. The
whole weight will press on what the advocates choose to call luxuries —
such as linen, worsted stuffs, silks, spirits, wines; most of which may
come, indirectly, into competition with home-made articles, for which
they may be substituted ; and all of which, or nearly so, are got in ex
change, not for manufactures, but the productions of our soil ; and are,
therefore, according to the genius of the system, legitimately objects of
high taxation.

Such, gentlemen, must be the system of imposts, if the influence which
has heretofore controlled you should continue to do so ; which, I fear,
hardly admits of a doubt. It is precisely the system proposed to be
established ly the bill of the other house. It may, indeed, be modified,
to catch a few Southern votes ; but there is little hazard in saying that it
is what is desirtd, and will be approached as near as may be practicable.
It is on such a tatiff that you propose to rely exclusively for revenue to
maintain the public credit, and to support the government, at a rate of ex
penditures graduated by tV highest scale ; and this you expect to do in
the present depressed state of credit, crippled condition of commerce, and
deranged state of the currency. I shall not stop to discuss the influence
which these, and the many other Causes that might be enumerated, must
have in diminishing, far below ah otdinary calculation, the income from
such a tariff; the advanced growth of our manufactures in most of the
important branches ; the effects of high duties on the articles for which
our great agricultural staples are for the most part exchanged j and the

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALIIOUN. 517

great extent of smuggling, which cannot but take place in the present
condition of the country ; but 1 will venture to tell you that you will be
utterly disappointed in your expectation of an adequate revenue from
such a tariff. The income will fall far short, and the credit of the country
will receive a shock from which it will be hard to recover it. The end
will be, the abandonment of your system, or a resort to internal taxes ;
when an entire change of our financial system will follow.

Thus thinking, I cannot vote for this bill. I would rather meet the dif
ficulties at once, than to contribute by my vote to postpone the shock, by
sustaining a system which I solemnly believe must lead to such danger
ous consequences. I would rather let the patient take his chance, than
to countenance what I cannot but regard as the most dangerous quackery.
But we are not reduced to the alternative of doing nothing or taking this
bill. There are other, and safe and speedy measures of relief, if you would
but agree to abandon your system of policy and adopt them. They are
so obvious, that I cannot persuade myself that they have been overlooked ;
and am forced to believe that they have not been adopted because your
policy forbids it. If you could be persuaded to yield that, and substitute
for this bill a provision to fund the outstanding treasury-notes in six per
cent, stocks, payable in four, five, or six years ; to surrender the public
lands, and pledge them for the faithful redemption of that stock ; and pass
a joint resolution refusing to receive the notes of banks that declined to
receive your treasury-notes at par, the market would speedily be freed
from that excess which depresses the credit of treasury-notes, and the
residue would rise at once to par with specie. If the banks agreed to re
ceive them, their interest and that of the government would be combined
to uphold their credit at par; and, if not, the fact that they would be ex
clusively received with specie in the public dues would give a greatly in
creased demand for them, which would have the same effect.

That done, follow up with a rigid system of economy and retrench
ment ; lop off all expenses not necessary for the defence of the country
and the frugal administration of the government ; put an end to waste,
extravagance, and fraud ; and, after you have made your appropriations,
and revised the duties with an eye mainly to revenue and equality of
burden — if there should be an estimated deficit in the income, before the
increased duties could be made available, it may be met by the use of
your own credit directly, or the negotiation of a small loan, which could
then be had on fair terms, and for a short period. It is by this simple
process that you may relieve the government from its present embarrass
ment, restore its credit, and raise what supplies may be necessary at home,
without going abroad at present. I have (said Mr. C.), on my part, in
superable objections to sending our credit abroad in the world at this
time. It stands low at present ; and, as an American and Republican, I am
too proud to have it exposed to the contumely of the rich and powerful
bankers of Europe, to which it must necessarily be at such a period. I
would adopt any expedient, or make any reasonable sacrifice, to avoid
such disgrace. Adopt the measures I have suggested, which, instead of
sacrifice, will afford relief on terms more favourable than the most san
guine can anticipate obtaining supplies from abroad, and it will be avoid
ed. I can imagine but one objection, and that the oft-repeated one — your
system — forbids.

Having now said what I intended in reference to this measure, let me
add, in conclusion, that if I could be governed by party feelings and views
at such a juncture as I conceive this to be in our affairs, instead of the
solemn and earnest desire I feel to see the credit of the government re
stored, and the country extricated from its present difficulties, I would

518 SPEECHES OF JOHN c. CALHOUN.

rejoice to see the party opposed to me pursuing the course they do. !
feel the most thorough conviction that, under their system, the credit of
the government, instead of improving, will grow worse and worse ; and
will end, if persisted in, not only in the overthrow, but in the dissolution
of the party, and affixing permanent odium to their measures and policy,
but, in the mean time, with no small hazard to the country and its institu
tions.

xxxvi.

SPEECH ON THE PASSAGE OF THE TARIFF BILL, AUGUST 5, 1842.

MR. PRESIDENT — The Tariff Bill of 1828 has, by common consent, been
called the bill of abominations ; but, as bad as that was, this — all things consid
ered — is worse. It is, in the first place, worse, because it is more onerous ;
not that the duties are on £n average higher — for they are probably less by about
10 per cent. This, it is estimated, will average about 36 per cent, ad valorem
on the aggregate of the imports ; and that averaged, according to the best esti
mate that 1 have been able to make, about 46. But this difference is more than
made up by other considerations ; and, among them, that allowed long credit
for the payment of the duties ; this requires them to be paid in cash, which
will add to their burden not less than 4 or 5 per cent. Again : there has been
a great falling off in prices on almost all articles, which increases, in the same
proportion, the rate per cent, on the cost of all specific duties — probably not
much less than 50 per cent. ; which, considering the number and the importance
of the articles on which they are laid in this bill, will much more than make up
the difference. To these may be added its arbitrary and oppressive provisions
for valuing goods and collecting duties, with the fact that it goes into operation,
without notice, immediately on its passage, which would fall heavily on the
commercial interest ; and the undue weight it would impose on the less wealthy
portions of the community, in consequence of the higher duties it lays on coarse
articles of general consumption.

It is, in the next place, worse, because, if it should become a law, it would
become so under circumstances still more objectionable than did the tariff of
1828. I shall not dwell on the fact that, if it should, it would entirely super
sede the Compromise Act, and violate pledges openly given here in this cham
ber, by its distinguished author, and the present Governor of Massachusetts,
then a member of this body — that, if we of the South would adhere to the com
promise while it was operating favourably to the manufacturing interest, they
would stand by it when it came to operate favourably to us. I pass, also, with
out dwelling on the fact that it proposes to repeal the provision in the act of
distribution, which provides that the act shall cease to operate if the duties
should be raised above ,20 per cent. — a provision, without which, neither that nor
the Bankrupt Bill could have become a law, and which was inserted under cir
cumstances that pledged the faith of the majority to abide by it. I dwell not on
these double breaches of plighted faith, should this bill become a law : not be
cause I regard them as slight objections ; on the contrary, they are of a serious
character, and likely to exercise a very pernicious influence over our future le
gislation, by preventing amicable adjustments of questions that may hereafter
threaten the peace of the country ; but because I have, on a former occasion,
expressed my views fully in relation to them. I pass on to the objection that,
if this bill should pass, it would against the clear light of experience. When
that of 1 828 passed, we had but little experience as to the effects of the pro
tective policy. It is true that the act of 1824 had been in operation a few

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. GALHOUN. 519

years, which may be regarded the first which avowed the policy that ever pass
ed ; but it had been in operation too short a time to shed much light on the
subject. Since then, our experience has been greatly enlarged. We have had
periods of considerable duration both of increase and reduction of duties, and
their effects respectively on the industry and prosperity of the country, which
enables us to compare, from authentic public documents, the result. It is most
triumphantly in favour of reduction, though made under circumstances most ad
verse to it, and most favourable to increase. I have, on another occasion du
ring this session, shown^ from the commercial tables and other authentic sources,
that, during the eight years of high duties, the increase of our foreign commerce*
and of our tonnage, both coastwise and foreign, was almost entirely arrested ;
and that the exports of domestic manufactures actually fell off, although it was
a period exempt from any general convulsion in trade or derangement of the cur
rency. On the same occasion, I also showed that the eight years of the reduc
tion of duties, which followed, were marked by an extraordinary impulse given
to every branch of industry — agricultural, commercial, navigating, and manu
facturing. Our exports of domestic productions, and our tonnage, increased
fully a third, and our manufactures still more ; and this, too, under the adverse
circumstances of an inflated, unsteady currency, and the whole machinery of
commerce deranged and broken. And yet, with this flood of light from authen
tic documents before us, what are we about to do ? To pass this bill, and to re
store the old, and, as was hoped, exploded system of restrictions and prohibi
tions, under the false guise of a revenue bill, as I shall next proceed to show.

Yes, senators, we are told by the chairman of the Finance Committee, and
others who advocate it, that this bill is intended for revenue, and that of 1828
was for protection ; and it is on that assumption they attempt to discriminate
between the two, and hope to reconcile the people to this measure. It is, in
deed, true that the bill of 1828 was for protection. The treasury was then well
replenished, and not an additional dftllar was needed to meet the demands of
the government ; and, what made it worse, the public debt was then reduced to
a small amount ; and what remained was in a regular and rapid course of re
duction, which would in a few years entirely extinguish the whole, when more
than half of the revenue would have become surplus. It was under these cir
cumstances that the bill of 1828, which so greatly increased the duties, was in
troduced, and became a law — an act of legislative folly and wickedness almost
without example. Well has the community paid the penalty. Yes, much
which it now suffers, and has suffered, and must suffer, are but its bitter fruitt.
It was that which so enormously increased the surplus revenue after the extin
guishment of the debt in 1832 ; and it was that surplus which mainly led to
the vast expansion of the currency that followed, and from which have suc
ceeded so many disasters. It was that which wrecked the currency, overthrew
the almost entire machinery of commerce, precipitated hundreds of thousands
from affluence to want, and which has done so much to taint private and public
morals.

But is this a revenue bill ? I deny it. Wre have, indeed, the word of the
chairman for it. He tells us it is necessary to meet the expenditures of the
government ; of which, however, he gave us but little proof, except his word.
But I must inform him that he must go a step farther before he can satisfy me.
He must not only show that it is necessary to meet the expenditures of the gov
ernment, but also that those expenditures themselves are necessary. He must
show that retrenchment and economy have done their full work ; that all use
less expenditures have been lopped off; that exact economy has been enforced
in every branch, both ia the collection and disbursement of the revenue ; and,
above all, that none of the resources of the government have been thrown away
or surrendered. Has he done all that? Or has he showed that it has been
even attempted 1 that either he or his party have made any systematic or se-

520 SPEECHES OF JOHN C CALHOUN.

rious effort to redeem the pledge, so often and solemnly given before the elec
tion, that the expenditures should be greatly reduced below what they then
were, and be brought down to seventeen, sixteen, and even as low as thirteen
millions of dollars annually ? Has not their course been directly the reverse
since they came into power I Have they not surrendered one of the two great
sources of revenue — the public lands ; raised the expenditure from twenty-one
or two millions, to twenty-seven annually ; and increased the public debt from
five and a half to more than twenty millions? And has not ail this been done
under circumstances well calculated to excite suspicion tjiat the real design was
to create a necessity for duties, with the express view of affording protection
to manufactures ? Have they not, indeed, told us, again and again, through
their great head and organ, that the two great and indispensable measures to
relieve the country from existing embarrassments were a protective tariff and a
National Bank ? and is it, then, uncharitable to assert that the expenditures, so
far from being necessary to the just and economical wants of the government,
have been raised to what they are, with the design of passing this bill in the
only way it could be passed — under the guise of revenue ?

But. if it were admitted that the amount i't proposes to raise is necessary to
meet the expenditures of the government, and that the expenditures themselves
were necessary, the chairman must still go one step farther, to make good his
assertion that this is a bill for revenue, and not for protection. He must show-
that the duties it proposes are laid on revenue, and not on protective principles.

No two things, senators, are more different than duties for revenue and pro
tection. They are as opposite as light and darkness. The one is friendly, and
the other hostile, to the importation of the article on which they may be im
posed. Revenue seeks not to exclude or diminish the amount imported ; on the
contrary, if that should be the result, it neither designed nor desired it. While
it takes, it patronises ; and patronises, that it may take more. It is the reverse,
in every respect, with protection. It seeks, directly, exclusion or diminution.
It is the desired result ; and, if it fails in that, it fails in its object. But, al
though so hostile in character, they are intimately blended in practice. Every
duty imposed on an article manufactured in the country, if it be not raised to
the point of prohibition, will give some revenue ; and every one laid for rev
enue, be it ever so low, must afford some protection, as it is called. But, not
withstanding they are so blended in practice, plain and intelligible rules may
be laid down, by which the one may be so distinguished from the other as
never to be confounded. To make a duty a revenue, and not a protective duty,
it is indispensable, in the first place, that it should be necessary to meet the ex
penditures of the government ; and, in the next, that the expenditures them
selves should be necessary for the support of the government, without the defi
cit being caused intentionally, to raise the duty, either by a surrender of other
sources of revenue, or by neglect or waste. In neither case, as has been stated,
would the duty be for revenue. It must, in addition, never be so high as to
prohibit the importation of the article : that would be utterly incompatible with
the object of revenue. But there are other less obvious, though not less im
portant rules, by which they may be discriminated with equal certainty.

On all articles on which duties can be imposed, there is a point in the rate
of duties which may be called the maximum point of revenue — that is, a point
at which the greatest amount of revenue would be raised. If it be elevated
above that, the importation of the article would fall off more rapidly than the
duty would be raised ; and, if depressed below it, the reverse effect would fol
low : that is, the duty would decrease more rapidly than the importation would
increase. If the duty be raised above that point, it is manifest that all the in
termediate space between the maximum point and that to which it may be
raised would be purely protective, and not at all for revenue. Another rule
remains to be laid down, drawn from the facts just stated, still more important

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 521

than the preceding, as far as the point under consideration is involved. It re
sults, from the facts stated, that any given amount of duty, other than the maxi
mum, may be collected on any article, by two distinct rates of duty — the one
above the maximum point, and the other below it. The lower is the revenue
rate, and the higher the protective ; and all the intermediate is purely prote'c-
tive, whatever it be called, and involves, to that extent, the principle of pro
hibition, as perfectly as if raised so high as to exclude importation totally. It
follows that all duties not laid strictly for revenue are purely protective,
whether called incidental or not ; and hence the distinction taken by the sen
ator from Arkansas immediately on my left (Mr. Sevier) between incidental
and accidental protection is not less true and philosophical than striking. The
latter is the only protection compatible with the principles on which duties for
revenue are laid.

This bill, regarded as a revenue bill, cannot stand the test of any one of these
rules. That it cannot as to the first two, has already been shown. That
some of the duties amount to prohibition, has been admitted by the chairman.
To those, he admits, a long list of others might be added. I have in my
drawer an enumeration of many of them, furnished by an intelligent and ex
perienced merchant ; but I will not occupy the time of the Senate by reading
the catalogue. That a large portion of the duties on the protected articles ex
ceed the maximum point of revenue, will not be denied ; and that there are
few or none imposed on protected articles, on which an equal revenue might
not be raised at a lower rate of duty, will be admitted. As, then, every fea
ture of this bill is stamped with protection, it is as much a bill for protection as
that of 1828. Wherein, then, does it differ ? In this : that went openly, boldly,
and manfully for protection ; and this assumes the guise of revenue. That car
ried the drawn dagger in its hand ; and this conceals it in its bosom. That
imposed the burden of protection — a burden admitted to be unjust, unequal, arid
oppressive, but it was the only burden ; but this superadds the weight of its
false guise — a heavy debt, extravagant expenditures, the loss of public lands,
and the prostration of public credit, with the intent of concealing its purpose.
And this, too, may be added to the other objections, which makes it worse than
its predecessor in abomination.

I am, senators, now brought to the important question, Why should such a
bill pass 1 Who asks for it, and on what ground ? It comes ostensibly from
the manufacturing interest. I say ostensibly ; for I shall show, in the sequel,
that there are other and more powerful interests among its advocates and sup
porters. And on what grounds do they ask it? It is on that of protection.
Protection against what ? Against violence, oppression, or fraud 1 If so, gov
ernment is bound to afford it, if it comes within the sphere of its powers, cost
what it may. It is the object for which government is instituted ; and if it fails
in that, it fails in the highest point of duty. No : it is against neither violence,
oppression, nor fraud. There is no complaint of being disturbed in property or
pursuits, or of being defrauded out of the proceeds of industry. Against what,
then, is protection asked ? It is against low prices. The manufacturers com
plain that they cannot afford to carry on their pursuits at prices as low as at
present ; and that, unless they can get higher, they must give up manufactu
ring. The evil, then, is low prices ; and what they ask of government is to
give them higher. But how do they ask it to be done ? Do they ask govern
ment to compel those who may want to purchase to give them higher ? No :
that would be a hard task, and not a little odious ; difficult to be defended on
the principles of equity, justice, or the Constitution, or to be enforced, if it could
be. Do they ask that a tax should be laid on the rest of the community, and
the proceeds divided among them, to make up for low prices ? or, in other
words, do they ask for a bounty? No: that would be rather too open, op
pressive, and indefensible. How, then, do they ask it to be done ? By put-

U u u

522 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

ting down competition, by the imposition of taxes on the products of others, so
as to give them the exclusion of the market, or at least a decided advantage
over others ; and thereby enable them to sell at higher prices. Stripped of all
disguise, this is their request ; and this they call protection. Protection, in
deed ! Call it tribute, levy, exaction, monopoly, plunder ; or, if these be too
harsh, call it charity, assistance, aid — anything rather than protection, with
which it has not a feature in common.

Considered in this milder light, where, senators, will you find the power to
give the assistance asked ? Or, if that can be found, how can you reconcile it
to the principles of justice or equity to grant it? But suppose that to be over
come : I ask, Are you prepared to adopt as a principle that, whenever any
branch of industry is suffering from depressed prices, it is your duty to call on
all others to assist it ? Such is the broad principle that lies at the bottom of
what is asked ; and what would it be, if carried out, but equalization of income ?
And what that, but agrarianism as to income ? And in what would that differ,
in effect, from the agrarianism of property, which you, on the opposite side of
the chamber, profess so much to detest ? But, if you are not ready to carry
out the principle in its full extent, are you prepared to restrict it to a single
class — the manufacturers ? Will you give them the great and exclusive ad
vantage of having the right of demanding assistance from the rest of the com
munity whenever their profits are depressed below the point of remuneration
by vicissitudes to which all others are exposed ?

But suppose all these difficulties surmounted: there is one rule, where as
sistance is asked, which, on no principle of justice, equity, or reason, can be
violated — and that is, to ascertain, from careful and cautious examination,
whether, in fact, it be needed by the parly asking ; and, if it be, whether the
one of whom it is asked can afford to give it or not. Now I ask whether any
such examination has been made. Has the Finance Committee, which report
ed this bill, or the Committee on Manufactures, to which the numerous peti
tions have been referred, or any member of the majority who support this bill,
made an impartial or careful examination, in order to ascertain whether they
who ask aid can carry on their manufactures without higher prices ? Or have
they given themselves the least trouble to ascertain whether the other portions
of the community could afford to give them higher? Will any one pretend that
he has ? I can say, as to the interest with which I am individually connected,
I have heard of no such inquiry ; and can add farther, from my own experi
ence (and fearlessly appeal to every planter in the chamber to confirm my state
ment), that the great cotton-growing interest cannot afford to give higher prices
for its supplies. As much as the manufacturing interest is embarrassed, it is
not more so than the cotton-growing interest ; and as moderate as may be the
profit of the one, it cannot be more moderate than that of the other. I ask
those who represent the other great agricultural staples — I ask the great pro
vision interest of the West, the navigating, the commercial, and, finally, the
great mechanical and handicraft interests — if they have been asked whether
they can afford to give higher prices for their supplies ? And, if so, what was
their answer ?

If, then, no such examination has been made, what has been done ? Those
who have asked for aid have been permitted to fix the amount according to
their own cupidity ; and this bill has fixed the assessment on the other in
terests of the community, without consulting them, with all the provisions ne
cessary for extorting the amount in the promptest manner. Government is to
descend from its high appointed duty, and become the agent of a portion of the
community to extort, under the guise of protection, tribute from the rest of the
community ; and thus defeat the end of its institution, by perverting powers, in
tended for the protection of all, into the means of oppressing one portion for the
benefit of another.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 523

But there never yet has been devised a scheme of emptying the pockets of
one portion of the community into those of the other, however unjust or op
pressive, for which plausible reasons could not be found ; and few have been
so prolific of such as that under consideration, Among them, one of the most
plausible is, that the competition which is asked to be excluded is that of
foreigners. The competition is represented to be between home arid foreign
industry ; arid he who opposes what is asked is held up as a friend to foreign,
and the enemy to home industry, and is regarded as very little short of being a
traitor to his country. I take issue on the fact. 1 deny that there is, or can be,
any competition between home and foreign industry but through the latter ; and
assert that the real competition, in all cases, is, and must be, between one
branch of home industry and another. To make good the position taken, I
rely on a simple fact, which none will deny — that imports are received in ex
change for exports. From that it follows, if there be no export trade, there
will be no import trade ; and that to cut off the exports, is to cut off the im
ports. It is, then, not the imports, but the exports which are exchanged for
them, and without which they would not be introduced at all, that causes, in
reality, the competition. It matters not how low the wages of other countries
may be, and how cheap their productions, if we have no exports, they cannot
compete with ours.

The real competition, then, is with that industry which produces the articles
for export, and which purchases them and carries them abroad, and brings
back the imported articles in exchange for them ; and the real complaint is, that
those so employed can furnish the market cheaper than those can who manu
facture articles similar with the imported ; and what, in truth, is asked is, that
this cheaper process of supplying the market should be taxed, by imposing high
duties on the importation of th/5 articles received in exchange for those exported,
in order to give the dearer a monopoly, so that it may sell its products for high
er prices. It is, in fact, a warfare on the part of the manufacturing industry,
and those which are associated with it, against the export industry of the com
munity, and those associated with it. Now I ask, What is that export indus
try ? What is the amount produced ? by whom produced ? and the number of
persons connected with it, compared with those who ask a monopoly against it ?

The annual domestic exports of the country may be put down, even in the
present embarrassed condition of the country, at $110,000,000, valued at our
own ports. It is drawn from the forest, the ocean, arid the soil, except about
ten millions of domestic manufactures, and is the product of that vast mass of
industry engaged in the various branches of the lumber business, the fisheries,
in raising grain and stock, producing the great agricultural staples, rice, cotton,
and tobacco ; in purchasing and shipping abroad these various products, and
exchanging and bringing home, in return, the products of other countries, with
all the associated industry necessary to keep this vast machinery in motion —
the ship-builder, the sailor, and the hundreds of thousands of mechanics, inclu
ding manufacturers themselves, and others, who furnish the various necessary
supplies for that purpose. It is difficult to estimate with precision the number
employed, directly or indirectly, in keeping in motion this vast machinery, of
which our great commercial cities, and numerous ships, which whiten the ocean,
are but a small part. A careful examination of the returns of the statistics ac
companying the census would afford a probable estimate ; and on the faith of
such examination, made by a friend, I feel myself warranted in saying that it
exceeds those employed in manufacturing, with the associated industry necessa
ry to furnish them with supplies, in the proportion at least of ten to one. It is
probably much greater.

Such is the export industry of the country ; such its amount ; such the sour
ces from which it is drawn ; such the variety and magnitude of its branches :
and such the proportion in numbers which those who are employed in it, directly

524 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

and indirectly, bears to those who are, in like manner, employed in manufac
turing industry. It is this vast and various amount of industry employed at
home, and drawing from the forest, the water, and the soil, as it were by crea
tion, this immense surplus wealth, to be sent abroad, and exchanged for the pro
ductions of the rest of the globe, that is stigmatized as foreign industry ! And
it is that, senators, which you are now called on to tax, by imposing the high
duties proposed in this bill on the articles imported in exchange, in order to ex
clude them, in whole or part, for the supposed benefit of a very minor interest,
which chooses to regard itself as exclusively entitled to your protection and fa
vour. Are you prepared to respond favourably to the call, by voting for this
bill ? Waiving the high questions of justice and constitutional power, I propose
to examine, in the next place, the mere question of expediency ; and, for that
purpose, the operation of these high protective duties — tracing, first, their effects
on the manufacturing interest intended be to benefited, and afterward on the ex
port interest, against which they are directed.

And here let me say, before I enter on this part of my subject, that I am no
enemy to the manufacturing interest. On the contrary, few regard them with
greater favour, or place a higher estimate on their importance, than myself.
According to my conception, the great advance made in the arts by mechanical
and chemical inventions and discoveries, in the last three or four generations,
has done more for civilization, and the elevation of the human race, than all oth
er causes combined in the same period. With this impression, I behold with
pleasure the progress of the arts in every department, and look to them mainly
as the great means of bringing about a higher state of civilization, with all the
accompanying blessings, physical, political, and moral. It is not to them, nor to
the manufacturing interest, I object, but to what I believe to be the unjust, the
unconstitutional, the mistaken and pernicious means of bettering their condition,
by what is called the protective system.

In tracing what would be the effects of the high protective duties proposed
by the bill, I shall suppose all the grounds assumed by its advocates to be true ;
that the low prices complained of are caused by the imports received in ex
change for exports ; that the imports have, to a great extent, taken possession
of the market ; and tha.t the imposition of high duties proposed on the imports
would exclude them either wholly, or to a great extent ; and that the market, in
consequence, would be relieved, and be followed by the rise of price desired.
I assume all to be as stated, because it is the supposition mo»t favourable to
those who ask for high duties, and the one on which they rely to make out their
case. It is my wish to treat the subject with the utmost fairness, having no
other object in view but truth.

According, then, to the supposition, the first leading effect of these high pro
tective duties would be to exclude the imported articles, against which they are
asked, either entirely, or to a great extent. If they should fail in that, it is ob
vious that they would fail in the immediate object desired, and that the whole
would be an abortion. What, then, I ask, must be the necessary consequence
of the exclusion of the articles against which the protective duties are propo
sed to be laid ? The answer is clear. The portion of the exports, which would
have been exchanged for them, must then return in the unprotected and free ar
ticles ; and among the latter, specie, in order to purchase from the manufactu
rers at home the supplies which, but for the duties, would have been purchased
abroad. And what would be the effect of that, but to turn the exchange, arti
ficially, in our favour, as against other countries, and in favour of the manufac
turing portion of the country, as against all others ? And what would that be
but an artificial concentration of the specie of the country in the manufacturing
region, accompanied by a corresponding expansion of the currency from that
cause, and still more from the discounts of the banks ? I next ask, What must
be the effects of such expansion but that of raising prices there ? and what of

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALIIOTJN. 525

that, but of increasing the expense of manufacturing, and that continuing till the
increased expense shall raise the cost of producing so high as to be equal to
that of the imported article, with the addition of the duty, when the importations
will again commence, and an additional duty be demanded ?

This inevitable result would be accelerated by two causes. The effect of
the duty in preventing importation would cause a falling off of the demand abroad,
and a consequent falling off, temporarily, of price there. The extent would de
pend on the extent of the falling off compared with the general demand for the
article ; and, of course, would be greater in some articles, and less in others.
All would be more or less affected ; but none to an extent so great as was in
sisted on by the chairman, and other advocates of the system, the other day, in
the discussion of the duty on cotton bagging; but still sufficient, in most cases,
to be sensibly felt. I say temporarily, for the great laws which regulate and
equalize prices would in lime cause, in turn, a corresponding falling off in the
production of the article proportional to the falling off of the demand.

But another and more powerful cause would be put in operation at home,
which would tend still more to shorten the periods between the demand for pro
tection. The stimulus caused by the expansion of the currency, and increased
demand and prices consequent on the exclusion of the article from abroad, would
tempt numerous adventurers to rush into the business, often without experience
or capital ; and the increased production, in consequence, thrown into the mar
ket would greatly accelerate the period of renewed distress and embarrassment,
and demand for additional protection.

Thre history of the system fully illustrates the operation of these causes, and
the truth of the conclusion drawn from them. Every protective tariff that Con
gress has ever laid has disappointed the hopes of its advocates ; and has been
followed, at short intervals, by a demand for higher duties, as I have shown on
a former occasion.* The cry has been protection after protection ; one bottle
after another, and each succeeding one more capacious than 'the preceding.
Repetition but increases the demand, till the whole terminates in one universal
explosion, such as that from which the country is now struggling to escape.

Such are the effects of the system on the interest in favour of which these
high protective duties are laid ; and I shall now proceed to trace them on the
great export interest, against which they are laid. I start at the same pmnt —
the exclusion, in part or whole, of the importation of the articles against which
they are laid — their very object, as I have stated, and which, if not effected, the
whole must fail. The necessary consequence of the falling off of the imports
must be, ultimately, the falling off of the exports. They are mutually depend
ant on each other. It is admitted that the amount of the exports limits the im
ports ; and that, taking a series of years together, their value, fairly estimated,
will be equal, or nearly so ; but it is no less certain that the imports limit, in
like manner, the exports. If all imports be prohibited, all exports must cease ;
and if a given amount of imports only be admitted, the exports must finally sink
down to the same amount. For like reason, if such high duties be imposed
that only a limited amount can be imported with profit (which is the case in
question), the exports must, in like manner, sink down to the same amount. In
this aspect, it is proper to trace the effect of another and powerful cause, inti
mately connected with that under consideration.

This falling off of the imports would necessarily cause a falling off of the de
mand in the market abroad for our exports. The capacity of our customers
there to buy from us depends, in a great measure, on their capacity of selling
to us. To impair the one is to impair the other. The joint operation of the
two causes would be highly adverse to the export industry of the country. If
it should not cause an actual decrease of the exports, it would arrest, or greatly

* Mr. Calhoun's Speech on the Assumption of the Debts of the States.

526 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

retard, their increase, and with it, the commerce, the navigation, and their as
sociate interests ; which explains why those great branches of business were ar
rested in their growth under the protective tariffs of 1824 and 1828, and receiv
ed such a mighty impulse from the reduction of duties under the Compromise
Act, as shown from the commercial tables, exhibited on a former occasion du
ring the present session.*

But the loss would not be limited to the falling off of the quantity of the ex
ports. There would be a falling off of price as well as quantity. The effects
of these high protective duties, by preventing imports, would be, to cause a
drain of specie from abroad, as has been stated, to purchase at home the sup
plies which before had been obtained abroad. This, together with the di
minished capacity of our foreign customers to buy, as just explained, would
tend to cause a fall in the price of the articles exported, which would be more
or less considerable on each, according to circumstances. Both causes com
bined — the falling off of quantity and price — would proportionably diminish the
means of those direc.tly and indirectly engaged in the great export business of
the country ; which would be followed by another and more powerful cause of
their impoverishment — that they would have to give a higher price — more
money, out of their diminished means, to purchase their supplies, whether im
ported or manufactured at home, than what they could have got them for
abroad. Say that the effect would be to increase prices but 25 per cent. :
then they would have to give one dollar and twenty-five cents, where other
wise one dollar would have been sufficient. The joint effects of the whole
would be the diminution of means, and a contraction of the currency and fall
of prices in the portion of the Union where the export interest is predominant
and an expansion of the currency and increase of price in that where the
manufacturing interest is, as has been explained. The consequence would be,
to compel the suffering interest to resort, in the first place, to economy and cur
tailment of expenses ; and, if the system be continued, to the abandonment of
pursuits that no longer afford remunerating profits.

I next propose to consider what must be the^ consequence of that result on
the business and trade of the country. For that purpose, I propose to select a
single article, as it will be much easier to trace the effects on a single article
with precision and satisfaction, than it would be on so great a number and va
riety. I shall select cotton, because by far the most considerable in the list of
domestic exports, and the one with which I am the best acquainted.

When the cultivation of cotton is profitable, those engaged in it devote their
attention almost exclusively to it, and rely on the proceeds of their crop to pur
chase almost every article of supply except bread ; and many even that, to a
great extent. But when it ceases to be profitable, from high protective duties,
or other causes, they curtail their expenses, and fall back on their own re
sources, with which they abound, to supply their wants. Household industry
revives ; and strong, substantial, coarse clothing is manufactured from cotton
and wool for their families- and domestics. In addition to cotton, corn and
other grains are cultivated in sufficient abundance, not only for bread, but for
the rearing of stock of various descriptions — hogs, horses, mules, cattle, and
sheep. The effect of all t]lis is to diminish greatly the consumption of the
manufactured articles, whether imported or made in other portions of the Union ;
and still, in a greater degree, the purchase of meat, grain, and stock, followed
by a great falling off in the trade between the cotton region of the South and
the manufacturing region of the North on one side, and, on the other, the great
provision and stock region of the West. But the effects do not end there.
The West — the great and fertile valley of the Mississippi — draws its means
of purchasing from the manufacturing region almost exclusively from the cot-

* Mr. Calhoun's Speech on Mr. Clay's Resolutions .

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 527

ton ; and the falling off of its trade with that region is followed by a corre
sponding falling off in that with the manufacturing. The end is, that this
scheme of compelling others to give higher prices than they can afford termi
nates, as it regards this great branch of industry, in the impoverishment of cus
tomers, and loss of the trade of two great sections of the Union. It is thus,
senators, that every act of folly or vice (through the principle of retributive jus
tice, so deeply seated by an all-wise Providence in the political and moral
world) is sure at last to recoil on its authors.

What is said of cotton is equally applicable to every other branch of indus
try connected directly or indirectly with the great export industry of the coun
try. This bill would affect them all alike ; cause them to sell less, get less,,
and give more for what they buy, and to fall back on their own resources for
supplies ; or abandon their pursuits, to be followed, finally, by impoverishment
and loss of custom to those with whom it originates. The whole tendency of
the measure is to isolate country from country, state from state, neighbourhood
from neighbourhood, arid family from family, with diminished means and in
creasing poverty as the circle contracts. The consummation of the system, to
use an illustration no less true than striking of a deceased friend,* " is Robin
son Crusoe in goatskin."

Such would be the effects of the proposed high protective duties, both on the
interest in favour of which, and that against which they are intended ; even on
the supposition that the evil is such as the advocates of this bill suppose. But
such is not the case. The present embarrassment of the manufacturing inter
est is not caused by the fact, as supposed, that the imported articles have taken
possession of the market, almost to the exclusion of the domestic. It is far
otherwise. Of the whole amount, in value, of the articles proposed to be pro
tected by this bill, the imported bear but a small proportion to the domestic.
The chairman of the Committee on Manufactures (Mr. Simmons) estimates the
former at $45,000,000, and the latter at $400,000,000 ; that is, about one to
nine. This estimate is based on the census of 1840. It is probably less now
than then, in consequence of the increase of the manufactures since, and the
falling off of the imports. I venture nothing in saying that at no former period
of our history has the disproportion been so great between them, or the com
petition so decidedly against the imported articles. If farther and even more
decided proof be required, it will be found in the state of the exchange. It is
now about 3^ per cent, in favour of New-York, against Liverpool ; which is
proof conclusive that our exports, after meeting our engagements abroad, are
more than sufficient to supply the demands of the country for imported articles,
even at the comparatively low rates of duty for the last year ; so much so, that
it is more profitable to import money than goods. As proof of the fact, I see
it stated that one of the banks of New- York has given orders to import a large
amount of specie on speculation, It is in such a state of things, and not such
as that supposed, that it is proposed to lay these high protective duties ; and
the question is, How will they work under it ?

That they will still more effectually exclude the imported articles, and still
more strongly turn the exchange in our favour, and thereby give a local and
artificial expansion to the currency in the manufacturing region, and a tem
porary stimulus to that branch of industry, is probable, but there is no hazard
in saying that it would be fleeting, beyond what has been usual from the same
cause, and would be succeeded more speedily, and to a greater extent, by the
falling off of the home market, through the operation of causes already ex
plained. The result, in a few words, would be a greater and more sudden
reaction, to be followed by a more sudden and more extensive loss of the
home market ; so that, whatever might be gained by the exclusion of foreign

* Hon. Warren R. Davis.

528 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

articles, would be far outweighed by the loss of it. What else would follow,
I will not attempt to anticipate. It would be the first time that a high protect
ive tariff has ever been adopted under similar circumstances ; and it would be
difficult, without the aid of experience,- in a case so unprecedented, and on a
subject so complicated, to trace consequences with anything like precision or
certainty.

The advocates of the protective, or, rather, the prohibitory system (for that is
the more appropriate name), have been led into error, from not distinguishing
between the situation of our country and that of England. That country has
risen to great power arid wealth, and they attribute it to her prohibitory policy,
overlooking the great advantages of her position ; her greater freedom and
security, compared to the rest of Europe ; and forgetting that other European
countries, and Spain in particular, pushed the system even farther, with the
very reverse effect. But, admitting that the greatness of England may, in part,
be attributed to the system, still jt would furnish no proof that its effects would
be the same with us. Our situation is, in many respects, strikingly different
from hers ; and, among others, in the important particular, as it affects the point
under consideration, that she never had but few raw materials to export, and
they of no great value : coal and salt now, and wool formerly ; while our coun
try has numerous such products, and of the greatest value in the general com
merce of the world. England had to create, by manufacturing, the products
for her export trade ; but, with us, our soil and climate and forests are the great
sources from which they are drawn. To extract them from these, to ship them
abroad, and exchange them for the products of the rest of the world, forms the
basis of our industry, as has been shown. In that is to be found the great
counteracting cause, with us, to the system of prohibitory duties, the operation
of which I have endeavoured rapidly to sketch. It has heretofore defeated,
and will continue to defeat, the hopes of its advocates. In England, there
neither was nor is any such counteracting cause ; and hence the comparative
facility and safety with which it could be introduced and established there.

But it was asked, What is to be done ? What course does true policy re
quire, to give the highest possible impulse to the industry and prosperity of the
country, including manufactures and all ? I answer, the very reverse of that
proposed by this bill. Instead of looking to the home market, and shaping all
our policy to secure that, we must look to the foreign, and shape it to secure
that.

We have, senators, reached a remarkable point in the progress of civiliza
tion and the mechanical and chemical arts, and which will require a great
change in the policy of civilized nations. Within the last three or four gen
erations, they have received an impulse far beyond all former example, and
have now obtained a perfection before unknown. The result has been a won
derfully increased facility of producing all articles of supply depending on those
arts ; that is, of those very articles which we call, in our financial language,
protected articles ; and against the importation of which these high duties are
for the most part intended. In consequence of this increased facility, it now
requires but a small part, comparatively, of the labour and capital of a country
to clothe its people, and supply itself with most of the products of the useful
arts ; and hence, all civilized people, with little exception, are producing their
own supply, and even overstocking their own market. It results that no peo
ple restricted to the home market can, in the present advanced state of the
useful arts, rise to greatness and wealth by manufactures. For that purpose,
they must compete successfully for the foreign market in the younger, less ad
vanced, and less civilized countries. This necessity for more enlarged and
freer intercourse between the older, more advanced, and more civilized nations,
and the younger, less advanced, and less civilized, at a time when the whole
globe is laid open to our knowledge, and a rapidity and facility of intercourse

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 529

established between all its parts heretofore unknown, is one of the mighty means
ordained by Providence to spread population, light, civilization, and prosperity-
far and wide over its entire surface.

The great problem, then, is, How is the foreign market to be commanded ? I
answer, by the reverse means proposed in order to command the home market
— low instead of high duties ; and a sound currency, fixed, stable, and as near
ly as possible on the level with the general currency of the world, instead of an
inflated and fluctuating one. Nothing can be more hostile to the command of
foreign trade than high prohibitory duties, even as it regards the exports of
manufactures. The artificial expansion of the currency, and consequent rise
of price and increased expense of production, which, as has been shown, must
follow, would be of themselves fatal ; but to that must be added another cause
not much less so. I refer to the general pressure of the prohibitory system on
the export industry of the country, as already explained, and which would fall
with as much severity on the export of manufactures as on that of cotton or
any other manufactured article. The system operates with like effect on ex
ports, whether of raw materials or manufactured articles in the last and highest
state of finish. The reason is the same as to both. This begins to be understood
in countries the most advanced in the arts, and whose exports consist almost
exclusively of manufactured articles ; and especially England, the most so of
any ; and hence they have already begun the process of reduction of duties,
with the view of increasing their exports. In the recent adjustment of her tar
iff, England, with that avowed view, made great reduction in her import duties.

But can we hope to compete successfully in the market of the world by means
of a sound currency and low duties ? I answer, if we cannot, we may give up
the contest as desperate ; and the sooner the better. It is idle, and worse than
idle, to attempt to add to the growth of our manufactures by the prohibitory sys
tem. They have already reached, under its influence, their full, but stunted
growth. To attempt to push them farther, must react and retard instead of ac
celerating their growth. The home market cannot consume our immense sur
plus productions of provisions, lumber, cotton, and tobacco ; nor find employ
ment in manufacturing, for home consumption, the vast amount of labour em
ployed in raising the surplus beyond the home consumption, and which can only
find a market abroad. Take the single article of cotton. It takes, at me least
calculation, 700,000 labourers to produce the crop — more than twice the num
ber, on a fair calculation, employed in all the branches of manufactures which
can expect to be benefited by these high duties. Less than the si^th part would
be ample to raise every pound of cotton necessary for the home market, if every
yard of cotton cloth consumed at home were manufactured at home, and made
from home-raised cotton. What, then, I ask, is to becorr^ of the five or six
hundred thousand labourers now employed in raising the article for the foreign
market? How can they find employment in manufacturing, when 91 parts in
100 of all the protected articles consumed in the country are now made at home ?
And if not in manufacturing, how else can they be employed ? In raiding pro
visions ? Those engaged in that already supplv, and more than supply, the
home market ; and how shall they find employrpent in that quarter ? How those
employed in the culture of tobacco, and the libber business, and foreign tuade ?
The alternative is inevitable — they must either persist, in spite of these high
protective duties, with all the consequent loss and impoverishment which must
follow them, in their present employment, or be forced into universal competi
tion in producing the protected articles for the home market, which is already
nearly fully supplied by the small amount of labour engaged in their production.

But why should we doubt our capacity to compete successfully, with a sound
currency and low duties, in the general market of the world ? A superabun
dance of cheap provisions, and of the raw material, as far as cotton is concern
ed, gives us great advantage in the greatest and most important branch of man-

X x x

530 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

nfactures in modern times. To these may be added, a favourable situation for
trade with all the world ; the most abundant and cheap supply of what may be
called natural capital — water, coal, timber, and soil ; and a peculiar aptitude for
mechanical and chemical improvements on the part of our citizens, combined

with great energy, industry, and skill. There are but two drawbacks high

wages and high interest. In other respects, no country has superior advanta
ges for manufacturing.

No one is more averse to the reduction of wages than I am, or entertains a
greater respect for the labouring portion of the community. Nothing could in
duce me to adopt a course of policy that would impair their comfort, or prosper
ity. But when we speak of wages, a distinction must be made between the
real and artificial ; between that which enables a labourer to exchange the fruits
of his industry for the greatest amount of food, clothing, and other necessaries
or comforts, without regard to the nominal amount in money, and the mere nom
inal money amount, that is often the result of an inflated currency, which, in
stead of increasing wages in proportion to the price and the means of the la
bourer, is one of the most effective means of defrauding him of his just dues.
But it is a great mistake to suppose that low prices and high wages, estimated
in money, are irreconcilable. Wages are but the residuum after deducting the
profit of capital, the expense of production, including the exactions of the gov
ernment in the shape of taxes, which must certainly fall on production, however
laid. The less that is paid for the use of capital, for the expense of produc
tion, and the exactions of the government, the greater is the amount left for wa
ges ; and hence, by lessening these, prices may fall, and wages rise at the same
time : and that is the combination which gives to labour its greatest reward, and
places the prosperity of a country on the most durable basis. It is not my
habit to stop and illustrate by example ; but the importance of the point under
consideration is such, that it would seem to justify it.

For this purpose, I shall select a product of the soil, and take the article of
wheat. Suppose twenty bushels of wheat to be produced on an acre of land in
Virginia, worth ten dollars the acre, and twenty on an acre in England, worth
one hundred dollars, and the wheat to be worth one dollar a bushel ; suppose,
also, that the interest, or cost for the use of capital, to be the same in both
countries — say 6 per cent. — and the cost of cultivation and the exactions of the
government the same : it is manifest, on the supposition, that wages could not
commence in England till $6 (the interest on $100) was paid ; while in Vir
ginia it would commence after 60 cents (the interest on $10) was paid. And
hence, in Engird, setting the cost of cultivation and the exactions of the gov
ernment aside, bir. $14 would be left for wages, while $19 40 would be left in
Virginia ; and henco, the product of labour in Virginia, out of this greater re
siduum, might sell ai a lower price, and leave still a greater fund for the re
ward of wages. The induction of the cost of cultivation, and of the exactions
of the government, woula have the same effect as paying less for the capital,
and would have the effect of making a still greater difference in the fund to
pay wages. Taking the aggregate of the whole, and comparing all the ele
ments that enter into the compilation, I feel assured that, with a sound curren
cy and low duties — i. e., light ta^s exacted on the part of the government —
the only element which is against us in the rate of interest, but that our advanta
ges in other respects would more than counterbalance it ; and that we have no
thing to fear in open competition with ot'aer countries in the general market of
the world. We would have our full share with the most successful ; while, at
the same time, the exuberance of the home market, relieved from oppressive
burdens, would be vastly increased, and be more effectually and exclusively
commanded by the productions of our own manufacturers, than it can possibly
be by the unjust, unconstitutional, monopolizing, and oppressive scheme propo
sed by this bill.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALIIOUN. 531

I am Yiot ignorant, senators, that it is the work of time and of great delicacy
to pass from the artificial condition in which the country has long been placed,
in reference to its industry, by a mistaken and mischievous system of policy.
Sudden transitions, even to better habits or better conditions, are hazardous, un
less slowly effected. With this impression, I have ever been averse to all sud
den steps, both as to the currency and the system of policy which is now the
subject of our deliberation, bad as I believe them both to be ; and deep as my
conviction is in favour of a sound currency and low duties, I am by no means
disposed to reach, by a sudden transition, the points to which I firmly believe
they may be reduced, consistently with the necessary wants of the government,
by a proper management of our finances.

But, as pernicious as the prohibitory or protective system may be on the in
dustrial pursuits of the country, it is still more so on its politics and morals.
That they have greatly degenerated within the last fifteen or twenty years ; that
there are less patriotism and purity, and more faction, selfishness, and corrup
tion ; that our public affairs are conducted with less dignity, decorum, and re
gard to economy, accountability, and public faith ; and. finally, that the taint has
extended to private as well as public morals, is, unhappily, out too manifest to
be denied. If all this be traced back, the ultimate cause of this deplorable
change will be found to originate mainly in the fact, that the duties (or, to speak
more plainly, the taxes on imports), from which *o^ the whole revenue is de
rived, are so laid, that the most powerful porlioFofthe community— not in num
bers, but influence— are not only exempted ironi the burden, but, in fact, ac
cording to their own conception, receive bounties from their operation. They
crowd our tables with petitions, imploring Congress to impose taxes— high tax
es ; arid rejoice at their imposition as Lhe greatest blessing, and deplore their
defeat as the greatest calamity ; wtl'le other portions regard them in the oppo
site light, as oppressive and p*'evous burdens. Now, senators, I appeal to
you— to the candour and gor^ sense even of the friends of this bill — whether
these facts do not furnish roof conclusive that these high protective duties are
regarded as bounties, an-' not taxes, by these petitioners, and those who support
their course, and urg^ ^e passage of the bill ? Can stronger proof be offered ?
Bounties may be j«iplored, but it is not in human nature to pray for taxes, bur
den, and oppress011' believing them to be such. I again appeal to you, and ask
if the power <V taxation can be perverted into an instrument in the hands of gov-
ern«ient to enrich and aggrandize one portion of the community at the expense
Q( the oAetj without causing all of the disastrous consequences, political and
moral, which we all deplore ? Can anything be imagined more destructive of pa
triotism, and more productive of faction, selfishness, and violence ; or more hos-
tiJe to all economy and accountability in the administration of the fiscal department
of the government? Can those who regard taxes as a fruitful source of gain,
or as the means of averting ruin, regard extravagance, waste, neglect, or any
other means by which the expenditures may be increased, and the tax on the
imports raised, with the deep condemnation which their corrupting consequen
ces on the politics and morals of the community demand ? Let the history of
the government since the introduction of the system, and its present wretched
condition, respond.

But it would be doing injustice to charge the evils which have flowed from
f the system, and the greater which still threaten, exclusively on the manufactu
ring interest. Although it ostensibly originates with it, yet, in fact, it is the
least efficient, and the most divided, of all that combination of interests from
which the system draws its support. Among them, the first and most powerful
is that active, vigilant, and well-trained corps, which lives on government, or
expects to live on it ; which prospers most when the revenue is the greatest,
the treasury the fullest, and the expenditures the most profuse ; and, of course,
is ever the firm and faithful support of whatever system shall extract most from

532 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

the pockets of the rest of the community, to be emptied into theirs. The next
in order — when the government is connected with the banks — when it receives
their notes in its dues, and pays them away as cash, and uses them as its de
positories and fiscal agents — are the banking and other associated interests,
stock-jobbers, brokers, and speculators ; and which, like the other, profit the
more in consequence of the connexion ; the higher the revenue, the greater its
surplus and the expenditures of the government. It is less numerous, but still
more active and powerful, in proportion, than the other. These form the basis ;
and on these, political aspirants, who hope to rise to power and control through
it, rear their party organization. It is they who infuse into it the vital princi
ple, and give life, and energy, and direction to the whole. This formidable com
bination, thus vivified and directed, rose to power in the late great political
struggle, and is now in the ascendant ; and it is to its death-like efforts to main
tain and consolidate its power, that this and the late session owe their extra
ordinary proceedings. Its hope now is centred in this bill. In their estima
tion, without a protective tariff, all is lost ; and, with it, that which is now lost
may be regained.

I have now, senators, said what I intended. It may be asked, Why have I
spoken at all ? ^It is not from the expectation of changing a single vote on the
opposite side. That is hopeless. The indications during this discussion show,
beyond doubt, a foregone 4eiermination on the part of its advocates to vote for
the bill, without the slightest auendment, be its defects or errors ever so great.
They have shut their eyes and cl^ed their ears. The voice of an angel from
heaven could not reach their understanding. Why, then, have I raised mine ?
Because my hope is in truth. " Crushed to earth, it will rise again." It is
rising, and I have added my voice to fasten its resurrection. Great already
is the change of opinion on this subject sii.,e 1828. Then the plantation states,
as they were called, stood alone against this ^}se an(j oppressive system. We
had scarcely an ally beyond their limits, and w. had to throw off the crushing
burden it imposed, as we best could, within the hmts of the Constitution. Very
different is the case now. On whatever side the eyt;s turned, firm and faith
ful allies are to be seen. The great popular party is ai«,a(jy rallied almost en
masse around the banner which is leading the party to its ,nai triumph. The
few that, still lag will soon be rallied under its ample folds, in that banner is
inscribed, FREE TRADE; LOW DUTIES; NO DEBT; SEPARATION
FROM BANKS; ECONOMY; RETRENCHMENT, AND S'lRICT AD
HERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION. Victory in such a cas* will b*
great and glorious ; and if its principles be faithfully and firmly adhered to, after
it is achieved, much will it redound to the honour of those by whom it will have
been won ; and long will it perpetuate the liberty and prosperity of the country.

XXXVII.

SPEECH ON THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON, AUGUST, 1842.

MR. CALHOUN said that his object in rising was not to advocate or oppose
the treaty, but simply to state the reasons that would govern him in voting for
its ratification. The question, according to his conception, was not whether it
was all we could desire, or whether it was liable to this or that objection, but
whether it was such a one that, under all the circumstances of the case, it
would be most advisable to adopt or reject. Thus regarded, it was his inten
tion to state fairly the reasons in favour of and against its ratification, and to
assign to each its proper weight, beginning with the portion relating to the
Northeastern boundary, the settlement of which was the immediate and promi
nent object of the negotiation.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 533

lie was one of those who had not the slightest doubt that the boundary for
which the State of Maine contended was the true one, as established by the
treaty of peace in 1783 ; and had accordingly so recorded his vote, after a de
liberate investigation of the subject. But, although such was his opinion, he
did not doubt, at the time, iuat tiie boundary could only be settled by a compro
mise line. We had admitted it to be doubtful at an early period during the
administration of Washington, and more recently and explicitly, by stipulating
to submit it to the arbitration of a friendly power, by the treaty of Ghent. The
doubt thus admitted on our part to exist had been greatly strengthened by the
award of the King of Holland, who had been mutually selected as the arbiter
under the treaty. So strong, indeed, was his (Mr. C.'s) impression that the
dispute could only be settled by a compromise or conventional line, that he said
to a friend in the then cabinet (when an appropriation was made a few years
since for a special mission to be sent to England on the subject of the boundary,
and his name, among others, was mentioned for the place), that the question
could only be settled by compromise ; and for that purpose some distinguished
citizen of the section ought to be selected ; and neither he, nor any other
Southern man, ought to be thought of. With these previous impressions, he
was prepared, when the negotiation opened, to expect, if it succeeded in adjust
ing the difficulty, it would be (as it has been) on a compromise line. Notwith
standing, when it was first announced that the line agreed on included a con
siderable portion of the territory lying to the west of the line awarded by the
King of Holland, he was incredulous, and expressed himself strongly against
it. His first impression was perhaps the more strongly against it, from the
fact that he had fixed on the River St. John, from the mouth of Eel River,
taking the St. Francis branch (the one selected by the King of Holland) as the
natural and proper compromise boundary, including in our limits all the portion of
the disputed territory lying north of Eel River, and west and south of the St. John,
above its junction; and all the other within that of Great Britain. On a little
reflection, however, he resolved not to form his opinion of the merits or demer
its of the treaty on rumour or imperfect information, but to wait until the whole
subject was brought before the Senate officially, and then to make it up on full
knowledge of all the facts and circumstances, after deliberate and mature reflec
tion ; and that he had done with the utmost care and impartiality. What he
now proposed was to give the result, with the reasons on which it rests, and
which would govern his vote on the ratification.

He still believed that the boundary which he had fixed in his own mind was
the natural and proper one ; but, as that could not be obtained, the question for
them to decide was, Are the objections to the boundary as actually agreed on,
and the stipulations connected with it, such as ought to cause its rejection ? In
deciding it, it must be borne in mind that, as far as this portion of the boundary
is concerned, it is a question belonging much more to the State of Maine than
to the Union. It is, in truth, but the boundary of that state ; and it makes a
part of the boundary of the United States, only by being the exterior boundary
of one of the states of our Federal Union. It is her sovereignty and soil that
are in dispute, except the portion of the latter that still remains in Massachu
setts ; and it belongs, in the first place, to her, and to Massachusetts, as far as her
right of soil is involved, to say what their rights and interests are, and what is
required to be done. The rest of the Union is bound to defend them in then
just claim ; and to assent to what they may be willing to assent, in settling the
claim in contest, if there should be nothing in it inconsistent with the interest,
honour, or safety of the rest of the Union. It is so that the controversy has
ever been regarded. It is well known President Jackson would readily have
agreed to the award of the King of Holland, had not Maine objected ; and that,
to overcome her objection, he was prepared to recommend to Congress to give
her, in order to get her consent, one million of acres of the public domain, worth.

534 SPEECHES OF JOIIiN C. CALHOUtf.

at the minimum price, a million and a quarter of dollars. The case is now re
versed. Maine and Massachusetts have both assented to the stipulations of the
treaty, as far as the question of the boundary affects their peculiar interest,
through commissioners vested with full powers to represent them ; and the
question for us to decide is, Shall we reject that to which they have assented ?
Shall the government, after refusing to agree to the award of the King of Hol
land, because Maine objected, now reverse its course, and refuse to agree to
that which she and Massachusetts have both assented to? There may, indeed, be
reasons strong enough to authorize such a course ; but they must be such as
will go to prove that we cannot give our assent consistently with the interests,
the honour, or the safety of the Union. That has not been done ; and, he
would add, if there be any such, he has not been able to detect them.

It has, indeed, been said that the assent of Maine was coerced. She cer
tainly desired to obtain a more favourable boundary ; but when the alternative
was presented of another reference to arbitration, she waived her objection, as
far as she was individually concerned, rather than incur the risk, delay, uncer
tainty, and vexation of another submission of her claims to arbitration ; and left
it to the Senate, the constituted authority appointed for the purpose, to decide
on the general merits of the treaty as it relates to the whole Union. In so
doing, she has, in his opinion, acted wisely and patriotically — wisely for her
self, and patriotically in reference to the rest of the Union. She has not got,
indeed, all she desired ; and has even lost territory, if the treaty be compared
to the award of the King of Holland ; but, as an offset, that which she has lost
is of little value, while that which she retains has been greatly increased in
value by the stipulations contained in the treaty. The whole amount lost is
about half a million of acres. It lies along the eastern slope of the highlands,
skirting the St. Lawrence to the east, and is acknowledged to be of little value
for soil, timber, or anything else— a steril region, in a severe, inhospitable clime.
Against that loss, she has acquired the right to navigate the River St. John ;
and that, not only to float down the timber on its banks, but all the productions
of the extensive, well-timbered, and, taken as a whole, not steril portion of
the state that lies on her side of the basin of that river and its tributaries. But
that is not all. She also gains what is vastly more valuable — the right to ship
them, on the same terms as colonial productions, to Great Britain and her colo
nial possessions.

These great and important advantages will probably double the value of that
extensive region, and make it one of the most populous and flourishing portions
of the state. Estimated by a mere moneyed standard, these advantages are
worth, he would suppose, all the rest of the territory claimed by Maine without
them. If to this be added the sum of about $200,000 to be paid to her for the
expense of defending her territory, and $300,000 to her and Massachusetts in
equal moieties, in consequence of their assent to the boundary and the equiva
lents received, it must be apparent that Maine has not made a bad exchange in
accepting the treaty, as compared with the award, as far as her separate inter
est is concerned. But be that as it may, she is the rightful judge of her own
interests ; and her assent is a sufficient ground for our assent, provided that to
which she has assented does not involve too great a sacrifice on the part of the
rest of the Union, nor their honour or safety. So far from that, as far as the
rest of the Union is concerned, the sacrifice is small and the gain great. They
are under solemn constitutional obligations to defend Maine, as one of the mem
bers of the Union, against invasion, and to protect her territory, cost what it
may, at every hazard. The power claiming what she contended to be hers,
is one of the greatest, if not the greatest, on earth ; the dispute is of long stand
ing, and of a character difficult to be adjusted ; and, however clear the right of
Maine may be regarded in the abstract, it has been made doubtful in conse
quence of admissions, for which the government of the Union is responsible.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 535

To terminate such a controversy, with the assent of the party immediately in
terested, by paying the small sum of half a million — of which a large part
(say $200,000) is unquestionably due to Maine, and would have to be paid to
her without the treaty — is indeed a small sacrifice — a fortunate deliverance.
President Jackson was willing to allow her, as has been stated, more than twice
as much for her assent to the award ; and in doing so, he showed his wisdom,
whatever might have been thought of it at the time. Those, at least, who op
posed the treaty will not charge him with being willing to sacrifice the inter
est and honour of the Union in making the offer ; and yet the charge which
they make against this portion of the treaty does, by implication, subject what
he was ready to do to a similar one.

But it is said that the territory which England would acquire beyond the
boundary of the awarded line would greatly strengthen her frontier and weak
en ours, and would thereby endanger the safety of the country in that quarter.
He did not profess to be deeply versed in military science, but, according to
his conception, there was no foundation for the objection. It was, if he did not
mistake, the very last point on our whole frontier, from the mouth of the St.
Croix to the outlet of Lake Superior, on which an expedition would be organi
zed on either side to attack the possessions of the other. In a military point
of view, our loss is as nothing in that quarter ; while in another, and a much more
important quarter, our gain by the treaty is great, in the same point of view.
He referred to that provision by which we acquire Rouse's Point, at the nor
thern extremity of Lake Champlain. It is among the most important military
positions on the whole line of our Eastern and Northern frontier, whether it be
regarded in reference to offensive or defensive operations. He well remem
bered the deep sensation caused among military men in consequence of its loss ;
and he would leave the question of loss or gain, in a military point of vievy
(taking the two together), to their decision, without the least doubt what it
would be.

But if it should be thought by any one that these considerations, as conclu
sive as they seemed to be, were not sufficient to justify the ratification of this
portion of the treaty, there were others, which appeared to him to be perfectly
conclusive. He referred to the condition in which we would be left if the
treaty should be rejected. He would ask, If, after having agreed at Ghent to
refer the subject to arbitration, and after having refused to agree to the award
made under that reference, by an arbitrator of our own selection, we should
now reject this treaty, negotiated by our own Secretary of State, under our own
eyes, and which had previously received the assent of the states immediately
interested, whether there would be the slightest prospect that another equally
favourable would ever be obtained ? On the contrary, would we not stand in a
far worse condition than ever in reference to our claim ? Would it not, indeed,
be almost certain that we should lose the whole of the basin of the St. John,
and Great Britain gain all for which she ever contended, strengthened as she
would be by the disclosures made during this discussion ?* He was far from

* The following extract from the speech of Mr. Rives, the chairman of the Committee on For
eign Relations, will show what the disclosures were :

It appears to the committee, therefore, in looking back to the public and solemn acts of the gov
ernment, and of successive administrations, that the time has passed, if it ever existed, when we
could be justified in making the precise line of boundary claimed by us the subject of a sine qua
non of negotiation, or of the ultimo ratio — of an assertion by force. Did a second arbitration, then,
afford the prospect of a more satisfactory result? This expedient seemed to be equally rejected by
all parties — by the United States, by Great Britain, and by the State of Maine. If such an alterna
tive should be contemplated by any one as preferable to the arrangement which had been made, it
is tit to bear in mind the risk and uncertainty, as well as the inevitable delay and expense, incident
to that mode of decision We have already seen, in the instance of the arbitration by the King of
the Netherlands, how much weight a tribunal of that sort is inclined to give to the argument of con
venience, and a supposed intention on the part of the negotiators of the treaty of 1783, against the
literal and positive terms employed t-y the instrument in its description of limits. Is there no dan
ger, in the event of another arbitration, that a farther research into the public archives of Europe
might bring to light some embarrassing (even though apocryphal) document, to throw a new shade

536 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

asserting that the facts disclosed established the claim of Great Britain, or that
the map exhibited is the one to which Franklin referred in his note to the Count

of plausible doubt on the clearness of our title, in the view of a sovereign arbiter? Such a docu
ment has already been communicated to the committee ; and I feel it (said Mr. R.) to be my duty to
lay it before the Senate, that they may fully appreciate its bearings, and determine for themselves
the weight and importance which belong to it. It is due to the learned and distinguished gentleman
(Mr. Jared Sparks, of Boston) by whom the document referred to was discovered in the archives of
France, while pursuing his laborious and intelligent researches connected with the history of our
own country, that the account of it should be given in his own words, as contained in a communi
cation addressed by him to the department of state. I proceed, therefore, to read from that com
munication :

" While pursuing my researches among the voluminous papers relating to the American Revolu
tion in the Archives des Affaires Etrangeres in Paris, I found in one of the bound volumes an ori
ginal letter from Dr. Franklin to Count de Vergennes, of which the following is an exact transcript :

" ' Passy, December 6, 1782.

" ' SIR — I have the honour of returning herewith the map your excellency sent me yesterday. 1
have marked with a strong red line, according to your desire, the limits of the United States, as
settled in the preliminaries between the British and American plenipotentiaries.

" ' With great respect, I am, &c.,

" ' B. FRANKLIN.'

" This letter was written six days after the preliminaries were signed ; and if we could procure
the identical map mentioned by Franklin, it would seem to afford conclusive evidence as to the
meaning affixed by the commissioners to the language of the treaty on the subject of the boundaries.
You may well suppose that I lost no time in making inquiry for the map, not doubting that it would
confirm all my previous opinions respecting the validity of our claim. In the geographical depart
ment of the Archives are sixty thousand maps and charts ; but so well arranged with catalogues
and indexes, that any one of them may be easily found. A fter a little research in the American di
vision, with the aid of the keeper, 1 came upon a map of North America, by D'Anville, dated 1746r
in size about eighteen inches square, on which was drawn a strong red line throughout the entire
boundary of the United States, answering precisely to Franklin's description. The line is bold and
distinct in every part, made with red ink, and apparently drawn with a hair-pencil, or a pen with a
blunt point. There is no other colouring on any part of the map.

" Imagine my surprise on discovering that this line runs wholly south of the St. John, and between
the head waters of that river and those of the Penobscot and Kennebec. In short, it is exactly the
line now contended for by Great Britain, except that it concedes more than is claimed. The north
line, after departing from the source of the St. Croix, instead of proceeding to Mars Hill, stops far
short of that point, and turns off fcp the west, so as to leave on the British side all the streams
which flow into the St. John between the source of the St. Croix and Mars Hill. It is evident
that the line, from the St. Croix to the Canadian highland, is intended to exclude all the waters run
ning into the St. John.

" There is no positive proof that this map is actually the one marked by Franklin ; yet, upon any
other supposition, it would be difficult to explain the circumstances of its agreeing so perfectly with
his description, and of its being preserved in the place where it would naturally be deposited by
Count de Vergennes. 1 also found another map in the Archives, on which the same boundary was
traced in a dotted red line with a pen, apparently copied from the other.

" I enclose herewith a map of Maine, on which I have drawn a strong black line, corresponding
with the red one above mentioned."

I am far from intimating (said Mr. R.) that the documents discovered by Mr. Sparks, curious and
well worthy of consideration as they undoubtedly are, are of weight sufficient to shake the title of
the United States, founded on the positive language of the treaty of peace. But they could not fail,
in the event of another reference, to give increased confidence and emphasis to the pretensions of
Great Britain, and to exert a corresponding influence upon the mind of the arbiter. It is worth
while, in this connexion, to turn to what Lord Ashburton has said, in one of his communications to
Mr. Webster, when explaining his views of the position of the highlands described in the treaty :

'• My inspection of the maps, and my examination of the documents," says his lordship, " lead me
to a very strong conviction that the highlands contemplated by the negotiators of the treaty were
the only highlands then known to them— at the head of the Penobscot, Kennebec, and the rivers west
of the St. Croix; and that they did not precisely know how the north line from the St. Croix would
strike them ; and if it were not my wish to shorten this discussion, I believe a very good argument
might be drawn from the words of the treaty in proof of this. In the negotiations with Mr. Living
ston, and afterward with Mr. M'Lane, this view seemed to prevail; and, as you are aware, there
were proposals to search for these highlands to the west, where alone, I believe, they will be found
to answer perfectly the description of the treaty. If this question should, unfortunately, go to a farther
reference, I should by no means despair of finding some confirmation of this view of the cose."

It is for the Senate to consider (added Mr. R.) whether there would not be much risk of intro
ducing new complications and embarrassments in this controversy, by leaving it open for another
litigated reference ; and if the British government — strongly prepossessed, as its minister tells us it
is, with the justice of its claims— would not find what it would naturally consider a persuasive
" confirmation of its view of the case" in documents such as those encountered by Mr. Sparks in
his historical researches in the Archives of France.

A map has been vauntingly paraded here from Mr. Jefferson's collection, in the zeal of opposi
tion (without taking time to see what it was), to confront and invalidate the map found by Mr.
Sparks in the foreign office at Paris ; but, the moment it is examined, it is found to sustain, by the
most precise and remarkable correspondence in every feature, the map communicated by Mr. Sparks.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 537

de Vergennes, the French minister ; but it cannot be doubted that the conform
ity of the line delineated on the map with the one described in his note,
would have the effect of strengthening riot a little the claims of Great Britain
in her own estimation and that of the world. But the facts stated, and the map
exhibited by the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations (Mr. Rives),
are not the only or the strongest disclosures made during the discussion. The
French map introduced by the senator from Missouri (Mr. Benton), from Mr.
Jefferson's collection in the Congress library, in order to rebut the inference
from the former, turned out to be still more so. That was made in the village
of Passy, in the year after the treaty of peace was negotiated, where Franklin
(who was one of the negotiators) resided, and was dedicated to him ; and that
has the boundary line drawn in exact conformity to the other, and in the man
ner described in the note of Doctor Franklin — a line somewhat more adverse
to us than that claimed by Great Britain. But, as striking as is this coincidence,
he was far from regarding it as sufficient to establish the claim of Great Brit
ain. It would, however, be in vain to deny that it was a corroborating circum
stance, calculated to add no small weight to her claim.

It would be still farther increased by the fact that France was our ally at the
time, and, as such, must have been consulted, and kept constantly advised of
all that occurred during the progress of the negotiation, including its final result.
It would be idle to suppose that these disclosures would not weigh heavily
against us in any future negotiation. They would, so much so — taken in con
nexion with the adverse award of the King of Holland, and this treaty, should
it be rejected — as to render hopeless any future attempt to settle the question
by negotiation or arbitration. No alternative would be left us but to yield to
the full extent of the British claim, or to put Maine in possession by force, and
that, too, with the opinion and sympathy of the world against us and our cause.
In his opinion, we would be bound to attempt it, in justice to Maine, should we
refuse to agree to what she has assented. So much for the boundary question,
as far as Maine is concerned.

Having now shown — satisfactorily, he hoped — that Maine has acted wisely
for herself in assenting to the treaty, it remained to be considered whether we,
the representatives of the Union on such questions, would not also do so in rat
ifying it, so far, at least, as the boundary question is involved. He would add
nothing to what had already been said of the portion in which Maine was im
mediately interested. His remarks would be confined to the remaining portion
of the boundary, extending from the northwestern corner of that state to the
Rocky Mountains.

Throughout this long-extended line every question has been settled to our
satisfaction. Our right has been acknowledged to a territory of about one hun
dred thousand acres of land in New-Hampshire, which would have been lost by
the award of the King of Holland. A long gore of about the same amount, ly
ing in Vermont and New- York, and which was lost under the treaty of Ghent,
would be regained by this. It includes Rouse's Point. Sugar Island, lying in
the water connexion between Lakes Huron and Superior, and heretofore in dis
pute, is acknowledged to be ours ; it is large, and valuable for soil and position.
So, also, is Isle Royale, near the northern shore of Lake Superior, acknowledg-

The senator who produced it could see nothing but the microscopic dotted line running off in a
northeasterly direction ; hut the moment other eyes were applied to it, there was found, in bold re
lief, a strong red line, indicating the limits of the United States, according to the treaty of peace,
and coinciding, minutely and exactly, with the boundary traced on the map of Mr. Sparks. That
this red line, and not the hardly visible dotted line, was intended to represent the limits of the United
States, according to the treaty of peace, is conclusively shown by the circumstance that the red line
is drawn on the map all around the exterior boundary of the United States ; through the middle of
the Northren Lakes, thence through the Long Lake and the Rainy Lake to the Lake of the Woods ;
and from the western extremity of the Lake of the Woods to the River Mississippi ; and along that
river to the point where the boundary of the United States, according to the treaty of peace, leaves
it ; and thence, by its easterly course to the mouth of the St. Mary's on the Atlantic.

Y y y

538 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

ed to be ours — a large island, and valuable for its fisheries. And also a large
tract of country to the north and west of that lake, between Fond du Lac and
the River St. Louis on one side, and Pigeon River on the other — containing four
millions of acres. It is said to be steril, but cannot well be more so than that
acquired by Great Britain lying west of the boundary awarded by the King of
Holland. In addition, all the islands in the River St. Lawrence and the lakes,
which were divided in running out the division line under previous treaties, are
acquired by us under this ; and all the channels and passages are opened to the
common uses of our citizens and the subjects of Great Britain.

Such are the provisions of the treaty in reference to this long line of bounda
ry. Our gain — regarded in the most contracted point of view, as mere equiva
lents for the sum assumed to be paid by us to Maine and Massachusetts for their
assent to the treaty — is vastly greater than what we have contracted to pay.
Taking the whole boundary question together, and summing up the loss and
gain of the whole, including what affects Maine and Massachusetts, and he could
not doubt that, regarded merely as set-offs, our gain greatly exceeds our loss —
vastly so, compared to what it would have been under the award of the King
of Holland, including the equivalent which our government was willing to al
low Maine for her assent. But it would be, indeed, to take a very contracted
view to regard it in that light. It would be to overlook the vast importance of
permanently establishing, between two such powers, a line of boundary of sev
eral thousand miles, abounding in disputed points of much difficulty and long
standing. The treaty, he trusted, would do much to lay the foundation of a solid
peace between the countries — a thing so much to be desired.

It is certainly much to be regretted, after settling so large a portion of the
boundary, that the part beyond the Rocky Mountains should remain unadjusted.
Its settlement would have contributed much to strengthen the foundation of a
durable peace. , But would it be wise to reject the treaty because all has not
been done that could be desired ? He placed a high value on our territory on
the west of those mountains, and held our title to it to be clear ; but he would
regard it as an act of consummate folly to stake our claim on a trial of strength
at this time. The territory is now held by joint occupancy, under the treaty of
Ghent, which either party may terminate by giving to the other six months' no
tice. If we were to attempt to assert our exclusive right of occupancy at pres
ent, the certain loss of the territory must be the result"; for the plain reason that
Great Britain could concentrate there a much larger force, naval and military,
in a much shorter time, and at far less expense, than we could. That will not
be denied ; but it will not always be the case. Our population is steadily — he
might say rapidly — advancing across the Continent, to the borders of the Pa
cific Ocean. Judging from past experience, the tide of population will sweep
across the Rocky Mountains, with resistless force, at no distant period, when
what we claim will quietly fall into our hands, without expense or bloodshed.
Time is acting for us. Wait patiently, and all we claim will be ours ; but if we
attempt to seize it by force, it will be sure to elude our grasp.

Having now stated his reasons for voting to ratify the articles in the treaty
relating to the boundary, he would next proceed to assign those that would gov
ern his vote on the two relating to the African slave-trade. And here he would
premise, that there are several circumstances which caused no small repug
nance on his part to any stipulations whatever with Great Britain on the sub
ject of those articles ; and he would add, that he would have been gratified if
they, and all other stipulations on the subject, could have been entirely omitted ;
but he must, at the same time, say he did not see how it was possible to avoid
entering into some arrangement on the subject. To understand our difficulty,
it will be necessary to advert to the course heretofore taken by the government
in reference to the subject, and the circumstances under which the negotiations
that resulted in this treaty commenced.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALIIOUN. 539

Congress at an early day — as soon, in fact, as it could legislate on the sub
ject under the Constitution — passed laws enacting severe penalties against the
African slave-trade. That was followed by the treaty of Ghent, which declared
it to be irreconcilable with the principles of humanity and justice, arid stipula
ted that both of the parties — the United States and Great Britain — should use
their best endeavours to effect its abolition. Shortly after, an act of Congress
was passed declaring it to be piracy ; and a resolution was adopted by Congress
requesting the President to enter into arrangements with other powers for its
suppression. Great Britain, actuated by the same feelings, succeeded in ma
king treaties with the European maritime powers for its suppression ; and, not
long before the commencement of this negotiation, had entered into joint stipu
lations with the five great powers to back her on the question of search. She
had thus acquired a general supervision of the trade along the African coast ;
so that vessels carrying the flag of every other country, except ours, were sub
ject on that coast to the inspection of her cruisers, and to be captured, if sus
pected of being engaged in the slave-trade. In consequence, ours became al
most the only flag used by those engaged in the trade, whether our own peo
ple or foreigners, although our laws inhibited the traffic under the severest
penalties. In this state of things, Great Britain put forward the claim of the
right of search as indispensable to suppress a trade prohibited by the laws of
the civilized world, and to the execution of the laws and treaties of the nations
associated with her by mutual engagements for its suppression. At this stage,
a correspondence took place between our late minister at the Court of St. James
and Lord Palmerston on the subject, in which the latter openly and boldly
claimed the right of search, and which was promptly and decidedly repelled on
our side. We had long since taken our stand against it, and had resisted its
abuse, as a belligerant right, at the mouth of the cannon. Neither honour nor
policy on our part could tolerate its exercise in time of peace, in any form —
whether in that of search, as claimed by Lord Palmerston, or the less offensive
and unreasonable one of visitation, as proposed by his successor. Lord Aber
deen. And yet we were placed in such circumstances as to require that some
thing should be done. It was in such a state of things that the negotiation com
menced ; and commenced, in part, in reference to this subject, which was tend
ing rapidly to bring the two countries into collision. On our side, we were
deeply committed against the traffic, both by legislation and treaty. The in
fluence and the efforts of the civilized world were directed against it; and that,
too, under our lead at the commencement ; and with such success as to compel
vessels engaged in it to take shelter, almost exclusively, under the fraudulent
use of our flag. To permit such a state of things to continue could not but
deeply impeach our honour, and turn the sympathy of the world against us. On
the other side, Great Britain had acquired, by treaties, the right of supervision,
including that of search and capturing, over the trade on the coast of Africa,
with the view to its suppression, from all the maritime powers except ourselves.
Thus situated, he must say that he saw no alternative for us but the one adopt
ed — to take the supervision of our own trade on that coast into our own hands,
and to prevent, by our own cruisers, the fraudulent use of our flag. The only
question, in the actual state of things, as it appeared to him, was, whether it
should be done by a formal or informal arrangement. He would have prefer
red the latter ; but the difference between them was not, in his opinion, such
as would justify, on that account, the rejection of the treaty. They would, in
substance, be the same, and have differed but little, probably, in the expense of
execution. Either was better than the other alternatives — to do nothing ; to
leave things in the dangerous state they stood, or to yield to the right of search
or visitation.

It is objected that the arrangement entered into is virtually an ticknowledg-
ment of the right of search. He did not so regard it. On the contrary, he

540 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

considered it, under all the circumstances, as a surrender of that claim on the
part of Great Britain : a conclusion which a review of the whole transaction,
in his opinion, would justify. Lord Palmerston, in the first place, claimed the
unqualified right of search, in which it is understood he was backed by the five
great powers. Lord Aberdeen, with more wisdom and moderation, explained
it to mean the right of visitation simply ; and, finally, the negotiation is closed
without reference to either, simply with a stipulation between the parties to keep
up for five years a squadron of not less than eighty guns on the coast of Alrica,
to enforce separately and respectively the laws and obligations of each of the
countries for the suppression of the slave-trade. It is carefully worded, to make
it mutual, but at the same time separate and independent ; each looking to the
execution of its own laws and obligations, and carefully excluding the supervis
ion of either over the other, and thereby directly rebutting the object of search
or visitation.

The other article, in reference to the same subject, stipulates that the parties
will unite in all becoming representation and remonstrance with any powers
within whose dominions markets are permitted for imported African slaves. If
he were to permit his feelings to govern him exclusively, he would object to
this more strongly than any other provision in the treaty : not that he was oppo
sed to the object or the policy of closing the market to imported negroes ; on the
contrary, he thought it both right and expedient in every view. Brazil and the
Spanish colonies were the only markets, he believed, still remaining open, and
to which this provision would apply. They were already abundantly supplied
with slaves, and he had no doubt that sound policy on their part required that
their markets should be finally and effectually closed. He would go farther,
and say that it was our interest they should be. It would free us from the ne
cessity of keeping cruisers on the African coast to prevent the illegal and fraud
ulent use of our flag, or for any other purpose but to protect our commerce in
that quarter — a thing of itself much to be desired. We would have a still strong
er interest if we were governed by selfish considerations. We are rivals in the
production of several articles, and more especially the greatest of all the agri
cultural staples — cotton. Next to our own country, Brazil possesses the great
est, advantages for its production, and is already a large grower of the article ;
towards the production of which the continuance of the market for imported
slaves from Africa would contribute much. But he would not permit such con
siderations to influence him in voting on the treaty. He had no objection to see
Brazil develop her resources to the full ; but he did believe that higher con
siderations, connected with her safety, and that of the Spanish colonies, made
it their interest that their market should be closed against the traffic.

But it may be asked, Why, with these impressions, should he have any ob
jection to this provision of the treaty ? It was because he was averse to inter
fering with other powers when it could be avoided. It extends even to cases
like the present, where there was a common interest in reference to the sub
ject of advice or remonstrance ; but it would be carrying his aversion to fastid
iousness, were he to permit it to overrule his vote in the adjustment of questions
of such magnitude as are involved on the present occasion.

But the treaty is opposed, not only for what it contains, but also for what it
does not ; and, among other objections of the kind, because it has no provision
in reference to the case of the Creole, and other similar ones. He admitted
that it is an objection ; and that it was very desirable that the treaty should have
guarded, by specific and efficient provisions, against the recurrence of such out
rages on the rights of our citizens, and indignity to our honour and independ
ence. If any one has a right to speak warmly on this subject, he was the in
dividual ; but he could not forget that the question for us to decide is, Shall we
ratify or reject the treaty ? it is not whether all has been done which it was
desirable should be done, but whether we shall confirm or reject what has ac-

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 541

tually been done ; not whether we have gained all we could desire, but whether
we shall retain what we have gained. To decide that as it ought to be, it is
our duty to weigh, calmly and fairly, the reasons for and against the ratification,
and to decide in favour of the side which preponderates.

It does not follow that nothing has been done in relation to the cases under
consideration because the treaty contains no provisions in reference to them.
The fact is otherwise. Much, very much, has been done ; in his opinion, lit
tle short, in its efiect, of a positive stipulation by the treaty to guard against the
recurrence of such cases hereafter. To understand how much has been done,
and what has been gained by us, it is necessary to have a correct conception
of the state of the case in reference to them before the negotiation commenced,
and since it terminated.

These cases are not of recent origin. The first of the kind was that of the
brig Comet, which was stranded on the false keys of the Bahamas, as far back
as 1830, with slaves on board. She was taken into Nassau, New-Providence,
by the wreckers, and the slaves liberated by the colonial authorities. The next
was the Encomium, which occurred in 1834, and which, in all the material cir
cumstances, was every way similar to that of the Comet. The case of the En
terprise followed. It took place in 1835, and differed in no material circum
stance from the others, as was acknowledged by the British government, except
that it occurred after the act of Parliament abolishing slavery in the colonies
had gone into operation, and the others prior to that period.

After a long correspondence of nearly ten years, the British government
agreed to pay for the slaves on board of the first two, on the ground that they
were liberated before the act abolishing slavery had gone into operation ; but
refused to pay for those belonging to the Enterprise, because they were libera
ted after it had. To justify this distinction, Lord Palmerston had to assume
the ground, virtually, that the law of nations was opposed to slavery — an as
sumption that placed the property of a third of the Union without the pale of
its protection. On that ground, he peremptorily refused compensation for the
slaves on board the Enterprise. Our executive, under this refusal, accepted
the compensation for those on board the Comet and Encomium, and closed the
correspondence, without even bringing the subject before Congress. With
such perfect indifference was the whole affair treated, that, during the long pe
riod the negotiation was pending, the subject was never once mentioned, as far
as he recollected, in any executive message ; while those of far less magnitude
— the debt of a few millions due from France, and this very boundary question
— were constantly brought before Congress, and had nearly involved the coun
try in war with two of the leading powers of Europe. Those who are now so
shocked that the boundary question should be settled, without a settlement also
of this, stood by in silence, year after year, during this long period, not only
without attempting to unite the settlement of this with that of the boundary, but
without ever once naming or alluding to it as an item in the list of the dispute
between the two powers. It was regarded as beneath notice. He rejoiced to
witness the great change that has taken place in relation to it, and to find
that, those who were then silent and indifferent now exhibit so much zeal and
vehemence about it. He took credit to himself for having contributed to bring
this change about. It was he who revived our claim when it lay dead and
buried among the archives of the state department — who called for the corre
spondence — who moved resolutions affirming the principles of the law of na
tions in reference to these cases, and repelling the presumptuous and insulting
assumption on which it was denied by the British negotiator. Such was the
force of truth, and so solid the foundation on which he rested our claim, that
his resolutions received the unanimous vote of this body ; but he received no
support — no, not a cheering word — from the quarter which now professes so
much zeal on the subject. His utmost hope, at the time, was to keep alive our

542 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

right till some propitious moment should arrive to assert it successfully. In
the mean lime, the case of the Creole occurred, which, as shockino- and out
rageous as it is, was but the legitimate consequence of the principle maintained
by Lord Palmerston, and on which he closed the correspondence in the case
of the Enterprise.

Such was the state of the facts when the negotiations commenced in refer
ence to these cases ; and it remains now to be shown in what state it has left
them. In the first place, the broad principles of the law of nations, on which
he placed our right in his resolutions, have been clearly stated and conclusively
vindicated in the very able letter of the Secretary of State, which has strength
ened our cause not a little, as well from its intrinsic merit as the quarter from
which it comes. In the next place, we have an explicit recognition of the
principles for which we contend, in the answer of Lord Ashburton, who ex
pressly says that, "on the great general principles affecting this case" (the
Creole), "they do not differ;" and that is followed by " an engagement that in
structions shall be given to the governors of her majesty's colonies on the
southern borders of the United States to execute their own laws with careful
attention to the wishes of their government to maintain good neighbourhood ;
and that there shall be no officious interference with American vessels driven
by accident or violence into their ports. The laws and duties of hospitality
shall be executed." This pledge was accepted by our executive, accompanied
by the express declaration of the President, through the Secretary of State,
that he places his reliance on those principles of public law which had been
stated in the note of the Secretary of State. To all this it may be added, that
strong assurances are given by the British negotiator of his belief that a final
arrangement may be made of the subject by positive stipulations in London.
Such is the state in which the negotiation has left the subject.

Here, again, he would repeat, that such stipulations in the treaty itself would
have been preferable. But who can deny, when he compares the state of the
facts as they stood before and since the close of this negotiation, that we have
gained — largely gained — in reference to this important subject ? Is there
no difference, he would ask, between a stern and peremptory denial of our right
on the broad and insulting ground assumed by Lord Palmerston, and its ex
plicit recognition by Lord Ashburton ? none in the pledge that instructions
should be given to guard against the recurrence of such cases, and a positive
denial that we had suffered wrong or insult, or had any right to complain ?
none between a final closing of all negotiation, and a strong assurance of a
final adjustment of the subject by satisfactory arrangement by treaty? And
would it be wise or prudent, on our part, to reject what has been gained, be
cause all has not been ? As to himself, he must say that, at the time he moved
his resolutions, he little hoped, in the short space of two years, to obtain what
has already been- gained ; and that he regarded the prospect of a final and satis
factory adjustment, at no distant day, of this subject, so vital in its principles to
his constituents and the whole South, as far more probable than he then did
this explicit recognition of the principles for which he contended. In the
mean time, he felt assured the engagement given by the British negotiator
would be fulfilled in good faith ; and that the hazard of collision between the
countries, and the disturbance of their peace and friendship, has passed away,
as far as it depends on this dangerous subject. But if in this he should, unfor
tunately, be mistaken, we should stand on much more solid ground in defence
of our rights, in consequence of what has been gained ; as there would then
be superadded broken faith to the violation of the laws of nations.

Having now said what he intenJsd on the more important points, he would
pass over without dwelling on the provision of the treaty for delivering up to
justice persons charged with certain crimes ; the affair of the Caroline ; and
the correspondence in reference to impressment. The first is substantially

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 543

the same as that contained in Jay's treaty on the same subject. On the next,
he had nothing to add to what has already been said by others. As to the last,
he did not doubt that the strong ground taken in the correspondence against the
impressment of seamen on board of our merchant vessels, in time of war,
would have a good effect. It will contribute to convince Great Britain that the
practice cannot be renewed, in the event of another European war, without a
certain and immediate conflict between the two countries.

I (said Mr. Calhoun) have now stated my opinion fully and impartially on
the treaty, with the connected subjects. On reviewing the whole, and weigh
ing the reasons for and against its ratification, I cannot doubt that the former
greatly preponderate. If we have not gained all that could be desired, we
have gained much that is desirable ; and, if all has not been settled, much has
been, and that not of little importance. It is not of little importance to have
the Northeastern boundary settled, and that, too, with the consent of the states
immediately interested ; a subject which has been in dispute almost from the
origin of the government, and which had become more and more entangled, and
adverse to our claim, on every attempt heretofore made to settle it. Nor is it
of little importance to have the whole line of boundary between us and the
British dominions, from the source of the St. Croix to the Rocky Mountains,
settled — a line of more than three thousand miles, with many disputed points
of long standing, the settlement of which had baffled all previous attempts.
Nor is it of little importance to have adjusted the embarrassments relating to
the African slave-trade, by adopting the least objectionable of the alternatives.
Nor to have the principles of the law of nations for which we contended, in
reference to the Creole and other cases of the kind, recognised by Great Brit
ain ; nor to have a solemn pledge against their recurrence, with a reasonable
assurance of satisfactory stipulations by treaty. Nor is it of little importance
to have, by the settlement of these inveterate and difficult questions, the relation
of the two countries settled down in amity and peace — permanent amity and
peace, as it may be hoped — in the place of that doubtful, unsettled condition,
between peace and war, which has for so many years characterized it, and
which is so hostile to the interests and prosperity of both countries.

Peace (said Mr. C.) is the first of our wants, in the present condition of our
country. We wanted peace, to reform our own government, and to relieve the
country from its great embarrassments. Our government is deeply disordered ;
its credit is impaired; its debt increasing; its expenditures extravagant and
wasteful; its disbursements without efficient accountability; and its taxes (for
duties are but taxes)* enormous, unequal, and oppressive to the great producing
classes of the country. Peace, settled and undisturbed, is indispensable to a
thorough reform, and such a reform to the duration of the government. But, so
long as the relation between the two countries continues in a state of doubt be
tween peace and war, all attempts at such reform will prove abortive. The
first step in any such, to be successful, must be to reduce the expenditures to
the legitimate and economical wants of the government. Without that, there
can be nothing worthy of the name ; but in an unsettled state of the relations
of the two countries, all attempts at reduction will be baffled by the cry of war,
accompanied by insinuations against the patriotism of those who may be so
hardy as to make them. Should the treaty be ratified, an end will be put to
that, and no excuse or pretext be left to delay the great and indispensable work
of reform. This may not be desirable to those who see, or fancy they see,
benefits in high duties and wasteful expenditures ; but, by the great producing
and tax-paying portions of the community, it will be regarded as one of the
greatest of blessings. These are not the only reasons for wanting peace. We
want it, to enable the people and the states to extricate themselves from their
embarrassments. They are both borne down by heavy debts, contracted in a
period of fallacious prosperity, from which there is no other honest and hon-

544 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOTJN.

curable extrication but the payment of what is due. To enable both states and
individuals to pay their debts, they must be left in full possession of all their
means, with as little exactions or restrictions on their industry as possible on
the part of this government. To this, a settled state of peace, and an open
and free commerce, are indispensable. With these, and the increasing habits
of economy and industry now everywhere pervading the country, the period
of embarrassment will soon pass away, to be succeeded by one of permanent
and healthy prosperity.

Peace is, indeed, our policy. A kind Providence has cast our lot on a por
tion of the globe sufficiently vast to satisfy the most grasping ambition, and
abounding in resources beyond all others, which only require to be fully de
veloped to make us the greatest and most prosperous people on earth. To the
full development of the vast resources of our country we have political institu
tions most happily constituted. Indeed, it would be difficult to imagine a sys
tem more so than our Federal Republic — a system of State and General Gov
ernments, so blended as to constitute one sublime whole ; the latter having
charge of the interests common to all, and the former those local and peculiar
to each state. With a system so happily constituted, let a durable and firm
peace be established, and this government be confined rigidly to the few great
objects for which it was instituted ; leaving the states to contend in generous
rivalry to develop, by the arts of peace, their respective resources ; and a
scene of prosperity and happiness would follow heretofore unequalled on the
globe. I trust (said Mr. C.) that this treaty may prove the first step towards
such a peace. Once established with Great Britain, it would not be difficult,
with moderation and prudence, to establish permanent peace with the rest of ~
the world, when our most sanguine hopes of prosperity may be realized.

XXXVIII.

SPEECH ON THE OREGON BILL, JANUARY 24, 1843.

MR. CALHOUN said it ought to be borne in mind, in the discussion of
this measure, that there is a conflict between our claim and that of Great
Britain to the Oregon territory; and that it extends to the whale terri
tory from the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific Ocean, afid from the north
ern limits of Mexico, in latitude 42°, to the southern J/'mits of the Rus
sian possessions, in latitude 54°. Nor ought it to be forgotten that the two
governments have made frequent attempts to adjust their conflicting
claims, but, as yet, without success. The first of these was made in
1818. It proved abortive ; but a convention was entered into which pro
vided that the territory should be left free and open to our citizens and
the subjects of Great Britain for ten years ; the object of which was to
prevent collision and preserve peace till their respective claims could be
adjusted by negotiation. The next was made in 1824, when we offered
to limit our claim to the territory by the 49th degree of latitude, which
would have left to Great Britain all north of that latitude to the southern
boundary of Russia. Her negotiator objected, and proposed the Colum
bia River as the boundary between the possessions of the two countries.
It enters the ocean about the 46th degree of latitude. It follows that the
portion of the territory really in dispute between the two countries is
about three degrees of latitude — that is, about one fourth of the whole.
The attempt to adjust boundaries again failed, and nothing was effected.
I learn from our negotiator (a distinguished citizen of Pennsylvania, now

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 545

in this city), that the negotiation was conducted with much earnestness,
and riot a little feeling, on the part of the British negotiators.

In 1827, just before the termination of the ten years, another attempt
was made at an adjustment. The negotiation was conducted on our part
by Mr. Gallatin. The whole subject was discussed fully, and with great
ability and clearness on both sides, but, like the two preceding, failed to
adjust the conflicting claims. The same offers were made respectively
by the parties that were made in 1824, and again rejected. All that could
be done was to renew the convention of 1818, but with the provision that
each party might, at its pleasure, terminate the agreement by giving a
year's notice. The object of the renewal was, as in 1818, to preserve
peace for the time, by preventing either party from asserting its exclusive
claim to the territory ; and that of the insertion of the provision to give
either party the right of doing so whenever it might think proper, by giv
ing the stipulated notice.

Nor ought it to be forgotten that, during the long interval from 1818
to this time, continued efforts have been made in this and the other house
to induce Congress to assert, by some act, our exclusive right to the ter
ritory, and that they have all heretofore failed. It now remains to be seen
whether this bill, which covers the whole territory, as well north as south
of the 49th, and provides for granting land, and commencing systemati
cally the work of colonization and settlement, shall share the fate of its
predecessors.

To determine whether it ought or ought not involves the decision of
two preliminary questions. The first is, whether the time is now arrived
when it would be expedient, on our part, to attempt to assert and maintain
our exclusive claim to the territory, against the adverse claim of Great
Britain ; and the other, if it has, whether the mode proposed in this bill
is the proper one.

In discussing them, I do not intend to consider the question of our right
to the territory, nor its value, nor whether Great Britain is actuated by
that keen1,1 jealous, and hostile spirit towards us which has been attributed
to her in this discussion. I shall, on the contrary, assume our title to be
as valid as the warmest advocate of this bill asserts it to be ; the terri
tory to be, as to soil, climate, production, and commercial advantages, all
that the ardent imagination of the author of the measure paints it to be ;
and Great Britain to be as formidable and jealous as she has been repre
sented. I make no issue on either of these points. I controvert none of
them. According to my view of the subject, it is not necessary. On the
contrary, the clearer the title, the more valuable the territory ; and the
more powerful and hostile the British government, the stronger will be
the ground on which I rest my opposition to the bill.

With these preliminary remarks, I repeat the question, Has the time ar
rived when it would be wise and prudent for us to attempt to assert and
maintain our exclusive right to the territory against the adverse and con
flicting claim of Great Britain 1 I answer, No, it has not ; and that for
the decisive reason, because the attempt, if made, must prove unsuccess
ful against the resistance of Great Britain. We could neither take nor
hold it against her ; and that for a reason not less decisive — that she
could in a much shorter time, and at far less expense, concentrate a far
greater force than we could in the territory.

We seem to forget, in the discussion of this subject, the great events
which have occurred in the eastern portion of Asia during the last year,
and which have so greatly extended the power of Great Britain in that
quarter of the globe. She has there, in that period, terminated success
fully two wars 5 by one of which she has given increased quiet and sta-

Z z z

546 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

bility to her possessions in India ; and, by the other, has firmly planted her
power on the eastern coast of China, where she will undoubtedly keep up,
at least for a time, a strong military and naval force, for the purpose of
intimidation and strengthening her newly-acquired possession. The point
she occupies there, on the western shore of the Pacific, is almost directly
opposite to the Oregon Territory, at the distance of about five thousand
five hundred miles from the mouth of Columbia River, with a tranquil
ocean between, which may be passed over in six weeks. In that short
time she might place, at a moderate expense, a strong naval and military
force at the mouth of that river, where a formidable body of men, as hardy
and energetic as any on this continent, in the service of the Hudson Bay
Company, and numerous tribes of Indians under its control, could be pre
pared to sustain and co-operate with it. Such is the facility with which
she could concentrate a force there to maintain her claim to the territory
against ours, should they be brought into collision by this bill.

I now turn to examine our means of concentrating an opposing force
by land and water, should it become necessary to maintain our claim.
We have no military or naval position in the Pacific Ocean. Our fleet
would have to sail from our own shores, and would have to cross the line
arid double Cape Horn in 56 degrees of south latitude, and, turning north,
recross the line and ascend to latitude 46 north, in order to reach the
mouth of Columbia River — a distance from NeW-York (over the straight-
est and shortest line) of more than 13,000 miles, and which would require
a run of more than 18,000 of actual sailing on the usual route. Instead
of six weeks, the voyage would require six months. I speak on the au
thority of one of the most experienced officers attached to the navy de
partment.

These facts are decisive. We could do nothing by water. As far as that
element is concerned, we could not oppose to her a gun or a soldier in the
territory.

But, as great as are the impediments by water, they are, at present, not
much less so by land. If we assume some central point in the State of Mis
souri as the place of rendezvous from which our military force would
commence its march for the territory, the distance to the mouth of the
Columbia River will be found to be about two thousand miles, of which
much more than a thousand miles would be over an unsettled country, con
sisting of naked plains or mountainous regions, without provisions, ex
cept such game as the rifle might supply. On a greater portion of this
long march the force would be liable to be attacked and harassed by nu
merous and warlike tribes of Indians, whose hostilities might be readily
turned against us by the British traders. To march such a distance with
out opposition would take upward of 120 days, assuming the march to
be at the usual rate for military forces. Should it be impeded by the
hostilities of Indians, the time would be greatly prolonged.

I now ask, How could any considerable force sustain itself in so long a
march, through a region so destitute of supplies! A small detachment
might live on game, but that resource would be altogether inadequate to
the support of an army. But, admitting an army could find sufficient
supplies to sustain itself on its march to the territory, how could it sus
tain itself in an uncultivated territory, too remote to draw supplies from
our settlements in its rear, and with the ocean in front closed against it
by a hostile fleet ! And how could supplies be found to return if a re
treat should become necessary! In whatever view the subject maybe
regarded, I hazard nothing in asserting that, such is the difficulty at present
on our part of concentrating and maintaining a force in the territory, that
a few thousand regulars, advantageously fortified on the Columbia River,

SPEECHES OP JOHN C. CALHOUN. 547

with a small naval force to support them, could, with the aid of the em
ployees of the Hudson Bay Company, and the co-operation of the Indians
under its influence, bid defiance to any effort we could make to dislodge
them. If all other difficulties could be surmounted, that of transporting
a sufficient battering-train, with all of its appurtenances, to so great a dis
tance, and over so many obstacles, would be insuperable.

Having now made good my first position, that the attempt, at present,
to assert and maintain our exclusive claim to the territory against the
adverse claim of Great Britain, must prove unsuccessful if she resisted,
it now remains to inquire whether she would resist. And here let me
say, whatever might be ihe doubts of others, surely they who have in this
discussion insisted so strongly on her power, her jealousy, and her deter
mination to hold the territory, cannot doubt that she would resist. If,
indeed, provoking language can excite her to resistance, or if half which
has been said of her hostile disposition be true, she not only would resist,
but would gladly seize so favourable an occasion to do so, while we are
comparatively so weak and she so strong in that quarter. However un
favourable the time might be for us, for her it would be the most propiti
ous. Her vast resources and military power in the East are liberated,
and at her disposal, to be directed to assert and maintain her exclusive
claim to the territory against ours, if she should determine to follow our
example in case this bill should pass. Even I, who believe that the pres
ent ministry is disposed to peace ; that the recent mission to this coun
try originated in the spirit of peace ; and that Sir Robert Peel has exhib
ited great wisdom and moderation — moderation in the midst of splendid
success, and therefore more to be trusted — do not doubt she would re
sist, if we should adopt this measure. We must not forget, as clear as
we believe our title to be, that the right to the territory is in dispute be
tween the two countries, and that, as certain as we regard our right to
be, she regards hers as not less so. It is a case of adverse conflicting
claims, and we may be assured, if we undertake to assert our exclusive
right, she will oppose us by asserting hers ; and if the appeal should be to
force, to decide between us at present, the result would be inevitable —
the territory would be lost to us. Indeed, this is so incontestable that no
one has ventured to deny it, and there is no hazard in asserting that no
one will who understands the subject, and does not choose to have the
soundness of his judgment questioned.

But it may be asked, What then] Shall we abandon our claim to the
territory 1 I answer, No. I am utterly opposed to that ; but, as bad as
that would be, it would not be as much so as to adopt a rash and precip
itate measure, which, after great sacrifices, would finally end in its loss.
But I am opposed to both. My object is to preserve, and not to lose the
territory. I do not agree with my eloquent and able colleague that it is
worthless. He has underrated it both as to soil and climate. It contains
a vast deal of land, it is true, that is barren and worthless, but not a little
that is highly productive. To that may be added its commercial advan
tages, which will, in time, prove to be great. We must not overlook the
important events to which I have alluded as having recently occurred in
the eastern portion of Asia. As great as they are, they are but the begin
ning of a series of a smilar character which must follow at no distant day.
What has taken place in China will, in a few years, be followed in Japan
and all the eastern portions of that continent. Their ports, like the Chi
nese, will be opened, and the whole of that large portion of Asia, contain
ing nearly half of the population and wealth of the globe, will be thrown
open to the commerce of the world, and be placed within the pale of Eu
ropean and American intercourse and civilization. A vast market will be

548 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

created, and a mighty impulse will be given to commerce. No small
portion of the share that would fall to us with this populous and indus
trious portion of the globe is destined to pass through the ports of the
Oregon Territory to the valley of the Mississippi, instead of takiiig the
circuitous and long voyage round Cape Horn, or the still longer round
the Cape of Good Hope. It is mainly because I place this high estimate
on its prospective value that I am so solicitous to preserve it, and so ad
verse to this bill, or any other precipitate measure which might terminate
in its loss. If I thought less of its value, or if I regarded our title less
clear, my opposition would be less decided.

Having now, I trust, satisfactorily shown that, if we should now attempt
to assert and maintain our exclusive right to the territory against the ad
verse claim of Great Britain, she would resist ; and that, if shere sisted,
our attempt would be unsuccessful, and the territory be lost, the question
presents itself, How shall we preserve it 1

There is only one means by which it can be preserved, but that, fortu
nately, is the most powerful of all — time. Time is acting for us ; and if
we shall have the wisdom to trust its operation, it will assert and main
tain our right with resistless force, without costing a cent of money or a
drop of blood. There is often, in the affairs of government, more effi
ciency and wisdom in non-action than in action. All we want to effect
our object in this case is "a wise and masterly inactivity." Our popula
tion is rolling towards the shores of the Pacific with an impetus greater
than what we realize. It is one of those forward movements which leaves
anticipation behind. In the period of thirty-two years which have elapsed
since I took my seat in the other house, the Indian frontier has receded a
thousand miles to the West. At that time our population was much less
than half what it is now. I,t was then increasing at the rate of about a
quarter of a million annually ; it is now not less than six hundred thou
sand, and still increasing at the rate of something more than three per
cent, compound annually. At that rate, it will soon reach the yearly in
crease of a million. If to this be added that the region west of Arkansas
and the State of Missouri, and south of the Missouri River, is occupied
by half-civilized tribes, who have their lands secured to them by treaty
(and which will prevent the spread of population in that direction), and
that this great and increasing tide will we forced to take the comparative
ly narrow channel to the north of that river and south of our northern
boundary, some conception may be formed of the strength with which the
current will run in that direction, and how soon it will reach the eastern
gorges of the Rocky Mountains. I say some conception, for I feel as
sured that the reality will outrun the anticipation. In illustration, I will
repeat what I stated when I first addressed the Senate on this subject. As
wise and experienced as was President Monroe — as much as he had wit
nessed of the growth of our country in his time, so inadequate was his
conception of its rapidity, that near the close of his administration, in the
year 1824-, he proposed to colonize the Indians of New-York, and those
north of the Ohio River and east of the Mississippi, in what is now called
the Wisconsin Territory, under the impression that it was a portion of
our territory so remote that they would not be disturbed by our increas
ing population for a long time to come. It is now but eighteen years
since ; and already, in that short period, it is a great and flourishing ter
ritory, ready to knock at our door for admission as one of the sovereign
members of the Union. But what is still more striking— what is really
wonderful and almost miraculous is, that another territory (Iowa), still
farther west (beyond the Mississippi), has spru'ng up, as if by magic, and
has already outstripped Wisconsin, and may knock for entrance before

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 549

she is prepared to do so. Such is the wonderful growth of a popula
tion which has attained the number ours has, and is still yearly increas
ing at the compound rate it is, and such the impetus with which it is
forcing its way, resistlessly, westward. It will soon — far sooner than an
ticipated — reach the Rocky Mountains, and be ready to pour into the Ore
gon Territory, when it will come into our possession without resistance
or struggle ; or, if there should be resistance, it would be feeble and inef
fectual. We should then be as much stronger there, comparatively, than
Great Britain, as she is now stronger than we are ; and it would then be as
idle in her to attempt to assert and maintain her exclusive claim to the
territory against us, as it would now be in us to attempt it against her. Let
us be wise and abide our time, and it will accomplish all that we desire
with more certainty, and with infinitely less sacrifice than we can with
out it.

But if the time had already arrived for the successful assertion of our
right against any resistance which might be made, it would not, in my
opinion, be expedient in the present condition of the government. It is
weak — never more so ; weak politically, and from the state of the finances.
The former was so ably and eloquently described by my colleague, that I
have nothing to add but a single remark on the extraordinary state of
parties at present. There are now three parties in the Union ; of which
one is in possession of the executive department, another of the legisla
tive, and the other, judging by the recent elections, of the country, which
has so locked and impeded the operations of the government, that it is
scarcely able to take measures necessary to its preservation.

In turning from this imbecile political condition of the government, and
casting my eyes on the state of its finances, I behold nothing but disorder
and embarrassment ; credit prostrated ; a new debt contracted, already
of considerable amount, and daily increasing; expenditures exceeding in
come ; and the prospect, instead of brightening, growing still more
gloomy. Already the debt falls not much short of thirty millions of dol
lars, to which will be added, from present appearances, by the end of the
year (if the appropriations are not greatly curtailed and the revenue im
proved), not less, probably, than ten millions, when the interest would be
upward of two millions of dollars annually — a sum more than equal to the
nett revenue from the public lands. The only remaining revenue is derived
from the foreign commerce of the country, and on that such heavy duties
are imposed that it is sinking under the burden. The imports of the last
quarter, it is estimated, will be less than nine millions of dollars — a fall
ing off of about two thirds, compared with what it ought to be, according
to the estimate made at the last session by those who imposed the burden.
But as great as it is, the falling off will, I understand, be still greater, from
present indications, during the present quarter; and yet, in the face of
all this, we are appropriating money as profusely, and projecting schemes
of expenditure as thoughtlessly, as if the treasury were full to overflowing.
So great is the indifference, that even the prostrated condition of the
treasury attracts no attention. It is scarcely mentioned or alluded to.
No one seems to care anything about it. Not an inquiry is made how
the means of supplying the acknowledged deficit to meet the current de
mands on the treasury, or to cover the extraordinary expenditures which
will be incurred by this measure, should it be adopted, are to be raised. I
would ask its advocates, Do you propose to borrow the funds necessary
for its execution 1 Our credit is already greatly impaired, and our debt
rapidly increasing; and are you willing still farther to impair the one and
add to the increase of the other] Do you propose to raise them by in
creasing the duties ] Can you hope to derive additional revenue from

550 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

such increase, when the duties are already so high as not omy to paralyze
the commerce, agriculture, and industry of the country, but to diminish,
to an alarming extent, the revenue from the imports'? Are you prepared
to lay a duty on tea and coffee, and other free articles 1 If so, speak out,
and tell your constituents plainly that such is your intention; that money
must be had j and that no other source of revenue is left which can be
relied on but a tax on them. It must come to that ; and, before we incur
the expense, it is but fair that our constituents should know the conse
quence.

But we are told the expense will be small — not exceeding one or two
hundred thousand dollars. Let us not be deceived. What this bill ap
propriates is but the entering-wedge. Let it pass, and no one can tell
what it will cost. It will depend on circumstances. Under the most
favourable, on the supposition that there will be no resistance on the part
of Great Britain, it would amount to millions ; but if she should resist,
and we should make it a question of force, I hazard nothing in saying it
would subject the country to heavier expenditures, and expose it to
greater danger, than any measure which has ever received the sanction
of Congress.

Many and great are the acts of folly which we have committed in the
management of our finances in the last fourteen or fifteen years. We
doubled our revenue when our expenditures were on the eve of being re
duced one half by the discharge of the public debt. We reversed that
act of folly, arid doubled our expenditures when the revenue was in the
course of reduction under the Compromise Act. When the joint effects
of the operation of the two had exhausted the treasury, and left the gov
ernment without adequate means to meet current demands, by an aptitude
in folly unexampled, we selected that as the fit moment to divest the
government of the revenue from the public domain, and to place the en
tire burden of supporting it on the commerce of the country. And then,
as if to consummate the whole, we passed an act at the close of the last
session which bids fair to cripple effectually this our only remaining
source of revenue. And now what are we doing] Profiting by the dis
astrous consequences of past mismanagement! Quite the reverse: com
mitting, if possible, greater and more dangerous acts of folly than ever.
When the government and the country are lying prostrate by this long
series of errors and mismanagement ; when the public credit is deeply
impaired ; when the people and the states are overwhelmed by debt, and
need all their resources to extricate themselves from their embarrass
ments, that is the moment we select to bring forward a measure which,
on the most favourable supposition, if adopted, cannot fail to subject the
government to very heavy expenditures, even should events take the most
favourable turn ; and may — no, that is not strong enough — would, prob
ably, subject it to greater than it ever has heretofore been. Where would
the government find resources to meet them 1 Not in its credit, for that
would be extinct. Not in the impost, for that is already overburdened.
Not in internal taxes, the indebted condition of the states forbids that.
More than half the states of the Union are in debt j many deeply, and
several even beyond their means of payment. They require every cent
of the surplus means of their citizens, which can be reached by taxes, to
meet their own debts. Under such a state of things, this government
could not impose internal taxes-, to any considerable amount, without
bankrupting the indebted states or crushing their citizens. What would
follow should the government be compelled, in consequence of this meas
ure, to resort to such taxes, I shall not undertake to trace. Suffice it to
gay, that all preceding disasters, as great as they are, which followed the
preceding acts of folly, would be as nothing compared to the overwhelm

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 551

ing calamities which would follow this. Our system might sink under
the shock.

If, senators, you would hearken to the voice of one who has some ex
perience, and no other desire but to see the country free and prosperous, I
would say, Direct your eyes to the finances. There, at present, the danger
lies. Restore, without delay, the equilibrium between revenue and expen
ditures, the want of which has done so much to destroy our credit and de
range the whole fabric of the government. If that should not be done, the
government and country will be involved, ere long, in overwhelming diffi
culties. Cherish the revenue from the lands and the imports. They are our
legitimate sources of revenue. When the period arrives — come when it
may — that this government will be compelled to resort to internal taxes
for its support in time of peace, it will mark one of the most difficult and
dangerous stages through which it is destined to pass. If it should be a
period like the present — when the states are deeply in debt, and need all
their internal resources to meet their own engagements — it may prove
fatal ; and yet it would seem as if systematic efforts are, and have been
making for some time, to bring it about at this critical and dangefous pe
riod. To this all our financial measures tend — the giving away the pub
lic lands ; the crushing of the customs by high protective, and, in many
instances, prohibitory duties j the adoption of hazardous and expensive
measures of policy, like the present ; and the creation of a public debt,
without an effort to reduce the expenditures. How it is all to end time
only can disclose.

But if our finances were in ever so flourishing a state ; if the political
condition of the country were as strong as it could be made by an admin
istration standing at the head of a powerful dominant party ; and if our
population had reached the point where we could successfully assert and
maintain our claim against the adverse claim of Great Britain, there
would still remain a decisive objection to this bill. The mode in which
it proposes to do it is indefensible. If we are displeased with the exist
ing arrangement, which leaves the territory free and open to the citizens
and subjects of the two countries; if we are of opinion it operates prac
tically to our disadvantage, or that the time has arrived when we ought
to assert and carry into effect our claim of exclusive sovereignty over the
territory, the treaty provides expressly for the case. It authorizes either
party, by giving a year's notice, to terminate its existence whenever it
pleases, and without giving reasons. Why has not this bill conformed
to this express and plain provision 1 Why should it undertake to assert
our exclusive ownership to the whole territory, in direct violation of the
treaty 1. Why should it, with what we all believe to be a good title on
our part, involve the country in a controversy about the violation of the
treaty, in which a large portion (if not a majority) of the body believe
that we would be in the wrong, when the treaty itself might so easily, and
in so short a time, be terminated by our own act, and the charge of its
violation be avoided! Can any satisfactory reason be given to these
questions 1 I ask the author of the measure, and its warm advocates, for
an answer. None has been given yet, and none, I venture to assert, will
be attempted. I can imagine but one answer that can be given — that
there are those who will vote for the bill that would not vote to give no
tice, under the delusive hope that we may assert our exclusive ownership,
and take possession, without violating the treaty or endangering the peace
of the country. Their aim is, to have all the benefit of the treaty, without
being subject to its restrictions ; an aim in direct conflict with the only
object of the treaty — to prevent conflict between the two countries, by-
keeping the question of ownership or sovereignty in abeyance till the
question of boundary can be settled. That such is the object appears

552 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

to be admitted by all except the senator from New-Hampshire (Mr. Wood-
bury), whose argument, I must say, with all deference for him, was on
that point very unsatisfactory. The other advocates of the bill, accord
ingly, admit that a grant of lands to emigrants settling in the territory, to
take effect immediately, would be a violation of the treaty ; but contend
that a promise to grant hereafter would not be. The distinction is, no
•doubt, satisfactory to those who make it; but how can they rationally ex
pect it will be satisfactory to the British government, when so large a
portion of the Senate believe that there is no distinction between a grant
and a promise to grant lands, as it relates to the treaty, and hold one to be
as much a violation of it as the other 1 We may be assured that the British
government will look to the intention of the bill, and, in doing so, will see
that its object is to assert our exclusive claim of sovereignty over the en
tire territory against their adverse claim, and will shape their course ac
cordingly. Our nice distinction between actual grants and the promise
to grant will not be noticed. They will see in it the subversion of the
objeci for which the treaty was formed, and take their measures to coun
teract it. The result will be that, instead of gaining the advantage aimed
at, we shall not only lose the advantages of the treaty, but be involved in
the serious charge of having violated its provisions.

I am not, however, of opinion that Great Britain would declare war
against us. If I mistake not, she is under the direction, at this time, of
those who are too sagacious and prudent to take that course. She would
probably consider the treaty at an end, and take possession adverse to us,
if not of the whole territory, at least to the Columbia River. She would,
at the same time, take care to command that river by a strong fortifica
tion, manned by a respectable garrison, and leave it to us to decide
whether we shall acquiesce, or negotiate, or attempt to dislodge her.
To acquiesce, under such circumstances, would be a virtual surrender of
the territory; to negotiate with adverse and forcible possession against
us would be almost as hopeless ; and to dislodge her at present would,
as has been shown, be impracticable.

Such, in my opinion, would be the probable result, should this bill be
passed. It would place us, in every respect, in a situation far less eligible
than at present. The occupation of British subjects in the territory, as
things now stand, is by permission, under positive treaty stipulation, and
cannot ripen into a title, as it was supposed it would by the senator from
Illinois (Mr. M'Roberts).

But if their occupancy was adverse (as it would be should this measure
be adopted), and Great Britain should resist, then his argument would be
sound, and have great force. In that case, the necessity of taking some
decisive step on our part to secure our rights would be imperious. De
lay would then, indeed, be dangerous. Bat as it is, no length of time
can confer a title against us; and it is that, considering what advantage
Great Britain has over us at present, either to take or hold possession,
which ought to give to the treaty great value in our estimation. It is a
wise maxim to let well enough alone. We can do little at present to bet
ter our condition. Even the occupation and improvement by British sub
jects, against which so much has been said, will in the end, if we act
wisely, be no disadvantage. Neither can give any claim against us, when
the time comes to assert our rights, if we abide faithfully by the treaty.
They are but preparing the country for our reception ; and should their
improvements and cultivation be extended, it would only enable us to take
possession with more ease if it should ever become necessary to assert
our claims by force, which I do not think probable, if we shall have the
wisdom to avoid hasty and precipitate action, and leave the question to
the certain operation of time.

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 553

I

Jji conclusion, I might appeal to the authority of all preceding admin
istrations, from 1818 to the present time, in support of the views I have
taken. On what other supposition can it be explained that the adminis
tration of Mr. Monroe should assent to the treaty of that year, which left
the territory open and free to the citizens and subjects of the two coun
tries for the period of ten years 1 Or that Mr. Adams should revive it,
with the provision that either might terminate it by giving one year's no
tice 1 Or, still more emphatically, how can it be explained that, with this
right of terminating the treaty, the administration of General Jackson,
and that of his successor, should, for the period of twelve years, acquiesce
in it, but on the conviction that it was the best arrangement which could
be made, and that any change or movement on our part would but render
our situation worse, instead of better, in relation to the territory 1 It can
not be said that the present is a more favourable period to assert our ex
clusive right than during either of the preceding administrations. The re
verse is the fact. It is, in every view, far less favourable than either,
and especially than that of General Jackson, when the treasury was over
flowing, and the head of the administration possessed greater influence
and power than any other chief magistrate that ever presided over the
country. That, if ever, was the time to assert our exclusive ownership;
particularly as those who are so earnestly pressing it on the government
were then in power, and would have been responsible for its execution.
How is it to be explained that they were then so passive and are now so
urgent for the passage of this bill!

Entertaining these views, I hope that the motion of the senator from
Virginia (Mr. Archer) will prevail, and the bill be referred to the Com
mittee on Foreign Relations. The subject is one of great importance
and delicacy, and ought to be carefully examined by the appropriate or
gan of the body. Should it be referred, I trust the committee will report
amendments to strike out all the provisions of the bill which, by any
reasonable interpretation, might be regarded to be in conflict with the
stipulations of the treaty between the two countries, or which might in
cur any considerable expense in the present exhausted condition of the
treasury. As at present advised, I am not indisposed to the provision, if
properly guarded, which proposes to extend our jurisdiction over our
citizens in the territory. It ought not, however, to be carried farther
than the provisions of the act of Parliament of 1821. I am opposed to
holding out temptation to our citizens to emigrate to a region where we
cannot at present protect them ; but if there be any who may choose to
emigrate, I would be far from opposing them, and am unwilling that they
should lose, by emigration, personally the benefit of our jurisdiction and
laws.

I have now said what I intended in reference to this bill, and shall con
clude by noticing some remarks which fell from the senator from Mis
souri (Mr. Linn) who introduced it. When he first addressed the Senate,
in reply to my former remarks, he spoke a good deal about opposition
and injustice to the West, and referred to some of the acts of the govern
ment at an early date, which he supposed partook of that character. I
do not suppose that he intended it, but his remarks were calculated to
make the impression (taken in connexion with the time and subject) that
he regarded the opposition to the passage of this bill as originating in
unfriendly feelings to the West. But if he so regards it, and if he intended
to apply his remarks tome, I would appeal to my acts to repel the unjust
imputation.

[Here Mr. Linn disclaimed any intention of attributing to Mr. Calhoun
hostile or unkind feelings to the West.]

4 A

554 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN.

Mr. Calhoun : I am happy to hear the disclaimer of the senator. I felt
assured he could not have intended to do me so much injustice as to at
tribute to me the slightest hostility to the West. No one knows better
than he does that my opposition to the bill originates in public consid
erations, free from all local feelings, and that my general views of policy
have ever been friendly, and even liberal, towards the West; but as there
are others not so familiar with my course in reference to that great and
growing section, I deem it proper to avail myself of the opportunity briefly
to allude to it, in order to repel any improper imputation which may be
attempted to be attributed to me, from any quarter, on account of my
course on the present occasion.

I go back to the time when I was at the head of the war department.
At that early period I turned my attention particularly to the interest of
the West. I saw that it required increased security to its long line of
frontier, and greater facility for carrying on intercourse with the Indian
tribes in that quarter, and to enable it to develop its resources, especially
that of its fur-trade. To give the required security, I ordered a much larger
portion of the army to that frontier ; and to afford facility and protection
for carrying on the fur-trade, the military posts were moved much higher
up the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers. Under the increased security
and facility which these measures afforded, the fur-trade received a great
impulse. It extended across the continent, in a short time, to the Pacific,
and north and south to the British and the Mexican frontiers ; yielding
in a few years, as stated by the senator from Missouri (Mr. Linn), half a
million of dollars annually. But I stopped not there. I saw that indi
vidual enterprise on our part, however great, could not successfully com
pete with the powerful incorporated Canadian and Hudson Bay Compa
nies, and that additional measures were necessary to secure, permanently,
our fur-trade. For that purpose, 1 proposed to establish a post still higher
up the Missouri, at the mouth of the Yellow Stone River, and to give
such unity and efficiency to our intercourse and trade with the Indian
tribes, between our western frontier and the Pacific Ocean, as would en
able our citizens engaged in the fur-trade to compete successfully with
the British traders. Had the measures proposed been adopted, we would
not have to listen to the complaint, so frequently uttered in this discus
sion, of the loss of that trade.

But that is not all. I might appeal to a measure more recent, and still
more strongly illustrative of the liberal feelings which have ever influ
enced me whenever the interest of the West was concerned. I refer to
the bill relating to the portion of public domain lying within the new
states, which 1 introduced some time since. It is true, indeed, that I
looked to the interest of the whole Union in introducing that measure,
but it is not the less so that it would, if it should become a law, more
especially benefit the West. In doing that, I exposed myself, in my own
section, to the imputation of seeking the friendship of the West— as I do,
on this occasion, to that of hostility towards that great and growing sec
tion. As the hazard of the former could not deter me from doing my
duty then, so that of the latter cannot from doing my duty now. The
same sense of duty which on that occasion impelled me to support a
measure in which the West was peculiarly interested, at the hazard of
incurring the displeasure of my own section, because I believed it calcu
lated to promote the interest of the whole, impels me on this occasion to
oppose this measure, at the hazard of displeasing the West, because I be
lieve, in so doing, I not only promote the interest of the Union generally,
but that of the West especially.

THE END.

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